Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes

Jan G. Voelkel[1*], Michael N. Stagnaro[2*], James Chu[3*], Sophia L. Pink[4], Joseph S. Mernyk[1], Chrystal Redekopp[1], Isaias Ghezae[1], Matthew Cashman[2], Dhaval Adjodah[5], Levi Allen[6], Victor Allis[7], Gina Baleria[8,9], Nathan Ballantyne[10], Jay J. Van Bavel[11], Hayley Blunden[12], Alia Braley[13], Christopher Bryan[14], Jared Celniker[15], Mina Cikara[16], Margarett V. Clapper[17], Katherine Clayton[18], Hanne Collins[19], Evan DeFilippis[19], Macrina Dieffenbach[20], Kimberly C. Doell[11], Charles Dorison[21], Mylien Duong[22], Peter Felsman[23], Maya Fiorella[8,9], David Francis[24], Michael Franz[25], Roman Gallardo[26], Sara Gifford[7], Daniela Goya-Tocchetto[27], Kurt Gray[28], Joe Green[29], Joshua Greene[16], Mertcan Güngör[15], Matthew Hall[6], Cameron Hecht[17], Ali Javeed[11], John T. Jost[11], Aaron Kay[27], Nick R. Kay[29], Brandyn Keating[30], John Michael Kelly[15], James Kirk[6], Malka Kopell[8], Nour Kteily[21], Emily Kubin[31], Jeffrey Lees[32], Gabriel Lenz[13], Matthew Levendusky[33], Rebecca Littman[34], Kara Luo[35], Aaron Lyles[36], Ben Lyons[37], Wayde Marsh[38], James Martherus[39], Lauren Alpert Maurer[22], Caroline Mehl[22], Julia Minson[40], Molly Moore[41], Samantha L. Moore-Berg[26], Michael H. Pasek[34,42], Alex Pentland[43], Curtis Puryear[28], Hossein Rahnama[44], Steve Rathje[11], Jay Rosato[36], Maytal Saar-Tsechansky[14], Luiza Almeida Santos[45], Colleen Seifert[46], Azim Shariff[47], Otto Simonsson[48], Shiri Spitz Siddiqi[15], Daniel F. Stone[49], Palma Strand[8,50], Michael Tomz[18], David Yeager[51], Erez Yoeli[2], Jamil Zaki[45], James N. Druckman[52], David G. Rand[2], and Robb Willer[1]

[1]: Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

[2]: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

[3]: Department of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, USA

[4]: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

[5]: MIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

[6]: Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, USA

[7]: ActiVote, Boston, USA

[8]: Civity, San Francisco, USA

[9]: Department of Communication and Media Studies, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, USA

[10]: School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

[11]: Department of Psychology, New York University, New York City, USA

[12]: Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington D.C., USA

[13]: Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

[14]: McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

[15]: Department of Psychological Science, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, USA

[16]: Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

[17]: College of Liberal Arts, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

[18]: Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

[19]: Harvard Business School, Cambridge, USA

[20]: Facebook, Menlo Park, USA

[21]: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

[22]: Constructive Dialogue Institute, New York, USA

[23]: Social Work Department, Northern Michigan University, Marquette, USA

[24]: Information Technology, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, USA

[25]: Donald Bren School of Information and Computer Sciences, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, USA

[26]: Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

[27]: Fuqua School for Business, Duke University, Durham, USA

[28]: Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, USA

[29]: Centre for Applied Moral Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

[30]: YOUnify, Salt Lake City, USA

[31]: Department of Psychology, Rhineland-Palatinate Technical University Kaiserslautern-Landau, Landau, Germany

[32]: Behavioral Science for Policy Lab, Princeton University, Princeton, USA

[33]: Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

[34]: Department of Psychology, University of Illinois Chicago, Chicago, USA

[35]: Center for International Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

[36]: CommonAlly, Santa Monica, USA

[37]: Department of Communication, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

[38]: Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA

[39]: Morning Consult, Washington D.C., USA

[40]: Center for Public Leadership, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, USA

[41]: Department of Public Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA

[42]: Beyond Conflict, Boston, USA

[43]: Media Connection Service, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

[44]: School of Media, Toronto Metropolitan University; Toronto, Canada

[45]: Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

[46]: Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

[47]: Department of Psychology, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

[48]: Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institute, Solna, Sweden

[49]: Department of Economics, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, USA

[50]: Department of Marketing and Management, Creighton University, Omaha, USA

[51]: Department of Psychology, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, USA

[52]: Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

*: Shared lead authors.

Corresponding authors: Jan G. Voelkel and Robb Willer, Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. Contact: jvoelkel@stanford.edu and willer@stanford.edu.

Abstract

Deep partisan conflict in the mass public threatens the stability of American democracy. We conducted a megastudy (*n*=32,059) testing 25 interventions designed by academics and practitioners to reduce Americans' partisan animosity and anti-democratic attitudes. We find nearly every intervention reduced partisan animosity, most strongly by highlighting sympathetic and relatable individuals with different political beliefs. We also identify several interventions that reduced support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence, most strongly by correcting misperceptions of outpartisans' views – showing that anti-democratic attitudes, although difficult to move, are not intractable. Furthermore, both factor analysis and patterns of intervention effect sizes provide convergent evidence for limited overlap between these sets of outcomes, suggesting that, contrary to popular belief, different strategies are most effective for reducing partisan animosity versus anti-democratic attitudes. Taken together, our findings provide a toolkit of promising strategies for practitioners and shed new theoretical light on challenges facing American democracy.

Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes

American democracy is in crisis. Animosity toward political opponents, rising for decades (*1–4*), is now so widespread that it affects ostensibly non-political aspects of life. Partisan animosity threatens familial relationships (*5*), undermines romantic connections across party lines (*6*), causes workplace discrimination (*7*), exacerbates associated intergroup conflicts (*8*), and complicates collective responses to societal crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (*9*). Further, many voters violate democratic principles (*10*), for example by supporting overturning the results of the 2020 election (*11*), attacking the U.S. Capitol (*12*), and threatening violence against politicians and civil servants (*13*). Accordingly, many Americans are concerned that the country is extremely divided (*14*) and that American democracy is at risk of failing (*15*).

This crisis has motivated scholars from across the social sciences (*16*), as well as a large network of non-profit and activist organizations (see section *List of Example "Bridging" Organizations* of the Supplementary Materials (SM)), to identify how political conflict among Americans can be reduced. There are many ways to intervene to reduce political conflict and improve democratic functioning, including attempts to change the political system or influence political elites. Here we focus on interventions directed at changing attitudes in the American mass public, which can prevent democratic backsliding in many ways, for example by opposing undemocratic politicians or by voting for ballot initiatives that strengthen democratic institutions (*17–18*).

Most scholars and practitioners working in this space focus on reducing partisan animosity in the American public (for a review, see *19*). Despite this widespread interest,

however, the current state of knowledge is scattered. Insights from research often are isolated by academic discipline, ideas rarely spread between the social sciences and practitioners, and many ideas developed and used by practitioners have not been tested experimentally. Moreover, while this literature has identified several effective interventions, the use of different measures, research designs, and sampled populations makes it difficult to compare the effectiveness of interventions (*20–21*). Further, the reliability of existing findings is unclear in the context of widespread concerns about the replicability of social science research in general (*22*).

Beyond partisan animosity, many scholars are more concerned about the state of Americans' democratic attitudes than in levels of dislike between rival partisans (*23–24, 16, 10*). We define anti-democratic attitudes as individuals' support for undemocratic and/or violent forms of political engagement. While prior research has often assumed that reducing partisan animosity also improves anti-democratic attitudes (*16*), recent research casts doubt on this assumption (*24–25*), and few interventions have directly targeted anti-democratic attitudes (*26–28*).

In the current project, we fielded a large-scale survey experiment (n = 32,059) in April and May 2022, testing the effects of 25 interventions on partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, and a variety of additional outcomes (see section *Methods* of the SM). All interventions were obtained via an open call for interventions designed to reduce partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and/or support for partisan violence. By using a single between-subjects experiment with random assignment to interventions, consistent measures and control conditions, as well as the same sampled population, we directly compare the effectiveness of interventions relative to each other. By using a sample that is representative on several demographic benchmarks, we facilitate statistical

generalization of results to the population of U.S. partisans. And by studying many outcomes simultaneously, our study helps adjudicate among conflicting theoretical accounts of the extent to which the outcomes we study relate to – or are distinct from – each other.

In our study, we test the effects of "light-touch interventions" that are easy to implement (e.g., via websites or social media platforms), brief, inexpensive, and scalable (*29*). In all, we received 252 submitted interventions from 419 people in 17 countries and four continents. Submissions came from across the social sciences, including from psychologists, political scientists, sociologists, economists, and communication scholars. We also received submissions from practitioners working in non-profit organizations and activist groups for whom we provided targeted workshops and facilitated academic-practitioner collaboration teams. From this set of submissions, we selected the 25 most promising interventions in collaboration with an expert panel of social scientists and practitioners, basing our selections on evaluations of each submissions' likelihood of significantly reducing one or more of the target variables, novelty in the field, and uniqueness among the selected interventions (see section *Recruitment and election* of the SM). Three interventions were based on previously published papers, four were based on unpublished working papers, and 18 were newly developed interventions. Practitioners designed three interventions, academic-practitioner collaborations designed another three interventions, and academics designed the remaining 19 interventions. Table 1 shows descriptions of the 25 interventions (see also section *Treatments* of the SM).

Our study provides the best answers to date on several research questions. First, how common are a range of polarized and anti-democratic attitudes among U.S. partisans? Second, which interventions, if any, significantly reduce partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and/or support for partisan violence? Third, which interventions *most* strongly reduce

these outcomes? Finally, how do these and other outcomes (e.g., support for undemocratic candidates and biased evaluation of politicized facts; see Table 2 for all outcomes) relate to each other, and are the same interventions effective across various outcomes, or are different interventions needed for different outcomes?

Results

Baseline descriptives

Participants expressed concerning levels of partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence, as well as five other attitudes that are potentially problematic for healthy democratic functioning (Figure 1; see Table 2 for example items for all eight measures; all were measured on 0-100 scales; see section *Questionnaire and Treatments* of the SM for complete lists of items). On average, participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., the null control group, $N = 5{,}601$) reported high levels of animosity ($M = 68.1$) and moderate levels of social distrust ($M = 53.5$), support for undemocratic candidates ($M = 52.5$), and biased evaluations of politicized facts ($M = 51.5$). While preferences for social distance from rival partisans ($M = 30.7$), support for undemocratic practices ($M = 26.5$), opposition to bipartisan cooperation ($M = 20.9$), and support for partisan violence ($M = 10.9$) were lower in absolute terms, the levels of these attitudes could still challenge democratic functioning, for example by eroding norms prohibiting undemocratic practices and political violence.

While Democrats and Republicans reported concerning levels of all eight outcomes, Republicans expressed more support for undemocratic practices and candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distrust than Democrats. On the other hand, Democrats expressed more support for partisan violence and a stronger desire for social distance from

outpartisans. More strongly identified partisans displayed more antipathy on seven of the eight outcomes (for further descriptive analyses, see section *Descriptive Statistics* of the SM). These descriptive results underscore the importance of identifying effective interventions to reduce these potentially problematic attitudes.

Reducing partisan animosity

The submitters of most intervention focused on reducing partisan animosity in the American public (see section *Outcomes Submitters of Interventions Focused On* of the SM). Consistent with this, the interventions were overwhelmingly successful at reducing partisan animosity. In preregistered analyses, 23 out of the 25 interventions we tested significantly reduced partisan animosity (Figure 2A, Table S7.1). Many of the effects were also sizable, with the most effective interventions in our study reducing partisan animosity by more than 10 points on a 101-pt scale (maximum Cohen's d = -0.53).[1] Importantly, many interventions improved both the attitudinal (22 out of 25 effects significant; maximum Cohen's d = -0.52; Table S8.7) and the incentivized behavioral (22 out of 25 effects significant; maximum Cohen's d = -0.49; Table S8.8) components of our partisan animosity measure to a similar extent. Finally, using a preregistered follow-up study two weeks later, we tested whether the effects were durable for ten of the top performing interventions (for the selection criteria, see section *Durability Test* of the SM). We observed significant (sustained) reductions in partisan animosity for six of the ten interventions evaluated in this follow-up study (maximum Cohen's d = -0.21; Tables S11.1.1 and S11.2.1).

[1] An alternative control condition featuring information about the three branches of government also significantly reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (but not any of the other seven outcomes; see Tables S7.1.1-S8.5). Relative to this control condition, 17 interventions reduced partisan animosity, many sizably (maximum Cohen's d = -0.44), and durably (six significant effects). Regression results with the alternative control condition as the reference category are available in Tables S15.1.1-S15.1.9.

What were the strategies used by the most effective interventions for reducing partisan animosity? Two strategies stood out that were employed by the four top performing interventions, each of which outperformed at least 20 of the other 21 interventions (Table S9.1) The first strategy involved highlighting relatable, sympathetic individuals with different political beliefs. For example, the most effective intervention (*Positive Contact Video:* Cohen's $d = -0.53$, $p < .001$) presented a video depicting a series of interactions between pairs of people with quite different political orientations, nonetheless connecting with one another and finding mutual respect. Similarly, the fourth most effective intervention (*Sympathetic Personal Narratives*: Cohen's $d = -0.45$, $p < .001$) presented a series of videos of people from different backgrounds sharing views that other people might not expect them to hold.

The second effective strategy involved highlighting common cross-partisan identities. For example, the second most effective intervention (*Common Exhausted Majority Identity:* Cohen's $d = -0.51$, $p < .001$) argued that Democrats and Republicans jointly represent an exhausted majority that has been served polarizing content by the mass media and is tired of political conflict. Similarly, the third most effective intervention (*Common National Identity*: Cohen's $d = -0.46$, $p < .001$) highlighted that Democrats and Republicans share a common national identity as Americans.

Other general strategies were associated with smaller effect sizes or null effects of interventions. Strategies associated with smaller effect sizes included (a) highlighting policy similarities between Democrats and Republicans (*Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot*: Cohen's $d = -0.16$, $p < .001$; *Party Overlap on Policies*: Cohen's $d = -0.17$, $p < .001$), and (b) providing understandable reasons why outpartisans have the party identity they do (*Counterfactual Partisan Selves*: Cohen's $d = -0.09$, $p = .004$; *Outpartisans' Experiences of*

Harm: Cohen's d = -0.10, p = .001; *Moral Similarities and Differences*: Cohen's d = -0.26, p < .001). Ameliorating perceptions of outpartisans as threatening by highlighting the electoral supremacy of the inparty (*Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat*: Cohen's d = 0.03, p = .827) and highlighting the ineffectiveness of violent protests (*Political Violence Inefficacy*: Cohen's d = -0.03, p = .112) were ineffective in reducing partisan animosity.

Reducing support for undemocratic practices

To what extent do these promising findings extend beyond partisan animosity? Encouragingly, we found interventions that yielded significant improvements for all of the seven other potentially problematic outcomes we examined. However, effects on these outcomes were generally less common (range: 5-12 statistically significant effects per outcome, see Figure 2D, Tables S7.2-S8.5), smaller (range of largest absolute effect size: Cohen's d = 0.11-0.25), and less durable (range: 0-3 durable statistically significant effects per outcome, see section *Durability Test* of the SM) than for partisan animosity. Below, we focus on support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence, the two other outcomes intervention submitters were targeting and for which we preregistered our analyses.

What were the strategies used by the most effective interventions for reducing support for undemocratic practices? We found evidence for three effective strategies (Figure 2B, Tables S7.2 & S9.2). The first is correcting exaggerated stereotypes of supporters of the other party. The top performing intervention (*Correcting Democracy Misperceptions*: Cohen's d = -0.25, p < .001) presented participants with survey data on the levels of rival partisans' support for a number of undemocratic practices, which for most indicated lower support for positions, such as reducing the number of voting stations in areas that support outparty candidates, than they anticipated. Another effective misperception correction intervention (*Correcting Division Misperceptions*:

Cohen's d = -0.10, p = .001; 3rd ranked) showed a video of partisans' reactions upon learning that they had overestimated how much outpartisans dehumanized them.[2]

The second effective strategy was highlighting the potentially drastic and violent consequences of democratic collapse. This strategy is illustrated by *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's d = -0.21, p < .001, 2nd ranked), which showed participants video of civic unrest and police repression in several countries (e.g., Venezuela, Russia, Turkey) following some degree of democratic collapse, before concluding with imagery of the January 6th, 2021 U.S. Capitol attack. The third effective strategy involved showing endorsements of democratic principles by political elites. This strategy is illustrated by *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* (Cohen's d = -0.09, p = .001, 4th ranked), which featured a short film in which the Democratic and Republican party's 2020 Utah Gubernatorial candidates discussed their common commitment to honor the results of the upcoming 2020 election.

While identifying these three strategies is promising, we also gained insights regarding what does *not* work for reducing support for undemocratic practices. Four of 25 interventions (*Common Exhausted Majority Identity*, *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat*, *Describing a Likable Outpartisan*, *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions*) backfired, increasing support for undemocratic practices – including three that successfully reduced partisan animosity. Follow-up analyses indicated that backfire effects were driven by different political groups (e.g., conservative Republicans, conservative Democrats) for different interventions, suggesting these effects were not produced by a common causal dynamic (see Table S10.4.1).[3]

---

[2] Although *Correcting Division Misperceptions* also includes a correction about attitudes on an immigration policy, we think it is more likely that the dehumanization information drove this effect because another intervention (*Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot*) included similar information on immigration policy but was significantly less effective than *Correcting Division Misperceptions* across several outcomes.

[3] We also measured participants' support for undemocratic candidates (Table 2). Effects of interventions on support for undemocratic candidates were highly correlated with effects on support for undemocratic practices (r = .75),

Reducing support for partisan violence

What strategies were used by the interventions that were most effective in reducing support for partisan violence? We found evidence for two strategies (Figure 2C, Tables S7.3 & S9.3), both of which also reduced support for undemocratic practices. The first strategy is correcting exaggerated stereotypes about supporters of the other party. This strategy was illustrated by two effective interventions, *Correcting Division Misperceptions* (Cohen's d = -0.14, $p < .001$, 1st ranked) and *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* (Cohen's d = -0.08, p = .005, 3rd ranked). The second effective strategy is endorsements of democratic principles by political elites. This strategy was illustrated not only by the bipartisan endorsement of election results from the *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* intervention (Cohen's d = -0.10, $p < .001$, 2nd ranked) but also by an article in which an inparty leader endorsed non-violent political engagement (*Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues*: Cohen's d = -0.08, p = .004, 4th ranked).

Strikingly, the only intervention that backfired by increasing support for partisan violence (*Democratic Collapse Threat*) was one of the top performing interventions for reducing support for undemocratic practices and also reduced partisan animosity. Further analyses indicated that this backfire effect was driven by the most conservative Republican participants (see Table S10.4.1), and may have been caused by the intervention using footage from the January 6th riots, which many Republicans now perceive to be a legitimate protest (*30*). If conservative Republican participants viewed riot participants as politically like-minded, this footage could have increased support for partisan violence among these participants via social influence.

---

though interestingly, the *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* intervention decreased support for undemocratic candidates (see Table S8.1 and Discussion for further analysis of effects on support for undemocratic candidates).

Relationships between outcomes

Finally, we leverage the unique structure of this megastudy to shed new theoretical light on the psychology underlying polarization and democracy. Prior research has offered conflicting theoretical accounts of the relationships between partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, and the other measures we collected (described in Table 2). One prominent line of theorizing, adopted by many scholars in the field (see section *Forecasting Intervention Effects* of the SM), contends that all of these outcomes are different indicators of the same underlying construct – sometimes dubbed "political sectarianism" (*16*). Recently, however, an alternative theoretical account has been proposed whereby partisan animosity is distinct from, and does not directly shape, Americans' democratic attitudes (*24–25*). These two accounts represent fundamentally different views of the psychology underlying polarization and democracy, with important implications for the design of interventions.

Here, we help to adjudicate between these competing accounts with two complementary sets of analyses. First, we factor analyze responses from the $N = 5{,}341$ participants assigned to the null control condition (see section *Relationships between Outcomes* of the SM). The first two factors of this analysis clearly demonstrate that the outcome variables are not all manifestations of a single underlying construct (Figure 3A). Support for undemocratic practices, partisan violence, and undemocratic candidates load heavily on one factor; whereas partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts load heavily on a second factor. Opposition to bipartisan cooperation and social distance load heavily on both factors.

Next, we examine the degree to which outcomes were similarly affected by the 25 tested interventions, which points to similar conclusions. Figure 3B shows a network visualization of how intervention effect sizes are correlated between each pair of outcomes (see Table S13.2.1 for

the correlation matrix). A strong correlation between two outcomes implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in a similar way (effect size correlations between outcome variables ranged from -.24 to .74). The results are broadly consistent with the factor analysis: partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts responded to interventions similarly, and in a manner that is distinct from the pattern of responses for support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence.

While support for partisan violence is somewhat divergent from all other outcomes, note that the relatively low correlation in effect sizes between support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence is largely driven by the *Democratic Collapse Threat* intervention, which – as noted above – increased support for partisan violence among conservative Republicans, likely due to its invocation of January 6th.[4] Excluding this intervention from the analysis, support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence more clearly are part of a cluster of outcomes that co-vary as a result of the interventions, converging with the results of the factor analysis (see Table S13.2.7 & Figure S13.2.7). Effect sizes for support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance are correlated with effect sizes for all outcomes, except for support for partisan violence.

Finally, we directly examine the relationship between the results of (a) the factor analysis, and (b) the effect size correlations analysis. To do so, we calculate the Euclidean distance between each of the 28 unique pairs of the eight outcomes in the 2-dimensional factor structure space. We find that this distance is strongly associated (r = -.72) with the correlation in intervention effect sizes between each unique pair of outcomes. In other words, the closer

[4] Another explanation for the relatively low effect size correlations between support for partisan violence and other variables is that only a small fraction of the population report support for partisan violence and, for those who do, it may be largely rooted in non-political motives (*31*).

together pairs of outcomes are in their loadings on the two factors from the factor analysis, the more similarly they tended to respond to the 25 interventions we tested. Thus, the factor analysis and the effect size correlations offer highly consistent insights regarding the structure underlying American partisans' polarization and democracy-related attitudes.

Taken together, the pattern of results across these analyses suggests that the psychology underlying these polarization and democracy outcomes consists of two distinct dimensions. Partisan animosity is highly associated with other societally relevant outcomes – general social distrust and biased evaluation of politicized facts – somewhat in line with the 'political sectarianism' perspective. At the same time, support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence are largely separate from partisan animosity. Other variables, including preferences for social distance from outpartisans, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and support for undemocratic candidates are associated with both the partisan animosity cluster and the anti-democratic attitudes cluster. Thus, while partisan animosity does index several attitudes important to well-functioning democracies, some of the most critical democratic attitudes – support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence in particular – are clearly distinct. These results indicate that partisan animosity is not a unifying construct underpinning the psychology of polarization and democracy. Instead, our findings emphasize the need for further theoretical work going beyond the present focus on partisan animosity, in particular work that illuminates the psychological causes of support for democratic practices and partisan violence.

Discussion

What have we learned about which interventions were most effective? Interventions that presented relatable, sympathetic outpartisans, or that highlighted a common cross-party identity, were most effective in reducing partisan animosity, while interventions that corrected

misperceptions about how anti-democratic outpartisans are, or that highlighted the potentially disastrous consequences of democratic collapse, were most effective in reducing support for undemocratic practices. Interventions that corrected misperceptions about outpartisans' dehumanization of political opponents, or that provided pro-democratic elites cues, were most effective in reducing support for partisan violence. Importantly, the five top-performing interventions for each of the three primary outcomes were all previously unpublished interventions, two of which were submitted by practitioners and academics working together. Future research crafting new interventions may use these top performing interventions as benchmarks for evaluating impact.

Interventions utilizing these strategies were not all equally effective. For example, the different misperception correction interventions varied in their effectiveness. Providing corrective information about outpartisans' anti-democratic attitudes and levels of dehumanization reduced support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. However, providing corrective information about policy positions (*Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot*), or about levels of acceptance of suffering for electoral advantages (*Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions*), or about levels of opposition to inparty initiatives among outpartisans (*Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions*), did not reduce support for undemocratic practices or partisan violence. These findings extend prior research on inaccurate outparty stereotypes (*32–34, 28*), showing that the effects of misperception corrections vary depending on the type of misperceptions they correct. More generally, these findings suggest that while some strategies are promising approaches, the specific way they are implemented matters as well.

We also observed several other characteristics of more effective interventions that often go unnoticed in studies that look at fewer interventions at once. First, the more interventions

explicitly referenced partisan animosity and support for undemocratic practices, the more they tended to reduce those outcomes (though this was not the case for support for partisan violence; see Table S14.2). Second, more multifactorial interventions – i.e., interventions that employed multiple unique theoretical mechanisms (e.g., *Common National Identity*) – tended to be more effective (Table S14.3). Although unifactorial interventions are often preferred by academics because they allow stronger theoretical inferences about the causal factors driving the observed effects, our finding suggests that multifactorial interventions are more effective for intervening on these outcomes. Third, interventions that had higher production quality and were more engaging were more effective in moving outcomes (Table S14.4).

How could these findings be used to ameliorate partisan division and anti-democratic attitudes? The most impactful interventions could be applied on websites and social media platforms to shift attitudes in the mass public. Because our online testing environment resembled those environments, we would expect similar effects for participants who engage with the interventions on these sites. Adapting the interventions identified here to target political elites could also affect policy (*33, 35*). Furthermore, the insights we have generated regarding the psychology underlying polarization and democracy could help in crafting structural interventions that can be more impactful and enduring than short term interventions or nudges (*36-38, 3*). For example, the impact of misperceptions of outpartisans' views suggests that changing feed algorithms on social media platforms to reduce the prominence of content stimulating such misperceptions could strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes. Additionally, the effects of the bipartisan endorsement of democratic principles by the two 2020 Utah gubernatorial candidates suggests that elites cues can produce content sufficient to strengthen pro-democratic attitudes. Production of content like this could be encouraged by consortiums of political donors who

earmark their contributions to be contingent on the candidates participating in bipartisan endorsements of democratic principles.

Our results offer additional insights about how to reduce other attitudes and beliefs that threaten democracy. For example, support for undemocratic candidates is important because voting is a crucial means by which the mass public can check democratic backsliding. We find that the interventions that reduced support for undemocratic candidates overlapped both with those that most strongly reduced support for undemocratic practices and, to a lesser extent, those that most strongly reduced partisan animosity. This suggests partisans can be encouraged to withdraw support for undemocratic inparty leaders either by reducing their support for undemocratic practices, or by reducing their animosity toward rival partisans, but only if the partisan animosity reduction is large.

Another way to improve democratic functioning is through structural democratic reforms. We identify several (previously unpublished) interventions – most notably *Democratic Collapse Threat* – significantly increased support for several proposed democratic reforms, including Automatic Voter Registration (Figures S8.9-8.12 and Tables S8.9-S8.12). Another way to strengthen democratic societies is to reduce unfounded skepticism about election integrity. Here as well, we found two (previously unpublished) interventions – *Common National Identity* and *Democratic Collapse Threat* – that reduced denial of recent presidential election results (which was one item of the *Biased Evaluation of Partisan Facts* composite) (see Figure S8.13 and Table S8.13).

Although an important insight from our findings is that the most effective strategies often varied across outcomes, some readers may be interested in the intervention that was most effective overall. *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* was the top performing intervention for

reducing a composite of all eight outcomes (see Figure S8.6 and Table S8.6). The most effective interventions for any subset of the eight outcomes can be identified using the Strengthening Democracy Challenge App at https://www.strengtheningdemocracychallenge.org/results.

There are several alternative accounts of our findings that are important to address. First, one might worry that these interventions are less effective among those identified by our descriptive analyses to be more likely to put party over democracy: strongly identified partisans and Republicans. We find, however, that the interventions were similarly or more effective for strongly (versus weakly) identified partisans, and similarly effective among Democrats and Republicans. A notable exception was the backfire effect of *Democratic Collapse Threat* on support for partisan violence among Republican (but not Democratic) participants. More generally, we find limited evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects across participant subgroups in analyses using generalized random forests to identify rank-weighted average treatment effects (see section *Heterogeneous Treatment Effects* of the SM). Additionally, our study focused solely on the U.S. While the rise of polarization and threats to democracy have been very salient in the U.S., they are pressing issues in many countries (*1, 39*). Thus, it is critical for future work to explore how our findings do or do not generalize across countries and cultures. Relatedly, future research should further assess the psychological mechanisms that explain why certain interventions were especially effective (e.g. *4*). We address other potential concerns – e.g., possible demand effects, robustness of results for outcomes with left-censored distributions, differential attrition, multiple testing, and measurement – in detail in the section *Addressing Alternative Accounts* of the SM.

Here, we have used a large-scale megastudy to shed new light on the psychology underlying polarization and democracy in America. Our results yield several main takeaways.

First, we document worrisome baseline levels of polarization and anti-democratic attitudes. Second, we show that many interventions reliably, sizably, and durably reduce both survey and behavioral indicators of partisan animosity. Third, we identify several (previously unpublished) interventions that reduced a variety of anti-democratic attitudes, thus filling an important gap in a literature that has focused almost exclusively on reducing partisan animosity. Fourth, we adjudicate between competing theoretical accounts, showing that – in our study – distinct causal forces influence partisan animosity versus support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. Finally, support for undemocratic candidates, a threat to democratic societies, can be reduced by intervening on either partisan animosity or support for undemocratic practices.

Societies have great interests in strengthening democratic attitudes. These efforts can be immensely costly, yet their effectiveness is unknown. Our study suggests low-cost, scalable interventions can strengthen pro-democratic opinions among U.S. partisans. While work should determine how to further optimize the intervention approaches presented here, the fact that numerous interventions successfully reduced partisan animosity and anti-democratic attitudes provides reason for optimism that researchers, practitioners, and governments can use cost-effective and evidence-based interventions to strengthen support for democracy in the U.S. mass public and beyond.

Intervention	Description
Befriending Meditation	Participants heard an audio track that guided them through a befriending meditation. The speaker emphasized treating oneself well and being kind to others.
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Participants played a collaborative trivia game in which they would perform better if they used answers shared by their outpartisan partner.
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	Participants were asked to what extent most outpartisans support undemocratic actions, and were then told the true extent of this support (quite low) using previously collected survey data.
Correcting Division Misperceptions	Participants watched a video featuring several Democrats and Republicans learning that the other side is less extreme on immigration and outparty dehumanization than they expected.
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Participants estimated to what extent outpartisans would accept extreme negative events (e.g., many U.S. COVID-related deaths) to increase odds of winning the next election, then received feedback that the average outpartisan would not accept such events for electoral advantage.
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Participants estimated how many outpartisans would oppose state legislative actions that could benefit the inparty. Participants got feedback on how the average outpartisan responded.
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Participants interacted with a chatbot, guessing where Democrats and Republicans fall on various political issues, then received feedback on how far apart Democrats and Republicans truly are.
Common Economic Interests	Participants watched a video suggesting that economic interests unite most Americans across political divides, and that the super rich are a common enemy of most Democrats and Republicans.
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Participants read that news media creates polarization to maximize its audience. Participants read that most Democrats and Republicans are part of an exhausted majority that rejects polarization.
Common National Identity	Participants read that democracy has been crucial to America's success. Participants read that Democrats and Republicans share a national identity which entails supporting democracy and rejecting violence.
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Participants read that environments and experiences shape people's political beliefs. Participants gave their views on divisive issues and then answered the questions again imagining they were born into different circumstances.
Democratic Collapse Threat	Participants watched a video of civic unrest and police repression in several countries where democracy collapsed and saw scenes from the 2021 US Capitol riot. Participants then answered questions about how they could protect democracy.
Democratic System Justification	Participants read an article about how the U.S. and Americans never abandon the principles that made America great. Participants read that Americans stay faithful to the principles of democracy, civility, and respect.
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Participants wrote about a person from the other party that they like and respect.

Moral Similarities and Differences	Participants read about Moral Foundation Theory, which argues that we all share the same six moral foundations. Participants read that people use these moral foundations differently on different issues.
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	Participants read that outpartisans hold their views due to personal experiences of suffering. For example, Republican participants read a story of a person who is anti-gun because their friend was murdered by someone who obtained a gun without a proper background check.
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Participants read a message and survey responses from an outpartisan who indicated a willingness to learn about and better understand opposing views. Participants then responded to the message.
Party Overlap on Policies	Participants answered questions about their views on eight policies. After each question, they are shown the high overlap in the views of Democrats and Republicans on the issue.
Political Violence Inefficacy	Participants read a news article about how non-violent protests are historically more effective than violent protests in bringing about social change.
Positive Contact Video	Participants watched a video showing pairs of British people bonding with one another despite having political disagreements. Participants who answered questions about the video correctly could share the video with someone from the other party.
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Participants read an op-ed (a) quoting a leader of their party rejecting violence and anti-democratic actions, and (b) reporting that more than 90% of inpartisans reject violence and anti-democratic actions.
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Participants watched a campaign ad from the 2020 Democratic and Republican candidates for Utah governor. Both candidates endorsed accepting the results of the election and a peaceful transfer of power.
Reducing Outpartisan Electoral Threat	Participants read about how their party is dominating American politics now and will for the foreseeable future.
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Participants watched five short videos of people talking about what others may miss about them. Participants then watched another animated video about how democracy allows people with different views to work together.
Utility of Outparty Empathy	Participants read that empathizing with people with different political beliefs can lead one's own side to be more persuasive and liked.

Table 1 | The 25 interventions. The Strengthening Democracy Challenge received 252 submissions from across the social sciences and from practitioners (see Table S5.1). The editorial board, guided by an 29-member Advisory Board of expert researchers and practitioners (see section *Advisory Board* of the SM), selected the 25 most promising interventions for experimental testing. Selection criteria were (a) likelihood to affect partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and/or support for partisan violence, (b) novelty, and (c) low overlap with other selected interventions. The label column has the names of the interventions we use throughout the manuscript to identify the interventions. When clicked, labels send readers to the content participants experienced during the study. The description column summarizes each intervention. More information about each intervention (including the submitting authors) can be found in section *Treatments* of the SM.

Outcome Variable	Definition	Example Item(s)
Partisan Animosity	Dislike for opposing partisans	…How would you rate [Democrats / Republicans]?...Very cold or unfavorable feeling…No feeling…Very warm or favorable feeling* …How many cents (if any) will you give to the [Democratic / Republican] participant?*
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Willingness to forgo democratic principles for partisan gain	[Republicans / Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose.
Support for Partisan Violence	Willingness to use violent tactics against outpartisans	How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans / Democrats] to use violence if the [Democratic / Republican] party wins more races in the next election?
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Willingness to ignore undemocratic practices to elect inparty candidates	How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican / Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans / Democrats] should not accept the results of elections they lose?
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Resistance to cross-partisan collaboration	To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?
Social Distrust	Distrust of people in general	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
Social Distance	Resistance to interpersonal contact with outpartisans	How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats / Republicans]?
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Skepticism of facts that favor the worldview of the other party	[Joe Biden / Donald Trump] was lawfully elected President in the [2020 / 2016] election against [Donald Trump / Hillary Clinton].

Table 2 | The eight outcome variables. The outcomes were selected as important variables relating to the psychology underlying polarization and democracy. The first column provides the name of each outcome variable. The second column provides the definition of each outcome variable. The third column provides item(s) illustrating how each outcome variable was measured (Note: Text of feeling thermometer and dictator game items are excerpted). The complete wording of these and all other items are in section *Questionnaire and Treatments* of the SM. Variables that were specified as targets for submitters and preregistered as primary outcome variables appear in bold print. Reliability estimates for all outcome variable measures are provided in Table S3.2.


A
Partisan Animosity
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0
25
50
75
100
B
Support for Undemocratic Practices
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
C
Support for Partisan Violence
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
D
Support for Undemocratic Candidates
E
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation
4.0%
F
Social Distrust
G
Social Distance
H
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts

Figure 1 | American partisans expressed concerning levels of attitudes that are potentially problematic for healthy democratic functioning. Participants in the null control condition reported **a.** high levels of partisan animosity (n = 5,552; M = 68.1), **b.** low levels of support for undemocratic practices (n = 5,556; M = 26.5), **c.** low levels of support for partisan violence (n = 5,556; M = 10.9), **d.** moderate levels of support for undemocratic candidates (n = 5,463; M = 52.5), **e.** low levels of opposition to bipartisan cooperation (n = 5,402; M = 20.9), **f.** moderate levels of social distrust (n = 5,405; M = 53.5), **g.** low levels of preferences for social distance from rival partisans (n = 5,401; M = 30.7), and **h.** moderate levels of biased evaluations of politicized facts (n = 5,388; M = 51.6). The measure for each variable is described in detail in *Questionnaire and Treatments* in the SM. All variables range from 0-100. Ranges on y-axes differ for each variable. Partisan differences were modest, as shown by large overlap in distributions between Democrats (blue) and Republicans (red) (overlap shown in purple). Democrats reported higher levels of support for partisan violence and social distance. Republicans reported higher levels of support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distrust (see section *Descriptive Statistics* of the SM). These results underscore the importance of identifying effective interventions to reduce these potentially problematic attitudes.


A
Effects of Interventions on Partisan Animosity
Positive Contact Video
Common Exhausted Majority Identity
Common National Identity
Sympathetic Personal Narratives
Correcting Division Misperceptions
Utility of Outparty Empathy
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn
Befriending Meditation
Describing a Likable Outpartisan
Moral Similarities and Differences
Democratic Collapse Threat
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz
Party Overlap on Policies
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions
Democratic System Justification
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues
Alternative Control
Counterfactual Partisan Selves
Common Economic Interests
Political Violence Inefficacy
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat
-12
-8
-4
0
B
Effects of Interventions on Support for Undemocratic Practices
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions
Democratic Collapse Threat
Correcting Division Misperceptions
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues
Common National Identity
Sympathetic Personal Narratives
Positive Contact Video
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn
Alternative Control
Befriending Meditation
Political Violence Inefficacy
Utility of Outparty Empathy
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz
Democratic System Justification
Moral Similarities and Differences
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot
Party Overlap on Policies
Counterfactual Partisan Selves
Common Economic Interests
Common Exhausted Majority Identity
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat
Describing a Likable Outpartisan
-6
-4
-2
0
2
C
Effects of Interventions on Support for Partisan Violence
Correcting Division Misperceptions
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions
Positive Contact Video
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat
Common National Identity
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot
Befriending Meditation
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm
Counterfactual Partisan Selves
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz
Common Economic Interests
Party Overlap on Policies
Sympathetic Personal Narratives
Political Violence Inefficacy
Utility of Outparty Empathy
Democratic System Justification
Moral Similarities and Differences
Common Exhausted Majority Identity
Alternative Control
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions
Describing a Likable Outpartisan
Democratic Collapse Threat
-4
-2
0
2
4
D
Effect Sizes across Outcome Variables
Positive Contact Video
Common Exhausted Majority Identity
Common National Identity
Sympathetic Personal Narratives
Correcting Division Misperceptions
Utility of Outparty Empathy
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn
Befriending Meditation
Describing a Likable Outpartisan
Moral Similarities and Differences
Democratic Collapse Threat
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz
Party Overlap on Policies
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions
Democratic System Justification
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues
Alternative Control
Counterfactual Partisan Selves
Common Economic Interests
Political Violence Inefficacy
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat
Partisan Animosity
Social Distance
Social Distrust
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation
Support for Undemocratic Candidates
Support for Undemocratic Practices
Support for Partisan Violence
Cohen's d
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5

Figure 2 | Megastudy identifies many effective interventions that reduce partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and/or support for partisan violence. a. 23 interventions significantly reduced partisan animosity (*n* = 31,835), most effectively by presenting relatable, sympathetic outpartisans, or highlighting a common, cross-party identity. **b.** Six interventions significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices (*n* = 31,856), most effectively by correcting misperceptions about how anti-democratic outpartisans are, or highlighting the potentially disastrous consequences of democratic collapse. **c.** Five interventions significantly reduced support for partisan violence (*n* = 31,837), most effectively by correcting misperceptions that outpartisans dehumanize political opponents, or providing pro-democracy elites cues. Figures 2a-c show regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effects of the 25 interventions and the alternative control condition, relative to the null control condition, based on preregistered regression models (Tables S7.1-S7.3). Effects are regression coefficients on a 101-pt scale. Interventions are sorted in order of effect size. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Note that we preregistered using one-sided p-values so that significance levels cannot be concluded from whether the confidence interval includes zero. **d.** Effectiveness of the interventions extended to other outcomes, including support for undemocratic candidates (six significant effects, *n* = 31,470), opposition to bipartisan cooperation (six significant effects, *n* = 31,239), social distrust (eleven significant effects, *n* = 31,247), social distance (twelve significant effects, *n* = 31,228), and biased evaluation of politicized facts (five significant effects, *n* = 31,186). Figure 2d shows the standardized effect sizes (Cohen's *d*) for all 25 interventions and the alternative control condition, relative to the null control condition, for eight outcomes. Identifying many interventions for several anti-democratic attitudes fills an important gap in the literature that has previously focused almost exclusively on reducing partisan animosity. Identifying top performing interventions provides benchmarks future research may use in evaluation of the impact of new interventions.


A
Factor 2 Loading
Factor 1 Loading
Strong loading on Factor 1
Strong loading on Factor 2
Partisan Animosity
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Social Distance
Social Distrust
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation
Support for Undemocratic Candidates
Support for Undemocratic Practices
Support for Partisan Violence
B
Social Distrust
Partisan Animosity
Support for Partisan Violence
Social Distance
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation
Support for Undemocratic Candidates
Support for Undemocratic Practices
Effect Size
Correlation

Figure 3 | The structure underlying the psychology underlying polarization and democracy consists of multiple clusters. a. A factor analysis suggests that (i) support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, and support for undemocratic candidates load heavily on one factor, (ii) partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts load heavily on the other factor, and (iii) opposition to bipartisan cooperation and social distance load heavily on both factors. The figure shows the factor loadings from a two-factor factor analysis with orthogonal factors among participants in the null control condition (n = 5,341). **b.** A network diagram of effect size correlations across the 25 interventions finds largely converging results with the factor analysis: effects of interventions on partisan animosity are most strongly associated with effects on social distrust and biased evaluation of politicized facts, more moderately associated with effects on support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance, and weakly associated or unassociated with effects on support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.1 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization. We find similar patterns for the effect size correlations among Democrats and Republicans as well as weak and strong partisans (see section Relationships between Outcomes of the SM). For comparison, a network diagram showing bivariate correlations of outcome variables in the null control group is shown in Figure S13.2.8. Taken together, factor analysis and effect size correlations provide converging evidence that partisan animosity indexes some attitudes important to well functioning democracies, but other important anti-democratic attitudes are largely distinct.

References

1. L. Boxell, M. Gentzkow, J. M. Shapiro, Cross-country trends in affective polarization. *Rev. Econ. Stat.* 10.1162/rest_a_01160 (2022).
2. S. Iyengar, M. Krupenkin, The strengthening of partisan affect. *Polit. Psychol.* **39**, 201–218 (2018).
3. S. Iyengar, Y. Lelkes, M. Levendusky, N. Malhotra, S. J. Westwood, The origins and consequences of affective polarization in the United States. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* **22**, 129–146 (2019).
4. J. T. Jost, D. Baldassarri, J. N. Druckman, Cognitive-motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts. *Nat. Rev. Psychol.* **1**, 560–576.
5. M. K. Chen, R. Rohla, The effect of partisanship and political advertising on close family ties. *Science* **360**, 1020–1024 (2018).
6. G. A. Huber, N. Malhotra, Political homophily in social relationships: Evidence from online dating behavior. *J. Polit.* **79**, 269–283 (2017).
7. C. McConnell, Y. Margalit, N. Malhotra, M. Levendusky, The economic consequences of partisanship in a polarized era. *Am. J. Pol. Sci.* **62**, 5–18 (2018).
8. S. J. Westwood, E. Peterson, The inseparability of race and partisanship in the United States. *Polit. Behav.* **44**, 1125-1147 (2022).
9. J. N. Druckman, S. Klar, Y. Krupnikov, M. Levendusky, J. B. Ryan, Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* **5**, 28–38 (2021).

10. M. H. Graham, M. W. Svolik, Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **144**, 392–409 (2020).

11. "National Tracking Poll #2110134," *Morning Consult/Politico*, October 2021; https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017c-c00e-d3c9-a77c-cb9eab6a0000&nname=playbook&nid=0000014f-1646-d88f-a1cf-5f46b7bd0000&nrid=0000014e-f115-dd93-ad7f-f91513e50001&nlid=630318.

12. K. Lonsdorf, C. Dorning, A. Isackson, M. L. Kelly, A. Chang, "A timeline of how the Jan 6th attack unfolded—Including who said what and when," *NPR*, 9 June 2022; https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-the-jan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when.

13. J. E. Greve, L. Gambino, "US faces new era of political violence as threats against lawmakers rise," *The Guardian*, 31 July 2022; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/jul/31/us-political-violence-threats-against-lawmakers.

14. "Partisan Antipathy: More Intense, More Personal," *Pew Research Center*, 10 October 2019; https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/10/10/the-partisan-landscape-and-views-of-the-parties/.

15. "Seven in ten Americans say the country is in crisis, at risk of failing," *NPR/Ipsos*, 3 January 2022; https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/seven-ten-americans-say-country-crisis-risk-failing.

16. E. J. Finkel, C. A. Bail, M. Cikara, P. H. Ditto, S. Iyengar, S. Klar, L. Mason, M. C. McGrath, B. Ryhan, D. G. Rand, L. J. Skitka, J. A. Tucker, J. J. Van Bavel, C. S. Wang, J. N. Druckman, Political sectarianism in America. *Science* **370**, 533–536 (2020).

17. S. Levitsky, D. Ziblatt, *How Democracies Die* (Crown, 2018).

18. B. R. Weingast, The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* **91**, 245–263 (1997).

19. R. Hartman, W. Blakey, J. Womick, C. A. Bail, E. Finkel, H. Han, J. Sarrouf, J. Schroeder, P. Sheeran, J. J. Van Bavel, R. Willer, K. Gray, Interventions to reduce partisan animosity. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* **6**, 1194-1205 (2022).

20. B. Hameiri, S. L. Moore-Berg, Intervention tournaments: An overview of concept, design, and implementation. *Perspect. Psychol. Sci.* 174569162110580 (2022).

21. K. L. Milkman, D. Gromet, H. Ho, J. S. Kay, T. W. Lee, P. Pandiloski, Y. Park, A. Rai, M. Bazerman, J. Beshears, L. Bonacorsi, C. Camerer, E. Chang, G. Chapman, R. Cialdini, H. Dai, L. Eskreis-Winkler, A. Fishbach, J. J. Gross, S. Horn, A. Hubbard, S. J. Jones, D. Karlan, T. Kautz, E. Kirgios, J. Klusowski, A. Kristal, R. Ladhania, G. Loewenstein, J. Ludwig, B. Mellers, S. Mullainathan, S. Saccardo, J. Spiess, G. Suri, J. H. Talloen, J. Taxer, Y. Trope, L. Ungar, K. G. Volpp, A. Whillans, J. Zinman, A. L. Duckworth, Megastudies improve the impact of applied behavioural science. *Nature* **600**, 478–483 (2021).

22. Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. *Science* **349**, aac4716 (2015).

23. L. Bartels, Ethnic antagonism erodes Republicans' commitment to democracy. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **117**, 22752–22759 (2020).

24. D. Broockman, J. Kalla, S. Westwood, Does affective polarization undermine democratic norms or accountability? *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* 10.1111/ajps.12719 (2022).

25. J. G. Voelkel, J. Chu, M. Stagnaro, J. S. Mernyk, C. Redekopp, S. L. Pink, J. Druckman, D. G. Rand, R. Willer, Interventions reducing affective polarization do not improve anti-democratic attitudes. *Nat. Hum. Behav.* 10.1038/s41562-022-01466-9 (2022).

26. "Tempered expectations and hardened divisions a year into the Biden presidency," *Bright Line Watch*, November 2021; http://brightlinewatch.org/tempered-expectations-and-hardened-divisions-a-year-into-the-biden-presidency/

27. N. P. Kalmoe, L. Mason, *Radical American partisanship: Mapping violent hostility, its causes, and the consequences for democracy* (University of Chicago Press, 2022), pp. 144-150.

28. J. S. Mernyk, S. L. Pink, J. N. Druckman, R. Willer, Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support for partisan violence. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **119**, e2116851119 (2022).

29. E. L. Paluck, R. Porat, C. S. Clark, D. P. Green, Prejudice Reduction: Progress and Challenges. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* **72**, 533-560 (2021).

30. A. Blake, "Analysis | More Republicans now call Jan. 6 a 'legitimate protest' than a 'riot,'" The Washington Post, 7 July 2022; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/07/many-republicans-no-longer-call-jan-6-an-insurrection-or-even-riot/.

31. S. J. Westwood, J. Grimmer, M. Tyler, C. Nall, Current research overstates American support for political violence. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* **119**, e2116870119 (2022).

32. D. J. Ahler, G. Sood, The parties in our heads: Misperceptions about party composition and their consequences. *J. Polit.* **80**, 964–981 (2018).

33. J. N. Druckman, S. Kang, J. Chu, M. N. Stagnaro, J. G. Voelkel, J. S. Mernyk, S. L. Pink, C. Redekopp, D. G. Rand, R. Willer, Correcting exaggerated meta-perceptions reduces American legislators' support for undemocratic practices. [Preprint] (2023) https://www.ipr.northwestern.edu/our-work/working-papers/2023/wp-23-04.html

34. A. P. Landry, J. W. Schooler, R. Willer, P. Seli, Reducing explicit blatant dehumanization by correcting exaggerated meta-perceptions. *Soc. Psychol. Personal Sci.* 194855062210991 (2022).

35. D. J. Hopkins, Stable views in a time of tumult: assessing trends in US public opinion, 2007-20. *Br. J. Polit. Sci* 10.1017/S0007123422000254 (2022).

36. N. Chater, G. Loewenstein, The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray. *Behav. Brain Sci.* 0.1017/S0140525X22002023 (2022).

37. F. Mols, S. A. Haslam, J. Jetten, N. K. Steffens, Why a nudge is not enough: a social identity critique of governance by stealth. *Eur. J. Polit. Res.* **54**, 81–98 (2015).

38. A. Wuttke, F. Sichart, F. Foos, Null Effects of Pro-Democracy Speeches by U.S. Republicans in the Aftermath of January 6th. [Preprint] (2022). 10.31235/osf.io/pd5za.

39. "Democracy report 2022: autocratization changing nature?" *V-Dem Institute*, March 2022; https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf.

Acknowledgements

The authors received funding for this project from the Civic Health Project, the Fetzer Institute, the Stanford Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society, Stanford Social Impact Labs, the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University, the United States Department of the Navy Office of Naval Research, the TDF Foundation, and the Ford Motor Company Center for Global Citizenship at Northwestern University. This work is supported under a Stanford Interdisciplinary Graduate Fellowship. We thank Mark Brandt, David Broockman, Kristin Hansen, Justin Grimmer, Rob Romero, Austin van Loon, and the members of the Stanford Polarization and Social Change Lab for helpful feedback on the project and Kylie Brianne Fuller and Jose Luis Gandara for administrative support. Finally, we are very grateful to the members of the Advisory Board: Mannie Ajayi, Chris Bail, Loren Bendele, Adam Berinsky, Pete Ditto, Long Doan, Corey Fields, Eli Finkel, Matthew Gentzkow, Cheryl Graeve, Kristin Hansen, Eszter Hargittai, Vincent Hutchings, Lucas Johnson, Cindy Kam, Adam Seth Levine, Neil Malhotra, Lilliana Mason, Leslie McCall, Melissa Michelson, Jenan Mohajir, Mohammed Naeem, Mara Ostfeld, Zeenat Rahman, Jaime Settle, Jesse Shapiro, Betsy Sinclair, Michelle Torres, and Julie Wronski.

Author Contributions

J.G.V., M.N.S., J.C., J.N.D., D.G.R., and R.W. designed the research. D.A., L.A., V.A., G.B., N.B., J.J.V.B., H.B., A.B., C.B., J.C., M.C., M.V.C., K.C., H.C., E.D.F., M.D., K.C.D., C.D., M.D., P.F., M.F., D.F., M.F., R.G., S.G., D.G.T., K.G., J.G., J.G., M.G., M.H., C.H., A.J., J.T.J., A.K., N.R.K., B.K., J.M.K., J.K., M.K., N.K., E.K., J.L., G.L., M.L., R.L., K.L., A.L., B.L., W.M., J.M., L.A.M., C.M., J.M., M.M., S.M.B., M.H.P., A.P., C.P., H.R., S.R., J.R., M.S.T., L.A.S., C.S., A.S., O.S., S.S.S., D.F.S., P.S., M.T., D.Y., E.Y., and J.Z. designed the interventions. J.G.V., M.N.S., J.C., S.P., J.S.M., C.R., and R.W. collected the data. J.G.V., J.C., and S.L.P. analyzed the data. J.G.V. wrote the first draft. D.G.R. and R.W. revised the paper. M.N.S., J.C., J.N.D., J.V.B., M.C., J.G., J.T.J., N.K., J.L., G.L., M.L., S.M.B., D.S., and D.Y. provided comments.

Competing Interests

Note that two members of the core author team (JGV & RW) had previously co-authored with one of the teams that submitted the "Utility of Outparty Empathy" intervention on a paper that included a similar intervention. To avoid any influence of bias, JV and RW recused themselves from reviewing this intervention. More generally, several members of the core author team (e.g., RW, JND, DGR) had at some point collaborated with submitters on past projects, and recused themselves from review of these interventions where the prior relationship rose to the level of a potential conflict of interest (e.g., RW recused himself from review of a submission by KC, who he had an ongoing research collaboration with). Additionally, all analyses were preregistered and conducted in a strictly parallel fashion across interventions.

Data and Materials Availability

The preregistration, anonymized data, and analysis code for our study will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/.

Supplementary Materials for "Megastudy identifying effective interventions to strengthen Americans' democratic attitudes"

1. List of Example "Bridging" Organizations

Here we define "bridging" organizations as organizations working on overcoming political divisions – and other social and cultural divisions associated with political divisions – in the U.S. at either an interpersonal or societal level. Below is a non-exhaustive list of several U.S.-based organizations for whom bridging these sorts of group divides is a major focus:

AllSides, American Exchange Project, American Public Square, Better Arguments Project, Beyond Conflict, Bipartisan Policy Center, Braver Angels, BridgeUSA, Civi, Civic Genius, Civity, Common Ground Committee, Constructive Dialogue Institute, Convergence Center for Policy Resolution, Crossing Party Lines, Divided We Fall, FixUS, In This Together, Living Room Conversations, Millennial Action Project, More in Common, National Institute for Civil Discourse, One America Movement, ProCon, Project Divided, Resetting the Table, The Flip Side, The Village Square, Unify America, YOUnify.

2. Recruitment and Selection

The identification of interventions to be included in the Strengthening Democracy Challenge proceeded in two stages: recruitment and selection. The recruitment stage involved several steps to maximize the number and diversity of high-quality submissions. The selection stage was the process we used to choose 25 interventions to test from the 252 submissions.

Recruitment

We recruited submissions from July 20, 2021, to October 1, 2021. We used five methods to recruit as many submissions from academics across the social sciences and practitioners as possible.

1. Before putting out the official call for submissions, we elicited preliminary commitments to submit from nearly 30 well-known scholars and practitioners who work on polarization and/or democracy.
2. We sent targeted invitations to more than 600 researchers from the different social science disciplines who have studied the topics. We also sent such invitations to more than 100 practitioners from organizations who work on polarization, democracy, or related topics. We asked all these individuals to share the information about the Strengthening Democracy Challenge with others who might be interested.
3. Along with the members of our Advisory Board, we distributed information about the Strengthening Democracy Challenge via social media. Cumulatively, this reached over 200,000 Twitter users.
4. We sent the call for submissions to listservs and organizations' subscriber lists to reach more than 65,000 scholars, practitioners, and members of the general public with an interest in polarization and/or democracy.

5. We presented the challenge in 11 lab meetings of academic research groups who study topics related to the challenge.

In addition to advertising the Strengthening Democracy Challenge, we employed several methods to assist people in developing submissions.

1. We developed a website that explained the logistics of the project and facilitated submission of interventions.
2. We made an extensive handbook with details about the challenge, including information on how to submit, rules of the competition, and how we would measure the targeted dependent variables.
3. We held four zoom workshops, including workshops designed for practitioners and academic researchers, that provided details and guidance to potential submitters.
4. We held over 30 one-on-one Zoom meetings with individual submitter teams (often practitioners) to answer questions, clarify requirements, and help transform ideas into workable submissions.
5. We facilitate partnerships between scholars and practitioners. We recruited graduate students interested in collaborating with practitioners. We matched five practitioner teams with graduate students.

Authors submitted their interventions via an online form on the SDC website. On this form, submitters specified which outcomes they were targeting (they could target one, two, or all three – regardless of what they indicated, all interventions were tested with regard to all three outcomes). They also could describe whether they had conducted any prior related tests of the intervention (although doing so was not required).

In all, we received 252 submissions. Submissions came from nearly all social science disciplines (including psychology, political science, sociology, communication, and economics), and career stages (including professors, post docs, graduate students, undergraduate students, high school students), and from a wide range of practitioners from more than two dozen organizations.

Selection

We had funding to test 25 interventions. Thus, we needed to select the 25 most promising interventions from the 252 submissions. The selection process proceeded in six steps:

1. Jan Voelkel checked every submission to ensure it met the criteria for inclusion: ethical (i.e., must be approvable by the Institutional Review Board), deployable on-line, scalable to hundreds of individuals who would participate asynchronously (e.g., it could not include a chat among all participants), short (i.e., no longer than 8 minutes), comprehensible in English, costless (i.e., could not pay participants beyond their base pay), and aligned (i.e., could not collect additional outcome measures). If a submission failed the check, the submitters could revise and resubmit it.
2. At least one member of our Editorial Board (consisting of James Druckman, David Rand, and Robb Willer) and one other member of the Strengthening Democracy Challenge Organization Team (Jan Voelkel, Nick Stagnaro, James Chu, and Sophia Pink) rated each intervention on a 5-point scale and provided comments/reactions. A subset of the team (James Druckman, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel) then met and, based on these ratings and subsequent discussion, selected 70 interventions to send out for further review.
3. Each of the 70 interventions sent for further review were assigned two members of the Advisory Board (see list of members below). Each board member was provided with a

form for evaluating each intervention on which they assessed the interventions assigned to them in terms of their expected effect size in reducing each of our three outcome variables (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence), and in terms of its novelty (in the context of the reviewer's professional experience). They also provided a brief justification for their evaluation and suggestions for how the submission could be improved.

4. Based on the ratings from advisory board members, a subset of the team (James Druckman, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel) evaluated all 70 interventions and selected the top 50 interventions.
5. A team of seven evaluators (James Druckman, David Rand, Robb Willer, Jan Voelkel, Nick Stagnaro, James Chu, and Sophia Pink) evaluated the top 50 interventions and selected the 25 interventions to test in the study. In so doing, the team drew upon all prior reviews by Advisory Board and Organization Team members, as well as attending to diversity considerations in terms of strategies (not accepting too many interventions of any one strategy, e.g., misperception corrections), background (e.g., practitioner/academic, academic discipline), and targeted outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence).

Once the top 25 interventions were accepted, we worked with the submitters on minor suggested revisions focused on fitting to the requirements of the challenge and the logistics of the testing environment, made updates to programming, and ensured all involved were comfortable with the final treatment.

Advisory Board

We recruited 29 practitioners and academics to serve on an advisory board. The board was diverse in terms of professional background (8 practitioners), disciplines among academics (political science, sociology, psychology, economics, communication), and demographic background (e.g., career stage, gender, and racial/ethnic identity). The advisory board members were:

Mannie Ajayi, Pacific Fin Capital

Chris Bail, Sociology, Duke University

Loren Bendele, Gell

Adam Berinsky, Political Science, MIT

Pete Ditto, Psychology, University of California, Irvine

Long Doan, Sociology, University of Maryland

Corey Fields, Sociology, Georgetown University

Eli Finkel, Psychology and Management and Organizations, Northwestern University

Matt Gentzkow, Economics, Stanford University

Cheryl Graeve, National Institute of Civil Discourse (NICD) at the University of Arizona

Kristin Hansen, Civic Health Project

Eszter Hargittai, Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich

Vincent Hutchings, Political Science, University of Michigan

Lucas Johnson, On Being

Cindy Kam, Political Science, Vanderbilt University

Adam Seth Levine, Government, Cornell University

Neil Malhotra, Political Economy, Stanford University

Lilliana Mason, Political Science, Johns Hopkins University

Leslie McCall, Sociology and Political Science, City University of New York (CUNY)

Melissa Michelson, Political Science, Menlo College

Jenan Mohajir, Interfaith Youth Core

Mohammed Naeem, American Immigration Council

Mara Ostfeld, Political Science, University of Michigan

Zeenat Rahman, University of Chicago

Jaime Settle, Government, College of William & Mary

Jesse Shapiro, Economics, Brown University

Betsy Sinclair, Political Science, Washington University in St Louis

Michelle Torres, Political Science, Rice University

Julie Wronski, Political Science, University of Mississippi

3. Methods

Sample

Sampling Plan

The target sample for the study was 31,000 responses from American partisans. Partisans were defined as participants who identified as Democrats, Independents leaning Democrat, Republicans, or Independents leaning Republican. True independents or political "others" were not included. The target sample size per condition was 1,000 participants per intervention condition, 1,000 participants in the alternative control condition, and 5,000 participants in the null control condition.

The target sample size was based on preregistered power analyses. The power analyses were conducted with G*Power (Faul et al., 2009). As preregistered, we used alpha = 0.05 and one-tailed tests. These power analyses indicate that we had 95% power to detect effect sizes of $d \geq 0.11$ for intervention vs null control analyses and $d \geq 0.15$ for intervention vs intervention analyses.

Data collection was managed by Bovitz-Forthright, who coordinated with two additional sample providers: Luth and Dynata. Bovitz-Forthright supplied 19% of the full sample from their panel, Luth supplied 18%, and Dynata supplied 63% to achieve the targeted sample size. Data collection stopped after 31,000 participants had fully completed the survey. Notably, participants who attrited from the study (see section *Addressing Alternative Accounts – Differential Attrition* for details) did not count toward the target of 31,000 participants. Participants did not count towards the target of 31,000 if they: (i) answered any of the pre-treatment attention checks incorrectly, (ii) identified as true Independents (i.e., identified as "Independent" or and did not subsequently identify as "Leaning" toward either the Democratic or Republican parties) or

political "other", (iii) took the survey more than once[5] (as defined by participants' IDs; keeping only the first case), (iv) were identified as using Internet Explorer (as it created technical issues with some interventions), (v) were not able or willing to turn on their audio, or (vi) did not complete the full survey.

The sample was designed to be representative of American partisans on several key demographics. Specifically, the final sample was quota-matched for: gender, age, race, education (quotas were separately applied within the groups of Democrats and Republicans; see Table S3.1). Achieving demographic quotas was implemented by the sample providers, who accounted for attrition so that quotas would be achieved for the final, working sample. With regard to partisan identity, targets were 50% Democrats (or Independents who reported leaning Democratic) and 50% Republicans (or Independents who reported leaning Republican). Within each partisan group, we targeted 45-55% identifying as strong partisans, 20-30% identifying as weak partisans, and 20-30% identifying as independents who lean toward the specific parties. These numbers are based on the data from the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES, 2021).

We attempted to maximize the number of completed participants in the first 13 days in order to have sufficient power to estimate effect sizes for all 25 conditions to support selection of a subset of ten interventions that were included in the durability data collection. The durability test (including criteria for the selection of interventions for the durability test) is described below in the *Durability Test* section.

[5] Individuals who tried to participate for a second time via a different platform were identified by Bovitz-Forthright and removed using a combination of IP addresses and cookies.

Table S3.1: *Sample Demographics*

Variable	Category	Targeted		Achieved	
		Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat
Gender	Female	47%	57%	51%	56%
Gender	Male	53%	43%	48%	43%
Gender	Other	-	-	0%	1%
Age	18-24	7%	13%	4%	8%
Age	25-34	14%	17%	12%	17%
Age	35-44	16%	17%	16%	20%
Age	45-54	17%	15%	18%	16%
Age	55-64	21%	17%	23%	18%
Age	65-75	16%	15%	21%	17%
Age	75+	9%	5%	5%	4%
Race/Ethnicity	White (non-Hispanic)	82%	54%	86%	62%
Race/Ethnicity	Black (non-Hispanic)	3%	20%	2%	17%
Race/Ethnicity	Hispanic	8%	16%	7%	12%
Race/Ethnicity	Asian / Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander	3%	5%	2%	5%
Race/Ethnicity	Native American / Alaskan Native	2%	2%	1%	0%
Race/Ethnicity	Multiple Races (non-Hispanic)	2%	4%	2%	2%
Race/Ethnicity	Other	-	-	1%	1%
Education	No high school degree	7%	7%	2%	1%
Education	High school graduate	28%	24%	19%	16%
Education	Some college	32%	26%	38%	36%
Education	Bachelor's degree	23%	26%	27%	29%
Education	Graduate degree	11%	17%	14%	18%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Leaner	20-30%	20-30%	14%	13%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Not Strong	20-30%	20-30%	33%	31%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Strong	45-55%	45-55%	53%	56%
Strength of Partisan Identity	Missing	-	-	0%	0%
Sample size		15,500	15,500	15726	16333

Notes. The targeted quotas are based on the 2020 survey of the American National Election Study. The achieved quotas are based on the participants who completed at least one of the main outcomes.

Final Sample

53,144 participants began the study. We filtered out participants based on several preregistered criteria all administered before participants were randomly assigned to conditions and experienced treatment or control materials. Filters are described here in order of occurrence. First, we filtered out 1,201 participants who did not agree to pay attention and participate in all sections of the study. Second, we filtered out 10,397 participants who failed at least one of the two attention checks (see section *Questionnaire: Part 1: Pre-Treatment* for the wording of the attention checks). Third, we filtered out 1,552 participants who indicated they were non-partisans (i.e., pure independents and those who identified as 'other'). We did not exclude participants who identified as Independent and then, on a follow-up question, indicated that they "lean" toward the Democratic or Republican party. Fourth, we filtered out 4,053 participants who dropped out of the study before random assignment to condition. Fifth, we filtered out 689 cases with the same participant ID, keeping only the first case that was assigned to a condition.

The remaining 35,252 participants were assigned to an experimental condition. We used all participants in our statistical analyses who had completed the outcome variable being analyzed. Thus, the final sample size is somewhat different for each outcome: partisan animosity (n = 31,835), support for undemocratic practices (n = 31,856), support for partisan violence (n = 31,837), support for undemocratic candidates (n = 31,470), opposition to bipartisan cooperation (n = 31,239), social distrust (n = 31,247), social distance (n = 31,228), biased evaluation of politicized facts (n = 31,186). The final sample we report in the main text is the number of participants who completed at least one of the primary outcomes, partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, or support for partisan violence: (n = 32,059).

The final sample was representative of American partisans on key demographics. Most of the targeted quotas listed in Table S3.1 were approximately achieved. White people were slightly overrepresented, and people with relatively low education levels and partisan leaners were slightly underrepresented, in the final sample.

Procedure

The entire study was conducted online. Participants first completed a short demographic survey designed by the sample provider, then proceeded to our main survey. The main survey consisted of three parts. All items and response scales are available in the section *Questionnaire*. The questionnaire can be taken from a participant's perspective by clicking here. For all outcome variables that were measured using multiple items, we formed composites by averaging the items. This procedure was preregistered for the three targeted outcome variables. We report reliability estimates for these composites in Table S3.2.

In the first part of the main survey, participants completed several demographic and filter questions. All items and response scales are available in the *Questionnaire* section. Participants' *partisan identity* was measured using standard questions from the American National Election Studies (ANES, 2021) which distinguish between Democrats (including strong, weak, and Independents who "lean" toward the party), Republicans (including strong, weak, and Independents who "lean" toward the party), "true" Independents (who do not lean toward one party or another), and those who respond "other." Participants who identified as independents who leaned neither toward the Democratic nor Republican parties were filtered out of the study. Additionally, participants' *strength of partisan identity* was measured with a single item: "How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?" (Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015).

Table S3.2: *Reliability Estimates for Outcomes*

Outcome	Full Sample	Democrats	Republicans
Partisan Animosity	0.56	0.56	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.80	0.82	0.78
Support for Partisan Violence	0.95	0.96	0.95
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.92	0.92	0.91
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.83	0.83	0.83
Social Distrust	-	-	-
Social Distance	0.93	0.92	0.94
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-	0.69	0.65

Notes. Reliability is estimated with the Spearman-Brown coefficient for two item scales (partisan animosity, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance) and with Cronbach's alpha for the other scales. There is no reliability estimate for social distrust because it was measured with a single item. There is no reliability estimate for biased evaluation of politicized facts for the full sample because we used different items for Democrats and Republicans.

In the second part of the main survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of twenty-seven conditions. In other words, the experiment featured a between-subjects design with 27 conditions. In the "null control" condition, participants advanced *directly* to the third part of the main survey. In the 25 intervention conditions and the alternative control condition, participants completed the content specific to that experimental condition. All interventions, including authors, descriptions and links to the content, as well as the control conditions are available in the section *Treatments*.

In the third part of the main survey, participants completed the outcome variables. All items and response scales are available in the section *Questionnaire*. All items were measured on 101-point slider scales ranging from "0" to "100" unless specified otherwise below. First, participants completed measures of the three primary outcome variables. The order of these three outcomes was randomized. *Partisan animosity* was measured with a feeling thermometer toward outpartisans and a real-stakes "dictator game" with a single outpartisan (based on Iyengar &

Westwood, 2015). The response scale for the dictator game ranged from "0" to "50" and was recoded to range from "0" to "100". *Support for undemocratic practices* was measured with four items (e.g., "[Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]"; adapted from Graham & Svolik, 2020). *Support for partisan violence* was measured with four items (e.g., "How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?"; adapted from Kalmoe & Mason, 2022).

Second, participants completed two secondary outcome variables. The order of these two outcomes was randomized. *Support for undemocratic candidates* was measured with four items (e.g., "How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]?"; adapted from Graham & Svolik, 2020). *Opposition to democratic reform* was measured with participants' support for or opposition to four possible democratic policy reforms (e.g., "Automatically registering eligible Americans to vote").

Third, participants completed eight tertiary outcome variables. The order of these eight outcomes was randomized. *Biased evaluation of politicized facts* was measured with four items (adapted from Peterson & Iyengar, 2021). All of these items were different for Democratic (e.g., "Donald Trump was lawfully elected President in the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton") and Republican participants (e.g., "Joe Biden was lawfully elected President in the 2020 election against Donald Trump"). *Attitudinal polarization* was measured with participants' support for or opposition to six policy positions (e.g., "Reducing access to abortion"). These six items were recoded so that 0 was the most conservative position and 100 the most liberal and then averaged to create a single composite. Attitudinal polarization was measured as the absolute value of the

distance from the midpoint. *Opposition to bipartisan cooperation* was measured with two items (e.g., "To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?"; Santos et al., 2022). *Partisan animosity toward voters* was measured with a feeling thermometer toward outparty voters (based on Druckman & Levendusky, 2019). *Partisan animosity toward politicians* was measured with a feeling thermometer toward outparty politicians (based on Druckman & Levendusky, 2019). *Voting intentions* were measured with one item ("In the general 2024 presidential election, which party's candidate do you plan to vote for?). The response options were "The Republican Party candidate", "The Democratic Party candidate", "An Independent candidate", "Another candidate", "I am undecided", and "I would not vote". *Social distrust* was measured with one item ("Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?"; based on the World Values Survey; Haerpfer et al., 2022). *Social distance* was measured with two items (e.g., "How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats/Republicans]?; adapted from Iyengar et al., 2012).

Fourth, participants completed measures of six potential mediating variables (hereafter "mediators"). The order of these six mediators was randomized. *Perceived similarity with outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How similar are you to [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Strength of partisan identity* was measured with one item ("How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?"). *Anger toward outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How much anger do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Empathy toward outpartisans* was measured with one item ("How much empathy do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?"). *Perceived unity against a common enemy* was measured with one item ("To what extent should Democrats and Republicans see themselves as united against a

common enemy?”). *Perceived threat from outpartisans* was measured with one item (“To what extent do you view [Democrats/Republicans] as a serious threat to the country's well-being?”). Finally, participants completed a one-item measure of *vaccine intentions* (“If periodic booster shots are needed in the future to prevent the spread of COVID-19, how likely are you to get the booster shots?”).

Analysis Plan

Intervention vs Null Control Analyses

We tested the effects of each of the 25 interventions relative to the null control condition with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. The null control condition was the reference category. We controlled for participants’ gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and sample supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants’ age and strength of partisan identification (using continuous measures). We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting (see *Addressing Alternative Accounts – Differential Attrition* section). The analyses for the three target outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) were preregistered. We used the same preregistered modeling approach for testing the effects of the interventions on the other outcome variables.

Intervention vs Intervention Analyses

We used the same strategy as for the intervention versus null control analyses. The only difference was that we reran the same model changing the reference categories of experimental condition.

Other Analyses

Strategies for all other analyses are reported below in the corresponding sections.

Missing Values

We only used participants who completed the measure that served as the dependent variable being analyzed. Thus, a participant who had missing values for one outcome was still included in analyses of the other outcomes for which they provided data. To account for potential biases caused by differential attrition (see *Addressing Alternative Accounts – Differential Attrition* for more details), we conducted inverse probability weighting (IPW). This procedure reweighted the data so that individuals who completed the study but had high underlying propensities for attriting, as inferred from a model predicting attrition as a function of baseline covariates and treatment assignment, were upweighted to counterbalance the missing outcomes from attriting participants. The key assumption needed for this procedure to accurately estimate average treatment effects is that attrition is independent of potential outcomes, once variations in attrition due to the baseline covariates have been addressed. Because attrition could be a complex function of interactions among our covariates (e.g. older women are more likely to leave in certain treatment conditions), we used random forests to calculate each participant's propensity to attrit from the study. As predictors, we included experimental condition, gender, age, race, education, party identification, strength of party identification, and the panel the participant was recruited from (e.g. Bovitz, Luth, or Dynata). The results are similar if we use a parametric approach of regressing an indicator for attrition on experimental condition indicators, all baseline covariates, and their full interactions. We calculated weights for each outcome separately, thus we do not assume that the patterns of selection that led to attrition for one dependent variable are identical for the others. Based on this model for attrition, we calculated the estimated

probabilities of attrition for each participant, and we use the inverse of these probabilities as weights in our regression analyses.

Outliers

We considered all values on our response scales as reasonable responses. Therefore, we did not exclude any potential outliers.

Inference Criteria

We used p-values as our criterion for inferring statistically significant effects. We used one-tailed tests to test for main effects of the treatments, relative to the null control condition, on the outcome variables. We used two-tailed tests for all other analyses (including backfire effects). We report $p \leq .05$ as significant effects, $.05 < p \leq .1$ as marginally significant effects, and $p > .1$ as nonsignificant effects. We did not use corrections for multiple tests because our main interest was in the individual effects of the interventions on the different outcomes, instead of testing the same hypothesis in different ways (for a full discussion of how we addressed multiple testing concerns, please see the *Addressing Alternative Accounts – Multiple Hypothesis Testing* section).

Preregistration, Data, and Code Availability

The preregistration, anonymized data, and analysis code for our study will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/.

4. Questionnaire and Treatments

Part 1: Pre-Treatment

Sample Provider Demographics Survey

Item	Scale
What is your age?	Number
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?	Less than high school graduate; High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED); Some college credit, no degree; Trade/technical/vocational training; Associate degree; Bachelor's degree; Master's degree; Professional degree; Doctorate degree
Which of the following ranges includes your total annual household income from all sources?	Less than $25,000; $25,000 to $34,999; $35,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to $124,999; $125,000 to $149,999; $150,000 to $174,999; $175,000 to $199,999; $200,000 to $249,999; $250,000 or more
In general, do you think of yourself as ...	Extremely liberal; Liberal; Slightly liberal; Moderate, middle of the road; Slightly conservative; Conservative; Extremely conservative
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?	Strong Republican; Republican; Lean Republican; Independent/ middle of the road; Lean Democrat; Democrat; Strong Democrat
Are you registered to vote?	Yes; No
What is your zip code?	Number

Notes. The order of the items was randomized. *The sample provider also sent us a history of attrition variable.*

Consent Form

Item	Scale
You are invited to participate in a research study that will ask about your opinions and attitudes. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate. There are no risks associated with this study and your identity will be kept confidential. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study. Participation If you decide to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty. The alternative is not to participate. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study. Contact Information If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this research, its procedures, risks and benefits, contact the Protocol Director, Robb Willer at willer@stanford.edu. If you wish to contact someone independent of the researchers, you may email the Stanford Institutional Review Board at irb2-manager@lists.stanford.edu. If you agree to participate in this research, please click to the next screen and complete the questionnaire.	-

Filter Item

Item	Scale
You will need to qualify for this study. You will find out if you qualify shortly. This study takes about 12-15 min to complete. It has several sections requiring attention. Because participating until the very end of this study and answering all questions is the only way we can use your responses, it is very important to us that you help and answer the following questions honestly. Do you agree to pay attention and participate in all sections of this study?	Yes; No

Demographics and Attention Check 1

Item	Scale
What is your gender?	Male; Female; Other [text box]
Please select which race / ethnicity you identify as. (Please select all that apply.)	White / Caucasian; Black / African American; Hispanic / Latino; Asian / Asian American; Other [text box]
To help us keep track of who is paying attention, please select "Somewhat disagree" in the options below.	Strongly agree; Agree; Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?	Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other [text box]

Party Identification

Item	Scale
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?	Strong Republican; Not very strong Republican
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?	Strong Democrat; Not very strong Democrat
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?	Closer to Republican Party; Neither; Closer to Democratic Party

Notes. The first question was only asked to participants who identified as a Republican in the last question on the previous page. The second question was only asked to participants who identified as a Democrat in the last question on the previous page. The third question was only asked to participants identified as an Independent in the last question on the previous page.

Strength of Party as a Social Identity

Item	Scale
How important is being a [Republican / Democrat] to you?	101-point scale from "Not important at all" to "Extremely important"

Notes. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" will be shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" wil be shown to Democratic participants. Participants also read the following instructions on this page: "Below is a range from 0 to 100 indicating how important this is to you. Click on any space within this range and a bar will appear. Feel free to move that bar around to the number that best represents your answer."

Attention Check 2

Item	Scale
Please read the following short article. Officials in a midsize town have been working for four years on a plan to produce an event license to cover all of the major events that occur at the town's local stadium, which hosts concerts and home sports games. The application would be submitted each January and list all events expected to occur at the stadium over the next 12 months. If an unlisted event emerges during the year, lawmakers could hold a special hearing on the event, or accept it without a hearing and add it into the existing license. To assist with this plan, lawmakers filed legislation that would change state licensing laws so that annual event licenses will expire within one year. "This makes a minor change to current law, which provides that all licenses issued shall expire on December 31 of each year," a lawmaker said. What was the topic of the short article you just read about?	Medical funding; Event licensing; Political polarization; City budgeting; Election monitoring policy; Campaign finance reform

Video and Audio Check

Item	Scale
Please watch the following video, and make sure your sound is turned on. Please pay attention to both the visual and audio as we will ask you about them after you watch. [Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=eu9cNZYkbMA] Below, select the best answers to both what you see and what you hear in the video above. Note that there could be more than one visual or audio option that applies.	Saw rocks in sand; Saw birds flying above waves; Saw people playing on beach; Saw waves crashing; Saw a large boat; heard people speaking; heard birds calling; heard ocean waves; heard dogs barking; heard a lighthouse horn

Notes. If participants answered incorrectly, they received an error message and were allowed to change their response: Your answer was incorrect. Please rewatch the video, and make sure your sound is turned on. Note, there could be more than one visual and one audio options that apply.

Transition from Pre-Treatment Variables to Treatments

Item	Scale
Congratulations, you have qualified for the full study! As you proceed to the next section, please make sure you do not close out of this tab. You must complete the whole study to collect your payment.	I understand I must complete the full study to collect my full earnings

Part 2: Treatments

At this stage participants were randomized to one of the 27 conditions (25 experimental conditions, 1 null control, 1 alternative control). The experimental conditions are described in more detail on the following pages.

Befriending Meditation

Submitters' Title: Befriending Meditation
Otto Simonsson
Karolinska Institute

Description: Participants take part in an eight-minute befriending meditation. They listen to an audio that emphasizes treating yourself well and extending kindness to others. The audio discusses being safe, happy, healthy, and having ease of being. It suggests thinking of a loved one in the same way. It then asks respondents to think of a stranger this way (wishing them safety, happiness, health, and ease of being). It then asks them to think of someone they find difficult in the same way. Finally, respondents are asked to extent the same kindness to all living beings. Respondents thus reflect on the importance of thinking positive thoughts about all beings.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/xfjfy2rn

Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz

Submitters' Title: Epistemic Rescue: Leveraging Knowledge Complementaries to Reduce Political Antipathy
Evan DeFilippis; Joshua Greene
Harvard Business School; Harvard University (Psychology Department)

Participants are paired with someone from the other party and they learn a little about them. They then privately answer twelve trivia questions (e.g., about cars, food, TV). Half the questions are likely to be correctly answered by Republicans (e.g., the last name of the family on Duck Dynasty) and half are likely to be correctly answered by Democrats (e.g., Ben and Jerry ice cream flavors). After answering each privately, the participant answers again, but this time they can choose to learn what their partner from the other party answered. They thus can learn how someone from the other party can help them.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/2v22fsxp

Common Economic Interests

Submitters' Title: A Common Economic Plight and a Common Economic Enemy

Joe Green; Nick R. Kay; Azim Shariff
The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia; The University of British Columbia

Description: Participants watch a video about how economic interests unite Americans across political divides. The video points out that other than the super rich, "we are all in this together," and the super rich share little in common with other Americans. Instead, the super rich have more in common with each other regardless of their partisanship such as life expectancy, political donations and access to elite schools. And that income inequality has increased over time. Participants then write about what they thought of the video. Participants thus learn about how they share an identity with most Americans regardless of different partisanship.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/3248k33h

Common Exhausted Majority Identity

Submitters' Title: Testing a 'Values Alignment' Approach to Reducing Partisan Animosity

Christopher Bryan; Cameron Hecht; Maytal Saar-Tsechansky; David Yeager; Margarett V. Clapper
The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin; The University of Texas at Austin

Description: Participants read about how the news media creates political division and outrage to maximize its audience. They are provided with quotes from books along these lines. Data are provided that show the more news media one watches, the more inaccurate and exaggerated their perceptions of the other side. Instructions are provided on how to take control back from the media and participants are asked to provide advice to others on how to do this. Participants thus learn that the media has caused perceived divisions that are, in reality, much less stark. Finally, participants reflect on actions they can take in response.

Available for review upon request to christopher.bryan@mccombs.utexas.edu, cameron.hecht@utexas.edu, maytal.saar-tsechansky@mccombs.utexas.edu, dyeager@utexas.edu, and/or m.clapper@utexas.edu.

Common National Identity

Submitters' Title: Common Identity-Based Intervention

Ali Javeed; Kimberly C. Doell; Steve Rathje; Jay Van J. Bavel
New York University; New York University; New York University; New York University

Description: Participants read about how democracy has been crucial to America's success as a leader in technology (e.g., computers, cellphones) and culture (e.g., film, music). They then read that American democracy is at risk from extreme partisanship. Participants learn that, fortunately, research shows that the vast majority of Americans support democracy, and this is a common identity of Americans. Moreover, despite perceptions to the contrary, most members of both parties like each other, disdain violence, and support the rules of democracy. Participants write about their two favorite things about being American. Participants thus learn of a common American identity and that most partisans share more in common than they think.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/22nn6aaj

Correcting Democracy Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Correcting Overestimates of Opposing Partisans' Willingness to Break Democratic Norms

Alia Braley; Gabriel Lenz; Dhaval Adjodah; Hossein Rahnama; Alex Pentland
University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Berkeley; MIT Media Lab; Toronto Metropolitan University; MIT Connection Science

Description: Participants are told that most people do not know much about the other party. They are then asked to guess what people from the other party believe when it comes to actions that undermine how democracy works (e.g., using violence to block laws, reducing the number of polling stations to help the other party, or not accepting the results of elections if they lose). Participants answer eight such questions. After each, they receive the correct answer – that is, they are told what the other party actually believes, based on recent surveys. The answers make clear the other party does not support actions that undermine democracy. They thus learn the other party supports maintaining key elements of democracy.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/5bwtm7hz

Correcting Division Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Reducing Political Polarization by Correcting Erroneous Meta-Perceptions: A Video Intervention

Samantha L. Moore-Berg; Michael H. Pasek; Rebecca Littman; Roman Gallardo; Nour Kteily
University of Pennsylvania; University of Illinois Chicago, Beyond Conflict; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University

Description: Participants watch a video showing some Democrats and Republicans reacting to survey findings on how much Democrats and Republicans actually agree on some issues (e.g., views on how much to open borders to immigrants). The partisans in the video learn that the extent to which Democrats and Republicans agree is much more than they expected. This can help participants learn that Americans tend to overestimate the extent to which partisans disagree. The viewers thus learn that partisans are not nearly as different as they typically think.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/6rht98vc

Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Reducing False Beliefs About Outgroup Members' Willingness to Sacrifice Large-Scale Suffering for Political Gain

Charles Dorison; Nour Kteily
Kellogg School of Management; Kellogg School of Management

Description: Participants are asked to predict how people from the other party would have responded to a series of questions (e.g., rushing the COVID-19 vaccine for political gain). They then are informed of the actual answers from the other party, and how much they mis-estimated the beliefs for the other party (i.e., making them more extreme than they actually are). They also read actual comments from those from the other party. Participants thus learn that many overestimate how people from the other party prioritize their political gains at the expense of large-scale suffering.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/4jw7t59u

Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions

Submitters' Title: Correcting Inaccurate Group Meta-Perceptions Reduces Polarization
Jeffrey Lees; Mina Cikara
Princeton University; Harvard University

Description: Participants read about actions their party might take to gain an electoral advantage (e.g., drawing voting districts to their advantage). They then estimate how much the other party would oppose those actions. Next, they learn that the average member of the other party typically is less opposed than most would estimate. Participants thus learn that the other party is not as against their party as they may have thought.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/2p9mb4x9

Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot

Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Animosity Through a Common Ground Discovery Chatbot Quiz
Brandyn Keating; Aaron Lyles; Jay Rosato
YOUnify; CommonAlly; CommonAlly

Description: Participants answer questions (in a chat) about where they think the average Democrat and Republican fall on various issues (gun control, immigration, climate change). After each answer, they are given the correct answer from a credible source. They also are asked about and learn that more than 70% of Americans agree on various issues (concerning police, minimum wage, COVID). Participants learn that the parties are not nearly as far apart from each other than most people believe. Participants thus learn the parties are similar on many issues.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/3z78s4ev

Counterfactual Partisan Selves

Submitters' Title: The Road Not Taken: Reflection on Counterfactual Selves as a Means to Reduce Animosity and Violence

Nathan Ballantyne; Jared Celniker; Mertcan Güngör; John Michael Kelly; Shiri Spitz Siddiqi
Arizona State University; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine; University of California, Irvine

Description: Participants are asked about their views on various issues (e.g., abortion, gun control, immigration). They then answer the same questions but are asked to imagine their life had been different on each issue (e.g., raised in a Christian fundamentalist tradition, had a sister who was assaulted and became pregnant). Participants are then provided the results of their attitudes versus their attitudes under different circumstances. They are told that many opponents are good people with different environments. Participants thus learn about how the beliefs of those from the other side reflect valid experiences.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/239mhntr

Democratic Collapse Threat

Submitters' Title: Appealing to Fear of Democratic Collapse

Katherine Clayton; Michael Tomz
Stanford University; Stanford University

Description: Participants watch a video about countries where democracy collapsed (Venezuela, Turkey). It explains what the rulers tried to do to stay in power by using violence and violating electoral rights. The video shows scenes of chaos. It then asks whether democracy could collapse in the US, showing scenes from the January 6th Capitol insurrection. Participants then read about what they could do to protect democracy such as defending the separation of powers, endorsing compromise, and rejecting violence. Participants thus learn about the consequences if the rules of democracy are violated.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/45295w3u

Democratic System Justification

Submitters' Title: Democratic System Justification
Aaron Kay; John T. Jost; Daniela Goya-Tocchetto
Duke University; New York University; Duke University

Description: Participants read an article about how the American system is unique in that people do not turn on one another, instead they stay faithful to the principles of civility and respect even during economic recession, a pandemic, or natural disaster. The article notes people debate and have to deal with media outlets that inflate their differences, but they retain faith in the system and trust in each other. Participants thus learn that the majority of Americans remain committed to values of mutual respect.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/bdj3u2jn

Describing a Likable Outpartisan

Submitters' Title: Thinking of Friends From Other Party Depolarizes
Matthew Levendusky
University of Pennsylvania

Description: Participants are asked to think about one person from the other party that they like and respect (and if none, then one they view most positively). They then are asked to reflect on and write about why they feel that way about the person. They answer a question about who the person is (e.g., friend, family member, co-worker), and how close they are to the person. Participants thus think about an individual positive example of the other party.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/3j5ceptm

Moral Similarities and Differences

Submitters' Title: Uncovering the Psychological Roots of Political Divides
Caroline Mehl; Mylien Duong; Macrina Dieffenbach; Lauren Alpert Maurer
Constructive Dialogue Institute; Constructive Dialogue Institute; Facebook; Constructive Dialogue Institute

Participants read about how our brain works and how the same information can be interpreted differently by different individuals. Participants also learn about Moral Foundation Theory, which argues that we all share the same six moral foundations when interpreting information, but use them differently on different issues (i.e., some people consider "loyalty" more, while others consider "fairness" more). Participants then read conversation on abortion and gun control from two speakers who use the same set of moral foundations overall but use different foundations on each issue. Participants thus learn that we all actually share the same set of moral foundations.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/2nvp8wmk

Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm

Submitters' Title: Sharing Harmful Personal Experiences Reduces Partisan Animosity
Emily Kubin; Curtis Puryear; Kurt Gray
Rhineland-Palatinate Technical University Kaiserslautern-Landau; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Participants hear from real people from the other party who explain their views come from personal experiences of suffering. For example, Republicans learn about someone who is anti-gun because his friend was murdered by someone who obtained a gun without a proper background check. Or, Democrats learn about someone who is pro-gun because one of his friends was murdered in a home invasion robbery. Participants thus learn that views from the other side reflect authentic experiences of vulnerability and suffering.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/4xvd7ckr

Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn

Submitters' Title: Using Expressed Learning Goals to Overcome Partisan Animosity
Hanne Collins; Julia Minson; Charles Dorison; Molly Moore; Hayley Blunden; Kara Luo
Harvard University; Harvard University; Northwestern University; Harvard University; American University Kogod School of Business; Harvard University

Description: Participants exchange messages with someone from the other party who is seeking an open-minded exchange. The messages involve explaining why the participant and the person from the other party have the positions that they do (e.g., on taxes, income). Participants thus engage with an open-minded member of the other party to exchange views in a productive manner.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/375e7rkt

Party Overlap on Policies

Submitters' Title: Exploring the Nuanced Partisan Overlap Between Political Parties
Victor Allis; Erez Yoeli; Sara Gifford
ActiVote; MIT Sloan School of Management; ActiVote

Description: Participants answer questions about views on eight policies (e.g., over the counter birth control, background checks for gun buying, legalization of marijuana). After each policy question, they are shown the high overlap in the views of Democrats and Republicans. At the end they are shown the average sizeable overlap across other issues which is 69%. They thus learn that the parties share a lot of views.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/3kx9rfvu

Political Violence Inefficacy

Submitters' Title: Reducing Support for Partisan Violence by Questioning Efficacy

Peter Felsman; Colleen Seifert
Northern Michigan University; University of Michigan

Description: Participants read a news article about how non-violent protests are much more effective in bringing about change than violent protests. They then answer questions about the article and are asked, based on the article, how they would convince a political leader to use non-violent tactics. Participants are then asked, based on the article, how effective they believe political violence is. Participants thus learn and actively rehearse the lesson that using violent means to achieve political ends is a relatively ineffective strategy.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/5n74a8av

Positive Contact Video

Submitters' Title: Using Media Trades to Incentivize Engagement With a Vivid Illustration of Contact Theory

Daniel F. Stone; David Francis; Michael Franz; Julia Minson
Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Bowdoin College; Harvard Kennedy School

Description: Participants watch a commercial from England that shows people with opposing political views bonding with one another despite learning of their political disagreements. The video shows pairs of people disagreeing on climate change, feminism, and transgender identity. It shows the pairs then working together, bonding, and deciding to spend time together (to drink a beer). They thus learn how people with different political views can get along. Before watching, participants are told that if they answer questions correctly about the video, they will get to choose an article or video to share with someone from the other party.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/2hd6zyy5

Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues

Submitters' Title: One Nation Utah Governor Race Joint PSA
Ben Lyons
University of Utah

Description: Participants watch a video with a Democrat and a Republican candidate who were running against each other to be governor. Each candidate emphasizes that all votes will be counted and they will honor the peaceful transfer of power. They explain that is what the county is built upon. Participants thus learn that office seekers on both sides respect democratic elections.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/3fwvvhe6

Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues

Submitters' Title: Strengthening Democracy With Partisan Social Norms
James Martherus
Morning Consult

Description: Participants are asked to read a fictional op-ed with real quotes and statistics. It focuses on the other party's beliefs about democracy and violence. They learn that the leader of the other party (Biden or Trump) condemns violence and supports democratic processes (e.g., right to vote, freedom of the press). The op-ed also cites social science data about how at least 90% of the other party do not support violence or breaking the rules to help their party win. Participants are asked to summarize the argument. Participants thus learn that the other party is against violence and supportive of democracy.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/yhn7tvpk

Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat

Submitters' Title: Reducing Partisan Threat Perceptions
Matthew Hall; Wayde Marsh; Levi Allen; James Kirk
University of Notre Dame; University of Tennessee; University of Notre Dame; University of Notre Dame

Description: Participants read about how their party is dominating American politics (e.g., controlling the three branches of government for Democrat respondents or controlling state government for Republican respondents) and their influence is likely to increase (e.g., having a growing voter base for Democrats, likely to do well in midterms for Republicans). Participants are told the country leans to their party in the foreseeable future. Participants thus may become less threatened by the other party.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/d5nmpk7e

Sympathetic Personal Narratives

Submitters' Title: Civity Storytelling: Expanding the Pool of People Who Matter
Malka Kopell; Palma Strand; Gina Baleria; Maya Fiorella
Civity; Civity & Creighton University; Civity & Sonoma State University; Civity & Sonoma State University

Description: Participants watch an introductory animated video about the importance of individual stories. They then watch five videos where individuals talk about themselves and their experiences. Participants then watch another animated video about the importance of "civity" – connecting with people who are different and seeing them as members of their community. This final video describes how civity is important for a healthy democracy. Participants then explain their takeaways. They are thus prompted to learn and think about how democracy promotes and can handle differences.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/yh64c9sk

Utility of Outparty Empathy

Submitters' Title: Beliefs about Cross-Partisan Empathy
Luiza Almeida Santos; Jamil Zaki
Stanford University; Stanford University

Description: Participants read about the benefits of empathizing with people with different political beliefs. For instance, they read that empathizing with the other political side (e.g., someone with different beliefs on gun control) leads one to be more persuasive and liked, and that it builds consensus. They then write about how empathy can be useful in competitive contexts and how they could be more empathetic going forward in their own lives. They thus learn about how empathy with those from the other political side can be beneficial.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/ysjjm4re

Null Control

Designed by the Strengthening Democracy Challenge team

Description: Participants in this condition moved on directly to the DVs.

Alternative Control

Designed by the Strengthening Democracy Challenge team

Description: Participants read some information about the three branches of government.

Available for review via https://tinyurl.com/yuztjf2a

Transition from Intervention to Dependent Variables

Item	Scale
You are now moving on to a different section of the study. Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. Thank you.	-

Part 3: Post-Treatment

Randomization of Sections

The outcome measures were asked in multiple separate sections. The order of the outcomes was randomized *within* their respective section, but not between. These outcomes were organized as:

Section	Outcomes
1 (Primary Outcomes)	Partisan Animosity; Support for Undemocratic Practices; Support for Partisan Violence
2 (Secondary Outcomes)	Support for Undemocratic Candidates; Opposition to Democratic Reform
3 (Tertiary Outcomes)	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts; Attitudinal Extremity; Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation; Partisan Animosity – Voters and Politicians; Voting Intentions; Social Distrust; Social Distance
4 (Mediators)	Perceived Similarity with Outpartisans; Strength of Partisan Identity; Anger toward Outpartisans; Empathy with Outpartisans; Shared Common Enemy with Outpartisans; Perceived Threat of Outpartisans
5 (Quaternary Outcomes)	Intentions to Get COVID Vaccine

Primary Outcome: Partisan Animosity

Item	Scale
We would like to get your feelings toward both Democrats and Republicans. We would like you to rate them using something we call the feeling thermometer.	
Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward them. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward them and that you don't care too much for them. You would rate them at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them.	101-point scale from “Very cold or unfavorable feeling” to “No feeling at all” to “Very warm or favorable feeling”
How would you rate Republicans? How would you rate Democrats?	
You have been anonymously and randomly matched with another participant who identifies as a [Democrat/Republican]. You have been given 50 cents. You will now decide how to split these 50 cents between yourself and the [Democratic/Republican] participant. You can give any amount between 0 cents and 50 cents to the other participant. The other participant cannot affect the outcome you choose.	
For example: - If you give 0 cents, you will end up with 50 cents and the [Democratic/Republican] participant will end up with 0 cents. - If you give 50 cents, you will end up with 0 cents and the [Democratic/Republican] participant will end up with 50 cents.	51-point scale from “0 cents” to “25 cents” to “50 cents”
How many cents (if any) will you give to the [Democratic/Republican] participant?	

Notes. The order of the items was randomized. The order of the rated groups for the feeling thermometer was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants’ party identification. The text before the “/” was shown to Republican participants. The text after the “/” was shown to Democratic participants.

Primary Outcome: Support for Undemocratic Practices

Item	Scale
[Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans].	101-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree"
[Republican/Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Democrat/Republican]-appointed judges.	101-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree"
[Republican/Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who accuse [Republican/Democratic] politicians of misconduct without revealing sources.	101-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree"
[Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose.	101-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the following statements." The order of the items was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" was shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" was shown to Democratic participants.

Primary Outcome: Support for Partisan Violence

Item	Scale
When, if ever, is it OK for [Republicans/Democrats] to send threatening and intimidating messages to [Democratic/Republican] party leaders?	101-point scale from "Never" to "Always"
When, if ever, is it OK for an ordinary [Republican/Democrat] in the public to harass an ordinary [Democrat/Republican] on the Internet, in a way that makes the target feel frightened?	101-point scale from "Never" to "Always"
How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?	101-point scale from "Not justified at all" to "Extremely justified"
How much do you feel it is justified for [Republicans/Democrats] to use violence if the [Democratic/Republican] party wins more races in the next election?	101-point scale from "Not justified at all" to "Extremely justified"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "Please answer the following questions." The order of the items was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" was shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" was shown to Democratic participants.

Secondary Outcome: Support for Undemocratic Candidates

Item	Scale
How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from "Definitely vote for the [Democratic/Republican] candidate" to "Definitely vote for the [Republican/Democratic] candidate"
How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republican/Democratic] governors should ignore unfavorable court rulings by [Democratic/Republican]-appointed judges?	101-point scale from "Definitely vote for the [Democratic/Republican] candidate" to "Definitely vote for the [Republican/Democratic] candidate"
How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republican/Democratic] governors should prosecute journalists who accuse [Republican/Democratic] politicians of misconduct without revealing sources?	101-point scale from "Definitely vote for the [Democratic/Republican] candidate" to "Definitely vote for the [Republican/Democratic] candidate"
How would you vote if you learned that the [Republican/Democratic] candidate said that [Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections they lose?	101-point scale from "Definitely vote for the [Democratic/Republican] candidate" to "Definitely vote for the [Republican/Democratic] candidate"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "For the next series of questions, please imagine a [Republican/Democratic] candidate runs for office against a [Democratic/Republican] candidate." The order of the items was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" was shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" was shown to Democratic participants.

Secondary Outcome: Opposition to Democratic Reform

Item	Scale
Automatically registering eligible Americans to vote	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Requiring that voters must present a government-issued photo identification in order to vote	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Allowing any eligible citizen to vote by mail	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Banning "partisan gerrymandering" by creating independent commissions to draw the lines of legislative and congressional districts in all states	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "Please indicate how much you oppose or support the following policies." The order of the items was randomized.

Tertiary Outcome: Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts

Item	Scale
The vast majority (more than 90%) of climate scientists believe that climate change is an established fact and that it is most likely caused by human-made emissions.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
The crime rate among illegal immigrants is lower than the crime rate among American citizens.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
White Americans own homes at a higher rate than Black Americans, and this gap is larger now than it was in the late 1960s.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
Joe Biden was lawfully elected President in the 2020 election against Donald Trump.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
During Donald Trump's presidency, there was the lowest rate of Black people and Hispanics in poverty since these data began being collected in 1966.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
The Trump administration deported fewer undocumented immigrants in its first three years than the Obama administration did in its first three years.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
During Donald Trump's presidency, the unemployment rate reached its lowest level since 1969.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”
Donald Trump was lawfully elected President in the 2016 election against Hillary Clinton.	101-point scale from “0% certainly false” to “100% certainly true”

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: “In this task, we will ask you to give us your opinion about various claims. The claims are statements that may be true or may be false. The truth or falsity of the statements has been determined by real-world sources. What is the likelihood that the following statements are true? Please choose a point that best describes your view on the below scale that goes from 0% (certainly false) to 100% (certainly true).” The order of the items was randomized. Republicans responded to items 1-4. Democrats responded to items 5-8.

Tertiary Outcome: Attitudinal Extremity

Item	Scale
Reducing access to abortion	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Providing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Increasing restrictions on gun ownership	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Increasing government regulations to protect the environment	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Raising taxes on the wealthiest Americans	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"
Expanding Medicaid to cover all currently uninsured Americans	101-point scale from "Strongly oppose" to "Strongly support"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "Please indicate how much you oppose or support the following political positions." The order of the items was randomized.

Tertiary Outcome: Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation

Item	Scale
To what extent would you like to see Democratic and Republican elected representatives work together?	101-point scale from "Not at all" to "A great deal"
To what extent would you like the Democratic and Republican parties to cooperate more, even if it means compromising on issues you care about?	101-point scale from "Not at all" to "A great deal"

Notes. The order of the items was randomized.

Tertiary Outcome: Partisan Animosity – Voters and Politicians

Item	Scale
How would you rate [Democratic / Republican] voters?	101-point scale from "Very cold or unfavorable feeling" to "Very warm or favorable feeling"
How would you rate [Democratic / Republican] politicians?	101-point scale from "Very cold or unfavorable feeling" to "Very warm or favorable feeling"

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: "We would like to get your feelings toward the following groups. We would like you to rate them using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward them. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward them and that you don't care too much for them. You would rate them at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them." The order of the items was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants' party identification. The text before the "/" was shown to Republican participants. The text after the "/" was shown to Democratic participants.

Tertiary Outcome: Voting Intentions

Item	Scale
In the general 2024 presidential election, which party's candidate do you plan to vote for?	The Republican Party candidate; The Democratic Party candidate; An Independent candidate; Another candidate; I am undecided; I would not vote

Tertiary Outcome: Social Distrust

Item	Scale
101-point scale from "Need to be very careful" to "Most people can be trusted"	101-point scale from "Need to be very careful" to "Most people can be trusted"

Tertiary Outcome: Social Distance

Item	Scale
How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from “Not comfortable at all” to “Extremely comfortable”
How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from “Not comfortable at all” to “Extremely comfortable”

Notes. The order of the items was randomized. Text in square brackets is conditional on participants’ party identification. The text before the “/” was shown to Republican participants. The text after the “/” was shown to Democratic participants.

Mediators

Item	Scale
How similar are you to [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from “Not similar at all” to “Extremely similar”
How important is being a [Republican/Democrat] to you?	101-point scale from “Not important at all” to “Extremely important”
How much anger do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from “No anger at all” to “A great deal of anger”
How much empathy do you feel toward [Democrats/Republicans]?	101-point scale from “No empathy at all” to “A great deal of empathy”
To what extent should Democrats and Republicans see themselves as united against a common enemy?	101-point scale from “Not at all” to “A great deal”
To what extent do you view [Democrats/Republicans] as a serious threat to the country's well-being?	101-point scale from “Not at all” to “A great deal”

Notes. Participants read the following instructions: “Please indicate how much you oppose or support the following political positions.” The order of the items was randomized.

Quaternary Outcome: Intentions to Get COVID Vaccine

Item	Scale
If periodic booster shots are needed in the future to prevent the spread of COVID-19, how likely are you to get the booster shots?	101-point scale from “0% extremely unlikely” to “100% extremely likely”

5. Outcomes Submitters of Interventions Focused On

Our study provides some evidence that researchers and practitioners are more likely to focus on partisan animosity than support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence. Submitters were asked: "Which of the following outcomes did you design your intervention to reduce? (Check all that apply.)" We stated that we would welcome and accept submissions that target one, two, and/or all three of the outcomes. For the vast majority of the 252 submitted interventions in our megastudy, submitters indicated that partisan animosity was their only target, or one of their targets (86% of 252 submissions and 96% of 25 selected interventions, versus 52% and 48% for support for undemocratic practices, and 66% and 64% for support for partisan violence; Table S5.1). Similar proportions were obtained among the 25 selected interventions. Table S5.2 provides the information submitters provided at the time of submission and Table S5.3 provides the predictions submitters sent before the main survey and the durability survey.

Submitters' also reported more prior experience studying partisan animosity than the other two outcomes. We asked the 25 teams whose intervention was selected for experimental testing for the number of studies and experiments they had conducted on the three targets. For example, we asked: "How many experiments have you or other members of your team conducted in which you tested the effect of the intervention submitted to the challenge (or an intervention very close to it) with partisan animosity (or a measure very close to it) as dependent or outcome variable?". 24 teams responded to our survey. They reported having previously conducted a total of 165 studies and 61 experiments on partisan animosity, while they reported having conducted 53 studies and 17 experiments on support for undemocratic practices, and 17 studies and 10 experiments on support for partisan violence, respectively.

Table S5.1: *Submitters' Targeted Outcomes among All Submitted Interventions*

Submitters	n	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
All	252	216 (86%)	131 (52%)	167 (66%)
Psychology	107	90 (84%)	57 (53%)	75 (70%)
Political Science	60	47 (78%)	36 (60%)	38 (63%)
Practitioners	53	52 (98%)	25 (47%)	31 (58%)
Sociology	22	18 (82%)	15 (68%)	17 (77%)
Communication	19	18 (95%)	10 (53%)	14 (74%)
Economics	16	14 (88%)	6 (38%)	7 (44%)
Other Research	45	35 (78%)	22 (49%)	30 (67%)
Other	32	31 (97%)	17 (53%)	22 (69%)

Notes. A submission is counted for a subgroup if at least one member self-identified as belonging to this category. For example, a submission counts as a practitioner submission if at least one self-identified practitioner belongs to that category.

Table S5.2: *Submitters' Targeted Outcomes among the Selected Interventions*

Submitters	n	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
All	25	24 (96%)	12 (48%)	16 (64%)
Psychology	15	14 (93%)	4 (27%)	8 (53%)
Political Science	6	6 (100%)	3 (50%)	3 (50%)
Practitioners	6	6 (100%)	4 (67%)	5 (83%)
Sociology	1	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)
Communication	3	2 (67%)	2 (67%)	3 (100%)
Economics	2	2 (100%)	1 (50%)	1 (50%)
Other Research	4	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	3 (75%)
Other	3	3 (100%)	2 (67%)	2 (67%)

Notes. A submission is counted for a subgroup if at least one member self-identified as belonging to this category. For example, a submission counts as a practitioner submission if at least one self-identified practitioner belongs to that category.

Table S5.3: *Submitters' Predictions for the Main Survey and Durability Survey among the Selected Interventions*

Intervention	Predicted Effect					
	Main Survey			Durability Survey		
	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemo. Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemo. Practices	Support for Partisan Violence
Befriending Meditation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Common Economic Interests	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Common Exhausted Majority Identity[1]	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Common National Identity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Correcting Division Misperceptions	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Democratic Collapse Threat	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Democratic System Justification	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Moral Similarities and Differences	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Yes	No	No			
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Party Overlap on Policies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Political Violence Inefficacy	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Positive Contact Video	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Utility of Outparty Empathy	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No

Notes. Submitters were asked whether they expected their intervention to significantly reduce the main outcomes before the main survey and before the durability survey. 1: Restrictions on the length of the intervention forced the submitters to cut features they would normally include to bolster longer-term effects so, although they have some hope/expectation that the tested version of their intervention might have effects that last as long as 2 weeks, they make that prediction with only low-to-moderate confidence.

6. Descriptive Statistics

In this section, we report several descriptive findings.

Raw Means and Standard Deviations by Experimental Condition

We report the raw means and standard deviations of the eight outcomes for each experimental condition (Table S6.1).

Correlations between Key Measures

We report the pairwise correlations between the eight outcomes and several key political variables in the literature, including partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican), the seven-point ANES measure of partisan identity (ranging from "strong Democrat" to "strong Republican"), a 101-point measure of strength of partisan identity, a 7-point measure of ideology (ranging from "extremely liberal" to "extremely conservative"), and a 4-point measure of ideological extremity (the absolute value of the distance from the midpoint of the ideology measure). We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., those in the null control condition). Table S6.2.1 provides the correlations across Democrats and Republicans. Table S6.2.2 provides the correlations among Democrats. Table S6.2.3 provides the correlations among Republicans.

Differences between Democrats and Republicans

We report partisan differences on the eight outcome variables (Table S6.3). We regressed each outcome on a dummy variable representing partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican). We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that Republicans reported significantly higher support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distrust and significantly lower support for partisan violence and social

Table S6.1: *Descriptive Statistics for the Outcomes (Mean (SD)) by Experimental Condition*

Condition	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Social Distrust	Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Null Control	68.10 (20.5)	26.50 (23.20)	10.80 (20.30)	52.50 (23.60)	20.90 (21.70)	53.50 (27.70)	30.70 (27.10)	51.60 (21.50)
Alternative Control	66.30 (20.40)	25.80 (23.50)	11.60 (21.00)	52.00 (23.60)	21.70 (22.40)	52.80 (27.80)	30.90 (27.50)	51.60 (21.50)
Befriending Meditation	62.40 (20.20)	26.60 (23.80)	11.30 (20.90)	53.20 (24.40)	20.50 (21.10)	51.50 (27.30)	29.10 (26.10)	51.20 (21.20)
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	64.90 (19.20)	27.20 (22.60)	10.10 (18.30)	51.90 (23.00)	20.20 (20.20)	52.50 (26.40)	31.90 (27.10)	50.80 (20.40)
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	59.20 (19.90)	25.80 (23.70)	11.30 (22.00)	51.40 (23.80)	18.70 (20.50)	49.50 (27.60)	27.40 (26.10)	50.00 (21.00)
Common National Identity	59.00 (19.10)	24.90 (22.90)	10.20 (19.60)	49.90 (23.00)	19.80 (21.10)	49.60 (27.40)	28.40 (26.70)	49.10 (20.60)
Positive Contact Video	57.40 (19.40)	26.00 (23.20)	10.50 (21.20)	50.50 (22.50)	19.60 (21.00)	52.10 (27.20)	29.60 (26.10)	51.70 (20.60)
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	66.30 (20.30)	27.90 (22.40)	11.10 (19.60)	55.1 (23.00)	21.30 (22.40)	53.30 (27.70)	31.50 (27.20)	52.10 (21.20)
Democratic Collapse Threat	63.40 (19.60)	22.00 (23.70)	13.20 (21.90)	48.3 (24.70)	19.30 (21.10)	50.50 (27.10)	29.00 (27.30)	50.80 (21.40)
Common Economic Interests	67.00 (19.90)	28.30 (24.20)	10.90 (20.10)	53.40 (24.00)	21.50 (22.40)	53.60 (27.10)	30.90 (27.30)	52.20 (21.60)
Utility of Outparty Empathy	60.80 (18.60)	27.20 (22.70)	11.60 (21.70)	52.40 (22.20)	21.50 (22.20)	52.30 (27.90)	31.00 (27.30)	50.40 (21.70)
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	64.00 (19.50)	26.80 (22.60)	10.70 (19.40)	51.50 (23.50)	21.10 (21.90)	52.40 (26.30)	29.20 (25.50)	51.90 (20.30)
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	66.20 (20.50)	26.90 (23.40)	10.80 (20.20)	52.40 (23.40)	19.90 (21.70)	53.10 (28.00)	30.90 (28.60)	51.90 (22.10)
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	65.70 (19.70)	25.90 (22.60)	9.40 (18.60)	51.40 (23.10)	20.40 (20.40)	52.70 (26.80)	31.80 (26.70)	52.00 (21.50)
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	62.70 (19.80)	26.30 (23.30)	9.60 (19.60)	52.10 (23.70)	20.80 (21.20)	52.40 (26.60)	28.90 (26.80)	52.40 (22.30)
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	57.90 (18.90)	27.90 (23.50)	11.40 (20.80)	49.80 (23.00)	18.30 (20.10)	49.60 (27.40)	27.00 (26.00)	49.70 (21.00)
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	65.10 (19.90)	27.10 (23.00)	10.00 (19.60)	53.70 (23.10)	20.10 (21.00)	52.50 (28.10)	28.60 (26.80)	51.40 (20.60)
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	62.00 (19.40)	20.90 (23.00)	9.30 (19.90)	48.30 (23.70)	19.90 (21.40)	51.20 (28.60)	27.90 (26.00)	49.50 (21.40)

Table S6.1: *Descriptive Statistics for the Outcomes (Mean (SD)) by Experimental Condition (continued)*

Condition	Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Social Distrust	Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts
Correcting Division Misperceptions	60.00 (19.80)	24.30 (21.40)	7.70 (16.10)	52.30 (23.20)	19.10 (20.90)	51.10 (27.90)	27.10 (26.60)	52.10 (20.80)
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	62.00 (20.60)	28.40 (23.60)	11.80 (21.20)	53.60 (22.90)	21.50 (21.90)	52.40 (26.60)	29.40 (26.70)	51.20 (21.30)
Moral Similarities and Differences	62.90 (19.20)	27.70 (22.30)	11.70 (19.80)	51.90 (22.80)	22.10 (22.00)	50.20 (27.60)	30.30 (26.70)	51.70 (21.40)
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	63.00 (21.40)	28.60 (24.10)	12.20 (22.10)	53.20 (24.40)	20.60 (22.20)	52.50 (27.60)	30.40 (27.30)	51.70 (22.80)
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	68.90 (19.80)	28.30 (23.70)	10.10 (18.60)	54.10 (24.60)	22.60 (22.40)	53.20 (27.00)	30.50 (26.30)	51.10 (21.20)
Party Overlap on Policies	64.60 (19.00)	27.50 (22.30)	11.10 (19.70)	53.20 (22.70)	22.90 (22.20)	52.20 (27.30)	31.60 (26.90)	53.90 (20.90)
Democratic System Justification	65.80 (19.90)	27.10 (23.00)	11.20 (20.10)	53.10 (23.60)	21.40 (22.50)	51.50 (27.20)	30.70 (27.90)	52.00 (21.20)
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	66.10 (20.60)	24.70 (22.10)	9.00 (17.90)	51.70 (23.90)	19.70 (22.00)	54.50 (27.70)	29.90 (27.20)	52.10 (21.10)
Political Violence Inefficacy	66.90 (20.60)	26.20 (22.70)	11.40 (20.50)	52.90 (23.40)	20.60 (21.60)	52.30 (28.10)	30.70 (26.80)	50.20 (21.50)

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100.

Table S6.2.1: *Correlations between the Outcomes and Key Political Variables*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	-0.05	-0.20	0.19	0.14	0.22	0.33	0.34	0.01	-0.03	0.16	0.05	0.14
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	-0.05	1.00	0.60	0.42	0.27	0.00	0.21	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.22	0.13	0.06
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.20	0.60	1.00	0.30	0.23	-0.13	0.16	-0.14	-0.03	-0.05	0.13	-0.05	0.06
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.19	0.42	0.30	1.00	0.21	0.04	0.26	0.19	0.06	-0.01	0.33	0.05	0.25
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation Social (OBC)	0.14	0.27	0.23	0.21	1.00	0.13	0.37	0.18	0.11	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.12
Distrust (SDT)	0.22	0.00	-0.13	0.04	0.13	1.00	0.19	0.18	0.06	0.07	-0.07	0.08	-0.02
Social Distance (SDE)	0.33	0.21	0.16	0.26	0.37	0.19	1.00	0.30	-0.17	-0.19	0.18	-0.15	0.17
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.34	0.07	-0.14	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.30	1.00	0.01	-0.02	0.18	0.09	0.16
Partisan Identity (PI)	0.01	0.12	-0.03	0.06	0.11	0.06	-0.17	0.01	1.00	0.95	-0.01	0.71	0.09
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.03	0.09	-0.05	-0.01	0.10	0.07	-0.19	-0.02	0.95	1.00	-0.11	0.69	0.01
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.16	0.22	0.13	0.33	0.04	-0.07	0.18	0.18	-0.01	-0.11	1.00	0.02	0.34
Ideology (IDE)	0.05	0.13	-0.05	0.05	0.10	0.08	-0.15	0.09	0.71	0.69	0.02	1.00	0.03
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.25	0.12	-0.02	0.17	0.16	0.09	0.01	0.34	0.03	1.00

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient with pairwise deletion.

Table S6.2.2: *Correlations between the Outcomes and Key Political Variables among Democrats*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	-0.18	-0.25	0.12	0.04	0.20	0.35	0.27	-0.10	0.13	-0.13	0.09
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	-0.18	1.00	0.67	0.40	0.26	-0.07	0.14	-0.05	-0.10	0.15	0.10	0.00
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.25	0.67	1.00	0.34	0.27	-0.16	0.11	-0.19	-0.12	0.12	0.02	0.09
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.12	0.40	0.34	1.00	0.17	-0.04	0.26	0.06	-0.23	0.29	-0.15	0.21
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.04	0.26	0.27	0.17	1.00	0.11	0.38	0.07	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	0.08
Social (OBC) Distrust (SDT)	0.20	-0.07	-0.16	-0.04	0.11	1.00	0.21	0.15	0.10	-0.14	0.05	-0.08
Social Distance (SDE)	0.35	0.14	0.11	0.26	0.38	0.21	1.00	0.26	-0.11	0.13	-0.21	0.21
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.27	-0.05	-0.19	0.06	0.07	0.15	0.26	1.00	-0.07	0.12	-0.08	0.04
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.10	-0.10	-0.12	-0.23	-0.03	0.10	-0.11	-0.07	1.00	-0.59	0.26	-0.34
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.29	-0.04	-0.14	0.13	0.12	-0.59	1.00	-0.20	0.28
Ideology (IDE)	-0.13	0.10	0.02	-0.15	-0.06	0.05	-0.21	-0.08	0.26	-0.20	1.00	-0.70
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.09	0.00	0.09	0.21	0.08	-0.08	0.21	0.04	-0.34	0.28	-0.70	1.00

Table S6.2.3: *Correlations between the Outcomes and Key Political Variables among Republicans*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF	PI7	SPI	IDE	IDX
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.08	-0.13	0.26	0.23	0.24	0.31	0.41	-0.19	0.18	0.27	0.21
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.08	1.00	0.55	0.44	0.26	0.05	0.35	0.21	-0.20	0.29	0.02	0.12
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.13	0.55	1.00	0.26	0.20	-0.10	0.22	-0.08	-0.08	0.13	-0.13	0.01
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.26	0.44	0.26	1.00	0.24	0.11	0.28	0.32	-0.35	0.38	0.20	0.29
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.23	0.26	0.20	0.24	1.00	0.14	0.42	0.28	-0.14	0.12	0.11	0.15
Social (OBC) Distrust (SDT)	0.24	0.05	-0.10	0.11	0.14	1.00	0.20	0.22	-0.04	0.01	0.06	0.03
Social Distance (SDE)	0.31	0.35	0.22	0.28	0.42	0.20	1.00	0.36	-0.19	0.23	0.15	0.16
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.41	0.21	-0.08	0.32	0.28	0.22	0.36	1.00	-0.29	0.25	0.34	0.29
Partisan Identity 7pt (PI7)	-0.19	-0.20	-0.08	-0.35	-0.14	-0.04	-0.19	-0.29	1.00	-0.61	-0.36	-0.46
Strength of Partisan Identity (SPI)	0.18	0.29	0.13	0.38	0.12	0.01	0.23	0.25	-0.61	1.00	0.32	0.41
Ideology (IDE)	0.27	0.02	-0.13	0.20	0.11	0.06	0.15	0.34	-0.36	0.32	1.00	0.76
Ideological Extremity (IDX)	0.21	0.12	0.01	0.29	0.15	0.03	0.16	0.29	-0.46	0.41	0.76	1.00

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition and who identified as Republicans were used in these analyses. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient with pairwise deletion.

Table S6.3: *Effect of Identifying as Republican (vs Democrat) on the Outcomes*

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.35	0.55	0.63	0.529	0.02
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	5.44	0.62	8.80	<.001	0.24
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	-1.09	0.54	-2.01	0.045	-0.05
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	2.78	0.64	4.36	<.001	0.12
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	4.93	0.59	8.35	<.001	0.23
Social Distrust	5,405	3.10	0.75	4.12	<.001	0.11
Social Distance	5,401	-9.15	0.73	-12.58	<.001	-0.34
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.58	0.59	0.99	0.322	0.03

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that Republican participants scored higher on this outcome than Democratic participants.

distance than Democrats. We did not find significant differences in partisan animosity and biased evaluation of politicized facts.

Differences between Less and More Strongly Identified Partisans

We report differences between more and less strongly identified partisans on the eight outcome variables (Table S6.4). We regressed each outcome on a measure of strength of partisan identity (on a 0-100 scale). We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that the participants who more strongly identified with their party reported more partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distance, and biased evaluation of political facts but less social distrust.

Partisan Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effect

We test whether the association between strength of partisan identity and the outcome variables is different for Democrats and Republicans (Table S6.5). We regressed each outcome

Table S6.4: *Effect of Strength of Partisan Identity on the Outcomes*

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.12	0.01	11.64	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	0.19	0.01	17.66	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	0.10	0.01	11.03	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	0.30	0.01	24.58	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	0.04	0.01	3.00	0.003
Social Distrust	5,405	-0.07	0.02	-4.60	<.001
Social Distance	5,401	0.19	0.01	12.97	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.15	0.01	13.04	<.001

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Strength of partisanship as a social identity was also scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that the more strongly participants identified as partisans, the higher they scored on this outcome.

Table S6.5: *Identifying as Republican (vs Democrat) x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effect on the Outcome Variables*

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Highest Scoring Group
Partisan Animosity	5,552	0.04	0.02	1.82	0.069	Strongly identified Partisans
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,556	0.12	0.02	5.48	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Support for Partisan Violence	5,556	0.00	0.02	-0.12	0.908	Strongly identified Democrats
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,463	0.09	0.02	3.69	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	0.14	0.02	6.12	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans
Social Distrust	5,405	0.16	0.03	5.34	<.001	Weakly identified Democrats
Social Distance	5,401	0.08	0.03	2.99	0.003	Strongly identified Democrats
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,388	0.10	0.02	4.41	<.001	Strongly identified Republicans

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes are scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that the effect of strength of partisan identity on the outcome is stronger among Republicans than among Democrats.

on the measure of strength of partisan identity (on a 0-100 scale), the dummy variable representing partisan identity (0 coded as Democrat, 1 coded as Republican), and their interaction. We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., the null control condition group).

We find evidence for such an interaction effect for six outcomes. For four of these outcomes (support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition

to bipartisan cooperation, and biased evaluation of politicized facts), the interaction effect indicates that strongly identified Republicans score uniquely high. For social distrust, the interaction effect indicates that weakly identified Democrats score uniquely high. For social distance, the interaction effect indicates that strongly identified Democrats score uniquely high.

For partisan animosity and support for partisan violence, we did not find significant interaction effects. In these cases, the main effects determine the highest scoring group. For partisan animosity, we observed a main effect for strength of partisan identity and no main effect for partisan identity. The group displaying the highest levels of partisan animosity were participants who strongly identified as partisans. For support for partisan violence, we observed a main effect for strength of partisan identity and a main effect for partisan identity. The group displaying the highest levels of support for partisan violence were strongly identified Democrats.

Differences between Liberals and Conservatives

We report ideological differences on the eight outcome variables (Table S6.6). We regressed each outcome on our measure of political ideology (ranging from 1 coded as extremely liberal to 7 coded as extremely conservative). We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that conservatives reported higher levels on six of the eight outcomes: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts (though note the Democratic and Republican formulations of biased evaluation of politicized facts varied in the content of the items). Liberals expressed higher levels on two of the outcomes: social distance and support for partisan violence.

Table S6.6: *Effect of Political Ideology on the Outcomes*

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,550	0.54	0.16	3.38	0.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,554	1.65	0.18	8.97	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,554	-0.58	0.17	-3.45	0.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,462	0.68	0.19	3.64	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	1.17	0.18	6.58	<.001
Social Distrust	5,404	1.19	0.21	5.58	<.001
Social Distance	5,400	-2.29	0.22	-10.43	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,387	1.03	0.17	6.05	<.001

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Political ideology was scaled from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that participants who identify as more ideologically conservative scored more highly on this outcome.

Differences between Ideological Moderate and Ideological Extreme People

We report differences between people with a moderate ideology and people with a more extreme ideology on the eight outcome variables (Table S6.7). We regressed each outcome on our measure of ideological extremity (ranging from 0 coded as moderate to 3 coded as extremely liberal/conservative). We included only participants who were not exposed to an intervention (i.e., those in the null control condition). We find that ideologically extreme participants reported higher levels on seven of the eight outcomes: partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts (though note the Democratic and Republican formulations of biased evaluation of politicized facts varied in the content of the items). Ideological extremity was not associated with significantly higher or lower levels of social distrust.

Table S6.7: *Effect of Ideological Extremity on the Outcomes*

Outcome	n	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	5,550	2.82	0.27	10.59	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	5,554	1.42	0.31	4.52	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	5,554	1.07	0.28	3.84	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	5,462	5.64	0.30	18.74	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	5,402	2.45	0.29	8.31	<.001
Social Distrust	5,404	-0.52	0.37	-1.40	0.162
Social Distance	5,400	4.50	0.36	12.51	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	5,387	3.20	0.29	11.14	<.001

Notes. Only participants assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Political ideology was scaled from 0 (moderate) to 3 (extremely liberal/conservative). Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that participants who identify as more ideologically extreme scored more highly on this outcome.

7. Results of Preregistered Analyses: Interventions vs Null Control

Partisan Animosity

Table S7.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.47	0.70	-15.02	<.001	-0.53
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.22	0.65	-15.6	<.001	-0.51
Common National Identity	-9.20	0.64	-14.34	<.001	-0.46
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.03	0.69	-13.01	<.001	-0.45
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.16	0.65	-12.46	<.001	-0.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.03	0.67	-10.45	<.001	-0.35
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.08	0.64	-9.47	<.001	-0.30
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.00	0.69	-8.72	<.001	-0.30
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.37	0.72	-7.49	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.23	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.21	0.72	-7.25	<.001	-0.26
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.14	0.66	-7.83	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.76	0.67	-7.16	<.001	-0.24
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.05	0.66	-6.10	<.001	-0.20
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.43	0.63	-5.42	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.26	0.65	-5.05	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.97	0.65	-4.60	<.001	-0.15
Democratic System Justification	-2.29	0.65	-3.53	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.15	0.65	-3.33	<.001	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.06	0.66	-3.10	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.10
Alternative Control	-1.77	0.69	-2.57	0.010	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.19	0.67	-1.77	0.038	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.87	0.71	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.61	0.65	0.94	0.827	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Support for Undemocratic Practices

Table S7.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.76	0.73	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.14	0.001	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.63	0.72	-2.28	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.27	0.76	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-0.99	0.77	-1.29	0.099	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	0.71	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.59	0.79	-0.75	0.228	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.50	0.76	-0.66	0.509	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.40	0.81	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.33	0.74	-0.44	0.330	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.08	0.76	0.10	0.542	0.00
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.09	0.71	0.12	0.548	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.29	0.72	0.41	0.658	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.36	0.74	0.49	0.689	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.43	0.71	0.61	0.730	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.58	0.72	0.81	0.791	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.68	0.73	0.93	0.825	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.70	0.70	0.99	0.840	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.94	0.71	1.33	0.908	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.39	0.77	1.80	0.964	0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.52	0.75	2.01	0.978	0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.62	0.75	2.16	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.69	0.74	2.28	0.989	0.07
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.85	0.77	2.39	0.992	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Support for Partisan Violence

Table S7.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.79	0.55	-5.10	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.58	-3.46	<.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.62	0.62	-2.59	0.005	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.59	-2.64	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.49	0.67	-2.22	0.013	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.82	0.70	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.60	-1.14	0.127	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.65	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.64	0.60	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.70	-0.72	0.237	-0.02
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.277	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.21	0.62	-0.34	0.366	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.64	-0.31	0.378	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.05	0.65	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.63	0.13	0.551	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.20	0.71	0.28	0.612	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.26	0.67	0.38	0.650	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.30	0.72	0.41	0.660	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.704	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.39	0.65	0.60	0.726	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.60	0.66	0.90	0.815	0.03
Alternative Control	0.71	0.68	1.04	0.300	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.76	0.66	1.14	0.873	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.27	0.70	1.82	0.965	0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.29	0.70	3.28	0.999	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

8. Results for Other Outcomes: Interventions vs Null Control

Support for Undemocratic Candidates

Figure S8.1: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.1: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.49	0.80	-5.62	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.17	0.75	-5.60	<.001	-0.18
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.73	-3.84	<.001	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.70	0.74	-3.64	<.001	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.37	0.77	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.64	0.77	-2.14	0.016	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.19	0.75	-1.59	0.056	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.13	0.75	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.04	0.74	-1.42	0.078	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.91	0.78	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.84	0.80	-1.05	0.148	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.57	0.75	-0.76	0.223	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.288	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.35	0.76	-0.46	0.322	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.33	0.73	-0.45	0.326	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.29	0.76	-0.39	0.698	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.38	0.77	0.49	0.689	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.42	0.73	0.58	0.719	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.46	0.82	0.56	0.711	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.48	0.78	0.62	0.732	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.53	0.76	0.70	0.757	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.57	0.72	0.80	0.788	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.78	0.74	1.06	0.856	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.79	0.71	1.11	0.867	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.32	0.75	1.76	0.960	0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.999	0.09
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation

Figure S8.2: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.2: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.45	0.68	-3.59	<.001	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.41	0.70	-3.46	<.001	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.69	0.69	-2.44	0.007	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.55	0.75	-2.07	0.019	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.53	0.70	-2.20	0.014	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.30	0.71	-1.83	0.034	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.09	0.70	-1.56	0.060	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.08	0.68	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.08	0.70	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.87	0.68	-1.27	0.102	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.80	0.75	-1.06	0.144	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.67	-1.11	0.133	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.72	0.67	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.30	0.77	-0.39	0.347	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.22	0.75	-0.30	0.384	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.20	0.76	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.10	0.77	0.13	0.551	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.13	0.72	0.18	0.571	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.18	0.74	0.24	0.594	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.31	0.72	0.42	0.664	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.73	0.46	0.677	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.47	0.75	0.62	0.732	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.67	0.73	0.92	0.820	0.03
Alternative Control	0.97	0.76	1.28	0.202	0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.68	0.73	2.32	0.990	0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	1.91	0.73	2.62	0.996	0.09
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Social Distrust

Figure S8.3: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier

Table S8.3: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.05	0.95	-4.26	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.83	0.92	-4.14	<.001	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.71	0.89	-4.17	<.001	-0.14
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.47	0.93	-3.72	<.001	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.94	0.91	-3.23	0.001	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.54	0.93	-2.75	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.46	0.92	-2.67	0.004	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-2.37	0.99	-2.40	0.008	-0.09
Democratic System Justification	-2.10	0.91	-2.32	0.010	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.82	0.98	-1.86	0.031	-0.07
Positive Contact Video	-1.73	0.97	-1.78	0.037	-0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.44	0.92	-1.57	0.058	-0.05
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.38	0.97	-1.43	0.076	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.38	0.90	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.31	0.89	-1.47	0.070	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.24	0.91	-1.36	0.087	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.21	0.99	-1.23	0.110	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.14	0.88	-1.29	0.098	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.05	0.90	-1.17	0.121	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.84	0.95	-0.89	0.187	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.45	0.96	-0.47	0.640	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.90	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.25	0.92	-0.27	0.394	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.93	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.17	0.89	-0.19	0.425	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.92	0.90	1.02	0.847	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Social Distance

Figure S8.4: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.4: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.85	0.88	-4.38	<.001	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.44	0.89	-3.85	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.15	0.88	-3.60	<.001	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.80	0.91	-3.08	0.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.73	0.84	-3.24	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.34	0.86	-2.73	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.28	0.86	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.27	0.94	-2.41	0.008	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.05	0.92	-2.22	0.013	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.89	0.90	-2.11	0.017	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.74	0.87	-1.99	0.023	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.53	0.86	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.25	0.86	-1.45	0.074	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.64	0.88	-0.73	0.233	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.34	0.92	-0.37	0.354	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.27	0.92	-0.30	0.383	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.20	0.92	-0.22	0.412	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.17	0.92	-0.19	0.424	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.06	0.91	-0.07	0.473	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.522	0.00
Alternative Control	0.08	0.93	0.08	0.933	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.87	0.22	0.587	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.22	0.89	0.25	0.600	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	0.88	1.09	0.863	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.05	0.86	1.22	0.890	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.21	0.90	1.35	0.911	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts

Figure S8.5: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.5: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.76	0.69	-4.03	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.23	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.03	0.71	-2.86	0.002	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.82	0.73	-2.49	0.006	-0.09
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.75	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.21	0.78	-1.56	0.060	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.03	0.72	-1.44	0.075	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.93	0.69	-1.34	0.090	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.69	0.70	-0.98	0.163	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.50	0.67	-0.75	0.228	-0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.50	0.71	-0.70	0.242	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.26	0.75	-0.34	0.367	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.14	0.77	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.11	0.74	-0.15	0.442	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.06	0.72	-0.08	0.469	0.00
Alternative Control	0.05	0.73	0.07	0.943	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.13	0.68	0.18	0.573	0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.20	0.72	0.28	0.611	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.22	0.69	0.32	0.625	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.69	0.36	0.641	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.26	0.72	0.35	0.638	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.34	0.71	0.49	0.687	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.691	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.42	0.69	0.61	0.728	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.45	0.79	0.57	0.715	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.19	0.69	3.15	0.999	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Composite of Eight Outcomes

Figure S8.6: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.6: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.31	0.40	-8.17	<.001	-0.27
Common National Identity	-3.12	0.39	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.40	-7.14	<.001	-0.23
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.39	-7.25	<.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-2.57	0.42	-6.19	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.57	0.40	-6.47	<.001	-0.21
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.34	0.41	-5.65	<.001	-0.19
Befriending Meditation	-1.53	0.42	-3.64	<.001	-0.12
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.45	0.44	-3.29	<.001	-0.12
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.13	0.43	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.39	-2.76	0.003	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.05	0.40	-2.63	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.93	0.39	-2.39	0.008	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.38	-2.16	0.015	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.81	0.40	-2.04	0.021	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.39	-2.04	0.021	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.63	0.38	-1.64	0.050	-0.05
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.45	0.40	-1.12	0.131	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.41	-1.11	0.134	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.32	0.43	-0.74	0.230	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.22	0.41	-0.54	0.294	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.15	0.43	-0.35	0.727	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.14	0.41	0.34	0.632	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.21	0.40	0.51	0.697	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.40	0.60	0.725	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.39	1.23	0.891	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Cold Feelings toward Outpartisans

Figure S8.7: *Interventions' Effects on Cold Feelings toward Outpartisans*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.7: *Interventions' Effects on Cold Feelings toward Outpartisans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-11.97	0.77	-15.55	<.001	-0.52
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-11.22	0.79	-14.24	<.001	-0.49
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-10.34	0.78	-13.21	<.001	-0.45
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.15	0.82	-11.13	<.001	-0.39
Positive Contact Video	-8.86	0.81	-11.00	<.001	-0.38
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-7.45	0.76	-9.79	<.001	-0.32
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.04	0.81	-8.68	<.001	-0.3
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-6.20	0.83	-7.47	<.001	-0.27
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.20	0.78	-7.94	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.54	0.85	-6.52	<.001	-0.24
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.35	0.82	-6.56	<.001	-0.23
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.85	0.78	-6.24	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-4.34	0.75	-5.80	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.23	0.81	-5.25	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.48	0.72	-4.80	<.001	-0.15
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.45	0.75	-4.62	<.001	-0.15
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.34	0.77	-4.37	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.33	0.79	-4.25	<.001	-0.14
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-2.05	0.75	-2.75	0.003	-0.09
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.91	0.76	-2.52	0.006	-0.08
Democratic System Justification	-1.89	0.75	-2.52	0.006	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.81	0.74	-2.46	0.007	-0.08
Alternative Control	-1.33	0.80	-1.67	0.095	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.23	0.81	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Common Economic Interests	-0.86	0.76	-1.13	0.129	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.66	0.73	0.89	0.814	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Withholding Money from Outpartisan in a Dictator Game

Figure S8.8: *Interventions' Effects on Percentage of Withheld Money from Outpartisan in a Dictator Game*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.8: *Interventions' Effects on Percentage of Withheld Money from Outpartisan in a Dictator Game*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-12.22	0.87	-13.97	<.001	-0.50
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.24	0.80	-11.58	<.001	-0.37
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.89	0.83	-10.68	<.001	-0.36
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-6.99	0.85	-8.24	<.001	-0.28
Common National Identity	-6.40	0.77	-8.32	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-6.03	0.79	-7.67	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.87	0.86	-6.80	<.001	-0.24
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.48	0.82	-6.65	<.001	-0.22
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.35	0.82	-6.56	<.001	-0.22
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.16	0.88	-5.83	<.001	-0.21
Befriending Meditation	-5.01	0.89	-5.61	<.001	-0.20
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.74	0.85	-5.58	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.68	0.81	-5.79	<.001	-0.19
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.57	0.91	-5.04	<.001	-0.18
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.39	0.82	-4.15	<.001	-0.14
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.08	0.83	-3.71	<.001	-0.12
Democratic System Justification	-2.71	0.82	-3.30	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.49	0.82	-3.03	0.001	-0.10
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.26	0.84	-2.67	0.004	-0.09
Alternative Control	-2.23	0.84	-2.65	0.008	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.68	0.82	-2.05	0.020	-0.07
Common Economic Interests	-1.57	0.85	-1.85	0.032	-0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.54	0.84	-1.84	0.033	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.65	0.81	-0.79	0.214	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.64	0.89	-0.72	0.237	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.55	0.81	0.68	0.751	0.02
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Opposition to Automatic Voter Registration

Figure S8.9: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Automatic Voter Registration*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.9: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Automatic Voter Registration*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.07	1.07	-3.81	<.001	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.41	1.11	-2.17	0.015	-0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-2.24	1.05	-2.14	0.016	-0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.23	1.11	-2.01	0.022	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-2.18	1.15	-1.90	0.029	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.14	1.08	-1.98	0.024	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.44	1.14	-1.26	0.103	-0.04
Democratic System Justification	-1.14	1.09	-1.05	0.147	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.02	1.10	-0.92	0.179	-0.03
Common Economic Interests	-1.00	1.08	-0.93	0.177	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.92	1.07	-0.86	0.195	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.90	1.18	-0.77	0.222	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.78	1.17	-0.67	0.252	-0.02
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.75	1.08	-0.69	0.245	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.73	1.13	-0.64	0.261	-0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.70	1.07	-0.65	0.258	-0.02
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.46	1.06	-0.43	0.332	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.33	1.12	-0.29	0.384	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.11	1.08	-0.10	0.461	0.00
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.05	1.14	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.12	1.11	0.11	0.543	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.35	1.07	0.33	0.628	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.80	1.08	0.74	0.771	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.83	1.06	0.78	0.782	0.02
Alternative Control	1.64	1.09	1.50	0.133	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.94	1.11	1.75	0.960	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Opposition to Voter ID Law

Figure S8.10: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Voter ID Law*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.10: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Voter ID Law*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Befriending Meditation	-0.95	0.95	-1.00	0.160	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.33	0.89	-0.37	0.357	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.27	0.86	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.14	0.90	-0.16	0.437	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.04	0.94	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.13	0.87	0.15	0.560	0.00
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.20	0.87	0.23	0.591	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.50	0.95	0.52	0.699	0.02
Common National Identity	0.60	0.87	0.68	0.753	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.84	0.88	0.96	0.831	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.93	0.92	1.00	0.842	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.01	1.00	1.02	0.845	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.04	0.93	1.12	0.869	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.06	0.88	1.19	0.884	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.07	0.90	1.18	0.882	0.04
Alternative Control	1.10	0.93	1.18	0.237	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.33	0.91	1.46	0.927	0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.40	0.90	1.56	0.941	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.44	0.91	1.58	0.943	0.05
Common Economic Interests	1.62	0.93	1.75	0.960	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.70	0.94	1.81	0.965	0.06
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.85	0.90	2.07	0.981	0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.86	0.97	1.92	0.973	0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.89	0.91	2.09	0.982	0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	2.15	0.94	2.29	0.989	0.07
Party Overlap on Policies	2.23	0.91	2.46	0.993	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Opposition to Voting by Mail

Figure S8.11: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Voting by Mail*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.11: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Voting by Mail*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.02	1.02	-2.96	0.002	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.82	1.02	-2.76	0.003	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.43	1.01	-1.42	0.077	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.16	1.05	-1.10	0.136	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.15	1.04	-1.10	0.135	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.06	0.99	-1.07	0.142	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.94	1.02	-0.92	0.178	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.76	1.04	-0.73	0.232	-0.02
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.57	1.03	-0.55	0.291	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.53	1.04	-0.51	0.306	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.44	1.01	-0.44	0.331	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	1.00	-0.37	0.355	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.34	1.03	-0.33	0.370	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.29	0.98	-0.29	0.384	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.22	1.02	-0.21	0.416	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.18	1.03	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.02	1.04	-0.02	0.493	0.00
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.27	0.99	0.27	0.606	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.33	1.11	0.30	0.617	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.34	1.01	0.34	0.634	0.01
Common National Identity	0.46	1.01	0.45	0.674	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.63	1.09	0.57	0.716	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1.08	1.08	1.00	0.840	0.03
Alternative Control	1.27	1.03	1.23	0.217	0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	1.96	1.09	1.80	0.964	0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	2.54	1.01	2.53	0.994	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Opposition to Partisan Gerrymandering

Figure S8.12: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Partisan Gerrymandering*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.12: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Partisan Gerrymandering*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.81	0.89	-3.15	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.33	0.89	-2.62	0.004	-0.08
Befriending Meditation	-2.03	0.92	-2.2	0.014	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.54	0.90	-1.71	0.044	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.42	0.94	-1.50	0.067	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.15	0.87	-1.32	0.093	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-1.00	0.89	-1.12	0.132	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.60	0.88	-0.68	0.250	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.54	0.95	-0.57	0.286	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.54	0.89	-0.61	0.272	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.43	0.86	-0.50	0.310	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.38	0.86	-0.44	0.329	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.26	0.90	-0.29	0.385	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.19	0.86	-0.22	0.413	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.13	0.92	-0.14	0.891	0.00
Democratic System Justification	-0.11	0.87	-0.12	0.451	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.06	0.85	-0.06	0.474	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.03	0.88	-0.03	0.489	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.499	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.19	0.88	0.22	0.586	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.44	0.93	0.47	0.681	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.46	0.93	0.50	0.690	0.02
Common National Identity	0.58	0.88	0.65	0.743	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.24	0.93	1.34	0.909	0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.77	0.91	1.94	0.974	0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.81	0.87	2.07	0.981	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Election Denial

Figure S8.13: *Interventions' Effects on Election Denial*



Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S8.13: *Interventions' Effects on Election Denial*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.64	1.08	-2.44	0.007	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.03	1.13	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.82	1.13	-1.61	0.054	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.96	1.19	-0.81	0.209	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.79	1.18	-0.67	0.251	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.69	1.16	-0.59	0.277	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.08	1.11	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.05	1.11	-0.05	0.482	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.12	1.10	0.11	0.544	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.28	1.13	0.24	0.596	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.37	1.13	0.33	0.630	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.50	1.12	0.45	0.673	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.64	1.23	0.52	0.699	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.79	1.11	0.71	0.761	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.84	1.17	0.71	0.763	0.02
Befriending Meditation	1.14	1.21	0.95	0.828	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.15	1.19	0.96	0.831	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.18	1.13	1.04	0.851	0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.55	1.14	1.36	0.914	0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1.66	1.13	1.47	0.929	0.05
Common Economic Interests	1.89	1.15	1.65	0.951	0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.94	1.11	1.74	0.959	0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.04	1.12	1.82	0.966	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.04	1.12	1.82	0.966	0.06
Alternative Control	2.25	1.15	1.95	0.051	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	4.46	1.13	3.93	1.000	0.13
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

9. Results of Intervention versus Intervention Analyses

Partisan Animosity

Table S9.1: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Partisan Animosity*

Rank	Intervention	% Outperformed Interventions	Outperformed Ranks
1	Positive Contact Video	88%	5 – 25
2	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	88%	5 – 25
3	Common National Identity	83%	6 – 25
4	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	83%	6 – 25
5	Correcting Division Misperceptions	79%	7 – 25
6	Utility of Outparty Empathy	67%	10 – 25
7	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	50%	14 – 25
8	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	50%	14 – 25
9	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	46%	15 – 25
10	Befriending Meditation	46%	15 – 25
11	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	46%	15 – 25
12	Moral Similarities and Differences	46%	15 – 25
13	Democratic Collapse Threat	38%	17 – 25
14	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	33%	18 – 25
15	Party Overlap on Policies	17%	22 – 25
16	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	12%	23 – 25
17	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	12%	23 – 25
18	Democratic System Justification	4%	25
19	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	4%	25
20	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	4%	25
21	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	4%	25
22	Alternative Control	4%	25
23	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	4%	25
24	Common Economic Interests	0%	-
25	Political Violence Inefficacy	0%	-

Notes. The percentage and ranks of interventions each intervention outperformed. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Support for Undemocratic Practices

Table S9.2: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Rank	Intervention	% Outperformed Interventions	Outperformed Ranks
1	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	96%	3 – 25
2	Democratic Collapse Threat	96%	3 – 25
3	Correcting Division Misperceptions	62%	11 – 25
4	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	62%	11 – 25
5	Common National Identity	50%	14 – 25
6	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	33%	18 – 25
7	Positive Contact Video	25%	20 – 25
8	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	25%	20 – 25
9	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	17%	22 – 25
10	Alternative Control	12%	23 – 25
11	Befriending Meditation	12%	23 – 25
12	Political Violence Inefficacy	0%	-
13	Utility of Outparty Empathy	0%	-
14	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0%	-
15	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0%	-
16	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0%	-
17	Democratic System Justification	0%	-
18	Moral Similarities and Differences	0%	-
19	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0%	-
20	Party Overlap on Policies	0%	-
21	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0%	-
22	Common Economic Interests	0%	-
23	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0%	-
24	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0%	-
25	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0%	-

Notes. The percentage and ranks of interventions each intervention outperformed. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Support for Partisan Violence

Table S9.3: *Relative Effectiveness of Interventions for Support for Partisan Violence*

Rank	Intervention	% Outperformed Interventions	Outperformed Ranks
1	Correcting Division Misperceptions	83%	6 – 25
2	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	58%	12 – 25
3	Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	42%	16 – 25
4	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	42%	16 – 25
5	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	29%	18, 20 – 25
6	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	12%	23 – 25
7	Positive Contact Video	8%	24 – 25
8	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	8%	24 – 25
9	Common National Identity	8%	24 – 25
10	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	8%	24 – 25
11	Befriending Meditation	4%	25
12	Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	4%	25
13	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	4%	25
14	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	4%	25
15	Common Economic Interests	4%	25
16	Party Overlap on Policies	4%	25
17	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	4%	25
18	Political Violence Inefficacy	4%	25
19	Utility of Outparty Empathy	4%	25
20	Democratic System Justification	4%	25
21	Moral Similarities and Differences	4%	25
22	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0%	-
23	Alternative Control	0%	-
24	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0%	-
25	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0%	-

Notes. The percentage and ranks of interventions each intervention outperformed. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Other Outcomes

The results for the relative effectiveness of interventions for the other outcomes will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/.

10. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

We examined the possibility that the interventions we tested might have heterogeneous effects on the outcome variables in several ways.

Moderation by Partisan Identity

First, we tested whether the treatment effects were moderated by partisan identity, i.e., whether participants identified as Democrats or Republicans (Tables S10.1.1 – S10.1.8). We used the same preregistered analytic strategy as for the intervention versus null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and partisan identity.

Across the eight outcomes, we found statistically significant differences in treatment effects between Republicans and Democrats for nine interventions. Because of the large number of hypotheses tested (8 outcomes multiplied by 25 interventions = 200 hypotheses), we would expect 10 interaction effects to be statistically significant (by $p < .05$ threshold) by chance alone. Thus, there was very little evidence for moderation by partisan identity, similar to what would be expected merely by chance. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects (see Table S10.1.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* did not significantly affect partisan animosity among Democrats, but significantly increased partisan animosity among Republicans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among both Democrats and Republicans, but the effect was significantly stronger among Democrats.

Table S10.1.1: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.08	1.39	0.78	0.436
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.46	1.45	-1.01	0.314
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.73	1.29	-0.56	0.573
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.05	1.39	-0.76	0.448
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.28	0.57	0.567
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.38	1.41	-0.27	0.787
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.33	0.04	0.967
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.34	1.34	-0.25	0.799
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.11	1.34	0.83	0.407
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.64	1.35	0.48	0.634
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.86	1.33	-0.65	0.518
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.23	1.33	-0.17	0.862
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.07	1.29	-0.83	0.406
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.6	1.43	-0.42	0.676
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.78	1.31	-0.59	0.554
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.40	1.29	1.08	0.278
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.44	1.28	1.90	0.057
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.21	1.31	-0.16	0.870
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.66	1.38	1.21	0.228
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.7	1.31	-1.29	0.196
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.18	1.44	-0.82	0.413
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.35	1.30	2.58	0.010
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.37	1.26	1.88	0.061
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.73	1.30	-1.34	0.181
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.42	1.33	1.07	0.283
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.81	1.43	0.57	0.571
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.2: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.65	1.52	1.08	0.279
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.85	1.63	0.52	0.601
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.72	1.46	0.49	0.623
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.30	1.53	-1.51	0.131
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.42	1.43	-0.30	0.767
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.74	1.55	1.12	0.261
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.23	1.42	-0.16	0.872
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.15	1.53	2.72	0.007
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.91	1.55	1.23	0.218
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.34	1.53	0.22	0.824
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.33	1.47	0.22	0.823
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.22	1.42	0.85	0.393
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.27	1.43	0.19	0.850
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.66	1.58	1.05	0.292
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.07	1.50	-0.71	0.476
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.78	1.43	0.55	0.586
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.36	1.45	-0.93	0.350
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.56	1.38	1.85	0.064
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.52	1.50	-1.01	0.310
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.19	1.43	0.83	0.406
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.43	1.55	1.57	0.117
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.54	1.48	1.04	0.298
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.71	1.41	0.50	0.616
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.46	1.41	-0.32	0.747
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.99	1.38	1.45	0.148
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.49	0.49	0.622
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.3: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.04	1.36	0.76	0.445
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.41	1.40	1.01	0.314
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.21	1.11	0.266
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.54	1.41	-1.09	0.275
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.02	1.23	-0.83	0.406
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.73	1.41	0.52	0.606
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.00	1.24	0.81	0.417
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.35	1.39	3.12	0.002
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.61	1.31	0.47	0.639
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.95	1.44	-0.66	0.509
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.44	1.27	1.13	0.258
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.93	1.26	1.54	0.125
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.11	1.18	-0.94	0.347
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.00	1.34	0.00	0.998
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.37	1.32	-0.28	0.783
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.92	1.23	0.75	0.454
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.20	1.25	0.16	0.876
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.39	1.09	1.27	0.204
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.15	1.32	-0.11	0.909
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.53	1.29	1.18	0.237
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.24	1.40	0.17	0.866
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.51	1.20	0.43	0.671
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.06	1.26	-0.05	0.963
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.64	1.26	1.31	0.191
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.83	1.15	0.72	0.473
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.22	1.33	0.17	0.866
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.4: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	4.43	1.52	2.92	0.004
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.03	1.65	0.62	0.532
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.26	1.50	0.17	0.864
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.90	1.54	1.24	0.216
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.56	1.45	-0.39	0.698
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.83	1.54	1.83	0.067
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.71	1.44	0.49	0.623
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.71	1.60	1.07	0.284
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.07	1.52	0.04	0.964
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.11	1.51	-0.07	0.943
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.72	1.56	0.46	0.643
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.41	1.46	0.28	0.778
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.89	1.47	0.60	0.546
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.97	1.60	1.23	0.220
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.49	1.48	0.33	0.739
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.64	1.42	1.16	0.248
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.16	1.49	0.11	0.916
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.62	1.47	-1.11	0.268
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.21	1.48	-0.14	0.889
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.49	0.61	0.543
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.98	1.56	2.55	0.011
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.76	1.50	1.84	0.066
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.78	1.43	-0.55	0.585
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.11	1.47	-1.44	0.151
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.12	1.50	1.41	0.157
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.70	1.56	-0.45	0.653
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.5: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.64	1.55	0.41	0.680
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.28	1.55	1.47	0.142
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.19	1.35	1.63	0.104
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.24	1.39	-0.17	0.863
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.36	1.37	-0.99	0.320
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.03	1.52	1.99	0.047
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.92	1.46	1.32	0.187
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.29	1.40	-0.21	0.837
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.03	1.51	0.02	0.984
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.03	1.55	-0.02	0.983
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.63	1.49	-0.42	0.674
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.37	1.42	0.97	0.332
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.47	1.35	0.35	0.726
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.55	1.54	-0.36	0.721
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.17	1.38	0.12	0.905
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.51	1.37	1.10	0.270
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.55	1.39	1.11	0.267
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.96	1.38	0.69	0.489
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.98	1.45	0.67	0.500
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.96	1.46	-0.66	0.512
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.06	1.50	0.04	0.967
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.25	1.46	-0.17	0.866
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.09	1.46	-0.06	0.953
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.51	1.46	-0.35	0.726
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.27	1.42	-0.89	0.371
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.14	1.54	-0.74	0.459
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.6: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Social Distrust*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.94	0.03	0.980
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.01	2.01	1.00	0.317
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.58	1.77	0.33	0.745
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.90	0.48	0.633
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.24	1.78	-0.70	0.485
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.84	1.96	1.45	0.147
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.60	1.80	0.33	0.741
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.35	1.83	1.28	0.199
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.18	1.86	-1.17	0.242
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.86	1.96	-0.95	0.343
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.06	1.80	0.59	0.557
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.79	1.85	0.43	0.670
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.59	1.78	-0.33	0.739
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.84	1.94	-0.43	0.664
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.05	1.86	-0.57	0.570
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.16	1.83	-0.09	0.929
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.08	1.85	1.13	0.261
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.63	1.84	0.88	0.378
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.56	1.79	1.43	0.153
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.53	1.86	-1.36	0.174
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.73	1.90	-0.38	0.700
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.03	1.78	0.58	0.564
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.89	1.84	0.49	0.628
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-3.52	1.81	-1.95	0.051
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.38	1.81	0.21	0.836
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.40	1.99	-1.21	0.228
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.7: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Social Distance*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.96	1.87	0.51	0.607
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.64	1.82	2.00	0.046
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.04	1.80	-0.58	0.564
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.73	1.79	0.97	0.334
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.42	1.71	0.83	0.408
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.20	1.84	0.65	0.514
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.29	1.74	-0.74	0.459
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.85	1.79	-1.04	0.300
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.09	1.81	-0.60	0.547
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.79	1.83	-0.97	0.330
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.18	1.72	-0.10	0.916
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.53	1.83	1.38	0.167
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-4.24	1.71	-2.48	0.013
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.26	1.88	-0.67	0.504
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	3.55	1.75	2.03	0.042
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.09	1.71	-0.05	0.960
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.71	1.69	1.61	0.108
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.13	1.76	0.64	0.522
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.84	1.75	0.48	0.632
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.77	0.76	0.448
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.97	1.84	1.62	0.106
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.43	1.71	0.25	0.801
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.37	1.76	0.21	0.832
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	-2.94	1.78	-1.66	0.098
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.22	1.72	-0.13	0.899
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.37	1.83	-0.75	0.454
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.8: *Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.30	1.46	1.58	0.115
Befriending Meditation x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.07	1.50	0.71	0.475
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.72	1.38	-0.53	0.599
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.46	0.03	0.975
Common National Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.16	1.37	1.57	0.115
Positive Contact Video x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.85	1.47	1.25	0.210
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.15	1.37	-0.11	0.911
Democratic Collapse Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.19	1.43	0.13	0.895
Common Economic Interests x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.17	1.45	0.12	0.908
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.34	1.55	0.87	0.387
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.22	1.39	0.88	0.380
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.82	1.43	0.57	0.567
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	-1.48	1.42	-1.05	0.296
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.51	1.58	0.32	0.746
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.66	1.42	0.46	0.644
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.70	1.33	-0.52	0.601
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.44	1.38	1.04	0.299
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.91	1.37	0.66	0.508
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Republican (vs Democrat)	2.46	1.42	1.73	0.084
Moral Similarities and Differences x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.87	1.43	0.60	0.546
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.80	1.53	1.17	0.241
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.52	1.40	-0.37	0.711
Party Overlap on Policies x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.98	1.39	0.71	0.479
Democratic System Justification x Republican (vs Democrat)	1.43	1.39	1.03	0.304
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Republican (vs Democrat)	0.05	1.38	0.04	0.971
Political Violence Inefficacy x Republican (vs Democrat)	-0.25	1.5	-0.16	0.870
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.9: *Simple Effects for the Significant Condition x Partisan Identity Interaction Effects*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Democrat	-1.11	0.97	-1.15	0.252
Partisan Animosity	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Republican	2.24	0.86	2.60	0.009
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Democrat	-6.77	1.00	-6.79	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Republican	-2.62	1.15	-2.27	0.023
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Democrat	0.18	0.95	0.19	0.852
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Republican	4.52	1.02	4.43	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Alternative Control	Democrat	-2.36	1.05	-2.25	0.024
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Alternative Control	Republican	2.06	1.10	1.88	0.060
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Democrat	-1.48	1.10	-1.35	0.178
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Republican	2.50	1.10	2.26	0.024
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Positive Contact Video	Democrat	-2.97	0.88	-3.36	0.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Positive Contact Video	Republican	0.06	1.24	0.05	0.959
Social Distance	Befriending Meditation	Democrat	-4.41	1.26	-3.51	<.001
Social Distance	Befriending Meditation	Republican	-0.78	1.31	-0.59	0.554
Social Distance	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Democrat	3.15	1.27	2.48	0.013
Social Distance	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Republican	-1.09	1.15	-0.95	0.343
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Democrat	-5.54	1.26	-4.39	<.001
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Republican	-1.99	1.21	-1.64	0.100

Notes. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for both levels of partisan identity (Democrat and Republican). The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

- *Democratic Collapse Threat* did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among Democrats, but significantly increased support for partisan violence among Republicans.
- The *Alternative Control* condition significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among Democrats, but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among Republicans.
- *Describing a Likable Outpartisan* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among Democrats, but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among Republicans.
- *Positive Contact Video* significantly reduced opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Democrats, but did not significantly affect opposition to bipartisan cooperation among Republicans.
- *Befriending Meditation* significantly reduced social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.
- *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* significantly increased social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced social distance among Democrats but did not significantly affect social distance among Republicans.

Out of these interaction effects, we are most concerned about the backfire effect of *Democratic Collapse Threat* on support for partisan violence among Republicans ($p = .002$). We think that this interaction effect might be meaningful because this intervention used footage from the January 6th riots, which may have upset the many Republicans who now perceive those riots

as a legitimate protest (Blake, 2022), and/or may have influenced Republicans to be more supportive of violent protest as a result of showing footage of a violent, right-leaning protest. Future research should explore whether this intervention could be revised to avoid, or even reverse, this backfire effect, while preserving the positive effects of the intervention.

Despite the lack of evidence for widespread heterogeneous treatment effects, for descriptive purposes we report the effects of all interventions separately for Democrats (Tables S10.1.10 – S10.1.17) and Republicans (Tables S10.1.18 – S10.1.25). For these analyses, we restricted the sample to Democrats and Republicans, respectively. We followed the same analysis strategy as in the preregistered analyses except that (a) we did not control for partisan identity (doing so is impossible when analyzing a single partisan identity because the variable is constant for these subgroup analyses) and (b) we did not use inverse probability weighting to correct for differential attrition.

Table S10.1.10: *Effects of Condition on Partisan Animosity among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.27	0.90	-11.38	<.001	-0.52
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.86	0.91	-10.8	<.001	-0.50
Common National Identity	-9.43	0.90	-10.44	<.001	-0.48
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.38	0.98	-8.58	<.001	-0.43
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-7.97	0.93	-8.53	<.001	-0.40
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.32	0.98	-7.48	<.001	-0.37
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-7.31	0.87	-8.45	<.001	-0.37
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.79	0.97	-7.01	<.001	-0.34
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.97	0.98	-5.06	<.001	-0.25
Party Overlap on Policies	-4.63	0.90	-5.13	<.001	-0.23
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-4.56	1.00	-4.54	<.001	-0.23
Befriending Meditation	-4.55	0.98	-4.66	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.53	0.88	-5.13	<.001	-0.23
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.36	0.94	-4.66	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-3.58	0.91	-3.94	<.001	-0.18
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.53	0.93	-3.79	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-2.89	0.88	-3.29	0.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.71	0.95	-2.86	0.002	-0.14
Alternative Control	-2.25	0.94	-2.4	0.016	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.83	0.89	-2.06	0.020	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.77	0.9	-1.98	0.024	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.75	0.95	-1.83	0.034	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.89	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Democratic System Justification	-1.42	0.92	-1.53	0.063	-0.07
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.36	0.97	-1.4	0.081	-0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.00	0.97	-1.03	0.152	-0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.11: *Effects of Condition on Support for Undemocratic Practices among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-6.72	0.99	-6.77	<.001	-0.29
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.09	1.02	-4.99	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.42	0.99	-3.47	<.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-3.11	0.98	-3.19	0.001	-0.13
Positive Contact Video	-1.80	1.04	-1.73	0.042	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.38	1.01	-1.36	0.087	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.28	1.14	-1.13	0.130	-0.06
Alternative Control	-1.26	1.03	-1.23	0.219	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.01	1.02	-1.00	0.160	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.89	1.09	-0.81	0.208	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.75	1.03	-0.73	0.232	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.51	0.98	-0.52	0.302	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.18	1.09	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.06	1.11	-0.06	0.477	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.04	1.03	-0.04	0.483	0.00
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.04	1.04	0.04	0.516	0.00
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.14	1.05	0.14	0.554	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.32	1.02	0.32	0.625	0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.39	1.04	0.38	0.647	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.60	1.05	0.57	0.716	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.68	1.00	0.68	0.752	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.69	1.08	0.64	0.740	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.83	1.05	0.79	0.784	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.08	0.98	1.11	0.866	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.99	1.10	1.81	0.965	0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.43	1.06	2.29	0.989	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.12: *Effects of Condition on Support for Partisan Violence among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.50	0.80	-4.39	<.001	-0.17
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.43	0.86	-2.84	0.002	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.68	0.94	-1.79	0.037	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.47	1.00	-1.48	0.070	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.43	0.90	-1.58	0.057	-0.07
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.31	0.90	-1.45	0.073	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.28	0.87	-1.47	0.070	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.22	0.99	-1.23	0.109	-0.06
Befriending Meditation	-1.16	0.95	-1.22	0.111	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.03	0.89	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.02	0.91	-1.12	0.131	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.96	0.89	-1.08	0.141	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.69	0.90	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.53	0.90	-0.59	0.279	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.36	0.94	-0.39	0.350	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.29	0.95	-0.31	0.380	-0.01
Common National Identity	-0.18	0.94	-0.19	0.426	-0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.16	0.95	0.16	0.565	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.17	0.92	0.18	0.573	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	0.95	0.18	0.572	0.01
Alternative Control	0.19	0.97	0.20	0.843	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.74	1.08	0.69	0.754	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.74	0.98	0.75	0.774	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.75	0.98	0.77	0.779	0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.98	1.07	0.91	0.819	0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.16	1.03	1.12	0.869	0.06
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.13: *Effects of Condition on Support for Undemocratic Candidates among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.22	1.11	-4.73	<.001	-0.23
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.29	1.05	-4.07	<.001	-0.19
Positive Contact Video	-3.67	1.05	-3.50	<.001	-0.16
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.96	1.02	-2.89	0.002	-0.13
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.52	1.07	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Common National Identity	-2.41	1.03	-2.35	0.009	-0.10
Alternative Control	-2.33	1.05	-2.23	0.026	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.19	1.00	-2.18	0.015	-0.09
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.76	1.11	-1.58	0.057	-0.08
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.62	1.05	-1.54	0.061	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.46	1.05	-1.39	0.082	-0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.44	1.10	-1.31	0.095	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.23	1.07	-1.15	0.125	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.69	1.03	-0.67	0.250	-0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.64	1.03	-0.62	0.269	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.17	1.04	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.14	1.10	-0.13	0.449	-0.01
Befriending Meditation	-0.10	1.10	-0.09	0.463	0.00
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.06	0.99	0.06	0.525	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.58	1.07	0.54	0.705	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.59	1.04	0.57	0.716	0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.66	1.05	0.63	0.736	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.94	1.02	0.93	0.823	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	1.04	0.93	0.823	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.57	1.04	1.51	0.934	0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.77	1.01	1.76	0.961	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.14: *Effects of Condition on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-2.98	0.90	-3.32	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.52	0.84	-3.01	0.001	-0.13
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.13	0.91	-2.35	0.010	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.13	0.89	-2.40	0.008	-0.11
Befriending Meditation	-1.92	0.89	-2.15	0.016	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.87	0.84	-2.23	0.013	-0.09
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.75	0.86	-2.02	0.021	-0.09
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.73	0.88	-1.97	0.024	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.59	0.88	-1.81	0.035	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.35	0.89	-1.51	0.065	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.98	0.86	-1.15	0.125	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.79	0.88	-0.90	0.184	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.71	0.95	-0.75	0.228	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.27	0.91	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.18	0.89	-0.20	0.422	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.15	1.01	-0.15	0.441	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.09	1.03	-0.09	0.465	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.03	1.01	-0.03	0.486	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.20	0.96	0.21	0.584	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.47	0.97	0.49	0.686	0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.53	0.97	0.55	0.708	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.55	0.96	0.58	0.718	0.03
Alternative Control	0.74	0.95	0.77	0.439	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.11	0.98	1.13	0.872	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.84	0.96	1.93	0.973	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.87	1.02	1.84	0.967	0.09

Includes controls

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.15: *Effects of Condition on Social Distrust among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.36	1.31	-3.33	<.001	-0.16
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.04	1.21	-3.34	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.61	1.29	-2.8	0.003	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.31	1.24	-2.67	0.004	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-3.22	1.27	-2.53	0.006	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.15	1.29	-2.43	0.007	-0.12
Common National Identity	-2.97	1.22	-2.43	0.008	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.93	1.24	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.47	1.22	-2.03	0.021	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-2.12	1.28	-1.66	0.049	-0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.91	1.25	-1.52	0.064	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.41	1.21	-1.17	0.121	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.35	1.21	-1.12	0.131	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.06	1.28	-0.83	0.202	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.97	1.19	-0.82	0.207	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.82	1.29	-0.64	0.261	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.75	1.34	-0.56	0.287	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.63	1.25	-0.51	0.307	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.54	1.25	-0.43	0.333	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.50	1.21	-0.41	0.340	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.43	1.31	-0.33	0.370	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.38	1.26	-0.3	0.762	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.28	1.24	-0.23	0.410	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.17	1.31	-0.13	0.447	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.82	1.22	0.67	0.748	0.03
Common Economic Interests	0.95	1.28	0.74	0.770	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.16: *Effects of Condition on Social Distance among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.59	1.26	-4.45	<.001	-0.20
Befriending Meditation	-4.46	1.25	-3.56	<.001	-0.16
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.10	1.30	-3.15	0.001	-0.15
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.05	1.21	-3.34	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.69	1.31	-2.81	0.002	-0.13
Common National Identity	-2.89	1.26	-2.30	0.011	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.62	1.27	-2.06	0.020	-0.10
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.26	1.22	-1.85	0.032	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.14	1.27	-1.69	0.045	-0.08
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.72	1.28	-1.34	0.090	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.60	1.35	-1.19	0.118	-0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.44	1.30	-1.11	0.134	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.43	1.23	-1.17	0.122	-0.05
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-1.32	1.29	-1.02	0.153	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.23	1.23	-1.00	0.158	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.03	1.28	-0.81	0.210	-0.04
Alternative Control	-0.28	1.32	-0.22	0.829	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.04	1.25	-0.03	0.486	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	1.32	0.13	0.551	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.44	1.32	0.33	0.630	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.67	1.38	0.49	0.687	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.75	1.26	0.6	0.725	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.81	1.24	0.65	0.743	0.03
Democratic System Justification	1.63	1.34	1.22	0.888	0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.79	1.29	1.39	0.917	0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	3.25	1.26	2.59	0.995	0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.17: *Effects of Condition on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts among Democrats*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-3.62	0.95	-3.82	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.92	1.01	-2.88	0.002	-0.14
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.30	0.98	-2.34	0.010	-0.11
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.85	1.10	-1.69	0.046	-0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.71	1.05	-1.63	0.052	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.60	1.06	-1.51	0.066	-0.07
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.41	1.06	-1.33	0.092	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.07	0.99	-1.08	0.140	-0.05
Alternative Control	-0.94	0.99	-0.95	0.344	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.93	1.00	-0.93	0.176	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.85	1.11	-0.77	0.222	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.69	1.03	-0.67	0.252	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.55	1.02	-0.54	0.294	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.47	1.02	-0.46	0.323	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	1.03	-0.36	0.359	-0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.98	-0.2	0.421	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.20	0.99	-0.2	0.420	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.18	1.03	-0.17	0.431	-0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.02	0.95	-0.02	0.492	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.00	1.01	0.00	0.498	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.12	0.99	0.12	0.548	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.22	1.04	0.22	0.585	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.36	1.14	0.32	0.625	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.46	0.97	0.47	0.681	0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.21	1.00	1.21	0.887	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.55	0.97	1.59	0.944	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Democrats were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.18: *Effects of Condition on Partisan Animosity among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.84	1.06	-10.23	<.001	-0.54
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.68	0.93	-11.46	<.001	-0.53
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.55	0.98	-9.73	<.001	-0.47
Common National Identity	-8.88	0.91	-9.74	<.001	-0.44
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.12	0.91	-8.89	<.001	-0.40
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-6.70	0.93	-7.24	<.001	-0.33
Befriending Meditation	-6.25	1.06	-5.89	<.001	-0.31
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.98	0.92	-6.53	<.001	-0.29
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.89	1.02	-5.77	<.001	-0.29
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.61	1.03	-5.45	<.001	-0.28
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.21	0.98	-5.34	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.98	0.99	-5.02	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.71	0.94	-5.00	<.001	-0.23
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.38	0.95	-4.62	<.001	-0.22
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.49	0.94	-3.70	<.001	-0.17
Democratic System Justification	-3.16	0.91	-3.48	<.001	-0.15
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.61	0.93	-2.82	0.002	-0.13
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.33	0.99	-2.35	0.009	-0.11
Party Overlap on Policies	-2.30	0.88	-2.60	0.005	-0.11
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.28	0.92	-2.47	0.007	-0.11
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.98	-1.80	0.036	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.27	0.92	-1.38	0.083	-0.06
Alternative Control	-1.07	1.01	-1.06	0.291	-0.05
Common Economic Interests	-0.45	0.93	-0.49	0.313	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.36	1.05	-0.34	0.366	-0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.28	0.86	2.66	0.996	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.19: *Effects of Condition on Support for Undemocratic Practices among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.54	1.03	-6.36	<.001	-0.29
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.70	1.16	-2.33	0.010	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.48	1.05	-2.36	0.009	-0.11
Common National Identity	-1.93	1.00	-1.93	0.027	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.31	0.98	-1.34	0.090	-0.06
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.17	0.96	-1.22	0.111	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.64	1.00	-0.64	0.260	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.20	1.14	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.09	1.08	-0.08	0.466	0.00
Befriending Meditation	0.11	1.20	0.10	0.538	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.18	0.99	0.18	0.570	0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.23	1.09	0.21	0.582	0.01
Alternative Control	0.28	1.11	0.26	0.798	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.29	1.06	0.27	0.607	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.44	1.03	0.43	0.667	0.02
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.61	1.00	0.61	0.728	0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.63	1.03	0.61	0.730	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.72	1.01	0.72	0.763	0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.83	1.03	0.81	0.792	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.86	1.05	0.82	0.795	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.91	0.96	0.94	0.827	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.97	1.02	0.95	0.828	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.08	0.99	1.09	0.862	0.05
Common Economic Interests	2.12	1.13	1.88	0.970	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.22	1.03	2.15	0.984	0.10
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.97	1.11	2.69	0.996	0.13
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.20: *Effects of Condition on Support for Partisan Violence among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.23	0.75	-2.96	0.002	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.11	0.77	-2.73	0.003	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.66	0.84	-1.99	0.023	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.61	0.77	-2.07	0.019	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.56	0.92	-1.70	0.044	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.14	0.79	-1.43	0.076	-0.06
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.61	0.93	-0.65	0.257	-0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.49	0.77	-0.64	0.262	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.48	0.84	-0.58	0.282	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.47	1.02	-0.46	0.321	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.15	0.96	-0.16	0.438	-0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.06	0.84	-0.08	0.470	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.02	0.86	-0.02	0.490	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.08	0.90	0.09	0.537	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.29	0.92	0.32	0.624	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.86	0.42	0.662	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.42	1.06	0.40	0.654	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.43	0.90	0.48	0.683	0.02
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.46	0.92	0.50	0.693	0.02
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.73	0.88	0.83	0.798	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.76	0.89	0.86	0.805	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.12	0.88	1.27	0.898	0.06
Alternative Control	1.14	0.96	1.19	0.235	0.06
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.20	0.9	1.33	0.909	0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.46	0.96	1.52	0.936	0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	4.44	1.02	4.37	1.000	0.23
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.21: *Effects of Condition on Support for Undemocratic Candidates among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.05	1.05	-3.85	<.001	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.68	1.15	-3.19	0.001	-0.16
Common National Identity	-3.16	1.03	-3.08	0.001	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.51	1.07	-2.35	0.009	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.11	1.02	-1.09	0.138	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.92	1.13	-0.82	0.206	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.74	1.11	-0.66	0.253	-0.03
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.67	1.04	-0.64	0.260	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.59	1.12	-0.52	0.301	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.58	1.02	-0.57	0.286	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.52	1.08	-0.48	0.314	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.51	1.02	-0.50	0.308	-0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.43	1.09	-0.40	0.346	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.30	1.03	-0.29	0.387	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.15	1.12	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.01	1.16	-0.01	0.496	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.10	0.99	0.10	0.541	0.00
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.16	1.16	0.14	0.557	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.48	1.07	0.45	0.674	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.71	1.07	0.66	0.746	0.03
Befriending Meditation	0.88	1.22	0.72	0.766	0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.61	1.03	1.57	0.942	0.07
Alternative Control	2.09	1.10	1.91	0.057	0.09
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.45	1.11	2.21	0.986	0.10
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.48	1.03	2.41	0.992	0.10
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.57	1.02	2.52	0.994	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.22: *Effects of Condition on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.49	1.10	-2.27	0.012	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.45	1.06	-2.31	0.010	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.10	1.06	-1.98	0.024	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.85	1.02	-1.82	0.035	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.74	1.07	-1.63	0.052	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.31	1.05	-1.25	0.105	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.86	1.19	-0.72	0.236	-0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.51	1.11	-0.46	0.322	-0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.49	1.16	-0.42	0.337	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.38	1.12	-0.34	0.367	-0.02
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.31	1.10	-0.29	0.388	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.30	1.03	-0.29	0.387	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.20	1.21	-0.17	0.434	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.17	1.13	-0.15	0.440	-0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.14	1.05	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.01	1.09	-0.01	0.498	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.03	1.13	0.02	0.509	0.00
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.15	1.08	0.14	0.555	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.24	1.25	0.19	0.575	0.01
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.41	1.04	0.39	0.653	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.48	1.14	0.42	0.663	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.83	1.14	0.73	0.768	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.09	1.16	0.94	0.826	0.05
Alternative Control	1.27	1.23	1.03	0.301	0.06
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.42	1.04	1.36	0.913	0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	1.67	1.09	1.54	0.938	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.23: *Effects of Condition on Social Distrust among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.77	1.35	-3.54	<.001	-0.17
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.41	1.38	-3.20	0.001	-0.16
Common National Identity	-4.38	1.29	-3.40	<.001	-0.16
Democratic System Justification	-3.81	1.31	-2.90	0.002	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.58	1.38	-2.60	0.005	-0.13
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.66	1.42	-1.88	0.030	-0.10
Political Violence Inefficacy	-2.44	1.48	-1.65	0.050	-0.09
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.75	1.36	-1.29	0.098	-0.06
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.7	1.43	-1.18	0.118	-0.06
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.56	1.31	-1.20	0.116	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.48	1.32	-1.12	0.132	-0.05
Befriending Meditation	-1.42	1.55	-0.92	0.180	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.4	1.31	-1.07	0.143	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.38	1.30	-1.06	0.145	-0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.23	1.38	-0.90	0.185	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-1.13	1.33	-0.85	0.198	-0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.02	1.33	-0.77	0.222	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.67	1.29	-0.51	0.303	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.34	1.46	-0.23	0.818	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.29	1.33	-0.21	0.415	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.27	1.50	-0.18	0.430	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.16	1.33	-0.12	0.452	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.10	1.30	-0.08	0.468	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.04	1.36	0.03	0.511	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.29	1.27	0.23	0.592	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1.04	1.33	0.78	0.782	0.04

Includes controls

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.24: *Effects of Condition on Social Distance among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.89	1.23	-2.34	0.010	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.76	1.31	-2.11	0.018	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.50	1.24	-2.02	0.022	-0.10
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.43	1.16	-2.10	0.018	-0.10
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.32	1.16	-2.00	0.023	-0.09
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.09	1.20	-1.73	0.042	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.64	1.16	-1.42	0.078	-0.06
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.60	1.20	-1.33	0.092	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.57	1.32	-1.19	0.117	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.39	1.20	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.26	1.24	-1.02	0.154	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.24	1.17	-1.07	0.143	-0.05
Democratic System Justification	-1.23	1.16	-1.06	0.144	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.02	1.21	-0.84	0.201	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.97	1.26	-0.77	0.221	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.92	1.15	-0.80	0.211	-0.04
Befriending Meditation	-0.65	1.32	-0.49	0.311	-0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.51	1.22	-0.42	0.338	-0.02
Common Economic Interests	-0.43	1.23	-0.35	0.362	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.09	1.19	-0.07	0.471	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.25	1.16	0.21	0.585	0.01
Alternative Control	0.61	1.32	0.46	0.647	0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.76	1.24	0.61	0.729	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.97	1.22	0.79	0.786	0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1.01	1.3	0.78	0.781	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.21	1.31	0.93	0.823	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.1.25: *Effects of Condition on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts among Republicans*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.78	1.01	-1.77	0.038	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.71	0.97	-1.78	0.038	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.65	0.98	-1.68	0.047	-0.08
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.28	1.04	-1.23	0.108	-0.06
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.20	0.92	-1.30	0.097	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.10	0.91	-1.21	0.113	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.91	1.01	-0.90	0.183	-0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.88	0.93	-0.95	0.172	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.86	0.94	-0.91	0.182	-0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.44	1.08	-0.41	0.342	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.14	0.99	-0.15	0.442	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.11	0.95	0.12	0.547	0.01
Befriending Meditation	0.16	1.07	0.15	0.560	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.20	1.00	0.20	0.578	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.23	0.96	0.24	0.597	0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.31	1.01	0.31	0.620	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.53	0.99	0.53	0.702	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.65	0.94	0.70	0.757	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.75	1.05	0.71	0.762	0.04
Positive Contact Video	0.80	1.06	0.75	0.773	0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.82	0.91	0.90	0.816	0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.86	1.05	0.82	0.794	0.04
Democratic System Justification	1.01	0.93	1.09	0.861	0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1.10	0.97	1.13	0.871	0.05
Alternative Control	1.43	1.06	1.35	0.179	0.07
Party Overlap on Policies	2.55	0.97	2.64	0.996	0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Moderation by Strength of Partisan Identity

Second, we tested if the treatment effects were moderated by strength of partisan identity (Tables S10.2.1 – S10.2.8). We used the same strategy as for the intervention vs null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and strength of partisan identity.

Across the eight outcomes, we found that nineteen treatment effects were significantly moderated by strength of partisan identity. For comparison, we would expect 10 interaction effects to be significant just by chance. Thus, we found some evidence for moderation by strength of partisan identity. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects for weakly (one standard deviation below the mean) and strongly (one standard deviation above the mean) identified partisans (see Table S10.2.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Sympathetic Personal Narratives* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Common National Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.

Table S10.2.1: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Partisan Animosity*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.536
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.08	0.939
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.66	0.509
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.08	0.03	-3.08	0.002
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-2.04	0.041
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.13	0.899
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.04	0.298
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.13	0.033
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.31	0.190
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.86	0.063
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.96	0.337
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.84	0.402
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.958
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.19	0.848
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-2.00	0.045
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.987
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.86	0.389
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.00	0.316
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.55	0.583
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.90	0.367
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.43	0.664
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.23	0.218
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.284
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.90	0.368
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.48	0.632
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.334
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.2: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.971
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.69	0.091
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.05	0.295
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.74	0.458
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.47	0.640
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.42	0.673
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.726
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.59	0.010
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.50	0.618
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.35	0.730
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.30	0.762
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.47	0.639
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.07	0.283
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.74	0.461
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.05	0.03	1.75	0.080
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.721
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.26	0.207
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.70	0.090
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.77	0.444
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.836
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.16	0.870
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.40	0.687
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.33	0.743
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.19	0.234
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.19	0.233
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.606
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.3: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Partisan Violence*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.999
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.80	0.422
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.02	-0.31	0.757
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.02	0.77	0.439
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	-0.08	0.936
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.52	0.601
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.70	0.483
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.525
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.82	0.412
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.56	0.578
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-1.76	0.078
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.02	1.29	0.195
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.02	-1.29	0.197
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.02	0.57	0.570
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.02	1.76	0.078
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.02	0.26	0.797
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.85	0.395
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-2.03	0.043
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.02	0.99	0.320
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.02	-0.53	0.598
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.950
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.02	-1.42	0.154
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.02	-0.88	0.379
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.901
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.02	-1.78	0.075
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.02	1.25	0.213
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.4: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.66	0.511
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.71	0.479
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.08	0.03	-2.55	0.011
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.00	0.317
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.63	0.527
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.42	0.157
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.16	0.873
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.08	0.038
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.56	0.575
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.05	0.296
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.23	0.026
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.12	0.263
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.13	0.033
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.78	0.437
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.87	0.385
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	1.03	0.303
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.28	0.202
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.25	0.804
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	0.324
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.08	0.281
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.42	0.675
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.05	0.03	1.55	0.120
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.881
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	0.321
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.06	0.039
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.695
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.5: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.1	0.03	-3.07	0.002
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.36	0.174
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.36	0.175
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.11	0.909
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.63	0.529
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.23	0.820
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-1.04	0.299
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.73	0.083
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.29	0.199
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.523
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.908
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.51	0.613
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.97	0.330
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.693
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.95	0.344
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.40	0.693
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.905
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.03	1.48	0.139
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.21	0.833
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.47	0.637
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.64	0.520
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.943
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.31	0.753
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.79	0.074
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.54	0.588
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.6: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Social Distrust*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.52	0.603
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.918
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.03	0.83	0.408
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.16	0.875
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.04	-0.34	0.732
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.924
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.68	0.499
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.04	-2.02	0.044
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.43	0.669
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.23	0.814
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.06	0.03	1.67	0.096
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.04	1.07	0.286
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.04	-1.17	0.241
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.28	0.782
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.04	-0.40	0.688
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.32	0.747
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.45	0.652
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.04	0.04	1.04	0.297
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.02	0.306
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.04	0.43	0.665
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.04	-1.39	0.165
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.46	0.647
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.04	0.92	0.356
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.21	0.832
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.37	0.709
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.03	0.04	0.66	0.510
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.7: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Social Distance*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.04	-2.27	0.024
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.04	0.37	0.709
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.58	0.115
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-1.69	0.092
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.96	0.337
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.54	0.588
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.04	-0.92	0.359
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.04	-2.48	0.013
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.04	-1.79	0.073
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.45	0.651
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.09	0.03	-2.56	0.011
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.988
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.27	0.205
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.04	-1.21	0.227
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.07	0.03	-2.12	0.034
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.532
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.904
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.04	-0.62	0.534
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.77	0.441
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.03	-0.78	0.436
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.04	-1.58	0.114
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.49	0.624
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.26	0.799
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.03	0.04	-0.84	0.399
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.34	0.180
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.04	-1.59	0.111
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.8: *Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.04	0.03	-1.38	0.167
Befriending Meditation x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.998
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.84	0.066
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.82	0.414
Common National Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.15	0.032
Positive Contact Video x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.26	0.798
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.984
Democratic Collapse Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.86	0.389
Common Economic Interests x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.57	0.571
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-1.86	0.062
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.66	0.510
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	0.15	0.878
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.12	0.907
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.23	0.819
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.05	0.03	-1.64	0.101
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.73	0.464
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.55	0.584
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.02	0.03	0.68	0.496
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.06	0.03	-2.14	0.032
Moral Similarities and Differences x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.00	0.03	-0.15	0.882
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.46	0.645
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.57	0.567
Party Overlap on Policies x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.43	0.666
Democratic System Justification x Strength of Partisan Identity	0.01	0.03	0.30	0.765
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.02	0.03	-0.63	0.531
Political Violence Inefficacy x Strength of Partisan Identity	-0.01	0.03	-0.37	0.710
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.2.9: *Simple Effects for the Significant Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Weakly Identified Partisan	-6.81	0.92	-7.41	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Sympathetic Personal Narratives	Strongly Identified Partisan	-11.13	1.04	-10.66	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common National Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-7.82	0.86	-9.12	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common National Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-10.56	0.99	-10.64	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-3.28	0.93	-3.54	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.20	0.98	-6.31	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-8.86	0.85	-10.42	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-11.58	1.03	-11.26	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-2.75	0.93	-2.96	0.003
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.64	1.19	-5.60	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.84	0.58	-3.17	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Strongly Identified Partisan	-3.74	0.84	-4.46	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Weakly Identified Partisan	1.36	1.02	1.34	0.180
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.60	1.14	-2.28	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-2.67	1.10	-2.42	0.015
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-6.24	1.24	-5.05	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.90	1.06	0.85	0.394
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.76	1.20	-2.30	0.021
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.53	0.97	0.55	0.584
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.76	1.16	-2.37	0.018
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.41	1.01	0.41	0.681
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.72	1.12	-2.44	0.015
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Alternative Control	Weakly Identified Partisan	3.43	1.14	3.01	0.003
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Alternative Control	Strongly Identified Partisan	-1.57	1.09	-1.44	0.150

Table S10.2.9: *Simple Effects for the Significant Condition x Strength of Partisan Identity Interaction Effects (continued)*

Intervention	Outcome	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Social Distrust	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	-0.97	1.29	-0.75	0.452
Social Distrust	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.82	1.35	-3.58	<.001
Social Distance	Alternative Control	Weakly Identified Partisan	2.36	1.30	1.81	0.070
Social Distance	Alternative Control	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.27	1.46	-1.55	0.120
Social Distance	Democratic Collapse Threat	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.58	1.27	0.46	0.649
Social Distance	Democratic Collapse Threat	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.30	1.39	-3.10	0.002
Social Distance	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Weakly Identified Partisan	0.69	1.13	0.61	0.539
Social Distance	Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	Strongly Identified Partisan	-3.84	1.33	-2.88	0.004
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.99	1.14	-1.74	0.082
Social Distance	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-5.73	1.34	-4.29	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Common National Identity	Weakly Identified Partisan	-1.13	0.95	-1.19	0.235
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Common National Identity	Strongly Identified Partisan	-4.36	1.08	-4.05	<.001
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Weakly Identified Partisan	1.04	0.92	1.13	0.260
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Strongly Identified Partisan	-2.05	1.10	-1.87	0.062

Notes. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of strength of partisan identity (one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean). The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Correcting Division Misperceptions* significantly reduced support for partisan violence among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.

- *Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, but the effect was significantly stronger among strongly identified partisans.
- *Bipartisan Joint Trivia Game* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The *Alternative Control Condition* significantly increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation among weakly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among strongly identified partisans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced social distrust among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The effect of the *Alternative Control Condition* on social distance went in different directions among weakly versus strongly identified partisans but neither of the two simple effects was statistically significant.

- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Bipartisan Joint Trivia Game* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced social distance among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts among strongly identified partisans, but the effect was non-significant among weakly identified partisans.
- The effect of *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions* on biased evaluations of politicized facts went in different directions among weakly versus strongly identified partisans but neither of the two simple effects was statistically significant.

Overall, this evidence indicates that treatment effects were sometimes stronger among participants who more strongly identified with their partisan identity. However, it is difficult to predict which interventions' effects will be moderated on which outcomes.

Moderation by Political Ideology

We also tested if the treatment effects were moderated by political ideology (Tables S10.3.1 – S10.3.8). We used the same strategy as for the intervention vs null control analyses. The only difference was that we added interaction terms for the experimental condition dummies and political ideology.

Across the eight outcomes, we found that 13 treatment effects were significantly moderated by political ideology. For comparison, we would expect 10 interaction effects to be significant just by chance. Thus, evidence for moderation by political ideology was weak. Below, we describe the patterns of the significant interaction effects for liberal (one standard deviation below the mean) and conservative (one standard deviation above the mean) identified partisans (see Table S10.3.9 for the simple effects test statistics):

- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* significantly reduced partisan animosity among both liberals and conservatives, but the effect was significantly stronger among conservatives.
- The Alternative Control significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic practices among conservatives.
- *Correcting Division Misperceptions* significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic practices among conservatives.
- The Alternative Control did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among liberals but significantly increased support for partisan violence among conservatives.

Table S10.3.1: *Condition x Political Ideology on Partisan Animosity*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.44	0.41	-1.08	0.282
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	-0.24	0.42	-0.57	0.566
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.33	0.38	-0.88	0.380
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	-0.38	0.40	-0.93	0.351
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.04	0.38	0.11	0.909
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.58	0.40	-1.44	0.150
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.23	0.38	0.61	0.540
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.26	0.38	-0.67	0.504
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.29	0.40	0.72	0.471
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.24	0.38	-0.62	0.536
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.33	0.39	-0.85	0.394
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.16	0.39	0.42	0.677
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.37	0.37	-0.99	0.324
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.10	0.41	0.25	0.802
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.79	0.39	-2.00	0.045
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.19	0.38	0.49	0.621
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.60	0.38	1.57	0.117
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.25	0.38	0.65	0.518
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.09	0.40	-0.24	0.813
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.26	0.38	-0.68	0.494
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	-0.60	0.43	-1.41	0.157
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.33	0.39	0.86	0.387
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.11	0.35	0.31	0.758
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.64	0.37	-1.71	0.087
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.09	0.38	0.24	0.810
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.21	0.42	-0.51	0.613
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.2: *Condition x Political Ideology on Support for Undemocratic Practices*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	1.10	0.45	2.47	0.013
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	-0.14	0.48	-0.30	0.763
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.18	0.43	-0.43	0.671
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	-0.22	0.46	-0.47	0.642
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.20	0.42	-0.48	0.635
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.43	0.43	0.99	0.321
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.10	0.41	0.24	0.813
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	0.90	0.46	1.96	0.050
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.58	0.45	1.28	0.199
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.75	0.42	1.78	0.074
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.01	0.44	-0.03	0.973
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.00	0.44	0.00	0.998
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.42	0.43	-0.98	0.327
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.81	0.44	1.84	0.066
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.23	0.43	0.54	0.592
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.27	0.42	-0.63	0.528
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.47	0.44	-1.08	0.280
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.90	0.39	2.33	0.020
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.17	0.44	-0.38	0.704
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.06	0.42	0.15	0.885
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.41	0.45	0.90	0.370
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.70	0.44	1.58	0.114
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.28	0.41	0.70	0.486
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.10	0.41	-0.23	0.817
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.49	0.40	1.23	0.220
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	0.02	0.44	0.05	0.963
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.3: *Condition x Political Ideology on Support for Partisan Violence*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.88	0.43	2.05	0.040
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.15	0.42	0.36	0.717
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.25	0.36	0.70	0.484
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.03	0.43	0.08	0.937
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.32	0.38	-0.83	0.405
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.43	0.42	1.02	0.307
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.44	0.38	1.17	0.244
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	1.24	0.43	2.85	0.004
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.28	0.40	0.69	0.490
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.15	0.42	-0.35	0.729
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.55	0.40	1.37	0.170
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.40	0.41	0.98	0.329
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.55	0.37	-1.47	0.141
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.40	0.41	0.99	0.321
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.34	0.40	0.85	0.396
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.06	0.37	0.16	0.876
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.25	0.4	-0.63	0.529
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.51	0.32	1.59	0.111
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.05	0.39	0.13	0.894
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.23	0.41	0.56	0.579
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.21	0.42	0.51	0.612
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.88	0.36	2.41	0.016
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.15	0.37	0.40	0.688
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	0.79	0.38	2.08	0.037
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.24	0.35	0.67	0.501
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	0.06	0.43	0.14	0.886
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.4: *Condition x Political Ideology on Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	1.58	0.43	3.64	<.001
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.89	0.47	1.88	0.060
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.23	0.44	0.53	0.598
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.62	0.44	1.39	0.164
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.09	0.43	-0.20	0.840
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	1.24	0.45	2.78	0.005
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.63	0.42	1.49	0.138
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	1.03	0.47	2.22	0.026
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.40	0.44	0.89	0.372
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.67	0.43	1.56	0.119
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.47	0.47	1.00	0.317
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.13	0.42	0.30	0.761
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.13	0.44	0.30	0.761
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	1.14	0.45	2.53	0.012
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.59	0.42	1.39	0.165
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.88	0.41	2.17	0.030
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.62	0.43	1.42	0.155
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.16	0.44	0.37	0.712
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.19	0.42	0.46	0.645
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.77	0.43	1.80	0.072
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.84	0.45	1.86	0.063
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	1.53	0.44	3.44	0.001
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.01	0.41	0.03	0.975
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.45	0.42	-1.07	0.286
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.64	0.44	1.45	0.148
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.18	0.45	-0.39	0.693
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.5: *Condition x Political Ideology on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.22	0.45	-0.48	0.632
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.53	0.46	1.17	0.243
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.58	0.40	1.43	0.153
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.31	0.41	0.75	0.455
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.39	0.42	-0.93	0.353
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.32	0.44	0.73	0.463
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.57	0.46	1.24	0.213
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.15	0.42	-0.36	0.719
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.14	0.46	0.31	0.757
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.23	0.46	-0.50	0.618
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.11	0.47	0.25	0.806
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.31	0.44	0.69	0.488
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.38	0.39	0.97	0.334
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.29	0.46	0.62	0.535
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.19	0.41	0.47	0.640
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.54	0.40	1.35	0.176
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.30	0.43	0.70	0.482
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.70	0.42	1.68	0.093
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.02	0.43	0.04	0.966
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.14	0.44	-0.31	0.756
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.23	0.47	0.48	0.629
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.08	0.47	0.17	0.867
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.35	0.42	0.83	0.409
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	0.14	0.45	0.32	0.750
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.41	0.43	-0.94	0.349
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.67	0.48	-1.40	0.162
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.6: *Condition x Political Ideology on Social Distrust*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.17	0.56	0.31	0.758
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.20	0.58	0.34	0.735
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	0.11	0.50	0.22	0.822
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.16	0.53	0.31	0.759
Common National Identity x Ideology	-0.26	0.51	-0.52	0.603
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.53	0.56	-0.94	0.349
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	-0.05	0.53	-0.10	0.919
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.02	0.52	-0.03	0.974
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	-0.65	0.53	-1.24	0.216
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.22	0.56	-0.40	0.687
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.02	0.52	0.04	0.969
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	-0.06	0.53	-0.11	0.911
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	0.06	0.52	0.11	0.911
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	-0.19	0.53	-0.36	0.720
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.49	0.53	-0.92	0.358
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.18	0.51	-0.34	0.732
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.65	0.52	1.27	0.205
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.37	0.52	0.71	0.480
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.61	0.50	1.23	0.220
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	-0.51	0.54	-0.95	0.343
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.04	0.53	0.08	0.933
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	-0.39	0.52	-0.76	0.447
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.46	0.52	0.88	0.381
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.87	0.52	-1.69	0.092
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.40	0.51	-0.78	0.438
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.71	0.58	-1.21	0.227
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.7: *Condition x Political Ideology on Social Distance*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	0.12	0.55	0.23	0.821
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.37	0.55	0.67	0.501
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.55	0.55	-1.01	0.315
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.60	0.55	1.08	0.282
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.25	0.53	0.46	0.643
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	-0.16	0.54	-0.29	0.774
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	0.06	0.52	0.11	0.916
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	-0.59	0.55	-1.07	0.285
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.43	0.56	0.77	0.443
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	-0.77	0.55	-1.39	0.165
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	-0.07	0.53	-0.12	0.902
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.41	0.55	0.74	0.459
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.77	0.53	-1.46	0.145
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.20	0.57	0.35	0.725
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	0.64	0.51	1.25	0.210
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	-0.07	0.52	-0.14	0.889
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.87	0.51	1.70	0.089
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.99	0.53	1.86	0.063
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.08	0.52	0.15	0.882
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.65	0.52	1.25	0.211
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.41	0.56	0.74	0.461
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	0.19	0.52	0.36	0.720
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	-0.10	0.52	-0.19	0.848
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.72	0.53	-1.36	0.175
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.16	0.52	-0.31	0.756
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-1.02	0.57	-1.79	0.074
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.8: *Condition x Political Ideology on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

Effect	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Alternative Control x Ideology	-0.09	0.44	-0.20	0.841
Befriending Meditation x Ideology	0.66	0.45	1.48	0.139
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot x Ideology	-0.26	0.42	-0.62	0.538
Sympathetic Personal Narratives x Ideology	0.23	0.43	0.53	0.599
Common National Identity x Ideology	0.56	0.41	1.37	0.169
Positive Contact Video x Ideology	0.01	0.43	0.02	0.987
Counterfactual Partisan Selves x Ideology	-0.04	0.41	-0.09	0.929
Democratic Collapse Threat x Ideology	0.08	0.42	0.19	0.848
Common Economic Interests x Ideology	0.32	0.42	0.76	0.448
Utility of Outparty Empathy x Ideology	0.50	0.45	1.12	0.261
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz x Ideology	0.17	0.41	0.41	0.684
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm x Ideology	0.01	0.43	0.03	0.979
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues x Ideology	-0.42	0.42	-1.01	0.311
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn x Ideology	0.01	0.44	0.03	0.979
Common Exhausted Majority Identity x Ideology	-0.24	0.42	-0.56	0.573
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions x Ideology	0.01	0.39	0.03	0.976
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions x Ideology	0.57	0.40	1.42	0.156
Correcting Division Misperceptions x Ideology	0.54	0.40	1.36	0.172
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions x Ideology	0.51	0.42	1.22	0.223
Moral Similarities and Differences x Ideology	0.29	0.42	0.69	0.492
Describing a Likable Outpartisan x Ideology	0.64	0.45	1.42	0.156
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat x Ideology	-0.44	0.41	-1.06	0.288
Party Overlap on Policies x Ideology	0.16	0.39	0.41	0.679
Democratic System Justification x Ideology	-0.36	0.40	-0.89	0.372
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues x Ideology	0.12	0.41	0.30	0.764
Political Violence Inefficacy x Ideology	-0.40	0.45	-0.88	0.376
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S10.3.9: *Simple Effects for the Significant Condition x Political Ideology Interaction Effects*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberals	-8.81	0.97	-9.13	<.001
Partisan Animosity	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservatives	-11.66	0.97	-12.01	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Alternative Control	Liberals	-2.52	1.07	-2.35	0.019
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Alternative Control	Conservatives	1.49	1.13	1.31	0.190
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Liberals	-3.88	0.98	-3.97	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Division Misperceptions	Conservatives	-0.60	0.99	-0.61	0.540
Support for Partisan Violence	Alternative Control	Liberals	-0.88	1.01	-0.87	0.382
Support for Partisan Violence	Alternative Control	Conservatives	2.31	1.06	2.18	0.029
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	0.05	1.05	0.04	0.964
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	4.54	1.05	4.30	<.001
Support for Partisan Violence	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberals	-2.35	0.93	-2.53	0.011
Support for Partisan Violence	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservatives	0.84	0.85	0.98	0.325
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic System Justification	Liberals	-1.15	0.92	-1.24	0.213
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic System Justification	Conservatives	1.73	0.94	1.83	0.067
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Alternative Control	Liberals	-3.16	1.11	-2.85	0.004
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Alternative Control	Conservatives	2.57	1.07	2.40	0.016
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Positive Contact Video	Liberals	-4.59	1.09	-4.20	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Positive Contact Video	Conservatives	-0.07	1.14	-0.06	0.950
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	-6.37	1.17	-5.47	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	-2.62	1.16	-2.27	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Liberals	-2.84	1.15	-2.48	0.013
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Conservatives	1.30	1.14	1.14	0.254
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Liberals	-0.84	1.08	-0.78	0.435
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Conservatives	2.35	0.96	2.44	0.015

Table S10.3.9: *Simple Effects for the Significant Condition x Political Ideology Interaction Effects (continued)*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberals	-6.37	1.17	-5.47	<.001
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservatives	-2.62	1.16	-2.27	0.023
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Liberals	-2.84	1.15	-2.48	0.013
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	Conservatives	1.30	1.14	1.14	0.254
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Liberals	-0.84	1.08	-0.78	0.435
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	Conservatives	2.35	0.96	2.44	0.015
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberals	-1.64	1.19	-1.38	0.168
Support for Undemo. Candidates	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservatives	3.93	1.01	3.88	<.001

Notes. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below the mean and one standard deviation above the mean). The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

- *Democratic Collapse Threat* did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among liberals but significantly increased support for partisan violence among conservatives.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* significantly reduced support for partisan violence among liberals but did not significantly affect support for partisan violence among conservatives.
- The effect of Democratic System Justification on support for partisan violence was significantly moderated by political ideology, but the simple effects among liberals and conservatives were both non-significant.
- The Alternative Control significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.

- *Positive Contact Video* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among both liberals and conservatives but the effect was stronger among liberals.
- *Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn* significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* did not significantly affect support for undemocratic candidates among liberals but significantly increased support for undemocratic candidates among conservatives.

Backfire Effects

We observed a series of unexpected backfire effects (see Table S10.4.1). We conducted exploratory follow-up analysis to identify which subgroups of participants were driving these backfire effects. Below, we describe the patterns of the backfire effects for liberal (one standard deviation below the mean of political ideology) Democrats, conservative (one standard deviation above the mean) Democrats, liberal Republicans, and conservative Republicans(see Table S10.4.1 for the test statistics):

- *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.
- *Describing a Likable Outpartisan* increased support for undemocratic practices compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among liberal Republicans.
- *Democratic Collapse Threat* increased support for partisan violence compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.

Table S10.4.1: *Backfire Effects for the Condition Broken Down by Political Subgroups*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	p-value
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Total	1.52	0.044
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberal Democrats	1.59	0.180
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservative Democrats	5.38	0.069
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Liberal Republicans	-1.63	0.612
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Common Exhausted Majority Identity	Conservative Republicans	1.30	0.237
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Total	1.62	0.032
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Liberal Democrats	1.71	0.130
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Conservative Democrats	7.39	0.011
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Liberal Republicans	4.35	0.176
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	Conservative Republicans	0.27	0.818
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Total	1.69	0.022
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Democrats	0.19	0.874
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Democrats	2.78	0.269
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Republicans	0.44	0.888
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Republicans	2.70	0.022
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Total	1.85	0.016
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Liberal Democrats	0.37	0.759
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Conservative Democrats	1.67	0.562
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Liberal Republicans	5.38	0.077
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Describing a Likable Outpartisan	Conservative Republicans	2.73	0.027
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Total	2.29	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberal Democrats	0.33	0.761
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservative Democrats	-0.97	0.702
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Liberal Republicans	-2.21	0.505
Support for Partisan Violence	Democratic Collapse Threat	Conservative Republicans	5.58	<.001

Table S10.4.1: *Backfire Effects for the Condition Broken Down by Political Subgroups (continued)*

Outcome	Intervention	Subgroup	b	p-value
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Total	2.14	0.002
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Liberal Democrats	0.92	0.414
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Conservative Democrats	6.58	0.008
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Liberal Republicans	1.16	0.700
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Counterfactual Partisan Selves	Conservative Republicans	2.96	0.009
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Total	1.68	0.020
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Democrats	2.14	0.076
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Democrats	0.71	0.794
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Liberal Republicans	-1.70	0.524
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	Conservative Republicans	2.13	0.075
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Total	1.91	0.008
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Democrats	1.42	0.188
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Democrats	4.55	0.072
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Republicans	-1.51	0.614
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Republicans	1.94	0.102
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Total	2.19	0.002
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Democrats	1.65	0.122
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Democrats	0.83	0.741
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Liberal Republicans	0.95	0.716
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Party Overlap on Policies	Conservative Republicans	2.35	0.021

Notes. Effects for experimental conditions were probed for two levels of partisanship (Democrats and Republicans) and two levels of political ideology (one standard deviation below and above the mean). Only participants identifying as Republicans were included. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

- *Counterfactual Partisan Selves* increased support for undemocratic candidates compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat* increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.
- *Party Overlap on Policies* increased opposition to bipartisan cooperation compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Democrats.
- *Party Overlap on Policies* increased biased evaluation of politicized facts compared to the null control condition. This backfire effect was strongest among conservative Republicans.

Optimal Targeting

While the above analyses investigate subgroup effects by partisan identity and strength of partisan identity, there might be heterogeneity on other dimensions or combinations of characteristics (e.g. Republican men). To address this possibility, we turn to a general way of operationalizing heterogeneous treatment effects. Generally, evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects occurs if interventions are more effective for some groups than for others. We can measure the evidence in favor of heterogeneous treatment effects via the rank-weighted average treatment effect (RATE; Yadlowsky et al., 2021). The RATE captures the difference in treatment effects obtained under optimal targeting, relative to random assignment.

Optimal targeting refers to assigning the treatment to participants who are most likely to be affected by it. To calculate this optimal targeting, we draw on generalized causal forests (Athey et al., 2021) to inductively identify the combination of participant characteristics that predict stronger (weaker) treatment effects. We used the following participant characteristics: gender, age, race, education, political affiliation, perceived importance of partisan identity, and indicator variables for survey panel supplier. Generalized causal forests are an ensemble model that aggregate multiple decision trees, where each individual tree subdivides participants with differential treatment effects. We use 80% of the sample as a training set and leave 20% as a test set. We also use "honest" estimation, which uses different subsamples for constructing the trees and making predictions.

One way to visually illustrate the RATE is to see its relationship to a targeting operator characteristic curve (TOC). To generate a TOC, we first divide the population into groups, rank ordered by their conditional average treatment effects. Groups who are most likely to be affected by the treatment, for instance, are rank-ordered first. We then plot the effect if we only treated

the top *q* percent of groups who are most sensitive to the treatment, relative to the average estimated effect for the whole population. For example, if we identify and treat only the top 5% of participants (in terms of how much they would be affected by the treatment), their treatment effect should be much larger in magnitude than the average. To estimate the RATE, we take the area under the targeting operator receiver characteristics curve, which aggregates the overall degree to which optimal targeting generates differential effects from the average treatment effect. Because optimal targeting is calibrated to maximize heterogeneity in treatment effects, this implies the RATE is an estimate of overall heterogeneous treatment effects. If our optimal targeting procedure (as based on generalized causal forests) successfully identifies individuals who are differentially affected by the treatment, we expect the RATE to be large in magnitude. Conversely, the RATE should be statistically indistinguishable from zero if our optimal targeting strategy cannot detect heterogeneous treatment effects.

As one concrete example, we plot the targeting operator characteristic curve for *Democratic Collapse Threat* on partisan animosity in Figure S10.5.1. The y-axis indicates the treatment effect in excess of the average treatment effect from rank ordering the top q percent of individuals. Because our interventions are intended to reduce various measures of potentially problematic attitudes concerning polarization and democracy, we reverse our outcomes here so that RATE can be understood as excess benefit to participants.

Figure S10.5.1 illustrates how much more partisan animosity would be reduced (out of a total scale of 100), if those who are most likely to benefit from the treatment are rank ordered. The estimated RATE is 2.55 with a standard error of 1.94, which is not statistically significant ($t = 1.32$, $p = 0.19$).

Figure S10.5.1: *Targeting Operator Characteristic for Partisan Animosity*



The estimated RATEs for each intervention, for each outcome, are plotted in Figure S10.5.2. The results generally show no statistically significant patterns of heterogeneous treatment effects. These results suggest that the participant characteristics in our model were generally insufficient to identify individuals more likely to be affected by the interventions, or that no such heterogeneity exists.

Figure S10.5.2: Estimated RATE by DV and Intervention, 80% Training



Note: Outcome measures reversed, so RATEs indicate magnitude of heterogeneity

11. Durability Test

Did the effects of the interventions endure for a longer period of time, or did they wear off? Prior interventions for intergroup bias have found that most effects do not persist beyond the initial session (Lai et al., 2014). Here, we report the results of a durability test conducted two weeks after participants completed the initial study.

Method

Participants were invited to participate in a durability survey beginning 14 days after their initial participation. The main survey refers to the survey in which participants were assigned to an intervention or a control condition, completed the content of that experimental condition, and completed the outcomes for the first time. The durability survey refers to the survey in which those participants who were invited back complete the same outcomes a second time.

Financial constraints prevented us from testing the durability of all 25 interventions. Instead, we selected for inclusion in the durability test those interventions with the largest effect sizes, while also weighing diversity of outcomes affected, such that the top performing interventions for each of the three primary outcomes were included in the durability test. To ensure a two week period for each participant between main survey and invitation to the durability survey, we began inviting participants to complete the durability survey before all of the main survey was completed. Thus, the ten interventions for the durability test were chosen based on, (i) the performance of all 25 interventions when approximately 70% of the data was collected, with an effort to (ii) include the interventions that had the largest impact on the three primary outcome variables up to that point of the study. The experimental conditions that were included in the durability test were: Null Control, Alternative Control, Common Exhausted Majority Identity, Common National Identity, Correcting Democracy Misperceptions, Correcting

Division Misperceptions, Democratic Collapse Threat, Positive Contact Video, Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues, Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues, Sympathetic Personal Narratives, and Utility of Outparty Empathy.

On Day 15 of the main survey, we began the process of recontacting individuals from the subset of conditions selected for the durability survey. Participants were recontacted in daily waves, inviting those participants who had taken part 14 days before, as well as reinviting participants previously invited to the durability survey who had not yet completed it.

The durability survey followed a similar but more minimal procedure as the main survey. Participants first saw a consent page. Next, participants answered demographic questions about their gender, race and partisan identity. Though participants' partisan identity was measured here, all items calibrated to partisan identity (e.g., items referencing inpartisans and/or outpartisans) were set to be based on the participant's partisan identity as reported in the main survey. After responding to the demographic questions, participants answered the same outcome measures as in the main survey.

Retention Rates

In total, 18,227 individuals were randomly assigned to the relevant conditions in the main survey to be reinvited to the durability test. Of these 18,227 participants, n = 16,780 participants had completed at least one of the target outcomes in the main survey. Of these 16,780 participants, n = 8,644 (51.5%) completed at least one of the target outcomes in the durability survey.

Analysis Strategy

We tested the effects of each of the 10 interventions relative to the null control condition with ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. Each dependent variable was

separately regressed on experimental condition. Experimental condition was coded as a series of dummy variables. The null control condition was the reference category. We controlled for participants' gender, ethnicity, education, partisan identity, and supplier (all dummy-coded) as well as participants' age and strength of partisan identification. We corrected for differential attrition via inverse-probability weighting (see section *Addressing Alternative Accounts – Differential Attrition*). We recalculated the weights for the durability survey using the same procedure as in the main survey. Analyses for the three target outcomes (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) were preregistered. Analyses for the other outcomes used the same strategy.

We used two strategies to estimate the durability of the interventions. The first strategy (in the following referred to as *the preregistered strategy*) used only participants who completed the outcome in both the main survey and the durability survey (partisan animosity: n = 8,527; support for undemocratic practices: n = 8,521; support for partisan violence: n = 8,520). The benefit of this strategy is that included participants experienced the complete treatment. Due to the unexpectedly low retention rate, the sample size for this strategy was lower than expected.

The second strategy (in the following referred to as *the larger n strategy*) used all participants who completed the durability survey (i.e., including attriters from the main survey). This procedure increases the sample size substantially (partisan animosity: n = 9,850; support for undemocratic practices: n = 9,845; support for partisan violence: n = 9,843). However, this strategy may underestimate effect sizes because participants who did not complete the outcomes in the main survey may have experienced only part of the treatment. An advantage of this strategy is that there was no evidence for differential attrition when one includes all participants who completed the durability survey. This makes sense because retaking another survey a couple

of weeks later is probably independent of the experimental condition participants were assigned in the main survey. Accordingly, we did not use IPW for these analyses.

Preregistration, Data Availability, and Code Availability

The preregistration, anonymized data, and analysis code for the durability test will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/.

Results

Ten of the tested interventions had effects on partisan animosity in the main survey. Six interventions had durable effects on partisan animosity. According to the preregistered strategy, six interventions significantly reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.1). The most effective intervention was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's d = -0.21). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 29% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.1). According to the larger n strategy, six interventions significantly reduced partisan animosity relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.1). The most effective intervention was *Common National Identity* (Cohen's d = -0.15). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 20% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.1).

Six of the tested interventions had effects on support for undemocratic practices in the main survey. Zero to one interventions had durable effects on support for undemocratic practices. According to the preregistered strategy, no intervention significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.2). The most effective intervention was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's d = -0.04). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the

Table S11.1.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	B	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.48	1.27	-3.52	<.001	-0.21
Positive Contact Video	-4.07	1.31	-3.10	0.001	-0.19
Common National Identity	-3.95	1.20	-3.28	0.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.40	1.21	-2.81	0.002	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.85	1.21	-2.36	0.009	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.67	1.29	-2.08	0.019	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.02	1.30	-0.78	0.216	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.66	1.23	-0.54	0.295	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.29	1.23	-0.23	0.408	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.10	1.15	0.09	0.535	0
Alternative Control	0.33	1.21	0.27	0.788	0.02
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-3.19	0.92	-3.49	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.03	0.91	-3.35	<.001	-0.14
Positive Contact Video	-2.89	0.91	-3.18	0.001	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.83	0.89	-3.18	0.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.79	0.91	-1.97	0.024	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.75	0.89	-1.97	0.024	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.26	0.91	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.70	0.88	-0.80	0.212	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.05	0.88	-0.05	0.479	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.07	0.91	0.07	0.529	0.00
Alternative Control	2.09	0.88	2.37	0.018	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.1: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	-0.19	-0.14	36.51	25.97
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.51	-0.21	-0.14	41.85	28.29
Common National Identity	-0.46	-0.19	-0.15	40.82	33.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.45	-0.13	-0.08	28.23	18.51
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.41	-0.14	-0.09	33.10	20.75
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.35	-0.01	-0.03	3.89	9.54
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.30	-0.16	-0.13	53.87	44.86
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.24	-0.05	-0.06	20.19	24.98
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.11	0.00	0.00	-4.34	1.98
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.10	-0.03	0.00	31.57	-3.11
Average	-0.35	-0.11	-0.08	32.02	23.97

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

durability survey amounted to 4% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.2). According to the larger n strategy, one intervention significantly reduced support for undemocratic practices relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.2). The most effective intervention was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's d = -0.08). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 11% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.2).

Four of the tested interventions had effects on support for partisan violence in the main survey. One intervention had a durable effect on support for partisan violence. According to the preregistered strategy, one intervention significantly reduced support for partisan violence

Table S11.1.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.84	1.31	-0.64	0.260	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.80	1.18	-0.68	0.247	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.61	1.30	-0.47	0.320	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.15	1.26	-0.12	0.454	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.11	1.32	0.09	0.534	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.51	1.29	0.39	0.652	0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.64	1.22	0.52	0.700	0.03
Alternative Control	1.01	1.29	0.78	0.435	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.23	1.31	0.94	0.827	0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.34	1.39	0.97	0.833	0.06
Positive Contact Video	1.49	1.37	1.09	0.862	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.91	0.93	-2.04	0.021	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.75	1.01	-0.75	0.227	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.28	0.94	-0.30	0.384	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.26	0.96	-0.28	0.392	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.26	0.93	-0.28	0.388	-0.01
Common National Identity	-0.12	0.90	-0.13	0.448	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.26	0.96	0.27	0.608	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.27	0.96	0.28	0.609	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.66	0.97	0.69	0.755	0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.835	0.04
Alternative Control	0.98	0.94	1.04	0.297	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.2: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.25	-0.03	-0.03	10.59	13.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.21	-0.04	-0.08	17.54	39.47
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.10	0.03	-0.01	-27.83	11.50
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.09	-0.04	-0.01	39.04	13.46
Common National Identity	-0.07	-0.01	-0.01	9.098	7.34
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.06	0.02	0.01	-36.78	-19.21
Average	-0.13	-0.01	-0.02	7.04	17.03

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.3). The most effective intervention was *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* (Cohen's *d* = -0.13). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 63% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.3). According to the larger n strategy, one intervention significantly reduced support for partisan violence relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.3). The most effective intervention was *Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues* (Cohen's *d* = -0.08). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 37% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.3).

Six of the tested interventions had effects on support for undemocratic candidates in the main survey. One to two interventions had durable effects on support for undemocratic candidates. According to the preregistered strategy, two interventions significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.4). The

Table S11.1.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.31	0.88	-2.62	0.004	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.59	1.08	-0.54	0.294	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.54	1.15	-0.47	0.321	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.48	1.06	-0.45	0.325	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.08	1.12	-0.07	0.472	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.32	1.12	0.29	0.613	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.36	1.22	0.29	0.616	0.02
Alternative Control	0.67	1.12	0.59	0.554	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.81	1.16	0.70	0.757	0.04
Positive Contact Video	0.92	1.28	0.72	0.765	0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.92	1.27	0.73	0.767	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.57	0.70	-2.25	0.012	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.51	0.77	-0.67	0.253	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.19	0.81	-0.23	0.409	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.18	0.76	-0.24	0.403	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.998	0.00
Common National Identity	0.13	0.78	0.17	0.567	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.19	0.80	0.24	0.596	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.20	0.79	0.26	0.602	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.26	0.81	0.32	0.627	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.87	0.81	1.07	0.859	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.09	0.84	1.29	0.902	0.06
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.3: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.14	-0.03	-0.01	22.65	7.16
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03	26.20	27.80
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.08	-0.03	-0.01	36.37	12.58
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.08	-0.13	-0.08	156.54	106.16
Average	-0.10	-0.05	-0.03	53.06	33.20

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

most effective intervention was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's *d* = -0.10). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 45% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.4). According to the larger n strategy, one intervention significantly reduced support for undemocratic candidates relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.4). The most effective intervention was *Democratic Collapse Threat* (Cohen's *d* = -0.09). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 32% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.4).

Six of the tested interventions had effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation in the main survey. Three to four interventions had durable effects on opposition to bipartisan cooperation. According to the preregistered strategy, two interventions significantly reduced opposition to bipartisan cooperation relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.5). The most effective intervention was *Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues* (Cohen's *d* = -0.12). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 59% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.5). According to the larger n strategy, four interventions significantly reduced opposition

Table S11.1.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.51	1.43	-1.75	0.040	-0.10
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.25	1.34	-1.68	0.046	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.47	1.37	-1.07	0.141	-0.06
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.14	1.44	-0.79	0.215	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.11	1.41	-0.79	0.215	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.06	1.36	-0.78	0.218	-0.04
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.27	1.36	-0.20	0.422	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.17	1.36	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.53	1.55	0.34	0.633	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.67	1.41	0.48	0.684	0.03
Alternative Control	1.89	1.35	1.40	0.163	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.09	1.03	-2.03	0.021	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.71	1.04	-1.64	0.051	-0.07
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.44	1.02	-1.41	0.079	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.89	1.03	-0.87	0.193	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.70	0.99	-0.71	0.240	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.55	1.06	-0.52	0.303	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.21	0.97	-0.22	0.414	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.02	1.01	-0.02	0.492	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.11	1.01	0.11	0.544	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.20	0.97	0.21	0.582	0.01
Alternative Control	1.23	1.02	1.21	0.227	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.4: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.19	-0.09	-0.09	48.69	45.34
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.18	-0.05	-0.07	26.01	39.10
Common National Identity	-0.12	-0.06	-0.03	50.48	23.97
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	-0.10	-0.06	93.89	53.97
Positive Contact Video	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-21.73	0.84
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.07	-0.05	-0.02	65.31	32.13
Average	-0.13	-0.05	-0.04	42.49	34.81

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

to bipartisan cooperation relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.5). The most effective intervention was *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* (Cohen's *d* = -0.08). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 51% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.5).

Eight of the tested interventions had effects on social distrust in the main survey. One intervention had a durable effect on social distrust. According to the preregistered strategy, one intervention significantly reduced social distrust relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.6). The most effective intervention was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's *d* = -0.10). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 25% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.6). According to the larger n strategy, one intervention significantly reduced social distrust relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.6). The most effective intervention was *Common National Identity* (Cohen's *d* = -0.10). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 32% of the

Table S11.1.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.7	1.24	-2.17	0.015	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.5	1.19	-2.10	0.018	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.12	1.21	-1.76	0.039	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.57	1.31	-1.20	0.115	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.19	1.38	-0.86	0.194	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.65	1.35	-0.48	0.316	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.48	1.42	-0.34	0.366	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.20	1.24	-0.16	0.437	-0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.69	1.38	0.50	0.691	0.03
Positive Contact Video	0.93	1.56	0.59	0.724	0.04
Alternative Control	3.20	1.35	2.37	0.018	0.14
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.82	0.96	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.80	0.93	-1.94	0.026	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.77	0.93	-1.90	0.029	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.71	0.93	-1.85	0.032	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.21	0.93	-1.30	0.098	-0.05
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.02	0.91	-1.12	0.132	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.79	0.97	-0.82	0.207	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	0.97	-0.54	0.294	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.03	0.96	-0.03	0.488	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.01	0.96	-0.01	0.497	0.00
Alternative Control	2.61	1.00	2.61	0.009	0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.5: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	-0.11	-0.05	101.90	41.52
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.1	0.03	0.00	-28.03	0.25
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.08	-0.10	-0.08	118.79	96.10
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.07	-0.01	0.00	12.60	1.90
Positive Contact Video	-0.07	0.042	-0.02	-59.36	33.74
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.06	-0.12	-0.08	201.79	134.85
Average	-0.08	-0.04	-0.04	52.93	45.74

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

Table S11.1.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.38	1.54	-1.55	0.061	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.05	1.59	-0.66	0.255	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.89	1.65	-0.54	0.296	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.87	1.59	-0.55	0.292	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.65	1.72	-0.38	0.352	-0.02
Positive Contact Video	0.12	1.65	0.07	0.529	0.00
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.12	1.60	0.07	0.529	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.01	1.70	0.60	0.724	0.04
Alternative Control	2.34	1.65	1.42	0.156	0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	2.45	1.67	1.46	0.928	0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	2.91	1.54	1.89	0.971	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.72	1.15	-2.37	0.009	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.93	1.21	-1.60	0.054	-0.07
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.79	1.22	-1.47	0.071	-0.07
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.78	1.23	-1.44	0.075	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.46	1.18	-1.24	0.108	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.38	1.21	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.29	1.21	0.24	0.593	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.51	1.18	0.44	0.669	0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.60	1.23	0.49	0.686	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.78	1.21	0.64	0.740	0.03
Alternative Control	1.48	1.19	1.25	0.213	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.6: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.15	-0.02	-0.01	15.80	9.29
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.14	-0.09	-0.07	61.60	50.27
Common National Identity	-0.14	-0.04	-0.10	27.13	70.83
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.11	0.00	-0.05	-3.85	48.46
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.09	-0.03	-0.06	35.73	71.90
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	34.97	72.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.07	0.04	0.03	-52.54	-40.50
Positive Contact Video	-0.06	0.00	0.01	-7.30	-17.30
Average	-0.11	-0.02	-0.04	19.55	38.58

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.6).

Seven of the tested interventions had effects on social distance in the main survey. One to two interventions had durable effects on social distance. According to the preregistered strategy, two interventions significantly reduced social distance relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.7). The most effective intervention was *Correcting Division Misperceptions* (Cohen's d = -0.14). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 23% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.7). According to the larger n strategy, four interventions significantly reduced social distance relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.7). The most effective intervention was *Correcting Division Misperceptions* (Cohen's d = -0.08). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 18% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.7).

Four of the tested interventions had effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts in the main survey. Three interventions had durable effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts. According to the preregistered strategy, three interventions significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts relative to the null control condition (Table S11.1.8). The most effective intervention was *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* (Cohen's d = -0.11). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 100% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.8). According to the larger n strategy, three interventions significantly reduced biased evaluation of politicized facts relative to the null control condition (Table S11.2.8). The most effective intervention was *Correcting Democracy Misperceptions* (Cohen's d = -0.11). Among interventions that had a significant effect in the main survey, the

Table S11.1.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.21	1.73	-1.85	0.032	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.13	1.55	-1.37	0.085	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.33	1.58	-0.84	0.200	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.42	1.65	-0.26	0.399	-0.02
Common National Identity	-0.25	1.58	-0.16	0.437	-0.01
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.19	1.60	-0.12	0.452	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.74	1.62	0.46	0.646	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.01	1.60	0.63	0.737	0.04
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.24	1.59	0.78	0.783	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.48	1.63	0.91	0.819	0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.76	1.79	0.98	0.837	0.06
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.20	1.16	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Common National Identity	-1.14	1.15	-0.99	0.161	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.84	1.19	-0.71	0.240	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.73	1.19	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.52	1.19	-0.44	0.331	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.49	1.22	-0.40	0.345	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.05	1.18	-0.04	0.484	0.00
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.75	1.18	0.63	0.737	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.20	1.21	0.99	0.838	0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.42	1.16	1.23	0.890	0.05
Alternative Control	1.81	1.18	1.53	0.127	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.7: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Social Distance Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.14	-0.08	-0.03	55.48	18.85
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.13	-0.02	-0.02	11.84	13.62
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.12	-0.12	-0.08	97.43	66.53
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.10	-0.01	-0.03	6.98	30.59
Common National Identity	-0.09	-0.01	-0.04	10.12	45.81
Positive Contact Video	-0.08	0.05	0.04	-67.59	-54.27
Democratic Collapse Threat	-0.07	0.05	0.00	-64.67	2.51
Average	-0.10	-0.02	-0.02	17.36	21.11

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

Table S11.1.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.92	1.25	-2.34	0.010	-0.13
Common National Identity	-2.82	1.35	-2.09	0.018	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.43	1.23	-1.98	0.024	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.07	1.31	-1.58	0.057	-0.09
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.52	1.39	-1.09	0.137	-0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.47	1.24	-1.18	0.118	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.19	1.22	-0.97	0.166	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.17	1.25	-0.94	0.175	-0.05
Alternative Control	0.27	1.28	0.21	0.834	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.61	1.31	0.46	0.679	0.03
Positive Contact Video	1.50	1.38	1.09	0.863	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.2.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.38	0.95	-2.49	0.006	-0.11
Common National Identity	-2.12	0.95	-2.23	0.013	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-1.79	0.95	-1.89	0.029	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.36	0.94	-1.45	0.074	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.56	1.01	-0.55	0.290	-0.03
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.39	0.94	-0.42	0.337	-0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.35	0.96	-0.37	0.356	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.12	0.97	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.33	0.98	0.34	0.632	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.83	0.96	0.86	0.806	0.04
Alternative Control	2.35	0.95	2.47	0.014	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.3.8: *Percentage of Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts Retained in Durability Test*

	Main Survey	Durability Survey			
		Preregistered	Large N	Preregistered	Large N
Intervention	d	d	d	% of Main Survey Effect	% of Main Survey Effect
Common National Identity	-0.13	-0.13	-0.10	97.35	73.48
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.10	-0.13	-0.08	130.98	80.81
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11	108.99	107.42
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.09	-0.09	-0.02	103.13	17.76
Average	-0.11	-0.11	-0.07	109.37	71.37

Notes. Only interventions with significant effects in the main survey were included.

average effect size in the durability survey amounted to 72% of the average effect size in the main survey (Table S11.3.8).

None of the interventions had significant backfire effects. Notably, this means that the backfire effect of *Democratic Collapse Threat* on support for partisan violence we observed in the main survey did not sustain until the durability survey (preregistered strategy: Cohen's d = 0.04; larger n strategy: Cohen's d = 0.01).

The evidence for sustainable treatment effects was similar, if not stronger, when using the alternative control condition instead of the null control condition as reference point (preregistered strategy: Tables S11.4.1-S11.4.8; larger n strategy: Tables S11.5.1-S11.5.8). The stronger effects occurred because, in the durability test, participants in the alternative control condition scored significantly higher on partisan animosity (larger n strategy: Cohen's d = 0.10), opposition to bipartisan cooperation (preregistered strategy: Cohen's d = 0.14; larger n strategy: Cohen's d = 0.12), and biased evaluation of politicized facts (Cohen's d = 0.11) than participants in the null control condition.

Table S11.4.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.81	1.58	-3.05	0.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-4.39	1.61	-2.73	0.003	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.27	1.52	-2.81	0.002	-0.20
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.72	1.53	-2.44	0.007	-0.18
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.18	1.53	-2.08	0.019	-0.15
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.00	1.59	-1.89	0.029	-0.14
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.35	1.60	-0.84	0.200	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.99	1.54	-0.64	0.260	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.61	1.54	-0.40	0.346	-0.03
Null Control	-0.33	1.21	-0.27	0.788	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.23	1.48	-0.15	0.439	-0.01

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.85	1.65	-1.12	0.131	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.81	1.54	-1.17	0.120	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.61	1.64	-0.99	0.162	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.15	1.61	-0.72	0.237	-0.05
Null Control	-1.01	1.29	-0.78	0.435	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	1.65	-0.54	0.295	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.50	1.64	-0.31	0.380	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.37	1.58	-0.23	0.408	-0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.23	1.65	0.14	0.555	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.33	1.71	0.19	0.577	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.49	1.70	0.29	0.613	0.02

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.98	1.24	-2.41	0.008	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.25	1.38	-0.91	0.182	-0.07
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.20	1.44	-0.84	0.202	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.15	1.37	-0.84	0.200	-0.06
Common National Identity	-0.75	1.42	-0.53	0.299	-0.04
Null Control	-0.67	1.12	-0.59	0.554	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.34	1.41	-0.24	0.404	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.31	1.50	-0.21	0.419	-0.02
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.14	1.45	0.10	0.540	0.01
Positive Contact Video	0.26	1.54	0.17	0.566	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.26	1.53	0.17	0.567	0.01
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.40	1.75	-2.51	0.006	-0.18
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.14	1.68	-2.47	0.007	-0.17
Common National Identity	-3.36	1.70	-1.98	0.024	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.03	1.76	-1.72	0.043	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.00	1.73	-1.73	0.042	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.95	1.70	-1.74	0.041	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.16	1.69	-1.28	0.101	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.06	1.69	-1.21	0.112	-0.08
Null Control	-1.89	1.35	-1.40	0.163	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.36	1.85	-0.74	0.230	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.22	1.73	-0.70	0.241	-0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-5.90	1.63	-3.62	<.001	-0.27
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.70	1.59	-3.58	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-5.32	1.60	-3.32	<.001	-0.24
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-4.77	1.68	-2.84	0.002	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.39	1.74	-2.53	0.006	-0.20
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-3.85	1.72	-2.24	0.012	-0.17
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.68	1.77	-2.09	0.018	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.40	1.63	-2.08	0.019	-0.15
Null Control	-3.20	1.35	-2.37	0.018	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.51	1.74	-1.45	0.074	-0.11
Positive Contact Video	-2.27	1.88	-1.21	0.113	-0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.72	2.00	-2.36	0.009	-0.17
Common National Identity	-3.39	2.04	-1.66	0.048	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.23	2.09	-1.54	0.061	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.21	2.04	-1.58	0.058	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.99	2.14	-1.40	0.081	-0.11
Null Control	-2.34	1.65	-1.42	0.156	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.22	2.08	-1.07	0.143	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.22	2.04	-1.09	0.138	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.33	2.13	-0.62	0.267	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.11	2.10	0.05	0.520	0.00
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.57	2.00	0.29	0.613	0.02
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.95	2.13	-1.86	0.032	-0.14
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.88	1.99	-1.44	0.074	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.08	2.01	-1.03	0.151	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.17	2.06	-0.57	0.286	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.99	2.01	-0.50	0.310	-0.04
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.94	2.02	-0.46	0.322	-0.03
Null Control	-0.74	1.62	-0.46	0.646	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.27	2.03	0.13	0.553	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.50	2.01	0.25	0.598	0.02
Positive Contact Video	0.74	2.05	0.36	0.641	0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1.02	2.18	0.47	0.680	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.4.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Preregistered Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.19	1.61	-1.98	0.024	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.09	1.69	-1.83	0.034	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.70	1.60	-1.69	0.045	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.34	1.66	-1.41	0.079	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.79	1.72	-1.04	0.150	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.74	1.60	-1.08	0.139	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.46	1.59	-0.92	0.180	-0.07
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.44	1.61	-0.89	0.186	-0.06
Null Control	-0.27	1.28	-0.21	0.834	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.34	1.66	0.20	0.581	0.02
Positive Contact Video	1.23	1.71	0.72	0.765	0.06
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-5.29	1.16	-4.56	<.001	-0.25
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-5.13	1.15	-4.45	<.001	-0.24
Positive Contact Video	-4.99	1.16	-4.31	<.001	-0.24
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.92	1.14	-4.32	<.001	-0.23
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.88	1.16	-3.36	<.001	-0.18
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.84	1.14	-3.38	<.001	-0.18
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.35	1.15	-2.90	0.002	-0.16
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.79	1.13	-2.47	0.007	-0.13
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.14	1.14	-1.88	0.030	-0.10
Null Control	-2.09	0.88	-2.37	0.018	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.03	1.15	-1.76	0.039	-0.10

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.89	1.21	-2.39	0.008	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.73	1.27	-1.37	0.085	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.26	1.22	-1.04	0.150	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.25	1.23	-1.01	0.156	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.25	1.21	-1.03	0.151	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.10	1.19	-0.93	0.177	-0.05
Null Control	-0.98	0.94	-1.04	0.297	-0.04
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.72	1.23	-0.58	0.280	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.72	1.23	-0.58	0.279	-0.03
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.32	1.23	-0.26	0.398	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.05	1.23	-0.04	0.483	0.00

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.56	0.92	-1.70	0.045	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.51	0.98	-0.52	0.301	-0.03
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-0.18	1.01	-0.18	0.428	-0.01
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.18	0.97	-0.19	0.425	-0.01
Null Control	0.00	0.75	0.00	0.998	0.00
Common National Identity	0.13	0.98	0.14	0.554	0.01
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.20	1.00	0.20	0.578	0.01
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.21	0.99	0.21	0.582	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.26	1.01	0.26	0.603	0.01
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.87	1.01	0.86	0.806	0.05
Positive Contact Video	1.09	1.03	1.06	0.855	0.06
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.32	1.32	-2.51	0.006	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.94	1.34	-2.20	0.014	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.67	1.32	-2.03	0.021	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.13	1.33	-1.60	0.055	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.93	1.29	-1.49	0.068	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.78	1.35	-1.32	0.094	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.44	1.28	-1.13	0.129	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.25	1.31	-0.96	0.169	-0.05
Null Control	-1.23	1.02	-1.21	0.227	-0.05
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.12	1.31	-0.86	0.196	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.03	1.28	-0.81	0.210	-0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.43	1.27	-3.49	<.001	-0.20
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-4.42	1.25	-3.54	<.001	-0.20
Common National Identity	-4.39	1.25	-3.51	<.001	-0.20
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.33	1.24	-3.48	<.001	-0.19
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-3.82	1.25	-3.06	0.001	-0.17
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.63	1.23	-2.95	0.002	-0.16
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-3.41	1.28	-2.67	0.004	-0.15
Positive Contact Video	-3.14	1.28	-2.46	0.007	-0.14
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.64	1.27	-2.09	0.019	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.62	1.27	-2.06	0.020	-0.12
Null Control	-2.61	1.00	-2.61	0.009	-0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-4.20	1.50	-2.80	0.003	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.41	1.54	-2.21	0.014	-0.12
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.27	1.56	-2.10	0.018	-0.12
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.26	1.57	-2.08	0.019	-0.12
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.94	1.53	-1.93	0.027	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.86	1.55	-1.20	0.115	-0.07
Null Control	-1.48	1.19	-1.25	0.213	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-1.19	1.55	-0.77	0.221	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.97	1.52	-0.63	0.263	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.88	1.56	-0.57	0.286	-0.03
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.70	1.55	-0.45	0.326	-0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.01	1.52	-2.64	0.004	-0.15
Common National Identity	-2.94	1.51	-1.95	0.025	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.65	1.54	-1.72	0.043	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.54	1.54	-1.65	0.050	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.33	1.54	-1.51	0.065	-0.08
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.30	1.57	-1.47	0.071	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.86	1.53	-1.21	0.112	-0.07
Null Control	-1.81	1.18	-1.53	0.127	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.06	1.53	-0.69	0.245	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.61	1.55	-0.39	0.347	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.38	1.52	-0.25	0.400	-0.01

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S11.5.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts Compared to the Alternative Control in Durability Test (Larger N Analysis)*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.73	1.23	-3.83	<.001	-0.21
Common National Identity	-4.47	1.23	-3.64	<.001	-0.20
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.15	1.23	-3.37	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-3.72	1.22	-3.04	0.001	-0.17
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-2.91	1.28	-2.28	0.011	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.75	1.22	-2.25	0.012	-0.12
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.71	1.24	-2.19	0.014	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.47	1.25	-1.98	0.024	-0.11
Null Control	-2.35	0.95	-2.47	0.014	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.02	1.26	-1.61	0.054	-0.09
Positive Contact Video	-1.52	1.24	-1.23	0.109	-0.07

Includes controls

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

12. Forecasting Intervention Effects

We conducted a forecasting challenge to examine how accurately forecasters would predict the effects of the interventions. Details regarding the forecasting challenge will be described in a different paper. Here, we report results to support the claim that many scholars in the field contend that the different outcomes we study (i.e., the main outcomes of partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence) are indicators of the same underlying construct. An implication of this claim is that experts would forecast that the effects of interventions on one outcome would be strongly correlated with the effects of the interventions on the other (two) outcomes.

Sample

Two cohorts of participants were invited to participate in the forecasting challenge: (a) practitioners and (b) academic social scientists (e.g., political science, psychology, sociology, economics). (We also invited members of the general public but that is not relevant to our purposes here.) Existing mailing lists for the Strengthening Democracy Challenge and lists from professional groups were used to recruit forecasters. To receive an invitation to participate as a practitioner, the individual had to self-identify as having worked in this "depolarization" or "bridging" sector (e.g. as a founder of a not-for-profit) in the past. Social science academics were invited if they identified as having studied the dependent variables of interest in the past. Hence, these two cohorts were likely to have different forms of expertise about the subject matter, with academics thinking more theoretically and in terms of falsification, and practitioners thinking more in terms of design and what would work.

Procedure

The maximum number of forecasts was 75 (25 interventions and three outcomes – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for partisan violence). Each expert forecaster was invited to make 75 forecasts, but not all participants completed all forecasts (average forecasts completed per participant = 29).

Intake Survey

All participants completed an intake survey that asked them about their background, such as age, race, gender, education, and experience. This survey also contained potential predictors of forecast accuracy, such as numeracy or open-mindedness.

Training Module

All participants were required to complete a training module on how to make forecasts prior to registering forecasts. After the training module, participants took a short quiz that checked their knowledge about how to participate, were offered corrections to incorrect answers, and received basic logistical and measurement information. The training module included logistical information about how to register forecasts and how they would be paid. Additionally, it conveyed information about how each dependent variable was measured, details of the experimental sample and statistical power, and how the success of the interventions would be measured (i.e., statistical significance at the .05 level using a one-tailed test relative to a control group). Finally, when making forecasts, participants were presented with a title and abstract of each intervention, and a link to the full intervention, exactly as participants in the experiment experienced it.

Registering Forecasts

Each participant was asked to forecast the effects of the interventions on *each* of the distinct outcomes (i.e., for each intervention, participants were asked to predict its effect on

partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence). For each combination of intervention and outcome, participants were asked to assign probabilities to the following five mutually exclusive events: (i) a statistically significant backfire effect ($d > 0$), (ii) no statistically significant effect, (iii) a statistically significant small effect ($d < 0$ & $d >= -0.3$), (iv) a statistically significant medium effect ($d < -0.3$ & $d >= -0.6$), or (v) a statistically significant large effect ($d < -0.6$). A key reason for using categories was to ensure the forecasting was accessible to non-academics, who were also informed about the scale of effect sizes in absolute terms (based on pilot studies). By summing probabilities of statistically significant, non-backfire effects, we calculate the overall predicted likelihood of an intervention having a statistically significant effect (i.e., we can collapse the small, medium, and large effect categories as all indicating a significant effect).

Participants completed forecasts on a platform called "Cultivate Forecasts." They could return to this site to complete forecasts over a longer period of time. This site also allowed participants to share rationales and see rationales from other forecasters.

Rewards

Forecasters received payment both for their participation and for accuracy. They earned $10 for completing the intake survey, $10 for forecasting the effects of 25 interventions on each dependent variable (for a maximum bonus of $30), and a final bonus of $15 for completing all 75 forecasts (a maximum participation payment of $55).

Participants could earn up to another $30 depending on the accuracy of their predictions. If the corresponding intervention had an effect in the predicted direction, participants were further paid 20 cents and $0 otherwise (a maximum bonus of $0.2*75=$15). They were paid an *additional* 20 cents for selecting the correct effect size category, scaled by the likelihood they

placed on that category, e.g. a 20% likelihood would result in 0.2*20 = 4 cents). To ensure people would freely share their rationales and ideas, these rewards were not zero-sum. Participants received accuracy pay regardless of the number of interventions they forecasted.

Analysis Strategy

We used the forecasting data to examine whether experts would forecast that the effects of interventions on one outcome are strongly correlated with the effects of the interventions on the other outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we calculated the forecasted treatment effect for each forecast by summing the products of assigned likelihood and the median of each effect size category. (A predicted significant backfire effect was coded as $d = .15$). We then calculated the Pearson correlations between the *predicted* treatment effects for partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence, among academic and practitioner expert forecasters.

Preregistration, Data Availability, and Code Availability

While the forecasting challenge had a preregistration, the analysis reported here were not preregistered. The anonymized data and analysis code for the forecasting challenge will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/.

Results

We found that expert forecasters expected intervention effects on different outcomes to be highly correlated.[6] Among academic expert forecasters, forecasted treatment effects on partisan animosity were highly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices (r = .457) and support for partisan violence (r = .455). Forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices were also strongly correlated with

[6] Results about the accuracy of the forecasts are available in the aforementioned distinct paper.

forecasted treatment effects on support for partisan violence (r = .538). Similar results were obtained among practitioner expert forecasters. Forecasted treatment effects on partisan animosity were highly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices (r = .499) and support for partisan violence (r = .509). Forecasted treatment effects on support for undemocratic practices were also strongly correlated with forecasted treatment effects on support for partisan violence (r = .726). We found similarly strong correlations in a robustness check in which we only distinguished between a forecasted null or backfire effect (coded as 0) and a significant treatment effect in the desired direction (coded as 1).

13. Relationships between Outcomes

As we report in the main text, we leveraged the unique structure of this megastudy to shed new theoretical light on the psychology underlying a number of polarization– and democracy-related attitudes. Specifically, we were interested in testing whether the outcomes we studied are better understood as (a) all different indicators of the same underlying construct, (b) whether they are largely distinct constructs from one another, or (c) if there is evidence for multiple constructs underlying the outcomes we studied. In the main text, we present two complementary analyses – a factor analysis of the eight outcomes and a network visualization of the correlations between the interventions' effect sizes on the eight outcomes.

We found evidence for two distinct dimensions of the psychology underlying polarization and democracy. Partisan animosity is highly associated with a cluster of societally relevant outcomes, including general social distrust and biased evaluation of politicized facts. In contrast, support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence are largely separate from partisan animosity. Other variables, including preferences for social distance from outpartisans, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and support for undemocratic candidates are associated with both the partisan animosity cluster and the anti-democratic attitudes cluster. Here, we conducted several robustness checks for the factor analysis and the correlational analysis of interventions' effect sizes on different outcomes.

Factor Analysis

We conducted a parallel analysis to determine the optimal number of factors. Including only participants from the null control condition who completed all eight outcomes (n = 5,341), we found that the optimal factorial solution contains two to three factors (see Table S13.1.1 and

Figure S13.1.1). While the first two factors had adjusted eigenvalues that were clearly above the conventional threshold of 0 (1.62 and 1.07), the third factor had an adjusted eigenvalue of 0.07.

We focus on the two-factor solution in the main text (see Table S13.1.2 and Figure S13.1.2). Three variables loaded heavily (factor loading > .3) on only the first factor: support for undemocratic practices, partisan violence, and undemocratic candidates. Three variables loaded heavily on only the second factor: partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts. Two variables loaded heavily on both factors: opposition to bipartisan cooperation and social distance.

Results were substantially similar in a three-factor solution (see Table S13.1.3 and Figure S13.1.3). Three variables loaded heavily (factor loading > .3) on the first factor: support for undemocratic practices, partisan violence, and undemocratic candidates. Four variables loaded heavily on the second factor: partisan animosity, social distance, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts (support for partisan violence loaded negatively on the second factor). Two variables loaded on the third factor: opposition to bipartisan cooperation and social distance. This factor could be thought of as the extent to which people valued cross-partisan contact and engagement, though as above, the factor was only barely above the conventional cut-off.

Figure S13.1.1: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*



Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.1: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Factor	Adjusted Eigenvalue	Unadjusted Eigenvalue	Estimated Bias
1	1.62	1.68	0.06
2	1.07	1.10	0.04
3	0.07	0.10	0.02
4	-0.05	-0.04	0.01
5	-0.08	-0.08	-0.01
6	-0.12	-0.14	-0.02
7	-0.16	-0.20	-0.04
8	-0.19	-0.24	-0.05

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Figure S13.1.2: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses

Table S13.1.2: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.02	0.62
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.75	-0.02
Support for Partisan Violence	0.80	-0.29
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.49	0.24
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.39	0.30
Social Distance	0.36	0.52
Social Distrust	-0.02	0.37
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.06	0.55

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Figure S13.1.3: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*



Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.3: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.58	0.17
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.79	-0.05	0.13
Support for Partisan Violence	0.70	-0.40	0.28
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.54	0.25	0.09
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.28	0.18	0.38
Social Distance	0.19	0.38	0.65
Social Distrust	-0.03	0.33	0.13
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.10	0.56	0.10

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

For the factor analyses reported above (and in the main text), we used a varimax rotation which sets the correlation between the factors to zero. Such independence of the factors has desirable characteristics for calculating the distance in the factor space. A different rotation method, promax, allows correlations between factors. A robustness check using promax provided substantially similar results (see Tables S13.1.4-S13.1.5 and Figures S13.1.4-S13.1.5).

Is the psychology underlying polarization and democracy different for Democrats and Republicans? We examined this question by conducting the same factor analysis restricting the sample to Democrats (n = 2,749; Tables S13.1.6-S13.1.10) or Republicans (n = 2,592; Tables S13.1.11-S13.1.15). Results were very similar to the ones described above among both Democrats and Republicans, suggesting that the relationships between the different outcomes are similar across different partisan identities.

Is the psychology underlying polarization and democracy different for weakly identified and strongly identified partisans? We examined this question by conducting the same factor analysis restricting the sample to weakly identified partisans (n = 2,749; Tables S13.1.16-S13.1.20) or strongly identified partisans (n = 2,592; Tables S13.1.21-S13.1.25), using a median split of our one-item measure of strength of partisan identity ("How important is being a

[Republican / Democrat] to you?”). Results were very similar to the ones described above among both weakly and strongly identified partisans, suggesting that the relationships between the different outcomes are similar across different strengths of partisan identities.

Figure S13.1.4: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*



Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.4: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.23	0.66
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.76	-0.02
Support for Partisan Violence	0.90	-0.31
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.41	0.26
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.29	0.32
Social Distance	0.19	0.55
Social Distrust	-0.14	0.39
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.12	0.58

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Figure S13.1.5: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*



Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.5: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for the Participants in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.13	0.56	0.14
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.84	-0.01	-0.09
Support for Partisan Violence	0.71	-0.43	0.17
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.55	0.29	-0.09
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.17	0.10	0.35
Social Distance	-0.03	0.22	0.68
Social Distrust	-0.11	0.30	0.12
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.04	0.57	0.01

Notes. Only participants who were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.6: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for Democrats in the Null Control Condition*

Factor	Adjusted Eigenvalue	Unadjusted Eigenvalue	Estimated Bias
1	1.58	1.67	0.08
2	1.10	1.15	0.05
3	0.11	0.14	0.03
4	-0.03	-0.02	0.01
5	-0.06	-0.06	-0.01
6	-0.13	-0.16	-0.03
7	-0.16	-0.20	-0.05
8	-0.16	-0.24	-0.07

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrat and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.7: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for Democrats in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.07	0.58
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.74	-0.21
Support for Partisan Violence	0.81	-0.35
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.49	0.11
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.44	0.24
Social Distance	0.42	0.66
Social Distrust	-0.03	0.35
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.02	0.42

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrat and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.8: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for Democrats in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.63	0.03
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.72	-0.23	0.23
Support for Partisan Violence	0.70	-0.41	0.32
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.60	0.20	0.04
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.21	0.08	0.52
Social Distance	0.21	0.53	0.55
Social Distrust	-0.12	0.29	0.18
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.01	0.43	0.06

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrat and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.9: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for Democrats in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.26	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.77	-0.05
Support for Partisan Violence	0.88	-0.17
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.43	0.21
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.34	0.33
Social Distance	0.18	0.73
Social Distrust	-0.15	0.34
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.16	0.41

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrat and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.10: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for Democrats in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.10	0.61	0.07
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.74	-0.13	0.08
Support for Partisan Violence	0.71	-0.31	0.17
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.62	0.30	-0.08
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.12	0.07	0.51
Social Distance	0.07	0.50	0.56
Social Distrust	-0.18	0.25	0.23
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.06	0.41	0.08

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrat and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.11: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for Republicans in the Null Control Condition*

Factor	Adjusted Eigenvalue	Unadjusted Eigenvalue	Estimated Bias
1	1.91	2.00	0.09
2	0.86	0.91	0.06
3	0.08	0.12	0.03
4	-0.05	-0.04	0.01
5	-0.11	-0.12	-0.01
6	-0.11	-0.14	-0.03
7	-0.14	-0.19	-0.05
8	-0.16	-0.24	-0.08

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republican and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.12: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for Republicans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	0.02	0.62
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.73	0.15
Support for Partisan Violence	0.81	-0.24
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.45	0.36
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.34	0.38
Social Distance	0.40	0.49
Social Distrust	-0.01	0.37
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.12	0.66

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republican and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.13: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for Republicans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	0.01	0.58	0.19
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.73	0.10	0.20
Support for Partisan Violence	0.72	-0.33	0.25
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.53	0.39	0.04
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.22	0.25	0.47
Social Distance	0.25	0.34	0.61
Social Distrust	-0.04	0.33	0.16
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.14	0.64	0.18

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republican and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.14: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for Republicans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	0.67	-0.21
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.10	0.69
Support for Partisan Violence	-0.34	0.93
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.35	0.33
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.39	0.21
Social Distance	0.50	0.23
Social Distrust	0.41	-0.15
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.72	-0.12

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republican and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.15: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for Republicans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.14	0.57	0.13
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.72	0.10	0.03
Support for Partisan Violence	0.79	-0.38	0.16
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.47	0.46	-0.15
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.10	0.14	0.45
Social Distance	0.09	0.19	0.59
Social Distrust	-0.14	0.30	0.15
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.02	0.65	0.07

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republican and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses.

Table S13.1.16: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for Weakly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Factor	Adjusted Eigenvalue	Unadjusted Eigenvalue	Estimated Bias
1	1.87	1.95	0.08
2	0.73	0.78	0.05
3	0.06	0.09	0.03
4	-0.03	-0.02	0.01
5	-0.08	-0.09	-0.01
6	-0.11	-0.14	-0.03
7	-0.14	-0.19	-0.05
8	-0.17	-0.24	-0.07

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.17: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for Weakly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	0.01	0.57
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.70	0.06
Support for Partisan Violence	0.86	-0.21
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.43	0.33
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.49	0.29
Social Distance	0.46	0.46
Social Distrust	0.01	0.33
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.14	0.53

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.18: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for Weakly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.56	0.11
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.76	0.04	0.20
Support for Partisan Violence	0.66	-0.26	0.47
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.49	0.34	0.10
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.30	0.21	0.46
Social Distance	0.23	0.41	0.56
Social Distrust	0.00	0.32	0.07
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.16	0.53	0.08

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.19: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for Weakly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.27	0.65
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.68	0.03
Support for Partisan Violence	0.99	-0.29
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.28	0.35
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.36	0.30
Social Distance	0.24	0.50
Social Distrust	-0.15	0.38
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.12	0.60

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.20: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for Weakly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.17	0.57	0.08
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.77	0.03	0.01
Support for Partisan Violence	0.62	-0.31	0.38
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.45	0.34	-0.05
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.13	0.18	0.43
Social Distance	-0.03	0.37	0.56
Social Distrust	-0.08	0.33	0.05
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.06	0.54	0.00

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.21: *Results of the Parallel Analysis for Strongly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Factor	Adjusted Eigenvalue	Unadjusted Eigenvalue	Estimated Bias
1	1.38	1.46	0.09
2	1.24	1.29	0.06
3	0.01	0.04	0.03
4	-0.06	-0.04	0.01
5	-0.06	-0.07	-0.01
6	-0.10	-0.12	-0.03
7	-0.14	-0.19	-0.05
8	-0.17	-0.24	-0.08

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.22: *Results of the Uncorrelated 2-Factor Analysis for Strongly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.09	0.63
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.76	-0.07
Support for Partisan Violence	0.77	-0.35
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.47	0.15
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.33	0.34
Social Distance	0.27	0.55
Social Distrust	-0.02	0.43
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.06	0.53

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.23: *Results of the Uncorrelated 3-Factor Analysis for Strongly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.08	0.55	0.25
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.83	-0.12	0.04
Support for Partisan Violence	0.66	-0.51	0.15
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.48	0.09	0.11
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.28	0.19	0.32
Social Distance	0.15	0.32	0.71
Social Distrust	0.00	0.39	0.15
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.02	0.56	0.11

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.24: *Results of the Correlated 2-Factor Analysis for Strongly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2
Partisan Animosity	-0.22	0.63
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.77	-0.04
Support for Partisan Violence	0.83	-0.32
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.44	0.18
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.26	0.36
Social Distance	0.16	0.57
Social Distrust	-0.11	0.43
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.17	0.54

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Table S13.1.25: *Results of the Correlated 3-Factor Analysis for Strongly Identified Partisans in the Null Control Condition*

Outcome	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Partisan Animosity	-0.11	0.51	0.18
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.90	-0.04	-0.16
Support for Partisan Violence	0.58	-0.56	0.18
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.51	0.12	-0.02
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.20	0.11	0.29
Social Distance	-0.11	0.07	0.80
Social Distrust	0.00	0.38	0.08
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.07	0.60	-0.05

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans and were assigned to the null control condition were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split.

Effect Size Correlations

We estimated how correlated the 25 intervention effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables. For example, we used the effects of the 25 interventions on partisan animosity (see Table S7.1) and the effects of the 25 interventions on support for undemocratic practices (see Table S7.2) and estimated whether effects on partisan animosity were correlated with effects on support for undemocratic practices. A strong correlation between two outcomes implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in a similar way (effect size correlations between outcome variables ranged from -.24 to .74).

For these analyses, we included all the outcome variables we collected in our study (a) that we deemed potentially problematic for healthy democratic functioning, (b) whose items formed a reliable scale, and (c) for which we found at least one significant reduction. As a result, we did not include the following variables: attitudinal extremity and specific 2024 voting intentions because they are not necessarily problematic for healthy democratic functioning, opposition to democratic reform because the items did not form a reliable scale, and resistance to getting the COVID vaccine because it does not directly impact healthy democratic functioning, and we did not find any intervention that reduced such resistance. We visualized the correlations in a network diagram. The location of variables in the network is based on their relative correlations with one another. Hence, variables that are located closer are more strongly correlated.

We find evidence for three groups of outcome variables. Partisan animosity, social distrust, and biased evaluation of politicized facts respond to interventions similarly, but in a manner that is distinct from the pattern of responses for support for undemocratic practices and support for partisan violence (which is somewhat divergent from all other outcomes, although

see discussion of this below). Effect sizes for support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance are correlated with effect sizes for all outcomes, except for support for partisan violence. Figure S13.2.1 is a network visualization of Table S13.2.1 (and is the same as Figure 3 in the main text). Table S13.2.1 presents the correlation matrix for the full sample. Results are similar when we use the alternative control condition instead of the null control condition as reference category (see Figure S13.2.2 and Table S13.2.2).

The relatively low correlation in effect sizes between (a) support for undemocratic practices and (b) support for partisan violence is largely driven by the *Democratic Collapse Threat* intervention. Excluding this intervention from the analysis (see Figure S13.2.3 & Table S13.2.3), effects on support for undemocratic practices and effects on support for partisan violence were highly correlated: $r = .69$. For comparison, including *Democratic Collapse Threat* intervention in the analysis, the correlation was much weaker: $r = .28$. However, it remains an open question whether the analysis with or without *Democratic Collapse Threat* is preferrable. On the one hand, *Democratic Collapse Threat* appears to be an outlier in its diverging effects on support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. On the other hand, the design of the Strengthening Democracy Challenge rewards interventions that simultaneously affect multiple outcomes, potentially resulting in an overestimation of the true relationships between outcomes. Future research is needed to examine the relationship between support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence.

Figure S13.2.1: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.1 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.1: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.25	-0.02	0.56	0.60	0.73	0.71	0.45
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.25	1.00	0.27	0.75	0.50	0.31	0.40	0.34
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.27	1.00	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.13	-0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.56	0.75	-0.04	1.00	0.61	0.57	0.49	0.54
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.60	0.50	0.16	0.61	1.00	0.43	0.68	0.53
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.31	-0.24	0.57	0.43	1.00	0.58	0.55
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.40	0.13	0.49	0.68	0.58	1.00	0.50
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.45	0.34	-0.13	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.50	1.00

Notes. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Figure S13.2.2: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions (Relative to the Alternative Control)*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among weakly identified partisans across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.2 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.2: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions (Relative to the Alternative Control)*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.25	-0.02	0.56	0.60	0.73	0.71	0.45
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.25	1.00	0.27	0.75	0.50	0.31	0.40	0.34
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.27	1.00	-0.04	0.16	-0.24	0.13	-0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.56	0.75	-0.04	1.00	0.61	0.57	0.49	0.54
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.60	0.50	0.16	0.61	1.00	0.43	0.68	0.53
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.31	-0.24	0.57	0.43	1.00	0.58	0.55
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.40	0.13	0.49	0.68	0.58	1.00	0.50
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.45	0.34	-0.13	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.50	1.00

Notes. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the alternative control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Figure S13.2.3: *Effect Size Correlations across the 24 Interventions (without the Democratic Collapse Threat Intervention)*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes across 24 interventions (without the Democratic Collapse Threat Intervention), for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.3 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization

Table S13.2.3: *Effect Size Correlations across the 24 Interventions (without the Democratic Collapse Threat Intervention)*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.28	-0.02	0.64	0.61	0.75	0.71	0.46
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.28	1.00	0.68	0.67	0.47	0.24	0.41	0.33
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.02	0.68	1.00	0.27	0.31	-0.16	0.21	-0.08
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.64	0.67	0.27	1.00	0.60	0.55	0.51	0.56
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.61	0.47	0.31	0.60	1.00	0.41	0.67	0.52
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.75	0.24	-0.16	0.55	0.41	1.00	0.57	0.54
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.41	0.21	0.51	0.67	0.57	1.00	0.49
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.46	0.33	-0.08	0.56	0.52	0.54	0.49	1.00

Notes. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention (except the Democratic Collapse Threat intervention) relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

As with the factor analysis, we investigate whether the psychology underlying polarization and democracy differs for Democrats and Republicans. We examined this question by analyzing how correlated the 25 intervention effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables, restricting the sample to Democrats and Republicans, respectively. Results were very similar to the ones described above among both Democrats (Figure S13.2.4 and Table S13.2.4) and Republicans (Figure S13.2.5 and Table S13.2.5). Significance tests for the comparison of the two correlation coefficients (Table S13.2.6) suggests that only one of the 28 unique correlation was significantly different among Democrats versus Republicans. Specifically, effects on partisan animosity were more strongly associated with effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among Democrats (r = .64) than among Republicans (r = .15). The low number of statistically significant differences suggests that the extent to which interventions affected the different outcomes was similar across different partisan identities, although the analysis is not well powered to detect such differences

Is the psychology underlying polarization and democracy different for weakly and strongly identified partisans? We examined this question by analyzing how correlated the 25 intervention effect sizes were for each pair of outcome variables restricting the sample to weakly identified partisans and strongly identified partisans, respectively. (As with our factor analysis, we use the median to divide strong versus weak partisans.) Results were very similar to the ones described above among both weakly identified partisans (Figure S13.2.7 and Table S13.2.6) and strongly identified partisans (Figure S13.2.8 and Table S13.2.7). Significance tests for the comparison of the two correlation coefficients (Table S13.2.9) suggests that three of the 28 unique correlations were significantly different among weakly identified versus strongly identified partisans. First, effects on support for partisan violence were positively associated with

Figure S13.2.4: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Democrats*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among Democrats across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.4 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.4: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Democrats*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.16	-0.16	0.49	0.49	0.73	0.71	0.65
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.16	1.00	0.44	0.62	0.33	0.35	0.18	0.15
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.16	0.44	1.00	-0.03	0.25	-0.11	0.03	-0.33
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.62	-0.03	1.00	0.44	0.54	0.43	0.45
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.49	0.33	0.25	0.44	1.00	0.50	0.52	0.30
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.73	0.35	-0.11	0.54	0.50	1.00	0.66	0.51
Social Distance (SDE)	0.71	0.18	0.03	0.43	0.52	0.66	1.00	0.57
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.65	0.15	-0.33	0.45	0.30	0.51	0.57	1.00

Notes. Only participants who identified as Democrats were used in these analyses. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Figure S13.2.5: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Republicans*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among Republicans across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.5 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.5: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Republicans*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.27	0.03	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.44	0.16
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.27	1.00	0.23	0.75	0.47	0.15	0.51	0.39
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	0.03	0.23	1.00	-0.03	0.06	-0.12	0.13	0.03
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.49	0.75	-0.03	1.00	0.58	0.44	0.45	0.37
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.53	0.47	0.06	0.58	1.00	0.41	0.60	0.53
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.51	0.15	-0.12	0.44	0.41	1.00	0.28	0.38
Social Distance (SDE)	0.44	0.51	0.13	0.45	0.60	0.28	1.00	0.30
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.16	0.39	0.03	0.37	0.53	0.38	0.30	1.00

Notes. Only participants who identified as Republicans were used in these analyses. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Table S13.2.6: *Correlations for each Combination of Outcomes between Effect Sizes among Democrats versus Republicans*

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Democrat r	Republican r	z-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.16	0.27	0.38	0.702
Partisan Animosity	Support for Partisan Violence	-0.16	0.03	0.63	0.526
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.49	0.49	0.00	1.000
Partisan Animosity	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.49	0.53	0.18	0.858
Partisan Animosity	Social Distrust	0.73	0.51	1.21	0.225
Partisan Animosity	Social Distance	0.71	0.44	1.38	0.169
Partisan Animosity	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.65	0.16	2.04	0.042
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	0.44	0.23	0.79	0.430
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.62	0.75	0.82	0.411
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.33	0.47	0.55	0.579
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distrust	0.35	0.15	0.71	0.477
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distance	0.18	0.51	1.26	0.207
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.15	0.39	0.86	0.387
Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.03	-0.03	0.00	1.000
Support for Partisan Violence	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.25	0.06	0.65	0.517
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distrust	-0.11	-0.12	0.03	0.973
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distance	0.03	0.13	0.33	0.738
Support for Partisan Violence	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	-0.33	0.03	1.24	0.216
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.44	0.58	0.63	0.528
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distrust	0.54	0.44	0.44	0.662
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distance	0.43	0.45	0.08	0.934
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.45	0.37	0.32	0.749
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distrust	0.50	0.41	0.38	0.706
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distance	0.52	0.60	0.39	0.698
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.30	0.53	0.93	0.352
Social Distrust	Social Distance	0.66	0.28	1.68	0.094
Social Distrust	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.51	0.38	0.54	0.590
Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.57	0.30	1.12	0.262

Notes. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlations were calculated as Pearson correlation coefficients.

Figure S13.2.6: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Weakly Identified Partisans*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among Republicans across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.7 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.7: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Weakly Identified Partisans*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.33	0.25	0.50	0.64	0.62	0.74	0.18
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.33	1.00	0.25	0.81	0.51	0.49	0.49	0.55
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	0.25	0.25	1.00	0.08	0.51	0.33	0.44	0.13
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.50	0.81	0.08	1.00	0.46	0.51	0.52	0.57
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.64	0.51	0.51	0.46	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.55
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.62	0.49	0.33	0.51	0.60	1.00	0.51	0.21
Social Distance (SDE)	0.74	0.49	0.44	0.52	0.75	0.51	1.00	0.43
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.18	0.55	0.13	0.57	0.55	0.21	0.43	1.00

Notes. Only participants who identified as weakly identified partisans were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Figure S13.2.7: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Strongly Identified Partisans*



Notes. The figure is a network diagram visualizing Pearson correlation coefficients calculated using Cohen's d effect sizes among strongly identified partisans across all 25 interventions, for each pair of outcome variables (see Table S13.2.8 for the correlation matrix). Classical multidimensional scaling (principal coordinates analysis) was used to calculate two dimensional coordinates for each vertex. Distances between outcomes indicate approximate dissimilarities (lack of correlated effects) from other outcomes. A stronger, positive correlation implies that interventions that affected one outcome also generally affected the other in the same direction and to a similar extent, and is represented with a darker-shaded network tie, and closer proximity in the visualization.

Table S13.2.8: *Effect Size Correlations across the 25 Interventions among Strongly Identified Partisans*

DV	PA	SUP	SPV	SUC	OBC	SDT	SDE	BEPF
Partisan Animosity (PA)	1.00	0.19	-0.15	0.53	0.49	0.63	0.64	0.56
Support for Undemocratic Practices (SUP)	0.19	1.00	0.36	0.59	0.48	0.20	0.25	0.10
Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)	-0.15	0.36	1.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.47	-0.14	-0.35
Support for Undemocratic Candidates (SUC)	0.53	0.59	-0.02	1.00	0.65	0.36	0.39	0.43
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation (OBC)	0.49	0.48	0.04	0.65	1.00	0.31	0.54	0.30
Social Distrust (SDT)	0.63	0.20	-0.47	0.36	0.31	1.00	0.62	0.68
Social Distance (SDE)	0.64	0.25	-0.14	0.39	0.54	0.62	1.00	0.53
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts (BEPF)	0.56	0.10	-0.35	0.43	0.30	0.68	0.53	1.00

Notes. Only participants who identified as strongly identified partisans were used in these analyses. Strength of partisanship was dichotomized via a median split. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlation is the Pearson correlation coefficient.

Table S13.2.9: *Correlations for each Combination of Outcomes between Effect Sizes among Weakly versus Strongly Identified Partisans*

Outcome 1	Outcome 2	Weak Partisans r	Strong Partisans r	z-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.33	0.19	0.50	0.618
Partisan Animosity	Support for Partisan Violence	0.25	-0.15	1.35	0.178
Partisan Animosity	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.50	0.53	0.14	0.892
Partisan Animosity	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.64	0.49	0.74	0.461
Partisan Animosity	Social Distrust	0.62	0.63	0.05	0.957
Partisan Animosity	Social Distance	0.74	0.64	0.64	0.524
Partisan Animosity	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.18	0.56	1.50	0.135
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Partisan Violence	0.25	0.36	0.40	0.687
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.81	0.59	1.49	0.136
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.51	0.48	0.13	0.895
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distrust	0.49	0.20	1.11	0.269
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Social Distance	0.49	0.25	0.93	0.352
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.55	0.10	1.72	0.086
Support for Partisan Violence	Support for Undemocratic Candidates	0.08	-0.02	0.33	0.740
Support for Partisan Violence	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.51	0.04	1.73	0.083
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distrust	0.33	-0.47	2.83	0.005
Support for Partisan Violence	Social Distance	0.44	-0.14	2.03	0.042
Support for Partisan Violence	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.13	-0.35	1.65	0.100
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	0.46	0.65	0.92	0.357
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distrust	0.51	0.36	0.62	0.538
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Social Distance	0.52	0.39	0.55	0.585
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.57	0.43	0.62	0.534
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distrust	0.60	0.31	1.24	0.217
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Social Distance	0.75	0.54	1.22	0.221
Opposition to Bipartisanship Cooperation	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.55	0.30	1.02	0.306
Social Distrust	Social Distance	0.51	0.62	0.54	0.590
Social Distrust	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.21	0.68	2.04	0.041
Social Distance	Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.43	0.53	0.43	0.666

Notes. The effect sizes were calculated for each intervention relative to the null control condition in Cohen's d for each of the eight outcomes. The correlations were calculated as Pearson correlation coefficients.

effects on social distrust among weakly identified partisans (r = .32) but negatively associated among strongly identified partisans (r = -.48). Second, effects on support for partisan violence were positively associated with effects on social distance among weakly identified partisans (r = .43) but negatively associated among strongly identified partisans (r = -.14). Finally, effects on social distrust were less strongly associated with effects on biased evaluation of politicized facts among weakly identified partisans (r = .22) than among strongly identified partisans (r = .69). The low number of significance differences again suggests that the extent to which interventions affected the different outcomes was similar across different strengths of partisan identities, but the analysis is not well powered to detect such differences.

14. Intervention Characteristics

We conducted an exploratory analysis to examine which underlying characteristics of interventions were associated with stronger effect sizes. The dependent variables in these analyses were the effect sizes reported in Tables S7.1-S.8.6. The independent variables were created based on the ratings of Jan G. Voelkel and Michael N. Stagnaro who coded all 25 interventions to measure several intervention characteristics. The codings will be made publicly available at the time of publication via https://osf.io/jzbnt/. The definition of each characteristic and reliability of the codings for this characteristic are available in Table S14.1. Here, we summarize our key findings.

Interventions that Explicitly Reference an Outcome Are More Effective on that Outcome

We coded to what extent interventions explicitly referred to partisan animosity, undemocratic practices, and partisan violence. We first examined how explicit reference to each of these three outcomes correlates with interventions' effect on partisan animosity (Table S14.2). Interventions that more explicitly referenced partisan animosity reduced partisan animosity significantly more. The extent to which interventions explicitly referenced undemocratic practices and partisan violence, however, were not significantly associated with the interventions' effects on partisan animosity.

Second, we examined how explicit reference to the three outcomes correlates with intervention effect sizes for support for undemocratic practices (Table S14.2). We found that interventions that more explicitly referenced undemocratic practices reduced support for undemocratic practices significantly more. The extent to which interventions explicitly referenced partisan animosity and partisan violence, however, were not significantly associated with the interventions' effects on support for undemocratic practices.

Table S14.1: *Definitions of Characteristics*

Characteristic	Definition	Spearman Brown Correlation
Referenced PA	The extent to which the intervention has content referencing partisan animosity.	0.78
Referenced SUP	The extent to which the intervention has content referencing undemocratic practices.	0.96
Referenced SPV	The extent to which the intervention has content referencing support for partisan violence.	0.94
Misperception Correction	The extent to which the intervention corrects misperceptions of outpartisans as a whole (not just specific outpartisans).	0.99
Invoked Threat	The extent to which the intervention seeks to make the participant feel threatened.	0.98
Portrayed Contact	The extent to which the intervention shows or creates cross-partisan (or cross-ideological) contact. (Note that contact should be interactional in some way, so not sufficient to merely present a specific out-partisan.)	0.99
Positive Exemplar	The extent to which the intervention describes/portrays one or more outparty exemplars in a positive light.	0.98
Elite Cues	The extent to which the intervention invokes the views/encouragements of influential leaders.	1.00
Common Identity	The extent to which the intervention tries to describe Democrats and Republicans (or other rival political groups) as being part of a common group identity.	0.95
Pragmatism	The extent to which the intervention argues that being pro-democracy, anti-violence, or friendly toward outpartisans has positive consequences for oneself or society.	0.99
Extremist	The extent to which the intervention tries to frame people who are anti-democracy, pro-violence, or hostile toward outpartisans as extremists	0.96
Typicality	The extent to which the intervention tries to portray pro-democratic, anti-violence, or warmth toward outpartisans as typical.	0.98
ProductionQuality	The extent to which the materials are well-produced.	0.90
Engaging	The extent to which the intervention is easy to pay attention to.	0.88
Video	Whether the intervention contains a video.	-
Submitter Background	Whether the intervention was developed by academics, practitioners, or both.	-
Median Time	The median time participants took to complete the intervention.	-

Notes. The definition and reliability for each intervention characteristic.

Table S14.2: *Interventions that Explicitly Reference an Outcome Are More Effective on that Outcome*

Outcome	Predictor	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Partisan Animosity	-0.07	0.02	-3.99	0.001
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.00	0.01	-0.04	0.969
Partisan Animosity	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.998
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Partisan Animosity	-0.01	0.03	-0.4	0.691
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.04	0.01	-3.12	0.005
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	-0.01	0.01	-0.94	0.357
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Partisan Animosity	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.99
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.01	0.01	-0.62	0.544
Support for Partisan Violence	Referenced Support for Partisan Violence	0.01	0.01	0.95	0.352

Notes. The extent to which each intervention referenced an outcome was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The outcome was the size of the effect of the intervention in Cohen's d.

Finally, we investigated how explicit reference to the three outcomes correlates with intervention effect sizes for support for partisan violence (Table S14.2). In this case, we did *not* find that interventions that explicitly referenced partisan violence had stronger effects on partisan violence. Additionally, the extent to which interventions explicitly referenced partisan animosity or support for undemocratic practices were also not significantly associated with the interventions' effects on support for partisan violence.

Multifactorial Interventions Are More Effective

A multifactorial intervention is one that draws on a variety of theoretically distinctive strategies. We coded different theoretical strategies deployed in each intervention and used the sum of these ratings as our measure of how multifactorial the interventions were. We regressed effect sizes for

each of the eight outcomes and a composite of these eight outcomes on this independent variable (Table S14.3). We found that interventions that manipulated more factors tended to reduce the outcomes more strongly. The effect was statistically significant for support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and the composite of all eight outcomes.

Engaging Interventions Are More Effective

We coded for perceived production quality and how engaging the intervention was. Because the ratings for the two were highly correlated with each other and with a binary indicator of whether the intervention contained a video, we averaged the two ratings and the video indicator into a composite (Cronbach's alpha = .86) which we used as our measure of how engaging the interventions were. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and a composite of these eight outcomes on this independent variable (Table S14.4). We found that more engaging interventions tended to reduce the outcomes more strongly. The effect was significant for support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and the composite of all eight outcomes.

Longer Interventions Are Potentially More Effective

We used the median time that participants took to complete the intervention as our measure of the length of the intervention. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and the composite on this independent variable (Table S14.5). We found that the longer the interventions were, the more effective the interventions were in reducing the outcomes. The effect was significant for partisan animosity, and social distrust. However, the effect went in the opposite direction for support for partisan violence.

Table S14.3: *Multifactorial Interventions Are More Effective*

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	0.01	-2.02	0.055
Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.01	0.00	-3.55	0.002
Support for Partisan Violence	0.00	0.00	-1.45	0.159
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.01	0.00	-4.42	<.001
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.00	0.00	-2.85	0.009
Social Distrust	0.00	0.00	-1.01	0.321
Social Distance	0.00	0.00	-2.04	0.053
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.00	-1.79	0.086
Composite of Outcomes	-0.01	0.00	-3.80	0.001

Notes. The extent to which each intervention utilized nine theoretical strategies was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). The extent to which each intervention utilized different theoretical strategies was calculated as the sum of the nine ratings. The outcome was the size of the effect of the intervention in Cohen's d.

Table S14.4: *Engaging Interventions Are More Effective*

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.03	-1.12	0.273
Support for Undemocratic Practices	-0.03	0.01	-2.47	0.021
Support for Partisan Violence	-0.01	0.01	-0.55	0.585
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.02	0.01	-2.21	0.038
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	-0.02	0.01	-3.12	0.005
Social Distrust	0.00	0.01	-0.23	0.819
Social Distance	-0.01	0.01	-1.58	0.127
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.01	0.37	0.714
Composite of Outcomes	-0.02	0.01	-2.10	0.047

Notes. The extent to which each intervention was engaging and had high production equality was measured as the average of the ratings of two coders, scaled from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). We also coded whether the intervention used a video. The extent to which each intervention was engaging was calculated as the average of the three indicators (weighted equally). The outcome was the size of the effect of the intervention in Cohen's d.

Table S14.5: *Longer Interventions Are More Effective*

DV	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	-0.03	0.01	-3.28	0.003
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.708
Support for Partisan Violence	0.01	0.00	2.71	0.013
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	-0.01	0.00	-1.62	0.120
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	0.00	0.00	-0.48	0.638
Social Distrust	-0.01	0.00	-3.47	0.002
Social Distance	-0.01	0.00	-1.86	0.075
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	0.00	0.00	-0.64	0.530
Composite of Outcomes	-0.01	0.01	-1.84	0.079

Notes. The length of each intervention was measured as the median completion time for all participants who completed the intervention. The outcome was the size of the effect of the intervention in Cohen's d.

Interventions Developed by Academics versus Practitioners Were Similarly Effective

19 interventions were developed by academics, three interventions by practitioners, and another three interventions by hybrid teams consisting of academics and practitioners. We regressed effect sizes for each of the eight outcomes and the composite on a dummy-coded measure of submitter background using academics as the reference category (Table S14.6). While the small sample size prevents meaningful significance tests, we found that hybrid teams designed the most effective interventions for six of the eight outcomes and the composite.

Table S14.6: *Interventions Developed by Academics versus Practitioners Were Similarly Effective*

Outcome	Predictor	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.01	0.05	0.23	0.819
Partisan Animosity	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.12	0.08	-1.46	0.159
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.04	0.02	2.11	0.046
Support for Undemocratic Practices	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.02	0.04	-0.65	0.524
Support for Partisan Violence	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.01	0.02	0.3	0.764
Support for Partisan Violence	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.03	0.04	-0.65	0.525
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Practitioner (vs Academic)	-0.01	0.02	-0.32	0.748
Support for Undemocratic Candidates	Hybrid (vs Academic)	0.01	0.03	0.33	0.744
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.02	0.03	0.84	0.411
Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.01	0.05	-0.2	0.847
Social Distrust	Practitioner (vs Academic)	-0.03	0.03	-0.9	0.376
Social Distrust	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.04	0.03	-1.64	0.115
Social Distance	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.06	0.03	1.96	0.062
Social Distance	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.02	0.05	-0.52	0.607
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.952
Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts	Hybrid (vs Academic)	0.03	0.05	0.66	0.516
Composite of Outcomes	Practitioner (vs Academic)	0.03	0.02	1	0.326
Composite of Outcomes	Hybrid (vs Academic)	-0.05	0.07	-0.64	0.532

Notes. The background of the submitters of an intervention was categorized as academic, practitioner, or hybrid (mix of academics and practitioners). 'Academic' was the reference category. The outcome was the size of the effect of the intervention in Cohen's d.

15. Addressing Alternative Accounts

Demand Effects

One alternative account of our results is that the observed effects are not meaningful because they are demand effects. The logic of demand effects is that participants infer how the experimenter would like them to answer and then alter their behavior to be in line with their perceptions of the experimenter's preferences. When it comes to experiments, the concern is that some conditions may trigger stronger demand effects than others (in particular, stronger than in the control condition).

We note that interventions that attempt to persuade people in a non-deceitful way often cannot avoid a signal that the message source desires a change in the attitudes and behaviors in the recipient, in a way that parallels many real-world settings where political persuasion may occur and which may involve a demand component (political speeches, canvassing, TV and internet campaign ads, peer-to-peer conversations, direct mail, etc.). Thus, demand characteristics of interventions are not per se undesirable. That said, demand effects are problematic when they are the primary mechanism driving an effect but researchers argue that a different concept is responsible for the effect.

We do not think that our results are primarily driven by demand effects for several reasons. First, the literature suggests that demand effects should not be assumed by default. A recent paper (Mummolo & Peterson, 2019) experimentally tested how demand effects influence treatment effects. Online survey experiments that manipulated an experimenter's apparent preferences found that both information and financial incentives to comply with the preferences of the experimenter did not consistently increase treatment effects. In short, participants may

simply not be easily motivated to answer consistently with the preferences of experimenters, at least in online survey experiments.

Second, we found significant effects across both attitudinal and incentivized behavioral measures of partisan animosity, which we measured with a feeling thermometer and a dictator game with real financial incentives. If demand effects were driving the results, we would expect that the treatment effects would be lower for behavioral outcomes with financial incentives. However, we found that 22 of 25 interventions improved both the attitudinal (Table S8.7, average Cohen's d = -0.22) and the incentivized behavioral components (Table S8.8, average Cohen's d = -0.18) of partisan animosity and that effects were similar in size.

Third, we found many significant effects in a durability test (see section *Durability Test*). If we assume participants are unlikely to both (a) remember their perceptions of an experimenter's preferences multiple weeks after participating in a study, and (b) realize that the follow-up study was fielded by the same experimenter who fielded the original study, then we would expect demand effects to not be influential in durability tests. However, we find that many significant effects remained detectable after two weeks.

Fourth, we found significant effects when using an alternative control condition as the reference category instead of a null control condition. The alternative control condition presented basic information about how the three branches of government represent important cornerstones of American democracy. We designed this control condition to be similar to many interventions in terms of length, medium, and in referencing politics and democratic processes. In order for demand effects to explain a large proportion of the apparently meaningful effects we detected, it would need to be the case that merely being exposed to content related to politics and democracy is sufficient to signal experimenters' preferences for participants' behavior (since there is little

else that all, or nearly, of the interventions have in common). If this were the case, we would expect participants in the alternative control condition to differ significantly in their responses compared to participants in the null control condition.

However, we did not find such effects for seven of the eight outcomes and the composite of the eight outcomes (see Tables S15.1.2-S15.1.9). The only exception was that participants in the alternative control condition reported significantly less partisan animosity than participants in the null control condition (Table S15.1.1). Interestingly, the effect of the alternative control condition was driven by the behavioral component of our measure of partisan animosity (Table S8.8). But even for partisan animosity, 16 interventions still had significant effects on partisan animosity when compared with the alternative control condition (Table S15.1.1).

Overall, these findings suggest that demand effects are unlikely to be a primary mechanism driving our findings. While we cannot argue that any of these findings perfectly rules out demand effects for specific interventions and specific outcome variables, the literature and the various findings from our own analyses provide little evidence to believe that demand effects are responsible for a large proportion of the observed effects.

Table S15.1.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-8.69	0.90	-9.62	<.001	-0.44
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-8.45	0.87	-9.68	<.001	-0.42
Common National Identity	-7.42	0.86	-8.61	<.001	-0.37
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-7.26	0.90	-8.04	<.001	-0.36
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-6.39	0.87	-7.32	<.001	-0.32
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-5.26	0.89	-5.94	<.001	-0.26
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.31	0.86	-4.99	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-4.23	0.90	-4.71	<.001	-0.21
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-3.60	0.92	-3.91	<.001	-0.18
Befriending Meditation	-3.46	0.92	-3.75	<.001	-0.17
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-3.44	0.92	-3.73	<.001	-0.17
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.37	0.87	-3.85	<.001	-0.17
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.99	0.88	-3.40	<.001	-0.15
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-2.28	0.88	-2.59	0.005	-0.11
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.66	0.86	-1.94	0.026	-0.08
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.49	0.87	-1.72	0.043	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.20	0.87	-1.39	0.083	-0.06
Democratic System Justification	-0.52	0.87	-0.60	0.274	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.38	0.87	-0.44	0.331	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.29	0.88	-0.33	0.372	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.23	0.88	-0.26	0.397	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.01	0.88	0.02	0.506	0.00
Common Economic Interests	0.59	0.88	0.66	0.746	0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.90	0.92	0.98	0.837	0.04
Alternative Control	1.77	0.69	2.57	0.010	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.38	0.87	2.75	0.997	0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.26	0.97	-5.45	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.24	0.99	-4.27	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.74	0.94	-1.86	0.032	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.66	0.94	-1.77	0.038	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.13	0.96	-1.18	0.119	-0.05
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.77	0.99	-0.78	0.219	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.49	1.00	-0.49	0.312	-0.02
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.39	0.96	-0.41	0.341	-0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.09	1.02	-0.09	0.465	0.00
Befriending Meditation	0.10	1.03	0.10	0.538	0.00
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.17	0.98	0.18	0.570	0.01
Alternative Control	0.50	0.76	0.66	0.509	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.58	0.99	0.58	0.720	0.03
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.59	0.95	0.62	0.731	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.79	0.96	0.83	0.796	0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.86	0.97	0.89	0.813	0.04
Democratic System Justification	0.93	0.95	0.98	0.837	0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.08	0.96	1.13	0.871	0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.18	0.97	1.22	0.889	0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	1.20	0.95	1.27	0.897	0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.44	0.95	1.51	0.935	0.06
Common Economic Interests	1.90	1.00	1.89	0.971	0.08
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	2.02	0.99	2.04	0.980	0.09
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	2.12	0.98	2.15	0.984	0.09
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	2.19	0.98	2.24	0.987	0.09
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	2.35	1.00	2.35	0.991	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.49	0.80	-4.39	<.001	-0.17
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.71	0.82	-3.31	<.001	-0.14
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.32	0.85	-2.73	0.003	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.26	0.83	-2.74	0.003	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.19	0.89	-2.48	0.007	-0.11
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.64	0.84	-1.95	0.026	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.52	0.91	-1.67	0.047	-0.08
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-1.38	0.83	-1.67	0.048	-0.07
Common National Identity	-1.36	0.85	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.34	0.84	-1.61	0.054	-0.07
Befriending Meditation	-1.20	0.90	-1.33	0.092	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.08	0.85	-1.26	0.104	-0.05
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.92	0.85	-1.08	0.140	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.90	0.86	-1.05	0.147	-0.04
Common Economic Interests	-0.75	0.87	-0.86	0.194	-0.04
Alternative Control	-0.71	0.68	-1.04	0.300	-0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.62	0.85	-0.73	0.232	-0.03
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.50	0.91	-0.55	0.291	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.88	-0.51	0.306	-0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.41	0.92	-0.44	0.328	-0.02
Democratic System Justification	-0.37	0.85	-0.43	0.333	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.32	0.87	-0.37	0.357	-0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-0.11	0.88	-0.12	0.451	-0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.05	0.88	0.06	0.523	0.00
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.57	0.91	0.63	0.734	0.03
Democratic Collapse Threat	1.58	0.91	1.75	0.960	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.19	1.02	-4.11	<.001	-0.18
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.88	0.98	-3.96	<.001	-0.17
Common National Identity	-2.49	0.96	-2.58	0.005	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.4	0.98	-2.46	0.007	-0.10
Positive Contact Video	-2.08	1.00	-2.08	0.019	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.35	1.00	-1.35	0.088	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.89	0.98	-0.91	0.182	-0.04
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.83	0.98	-0.85	0.198	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.97	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.61	1.00	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.54	1.02	-0.53	0.297	-0.02
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.28	0.98	-0.28	0.389	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.11	0.97	-0.12	0.454	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.05	0.99	-0.05	0.478	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.04	0.97	-0.04	0.485	0.00
Alternative Control	0.29	0.76	0.39	0.698	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.68	1.00	0.68	0.750	0.03
Democratic System Justification	0.72	0.97	0.74	0.771	0.03
Befriending Meditation	0.75	1.04	0.73	0.766	0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.78	1.01	0.77	0.781	0.03
Common Economic Interests	0.82	0.99	0.83	0.797	0.04
Party Overlap on Policies	0.87	0.96	0.91	0.818	0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.08	0.97	1.11	0.866	0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1.09	0.95	1.14	0.873	0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.61	0.98	1.64	0.949	0.07
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.44	0.96	2.54	0.994	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.42	0.94	-3.64	<.001	-0.16
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.38	0.95	-3.56	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.67	0.95	-2.81	0.002	-0.12
Positive Contact Video	-2.52	0.99	-2.55	0.005	-0.12
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.51	0.95	-2.64	0.004	-0.12
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.27	0.96	-2.37	0.009	-0.11
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.96	-2.16	0.015	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.05	0.94	-2.18	0.015	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.05	0.95	-2.15	0.016	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.84	0.94	-1.96	0.025	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-1.77	0.99	-1.79	0.037	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.72	0.93	-1.84	0.033	-0.08
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.70	0.93	-1.82	0.035	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.28	1.00	-1.27	0.102	-0.06
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-1.20	0.99	-1.21	0.114	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.17	1.00	-1.17	0.120	-0.05
Alternative Control	-0.97	0.76	-1.28	0.202	-0.05
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.87	1.01	-0.87	0.193	-0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.85	0.97	-0.87	0.191	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.98	-0.81	0.209	-0.04
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.67	0.97	-0.69	0.246	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.64	0.98	-0.65	0.257	-0.03
Common Economic Interests	-0.51	0.99	-0.51	0.305	-0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.30	0.98	-0.31	0.379	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.71	0.97	0.73	0.767	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.93	0.98	0.96	0.830	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.60	1.25	-2.89	0.002	-0.13
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.38	1.23	-2.75	0.003	-0.12
Common National Identity	-3.26	1.20	-2.71	0.003	-0.12
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.02	1.23	-2.45	0.007	-0.11
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.49	1.22	-2.05	0.020	-0.09
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.09	1.23	-1.71	0.044	-0.08
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.01	1.23	-1.64	0.050	-0.07
Befriending Meditation	-1.93	1.28	-1.51	0.066	-0.07
Democratic System Justification	-1.65	1.21	-1.36	0.087	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.38	1.27	-1.08	0.139	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-1.28	1.26	-1.02	0.155	-0.05
Party Overlap on Policies	-0.99	1.22	-0.81	0.209	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.93	1.26	-0.74	0.230	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.93	1.21	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.86	1.20	-0.72	0.236	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.79	1.22	-0.65	0.258	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.77	1.28	-0.60	0.275	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.69	1.20	-0.58	0.281	-0.03
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.6	1.21	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.40	1.25	-0.32	0.376	-0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.14	1.21	0.12	0.547	0.01
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.20	1.23	0.16	0.565	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.28	1.23	0.23	0.591	0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.28	1.20	0.23	0.592	0.01
Alternative Control	0.45	0.96	0.47	0.640	0.02
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1.37	1.21	1.13	0.871	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.93	1.18	-3.32	<.001	-0.15
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.52	1.19	-2.95	0.002	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.23	1.18	-2.74	0.003	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.88	1.21	-2.39	0.008	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.81	1.16	-2.43	0.008	-0.1
Common National Identity	-2.42	1.17	-2.07	0.019	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.36	1.17	-2.02	0.022	-0.09
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.34	1.23	-1.91	0.028	-0.09
Positive Contact Video	-2.13	1.21	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.97	1.19	-1.65	0.050	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.82	1.18	-1.54	0.061	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.61	1.17	-1.38	0.084	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.33	1.17	-1.14	0.128	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.72	1.19	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.42	1.21	-0.35	0.363	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.35	1.21	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.28	1.21	-0.23	0.408	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.25	1.21	-0.21	0.417	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.14	1.20	-0.12	0.453	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.08	0.93	-0.08	0.933	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.03	1.16	-0.03	0.489	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.11	1.18	0.09	0.538	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.14	1.19	0.12	0.549	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.88	1.18	0.75	0.772	0.03
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.97	1.17	0.83	0.798	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.13	1.20	0.95	0.828	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.81	0.92	-3.07	0.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.28	0.92	-2.47	0.007	-0.11
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.09	0.94	-2.23	0.013	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.87	0.95	-1.97	0.025	-0.09
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.40	0.97	-1.45	0.074	-0.07
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.26	0.99	-1.28	0.101	-0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.08	0.94	-1.15	0.124	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.98	0.92	-1.06	0.144	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.74	0.93	-0.80	0.213	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.55	0.90	-0.61	0.271	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.55	0.94	-0.59	0.278	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.31	0.97	-0.32	0.375	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.19	0.98	-0.19	0.424	-0.01
Positive Contact Video	-0.16	0.96	-0.17	0.433	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.11	0.94	-0.12	0.454	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.05	0.73	-0.07	0.943	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.07	0.92	0.08	0.532	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.15	0.94	0.16	0.563	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.17	0.92	0.18	0.572	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.20	0.95	0.21	0.585	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.20	0.92	0.22	0.585	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.29	0.93	0.31	0.623	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.29	0.92	0.32	0.625	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.92	0.40	0.654	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.40	1.00	0.40	0.655	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.13	0.92	2.31	0.990	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.1.9: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes Compared to the Alternative Control*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.16	0.54	-5.81	<.001	-0.25
Common National Identity	-2.97	0.54	-5.54	<.001	-0.24
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.73	0.54	-5.03	<.001	-0.22
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.68	0.53	-5.03	<.001	-0.21
Positive Contact Video	-2.42	0.55	-4.39	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.42	0.54	-4.50	<.001	-0.19
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.19	0.55	-3.98	<.001	-0.18
Befriending Meditation	-1.38	0.55	-2.48	0.007	-0.11
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.30	0.57	-2.28	0.011	-0.10
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.99	0.56	-1.75	0.040	-0.08
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.93	0.53	-1.74	0.041	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-0.90	0.54	-1.67	0.048	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.78	0.53	-1.46	0.072	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.67	0.53	-1.28	0.100	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.66	0.54	-1.23	0.109	-0.05
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.65	0.54	-1.22	0.111	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.48	0.53	-0.91	0.180	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.31	0.55	-0.56	0.288	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.30	0.54	-0.55	0.290	-0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.17	0.56	-0.30	0.381	-0.01
Democratic System Justification	-0.07	0.55	-0.14	0.446	-0.01
Alternative Control	0.15	0.43	0.35	0.727	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.28	0.54	0.52	0.699	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.36	0.54	0.66	0.744	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.39	0.54	0.72	0.763	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.63	0.54	1.18	0.882	0.05
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Alternative Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Differential Attrition

Another alternative account of our results is that the observed effects are driven by differential attrition of participants across experimental conditions. Differential attrition is an important concern for the internal validity of experiments (Zhou & Fishbach, 2016). The logic is that some interventions increase the likelihood that certain participants drop out of the experiment and that these participants who drop out differ from those participants who stay in the study, biasing estimated treatment effects.

Below we address the issue of differential attrition in two steps. First, we test for evidence of differential attrition. Second, we explain how our preregistered strategy (inverse-probability weighting) accounts for differential attrition in the results that we report in the main text. Third, we show the results of several robustness checks that account for differential attrition in different ways, including a novel method for including attriters that were recaptured by recontacting them immediately after they dropped out in our analyses. Overall, results of these robustness checks suggest that our results are not driven by differential attrition.

Step 1: Evidence for Differential Attrition

We define that a participant attrited for an outcome if (i) the participant was randomly assigned to an experimental condition, but (ii) did not respond to all item(s) measuring the outcome, irrespective of whether they fully answered other outcomes. Following recommended practice in experimental design (Lin & Green, 2016), we test for differential attrition using two preregistered tests. For both tests, we consider p-values below .05 as evidence of differential attrition. We consider our study to have differential attrition if *either* test yields $p < .05$.

First, we tested whether rates of attrition differed significantly across experimental conditions. To answer this question, we conducted a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test

(Wooldridge, 2010: 62) of the hypothesis that none of the experimental conditions affect the attrition rate (i.e., that attrition rates in each of the intervention conditions is equal to the attrition rate in the control condition).

Second, we tested whether different kinds of participants attritted within different experimental conditions. In a linear regression, we regressed a binary variable for attrition on experimental condition, all baseline covariates pre-registered in the balance test, and all condition-covariate interactions. We then conducted a heteroskedasticity-robust F-test of the hypothesis that all the interaction coefficients are zero.

We found clear evidence of differential attrition. There were significant differences in the rate at which participants attrited across experimental conditions We illustrate the evidence for differential attrition focusing on partisan animosity. However, differential attrition is present for all eight outcomes and the composite of the eight outcomes.

In total, 35,252 participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition. Of these participants, 31,835 participants completed the items measuring partisan animosity. In other words, 3,417 attrited before completing our measure of partisan animosity. For partisan animosity, attrition varied widely across conditions, ranging from 1.6% to 23.0%. Thus, we found clear evidence that some conditions resulted in significantly more participants dropping out than other conditions did. Table S15.2.1.1-S15.2.1.8 below shows attrition rates by experimental condition for the eight outcomes.

The evidence for differential attrition brings up the question of whether significant differences in attrition rates across conditions threaten the validity of causal inferences we have made from our data. For example, if participants with higher levels of partisan animosity were more likely to drop out in condition A than condition B, analyses that do not correct for

Table S15.2.1.1: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Partisan Animosity*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,552	97.6%	50	0.9%	89	1.6%
Alternative Control	1,133	981	86.6%	66	5.8%	86	7.6%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	876	77.0%	125	11.0%	137	12.0%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,025	90.6%	49	4.3%	57	5.0%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	962	84.8%	73	6.4%	99	8.7%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,069	93.6%	27	2.4%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	892	77.8%	109	9.5%	146	12.7%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,084	95.7%	18	1.6%	31	2.7%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,022	90.0%	50	4.4%	63	5.6%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,008	89.0%	56	4.9%	68	6.0%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	896	78.7%	113	9.9%	130	11.4%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	995	87.4%	69	6.1%	74	6.5%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,079	95.8%	16	1.4%	31	2.8%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,070	93.9%	28	2.5%	41	3.6%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	868	76.5%	116	10.2%	150	13.2%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	988	86.4%	68	5.9%	88	7.7%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,083	95.3%	17	1.5%	36	3.2%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,079	94.3%	23	2.0%	42	3.7%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,051	92.8%	31	2.7%	51	4.5%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,028	90.7%	52	4.6%	54	4.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,010	88.9%	64	5.6%	62	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	984	86.3%	68	6.0%	88	7.7%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,073	94.6%	16	1.4%	45	4.0%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,053	92.4%	27	2.4%	60	5.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,092	95.8%	19	1.7%	29	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,099	95.9%	19	1.7%	28	2.4%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	916	80.8%	93	8.2%	124	10.9%
Total	35,252	31,835	90.3%	1,462	4.1%	1,955	5.5%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.2: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Support for Undemocratic Practices*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,556	97.6%	47	0.8%	88	1.5%
Alternative Control	1,133	980	86.5%	65	5.7%	88	7.8%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	873	76.7%	130	11.4%	135	11.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,027	90.8%	49	4.3%	55	4.9%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	963	84.9%	72	6.3%	99	8.7%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,070	93.7%	26	2.3%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	895	78.0%	114	9.9%	138	12.0%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,091	96.3%	15	1.3%	27	2.4%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,026	90.4%	47	4.1%	62	5.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,006	88.9%	56	4.9%	70	6.2%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	898	78.8%	112	9.8%	129	11.3%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	997	87.6%	72	6.3%	69	6.1%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,083	96.2%	15	1.3%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,068	93.8%	27	2.4%	44	3.9%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	869	76.6%	113	10.0%	152	13.4%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	982	85.8%	69	6.0%	93	8.1%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,082	95.2%	16	1.4%	38	3.3%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,077	94.1%	22	1.9%	45	3.9%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,045	92.2%	31	2.7%	57	5.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,029	90.7%	49	4.3%	56	4.9%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,010	88.9%	63	5.5%	63	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	984	86.3%	70	6.1%	86	7.5%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,078	95.1%	18	1.6%	38	3.4%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,052	92.3%	28	2.5%	60	5.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,093	95.9%	17	1.5%	30	2.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,106	96.5%	18	1.6%	22	1.9%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	916	80.8%	95	8.4%	122	10.8%
Total	35,252	31,856	90.4%	1,456	4.1%	1,940	5.5%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.3: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Support for Partisan Violence*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,556	97.6%	44	0.8%	91	1.6%
Alternative Control	1,133	977	86.2%	72	6.4%	84	7.4%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	876	77.0%	127	11.2%	135	11.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,026	90.7%	50	4.4%	55	4.9%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	963	84.9%	74	6.5%	97	8.6%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,068	93.5%	28	2.5%	46	4.0%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	893	77.9%	114	9.9%	140	12.2%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,089	96.1%	18	1.6%	26	2.3%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,025	90.3%	48	4.2%	62	5.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	1,003	88.6%	56	4.9%	73	6.4%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	896	78.7%	109	9.6%	134	11.8%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	1,000	87.9%	70	6.2%	68	6.0%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,081	96.0%	17	1.5%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,067	93.7%	24	2.1%	48	4.2%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	866	76.4%	115	10.1%	153	13.5%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	983	85.9%	70	6.1%	91	8.0%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,086	95.6%	16	1.4%	34	3.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,082	94.6%	25	2.2%	37	3.2%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,045	92.2%	31	2.7%	57	5.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,025	90.4%	50	4.4%	59	5.2%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	1,012	89.1%	62	5.5%	62	5.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	979	85.9%	67	5.9%	94	8.2%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,079	95.1%	15	1.3%	40	3.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,049	92.0%	27	2.4%	64	5.6%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,094	96.0%	18	1.6%	28	2.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,100	96.0%	19	1.7%	27	2.4%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	917	80.9%	95	8.4%	121	10.7%
Total	35,252	31,837	90.3%	1,461	4.1%	1,954	5.5%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.4: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Support for Undemocratic Candidates*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,463	96.0%	0	0.0%	228	4.0%
Alternative Control	1,133	966	85.3%	0	0.0%	167	14.7%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	870	76.4%	0	0.0%	268	23.6%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	948	83.6%	0	0.0%	186	16.4%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,061	92.9%	0	0.0%	81	7.1%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	886	77.2%	0	0.0%	261	22.8%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,077	95.1%	0	0.0%	56	4.9%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,013	89.3%	0	0.0%	122	10.7%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	998	88.2%	0	0.0%	134	11.8%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	890	78.1%	0	0.0%	249	21.9%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	983	86.4%	0	0.0%	155	13.6%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,063	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,056	92.7%	0	0.0%	83	7.3%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	862	76.0%	0	0.0%	272	24.0%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	983	85.9%	0	0.0%	161	14.1%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,075	94.6%	0	0.0%	61	5.4%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,066	93.2%	0	0.0%	78	6.8%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,036	91.4%	0	0.0%	97	8.6%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,017	89.7%	0	0.0%	117	10.3%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	999	87.9%	0	0.0%	137	12.1%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	971	85.2%	0	0.0%	169	14.8%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,060	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,045	91.7%	0	0.0%	95	8.3%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,076	94.4%	0	0.0%	64	5.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,085	94.7%	0	0.0%	61	5.3%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	908	80.1%	0	0.0%	225	19.9%
Total	35,252	31,470	89.3%	0	0.0%	3,782	10.7%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.5: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,402	94.9%	0	0.0%	289	5.1%
Alternative Control	1,133	960	84.7%	0	0.0%	173	15.3%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	865	76.0%	0	0.0%	273	24.0%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,010	89.3%	0	0.0%	121	10.7%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	940	82.9%	0	0.0%	194	17.1%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,053	92.2%	0	0.0%	89	7.8%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	882	76.9%	0	0.0%	265	23.1%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,071	94.5%	0	0.0%	62	5.5%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,005	88.5%	0	0.0%	130	11.5%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	989	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	888	78.0%	0	0.0%	251	22.0%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	975	85.7%	0	0.0%	163	14.3%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,057	93.9%	0	0.0%	69	6.1%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,046	91.8%	0	0.0%	93	8.2%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	858	75.7%	0	0.0%	276	24.3%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	976	85.3%	0	0.0%	168	14.7%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,068	94.0%	0	0.0%	68	6.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,061	92.7%	0	0.0%	83	7.3%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,034	91.3%	0	0.0%	99	8.7%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,011	89.2%	0	0.0%	123	10.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	994	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	964	84.6%	0	0.0%	176	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,052	92.8%	0	0.0%	82	7.2%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,037	91.0%	0	0.0%	103	9.0%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,066	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,079	94.2%	0	0.0%	67	5.8%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	896	79.1%	0	0.0%	237	20.9%
Total	35,252	31,239	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,013	11.4%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.6: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Social Distrust*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,405	95.0%	0	0.0%	286	5.0%
Alternative Control	1,133	962	84.9%	0	0.0%	171	15.1%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	864	75.9%	0	0.0%	274	24.1%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	937	82.6%	0	0.0%	197	17.4%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	880	76.7%	0	0.0%	267	23.3%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,073	94.7%	0	0.0%	60	5.3%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,009	88.9%	0	0.0%	126	11.1%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	990	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	885	77.7%	0	0.0%	254	22.3%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	976	85.8%	0	0.0%	162	14.2%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,053	93.5%	0	0.0%	73	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,047	91.9%	0	0.0%	92	8.1%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	855	75.4%	0	0.0%	279	24.6%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	975	85.2%	0	0.0%	169	14.8%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,069	94.1%	0	0.0%	67	5.9%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,057	92.4%	0	0.0%	87	7.6%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,034	91.3%	0	0.0%	99	8.7%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,015	89.5%	0	0.0%	119	10.5%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	994	87.5%	0	0.0%	142	12.5%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	964	84.6%	0	0.0%	176	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,052	92.8%	0	0.0%	82	7.2%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,039	91.1%	0	0.0%	101	8.9%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,066	93.5%	0	0.0%	74	6.5%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,083	94.5%	0	0.0%	63	5.5%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	898	79.3%	0	0.0%	235	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,247	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,005	11.4%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.7: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Social Distance*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,401	94.9%	0	0.0%	290	5.1%
Alternative Control	1,133	960	84.7%	0	0.0%	173	15.3%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	866	76.1%	0	0.0%	272	23.9%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,013	89.6%	0	0.0%	118	10.4%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	938	82.7%	0	0.0%	196	17.3%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	878	76.5%	0	0.0%	269	23.5%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,070	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,009	88.9%	0	0.0%	126	11.1%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	989	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	886	77.8%	0	0.0%	253	22.2%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	974	85.6%	0	0.0%	164	14.4%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,054	93.6%	0	0.0%	72	6.4%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,044	91.7%	0	0.0%	95	8.3%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	856	75.5%	0	0.0%	278	24.5%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	974	85.1%	0	0.0%	170	14.9%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,069	94.1%	0	0.0%	67	5.9%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,059	92.6%	0	0.0%	85	7.4%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,031	91.0%	0	0.0%	102	9.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,012	89.2%	0	0.0%	122	10.8%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	995	87.6%	0	0.0%	141	12.4%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	965	84.6%	0	0.0%	175	15.4%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,049	92.5%	0	0.0%	85	7.5%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,038	91.1%	0	0.0%	102	8.9%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,065	93.4%	0	0.0%	75	6.6%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,082	94.4%	0	0.0%	64	5.6%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	899	79.3%	0	0.0%	234	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,228	88.6%	0	0.0%	4,024	11.4%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

Table S15.2.1.8: *Attrition Rates by Experimental Condition for Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts*

	Assigned	Completed		Recaptured		Attrited	
Intervention	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Null Control	5,691	5,388	94.7%	0	0.0%	303	5.3%
Alternative Control	1,133	963	85.0%	0	0.0%	170	15.0%
Befriending Meditation	1,138	860	75.6%	0	0.0%	278	24.4%
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1,131	1,012	89.5%	0	0.0%	119	10.5%
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	1,134	940	82.9%	0	0.0%	194	17.1%
Common National Identity	1,142	1,052	92.1%	0	0.0%	90	7.9%
Positive Contact Video	1,147	877	76.5%	0	0.0%	270	23.5%
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1,133	1,070	94.4%	0	0.0%	63	5.6%
Democratic Collapse Threat	1,135	1,006	88.6%	0	0.0%	129	11.4%
Common Economic Interests	1,132	988	87.3%	0	0.0%	144	12.7%
Utility of Outparty Empathy	1,139	884	77.6%	0	0.0%	255	22.4%
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	1,138	975	85.7%	0	0.0%	163	14.3%
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	1,126	1,052	93.4%	0	0.0%	74	6.6%
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1,139	1,041	91.4%	0	0.0%	98	8.6%
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	1,134	857	75.6%	0	0.0%	277	24.4%
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1,144	974	85.1%	0	0.0%	170	14.9%
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	1,136	1,068	94.0%	0	0.0%	68	6.0%
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	1,144	1,056	92.3%	0	0.0%	88	7.7%
Correcting Division Misperceptions	1,133	1,031	91.0%	0	0.0%	102	9.0%
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1,134	1,009	89.0%	0	0.0%	125	11.0%
Moral Similarities and Differences	1,136	993	87.4%	0	0.0%	143	12.6%
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1,140	962	84.4%	0	0.0%	178	15.6%
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1,134	1,050	92.6%	0	0.0%	84	7.4%
Party Overlap on Policies	1,140	1,035	90.8%	0	0.0%	105	9.2%
Democratic System Justification	1,140	1,067	93.6%	0	0.0%	73	6.4%
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	1,146	1,077	94.0%	0	0.0%	69	6.0%
Political Violence Inefficacy	1,133	899	79.3%	0	0.0%	234	20.7%
Total	35,252	31,186	88.5%	0	0.0%	4,066	11.5%

Notes. Assigned refers to participants who were assigned to a condition. Completed refers to participants who completed the outcome in the main survey. Recaptured refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey but completed the outcome in the attriter survey. Attrited refers to participants who did not complete the outcome in the main survey and in the attriter survey.

differential attrition might wrongly suggest that condition A caused a reduction in partisan animosity compared to condition B. Although it is impossible to know how attrited participants differed from non-attrited participants, there are several ways to examine to what extent differential attrition may have biased the results.

Step 2: Preregistered Strategy to Account for Differential Attrition

Our preregistered strategy to correct for differential attrition used inverse probability weighting (IPW). This procedure reweights the data so that individuals who completed the study but had high underlying propensities for attriting, as inferred from a model predicting attrition as a function of baseline covariates, are upweighted to counterbalance the missing outcomes from attriting participants. The key assumption needed for this procedure to accurately estimate average treatment effects is that attrition is independent of potential outcomes, conditional on the specified baseline covariates. To calculate each participant's propensity to attrit, we use random forests to predict attrition (and to avoid over-fitting). We include all baseline covariates as predictors of attrition, including experimental condition, gender, age, race, education, party identification, strength of party identification, and the panel the participant was recruited from (e.g. Bovitz, Luth, or Dynata). The results are similar if we use a parametric approach of regressing an indicator for attrition on experimental condition indicators, all baseline covariates, and their full interactions. We calculate weights for each outcome separately, such that we do not assume that the patterns of selection that led to attrition for one dependent variable are identical for the others. Based on this model for attrition, we calculate the fitted probabilities of attrition for each participant, and we use the inverse of these probabilities as weights in our regression analyses. The results using IPW are the results described in the main text (see Tables S7.1-S8.6).

Below, we first describe a variety of robustness checks that specify alternative ways of dealing with attrition. Afterwards, in the "Results" section, we compare the results from the different strategies.

Step 3: Baseline Results

To examine how much differential attrition impacts the treatment effects, our first check is that we compare the results described in the main text to the results that do not correct for differential attrition. By not correcting for differential attrition, we mean that we ran the same regression analyses without inverse-probability weighting. These results are given in Tables S15.2.3.1-S15.2.3.9.

Step 4: Recapturing Attriters to Account for Differential Attrition

In addition to the preregistered IPW approach detailed above, we developed a new strategy for recapturing attriters. This involved (i) identifying participants who attrited, (ii) creating a secondary survey that included the measures from the main survey of the three primary outcome variables (partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, and support for partisan violence), and (iii) recruiting participants into this "recapture survey" as quickly as possible to mitigate any timing differences and attempt to capture possible treatment effects.

We operationalized attrition as inactivity for at least one hour after treatment assignment (the main survey took roughly 16 min for participants to complete). We tracked participants' progress and identified participants who stopped participating for at least one hour[7]. At that point, the survey was closed and the participant was excluded from further participation in the

[7] This strategy implies that a participant could take repeated breaks of up to 59 min and then continue with the survey without being labeled as attrited.

Table S15.2.3.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Positive Contact Video	-10.53	0.69	-15.19	<.001	-0.53
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.23	0.65	-15.63	<.001	-0.52
Common National Identity	-9.19	0.64	-14.35	<.001	-0.46
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.02	0.70	-12.98	<.001	-0.45
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.17	0.65	-12.51	<.001	-0.41
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.00	0.67	-10.37	<.001	-0.35
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.06	0.64	-9.44	<.001	-0.30
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.02	0.69	-8.74	<.001	-0.30
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.37	0.71	-7.51	<.001	-0.27
Befriending Meditation	-5.26	0.72	-7.31	<.001	-0.26
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.24	0.72	-7.28	<.001	-0.26
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.17	0.66	-7.88	<.001	-0.26
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.78	0.67	-7.19	<.001	-0.24
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.05	0.66	-6.09	<.001	-0.20
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.41	0.63	-5.39	<.001	-0.17
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.26	0.65	-5.04	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.98	0.65	-4.60	<.001	-0.15
Democratic System Justification	-2.31	0.65	-3.55	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.17	0.64	-3.36	<.001	-0.11
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.66	-3.12	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.01	0.66	-3.02	0.001	-0.10
Alternative Control	-1.79	0.69	-2.59	0.010	-0.09
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.66	-2.65	0.004	-0.09
Common Economic Interests	-1.20	0.67	-1.79	0.037	-0.06
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.92	0.72	-1.29	0.099	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.61	0.65	0.95	0.828	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.77	0.73	-7.93	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.74	0.76	-6.22	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.24	0.69	-3.25	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.17	0.69	-3.15	0.001	-0.09
Common National Identity	-1.65	0.72	-2.30	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.28	0.77	-1.67	0.048	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.04	0.77	-1.35	0.089	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.89	0.71	-1.24	0.107	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.61	0.79	-0.77	0.221	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.51	0.76	-0.67	0.504	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.41	0.81	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.38	0.75	-0.51	0.304	-0.02
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.07	0.71	0.09	0.537	0.00
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.13	0.76	0.17	0.569	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.32	0.74	0.44	0.670	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.32	0.72	0.45	0.674	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.71	0.63	0.736	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.59	0.72	0.83	0.796	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.66	0.73	0.91	0.818	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.69	0.70	0.98	0.836	0.03
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.92	0.71	1.31	0.904	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.39	0.77	1.80	0.964	0.06
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.48	0.75	1.96	0.975	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.62	0.75	2.15	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.67	0.74	2.26	0.988	0.07
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.84	0.78	2.37	0.991	0.08
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.79	0.55	-5.10	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.58	-3.45	<.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.63	0.63	-2.60	0.005	-0.08
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.55	0.59	-2.61	0.005	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.49	0.68	-2.19	0.014	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.62	-1.52	0.064	-0.05
Positive Contact Video	-0.83	0.71	-1.16	0.122	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.60	-1.15	0.125	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.66	0.61	-1.09	0.139	-0.03
Common National Identity	-0.66	0.62	-1.06	0.145	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.50	0.71	-0.70	0.240	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.37	0.63	-0.59	0.278	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.22	0.62	-0.35	0.362	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.20	0.64	-0.31	0.377	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.04	0.66	-0.06	0.476	0.00
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.63	0.12	0.550	0.00
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.598	0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.27	0.67	0.40	0.656	0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.32	0.73	0.44	0.669	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.34	0.63	0.54	0.705	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.41	0.65	0.64	0.738	0.02
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.58	0.67	0.87	0.807	0.03
Alternative Control	0.70	0.68	1.02	0.307	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.74	0.67	1.12	0.868	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.33	0.71	1.87	0.969	0.07
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.26	0.70	3.24	0.999	0.11
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.49	0.80	-5.62	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.18	0.74	-5.61	<.001	-0.18
Common National Identity	-2.79	0.72	-3.86	<.001	-0.12
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.71	0.74	-3.65	<.001	-0.12
Positive Contact Video	-2.40	0.77	-3.13	0.001	-0.10
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.66	0.77	-2.16	0.016	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.20	0.75	-1.60	0.055	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.13	0.74	-1.53	0.062	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.05	0.74	-1.42	0.077	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.96	0.78	-1.23	0.108	-0.04
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.90	0.80	-1.12	0.132	-0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.59	0.75	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.44	0.73	-0.60	0.274	-0.02
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.33	0.73	-0.46	0.324	-0.01
Alternative Control	-0.31	0.76	-0.41	0.683	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.31	0.75	-0.41	0.340	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.35	0.77	0.46	0.676	0.02
Befriending Meditation	0.39	0.82	0.48	0.683	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.44	0.73	0.60	0.725	0.02
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.48	0.78	0.62	0.731	0.02
Common Economic Interests	0.51	0.76	0.67	0.750	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.56	0.72	0.78	0.781	0.02
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.79	0.74	1.08	0.860	0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.82	0.71	1.16	0.876	0.03
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.29	0.75	1.72	0.958	0.06
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.10	0.72	2.91	0.998	0.09
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.46	0.68	-3.6	<.001	-0.11
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.38	0.70	-3.4	<.001	-0.11
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-1.72	0.69	-2.49	0.006	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-1.68	0.74	-2.26	0.012	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.55	0.70	-2.24	0.013	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.32	0.71	-1.87	0.031	-0.06
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.10	0.70	-1.57	0.059	-0.05
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.10	0.70	-1.58	0.057	-0.05
Common National Identity	-1.06	0.69	-1.54	0.061	-0.05
Befriending Meditation	-0.92	0.75	-1.23	0.110	-0.04
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.87	0.68	-1.27	0.102	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.75	0.67	-1.11	0.133	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.72	0.68	-1.06	0.144	-0.03
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.31	0.75	-0.41	0.339	-0.01
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.29	0.77	-0.38	0.351	-0.01
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.23	0.76	-0.31	0.380	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.04	0.77	0.05	0.518	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.11	0.72	0.16	0.563	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.18	0.74	0.24	0.596	0.01
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.28	0.72	0.39	0.651	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.31	0.73	0.42	0.662	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.44	0.75	0.58	0.721	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.66	0.74	0.90	0.815	0.03
Alternative Control	0.97	0.76	1.27	0.205	0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.71	0.73	2.34	0.990	0.08
Party Overlap on Policies	1.89	0.73	2.59	0.995	0.09
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.02	0.95	-4.23	<.001	-0.15
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.80	0.92	-4.12	<.001	-0.14
Common National Identity	-3.72	0.89	-4.18	<.001	-0.14
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.49	0.93	-3.75	<.001	-0.13
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.99	0.91	-3.29	0.001	-0.11
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.52	0.93	-2.72	0.003	-0.09
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.43	0.92	-2.64	0.004	-0.09
Befriending Meditation	-2.41	0.98	-2.44	0.007	-0.09
Democratic System Justification	-2.09	0.91	-2.31	0.010	-0.08
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.72	0.98	-1.76	0.039	-0.06
Positive Contact Video	-1.70	0.97	-1.76	0.039	-0.06
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.42	0.92	-1.55	0.061	-0.05
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.38	0.96	-1.44	0.076	-0.05
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.36	0.90	-1.51	0.065	-0.05
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.33	0.89	-1.49	0.068	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.26	0.99	-1.27	0.102	-0.05
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.24	0.91	-1.36	0.087	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.10	0.88	-1.24	0.107	-0.04
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.97	0.90	-1.08	0.140	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.84	0.95	-0.89	0.187	-0.03
Alternative Control	-0.44	0.96	-0.46	0.646	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.90	-0.35	0.365	-0.01
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.24	0.92	-0.26	0.398	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.93	-0.18	0.429	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.16	0.89	-0.18	0.430	-0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.93	0.90	1.03	0.848	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.89	0.88	-4.43	<.001	-0.14
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.43	0.90	-3.82	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.18	0.87	-3.64	<.001	-0.12
Befriending Meditation	-2.80	0.91	-3.06	0.001	-0.10
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.72	0.84	-3.23	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-2.30	0.86	-2.68	0.004	-0.09
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.27	0.86	-2.64	0.004	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-2.23	0.94	-2.37	0.009	-0.08
Positive Contact Video	-2.05	0.92	-2.23	0.013	-0.08
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.92	0.89	-2.15	0.016	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.77	0.87	-2.03	0.021	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.58	0.86	-1.84	0.033	-0.06
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.24	0.86	-1.44	0.075	-0.05
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.67	0.88	-0.76	0.223	-0.03
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.34	0.92	-0.37	0.357	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.33	0.92	-0.36	0.361	-0.01
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.21	0.92	-0.23	0.409	-0.01
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.13	0.92	-0.14	0.443	0.00
Common Economic Interests	-0.09	0.90	-0.10	0.459	0.00
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.05	0.85	0.05	0.522	0.00
Alternative Control	0.06	0.94	0.07	0.947	0.00
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.87	0.21	0.585	0.01
Democratic System Justification	0.19	0.89	0.21	0.584	0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.96	0.88	1.10	0.864	0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.03	0.86	1.20	0.886	0.04
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.20	0.90	1.34	0.909	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common National Identity	-2.76	0.68	-4.04	<.001	-0.13
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.20	0.69	-3.19	0.001	-0.10
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.00	0.71	-2.82	0.002	-0.09
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.80	0.73	-2.46	0.007	-0.08
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.75	-1.80	0.036	-0.06
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.12	0.77	-1.45	0.074	-0.05
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.04	0.72	-1.46	0.073	-0.05
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.92	0.69	-1.33	0.092	-0.04
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.68	0.70	-0.97	0.167	-0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.53	0.71	-0.75	0.227	-0.03
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.49	0.67	-0.74	0.230	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.26	0.75	-0.34	0.365	-0.01
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.16	0.77	-0.20	0.419	-0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.07	0.72	-0.10	0.460	0.00
Positive Contact Video	-0.04	0.73	-0.06	0.478	0.00
Alternative Control	0.03	0.73	0.05	0.963	0.00
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.10	0.68	0.15	0.560	0.00
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.21	0.72	0.29	0.613	0.01
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.21	0.69	0.30	0.617	0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.23	0.72	0.32	0.625	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.27	0.69	0.38	0.649	0.01
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.33	0.71	0.46	0.677	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.691	0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.41	0.69	0.59	0.723	0.02
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.47	0.79	0.59	0.724	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	2.17	0.69	3.13	0.999	0.10
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

Table S15.2.3.9: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes without Weighting*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.29	0.40	-8.14	<.001	-0.26
Common National Identity	-3.11	0.39	-7.90	<.001	-0.25
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.40	-7.11	<.001	-0.23
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.39	-7.25	<.001	-0.23
Positive Contact Video	-2.61	0.41	-6.29	<.001	-0.21
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.58	0.40	-6.52	<.001	-0.21
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.36	0.41	-5.70	<.001	-0.19
Befriending Meditation	-1.55	0.42	-3.71	<.001	-0.12
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.44	0.44	-3.27	0.001	-0.12
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.12	0.43	-2.63	0.004	-0.09
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.39	-2.78	0.003	-0.09
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.06	0.40	-2.68	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.92	0.39	-2.38	0.009	-0.07
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.38	-2.15	0.016	-0.07
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.82	0.40	-2.05	0.020	-0.07
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.39	-2.03	0.021	-0.06
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.62	0.39	-1.62	0.053	-0.05
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.49	0.41	-1.20	0.116	-0.04
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.46	0.40	-1.14	0.127	-0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.34	0.43	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Democratic System Justification	-0.23	0.41	-0.55	0.290	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.16	0.43	-0.36	0.715	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	0.12	0.41	0.30	0.617	0.01
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.19	0.40	0.48	0.684	0.02
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.40	0.59	0.722	0.02
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.39	1.24	0.893	0.04
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. No inverse-probability weighting was used.

main study. If the participant attritted after assignment to condition[8], a series of steps were taken to recapture that participant's data.

Attriters were reinvited for a follow-up survey. Depending on the sample provider platform, participants were either immediately invited to a follow-up study that asked the key outcomes (Bovitz-Forthright), or were invited to the follow-up study at six time points each day (Luth and Dynata). The attriter survey was *not* tied to the main survey participants had just attrited from. This attriter survey was much shorter, including only the key outcome variables, and did not reference the study participants had just attritted from. However, compensation for completing it was the same as what participants would have received if they had not attrited. This increased the incentive to complete the follow-up survey. If participants did not participate in the attriter survey by the end of that calendar day, they would begin to receive daily reminder emails to encourage their participation. For this stage of the study design, the focus was on doing whatever was possible to obtain data for the three primary outcome variables.

This recapturing procedure allowed us to get the main outcomes from approximately 47% of attriters. As a result, differential attrition was still evident, but much reduced. For example, without the recaptured attriters, attrition for partisan animosity ranged from 1.6% to 23.0% across experimental conditions. Including the recaptured attriters, attrition for partisan animosity ranged from 0.9% to 12.7% across experimental conditions. Tables S15.2.1.1-S15.2.1.3 shows the percentages of attriters we recaptured for each experimental condition and outcome. Table S15.2.4.1 shows the results of comparisons between non-attriters and recaptured attriters.

[8] Assignment to condition took place after demographics and attention checks, sections that did not vary across conditions. Thus if participants dropped out of the survey before being assigned to a condition, attrition was not driven by any feature that differed between conditions. As a result, such dropping out does not threaten internal validity.

Table S15.2.4.1: *Effect of Recaptured Attriters (vs Non-Attriters) on the Outcomes*

Outcome	b	SE	t-value	p-value
Partisan Animosity	10.17	0.54	18.93	<.001
Support for Undemocratic Practices	0.51	0.63	0.80	0.425
Support for Partisan Violence	-1.86	0.47	-3.93	<.001

Notes. Only participants who completed either the main survey or the attriter survey were used in these analyses. All outcomes were scaled from 0 to 100. Positive regression coefficients (b) indicate that recaptured attriters scored higher on this outcome than non-attriters.

We reran the regression models including the recaptured attriters. That is, we added the responses provided in the attriter survey in place of the missing values from the main survey. If a participant responded to an outcome in both the main survey and the attriter survey, we used the measure participants completed from the main survey. Since differential attrition was still evident, we used inverse-probability weighting to account for the attriters we were not able to recapture. The results are available in Tables S15.2.4.2-S15.2.4.4.

Step 5: Using the Alternative Control to Account for Differential Attrition

Another strategy we used to account for differential attrition was including an alternative control condition. The alternative control condition was more similar to the interventions in length, and in asking participants to consume content concerning politics and government, than was the null control condition. Thus, participants who dropped out in the alternative control condition may be similar to the participants who drop out in the intervention conditions. As a result, if differential attrition biases estimated treatment effects, the alternative control condition would show different results than the null control condition and comparisons between the interventions and the alternative control condition may provide more unbiased treatment effects. The results are in Tables S15.1.1-S15.1.9.

Table S15.2.4.2: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity with Recaptured Attriters*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-9.07	0.65	-13.92	<.001	-0.45
Positive Contact Video	-8.96	0.67	-13.33	<.001	-0.45
Common National Identity	-8.82	0.64	-13.81	<.001	-0.44
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-8.08	0.68	-11.84	<.001	-0.40
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-7.71	0.65	-11.86	<.001	-0.38
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.82	0.64	-9.11	<.001	-0.29
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-5.74	0.65	-8.80	<.001	-0.28
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-5.65	0.67	-8.38	<.001	-0.28
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-4.84	0.68	-7.14	<.001	-0.24
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-4.84	0.70	-6.89	<.001	-0.24
Moral Similarities and Differences	-4.58	0.64	-7.13	<.001	-0.23
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.50	0.65	-6.88	<.001	-0.22
Befriending Meditation	-4.25	0.69	-6.17	<.001	-0.21
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-3.59	0.65	-5.5	<.001	-0.18
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.29	0.63	-5.24	<.001	-0.16
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-3.00	0.64	-4.66	<.001	-0.15
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-2.88	0.64	-4.53	<.001	-0.14
Democratic System Justification	-2.27	0.64	-3.54	<.001	-0.11
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.02	0.64	-3.17	0.001	-0.10
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.99	0.66	-3.01	0.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.95	0.66	-2.96	0.002	-0.10
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.70	0.66	-2.57	0.005	-0.08
Alternative Control	-1.15	0.67	-1.71	0.088	-0.06
Common Economic Interests	-0.82	0.66	-1.25	0.105	-0.04
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.30	0.69	-0.43	0.334	-0.01
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.62	0.64	0.96	0.832	0.03
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.2.4.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices with Recaptured Attriters*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-5.67	0.73	-7.81	<.001	-0.25
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.37	0.75	-5.84	<.001	-0.19
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.36	0.68	-3.48	<.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.22	0.69	-3.22	0.001	-0.10
Common National Identity	-1.62	0.71	-2.29	0.011	-0.07
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.92	0.75	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Positive Contact Video	-0.86	0.73	-1.17	0.122	-0.04
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.74	0.70	-1.05	0.146	-0.03
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.59	0.75	-0.78	0.216	-0.03
Befriending Meditation	-0.47	0.76	-0.63	0.266	-0.02
Alternative Control	-0.41	0.73	-0.56	0.576	-0.02
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.18	0.71	0.25	0.600	0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.72	0.34	0.634	0.01
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.40	0.71	0.56	0.713	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.42	0.73	0.57	0.715	0.02
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.70	0.64	0.738	0.02
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.52	0.70	0.74	0.772	0.02
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.68	0.74	0.93	0.823	0.03
Party Overlap on Policies	0.76	0.70	1.08	0.860	0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.88	0.72	1.22	0.889	0.04
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.89	0.70	1.27	0.897	0.04
Common Economic Interests	1.10	0.76	1.46	0.927	0.05
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.50	0.75	1.99	0.977	0.06
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.55	0.74	2.10	0.982	0.07
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.57	0.73	2.15	0.984	0.07
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.59	0.73	2.17	0.985	0.07
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Table S15.2.4.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence with Recaptured Attriters*

Intervention	b	SE	t-value	p-value	Cohen's d
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.80	0.54	-5.22	<.001	-0.14
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.95	0.58	-3.37	<.001	-0.10
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.55	0.58	-2.66	0.004	-0.08
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.55	0.62	-2.51	0.006	-0.08
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.48	0.63	-2.35	0.009	-0.07
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.94	0.61	-1.54	0.062	-0.05
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.72	0.59	-1.22	0.112	-0.04
Common National Identity	-0.56	0.61	-0.91	0.180	-0.03
Positive Contact Video	-0.53	0.67	-0.79	0.216	-0.03
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.45	0.60	-0.76	0.224	-0.02
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.31	0.61	-0.50	0.309	-0.02
Befriending Meditation	-0.27	0.65	-0.41	0.342	-0.01
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.25	0.63	-0.40	0.346	-0.01
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.18	0.61	-0.29	0.386	-0.01
Common Economic Interests	-0.17	0.63	-0.26	0.396	-0.01
Party Overlap on Policies	0.08	0.62	0.13	0.553	0.00
Democratic System Justification	0.25	0.62	0.40	0.657	0.01
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.37	0.63	0.59	0.723	0.02
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.39	0.69	0.56	0.713	0.02
Alternative Control	0.47	0.65	0.73	0.468	0.02
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.53	0.65	0.82	0.793	0.03
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.73	0.65	1.12	0.868	0.04
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.74	0.68	1.08	0.861	0.04
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.77	0.65	1.18	0.882	0.04
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.23	0.68	1.80	0.964	0.06
Democratic Collapse Threat	2.32	0.68	3.39	1.000	0.12
Includes controls					

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier.

Results

Comparing the results across these different models should help us to estimate whether, and to what extent, differential attrition biases our estimates of treatment effects. If differential attrition biases the treatment effects (and the techniques we used correct at least partially for these biases), we would expect that the results differ across these different analysis strategies.

Encouragingly, we find no major differences between these analyses. The numbers of effective interventions across procedures were very similar for all the outcomes we collected in the follow-up survey: partisan animosity (without correction: 23 out of 25; with IPW correction: 23 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 22 out of 25), support for undemocratic practices (without correction: 6 out of 25; with IPW correction: 6 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25), and support for partisan violence (without correction: 5 out of 25; with IPW correction: 5 out of 25; with recaptured attriters and IPW correction: 5 out of 25). Thus, these analyses suggest that, while differential attrition is clearly present in our study, we find no evidence that it causes systematic bias in estimates of treatment effects.

However, we cannot rule out that attrition biased our effect estimates. Of the participants who attrited, we recaptured approximately 47%. Thus, the possibility remains that non-recovered attriters were meaningfully different from the rest of the sample, such that their inclusion would have affected our estimated treatment effects in meaningful ways. However, as noted above, the attriter survey bore only minimal similarity to the main study participants attrited from, in that the attriter survey was shorter, did not itself include demographic questions, nor an intervention. The only close similarity between the attriter survey and main survey was the text of the main outcome variables, which many attriters had not seen at the point they attrited. Beyond that, the

attriter survey concerned politics and political parties, which also generally resembles the topics of the main survey, though these topics are not unusual for survey respondents. As a result, if participants attrited from the main study due to some reaction to the content they experienced in it, it is likely that many, or even most, of them would not be able to identify a connection between the two studies and opt out of taking the attriter survey. Therefore, content specific factors were unlikely to play a large role in inhibiting the recapture of participants via the attriter survey, which would allow for differential attrition by condition based on the content of conditions, the precise problem we sought to address with the attriter survey. Instead, other factors, independent of the content of the experimental condition participants were assigned to, were likely the primary determinants of whether participants took part in the attriter survey. A piece of evidence for this perspective comes from the fact that attriter recapture rates varied across the three sample providers; with those best able to immediately recontact participants (Bovitz-Forthright) showing the highest rate of recapture (81%), and those showing the slowest (Dynata) producing the lowest recapture rates (36%). If the main impediment to recapturing attriters was their experience in the study they attrited from, we would expect contacting them when their memory of that experience was fresh would show *lower* recapture rates, not higher. Conversely, if the main impediment to recapture was some extrinsic factors, contacting participants long after they have gotten off of their device, and stopped a session of working online, should show the lowest recapture rates, as was the case in our study.

Multiple Hypothesis Testing

We did not correct for multiple testing for the results reported in the main text. This is consistent with the approach taken by other megastudies (e.g., Lai et al., 2014; Milkman et al., 2021, 2022). The reason is that we were here primarily interested in testing the individual effects of interventions on specific outcome variables, which we viewed as tests of separate hypotheses. For example, one hypothesis we tested was whether the intervention *Positive Contact Video* would decrease partisan animosity. A *different* hypothesis was whether the intervention *Common Exhausted Majority Identity* decreases partisan animosity.

However, readers may be concerned that some statistically significant results are false positives that occurred because we tested so many hypotheses at once. One reason to correct for multiple testing is to control the rate of false discoveries. This is relevant for our paper because we make statements in the main text summarizing the number of effects on the different outcome variables. For example, we state that "23 out of the 25 interventions we tested significantly reduced partisan animosity". One could argue that the 25 tests for significant effects of the 25 interventions constitute multiple tests of a single hypothesis (e.g., a test of whether interventions reduce partisan animosity in general). To address this possibility, we have also conducted robustness checks calculating p-values with adjustments for multiple testing, which we summarize in the two subsections that follow.

Controlling the False Discovery Rate

The first robustness check controls for the false discovery rate (a similar robustness check was conducted by Milkman et al., 2021, 2022). The false discovery rate is defined as the expected proportion of rejected null hypotheses (i.e., results suggesting that the interventions worked) that are false (i.e., the intervention in fact does not work) among all rejected null

hypotheses. By adjusting the p-values, we can set the false discovery rate to 5%. That is, among the significant effects, one in twenty significant effects is expected to be false.

We calculated the adjusted p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure. This procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) rank orders the p-values of the multiple hypothesis tests (from smaller to larger). An adjusted critical value for the p-value is calculated by multiplying the false discovery rate (5%) by the rank and then dividing the product by the total number of hypotheses to be tested (here 25). The largest p-value that is still less than this adjusted critical value is deemed statistically significant, and we accept the null hypothesis for all p-values greater than this adjusted critical value. One implication of the procedure is that, as the number of hypotheses increases, p-values must be smaller to be considered statistically significant.

The results when applying this procedure suggest that most significant effects remain significant. Tables S15.3.1.1 – S15.3.1.9 reports the interventions, original p-values, ranks of the original p-values, adjusted critical p-values, and the results of the comparisons of the original p-values to the adjusted critical values. For partisan animosity, 23 of 23 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic practices, 4 of 6 effects remain significant. For support for partisan violence, 4 of 5 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic candidates, 5 of 6 effects remain significant. For opposition to bipartisan cooperation, 2 of 6 effects remain significant. For social distrust, 9 of 11 effects remain significant. For social distance, 10 of 12 effects remain significant. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, 4 of 5 effects remain significant.

Table S15.3.1.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	4	0.008	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	5	0.010	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.000	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	7	0.014	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.000	8	0.016	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.000	9	0.018	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.000	10	0.020	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.000	11	0.022	Significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.000	12	0.024	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	13	0.026	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.000	14	0.028	Significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.000	15	0.030	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.000	16	0.032	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.000	17	0.034	Significant
Democratic System Justification	0.000	18	0.036	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.000	19	0.038	Significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.001	20	0.040	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	21	0.042	Significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.004	22	0.044	Significant
Common Economic Interests	0.038	23	0.046	Significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.112	24	0.048	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.827	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.001	3	0.006	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	4	0.008	Significant
Common National Identity	0.011	5	0.010	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.048	6	0.012	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.099	7	0.014	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.105	8	0.016	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.228	9	0.018	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.310	10	0.020	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.330	11	0.022	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.542	12	0.024	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.548	13	0.026	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.658	14	0.028	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.689	15	0.030	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.730	16	0.032	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.791	17	0.034	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.825	18	0.036	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.840	19	0.038	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.908	20	0.040	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.964	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.978	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.984	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.989	24	0.048	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.992	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.004	3	0.006	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.005	4	0.008	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.013	5	0.010	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.064	6	0.012	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.122	7	0.014	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.127	8	0.016	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.145	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.145	10	0.020	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.237	11	0.022	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.277	12	0.024	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.366	13	0.026	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.378	14	0.028	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.471	15	0.030	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.551	16	0.032	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.612	17	0.034	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.650	18	0.036	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.660	19	0.038	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.704	20	0.040	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.726	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.815	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.873	23	0.046	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.965	24	0.048	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	3	0.006	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	4	0.008	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.016	6	0.012	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.056	7	0.014	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.065	8	0.016	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.078	9	0.018	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.122	10	0.020	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.148	11	0.022	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.223	12	0.024	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.288	13	0.026	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.322	14	0.028	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.326	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.689	16	0.032	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.711	17	0.034	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.719	18	0.036	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.732	19	0.038	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.757	20	0.040	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.788	21	0.042	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.856	22	0.044	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.867	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.960	24	0.048	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.007	3	0.006	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.014	4	0.008	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.019	5	0.010	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.034	6	0.012	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.058	7	0.014	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.060	8	0.016	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.062	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.102	10	0.020	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.133	11	0.022	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.142	12	0.024	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.144	13	0.026	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.347	14	0.028	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.384	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.397	16	0.032	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.551	17	0.034	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.571	18	0.036	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.594	19	0.038	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.664	20	0.040	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.677	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.732	22	0.044	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.820	23	0.046	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.990	24	0.048	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.996	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	3	0.006	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.000	4	0.008	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.003	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.014	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.008	8	0.016	Significant
Democratic System Justification	0.010	9	0.018	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.031	10	0.020	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.037	11	0.022	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.058	12	0.024	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.062	13	0.026	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.070	14	0.028	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.076	15	0.030	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.087	16	0.032	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.098	17	0.034	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.110	18	0.036	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.121	19	0.038	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.187	20	0.040	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.367	21	0.042	Non-significant
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.394	22	0.044	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.425	23	0.046	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.429	24	0.048	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.847	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	3	0.006	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	4	0.008	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.001	5	0.010	Significant
Common National Identity	0.003	6	0.012	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.014	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.008	8	0.016	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.013	9	0.018	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.017	10	0.020	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.023	11	0.022	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.037	12	0.024	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.074	13	0.026	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.233	14	0.028	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.354	15	0.030	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.383	16	0.032	Non-significant
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.412	17	0.034	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.424	18	0.036	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.473	19	0.038	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.522	20	0.040	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.587	21	0.042	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.600	22	0.044	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.863	23	0.046	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.890	24	0.048	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.911	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common National Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.002	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.006	4	0.008	Significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.037	5	0.010	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.060	6	0.012	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.075	7	0.014	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.090	8	0.016	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.163	9	0.018	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.228	10	0.020	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.242	11	0.022	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.367	12	0.024	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.429	13	0.026	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.442	14	0.028	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.469	15	0.030	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.573	16	0.032	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.611	17	0.034	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.625	18	0.036	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.638	19	0.038	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.641	20	0.040	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.687	21	0.042	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.691	22	0.044	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.715	23	0.046	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.728	24	0.048	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Table S15.3.1.9: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes with Benjamini-Hochberg-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	2	0.004	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	3	0.006	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	4	0.008	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	5	0.010	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.000	6	0.012	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	7	0.014	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.000	8	0.016	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.000	9	0.018	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.003	10	0.020	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.004	11	0.022	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.004	12	0.024	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.008	13	0.026	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.015	14	0.028	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.021	15	0.030	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.021	16	0.032	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.050	17	0.034	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.131	18	0.036	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.134	19	0.038	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.230	20	0.040	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.294	21	0.042	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.632	22	0.044	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.697	23	0.046	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.725	24	0.048	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.891	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Benjamini Hochberg procedure to control the false discovery rate.

Controlling the Family-Wise Error Rate

The second robustness check controls for the family-wise error rate. The family-wise error rate is defined as the probability to reject at least one null hypothesis that is actually true among all tested hypotheses. For an individual test of a null hypothesis, the probability to falsely reject the null hypothesis was set to 5%. However, if all 25 interventions were actually ineffective at moving at outcome, the probability to falsely reject at least one of the null hypotheses would be 72%. By adjusting the p-values, we set the family-wise error rate back to 5%.

We calculated the adjusted p-values using the Holm procedure (Holm, 1979). The Holm procedure rank orders the p-values of multiple hypothesis tests (from smaller to larger). An adjusted critical value for the p-value is calculated by dividing the family-wise error rate (5%) by the difference between (a) the sum of the total number of hypotheses to be tested and 1 (here 25 + 1) and (b) the rank. The largest p-value that is still lower than this adjusted critical value is deemed statistically significant, and we accept the *null* hypothesis for p-values larger than this adjusted critical value.

Most significant effects remain significant following application of this adjustment procedure. Tables S15.3.2.1 – S15.3.2.9 reports the intervention, the original p-values, the rank of the p-value, the adjusted critical values for the p-values, and the result of the comparison of the original p-values to the adjusted critical values. For partisan animosity, 22 of 23 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic practices, 4 of 6 effects remain significant. For support for partisan violence, 2 of 5 effects remain significant. For support for undemocratic candidates, 5 of 6 effects remain significant. For opposition to bipartisan cooperation, 2 of 6 effects remain significant. For social distrust, 5 of 11 effects remain significant. For social

Table S15.3.2.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	4	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	5	0.002	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.000	6	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	7	0.003	Significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.000	8	0.003	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.000	9	0.003	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.000	10	0.003	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.000	11	0.003	Significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.000	12	0.004	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	13	0.004	Significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.000	14	0.004	Significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.000	15	0.005	Significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.000	16	0.005	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.000	17	0.006	Significant
Democratic System Justification	0.000	18	0.006	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.000	19	0.007	Significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.001	20	0.008	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	21	0.010	Significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.004	22	0.013	Significant
Common Economic Interests	0.038	23	0.017	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.112	24	0.025	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.827	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.001	3	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.001	4	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.011	5	0.002	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.048	6	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.099	7	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.105	8	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.228	9	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.310	10	0.003	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.330	11	0.003	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.542	12	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.548	13	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.658	14	0.004	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.689	15	0.005	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.730	16	0.005	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.791	17	0.006	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.825	18	0.006	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.840	19	0.007	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.908	20	0.008	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.964	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.978	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.984	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.989	24	0.025	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.992	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.004	3	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.005	4	0.002	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.013	5	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.064	6	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.122	7	0.003	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.127	8	0.003	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.145	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.145	10	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.237	11	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.277	12	0.004	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.366	13	0.004	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.378	14	0.004	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.471	15	0.005	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.551	16	0.005	Non-significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.612	17	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.650	18	0.006	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.660	19	0.007	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.704	20	0.008	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.726	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.815	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.873	23	0.017	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.965	24	0.025	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	3	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	4	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.016	6	0.002	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.056	7	0.003	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.065	8	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.078	9	0.003	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.122	10	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.148	11	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.223	12	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.288	13	0.004	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.322	14	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.326	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.689	16	0.005	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.711	17	0.006	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.719	18	0.006	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.732	19	0.007	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.757	20	0.008	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.788	21	0.010	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.856	22	0.013	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.867	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.960	24	0.025	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.007	3	0.002	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.014	4	0.002	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.019	5	0.002	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.034	6	0.002	Non-significant
Common National Identity	0.058	7	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.060	8	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.062	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.102	10	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.133	11	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.142	12	0.004	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.144	13	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.347	14	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.384	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.397	16	0.005	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.551	17	0.006	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.571	18	0.006	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.594	19	0.007	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.664	20	0.008	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.677	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.732	22	0.013	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.820	23	0.017	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.990	24	0.025	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.996	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	3	0.002	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.000	4	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.003	6	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.008	8	0.003	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.010	9	0.003	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.031	10	0.003	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.037	11	0.003	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.058	12	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.062	13	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.070	14	0.004	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.076	15	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.087	16	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.098	17	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.110	18	0.006	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.121	19	0.007	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.187	20	0.008	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.367	21	0.010	Non-significant
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.394	22	0.013	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.425	23	0.017	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.429	24	0.025	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.847	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	3	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	4	0.002	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.001	5	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.003	6	0.002	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.004	7	0.003	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.008	8	0.003	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.013	9	0.003	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.017	10	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.023	11	0.003	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.037	12	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.074	13	0.004	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.233	14	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.354	15	0.005	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.383	16	0.005	Non-significant
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	0.412	17	0.006	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.424	18	0.006	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.473	19	0.007	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.522	20	0.008	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.587	21	0.010	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.600	22	0.013	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.863	23	0.017	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.890	24	0.025	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.911	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Common National Identity	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.001	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.002	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.006	4	0.002	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.037	5	0.002	Non-significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.060	6	0.002	Non-significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.075	7	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.090	8	0.003	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.163	9	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.228	10	0.003	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.242	11	0.003	Non-significant
Befriending Meditation	0.367	12	0.004	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.429	13	0.004	Non-significant
Positive Contact Video	0.442	14	0.004	Non-significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.469	15	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.573	16	0.005	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.611	17	0.006	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.625	18	0.006	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.638	19	0.007	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.641	20	0.008	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.687	21	0.010	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.691	22	0.013	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.715	23	0.017	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.728	24	0.025	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.999	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

Table S15.3.2.9: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes with Holm-Corrected P-Values*

Intervention	Original p	Rank	Critical p value	Comparison
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	0.000	1	0.002	Significant
Common National Identity	0.000	2	0.002	Significant
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	0.000	3	0.002	Significant
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	0.000	4	0.002	Significant
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.000	5	0.002	Significant
Positive Contact Video	0.000	6	0.002	Significant
Democratic Collapse Threat	0.000	7	0.003	Significant
Befriending Meditation	0.000	8	0.003	Significant
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.000	9	0.003	Significant
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.003	10	0.003	Significant
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.004	11	0.003	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.004	12	0.004	Significant
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.008	13	0.004	Non-significant
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.015	14	0.004	Non-significant
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.021	15	0.005	Non-significant
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.021	16	0.005	Non-significant
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.050	17	0.006	Non-significant
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.131	18	0.006	Non-significant
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.134	19	0.007	Non-significant
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.230	20	0.008	Non-significant
Democratic System Justification	0.294	21	0.010	Non-significant
Common Economic Interests	0.632	22	0.013	Non-significant
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.697	23	0.017	Non-significant
Party Overlap on Policies	0.725	24	0.025	Non-significant
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.891	25	0.050	Non-significant

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. P-values were corrected with the Holm procedure to control the family-wise error rate.

distance, 5 of 12 effects remain significant. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, 3 of 5 effects remain significant.

Although the Holm correction to control the family-wise error rate is a common approach, it heavily weighs minimizing the likelihood of false positives over maintaining power. In many cases, people may be willing to tolerate a certain proportion of false positives to maintain more power to identify interventions that actually worked, i.e., in many settings false negatives and false positives may be of equal concern, in which case the Holm correction procedure would be overly conservative.

Measurement

Another potential critique of the validity of our findings is that our measures do not capture actual support for undemocratic practices and partisan violence. Our measures of anti-democratic attitudes refer to situations in which participants are confronted with undemocratic or violent actions by fellow ingroup-members. Although Americans typically support democratic principles at very high levels in the abstract (Malka & Costello, 2022; Norris, 2011), recent research suggests that partisans are largely *unwilling* to prioritize democratic principles over partisan ends (Graham & Svolik, 2020; Malka & Costello, 2022). Thus, tolerance of undemocratic practices and violence by fellow inpartisans is a substantial threat to democracies. This prior work led us to measure these attitudes in scenarios where loyalty to one's own party might lead partisans to express anti-democratic attitudes.

A potential issue with our measure of support for undemocratic practices is that participants may not perceive the practices we study as undemocratic. For example, participants may agree with the statement that "[Republicans/Democrats] should reduce the number of polling stations in areas that support [Democrats/Republicans]" because they think their side winning will ultimately do more for democracy. Yet, it is a clear violation of an essential democratic process of equal voting rights, a consensus principle endorsed by citizens and experts (Carey et al., 2019).

However, actual data suggest that participants perceive the selected practices (used in our measure) as undemocratic. We selected three of our items based on previous research by Graham and Svolik (2020, Appendix E.2). They conducted a survey asking participants to rate how democratic they perceived several practices to be on a scale from 1 (not at all democratic) to 10 (completely democratic). The three items that closely relate to the items we selected received

average ratings between 2.5 and 2.7 on the scale: (i) "the government cut the number of polling stations in areas that support the opposition", (ii) "the government prosecutes journalists who criticize the president and refuse to reveal sources", and (iii) "the government ignores unfavorable court rulings". The fourth item we used – "[Republicans/Democrats] should not accept the results of elections if they lose: – was not based on Graham and Svolik. We included it because of the high relevance of this attitude in light of the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election. Because the item specifies that election results are rejected after a loss and provides no justification for the refusal of election results, we believe that most participants would perceive this behavior to be undemocratic. Consistent with this, other conceptual work (Ahmed, 2022: 3) states, "I also include here [i.e,. a violation of the law] questions about the rejection of election results where the question clearly indicates that the candidate has lost…Violations of the law represent the most egregious of democratic transgressions." Thus, we believe that the items we used to measure support for undemocratic practices are widely perceived as highly undemocratic, including – most likely – by the vast majority of study participants.

Another potential critique is that the items describe hypothetical scenarios that are not relevant in the real world. As a result, it might be easy to convince participants to reject such practices. However, work by Graham and Svolik (2020) identifies that there are real-world examples for the items that we used. For example, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker and Republican lawmakers attempted to restrict the number of polling stations in the Democrat-leaning city of Milwaukee (Marley & Stein, 2016). Former president Donald Trump encouraged then FBI director James Comey to jail journalists for refusing to reveal sources (Comey, 2017). Texas Senator Ted Cruz encouraged states not directly named in the case Obergefell v. Hodges on same-sex marriage to ignore the ruling of the Supreme Court (Molinet, 2015). Recent work

by FiveThirtyEight (2022) suggests at least 199 Republican nominees for major office in 2022 denied the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election. More examples are available in Graham and Svolik (2020, Appendix B). Thus, we believe that the items we used to measure support for undemocratic practices meaningfully connect to events that have happened and could happen again in the real world.

A distinct critique is that the endorsement of undemocratic practices only is problematic when endorsed by a large number of individuals or pursued by many officeholders. However, Grillo and Prato (2021) show that democratic erosion can occur even when most citizens and politicians value democracy. Such erosion is possible because leeway provided by a small number of voters can allow a small number of politicians to take actions that lead to backsliding.

A potential criticism of our measure of support for partisan violence is that recent evidence suggests that responses to survey items about support for partisan violence are exaggerated (Westwood et al., 2022). One reason for this is that, in some surveys, some participants do not pay attention to the questions. Because the average support for partisan violence among engaged respondents is very low, random responses result in overestimates of support for partisan violence.

Two features of our study address this important issue. First, consistent with Westwood et al. (2022), we included several attention checks to filter out unattentive participants. These filters should keep the number of disengaged participants relatively low. Consistent with this, we find decent levels of test-retest reliability among the participants in the null control condition who completed the measure of support for partisan violence in the main survey and the durability survey (r = .63). The size of the correlation was comparable to the correlations for the other polarization and democracy related attitudes (range of r = [.60, .75].

Second, we were most interested in the causal effects of interventions on support for partisan violence. This means our interest lies in relative differences between randomly assigned conditions. Due to random assignment to the interventions and control conditions, disengagement cannot explain differences between experimental conditions. If anything, disengaged participants being especially influential on responses for this measure would make our test of the effects of the 25 interventions on this outcome a conservative one. Furthermore, it is reassuring that the most promising strategies we identified (corrections of exaggerated stereotypes about outpartisans and elite cues) are consistent with results in the published literature (Kalmoe & Mason, 2022; Mernyk et al., 2022). Thus, we believe that the observed effects of interventions on support for partisan violence are meaningful.

Left-Censored Distributions of Outcome Variables

A final alternative account is that we actually *underestimated* the number of effective interventions because some of the outcomes were left-censored. Left-censoring can occur when participants' actual level of an attitude is below the lowest possible value on a scale. For example, many participants reported the lowest possible value (0) for support for partisan violence. However, the scale fails to distinguish between those who more or less strongly reject partisan violence. An issue with left-censored outcomes in the present research is that interventions may have significantly increased rejection of partisan violence, but there is no "room" on the scale to measure this effect.

Our descriptive data suggests that several of our dependent variables are left censored (see Figure 1). Large proportions of participants report the lowest possible value (0) for support for undemocratic practices[9], support for partisan violence, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, and social distance.

To account for this possibility, we conducted censored regression models (also called Tobit models) as a robustness check. At a high level, a Tobit model assumes a *latent* dependent variable that was not censored. It assumes that the censored dependent variable we observe is a function of this latent variable, which equals zero whenever the latent variable is less than zero. In other words, this latent dependent variable assumes the values of the dependent variable in fact could have been negative but were artificially fixed to 0 if under 0. The regression is then run with this latent variable.

[9] Note that while the distribution of support for undemocratic practices is left-censored, the highly related outcome variable support for undemocratic candidates is not. If left-censoring of support for undemocratic practices had a substantial effect on the substantive results of the interventions on this outcome, then we would expect very different results for support for undemocratic candidates. However, results for these two outcomes were in fact quite similar (effect sizes were highly correlated: $r = .75$).

The results show that the number of significant effects in which treatments reduced the eight outcome variables increased slightly for some of the left-censored outcomes. Tables S15.5.1 – S15.5.8 reports the results. For the variables with limited evidence of left-censoring – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic candidates, and social distrust – the number of significant effects remained exactly the same. For biased evaluation of politicized facts, another variable that was not clearly left-censored, the number of significant effects increased from 5 to 6. For 3 of the 4 variables listed above with clear evidence of left-censoring, the number of significant effects increased: support for partisan violence (from 5 to 7), opposition to bipartisan cooperation (from 6 to 8), and social distance (from 12 to 13). For support for undemocratic practices, the number of significant effects stayed the same.

The results also show that the number of significant backfire effects remains very similar. For most variables – partisan animosity, support for undemocratic practices, support for undemocratic candidates, opposition to bipartisan cooperation, social distrust, social distance, and biased evaluation of politicized facts – the number of significant backfire effects remained exactly the same. For support for partisan violence, the number of significant backfire effects increased (from 1 to 2).

Table S15.5.1: *Interventions' Effects on Partisan Animosity using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Positive Contact Video	-10.49	0.66	-15.97	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-10.23	0.63	-16.16	<.001
Common National Identity	-9.21	0.63	-14.6	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-9.04	0.67	-13.48	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-8.19	0.64	-12.71	<.001
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-7.03	0.64	-11.02	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.08	0.63	-9.63	<.001
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-6.01	0.67	-8.92	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-5.38	0.67	-8.02	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-5.25	0.68	-7.74	<.001
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-5.22	0.69	-7.51	<.001
Moral Similarities and Differences	-5.16	0.64	-8.06	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.77	0.65	-7.35	<.001
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-4.07	0.64	-6.31	<.001
Party Overlap on Policies	-3.44	0.62	-5.53	<.001
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-3.27	0.63	-5.17	<.001
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.98	0.64	-4.66	<.001
Democratic System Justification	-2.29	0.64	-3.58	<.001
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-2.16	0.64	-3.40	<.001
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-2.07	0.66	-3.15	0.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.00	0.66	-3.06	0.001
Alternative Control	-1.78	0.67	-2.67	0.008
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-1.76	0.65	-2.69	0.004
Common Economic Interests	-1.18	0.65	-1.82	0.035
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.87	0.68	-1.28	0.100
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.60	0.64	0.95	0.828
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.2: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Practices using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-6.65	0.79	-8.41	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-5.14	0.80	-6.42	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.50	0.73	-3.42	<.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.32	0.73	-3.17	0.001
Common National Identity	-1.66	0.75	-2.22	0.013
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.56	0.79	-1.96	0.025
Positive Contact Video	-1.17	0.78	-1.51	0.066
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.84	0.75	-1.13	0.130
Alternative Control	-0.69	0.78	-0.88	0.377
Befriending Meditation	-0.55	0.81	-0.68	0.247
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.51	0.78	-0.66	0.255
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.17	0.74	-0.23	0.408
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.19	0.76	0.25	0.599
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.28	0.76	0.37	0.645
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.30	0.74	0.41	0.658
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.35	0.76	0.46	0.677
Democratic System Justification	0.55	0.74	0.75	0.772
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.81	0.73	1.10	0.864
Party Overlap on Policies	0.85	0.73	1.17	0.878
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	0.90	0.75	1.19	0.884
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	1.08	0.74	1.47	0.929
Common Economic Interests	1.49	0.79	1.88	0.970
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.61	0.77	2.11	0.982
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.61	0.78	2.07	0.981
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	1.72	0.78	2.22	0.987
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.94	0.79	2.45	0.993
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.3: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Partisan Violence using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-4.40	0.72	-6.09	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.96	0.78	-3.78	<.001
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.64	0.72	-3.67	<.001
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.93	0.72	-2.66	0.004
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.90	0.78	-2.44	0.007
Positive Contact Video	-1.64	0.83	-1.98	0.024
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.38	0.75	-1.84	0.033
Common National Identity	-1.03	0.75	-1.38	0.084
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.65	0.72	-0.90	0.183
Befriending Meditation	-0.55	0.79	-0.69	0.245
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.30	0.76	-0.39	0.347
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.29	0.71	-0.40	0.345
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-0.16	0.82	-0.19	0.423
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.05	0.74	-0.06	0.475
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.04	0.74	0.06	0.524
Party Overlap on Policies	0.17	0.75	0.22	0.588
Common Economic Interests	0.24	0.76	0.31	0.622
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.60	0.79	0.77	0.779
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.66	0.80	0.82	0.793
Democratic System Justification	0.74	0.74	1.00	0.842
Alternative Control	0.83	0.79	1.06	0.289
Moral Similarities and Differences	1.05	0.75	1.41	0.920
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	1.20	0.75	1.59	0.945
Political Violence Inefficacy	1.20	0.74	1.62	0.947
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	1.63	0.80	2.03	0.979
Democratic Collapse Threat	3.22	0.78	4.10	1.000
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.4: *Interventions' Effects on Support for Undemocratic Candidates using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Democratic Collapse Threat	-4.53	0.79	-5.76	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-4.23	0.74	-5.68	<.001
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.72	-3.87	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.71	0.72	-3.75	<.001
Positive Contact Video	-2.37	0.73	-3.25	0.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.65	0.75	-2.21	0.013
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.15	0.74	-1.55	0.061
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.09	0.72	-1.51	0.066
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.02	0.73	-1.39	0.082
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.91	0.76	-1.20	0.115
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.82	0.76	-1.09	0.138
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.59	0.74	-0.80	0.212
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.36	0.72	-0.50	0.307
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-0.33	0.72	-0.47	0.321
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-0.32	0.73	-0.44	0.330
Alternative Control	-0.30	0.74	-0.41	0.681
Befriending Meditation	0.40	0.78	0.51	0.696
Political Violence Inefficacy	0.41	0.74	0.55	0.709
Democratic System Justification	0.45	0.73	0.61	0.730
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	0.49	0.76	0.64	0.740
Party Overlap on Policies	0.57	0.71	0.80	0.788
Common Economic Interests	0.60	0.74	0.81	0.790
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	0.82	0.71	1.16	0.877
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.83	0.72	1.15	0.876
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.32	0.74	1.78	0.962
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	2.18	0.71	3.06	0.999
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.5: *Interventions' Effects on Opposition to Bipartisan Cooperation using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.96	0.83	-3.55	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.63	0.81	-3.25	0.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.39	0.85	-2.82	0.002
Positive Contact Video	-2.18	0.87	-2.51	0.006
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-2.09	0.87	-2.42	0.008
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.00	0.84	-2.39	0.009
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-1.81	0.86	-2.10	0.018
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-1.48	0.84	-1.75	0.040
Common National Identity	-1.28	0.82	-1.55	0.061
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.20	0.83	-1.45	0.074
Befriending Meditation	-1.02	0.85	-1.20	0.115
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.91	0.81	-1.12	0.132
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.61	0.80	-0.76	0.223
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-0.37	0.87	-0.43	0.335
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.17	0.87	-0.20	0.421
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.12	0.86	-0.13	0.446
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.06	0.85	0.07	0.526
Democratic System Justification	0.13	0.87	0.15	0.558
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.17	0.86	0.20	0.578
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.25	0.86	0.29	0.614
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	0.40	0.84	0.48	0.684
Common Economic Interests	0.41	0.88	0.47	0.681
Moral Similarities and Differences	0.92	0.85	1.08	0.861
Alternative Control	1.08	0.88	1.22	0.221
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	1.81	0.86	2.11	0.983
Party Overlap on Policies	2.47	0.84	2.95	0.998
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.6: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distrust using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-4.09	0.92	-4.44	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-3.84	0.90	-4.27	<.001
Common National Identity	-3.71	0.88	-4.21	<.001
Moral Similarities and Differences	-3.54	0.92	-3.86	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.93	0.89	-3.28	0.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.57	0.92	-2.80	0.003
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.52	0.91	-2.76	0.003
Befriending Meditation	-2.40	0.93	-2.57	0.005
Democratic System Justification	-2.13	0.91	-2.36	0.009
Positive Contact Video	-1.78	0.92	-1.94	0.026
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.78	0.92	-1.92	0.027
Party Overlap on Policies	-1.41	0.91	-1.56	0.060
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-1.38	0.89	-1.55	0.060
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-1.37	0.88	-1.55	0.061
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.30	0.90	-1.45	0.074
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-1.30	0.91	-1.43	0.077
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.21	0.94	-1.29	0.099
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-1.13	0.87	-1.29	0.098
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.98	0.87	-1.12	0.131
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.80	0.92	-0.87	0.192
Alternative Control	-0.42	0.93	-0.45	0.654
Outpartisans’ Experiences of Harm	-0.31	0.92	-0.34	0.368
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	-0.29	0.89	-0.32	0.373
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.19	0.89	-0.21	0.416
Common Economic Interests	-0.12	0.91	-0.13	0.447
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.93	0.90	1.03	0.849
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.7: *Interventions' Effects on Social Distance using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-4.57	1.01	-4.53	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-3.91	1.02	-3.83	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-3.90	1.01	-3.86	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.81	1.00	-3.79	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-3.47	1.01	-3.43	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-3.01	1.05	-2.88	0.002
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-2.81	1.00	-2.82	0.002
Common National Identity	-2.66	0.99	-2.69	0.004
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.45	1.02	-2.40	0.008
Positive Contact Video	-2.40	1.01	-2.37	0.009
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-2.10	1.00	-2.10	0.018
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-1.71	0.98	-1.75	0.040
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.64	1.00	-1.65	0.049
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.60	0.99	-0.60	0.274
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.45	1.03	-0.44	0.329
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.44	1.04	-0.42	0.336
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.13	1.00	-0.13	0.449
Democratic System Justification	-0.11	1.02	-0.11	0.456
Common Economic Interests	-0.10	1.01	-0.10	0.459
Alternative Control	-0.06	1.04	-0.06	0.955
Utility of Outparty Empathy	0.04	0.99	0.04	0.516
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.14	0.99	0.14	0.556
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.39	0.96	0.40	0.656
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	1.11	0.98	1.14	0.872
Party Overlap on Policies	1.17	0.99	1.19	0.883
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	1.55	1.00	1.54	0.939
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.8: *Interventions' Effects on Biased Evaluation of Politicized Facts using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Common National Identity	-2.78	0.67	-4.13	<.001
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-2.26	0.68	-3.32	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.03	0.68	-2.98	0.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-1.82	0.70	-2.60	0.005
Political Violence Inefficacy	-1.35	0.71	-1.90	0.029
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.20	0.73	-1.66	0.049
Democratic Collapse Threat	-1.04	0.70	-1.50	0.067
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.92	0.67	-1.37	0.085
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	-0.65	0.69	-0.96	0.170
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.52	0.70	-0.75	0.226
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.46	0.65	-0.70	0.242
Befriending Meditation	-0.24	0.70	-0.34	0.365
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.12	0.73	-0.16	0.435
Positive Contact Video	-0.09	0.69	-0.13	0.450
Moral Similarities and Differences	-0.06	0.70	-0.09	0.466
Alternative Control	0.05	0.70	0.07	0.945
Correcting Division Misperceptions	0.14	0.67	0.20	0.580
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	0.22	0.70	0.31	0.623
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	0.23	0.68	0.34	0.633
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	0.25	0.67	0.38	0.647
Common Economic Interests	0.26	0.70	0.38	0.647
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	0.35	0.69	0.50	0.692
Democratic System Justification	0.36	0.68	0.53	0.702
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.43	0.68	0.64	0.737
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	0.46	0.73	0.63	0.735
Party Overlap on Policies	2.20	0.68	3.25	0.999
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

Table S15.5.9: *Interventions' Effects on the Composite of the Eight Outcomes using a Tobit Model*

Intervention	b	SE	z	p-value
Correcting Democracy Misperceptions	-3.31	0.39	-8.39	<.001
Common National Identity	-3.12	0.38	-8.13	<.001
Sympathetic Personal Narratives	-2.88	0.38	-7.50	<.001
Common Exhausted Majority Identity	-2.83	0.37	-7.59	<.001
Positive Contact Video	-2.57	0.39	-6.68	<.001
Correcting Division Misperceptions	-2.57	0.38	-6.69	<.001
Democratic Collapse Threat	-2.34	0.40	-5.87	<.001
Befriending Meditation	-1.53	0.39	-3.96	<.001
Outpartisans' Willingness to Learn	-1.45	0.41	-3.56	<.001
Utility of Outparty Empathy	-1.13	0.40	-2.86	0.002
Moral Similarities and Differences	-1.08	0.38	-2.86	0.002
Pro-Democracy Bipartisan Elite Cues	-1.05	0.39	-2.70	0.004
Correcting Oppositional Misperceptions	-0.93	0.38	-2.44	0.007
Pro-Democracy Inparty Elite Cues	-0.82	0.37	-2.22	0.013
Correcting Opportunism Misperceptions	-0.81	0.39	-2.11	0.017
Bipartisan Joint Trivia Quiz	-0.80	0.38	-2.13	0.017
Correcting Policy Misperceptions Chatbot	-0.63	0.37	-1.70	0.045
Outpartisans' Experiences of Harm	-0.45	0.39	-1.15	0.126
Political Violence Inefficacy	-0.45	0.38	-1.19	0.118
Describing a Likable Outpartisan	-0.32	0.41	-0.77	0.220
Democratic System Justification	-0.22	0.40	-0.55	0.290
Alternative Control	-0.15	0.41	-0.37	0.715
Common Economic Interests	0.14	0.39	0.35	0.637
Counterfactual Partisan Selves	0.21	0.39	0.53	0.700
Party Overlap on Policies	0.24	0.39	0.62	0.731
Reducing Outparty Electoral Threat	0.49	0.38	1.26	0.897
Includes controls				

Notes. The reference category for Condition is the Null Control condition. The outcome was scaled from 0 to 100. We controlled for participants' gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, partisan identity, strength of partisan identity, and supplier. A Tobit model was used to correct for left-censoring.

16. References

American National Election Studies. (2021). *ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release* [Data file]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan (Producers). Retrieved from www.electionstudies.org

Ahmed, A. (2022). Is the American Public Really Turning Away from Democracy? Backsliding and the Conceptual Challenges of Understanding Public Attitudes. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1-12.

Athey, S., Tibshirani, J., & Wager, S. (2019). Generalized random forests. *Annals of Statistics*, *47* (2): 1148–78.

Blake, A. (2022). More Republicans can now call Jan. 6 a 'legitimate protest' than a 'riot'. Washington Post. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/07/many-republicans-no-longer-call-jan-6-an-insurrection-or-even-riot/

Carey, J. M., Helmke, G., Nyhan, B., Sanders, M., & Stokes, S. (2019). Searching for bright lines in the Trump presidency. *Perspectives on Politics*, *17*(3), 699-718.

Comey, J. B. (2017, January 7). My notes from private session with PE on 1/6/17 [Memorandum]. Retrieved from https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4442900-Ex-FBI-Director-James-Comey-s-memos.html

Druckman, J. N., & Levendusky, M. S. (2019). What do we measure when we measure affective polarization?. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *83*(1), 114-122.

Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using G* Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. *Behavior research methods*, *41*(4), 1149-1160.

Graham, M. H., & Svolik, M. W. (2020). Democracy in America? Partisanship, polarization, and the robustness of support for democracy in the United States. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 392-409.

Grillo, E., & Prato, C. (2023). Reference points and democratic backsliding. *American Journal of Political Science*, *67*(1), 71-88.

Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano J., M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen (eds.). 2022. World Values Survey: Round Seven - Country-Pooled Datafile Version 5.0. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. doi:10.14281/18241.20

Holm, S. (1979). A simple sequentially rejective multiple test procedure. *Scandinavian journal of statistics*, 65-70.

Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. *American Political Science Review*, *109*(1), 1-17.

Iyengar, S., Sood, G., & Lelkes, Y. (2012). Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization. *Public opinion quarterly*, *76*(3), 405-431.

Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. *American journal of political science*, *59*(3), 690-707.

Kalmoe, N. P., & Mason, L. (2022). *Radical American partisanship: Mapping violent hostility, its causes, and the consequences for democracy*. University of Chicago Press.

Lai, C. K., Marini, M., Lehr, S. A., Cerruti, C., Shin, J. E. L., Joy-Gaba, J. A., ... & Nosek, B. A. (2014). Reducing implicit racial preferences: I. A comparative investigation of 17 interventions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *143*(4), 1765.

Lin, W., & Green, D. P. (2016). Standard operating procedures: A safety net for pre-analysis plans. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, *49*(3), 495-500.

Malka, A., & Costello, T. H. (2022). Professed Democracy Support and Openness to Politically Congenial Authoritarian Actions Within the American Public. *American Politics Research*, 1532673X221109532.

Marley, P., & Stein, J. (2016, July 30). Judge strikes down Wisconsin voter ID, early voting laws. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/07/30/judge-strikes-down-wisconsin-voter-id-early-voting-laws/87803408/

Mernyk, J. S., Pink, S. L., Druckman, J. N., & Willer, R. (2022). Correcting inaccurate metaperceptions reduces Americans' support for partisan violence. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(16), e2116851119.

Milkman, K. L., Gandhi, L., Patel, M. S., Graci, H. N., Gromet, D. M., Ho, H., ... & Duckworth, A. L. (2022). A 680,000-person megastudy of nudges to encourage vaccination in pharmacies. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(6), e2115126119.

Milkman, K. L., Gromet, D., Ho, H., Kay, J. S., Lee, T. W., Pandiloski, P., ... & Duckworth, A. L. (2021). Megastudies improve the impact of applied behavioural science. *Nature*, *600*(7889), 478-483.

Molinet, J. (2015, June 28). Ted Cruz says states can ignore Supreme Court's ruling on gay marriage. New York Daily News. Retrieved from https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ted-cruz-states-ignore-supremes-ruling-gay-marriage-article-1.2275933

Mummolo, J., & Peterson, E. (2019). Demand effects in survey experiments: An empirical assessment. *American Political Science Review*, *113*(2), 517-529.

Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge University Press.

Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2021). Partisan gaps in political information and information-seeking behavior: Motivated reasoning or cheerleading?. *American Journal of Political Science*, *65*(1), 133-147.

Santos, L. A., Voelkel, J. G., Willer, R., & Zaki, J. (2022). Belief in the utility of cross-partisan empathy reduces partisan animosity and facilitates political persuasion. *Psychological Science*, *33*(9), 1557-1573.

FiveThirtyEight. (2022, November 7). The Republican Party's Election Lies Are Causing Lasting Damage. Retrieved from https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/republicans-trump-election-fraud/

Westwood, S. J., Grimmer, J., Tyler, M., & Nall, C. (2022). Current research overstates American support for political violence. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *119*(12), e2116870119.

Yadlowsky, S., Fleming, S., Shah, N., Brunskill, E., & Wager, S. (2021). Evaluating treatment prioritization rules via rank-weighted average treatment effects. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2111.07966*.

Zhou, H., & Fishbach, A. (2016). The pitfall of experimenting on the web: How unattended selective attrition leads to surprising (yet false) research conclusions. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *111*(4), 493.