**Experiments** Participants completed the following experiments at both time periods. Sunk costs. People are more willing to invest additional resources in something when they have incurred costs that cannot be recovered (Knox & Inkster, 1968). Replicating Oppenheimer and colleagues (2009), participants were asked to “Imagine that your favorite football team is playing an important game. You have a ticket to the game that you [have paid handsomely for] [have received for free from a friend]. However, on the day of the game, it happens to be freezing cold. What do you do?” Participants rated their likelihood of attending the game on a 9-point scale (1 = definitely stay at home, 9 = definitely go to the game). Gain versus loss framing for combating disease. People are more willing to accept risk to avoid potential losses than they are willing to take risks rather than capture certain gains. Replicating Tversky and Kahneman (1981), participants were asked to imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an disease and select from two courses of action: Program A, under which 200 people will be saved[400 people will die] or Program B, under which there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved [no people will die] and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved [600 people will die]. Anchoring and Adjustment. The presentation of a number prior to making a quantitative judgment can influence the subsequent judgment. In a partial replication of Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995), participants were presented with four scenarios in which they estimated size or distance after first receiving an anchor that was clearly too large or too small. In this study, we asked participants to make four quantitative estimates (the length of the Mississippi River, the population of Chicago, the height of Mount Everest, and how many babies are born per day in the United States) after being told that the target is greater than or less than a specified value. Retrospective Gambler’s Fallacy. The retrospective gambler’s fallacy is the perception that an event that seems rare must come from a longer sequence than an event that is less rare (Oppenheimer & Monin, 2009). Replicating Oppenheimer and Monin, participants were asked to imagine seeing a man rolling dice. The man rolls 3 sixes, [2 sixes and a three]. Participants then estimated how many times the man had rolled the dice before they had entered the room to watch him. Low-vs.-high category scales. People use response scales provided by researchers to inform estimates, assuming that the middle of a scale reflects the middle of the distribution of the population overall. Consequently, high frequency scales lead people to report engaging in an activity more often than low frequency scales. Replicating Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch & Strack (1985) participants were asked to estimate how much TV they watch daily on either a low-frequency Likert-type scale (Up to ½ hour a day, 1/2 hour to 1 hour a day, 1 to 1 ½ hours a day, 2 to 2 ½ hours a day, More than 2 ½ hours a day) or a high-frequency scale (Up to 2 ½ hours (2.5 hours) a day, 2 ½ hours to 3 hours a day, 3 to 3 ½ hours a day, 4 to 4 ½ hours a day, More than 4 ½ hours a day). Norm of Reciprocity. People tend to preferentially treat ingroups, but are also motivated to treat groups consistently. As a result, people are more willing to allow reporters from an enemy country to report news from their home country after first indicating whether reporters from their home country should be allowed to report back from an enemy country. Conceptually replicating Hyman and Sheatsley (1950), participants were asked in a randomly assigned order whether i.) North Korea should allow American reporters in and allow them to report the news back to American papers and ii.) whether America should allow North Korean reporters into the United States and allow them to report back to their papers. Participants responded by indicating “Yes” or “No”. Allowed/Forbidden. Word choice can influence responses to logically identical questions. Replicating an early demonstration of this effect (Rugg, 1941), participants were asked to indicate whether (1) The United States should allow speeches against democracy, or (2) The United States should forbid speeches against democracy. Participants responded by indicating “Yes” or “No”. Quote Attribution. The source of information influences how people perceive it. In an early illustration of this effect, Lorge and Curtis (1936) demonstrated that people agree more with a quote when it is attributed to a liked person (Thomas Jefferson) than a disliked person (Vladmir Lenin). In a conceptual replication, participants were asked to indicate their agreement to a quote (“I have sworn to only live free, even if I find bitter the taste of death”) attributed to either George Washington or Osama Bin Laden and indicate the extent to which they agree with the quote (1 = Strongly Agree, 9 = Strongly Disagree). Flag Priming. Priming effects occur when a presented stimulus unconsciously influences later responses. The American flag is a powerful symbol in American culture, and Carter et al. (2011) demonstrated that brief exposure to an American flag led to a conservative shift in U.S. participants. In a conceptual replication of this experiment, participants were exposed to a flag prime by rating the time of day on otherwise identical images that did or did not contain the US flag. Following this participants indicated their opinions on a number of policy issues correlated with political ideology. Currency priming. Money is thought to be a powerful symbol that may impact behavior without awareness, including increasing support for the free market system and the current social order. Closely replicating Caruso, Vohs, Baxter and Waytz (2012), participants were exposed to either a picture of $100 bills or an abstract control image before being asked to indicate their support for the current social system (“system justification; Kay & Jost, 2003). Imagined Contact. Contact theory proposes that interacting with members of different racial and ethnic groups can reduce prejudice towards those groups when the interaction is positive (Allport, 1954). This effect has been shown even when participants merely imagine contact with outgroup members (Turner et al., 2007). Replicating Husnu and Crisp (2010), participants were asked to either imagine meeting a Muslim stranger for the first time or, in the control condition, walking in the outdoors. Participants were given one minute to imagine the scene, and an additional minute to describe it. Participants then responded to four measures indicating their willingness to interact with Muslims.