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**Principal Investigator(s):** **Scott Clifford** University of Houston Email: [scliffor@central.uh.edu][1] Home page: [https://scottaclifford.com/][2] **Elizabeth Simas** University of Houston Email: [ensimas@uh.edu][3] Home page: [https://www.elizabethsimas.com/][4] **Sample size**: 769 **Field period**: 01/03/2020-06/26/2020 **Abstract** Partisan polarization has reached historical highs, while politicians’ credibility has reached historical lows. For example, recent polls suggest that as few as 8% of Americans think that politicians believe most of the stances that they take on issues. This extreme level of cynicism threatens to break a fundamental link in representation. If candidates cannot credibly convey their positions, then voters cannot evaluate them on policy. Yet, we know little about the strategies politicians might take to convey the credibility of their claims. In this paper, we investigate whether politicians can signal credibility by taking extreme positions or by justifying their stances in moral terms. Across three experiments, we show that moral justifications tend to enhance credibility, while extreme positions do not. In a fourth study, we show that while extreme stances increase polarization in candidate ratings, moral justifications do not. Taken together, our findings suggest that moral justifications are a useful strategy to enhance credibility without contributing to rising levels of polarization. **Hypotheses** - H1: Candidates taking extreme issue positions will be perceived as more sincere. - H2: Issue stances justified with moral language will be perceived as more sincere. **Experimental Manipulations** A within-subjects vignette experiment. Respondents will be asked to evaluate three hypothetical politicians, each taking a stance on a particular issue. Within each candidate profile, the stance will be randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2x2 design. The stance will be either extreme or moderate and moral or pragmatic. **Outcomes** An index of the following questions: - Do you think this candidate truly believes in {stance}, or is just saying what some people want to hear? - In your opinion, how committed do you think this candidate is to {stance}? - In your opinion, how likely is it that this candidate will be a leader on {stance}? - In your opinion, how likely do you think it is that this candidate will flip-flop on {stance} in the future? **Summary of Results** As expected, the moral justification is perceived as significantly more credible than the pragmatic justification (b = .02, p = .002). The extreme position, on the other hand, is seen as slightly, but not significantly less credible than the more moderate position (b = -.007, p = .295). Thus, consistent with Study 1, moral justifications increase credibility, but extreme positions do not. Additionally, we find no evidence of an interaction between the treatments. **References** Paper presented at the the 2019 Texas American Politics Symposium (TAPS). [1]: mailto:scliffor@central.uh.edu [2]: https://scottaclifford.com/ [3]: mailto:ensimas@uh.edu [4]: https://www.elizabethsimas.com/
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