Loading wiki pages...

Wiki Version:
<p>Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does rational self-interest restrain the intuitive desire to cooperate? To answer this question, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play a mix of 1-shot and repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas. They can either use “intuition”, which is not sensitive to game type, or pay a cost to “deliberate” and thereby tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that selection favors one of two strategies: (i) intuitive defectors who never deliberate or (ii) dual-process agents that intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in 1-shot games. Critically, evolution never favors agents that use deliberation to override selfish impulses: deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation. Thus, for the first time, we provide a clear ultimate-level explanation about why people may be intuitively cooperative, but reflectively greedy.</p>
OSF does not support the use of Internet Explorer. For optimal performance, please switch to another browser.
This website relies on cookies to help provide a better user experience. By clicking Accept or continuing to use the site, you agree. For more information, see our Privacy Policy and information on cookie use.

Start managing your projects on the OSF today.

Free and easy to use, the Open Science Framework supports the entire research lifecycle: planning, execution, reporting, archiving, and discovery.