Date created: | Last Updated:

Category: Project

Description: In the past 10 years, corruption scandals, particularly those related to public procurement, have caused the removal of presidents in Brazil, Guatemala and Perú. Ongoing corruption scandals continue to rattle civic space across many countries. Considerable programming and research has focused on disseminating information about government malfeasance with an eye toward promoting transparency. The efficacy of such information likely varies depending on the way in which it is delivered as well as its intended audience. I propose to examine alternative ways to disseminate information on government malfeasance in public procurement in Guatemala’s municipalities. In particular we ask: Is it more effective to provide information on past corruption to citizens themselves or the bureaucrats who are directly engaged in procurement? To answer this question, we are in the process of implementing an information intervention with two treatment arms directed to local civil society and municipal bureaucrats, respectively, in collaboration with the Guatemalan think tank ASIES. Randomization was conducted by first matching 141 municipalities into sets of triplets, and then assigning program condition randomly within each matched triplet. Individuals within municipalities assigned to either treatment will receive information about the incidence of single bidding (a popular measure of risk of corruption in public procurement) and political favoritism in the allocation of municipal contacts, and how it compares to the national average. I will measure changes in procurement practices through surveys of civil society leaders and municipal bureaucrats as well as by monitoring procurement outcomes scraped from Guatecompras, Guatemala’s e-procurement system. Data collection will conclude on September 30, 2023. I expect that information given to local leaders will decrease the incidence of political favoritism in public procurement and the number of contracts allocated, and should have a stronger impact in more competitive municipalities. This is so because civil society leaders that receive the information treatment will increase their oversight and political participation, putting pressure on incumbent mayors to change their procurement practices. On the other hand, I expect information to have no effect on public procurement outcomes when given to municipal bureaucrats. Since hiring at the municipal level is highly clientelistic, bureaucrats are better off following the guidelines set by politicians regarding which contractors to select.