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We supplement the main article in four primary ways. In S1, we expand on why we think the approach we've argued for is a better way of testing for theory of mind from both a theoretical and methodological perspective. We then apply our framework and criteria to a number of existing cases of behavior that may (or may not) provide evidence for theory of mind. In S2, we consider how the framework we've outlined provides a principled way for deciding when a pattern of behavior does not provide evidence for a capacity for theory of mind. Next, in x3, we consider two examples of ways that existing theory of mind research falls short. Specifically,
in S3.1 we reconsider infant studies involving misleading appearances (e.g., Song and Baillargeon, 2008), and in S3.2 we take up interference effects (e.g., Kovacs et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010). In both cases, we argue that these paradigms do not provide clear evidence for theory of mind despite seeming to involve false beliefs. Finally, in S4, we consider two examples of places where we may have missed good evidence for theory of mind because it didn't involve false beliefs. In S4.1 we consider the evidence from helping paradigms with infants (e.g., Liszkowski et al., 2008), and in S4.2 we consider evidence from monkey theory of mind experiments (e.g., Santos et al., 2006). In both cases, we detail how our framework provides straightforward ways of augmenting these paradigms to ensure that they provide clear evidence for factive theory of mind.