Status and Reputation Nudging

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We conduct a natural field experiment with 808 insurance brokers to test the effects of compliments including status or reputation nudges on reciprocal behavior. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking them to share their expertise on specialist issues. Compared to a neutral request, we find that reputation nudges significantly increase brokers’ response rates and ultimately their willingness to follow through with an initial positive response. We find suggestive evidence for status nudges having a similar impact. These findings hold for several specifications, such as different geographical areas, and for brokers employed with large companies.

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