In this work, we introduce the disclosure-outcomes management model, which seeks to explain intelligence interviewees’ mental representation and disclosure of information. The model views disclosure as a form of instrumental helping behavior that interviewees implement to maximize their self-interests. We theorize that interviewees cooperate by managing their disclosures in response to self-interest dilemmas. That is, interviewees compare the potential outcomes of disclosing to their self-interests and estimate the extent to which the behavior will facilitate or impede those self-interests. That is to say, an interviewee’s self-interest dilemma elicits cooperation with respect to some information but not other information. We discuss how this model fits with and advances the paradigm of intelligence interviewing research.
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