How NATO Membership Transforms Public Support for War

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Abstract

How do military alliances affect public support for defending targets of aggression? We explore this question in the context of current debates about NATO expansion. We fielded an experiment on 14,000 voters in 13 NATO member-states involving a hypothetical scenario in which Russia attacked a target country, and we randomly varied whether the target was a member of NATO. Contrary to the view of alliances as empty gestures, we found that voters in every country were far more willing to use military force to defend each target when the target was in NATO. We also uncovered important heterogeneity across targets and within domestic audiences. These findings have profound implications for understanding the effects of NATO and debates about NATO enlargement.

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Introduction

Observers have long debated the effects of military alliances on decisions to use military force to defend other countries. Some argue that alliances can induce countries to fight when they would otherwise prefer not to get involved. Others contend that without a global authority to enforce international agreements, alliances are mere scraps of paper that countries can disregard when war would be inconvenient.

This debate is not only central to theories of international relations; it is also of practical importance for military planning, decisions about alliance membership, and the prospects for international peace. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 inspired Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and Bosnia and Georgia remain in the membership queue, but it is unclear how accession by these countries would affect the security landscape.

Resolving these academic and policy debates requires a deeper understanding of how alliances affect public support for war. While leaders are ultimately responsible for foreign policy decisions in democratic countries, political scientists have long demonstrated that policymakers are responsive to and constrained by public opinion, particularly when it comes to highly consequential policy areas *(1, 2)*. More specifically, growing evidence shows that, in democracies, public opinion influences decisions about military conflict (*3, 4, 5, 6*), including decisions to defend allies (*7, 8, 9*). Moreover, meta-analyses have found that citizens and elites respond to political situations in "strikingly similar ways," implying that surveys of ordinary citizens can reveal how decisionmakers would think about political issues, even absent public pressure (*10*). Little research, however, has tested how alliances move public opinion, and previous work has focused solely on the U.S. (*11, 12*).

In this study, we advance knowledge on three dimensions. First, we investigate how alliances shape public opinion not only in the U.S. but in twelve other NATO members. Studying

responses across NATO's membership is critical for informing theory and policy about the world's most powerful alliance. Second, we investigate whether the security benefits of joining NATO would be larger for some applicants than for others. Specifically, we compare the potential gains for Bosnia, Finland, Georgia, and Sweden, the four countries other than Ukraine that were furthest along in their bids for NATO accession at the time of our study. Finally, we test whether willingness to help NATO members depends upon how valuable voters *a priori* believe NATO to be for their own country. If so, political rhetoric disparaging NATO could undermine its ability to deter foreign aggression, whereas efforts to improve public perceptions of NATO could strengthen the alliance's effectiveness.

Estimating the effects of alliances is difficult with historical data because states do not form alliances randomly. We therefore fielded a large-scale preregistered survey experiment (*13, 14, 15*) on more than 14,000 voters in 13 NATO countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States), with our sample data reweighted to match key demographic margins from each country's population.

Our experiment described a hypothetical Russian attack on four possible *targets*: Bosnia, Finland, Georgia, or Sweden. We randomly varied whether the target was characterized as a NATO member at the time Russia attacked, and measured whether voters thought their own country (the *sender*) should defend the target militarily. Figure 1 displays the sender and target countries in our study. We fielded our study during Russia's invasion of Ukraine and just before the 2022 NATO summit during which Sweden and Finland were formally invited to join the alliance—a moment when both interstate war in Europe and NATO expansion were top of mind, endowing the survey scenario with realism. Full details about the sample, design, and analysis can be found in the Methods section.

Figure 1: Map of Sender and Target Countries in Study. Figure displays the four possible target countries in the survey experiment scenario, shown in red, and the thirteen sender countries (i.e. the survey respondents' countries), shown in blue.



We hypothesized that, all else equal, voters would be more willing to use military force to defend target countries if those countries were members of NATO, versus if they were not. In theory, alliances such as NATO could create reputational incentives to intervene. Failing to aid an ally could hurt one's reputation as a desirable security partner, jeopardizing current and future alliances (*16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21*). Alliances could also give rise to moral obligations. Mounting evidence shows that moral considerations influence public thinking about foreign policy (*22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 14, 27*). Having promised to defend members of the alliance, citizens may feel an ethical duty to act.

The alternative perspective is that alliance treaties have little effect on public support for the use of force. Given the costs of military intervention and no international authority to enforce

international promises, voters in the U.S. and Europe might assign little weight to NATO membership when deciding whether to defend new alliance members against Russian aggression.

Results

To adjudicate between these competing views, we designed our experiment to identify the effect of joining NATO, independent of other factors, among voters in a large proportion of NATO countries. Consistent with our first hypothesis, NATO membership powerfully shaped public support for war. Figure 2 depicts the percentage of voters who supported defending the target after a Russian attack, depending on whether the target was in NATO or not. The Methods section provides details about our preregistered estimation procedures. The first row, which averages over both senders and targets, shows that when the target country was not in NATO, only a minority of voters across the thirteen sender countries (45%) supported military intervention. Support swelled to an average of 74%, however, when the target joined NATO. This 29-point swing in public opinion is substantively sizable and easily distinguishable from zero.

The remaining rows of Figure 2 display effects for each sender, averaging across targets. In every sender country, the effect of NATO was large—between 23 and 35 percentage points—notwithstanding differences in baseline willingness to defend non-NATO targets. In summary, voters did not treat alliances as mere scraps of paper that could be dismissed when inconvenient, nor did they opt to "pass the buck" to other alliance members. Instead, alliances powerfully shaped public support for war.

Figure 2: Effect of Target Joining NATO, Overall and by Sender Country. Figure shows the percentage of voters who supported defending the target after a Russian attack, depending on whether the target was in NATO (middle panel) or not (left panel). The right panel shows the effect of the target being in NATO. Each row corresponds to a specific sender (i.e. respondent) country, with the top row showing the average across all sender countries. 95% confidence intervals are displayed.



Our second preregistered hypothesis was that joining NATO would matter more for Bosnia and Georgia than for Finland and Sweden. As we detail in the Supplementary Information (SI), Bosnia and Georgia are viewed as less democratic than Finland and Sweden; the costs of defending Bosnia and Georgia would likely be higher than the costs of defending Finland and Sweden, due to differences in military power, economic wealth, and compatibility with NATO's force structure; and for current NATO members, the economic and security consequences of a Russian attack would be lower if the target were Bosnia or Georgia, than if the target were Finland or Sweden. Based on previous research in the U.S. *(11)*, these are all reasons

to suspect that willingness to defend Bosnia and Georgia in the absence of a NATO commitment would be lower than for Finland and Sweden, and hence that the effect of joining NATO would be larger for Bosnia and Georgia than for Finland and Sweden.

Figure 3 confirms this prediction. Only a minority of voters (36-38%) would defend Bosnia/Georgia when those countries remained outside NATO. Support nearly doubled, surging by 32-33 points, when Bosnia/Georgia joined NATO. Thus, the alliance commitment transformed skepticism into clear majority support. Support also increased when Finland and Sweden were characterized as NATO members, but NATO mattered less for these countries, which most voters (53-55%) would defend even without a NATO commitment.

Figure 3: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Target Country. Figure shows the percentage of voters who supported defending the target after a Russian attack, depending on whether the target was in NATO or not, with the results broken down by target countries (and averaged over sender countries). 95% confidence intervals are displayed.



The SI further disaggregates these findings by sender. When we described Bosnia or Georgia as not in NATO, majority support for intervention emerged in only one country. Russia could, therefore, attack Bosnia or Georgia without fearing widespread public pressure for military involvement by NATO nations. In contrast, when we portrayed Bosnia or Georgia as part of NATO, majorities in 12-13 of our NATO sender countries favored intervention. Again,

NATO membership was less consequential for Finland and Sweden, which majorities in 9 of 13 sender countries would defend even without NATO membership.

Our third preregistered hypothesis was that the effect of the target joining NATO should be largest among voters who think their own country's membership in NATO is a good thing. One might think that, by engaging reputational and moral concerns that transcend short-term material interests, alliances would have the same effects whether or not voters believe the alliance contributes to their own country's immediate security. We argue, however, that voters who value their own country's alliance membership should be even more sensitive to the negative consequences of failing to help an ally. Thus, alliances should more sharply increase support for war among voters who *a priori* prize the alliance than among those who doubt its value.

Figure 4 strongly supports this prediction. The figure separates voters into five groups, reflecting how much they agreed or disagreed that their country's NATO membership was a good thing (measured before administering the experiment). Among voters who agreed strongly, the effect of the target joining NATO was 35 percentage points. As enthusiasm for NATO waned, the effect of NATO declined in tandem, falling to a low of only 7 percentage points among voters who strongly doubted the value of their own country's membership in NATO. The SI confirms that these conclusions also held after controlling for a wide range of respondent characteristics that are upstream of pro-NATO attitudes and might have contributed to the treatment effect heterogeneity in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Attitudes about NATO Membership. Figure shows the percentage of voters who supported defending the target after a Russian attack, depending on whether the target was in NATO or not, with the results broken down by the respondents' views on NATO (i.e. whether their own country's membership in NATO is good). The results are averaged over sender and target countries. 95% confidence intervals are displayed.



The SI also contains additional complementary analyses. Our findings held when we measured support for war on a five-point scale, chose not to weight the data, or both. Moreover, alliances had large effects regardless of left-right ideology, gender, or (in the U.S.) political party. Further, alliances mattered at least as much among individuals with "elite-like" characteristics such as high education, income, political interest, or being at least 40 years old. Finally, the SI shows additional results of fielding our experiment in three *non*-NATO countries—Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland—alongside our main study.

Discussion

Our findings have important implications for understanding the effects of NATO and the consequences of NATO expansion. First, our experiments revealed that NATO can have powerful and widespread effects on public opinion, even though voters weigh many factors when evaluating war. We found that the target joining NATO produced a considerable surge in support

for intervention for every combination of sender and target. Majorities almost always supported defending fellow NATO members, even when support for defending the exact same target would be in doubt without a NATO commitment. Although our experiment was not designed to identify the precise mechanisms through which NATO membership influenced public support for war, it seems plausible that many citizens were motivated to support targets out of concern for reputation, ethical duty, or both.

The expansion of NATO could, therefore, transform European security. On the one hand, expansion of NATO could increase the scale and intensity of future wars. Aggression against a country that had joined NATO would galvanize public support for war among allies in Europe and North America, potentially drawing a larger number of countries into war than an attack on the same country if it had remained outside the alliance.

On the other hand, expansion of NATO could make wars in Europe less likely. Our study highlights an important reason why NATO deters aggression. By increasing public support for retaliation, NATO membership makes the threat of retaliation more credible. Potential aggressors may be dissuaded from attacking, due to the expectation that an attack would trigger retaliation by other alliance members.

Second, our findings highlight the distinction between the *reliability* of alliances (*28, 29, 30, 31*) and their *consequences*. Reliability refers to the probability that a country will uphold its alliance commitment by defending an ally that has been attacked. Consequences refers to probability that a country will defend an ally, minus the probability of defending an otherwise identical non-ally: in other words, how much does the alliance increase the likelihood of intervention? One might think that reliable alliances are consequential, and *vice versa*, but our findings underscore that reliability and consequences are distinct (*32*). Indeed, there may be an

inverse relationship between reliability and effectiveness, with alliances less consequential when they are more reliable, and less reliable when they are more consequential.

Consider, for example, how reliability and consequences varied across targets in our study. When Russia attacked a target that had joined NATO, public support for honoring the alliance was higher when the target was Finland or Sweden than when the target was Bosnia or Georgia. This pattern suggests that a NATO commitment to Finland and Sweden would be more reliable than a commitment to Bosnia and Georgia. At the same time, the effect of NATO membership on public support for intervention was larger for Bosnia and Georgia than for Finland and Sweden. Thus, in our experiment, NATO was more consequential when it was less reliable, and *vice versa*.

Our findings further imply that the impact of NATO enlargement should vary, depending on which countries join. We found relatively high public support for defending Finland and Sweden, even when those countries were not NATO members. Potential aggressors might, therefore, be deterred from attacking Finland or Sweden, regardless of whether those countries are in the alliance or not. In contrast, an aggressor could currently invade Bosnia or Georgia without fearing widespread support for retaliation, but support for intervention would skyrocket if these countries joined NATO. Thus, expanding NATO to include Finland and Sweden might be less consequential than inviting Bosnia and Georgia to become members. These findings have major policy implications for European security, especially since Bosnia and Georgia have both declared their aspirations to join NATO and have both been targets of external aggression in recent decades.

Finally, our findings suggest that the feelings voters have about particular alliances shape the defensive and deterrent value of those alliances. The alliance effect in our experiment was much larger among NATO supporters than among NATO skeptics. Rhetoric disparaging NATO

could, therefore, weaken its influence (*33, 34*): if voters doubt NATO's value, they will be less motivated to take costly actions that sustain the alliance. And if potential aggressors believe that electorates are unwilling to defend allies, the threat of retaliation will become less credible, emboldening aggressors to attack (*35, 36, 37*).

This conclusion puts past criticisms of NATO—as well as broader critiques of institutions—in a new light. A range of political actors have engaged in anti-NATO political rhetoric, including extreme parties in Europe (such as the National Rally in France and Die Linke in Germany), former U.S. President Donald Trump, and Russian leaders and operatives (*38*). Our findings suggest that if such criticisms of NATO are persuasive, they could erode the public's willingness to defend NATO allies, and thereby encourage adversaries to attack with less fear of consequences. Conversely, our findings suggest that rhetoric highlighting the benefits of NATO could bolster defense and deterrence, even if an alliance does not expand. Thus, our study also provides an additional mechanism through which rhetoric can reassure alliance partners (*39*).

Our findings open many questions for future research. We found that NATO membership transformed public support for war. Future research could explore whether other alliances, including ones with different contractual provisions *(8, 19, 40)*, would have similarly potent effects on public opinion. One could also design experiments to test whether decisions to use force by some members of an alliance would cause other members to join the effort, or instead lead them to free ride on the military efforts of other states. In addition, scholars could design studies to parse the mechanisms through which alliances shape public opinion, and why those mechanisms are more powerful in some circumstances than in others. Future research could build on our experimental template to explore these important questions.

Methods

Sample. We fielded a large-scale survey experiment in 13 NATO-member countries: the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We also conducted a parallel study in three non-NATO countries: Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland. The interviews took place in May-June 2022.

For each European country, the survey firm Respondi sampled approximately 1,000 adult respondents from the population of eligible voters. Respondi used country-specific gender and age quotas to recruit samples. For the United States, the survey firm Lucid sampled 2,352 adult respondents from the population of eligible voters. Lucid used quota sampling to produce a sample reflecting the U.S. adult population with respect to gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic region. For each country, we screened out the 5% of respondents with the shortest completion times. For details on the number of respondents per country and their demographic characteristics, see the Supplementary Tables.

Sample Weights. We used entropy balancing (*41*) to weight the sample to match the distribution of each country on gender, age, education. Specifically, we matched on the % female on the population; on the % in three age categories (18-39, 40-59, and 60+); and on the % in three categories of highest educational attainment (% below upper secondary education, % with upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, and % with tertiary education).

We calculated the population margins using the most recently available statistics from the OECD. For age and gender we used the OECD Population Statistics. For education we used the table on share of population by educational attainment in the OECD Education at a Glance database. We dropped respondents for whom weights could not be constructed due to missing

data on gender, age, or education, and we trimmed the weights at 6. The SI provides both weighted and unweighted analyses.

Experimental Procedure. The survey began by obtaining consent, and by screening out subjects who were not adult citizens of the country, were not eligible to vote in the country, or did not pass simple attention checks. After measuring pre-treatment variables, we informed respondents about whether their country was currently a member of NATO and about what the NATO treaty requires. For example, subjects in the UK learned, "The United Kingdom is a member of NATO. The NATO treaty says that if any member of NATO is attacked, the other members will take all necessary actions, including the use of armed force, to defend their ally."

Respondents then considered a hypothetical scenario involving a *Target* country that might join NATO: either Bosnia, Georgia, Finland, or Sweden. We told subjects, "There is much discussion about whether *Target* will become a member of NATO." We then randomized whether subjects learned that the target joined NATO. Thus, half of the subjects read, "Suppose that *Target* becomes a member of NATO, and then Russia attacks *Target*." The other half read, "Suppose that *Target* does not become a member of NATO, and then Russia attacks *Target*." We asked all subjects, "In that situation, do you think *Sender* should or should not use military force to defend *Target*?" where *Sender* was replaced by the respondent's own country. There were four answer options: definitely should, probably should, probably should not, and definitely should not.

We then presented a second scenario. To make the two vignettes as different as possible, subjects who had been told in the first scenario that the *Target* was either Bosnia or Georgia received a second scenario in which the *Target* was either Sweden or Finland, and vice versa. Moreover, subjects who were told in the first scenario that the *Target* joined NATO received a

second scenario in which the *Target* did not join NATO, and vice versa. We then asked, "In that situation, do you think *Sender* should or should not use military force to defend *Target*?"

Thus, each subject evaluated two scenarios: one involving either Bosnia or Georgia and one involving either Finland or Sweden, and one in which the *Target* joined NATO and one in which it did not. The survey concluded by collecting additional demographic and attitudinal variables. The SI provides the full text of the U.S. version of the questionnaire as an example.

Survey Translations. We designed the questionnaire in English and professionally translated the questionnaire into each country's language(s).

Variables. We constructed two measures of our dependent variable, support for military force. Our main measure, *Y_pct*, was 0 if the respondent selected "definitely should not" or "probably should not," and 100 if the respondent selected "probably should" or "definitely should." Our secondary measure, *Y_scale*, was coded such that "definitely should not" = 0, "probably should not" = 33, "probably should" = 67, and "definitely should" = 100. Following our preregistration, the article presents findings based on *Y_pct*, but the SI shows that our key conclusions held when we used *Y_scale*.

Our main predictor variable, *Member*, was coded as 1 if the target joined NATO, and 0 if the target did not join NATO. We also constructed indicators for names of *Sender* and *Target* countries. Finally, we included an individual-level moderator variable, *NATO_good*, which measured whether the respondent agreed or disagreed that NATO membership is/would be a good thing for their own country. *NATO_good* had five levels: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly.

For information on additional covariates employed in our analyses, see the Supplementary Tables in the SI.

Analysis. We generated Figure 2 by regressing *Y_pct* on a full set of interactions between *Sender*, *Target*, and *Member* (along with all lower-order terms), and then computing the average treatment effect—the effect of target membership in NATO—by giving equal weight to each combination of sender and target. In our Supplementary Figures, we also recreated this figure in the same manner but (a) using our alternative measure of the dependent variable, (b) not employing the sample weights, and (c) focusing on specific subsets of our sample as defined by key demographic characteristics.

We generated Figure 3 by regressing *Y_pct* on a full set of interactions between *Sender*, *Target*, and *Member* (along with all lower-order terms), and then computing average support for using force to defend each non-NATO target by giving equal weight to each sender. In our Supplementary Figures, we also recreated this figure in the same manner but (a) using our alternative measure of the dependent variable and (b) not employing the sample weights.

We generated Figure 4 by regressing *Y_pct* on a full set of interactions between *Member*, *Sender*, and *NATO_good*, and then computing the average treatment effect for each level of *NATO_good*, giving equal weight to each sender. In our Supplementary Figures in the SI, we also recreated this figure in the same manner but (a) using our alternative measure of the dependent variable and (b) not employing the sample weights.

For all analyses, standard errors were clustered at the respondent level, and 95% normality-based confidence intervals were constructed.

Pre-registration. All hypotheses and analyses were preregistered at OSF (https://osf.io/pfzva/?view_only=ed65571a06904f3eb5ebab64608c9af0). The plan was posted on 5/17/2022, before fieldwork began.

Data and Code Availability

Data, study materials, and replication code are available online: [*link to be added upon acceptance*].

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR:
HOW NATO MEMBERSHIP TRANSFORMS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR

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I. SUPPLEMENTARY TEXT AND ANALYSIS

Characterizing Bosnia and Georgia versus Finland and Sweden

As we explain in the main text, we predicted that joining NATO would have a stronger effect on public opinion when the target is Bosnia and Georgia relative to Finland and Sweden. We based this prediction on the expectation that, without a NATO commitment, support for defending Bosnia and would be lower than support for defending Finland or Sweden, due to three factors: (1) Bosnia and Georgia are perceived as less democratic than Finland and Sweden; (2) the costs of defending Bosnia and Georgia would likely be higher than the costs of defending Finland and Sweden, due to differences in military power, geographic location, and compatibility with NATO's force structure; and (3) for current NATO members, the economic and security consequences of a Russian attack would be lower if the target were Bosnia or Georgia than if the target were Finland or Sweden. Here we provide evidence corroborating these claims.

(1) Bosnia and Georgia are less democratic

Freedom House, a non-profit that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, annually rates the levels of access to political rights and civil liberties in countries around the world. According to Freedom House's 2022 Global Freedom Scores,[1] Sweden and Finland both received scores of 100 (out of 100), which denotes the highest level of freedom and corresponds to the status of "Free." In contrast, Bosnia received a score of 53 ("Partly Free") and Georgia a score of 58 ("Partly Free"), and both countries were further classified as being a "Transitional or Hybrid Regime" rather than a "Consolidated Democracy."

(2) The costs would be higher for defending Bosnia and Georgia

We base this claim on three factors: estimates of military power, estimates of economic power, and level of existing military coordination with NATO members.

In terms of current military power, Finland and Sweden have spent much more on their militaries over the past decade than Bosnia and Georgia. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an independent international institute that researches global armament and maintains an annual military expenditure database,[2] Finland's and Sweden's military expenditures over 2012-2021 (in 2020 USD, in millions) totaled 39,713 and 61,400, respectively. In contrast, Bosnia's and Georgia's military expenditures over the same period were 1,759 and 3,520, respectively.

In terms of economic power, Sweden and Finland are much wealthier than Bosnia and Georgia. The World Bank reports that in 2022 US dollars (in millions), the GDPs of Finland and Sweden in 2022 were 299,155.24 and 627,437.90, respectively. In contrast, the GDPs of Bosnia and Georgia were 22,571.51 and 18,700.24, respectively.

Finally, Sweden and Finland have higher levels of military coordination with most current NATO members, compared to Bosnia and Georgia. Sweden and Finland are both part of the European Union (EU), which maintains a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As a result, most NATO members maintain regular military coordination and foreign policy alignment with Finland and Sweden. In contrast, Bosnia and Georgia are not part of the EU, and thus do not share the same level of defense or

[1] https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
[2] https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

foreign policy alignment (though note that all four countries are part of various NATO coordination initiatives).[3]

(3) The consequences for current NATO members of an attack would be lower if the target were Bosnia or Georgia

Finally, for current NATO members, the stakes of a Russian invasion of Bosnia or Georgia would be lower than the stakes of a Russian invasion of Finland or Sweden. While space does not permit an exhaustive analysis of the stakes, we note two important points.

First, the stakes are lower when the target is Bosnia or Georgia because the NATO countries in our sample tend to be much less economically integrated with Bosnia or Georgia than with Finland or Sweden. Finland and Sweden are members of the EU, making them part of a free-trade zone with most of the NATO countries we sampled (the three exceptions are Norway, the UK, and the US), fostering deep economic integration. Thus, an attack on Finland and Sweden could have significant economic consequences for most of the NATO countries in our sample. In contrast, Bosnia and Georgia do not have nearly the same depth of economic ties with the NATO countries in our sample and an attack on them would result in less economic spillover to those countries.

Second, a Russian attack on Finland or Sweden could have particularly dire social and political consequences for NATO countries due to the free movement of people within the EU. As noted, Finland, Sweden, and most of the NATO countries in our sample share EU membership. EU membership permits individuals to move about freely within the EU for any reason they wish, which means that a Russian attack on Finland or Sweden could produce an influx of people to many of the countries in our NATO sample. This in turn could produce significant social and political dislocation. The movement of people between NATO countries and Bosnia and Georgia, in contrast, is currently much more restricted (Bosnia and Georgia also have smaller populations than Finland or Sweden). Thus, a Russian attack on Bosnia or Georgia would not produce comparable flows of individuals into, and hence destabilization of, the NATO countries we studied.

Influence of Attitudes about NATO Membership

As described in the main text, we hypothesized that alliances should more sharply increase support for war among voters who *a priori* prize the alliance than among those who doubt its value. We tested this by analyzing the heterogeneity of the NATO treatment effect across subsets of respondents characterized by the extent to which they agreed (or disagreed) that their own country's membership in NATO is a good thing, and the results (shown in Figure 4) provided strong support for our hypothesis: the effect of the NATO treatment on support for war was highest among voters with the strongest pro-NATO attitudes (i.e. those who agreed strongly), and that effect consistently declined with both statistical and substantive significance as enthusiasm for NATO waned.

Here, we further investigate the precise relationship between NATO attitudes and the NATO treatment effect in supplementary analyses that were not pre-registered. (For these analyses, as with the analyses reported in the main text, we employ our sample weights and cluster standard errors at the respondent level.) Specifically, we distinguish between treatment effect heterogeneity and causal moderation (*42*). In our context, treatment effect heterogeneity refers to the simple differences or heterogeneity of the NATO treatment effect across respondents with different attitudes toward NATO, which is precisely what is uncovered in our main analysis highlighted in Figure 4. In contrast, causal moderation refers to the possibility that those differences in the NATO treatment effect can be causally attributed to NATO

[3] https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_132726.htm

attitudes *per se*, rather than being driven by other potential influences that happen to be correlated with NATO attitudes.

To facilitate a smoother interpretation and comparison between treatment effect heterogeneity and causal moderation, we first coarsened our measurement of NATO attitudes. Specifically, we dichotomized voters' attitudes toward NATO into a pro-NATO indicator, which took a value of 1 for voters who agreed or strongly agreed that their own country's membership in NATO is a good thing, and a value of 0 otherwise. We then estimated the treatment effect heterogeneity by following the same analysis used to produce Figure 4, but using the dichotomized pro-NATO indicator in place of the original 5-point measurement. Giving equal weight to all countries, we find that having pro-NATO attitudes (relative to not) is associated with an increase in the NATO treatment effect of 18.4 percentage points (95% CI: [15.7 , 21.0]). In other words, while there is a strong surge in support for defending a target country when that target has joined NATO, that surge is much larger among voters who have pro-NATO attitudes than among voters who do not. We also find that this positive increase in the NATO treatment effect holds for all 13 of the sender countries individually, with statistical significance at the 95% level for 12 out of the 13.

The ensuing question is then whether that increase in the NATO treatment effect is not only associated with but also causally attributable to pro-NATO attitudes. This moves us from treatment effect heterogeneity to causal moderation. To assess this, we employed the causal moderation estimation framework from (*42*) to estimate the average treatment moderation effect (ATME), which corresponds to the causal influence of pro-NATO attitudes on the effect of the NATO treatment. Specifically, we applied the parallel-regression approach to estimate the ATME by appropriately controlling for a number of respondent characteristics that are upstream of pro-NATO attitudes and could be responsible for the treatment effect heterogeneity we observed (i.e. characteristics that could have an influence on both pro-NATO attitudes and responsiveness to the treatment). These characteristics include gender, age, education, income, political ideology, employment status, whether the respondent was born in their country, degree of political interest, level on a nationalism index, and level on a cosmopolitanism index. We estimated the ATME separately for each country and then computed an average of the estimates giving equal weight across all countries, thereby providing a result that is directly comparable to the 18.4 percentage-point difference in effects we computed above for treatment effect heterogeneity. Our average estimate of the ATME is 15.7 percentage points (95% CI: [13.0 , 18.3]). The country-specific estimates of the ATME are positive again for all 13 countries, and statistically significant at the 95% level for 10 out of the 13.

In sum, the causal moderation analysis provides results that, while slightly smaller in magnitude, are largely similar to the results of the treatment effect heterogeneity analysis. Of course, we do not believe we have necessarily controlled for every possible relevant variable in the causal moderation analysis, and such a feat would be practically impossible. Nonetheless, that our estimates remained robust (with very little substantive change) after adjusting for a broad range of variables of high theoretical salience provides compelling (even if tentative) evidence that NATO attitudes do indeed directly influence the effect of NATO on public opinion.

Results in Non-NATO Countries

In addition to thirteen NATO countries, we also fielded our experiment in three non-NATO countries: Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland. (Note that Sweden was not allowed as the target country for respondents in Sweden.) The purpose of fielding the experiment in these countries was to undertake additional, complementary analyses alongside the primary tests we describe in the main text.

Specifically, we tested three preregistered predictions. First, we hypothesized that the effect of the target joining NATO would be smaller among subjects in the three non-NATO countries than among subjects in NATO countries, because the target joining NATO only generates an obligation for fellow NATO members. Second, we predicted that the effect of the target joining NATO would be larger among subjects in Sweden than among respondents in Austria or Switzerland. We expected this because Sweden was considering joining NATO at the time of the survey and voters might have been answering our questions in anticipation of a future bid for NATO accession. Third, following similar reasoning, we expected the effect of the target joining NATO to be larger for subjects who said that their country joining NATO would be a good thing than among subjects who did not. Figures A20 and A21 show that all three of these hypotheses were supported.

II. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES

All Respondents in NATO Sender Countries

Figure A1: Effect of Target Joining NATO, Overall and by Sender Country



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A2: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Target Country



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A3: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Sender Country when Target is Bosnia



Note: Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A4: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Sender Country when Target is Georgia



Note: Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A5: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Sender Country when Target is Finland



Note: Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A6: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Sender Country when Target is Sweden



Note: Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A7: Effect of Target Joining NATO, by Attitudes about NATO Membership



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each sender country.

Subgroups of Respondents in NATO Sender Countries

Figure A8: Respondents with "Left" Ideology



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A9: Respondents with "Center" Ideology



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A10: Respondents with "Right" Ideology



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A11: Female Respondents



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A12: Male Respondents



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A13: Respondents with Tertiary Education



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A14: Respondents with Above-Median Income



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A15: Respondents with High Political Interest



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A16: Respondents At Least 40 Years Old



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country. Overall was estimated by giving equal weight to each sender country.

Figure A17: Democrats in the United States



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country.

Figure A18: Independents in the United States



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country.

Figure A19: Republicans in the United States



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target country.

Respondents in Non-NATO Sender Countries

Figure A20: Effect of Target Joining NATO



Note: The figure gives equal weight to each target except Sweden, which was excluded from the list of targets. The value for NATO senders gives equal weight to each of the 13 NATO sender countries, and the value for non-NATO senders gives equal weight to each of the 3 non-NATO sender countries.

Figure A21: Effect of Target Joining NATO, By Attitudes about Joining NATO



Note: The sample included all targets except Sweden, which was excluded from the list of targets. The figure gives equal weight to each sender country.

III. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

Summary Statistics for Respondents in NATO Member Countries

Table A1: Number of Respondents in Each of the 13 NATO Member Countries

Country:	Sample Size
Czech Republic	988
Denmark	989
France	996
Germany	957
Greece	996
Hungary	994
Italy	993
Netherlands	989
Norway	987
Poland	995
Spain	997
United Kingdom	999
United States	2,352
Total	14,232

Note: The sample sizes are reported after removing respondents who did not qualify.

Table A2: Gender and Age of Sample in the 13 NATO Member Countries

Country:	Gender (%)		Age (%)		
	Female	Male	18-39	40-59	60+
Czech Republic	50	50	30	38	31
Denmark	51	49	33	34	34
France	52	48	31	34	35
Germany	51	49	30	34	36
Greece	53	47	34	37	28
Hungary	51	49	31	37	31
Italy	52	48	27	37	37
Netherlands	51	49	32	34	34
Norway	50	50	35	34	31
Poland	52	48	33	34	33
Spain	52	48	28	39	33
United Kingdom	51	49	34	34	33
United States	51	49	36	33	30

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

Table A3: Education of Sample in the 13 NATO Member Countries

Country:	Education (%)		
	Below upper secondary	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	Tertiary
Czech Republic	6	70	24
Denmark	18	41	40
France	18	42	40
Germany	14	55	31
Greece	8	51	41
Hungary	14	57	28
Italy	37	43	20
Netherlands	19	38	42
Norway	17	37	45
Poland	7	60	33
Spain	37	23	40
United Kingdom	18	32	49
United States	8	42	50

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

Table A4: Attitudes about NATO Membership in the 13 NATO Member Countries

Country:	Agreement that own country's "membership in NATO is a good thing" (%)				
	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Agree strongly
Czech Republic	5	6	20	33	36
Denmark	1	2	13	26	58
France	3	5	27	32	33
Germany	3	4	20	28	46
Greece	9	10	35	29	16
Hungary	3	4	25	28	40
Italy	7	8	28	32	25
Netherlands	2	2	16	40	39
Norway	2	2	13	23	59
Poland	1	1	12	27	59
Spain	4	5	22	36	33
United Kingdom	1	2	17	30	49
United States	3	3	26	33	36

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

Summary Statistics for Respondents in Non-NATO Member Countries

Table A5: Number of Respondents in Each of the 3 Non-NATO Member Countries

Country:	Sample Size
Austria	996
Sweden	989
Switzerland	991
Total	2,976

Note: The sample sizes are reported after removing respondents who did not qualify.

Table A6: Gender and Age of Sample in the 3 Non-NATO Member Countries

Country:	Gender (%)		Age (%)		
	Female	Male	18-39	40-59	60+
Austria	51	49	32	35	33
Sweden	50	50	34	33	33
Switzerland	51	49	33	36	32

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

Table A7: Education of Sample in the 3 Non-NATO Member Countries

Country:	Education (%)		
	Below upper secondary	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	Tertiary
Austria	14	52	34
Sweden	16	39	45
Switzerland	11	44	45

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

Table A8: Attitudes about NATO Membership in the 3 Non-NATO Member Countries

Country:	Agreement that own country's "membership in NATO would be a good thing" (%)				
	Disagree strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Agree strongly
Austria	34	19	32	9	5
Sweden	9	9	27	28	27
Switzerland	20	20	40	15	6

Note: The statistics are reported after weighting.

IV. QUESTIONNAIRE (UNITED STATES)

Note: This questionnaire includes not only questions we preregistered for this article, but also questions that were included for unrelated projects.

Consent

You are invited to participate in a research study of public opinion. You will be asked questions about current economic, social, and political issues. The survey should take about 8 minutes to complete.

There are no risks associated with this study. You will be compensated according to your agreement with the survey company. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study.

If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The alternative is not to participate. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study.

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this research study, its procedures, risks and benefits, you should ask the Protocol Director, Professor Michael Tomz of Stanford University, at (650) 725-4031, email tomz@stanford.edu. If you are not satisfied with how this study is being conducted, or if you have any concerns, complaints, or general questions about the research or your rights as a participant, please contact the Stanford Institutional Review Board (IRB) to speak to someone independent of the research team at (650)-723-2480 or toll free at 1-866-680-2906, or email at irbnonmed@stanford.edu. You can also write to the Stanford IRB, Stanford University, 1705 El Camino Real, Palo Alto, CA 94306. Please save or print a copy of this page for your records.

If you agree to participate in this research, please select "I agree to participate." If you do not agree to participate, the survey will end immediately.

o I agree to participate
o I do not agree to participate

Programming instructions: If respondent selects "I do not agree to participate," end the survey.

—new page—

Screening Questions

Are you a citizen of the United States?
o Yes
o No

Programming instructions: If respondent selects "No," end the survey.

—new page—

Are you eligible to vote in the United States?
o Yes
o No

Programming instructions: If respondent selects "No," end the survey.

—new page—

Below, you will see a series of statements. Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each statement.

Programming instructions: randomize the order of these items.

2 + 2 = 7
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

Please click the "neither agree nor disagree" response
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The year 1910 came before the year 1920
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The use of military force only makes problems worse.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

Programming instructions: Confirm that respondent chose "disagree" or "disagree strongly" when prompted that 2+2=7; chose "neither agree nor disagree" when prompted to "click the neither agree nor disagree response"' and choose "agree" or "agree strongly" when prompted that "the year 1910 came before the year 1920." If respondent did not choose these answers, end the survey.

—new page—

Pretreatment Questions

Please specify your gender
o Male
o Female
o Other

In what year were you born?

o 2004
o 2003
…
o 1920

—*new page*—

Were you born in the United States?
o Yes
o No

—*new page*—

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...
o Republican
o Democrat
o Independent
o Another party, please specify
o No preference

—*new page*—

[If Republican] Would you call yourself a ...
o Strong Republican
o Not very strong Republican

[If Democrat] Would you call yourself a ...
o Strong Democrat
o Not very strong Democrat

[If neither Republican or Democrat] Do you think of yourself as closer to the ...
o Republican Party
o Democratic Party
o Neither party

—*new page*—

In general, do you think of yourself as ...
o Extremely liberal
o Liberal
o Slightly liberal
o Moderate, middle of the road
o Slightly conservative
o Conservative
o Extremely conservative

—new page—

In politics people often talk of "left" and "right". On this scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right), where would you classify your own political views?

o 0 left
o 1
…
o 10 right

—new page—

Which one of these is a part of the animal in the picture?
o Fin
o Tail
o Wings
o Beak
o Finger

Programming instructions: If respondent does not select "tail," end the survey.

—new page—

How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Programming instructions: randomize the order of these items.

Although the media often reports about national and international events and developments, this news is seldom as interesting as the things that happen directly in our own community and neighborhood.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

I enjoy learning about different cultures.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The United States has many things to learn from other countries.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

—new page—

How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Programming instructions: randomize the order of these items.

I would rather be a citizen of the United States than of any other country in the world.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

Generally speaking the United States is a better country than most other countries.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The United States should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

The U.S. government should just try to take care of the wellbeing of U.S. citizens and not get involved with other nations.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

—new page—

Next, we would like your opinion about some possible international concerns for the United States.

Programming instructions: randomize the order of these items.

Do you think that Russia's economic and political power is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to the United States?
o Major threat
o Minor threat
o Not a threat

How concerned are you about Russia using military force against the United States?
o Extremely concerned
o Very concerned
o Somewhat concerned
o Not very concerned
o Not at all concerned

—*new page*—

How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia?

Programming instructions: randomize the order of these items.

The United States's membership in NATO is a good thing.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

NATO should intervene in Ukraine against the ongoing Russian invasion.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

Russia's invasion of Ukraine represents a threat to all of Europe.
o Agree strongly
o Agree
o Neither agree nor disagree
o Disagree
o Disagree strongly

—*new page*—

Randomized Treatments

We randomly varied the following features:

The name of target country 1

- *target1* = Finland **–OR–**
- *target1* = Sweden

The name of target country 2

- *target2* = Bosnia **–OR–**
- *target2* = Georgia

Which target country was a member of NATO (*member1* is the membership status of *target1*, and *member2* is the membership status of *target2*)

- *member1* = yes and *member2* = no **–OR–**
- *member1* = no and *member2* = yes

Which of the two targets was presented in the first vignette (if *orderNATO*=t1, present vignette with target1 before vignette with target2. If *orderNATO*=t2, present vignette with target2 before vignette with target1.)

- *orderNATO* = t1 **–OR–**
- *orderNATO* = t2

Text of the Experiment

Please read these facts about NATO:

- The United States is a member of NATO.
- The NATO treaty says that if any member of NATO is attacked, the other members will take all necessary actions, including the use of armed force, to defend their ally.

o Click here after you have read this information carefully.

—new page—

Programming instructions: if orderNATO=t1, present vignette with target1 before vignette with target2. If orderNATO=t2, present vignette with target2 before vignette with target1.)

Vignette with target1

If target1 = Finland, display: The map below shows **the country of Finland**, which is located in Europe.

If target1 = Sweden, display: The map below shows **the country of Sweden**, which is located in Europe.



There is much discussion about whether **the country of ${e://Field/target1}** will become a member of NATO.

If member1 = yes, display: Suppose that ${e://Field/target1} **becomes a member** of NATO, and then Russia attacks ${e://Field/target1}. In that situation, do you think the United States should or should not use military force to defend ${e://Field/target1}?

o Definitely should
o Probably should
o Probably should not
o Definitely should not

If member1 = no, display: Suppose that ${e://Field/target1} **does not become a member** of NATO, and then Russia attacks ${e://Field/target1}. In that situation, do you think the United States should or should not use military force to defend ${e://Field/target1}?

o Definitely should
o Probably should
o Probably should not
o Definitely should not

—*new page*—

Vignette with target2

If target2 = Finland, display: The map below shows **the country of Bosnia**, which is located in Europe.

If target2 = Georgia, display: The map below shows **the country of Georgia**, which is located in Europe.

There is much discussion about whether **the country of ${e://Field/target2}** will become a member of NATO.

If member2 = yes, display: Suppose that ${e://Field/target2} **becomes a member** of NATO, and then Russia attacks ${e://Field/target2}. In that situation, do you think the United States should or should not use military force to defend ${e://Field/target2}?

o Definitely should
o Probably should
o Probably should not
o Definitely should not

If member2 = no, display: Suppose that ${e://Field/target2} **does not become a member** of NATO, and then Russia attacks ${e://Field/target2}. In that situation, do you think the United States should or should not use military force to defend ${e://Field/target2}?

o Definitely should
o Probably should
o Probably should not
o Definitely should not

—*new page*—

Additional Background Questions

How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you:
o Extremely interested
o Very interested
o Moderately interested
o Slightly interested
o Not at all interested

—*new page*—

Are you of Hispanic or Latino origin?
o No
o Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano
o Yes, Puerto Rican
o Yes, Cuban
o Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (please specify)

Which of the following best describes your race (mark all that apply)?
▢ White
▢ Black or African American
▢ American Indian or Alaska Native
▢ Asian
▢ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
▢ Some other race (please specify)

—*new page*—

Now we would like to ask you some final questions about your living conditions. Which of these options best describes your situation (in the last seven days)?
o Paid employee (including temporary leave of absence due to maternity/paternity, accident, illness or vacation)
o Self-employed (e.g. freelancer, independent contractor, or family-owned business)
o Student (excluding employer-sponsored education)
o Unemployed, actively searching for a job
o Unemployed, not actively searching
o Chronic illness or permanent disability
o Retired
o Working at home, caring for children or others

—*new page*—

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- o Did not graduate from high school
- o High school graduate
- o Some college, but no degree (yet)
- o 2-year college degree
- o 4-year college degree
- o Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

—*new page*—

Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

This information is very important for the validity of the study. Your information will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous.

- o Less than $10,000
- o $10,000 - $19,999
- o $20,000 - $29,000
- o $30,000 - $39,999
- o $40,000 - $49,999
- o $50,000 - $59,999
- o $60,000 - $69,999
- o $70,000 - $79,999
- o $80,000 - $99,999
- o $100,000 - $119,999
- o $120,000 - $149,999
- o $150,000 or more
- o Prefer not to say

—*new page*—

Which of the following statements comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?

- o With our current income, we live comfortably
- o With our current income, we make ends meet
- o With our current income, we have difficulties
- o With our current income, we have major difficulties

—new page—

In what state do you currently reside?

- o Alabama
- o Alaska
- o Arizona
- o Arkansas
- o California
- o Colorado
- o Connecticut
- o Delaware
- o District of Columbia
- o Florida
- o Georgia
- o Hawaii
- o Idaho
- o Illinois
- o Indiana
- o Iowa
- o Kansas
- o Kentucky
- o Louisiana
- o Maine
- o Maryland
- o Massachusetts
- o Michigan
- o Minnesota
- o Mississippi
- o Missouri
- o Montana
- o Nebraska
- o Nevada
- o New Hampshire
- o New Jersey
- o New Mexico
- o New York
- o North Carolina
- o North Dakota
- o Ohio
- o Oklahoma
- o Oregon
- o Pennsylvania
- o Puerto Rico
- o Rhode Island
- o South Carolina
- o South Dakota
- o Tennessee
- o Texas
- o Utah
- o Vermont
- o Virginia

o Washington
o West Virginia
o Wisconsin
o Wyoming
o I do not reside in the United States

What is the city/town in which you reside? _____