<b>STUDY 1a</b> (April - May 2014)<br> SAMPLE SIZE & SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS <br> We expect to collect data from 200 participants. The sample will consist of participants from University of Würzubrg subject pool (mostly students). The study will be given as a part of a bundle of several unrelated studies. The subjects will be paid for their participation. <br><br> MATERIALS - OVERVIEW <br> Materials will be presented and answers will be collected using a custom written Python program. The materials for the study can be found in Files section of the Materials node. The exact wording of all used materials can be also found in Materials node. <br><br> DESIGN <br> Participants will be presented with four moral dilemmas in a fixed order. Each dilemma has four possible versions (Self/Other X Obligation/Wrongness). At the begining of the experiment, it is randomly decided which dilemma will be presented in which version, so every participant will experience each from four possible versions exactly once. Participants will answer "yes" or "no" to each dilemma. <br><br> <b>STUDY 1b</b> (June 2014)<br> SAMPLE SIZE & SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS <br> We will collect data from 350 participants. The sample will consist of participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. The subjects will be paid for their participation. <br><br> MATERIALS - OVERVIEW <br> Materials will be presented and answers will be collected using a custom written web application. Screenshots showing the application are in Files. The exact wording of all used materials can be found in Materials node. <br><br> *Minor changes from Study 1a*: While one of the questions in Study 1a asked whether the sacrifice is “morally wrong” (moralisch falsch) in Study 1b we asked only whether it is “wrong” because we felt that English “wrong” is more clearly associated with moral judgment than German “falsch” (see O’Hara et al. [2010], who find only negligible effects of adding “morally” to adjectives on moral judgment and only for dilemmas concerning disgust, which was not our case). We also added an instruction to “suspend disbelief” in introduction that was adapted from Greene et al. (2009). <br> DESIGN <br> Participants will be presented with four moral dilemmas in a fixed order (reversed from the Study 1a). Each dilemma has four possible versions (Self/Other X Obligation/Wrongness). At the begining of the experiment, it is randomly decided which dilemma will be presented in which version, so every participant will experience each from four possible versions exactly once. Participants will answer "yes" or "no" to each dilemma. <br><br> <b>STUDY 2</b> (May 2017)<br> SAMPLE SIZE & SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS <br> The study will be administered as a part of a voluntary questionnaire given before administration of the General academic prerequisites (GAP) test used for university admissions in the Czech Republic. Based on the number of the GAP test takers in previous years, we expect to collect approximately 2000 participants, the majority of them aged between 18 and 21 years, and slighlty more than half of them will be female. <br><br> MATERIALS - OVERVIEW <br> Only the "submarine" dilemma from the previous studies is used in Study 2. Materials will be presented and answers will be collected using a pen & paper questionnaire. Administration of the questionnaire as well as scanning of the answers will be conducted by the company offering the GAP test. The exact wording of all used materials can be found in Materials node. <br><br> DESIGN <br> Each participant will be randomly presented with one of four possible versions of a moral dilemma: (Self / Other X 1st person / 3rd person). After reading the dilemma, each participant express how much he or she agrees or disagrees with one of four possible statements: whether the described action is right / wrong or whether it should / should not be done on a six-point Likert scale ranging from completely agree to completely disagree. <br><br> **References** Greene, J. D., Cushman, F. A., Stewart, L. E., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E. & Cohen, J. D. (2009). Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment. Cognition, 111(3), 364–371. O’Hara, R. E., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. & Sinnott-Armstrong, N. A. (2010). Wording effects in moral judgments. Judgment & Decision Making, 5, 547–554.