Changes in Religiosity during Adolescence among European Children of Immigrants: Towards or Away from the Mainstream

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Abstract

Immigration theorists argue that religion in Europe is a source of social cleavage, a “bright boundary” separating Muslim immigrants from non-Muslims (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). This dynamic can lead to salient religious identities and subsequent heightened religiosity. I use latent growth analysis to model changes in religiosity in early adolescence using the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey of Four European Countries. Even as they secularize, I find that Christian children of immigrants assign more importance to religion compared to natives, a difference that does not decrease over time. Muslim children of immigrants are not only more attached to religion but participate more in religious communities over time, diverging from other second-generation immigrants. However, Muslim religiosity does not impede engagement with the mainstream, but may instead foster the development of a Muslim European pan-ethnic identity.

Keywords

immigration; ethnicity; religion; pan-ethnicity; second generation; longitudinal methods

Wordcount: 6,974

Introduction

The constant flow of immigrants to Europe since World War II has led to a rise in religious diversity and religiosity, in stark contrast with the secularization trend among native-born Europeans (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014; Norris and Inglehart 2011). Though first-generation migrants face many challenges as they incorporate into European countries, the changing social fabric has an even greater impact on their children, who spend all or most of their childhood in Europe. Children of immigrants grow up between two worlds, rapidly incorporating culturally while trying to uphold their families' values and traditions. This process is especially apparent in adolescence. Between twelve and nineteen years old, children of immigrants start to form their own identities, influenced by interactions with their peers, the media, and the greater political context (Crosnoe and Johnson 2011; Dornbusch 1989). As they start to realize they are treated differently by the majority (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993, 69), religion might be one way for children of immigrants to connect to their families' traditions (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). Muslim children of immigrants might develop an even stronger religiosity than other groups, as they experience a "bright" boundary centred on religion, exemplified by experiences of segregation and discrimination (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999).

In Europe, research on immigrant religiosity focuses primarily on Muslims and describes the strength of Muslims' religiosity as a barrier to cultural and social integration. The few comparative studies find that Muslim children of immigrants have a higher religiosity than their peers, both in the survey country (de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Jacob and Kalter 2013; van Tubergen 2007) and in their origin-country (Güngör et al. 2013). Research on children of immigrants' religiosity over time is sparse and inconclusive, many studies using age or generations as a proxy for changes over

time (Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Jacob and Kalter 2013; Platt 2014; Verkuyten, Thijs, and Stevens 2012). In the only true comparative longitudinal analysis, Simsek, Fleischmann, and van Tubergen (2018) find that Muslims in Europe do not secularize over time, unlike other adolescents. They explain this trend using the concept of a “reactive” identity as defined by the segmented assimilation literature: an oppositional and disengaged identity developed due to perceived discrimination (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Waters 1999).

However, no study investigates how religiosity develops overtime alongside national identities. Previous analyses of religiosity and national identities show that the religiosity of Muslims is negatively correlated with ties to the host-country and contacts with the majority group, (Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Platt 2014), which might represent an oppositional stance towards the mainstream¹. However, few of these studies focus on the processes of identity formation in adolescence across groups, and therefore cannot compare the co-evolution of religiosity and national identities between Muslim and non-Muslim children of immigrants. Moreover, some empirical work in Europe does not find robust relationships between religiosity, perceived discrimination, and ethnic revitalization (Fleischmann and Phalet 2011; Platt 2014; Diehl and Schnell 2006). Therefore, I argue that this strong Muslim religiosity is instead the sign of a developing Muslim pan-ethnic identity: a re-interpretation of an imposed categorization to connect across cultures and engage with the mainstream.

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¹ By “mainstream,” I refer to the set of cultures and institutions that are understood by native Europeans to be part of their country (Alba and Nee 2003).

This paper follows children of immigrants over time, as they develop religious identities between fourteen and seventeen years old. I explore both subjective importance of religion and religious behaviours and compare the trajectories of Muslim and Christian children of immigrants to the trajectories of native Christians in Germany, England, Sweden, and the Netherlands, with parents and grandparents born in the same country. Using longitudinal data between ninth and eleventh grade (tenth and thirteenth in the UK), I model both overall religiosity and changes during adolescence. I expect children of immigrants to be overall more religious than European natives, net of intergenerational transmission of religiosity, due to their own experience with the processes of incorporation. Over time, I test if children of immigrants become more similar to native Europeans. I also expect Muslim children of immigrants to develop a stronger religiosity in adolescence due to their experiences with bright boundaries. Finally, I examine if this growing religiosity in adolescence supersedes ties to the origin country and develops alongside engagement with the host country, thus having the potential to represent a pan-ethnic Muslim European identity.

Theoretical background

In adolescence, children's social identities are more and more influenced by peers and institutions (Biddle, Bank, and Marlin 1980; Ozorak 2016). This process might be expressed very differently for religious European natives and children of immigrants. For European natives, interacting more with peers and institutions often leads to a slow decrease in religiosity over time (Simsek, Fleischmann, and van Tubergen 2018). In contrast, children of immigrants frequently experience dissonance or "a growing awareness that not all cultural values of the dominant group are beneficial to [them]," and start exploring their ethnic culture and identity in adolescence as a basis for a positive sense of self (Erikson 1968; Feliciano 2009; Phinney 1993, 69). This process is

also likely to happen for religious identities, which are both tied to national origins and often used in Europe as a basis for discrimination (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Woon 1999). Religiosity among children of immigrants, which both express one's religious identity and, in turn, increase a sense of group identity membership (Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Platt 2014), might therefore be the sign of a salient religious identity developed in response to experiences of discrimination (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010).

Religiosity and immigration

Children of immigrants, similarly to their parents, connect religion to their origins and use it for support and integration. Studies of religion and immigration in the US find that religion often becomes more important during process of incorporation in a new country. Through religious practice, immigrants and children of immigrants can meet co-nationals and uphold traditions from their home country (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004; Warner 1993). Moreover, in times of hardship, stress, and alienation brought by the processes of migration and incorporation, religion often gives immigrants a sense of meaning and belonging (Ebaugh 2001). Religious organizations also provide material and social resources, linking immigrants and their children to larger national institutions in the host-country (Mooney 2009; Hirschman 2004). While many of these studies are based in the US, the hardships encountered by European migrants are similar and should also lead to more reliance on religiosity during their own search for identity and community (Mooney 2009).

Migrant parents are often more intent in transmitting their religious and national culture to their child compared to parents who did not migrate. However, religion can also play a new role for children of immigrants. The subjective meaning of religion is different for second-generation immigrants, having spent all or most of their lives in the

host-country. Religious communities help diverse groups of children of immigrants in constructing new positive social identities (Cadge and Ecklund 2007). For example, religion can function as a symbolic identity for children of immigrants (Gans 1979), provide a sense of group belonging all the while being culturally incorporated into the host country. Due to the search for ties with their family's origins alongside the need for an identity in a new context, I expect that children of immigrants will give more importance to religion and engage in religious behaviour more frequently compared to natives, even accounting for their parents' religiosity. Among children of immigrants, Muslims will have the highest frequency of prayer due to differences in religious traditions and requirements. However, differences between children of immigrants in their levels of subjective importance of religion or attendance at religious services cannot be explained only by religious traditions, but instead by variations in the social context of reception.

Religiosity under bright social boundaries

According to classic and new assimilation theories, children of immigrants and native Europeans become more similar to each other over years and generations (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964). Though that process, children of immigrants often lose their cultural particularities. There is evidence in Europe and in the US that in an accepting social context, children of immigrants' religiosity become more similar to natives over time (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Cesari 2003; Güngör, Fleischmann, and Phalet 2011; Hirschman 2004). Therefore, because of secularization trends in Europe, I expect most children of immigrants to have a strong decrease in religiosity over time. This will be accompanied by fewer ties to their country of origin and an increase in the strength of their host country identity. However, in the context of salient categorizations, some children of immigrants might become more religious.

New assimilation and social boundary theories suggest that Muslim children of immigrants might become more religious because they develop a salient politicized religious identity out of interactions with institutions and natives categorizing them as “other” (Alba 2005; Massey and Sánchez 2010). Through day to day interactions, bright boundaries increase perceived differences between groups and therefore shape both natives' beliefs about children of immigrants and children of immigrants' group identities (Brown 2000; Martinovic and Verkuyten 2012; Peek 2005; Wimmer 2013; Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani 1976). The presence of a bright boundary around any given minority status characteristic – e.g., race, citizenship, religion – will increase the salience of that characteristic (Foner and Alba 2008). Zolberg and Woon (1999), and Alba (2005), argue that in Europe bright social boundaries are centred around religion – separating Muslims from non-Muslims – instead of race or ethnicity. Culturally imposed categorizations, negative attitudes, discrimination, and segregation will render Islam more salient to Muslim children of immigrants themselves. I hypothesize that because of a bright religious boundary in Europe, Muslims will have overall higher levels of importance given to religion, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events than other groups. Over time, I expect Muslim children of immigrants to experience an increase in religiosity.

Reactive vs. pan-ethnic religiosity

According to segmented assimilation theory, a strong religiosity developed out of social exclusion could reflect a reaction against the mainstream (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Under experiences of segregation, discrimination, and lack of opportunity, children of immigrants sometimes incorporate into existing minority groups and cultures experiencing similar exclusion from mainstream institutions. Thus, a reactive ethnic identity develops, as a product of confrontation and rise of defensive

identity (Portes and Zhou 1993; Thomson and Crul 2007; Voas and Fleischmann 2012; Zhou 1997). In these conditions, children of immigrants disengage with the host-country's culture and institutions. If Muslims' religiosity is indeed reactive, we would expect an increase in religiosity to be accompanied by a decrease in ties with the host country.

However, I propose that instead of being reactive, Muslims' religious identity may be pan-ethnic: a collective identity which reinterprets existent categorizations and reaches across national origins to mobilize politically. Research on pan-ethnicity in the US finds that when children of immigrants experience similar segregation and discrimination from natives, they develop ties across ethnic backgrounds within organizations to mobilize (Espiritu 1993; Okamoto and Mora 2014; Kibria 1998; Vasquez and Wetzel 2009). The differentiation between reactive and pan-ethnic identities is not clear in the literature, as both identities develop under similar conditions (Kibria 1998). Espiritu (1993) explains that a reactive pan-ethnic solidarity develops under threat and sometimes leads to more mobilization. This is not in line with segmented assimilation theorists who posit reactive identities as distinct from ethnic solidarity and definitely not a source of political engagement (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). I argue therefore that the concept of *reactive solidarity* in the pan-ethnic literature and the concept of *reactive identity* in the incorporation literature can represent alternative, competing hypotheses about religious identity formation among Muslim children of immigrants. Specifically, pan-ethnic identities reflect an engagement with mainstream culture and the potential for political mobilization while reactive identities reflect a disengagement with the mainstream and the development of politically disenfranchised subcultures. Moreover, pan-ethnic identities are uniquely associated with a decrease in ties with national origins, while reactive identities can be

mono-ethnic in nature. If Muslims' religiosity is indeed pan-ethnic, we would expect an increase in religiosity to be accompanied by an increase in ties with the host-country and a decrease in ties with the country of origin.

Data and method

Data source and case selection

I examine changes in religiosity and national identities among adolescents using panel data. I follow children of immigrants and native Europeans between ninth and eleventh grade in Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, and England. These four countries are ideal cases to analyse social boundaries and identity formation in Western Europe: they are among the largest immigrant-receiving countries in Europe and all share a common Christian history. I use data between 2010 and 2013 from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) funded by the Norface Era Net Plus Migration in Europe program (Kalter et al. 2016). In 2010, the research team selected schools with a probability proportional to their size and over-sampled schools with a higher proportion of children of immigrants; then, they interviewed all students in randomly selected classes in grades where most children were fourteen years old.). Throughout the paper, I use standardized the weights so that the weighted sample sizes are identical in each country. This method enables each country to contribute equally to the estimates (Kalter et al. 2016). The results without weights show more precise significant differences between Muslim children of immigrants, Christians, and natives: at the worst, my models underestimate differences between groups. The grades selected were equivalent to ninth grade in Germany, eighth grade in Sweden, tenth grade in England, and third grade of secondary for the Netherlands (I will refer to it as ninth grade for simplicity). The initial survey covered 480 schools and 952 classrooms

comprising of 21,135 students, 18,716 of whom participated in the first wave, 15,217 in the second wave, and 10,902 in the third wave. A total of 11,892 parents were interviewed alongside their child in either the first or second wave.

I analyse the subjective importance of religion and religious practice of native Europeans and children of immigrants who report a religious affiliation. I define native Europeans as children who have both parents and grandparents born in the survey country. Of all native Europeans, 58.6 per cent report a religious affiliation in at least one of the waves. Religious affiliation is based on the most consistent response over time and is missing if the adolescent gave a different answer in all three waves. Almost all affiliated natives (95.1 per cent) identify as Christians; therefore, I exclude native adolescents who report an affiliation with a religion other than Christianity. Christian natives are almost equally split between Catholicism and Protestantism on the one hand, and just “Christian” or “other Christian” on the other. Among participating students with a parent interviewed, a total of 3,780 are Christian native Europeans.

Alongside native Europeans, I focus on children of immigrants who have spent enough time in the host-country to be familiar with its culture. I include children of immigrants who moved to the survey country at or before the age of six (1.5 generation) as well as children of immigrants who were born in the host-country with at least one parent born abroad (2nd and 2.5 generation). Children of mixed parents, especially those who identify with a minority religion, are not exempt from discrimination and categorizations by natives. Among children of immigrants, 12.5 per cent never report a religious affiliation, 34.6 per cent are Christian, 44.1 per cent are Muslim – with no possible differentiation between Shi'a, Sunni, or other traditions – and 7.3 per cent identify with another religion. None of the other religious groups are large enough to be

included in the analysis. Among participating students with a parent interviewed, 2,817 are children of immigrants identifying as either Christian or Muslim.

I restrict my sample to students who have at least two waves present for time variant measures (importance of religion, religious practice, and national identities) in order to have the correct baseline and growth estimates. I also remove adolescents with missing values on time invariant covariates. The final sample totals 5,475 adolescents, including 3,233 native Christians, 1,143 Christian children of immigrants, and 1,099 Muslim children of immigrants.

Measures

For my dependent variables, I include three classic measures of religiosity. First, I include a measure of *subjective importance* with the question “how important is religion to you” using a four-point Likert-type scale answer: very important (3), fairly important (2), not very important (1), and not at all important (0). Second, I measure *frequency of prayer*, which ranges from never praying (0) to praying five times a day or more (5). Finally, I include *attendance at religious events*: how often the respondent attends a religious meeting place or a religious class, from 0 (never) to 4 (every day). Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendix.

I control for *demographics* measured in ninth grade which have been found to affect religiosity and identity development of adolescents. I investigate if identity changes are different for boys and girls. Gender is measured in the first wave, during adolescents’ ninth grade, or in subsequent waves if missing at first. I control for age in ninth grade to take into account that some children might have already developed ethnic and religious identities before reaching ninth grade (I compare children to the median age for that grade). Children who are missing on information for their age are given, by country, the mode for birth year and median for month and interview date.

Information on *parental background* are measured using the survey of one parent in one of the first two waves, I include a measure of parental subjective religiosity (1=religion is important). In addition, I measure if the child lives in a one-parent or recomposed family, if neither parent has a university degree or is employed. These measures of household composition and socioeconomic status are imputed with answers from the child in case of missing values in the parent survey.

I compare changes in subjective importance of religion and religious practice to changes in the strength of *national identities* among children of immigrants only. I use a measure of origin-country/ethnic identity salience asking if the child feels that he or she belongs to another group than the host-country (chosen from a list of countries and ethnic groups) and “how strongly” does he or she feels to that group: very strongly (4), fairly strongly (3), not very strongly (2), not at all strongly (1), or no other group (0). To measure ties to the host-country, I use the question “how strongly do you feel like you belong to [survey country]” which is coded from not at all strongly (0) to (3) very strongly. In the appendix, the second part of the table presents the salience of both host-country identities and origin-country specific to children of immigrants.

Method

I use Latent Growth Curve Analysis (LGCA) to investigate how children of immigrants develop their religiosity and national identities between ninth and eleventh grade (Chen and Lin 2016; Needham 2008). This method models changes over time in the dependent variables with a latent line, or curve, and provides estimates for the baseline value in ninth grade and slope of growth between ninth and eleventh grade. The Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) for natives and children of immigrants for each measure of religiosity is between 0.750 and 0.786, which shows that there is enough variation within adolescents over time to justify a LGCA. The ICC for national identities among

children of immigrants are 0.480 and 0.627 which shows fewer changes over time, but still enough to justify a LGCA.

I compute the LGCA estimates for the latent baseline and growth over time of my dependent variables by running weighted multilevel mixed-effects models using maximum likelihood estimations and unstructured covariances. The intercept of the model represents the latent baseline for each dependent variable and the effect of grade on the outcome represents the latent growth over time (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). I choose a linear representation of changes over time as both categorical and quadratic modelling of growth lead to similar results in modelling changes in subjective importance of religion and frequency of prayer. I use mixed-effects models in order to have each grade nested in each individual and include a random coefficient for the effect of growth between ninth and eleventh grade. Using likelihood-ratio tests for each measure of religiosity and salience of national identities, I find that having a random intercept and coefficient for growth is better than the simple model using fixed effects. Time invariant covariates used to predict the baseline levels of the outcome provide a better fit than the unconditional model without covariates. I am interested in how the growth in religiosity or national identities varies between Christian natives, Christian children of immigrants, and Muslim children of immigrants; therefore, I include an interaction between those three groups and growth, which significantly improves model fit. Finally, I use unstructured covariance to estimate the variance at each grade and between each pair of grades without imposing any structure (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). Small sample sizes and nested models preclude separate estimates by country. Sensitivity analysis on a simple regression model for each grade shows no evidence of multicollinearity.

Results

Baseline religiosity

Christian children of immigrants give more importance to religion than natives, even accounting for parent's own religiosity. The baseline and growth estimates over three years for subjective importance of religion, frequency of prayer, and attendance at religious events are displayed in Table 1. For each outcome, I first present the unconditional model with only differences in the baseline and growth between Christian natives, Christian children of immigrants, and Muslim children of immigrants. In the conditional models, I add individual controls that might shape subjective importance of religion and religious behaviour, and, in the final models, I include controls for family background and the parent's religiosity. In the unconditional models, Christian children of immigrants believe religion to be more important compared to natives and have a higher frequency of prayer. However, the difference in frequency of prayer between Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants disappears once accounting for parental background. Christian children of immigrants have on average a higher frequency of attendance at religious events compared to natives, but the difference is not significant. The difference between natives and Christian children of immigrants in subjective importance given to religion remains even when we control for parent's own importance given to religion.

When comparing adolescents from similar families, Muslim children of immigrants not only have the strongest ties to religion, but also report the most frequent religious practice. The largest difference between Muslim children of immigrants and Christian natives is in subjective importance of religion: in the all models, Muslim children of immigrants tend to believe religion is between fairly and very important while Christian natives and children of immigrants believe it is between not very and

Table 1. Unconditional and conditional LGCA estimates of religiosity for adolescents who identify with a religion in four European countries ($n=5,475$).

	<u>Subjective importance</u>			<u>Frequency of prayer</u>			<u>Attendance at religious events</u>		
	uncond.	cond.	family	uncond.	cond.	family	uncond.	cond.	family
Fixed Effects									
Baseline	1.201***	1.155***	0.887***	1.299***	1.389***	1.027***	0.996***	1.082***	0.890***
(<i>ref=Christian natives</i>)	(31.452)	(20.921)	(16.912)	(13.727)	(16.217)	(12.271)	(19.688)	(20.291)	(13.251)
Christian immigrants	0.296***	0.291***	0.219***	0.310*	0.325**	0.210	0.118	0.116	0.046
	(4.538)	(4.555)	(3.653)	(2.500)	(2.768)	(1.895)	(1.348)	(1.337)	(0.544)
Muslim immigrants	1.256***	1.247***	1.028***	1.024***	1.033***	0.676***	0.507***	0.498***	0.270**
	(20.194)	(20.245)	(15.739)	(6.994)	(7.545)	(4.764)	(5.775)	(5.892)	(3.108)
Growth	-0.066***	-0.067***	-0.067***	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.088***	-0.037**	-0.038**	-0.038**
(<i>ref=Christian natives</i>)	(-4.887)	(-4.932)	(-4.933)	(-4.419)	(-4.454)	(-4.377)	(-3.053)	(-3.067)	(-3.067)
Christian immigrants	0.036	0.035	0.034	0.027	0.027	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.030
	(1.188)	(1.182)	(1.148)	(0.649)	(0.646)	(0.610)	(1.055)	(1.049)	(1.014)
Muslim immigrants	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.088	0.087	0.085	0.087**	0.086**	0.086**
	(1.619)	(1.615)	(1.587)	(1.583)	(1.569)	(1.532)	(2.799)	(2.783)	(2.744)
Controls									
Girl		0.131**	0.136***		0.123	0.126		0.032	0.032
		(2.989)	(3.434)		(1.447)	(1.838)		(0.740)	(0.898)
Age in ninth grade		-0.009	0.010		-0.171***	-0.134**		-0.086**	-0.057*
		(-0.305)	(0.337)		(-3.397)	(-3.025)		(-3.191)	(-2.333)
Country (<i>ref=Germany</i>)									
England		0.042	0.036		-0.205	-0.237*		-0.120	-0.152
		(0.553)	(0.554)		(-1.785)	(-2.295)		(-1.361)	(-1.847)
Netherlands		-0.001	-0.042		0.037	-0.039		-0.159	-0.218*
		(-0.006)	(-0.681)		(0.117)	(-0.156)		(-1.139)	(-2.097)
Sweden		-0.360***	-0.210***		-0.788***	-0.571***		-0.253***	-0.118**

			(-7.375)	(-4.987)		(-9.542)	(-9.021)		(-5.130)	(-2.704) <i>Continued</i>
Parental background										
Parent consider religion important				0.539*** (15.080)			0.838*** (13.663)			0.540*** (13.494)
Single or reconstructed family				-0.124** (-2.750)			-0.207** (-2.801)			-0.181*** (-4.369)
Neither parent with college degree				0.010 (0.190)			-0.063 (-0.731)			-0.083 (-1.370)
Neither parent employed				-0.005 (-0.057)			0.173 (1.107)			0.099 (1.047)
Random effects										
Baseline	0.498*** (19.101)	0.486*** (19.102)	0.407*** (15.774)	1.683*** (19.531)	1.632*** (21.229)	1.449*** (20.667)	0.628*** (16.511)	0.625*** (15.834)	0.534*** (15.420)	
Growth	0.041*** (5.895)	0.041*** (5.873)	0.041*** (5.881)	0.104*** (3.583)	0.105*** (3.586)	0.104*** (3.585)	0.034** (2.620)	0.034** (2.644)	0.034** (2.668)	
Covariance	-0.029*** (-3.819)	-0.029*** (-3.848)	-0.025** (-3.033)	-0.160*** (-4.548)	-0.160*** (-4.546)	-0.157*** (-4.599)	-0.053*** (-3.592)	-0.056*** (-3.812)	-0.050*** (-3.424)	
Errors	0.204*** (20.346)	0.204*** (20.314)	0.204*** (20.360)	0.549*** (17.008)	0.549*** (17.027)	0.550*** (17.040)	0.249*** (13.829)	0.248*** (13.810)	0.248*** (13.821)	

t statistics in parenthesis.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Estimates adjusted for design effects, survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU

fairly important. Muslims also tend to pray more than once a month while other groups pray less. Even though all groups tend to have more similar frequency of religious attendance, Muslims still attend religious services significantly more often compared to both Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants. Muslim children of immigrants give more importance to religion, pray more often and attend more religious services compared to natives in their even when accounting for their parent's religiosity and socioeconomic status.

There are expected differences by demographics, country of survey, and parental background. Adolescent girls give more importance to religion and age is associated with lower religious practice. While there are close to no differences between Germany, England, and the Netherlands, adolescents have a significantly lower subjective importance of religion and less frequent religious behaviour in Sweden. Adolescents from intact and religious families are more religious, but they are not affected by their family's socioeconomic status. As expected, having a parent who believes religion is important increases both subjective importance of religion and religious practice. On the other hand, not having both biological parents at home is associated with a decrease in subjective importance of religion, less prayers, and less frequent attendance at religious events. Parental education does not seem to affect the child's subjective importance of religion or religious practice, but this may be due to the fact that parent education is strongly tied to immigrant background and religiosity.

Growth between ninth and eleventh grade

Between ninth and eleventh grade, there is a steady decrease in subjective importance of religion and religious practice for Christian natives and Christian children of immigrants, though Christian children of immigrants do not become more similar to natives. Figure 1 models the latent growth curve using estimates of the unconditional models in Table 1. Each figure's vertical axis is scaled to the minimum and maximum score possible for each outcome, which provides more precise comparisons of differences across outcomes. The

baseline and growth values for each religious group are calculated by adding the baseline and growth estimates for natives with the difference between each group and natives. Christian natives consider religion less important and practice religion less between ninth and eleventh grade (Figure 1). Christian children of immigrants experience a decrease in religiosity similar to natives: their estimates for the changes in subjective importance of religion and religious behaviours are not significantly different from native Christians (Table 1). As both groups secularize, Christian children of immigrants continue to give significantly more importance to religion compared to natives throughout high school. In additional analysis, I include interactions with each covariate and the growth variable, these do not alter the key differences between religious groups.

Figure 1. Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in religiosity for adolescents who identify with a religion (based on estimates from Table 1 unconditional models, $n=5,475$).

Over time, Muslim children of immigrants have a slow decrease in importance given to religion, a constant frequency of prayer, and an increase in their frequency of attendance at religious events. The growth estimates for importance and frequency of prayer for Muslim

children of immigrants are not significantly different from Christian natives (Table 1). However, the estimate for the decrease in importance for religion is not as negative as other groups and the estimate for changes in prayer is close to zero among Muslims. The greatest difference between Muslims and natives is in changes in attendance at religious events over time. The growth estimate for religious attendance is significantly greater for Muslims compared to Christian natives. Over time, Muslim children of immigrants become more and more different from the two other groups in their religious behaviour (Figure 1).

National identities

There is no evidence that Muslim children of immigrants become more attached to their national origins over time. In Table 2, I estimate the baselines and slopes for changes in origin-country national identity salience and host-country national identity salience over time for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants, the visual representation of the latent curves is presented in Figure 2. In ninth grade, Muslims have higher origin-country national identity salience than Christians, and this difference holds even controlling for demographics and family variables. Both Muslim and Christian children of immigrants have stable ties to their national origins over time. However, Christian children of immigrants generally have a slight, though not significant, positive change in their ties to their national origins between ninth and eleventh grade while Muslim children of immigrants have a slight, though not significant, negative change (Figure 2).

Table 2. Unconditional and conditional LGCA estimates of national identity salience for children of immigrants who identify with a religion in four European countries ($n=2,242$).

	Origin-country identity salience			Host-country identity salience		
	uncond.	cond.	family	uncond.	cond.	family
Fixed Effects						
Baseline	1.242***	1.208***	0.974***	0.465***	0.439***	0.380***
(<i>ref=Christian immigrants</i>)	(8.541)	(8.499)	(7.262)	(11.889)	(11.476)	(10.575)
Muslim immigrants	0.875***	0.872***	0.548***	-0.522***	-0.515***	-0.355***
	(7.120)	(7.232)	(4.292)	(-7.862)	(-8.142)	(-5.013)
Growth	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.139***	0.139***	0.140***
(<i>ref=Christian immigrants</i>)	(0.338)	(0.347)	(0.367)	(5.551)	(5.560)	(5.583)
Muslim immigrants	-0.024	-0.023	-0.023	0.031	0.031	0.032
	(-0.396)	(-0.393)	(-0.395)	(0.931)	(0.912)	(0.926)
Controls						
Girl		0.004	-0.062		0.012	0.027
		(0.033)	(-0.515)		(0.200)	(0.486)
Age in ninth grade		0.102	0.028		-0.098*	-0.072
		(1.026)	(0.268)		(-2.323)	(-1.640)
Country (<i>ref=Germany</i>)						
England		-0.444**	-0.350**		0.198*	0.100
		(-2.948)	(-2.688)		(2.100)	(1.109)
Netherlands		0.073	0.121		0.134*	0.073
		(0.564)	(1.008)		(2.150)	(1.135)
Sweden		-0.034	0.000		0.105	0.021
		(-0.280)	(0.001)		(1.611)	(0.346)
Parental background						
Parent strongly feels origin-country			1.006***			
			(8.681)			
Parent strongly feels host-country						0.465***
						(5.504)
Single or reconstructed family			-0.071			0.105
			(-0.685)			(1.801)
Neither parent with college degree			0.037			-0.037
			(0.273)			(-0.653)
Neither parent employed			0.045			0.004
			(0.297)			(0.059)
Random effects						
Baseline	1.242***	1.208***	0.974***	0.465***	0.439***	0.380***
	(8.541)	(8.499)	(7.262)	(11.889)	(11.476)	(10.575)
Growth	0.086	0.084	0.081	0.037*	0.036*	0.038*
	(1.575)	(1.531)	(1.464)	(2.056)	(2.040)	(2.108)
Covariance	-0.074	-0.067	-0.064	-0.049*	-0.041	-0.035
	(-1.346)	(-1.224)	(-1.193)	(-2.299)	(-1.919)	(-1.703)
Errors	1.484***	1.485***	1.488***	0.323***	0.323***	0.322***
	(13.280)	(13.283)	(13.201)	(11.816)	(11.832)	(11.831)

t statistics in parenthesis. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Estimates adjusted for design effects, survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.

Source: 2010 - 2013 CILS4EU.

Figure 2. Baseline and growth estimates for the latent curves of changes in national identity salience for Muslim and Christian children of immigrants (based on estimates from Table 2 unconditional models, $n=2,242$).

Muslims increase their attachment to the host-country over time, similarly to Christian children of immigrants. Children of immigrants have a significant increase in their ties to the host-country over the three years in high school. Even though Muslims start with fewer ties to the host country, there are no differences between Muslims and Christians in the growth over time. Muslim children of immigrants even have, on average, a greater estimate for growth than Christians. Therefore, over the three years in high school, Muslim children of immigrants have an increase in their ties to Germany, Sweden, England, and the Netherlands at least as fast as Christian children of immigrants. Muslim children of immigrants in adolescence have stable ties to their country of origin but an increase in ties to the host country.

Discussion

Christian children of immigrants continue to be symbolically tied to their religion as they assimilate into the host country. Even though children of immigrants report similar religious behaviour compared to natives, their higher attachment to religion is not explained by parent's religiosity, nor by differences in religious requirements. Therefore, there is something unique about the experience of children of immigrants that leads them to give more importance to religion compared to more secular natives (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Ebaugh 2001; Hirschman 2004). Contrary to expectations from classic and new theories of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964), the subjective importance given to religion for Christian children of immigrants and natives do not converge during high school; moreover, Christian children of immigrants do not drop ties to their country of origin. Children of immigrants continue to identify more strongly with their religion and origin-country even as they increase their ties to the host-country. Instead of evidence against the assimilation hypothesis, this might be the sign of symbolic religious identity for Christian children of immigrants (Gans 1979). Christian children of immigrants, as they incorporate culturally, might continue to hold to religion and their origin-country identity to develop a positive sense of self in adolescence (Erikson 1968; Phinney 1993). More qualitative and quantitative studies should focus on the process of incorporation for Christian children of immigrants and the role religion can play in helping them navigate multiple cultures.

Through mosque attendance, Muslim children of immigrants might be developing new pan-ethnic solidarities and identities. As expected from social boundary theory (Alba 2005; Wimmer 2013; Zolberg and Woon 1999), Muslim children of immigrants have overall higher religiosity levels even when accounting for parent's religiosity. Muslim children of immigrants diverge from other immigrant groups in their attendance at religious events, however, this increase in religious participation is accompanied by stable ties to their country

of origin and a decrease in ties to the host country, leading to two conclusions. First, mosques in Western Europe might play a significant role in bringing Muslim children of immigrants together regardless of national origins. As Muslims try to understand their place in Europe, they might turn to religious organizations to meet similar others and find a place for themselves as European Muslims. Mosques can provide important social and material resources to children of immigrants as they are trying to understand their place in the European political landscape. Beyond these resources found across religions, Islam has also clear goals to unify many Muslim countries together. Second, these pan-ethnic religious identities might lead to more engagement with the mainstream. There is no evidence that the religious behaviour of Muslim children of immigrants is reactive such as described in the segmented assimilation literature (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994; Zhou 1997). Instead, Muslim adolescents continue to attend religious services as they become more closely tied to the country of origin. This engagement with the mainstream could be the core for future pan-ethnic political movement. In adolescence, Muslim children of immigrants might become more aware of political issues affecting them, and thus choose to engage with mainstream political institution to improve their groups' situation. Future research should investigate how engagement with politics develops within Muslim pan-ethnic organizations, such as mosques.

There are several limitations to this paper. First, for my theoretical argument, I assume a strong relationship between religiosity and religious identity salience without formally testing it. In the future, research should examine the changes in religious identity salience during adolescence and differences between religious groups. Second, this paper reflects the difficulties in using social boundary theory in empirical work. I use boundary theory to explain differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, without testing the mechanisms (institutional discrimination and categorization) that connects the two. Future

work should study if experiences with boundaries, both at the individual and cultural level, explains some differences between religious groups. Regardless of these limitations, this paper shows how paths in religiosity and national identities vary by immigration status and religion in adolescence, and thus provides the groundwork for future research on the incorporation of religious children of immigrants in Europe.

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Declaration of Interest

There are no conflict of interests to report.

Biographical Note

Tamara van der Does is a postdoctoral fellow at the Santa Fe Institute, and holds a PhD in sociology from Indiana University, Bloomington. Her research interests include identity formation, immigration, politics, religion, and gender.

Data availability statement

The raw data are available from GESIS Data Archive for the Social Sciences in Cologne, Germany (<https://www.gesis.org/en/services/archiving-and-registering/data-archiving/>). Researchers will be asked to fill out a data user agreement before getting finally access to the data. The code supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author on request.

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Appendix

Table A1. Natives and children of immigrants' religiosity, demographics, parental background, and national identities in four European countries.

		Mean/Proportions			
		Full	Natives	Children of	
	Range	Sample	Christian	Christian	Muslim
		<i>n</i> =5475	<i>n</i> =3233	<i>n</i> =1143	<i>n</i> =1099
<i>All adolescents who identify with a religion</i>					
Religiosity					
Person-mean subjective importance	0 - 3	1.202	1.030	1.477	2.387
Person-mean frequency of prayer	0 - 5	1.140	0.969	1.458	2.218
Person-mean attendance at events	0 - 4	0.941	0.863	1.092	1.411
Demographics					
Girl (<i>ref</i> =boy)	0 - 1	0.541	0.529	0.584	0.568
Age (in ninth grade)	13 - 17	14.461	14.439	14.524	14.551
Parental background					
Parent consider religion important	0 - 1	0.504	0.449	0.607	0.851
Single or reconstructed family	0 - 1	0.215	0.203	0.297	0.162
Neither parent with college degree	0 - 1	0.641	0.627	0.654	0.759
Neither parent employed	0 - 1	0.045	0.027	0.070	0.179
<i>Children of immigrants</i>					
National identities					
Person-mean origin-country identity salience	0 - 4	1.932		1.632	2.581
Person-mean host-country identity salience	0 - 3	1.984		2.118	1.694
Parents' national identities					
Parent strongly feels origin-country	0 - 1	0.519		0.411	0.753
Parent strongly feels host-country	0 - 1	0.688		0.776	0.499

Source: 2010-2013 CILS4EU.

Estimates adjusted for design effects, survey weights scaled for equal weights by country.