As it is shown in the Figure A, overall the results revealed that the decision to violate followed the continuum predicted by EMNA: legitimate laws (deal drugs, damage property), prescriptions (donate blood, buy non-environmental products), coercive laws (consume alcohol in public places, illegally download music), and customs (greet by yelling, answer mobile phone in a public place). Furthermore, as expected, the higher the incentive (i.e., because it involved either a high benefit or a low cost) the higher the decision to violate. This was the case in both the Argentinean and the Spanish sample. Regarding the decision to “violate” the prescriptions and customs, it was not significantly correlated with age or social desirability, and the MANOVA did not reveal a significant influence of gender. Argentineans showed a lower decision to “violate” the prescription of donating blood and the custom of yelling when greeting in the street. Summing up, the pattern of results was virtually identical to that described in the manuscript and, moreover, robustly consistent with the premises derived from EMNA. However, we decided not to include this description for two reasons. First, from a theoretical view, we paid more attention to the decision of illegal violation, so “we focused on the appeals perceived as laws because the concept of violation involving a law is clearer”, and consequently manipulating the perceived benefit and cost is less problematic. Indeed, we focused on the hypothesis that “the decision to violate an appeal perceived as a legitimate law will always be less than in the case of an appeal perceived as a coercive law, even if the violation of the legitimate law implied a high benefit and the violation of the coercive law implied a high cost”. **Figure A.** Means of the Decision to Violate the Normative appeals in the conditions of high-incentive and low-incentive toward violation (Study 3) ![Figure A][1] [1]: https://osf.io/qfpra/?mode=render&action=download&accept_url=false