Catholic Clergy at Home and in Rome

Intersocial Processes in French Counterrevolution (1848–52)

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Abstract

Sociological scholarship on political revolution has recently begun to embrace a process-based understanding of revolutions. Such a processual ontology opens up for understanding hitherto unaddressed processes of counterrevolution. Historians of the Spring of Nations, and The Second French Republic (1848–52) in particular, have failed to address the international aspects of the revolutions, and above all of counterrevolution in the period. This paper addresses this gap through a historical case study of the French Catholic clergy in the Second French Republic. The study applies an amalgamation of recent theoretical developments from revolution scholarship in order to dissect the empirical material and births a new framework in the process. The results demonstrate the important intersocial work of Catholic clergy on the triumph of the counterrevolution in France. The political concerns of the Papal States and Pope Pius IX spilled over into French politics and cemented the legitimacy of the counterrevolutionary turn and fuelled the rise of Louis Napoleon. From these results a new theoretical framework that addresses the intersocial nature of political agency and moves beyond a domestic understanding of political processes is developed. Further studies applying this approach across cases are encouraged in order to better understand how these processes unfold and how multiple intersocial influences can interplay.

Keywords

Transnational sociology, Counterrevolution, Political revolution, Processual ontology, Revolutions of 1848

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1. Introduction

“History never repeats itself. The historians repeat each other.

The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it.”

– Oscar Wilde (2016:39)

Mid-nineteenth century Europe is, unlike periods such as the second world war, not necessarily familiar to those not engaged in its study. The chaotic nature of the Spring of Nations with its multiple revolutions, rebellions, and reactionary triumphs branches out across Europe in disparate narratives. This lack of popular familiarity may arguably even be a result of the failure of historians and social scientist to agree on a common narrative on a European scale and on why counterrevolutionary forces prevailed. This paper aims to address the lack of an international counterrevolutionary narrative by studying the role of French Catholic clergy in the political processes in France between 1848 and 1852. The case demonstrates the intimate ties between the political developments in Rome and Paris at the time. Fundamentally, the paper argues that the French Catholic clergy bridged the discourse and the narratives of the unfolding events both at home and in Rome, as they were forced to navigate the two simultaneously. Through their intersocial position, the Catholic clergy therefore links the process of counterrevolution in Paris and in Rome. Before delving deeper however, a short introduction to France during this period in line with established historical narrative is warranted. Note that this narrative is very much focused on the political players in Paris at the time; precisely the discourse which this paper will show is insufficient. The clergy is nowhere to be seen in this introduction; because its role has hitherto largely been ignored.

1.1 The Established History of The Second French Republic

Despite shifts in demographic structure, social relations, and ideological undercurrents in society following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, the reactionary monarchist forces had, for the most part, successfully held their grip over Europe (Bruun 1958:9–23). There were relatively few border changes on the continent after the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and industrialisation had already begun to take hold in most of western Europe by the 1840s.

In France, the July Revolution of 1830 had ousted the more reactionary Bourbon monarchy and established a liberal Orléanist constitutional monarchy under the tricolour. Though more liberal than their cousins, the new regime was still beset by anti-monarchist revolts until the June Rebellion of 1832, famously depicted by Victor Hugo in *Les Misérables* (1862). The July monarchy began to lose legitimacy in the 1840s following what were seen as failures to deal with economic fluctuations in prices and weak foreign policy positions undermining the general popularity of the government (Bruun 1958:24–25; Price 1972:31–95). Added to this, successively more conservative governments, and perceived interference by King Louis Phillipe I in daily political life, served to alienate the support of liberal elites and further tie the aforementioned perceived failures directly to the regime as a whole. When discontented liberal elites organised a “banquet” movement for an expanded franchise, Louis Phillipe I attempted to crack down on them by banning the banquets (Bruun 1958:26–27; Guyver 2016:66–103). Upon news of this, the people of Paris rose up in anger on 22 February 1848. Despite attempts by some loyal to the regime to install the King’s grandson, republican sentiments prevailed and the Second Republic was proclaimed by the evening of the 24 February to a crowd in front of the Hôtel de Ville (or at least the desire of the provisional government for a republican regime) (Fortescue 2005:74–75; Guyver 2016:66–103). As news of this first revolutionary outburst in Paris spread across Europe, revolutionaries rose to the hour across an already tense continent.

The provisional government called for a constituent assembly to establish the new republic. This early period of the Republic saw the rise of factions that would largely come to dominate the lines of conflict that were to come. These were in part the more radical republicans, who were often socialists, the moderate republicans, the Orléanist/Moderate liberals, and the more conservative Bourbon legitimists, with a complex and tenuous alliance between conservatives and liberals in the form of the Party of Order (Cox 1968). The dynamic of support of and between individuals in these groups was as complex as the multidimensional aspects of the Catholic clergy, but overall, these groups are often identified as the main political cliques by historians.

Tensions immediately began to brew between the provisional government and elites, many of whom had previously only been inclined towards a minor expansion of suffrage. The memories of 1789 most certainly played a role in shaping the reaction towards this new republican outburst, and the speed at which events unfolded left the rest of France little opportunity to act

(Fortescue 2005:133). The revolution, as seems too often to be the case in France, was a Parisian one disseminated outward after its initial outburst. As it would turn out, rural areas were largely conservative and reluctant to embrace a “social” republic. Especially after taxes were levied on even smaller plots of rural land in order to fund depleted state coffers, and as the rural population saw it, fund the national workshops which were established as a provisional measure to feed and employ the unemployed urban proletariat (Price 1972). Moreover, a proto dual power situation arose as radical workers were allowed to create a separate workers assembly in the form of the Luxembourg commission. As disillusionment began to grow after an overwhelming victory of the moderate liberal republicans in the constituent assembly elections in April 1848, loosely organised Montagnards (the more radical and socialist political party, a.k.a. the Democratic Socialists) stormed the assembly after a protest on 15 May 1848 to petition for radical reforms and intervention in solidarity with Polish revolutionaries. Conservatives portrayed this event as an attempted coup, and used the opportunity to go on the offensive against the socialists and the national workshops (Bruun 1958:28; Guyver 2016).

When the national workshops closed, disgruntled and now unemployed workers rose up in anger and were brutally crushed and killed in the June Days between 22 and 26 June 1848. An effective dictatorship was established under General Cavaignac, who despite the extensive executive powers, probably owing to a strong liberal republicanism, did not use the situation to solidify his own power, or at the very least found himself unable to vanquish the popular appeal of Louis Napoleon, the nephew of Napoleon I and a rising political figure (Fortescue 2005:135; Price 1972:193). This wave of repression not only saw the effective end of socialist influence in the Second Republic but seemed to signal the beginning of the end for other revolutionary movements across the continent. Eventually, Louis Napoleon managed to secure the election to the presidency in December with 74% of the vote, as liberals and conservatives largely moved to ally themselves with the popular figure (Fortescue 2005:154; Price 2007:220–23).

One exception to the general pattern of setbacks was the ousting of Pope Pius IX from Rome and the establishment of the Roman Republic in February 1849. Unfortunately for these Republicans, Louis Napoleon sent a successful French military expedition to reinstate the Pope (Bruun 1958:67–68). This period is the culmination of the intimate ties between the French and Roman political developments during the Spring of Nations. As this paper will demonstrate, the revolution in Rome mirrored that in Paris, but the reaction of the Papacy towards the Republicans had a profound impact on the political position of the French clergy at home. This

intersocial aspect is ever present but makes itself the most evident when French clergy are faced with a choice between radical republicanism and counterrevolutionary Papal authority on the Italian peninsula.

After a small second socialist rising in June 1849, the now evidently reactionary political life of France was split between the largely conservative National Assembly, and the “Prince-President” Louis Napoleon himself; Prince-President being a self-selected title with reference to his Imperial past and, probably, his ambitions. As the assembly began to impose limits on suffrage, the popularly elected president was placed into conflict with the Party of Order. When he failed to pass a law allowing for a second term with the required two thirds majority, a coup could almost be said to have been inevitable. On 2 December 1851, a symbolic date for Bonapartists as it was Napoleon I’s crowning anniversary, Louis Napoleon went through with the rather tackily titled caesarean operation “Rubicon”, dismantling the National assembly, and violently repressing the little that remained of the socialist republicans. In a referendum the following year, voters conceded to the proclamation of Louis Napoleon as Emperor, and on 2 December, 1852, the Second Republic came to an end as the president crowned himself Emperor Napoleon III (Bruun 1958:32–34; Price 1972:246–326). This paper demarcates this as the final end of the revolution and the triumph of the counterrevolutionary process. Democracy as it had been exercised during the Second Republic was at an end, and Napoleon III, unlike his uncle, found his regime largely welcomed by the international community. Though it was neither a return to the house of Orléans or Bourbon, the transformations of the revolutionary movement of 1848 were wiped clean.

But how did this counterrevolution come about? This may be a somewhat logical progression of events, but there are missing links. This counterrevolution did not occur in isolation from the rest of Europe. How did France go from universal Franchise to conservative Empire in just a handful of years? The powerful Catholic clergy and their relation to the developments in Rome hold part of the answer to that.

1.2 Starting Points

In a traditional sense, the birth of the Second French Republic was one brought about by revolution. Though defining what a political revolution constitutes part of the debate within revolution scholarship (Abrams 2021:4), I argue that most, if not all definitions, would place

the development in France in February 1848 as a political revolution. The finer points of contention for the field, with the Spring of Nations as a prominent example, is rather how to understand and study revolutions as processes. This paper takes a process-based approach to history rather than an event based one. Events begin and end, while processes may peter out or build up over time. How then is revolution to be understood? This paper borrows the definition from Lawson, who states that: “...*a revolution is a collective mobilization that attempts to quickly and forcibly overthrow an existing regime in order to transform political, economic, and symbolic relations.*” (Lawson 2019:10). This builds on the structural and processual ontology expounded upon in further detail throughout the paper. The focus here is on collective mobilisation and the overthrow of the old order as Lawson also points out. It distinguishes it from smaller elite mobilisation and long-term processes. February 1848 for France is then both an example of collective mobilisation from the Parisian masses and a total undoing of the old regime. The result of the revolt in Paris was the overturn of the Orléanist monarchy from the ground up. It was not a small transition of symbolic power, but the installation of an entirely new regime.

As much as February 1848 is of interest, this paper deals with what follows. As a process of contention, a revolution is also arguably under pressure during and following its initial birth. What then is a counterrevolution? Here there are no explicit definitions in the same tradition. I therefore define counterrevolution as a form of mirror image of Lawson’s definition of revolutions. This paper sees counterrevolution as *a mobilisation that attempts to reverse the transformations of revolutionary movements*. Notice that there is no emphasis on the speed or necessity of forceful means. It also does not make mass mobilisation a necessary component, thus allowing for a purely elite driven process. Counterrevolution is by definition a process in contention with the revolution, and thus seeks out the reversal of the transformations of revolutionaries. This does not necessarily mean an absolute reversal to an exact image of the original conditions before the revolution, but rather one which attempts to maximise that reversal for the protagonists’ own gains. This is relevant in that a counterrevolutionary does not necessarily seek to revivify and crown the headless corpse of Louis XVI, but adapts to the balance of political, economic, and symbolic relations that best suit them. The events in France between 1848–52 qualify as an example of a counterrevolution. The Orléanist or Bourbon monarchies may not have been reinstated, but the transformative institution of the Republic and the Socialist radicals within them were stalled, reversed, and ultimately defeated.

With its focus on the international developments of “1848”, this paper will also abundantly use the term “intersocial”. This is both done to distinguish this paper’s framework from the traditional international narratives in which states are the focus of analysis, but also as Lawson puts it,

...it examines the relationship between “external” and “internal” dynamics wherever these are found: in ideas that cross borders, amongst networks of revolutionary actors, in asymmetrical market interactions, and more. An intersocial approach is concerned with the ways in which differentially located, but interactively engaged, social sites affect the development of revolutions without containing a prior presumption of what these social sites are. (Lawson 2019:73)

This is the fundamental entry point for how this paper approaches its research question and aims.

It is my hope that the research question and the aims of this paper are relatively self-evident at every point throughout. But due to the nature of both formal expectations and variations in reading habits, I believe it reasonable enough to state these clearly here before going any further. The underlying question is really one about counterrevolutions generally: *how do counterrevolutions succeed?* Notice the that it is the how that is focused on and not the why, this being a conscious move towards a processual understanding. As should be clear however, the question is limited to the case of France in 1848 in order to make it tangible. In essence one might phrase it as: *how did counterrevolution succeed in France during the Second Republic?* Such a question is ambitious in its scope and may provoke the reader to believe that the paper offers one definitive answer. In a complex process the truth is bound to be multifaceted. As such, the paper highlights what I believe to be an important part in understanding the events in France during the Second Republic and political processes more broadly—even beyond just revolutions and counterrevolutions. The intersocial work of the Catholic clergy, in essence bridging the realities in Paris and in Rome, is not the only reason that the Republic fell, but it does demonstrate that the interconnected social realities of political groups themselves play an important role in understanding developments both domestic and international in scope and clarify the process behind the counterrevolution in 1848–52 France. If the reader prefers a leading question, it could be stated as: *how did Roman counterrevolution impact French counterrevolution in 1848–52?* But such a question fails to address both the abductive process of this paper, and tie back to the more meaningful questions that lay at its core. Ultimately, the

results impact how counterrevolutions and political processes should be understood and investigated. It is not how one impacted the other which is under investigation, rather how a seemingly disparate process can impact another seemingly disparate process.

The paper itself is divided into six main sections in order to address this topic in an organised fashion. These headings can be found under the table of contents. The following section addresses the previous literature and highlights the scarcity of debate on both the international context of the Second French Republic, and of counterrevolution as a whole. This is followed by section three which addresses the theoretical entry point of the paper as well and formulates a theory of intersocial agents in revolution and counterrevolution based on the empirical data presented in the case study. Under section four the methods are discussed along with some consideration for its limitations and to what extent the researcher affects the production of knowledge. In part five, the case study itself, the empirical narrative is presented contrasting the political positions of French Catholic clergy in France with the developments on the Italian peninsula. This fifth section includes the analysis and connects back both to the previous literature and the formulated framework outlined in section three. Finally, the paper concludes with section six where the main takeaways are discussed along with suggestions for future research.

2. Interpretations of "1848"

2.1 Historical Perspectives

The starting point for any analysis of the events of 1848 often begins with the highly influential essay authored by Marx in the very midst of the events in question. Though the final ceremonious transition from dictatorship to empire is omitted, Marx accurately predicts the events that follow the publishing of his 1852 text: *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* ([1852] 2012), reminiscent of the psychohistory in Asimov's *Foundation* trilogy ([1951] 2016). The essay on Louis Napoleon is also one of the first instances of Marx's dialectical materialist framework applied on a practical case. Briefly, Marx places the responsibility for the reactionary triumph on the growing bourgeoisie at the time. The parallels to the French Revolution of 1789, in which he famously states that history repeats itself "once as tragedy, the second as farce" ([1852] 2012:172) are not literal interpretations of a cyclical view of history,

but rather communicate the failure of society to learn from experience alone. In a sense, this is arguably a testament the materialist approach in so far as collective agency is shaped by immediate material conditions rather than purely interpretive ideals.

The forces of production and the different natures of property constitute the deciding factor in class boundaries and relations in the Marxist take. To Marx, the intra-elite divisions, which contemporary authors have continued to stress as a deciding factor in political developments (see Guyver 2016; Price 1972), can primarily be seen in the clash between landowning elites versus the city bourgeois, and then further with the propertyless growing class of proletarian Parisians and small tradesmen under threat from the republican movement during the perceived rising radicalism of the new mountain of Louis Blanc. Marx argues that the elites united under not only the Party of Order, but also with the popularity of Louis Napoleon in re-establishing control, though this time in the defence of a united property front of both land and capital. The ultimate aim of this now united elite was to drive back the gains of the socialists that had so prominently taken the stage under republicanism. In contrast with more contemporary historians, Marx expressly claims that foreign policy was used for the purposes of domestic politics, with the Roman expedition utilised as a form of bait (Marx [1852] 2012).

Though a commended piece of academic work on a counterrevolutionary process (Tilly 1978:13–14) Marx unfortunately leaves non-domestic attributes at that in his account. Of course, as this paper argues, it is not that the internal processes are irrelevant but rather that the international forces of reaction are often overlooked. After all, in an account of state power, those immediately in control of the mechanisms of the state matter. But given the international context of revolutions, their reactions are just as much conceived and birthed in an international context.

A more modern historical approach to 1848 is exemplified by *The Second French Republic: A Political Reinterpretation* (Guyver 2016), which draws on a wealth of historical sources to paint the picture of a revolution and counterrevolution fuelled by a misinterpretation on the part of elites of the aims and means of the working classes. As a historian, Guyver is understandably less concerned about forming a coherent theory of social action in these circumstances and more on the specific chronology of events. Further examples of outstanding historical work published in recent decades are that of Fortescue (see 2005) and Price (see 1972, 1989, 1996, 2004, 2007). Both share the same general focus on events and highlight the role domestic opinion and action

with the boundaries of the state. Price distinguishes himself in presenting a more complex and nuanced argument (possibly aided by the superior volume of work) which is more rooted in social theory. The most revealing of his monographs, titled *A Social History* (1972), reflects the more anchored approach to the social sciences. Nevertheless, there is an understandable lack of explication on both counterrevolution as a process, and the international nature of the events in question. Guyver, Price, and Fortescue all constitute the bulk of the sources from which the case study in this paper is built. They drive their own respective arguments, but ultimately still provide a wealth of information that can nonetheless be cross referenced and which collectively indicate the argument in this thesis. Collins (1923), which this paper also heavily relies on for historical material is also primarily only concerned with a chronology of internal Catholic involvement in politics. As it is the place of sociologists, for the most part, to push the envelope of social theory, historical narratives, though valuable, have continuously stagnated around an event-based account of revolution and counterrevolution.

Hobsbawm, a great example of a historian rooted in social theory, retroactively describes the events of 1848 as a “European revolution” (1975:21) (though presumably the idea was already well established given the popular name for the year as the “Springtime of People’s” or “Springtime of Nations”). For contemporaries the interlinked nature of political events in Europe was clear, at least if one is to go by the quote attributed to Metternich: “When Paris sneezes, Europe catches cold” ([n.d.] 2011). This sentiment is present in most of the literature cited so far, yet not explicitly focused on. Nevertheless, Hobsbawm argues that the “European revolution” was defeated because of its source; the proletariat, who frightened the middle classes (1975:28). And though France is, in his view, the epicentre of revolutionary movements in Europe (1962), there is a lack of concrete material presented as to how both the revolution and its reaction were so uniformly defeated. Though room is made for a specific analysis of local and regional conditions as to this effect (1975:26), the contradiction is then only exacerbated. If local conditions are to blame for failures, then why is the timing and tempo of events essentially the same? Surely the class composition and their political resources within each state was not identical. How come all middle classes possessed the same reactionary urge? Why describe it as a European phenomenon at all if classes only have national interests? It is not the place for this paper to answer all of these questions. They do however demonstrate the continued shortcomings of hitherto existing accounts.

Of those who have explicitly considered the events of 1848 in an international perspective, the contradiction between the international character of the revolt and the narratives of national identity sprung therefrom are of interest. At first ignored, the events of 1848 were ultimately integrated into the narratives of their national identities as democracies and nation states. In the process, the memory of the international was subdued by these national narratives (Clark 2012, 2019; Körner 2000). And though the various authors in Körner's work, who are the most explicit in this discourse, excellently highlight this, the empirical analysis continues in the tradition of the nation state. In this case, it may very well be because the contrast is their primary focus. Nonetheless, this focus fails to significantly point out any overlapping mechanisms of revolution, and more importantly for this paper, counterrevolution. And this despite concluding that: "True, it was not a revolution of Europe, for Europe was not a politically active entity. But it was a European revolution. The hegemonial powers, whose strength differed widely, were involved together." (Koselleck 2000:209). Thus, while acknowledging that there requires an entity of political power to undergo a revolutionary situation, and that Europe possessed nothing like it at the time, Koselleck still argues that there was a European revolution on the basis of a shared economic development. Was a European counterrevolution based on the same premise?

If an analogy is conceded, it would seem that the argument is that a house is on fire with a number of people inside. The fire spreads to most rooms in the house, and each person puts out the fire where they can. Now, I do not mean to pass off revolution as a literal fire threatening some idyllic peace, but merely as an analogy to the mechanisms involved. The house has no agency relative to the human conception of agency. The house is Europe in so far as it has no capacity for collective decision making, and the people are the tenants; that is the states within the geographic and economic region. The people actively fight the fire. But how is it that the house is on fire, and do the tenants communicate their firefighting efforts? Do the noises from one room warn the other tenants even though no one officially officiates the effort? The analogy might come uncomfortably close to a functionalist approach, which would be undesirable (see Elster 1982), but in this case the questions raised are nevertheless relevant. What historians of 1848 have failed to do is to effectively highlight the mechanisms driving social change *between* states, particularly in the process of reaction and counterrevolution.

3. Towards a Theory of Intersocial Agents of Counterrevolution

3.1 The Social Science of Counterrevolution

Lenin (1902) once rhetorically inquired “what is to be done?” This question is worth repeating here. If historians have failed to adequately address the international nature of counterrevolution in the Spring of Nations, what then of sociologists? The shortcomings of historians were in no part due to a lack of intellectual capacity, source material, or earnest desire for an answer. It seems even sociologists have struggled to outline counterrevolutionary processes. This, I argue, is in large part due to an event-based focus. Only a handful of recent studies have begun to shed light on the consequences of a processual framework for revolutions, and in turn even less so for counterrevolutions.

In the context of revolution scholarship there are those who claim that revolutionary theory has seen a number of generations, with a debate on whether contemporaries find themselves in the fourth or fifth (see Abrams 2019; Allinson 2019a, 2021; Lawson 2016). Though this generational perspective is arguably detrimental to the field in a number of ways (see Beck and Ritter 2021) and an inadequate framework in understanding knowledge production, it still serves as a foundation on which to present the dominant perspectives on sociological theories of revolution. To these can then be added the schools of thought which have been obscured by this way of thinking. The following is not meant as an account of the literature as a whole, but as an exploration into potential theories applicable to “1848”.

Goldstone (1980, 2001) first introduced the idea of “generations” into revolution scholarship. More recently, Lawson (2016) has outlined these generations once again. He categorically defines these generations up to the current “fourth”. The first of these, constituted by authors such as Crane Brinton, George Pettee, and Pitirim Sorokin, “were often critical of revolution” (Lawson 2016:107). To these scholars, much as in the functionalist sociology of Parsons (Elster 1982), society as a whole was analogous to a human body, and a revolution a disease of the body. In their view revolutionary action could not achieve anything other than destruction and delay. Lawson (2016) outlines that the main causes of revolution at least to Brinton were products of increased expectations, loss of legitimacy, and the rise of new ideologies, eventually

resulting in the dual power seen in Trotsky's ([1930] 2017) theories. Revolution in this sense might be inevitable, but certainly not viewed as a positive experience. Brinton writes in the suggestively titled *Anatomy of Revolutions* (1938:244–71) of counterrevolutions, with the “Thermidorian” reactions, as phases analogous to a cure against the “disease” of revolution. It is seen as a comedown from the revolutionary “fever” so to speak. Here the reaction in 1848–52 could be seen as a return to the “natural” state of affairs. But these analogies are just analogies, and value-loaded ones at that. It does not constitute a modern and coherent theory of counterrevolution, much less one which highlights the specific process at play. Moreover, it also fails to explicitly highlight international aspects of the missing puzzle of The Second French Republic and its place in the Spring of Nations.

The second generation according to Lawson (2016:108) shares the idea of expectations with the first as a driving cause of revolution, with the main authors being James Davies and Ted Gurr. It is also primarily focused on explaining an individual cause of revolution, where revolution is seen as an event rather than a process. Unlike the first generation, there is less of a value-loaded approach, and rather a singlehanded focus on expectations, particularly in tandem with economic fluctuations or perceived deprivations. On the one hand the downturn of the economy versus an expected outcome could build frustration. On the other, one social group's perception as not receiving as large a share as other groups could garner this frustration even in a growing economy. Though at first intuitively sound, the idea of relative deprivation encounters a problem in its definitions. If a sense of deprivation is the issue, then why do not all societies with perceived deprivations revolt? What is too much deprivation and to whom? Why do only some economic downturns result in revolution? And what is the mechanism behind grievance and political action? As much as it may add to the debate, it fails to really answer anything concrete (see Allinson 2019b:324; Lawson 2019:57–58). Moreover, when the idea of counterrevolution is considered, the house of cards seems to come apart. As far as I could gather, no scholars have explicitly mentioned relative deprivation theory in counterrevolutionary considerations. There is no examination as to the causes of counterrevolution, failure, or success. Is there a post-revolutionary concept of deprivation which leads to reaction? Surely members of the previous establishment cannot expect to benefit from a new system which attempts to exclude and replace them. Is counterrevolution unavoidable? Why would some succeed, and others fail? In all of this the second generation's event-based conception of revolution fails to build more than a façade where there should be a house. Anything after a revolution is declared, if such a thing exists, is impenetrable.

The structuralist third generation, are in Lawson's view the first to focus on macrostructural causes (2016:109). Among these Lawson identifies Barrington Moore Jr. ([1966] 1993) despite his focus on democracy versus dictatorship rather than revolution in a pure sense. He also places Skocpol and Goldstone in this category. This generation is arguably still very influential. The work of Goldstone in particular brings in a greater nuance of variables into the mix than preceding generations (see Goldstone 1991). Skocpol (1979) on the other hand opens up the field to international factors, and the dynamic long term context of interstate competition. Only the latter deals with counterrevolution, though briefly, with counterrevolution as an essentially external force imposed on the revolutionary state (Skocpol 1979:279–98). The issue with this in the context of the Second French Republic is that there were no victorious foreign armies marching through Paris. If anything, it was the French Republic who destroyed the Roman Revolution. And yet, by all means, it was still a French Republic born from a transformative seizure of power. Though this generation closes in on the issues in this paper, it still lacks in an explicit treatment of counterrevolution as such.

The next generation embraces the international narrative but continues in the same apparent tradition of the third, with the exception that it is more embracing of micro-meso-macro amalgamations (Lawson 2016:109). Here Lawson cites himself as well as Ritter (2015) and Goldstone's later works as part of this fourth generation. In his view, "fourth-generation revolutionary theory shifts the object of analysis from 'why revolutions take place' to 'under what conditions do states become unstable?'" (Lawson 2016:110). State stability and instability become the main focus of scholars in this generation. Seen from the point of view of counterrevolution, this school of thought is one of the more amenable to a theory of reaction. If state instability opens for political change in the form of revolution, factors of instability to the revolutionary government may open up for the equivalent takeover by the old elites. The question would then be what these processes and factors might look like, which is in many ways what this paper aims to highlight. In a sense, this case study fits into this discourse, which is, at least to a some (see Abrams 2019, 2021), still the dominant current. However, these works predominantly deal with revolution and not counterrevolution. If there is a set of conditions in which states become unstable, then what are the equivalent conditions of stability post instability? Is a partial reaction a part of this process? Counterrevolution is mostly ignored in this context because it is a process that occurs after the conditions for instability are met and is

thus beyond the scope of what scholars are necessarily after. This paper tackles counterrevolution head on.

The fifth generation, which Lawson (2016) outlines as processual and which Allinson (2019a, 2021) sees as not only existing, but already becoming obsolete, is rather vague. Allinson cites Ritter's *The Iron Cage of Liberalism* (2015) as an example of a fifth generation theory, while Lawson sees it as an example of the fourth generation. Some fourth generation works may or may not describe the revolution itself as an event, but the fundamentals of instability, I argue, indicate a process rather than an abrupt change. Nevertheless, in discussing this fifth generation, Allinson also highlights the lack of counterrevolutionary narratives and studies as the main drawback of past generations, and one of the touchstones of what he hopes to see in future research; particularly as his own research focuses on counterrevolution.

In summary, the “established canon” of revolution scholarship as seen through generational framework has progressively made more and more contributions towards an increasingly complex and nuanced understanding of revolutions. These have all independently been important contributions in their own right. What is missing however, is a carefully theorised understanding of counterrevolution in its own right.

3.2 Counterrevolution beyond the Generations

Beyond the generations of sociological research on revolutions, classical political science such as Hobbes' ([1651] 2018), and Rousseau ([1762] 2004) still fail to light a path towards a coherent theory of counterrevolution. Hobbes' theories are at most congruent with the functionalist approach of the, already discussed, first generation in sociology. Rousseau's ([1762] 2004) social contract make some headway in the understanding of Revolution as a reflection of the will of the people, but little as to the meaning of a counterrevolution. The greater will of the people is absolute, and in the resulting totality there is little room to understand discord, or why differing wills would manifest. Modern state formation theories (see Fukuyama 2012, 2015) have more room for a processual understanding of political developments. Nevertheless, they still lack an explicitly formulated discussion and analysis of counterrevolutions.

Arguably, the most fitting school of thought in a processual understanding of politics is found in parts of the Marxist tradition. Though Lawson (2016) makes specific reference to Tilly's body of work (see Tilly 1978, 1992, 1993), he is not placed within the generational framework, but rather as a step beyond it; perhaps because much of his work breaches broader subjects than revolution per se. Tilly is not only clear about the Marxist root of his analysis (1978:13–43), but also the importance of Trotsky's *History of the Russian Revolution* ([1930] 2017) to his own concept of a revolutionary situation and the idea of dual power (1978:190–94). When Tilly (1992) broaches state formation he does this from a position of conflict and material conditions; a view based on a tradition of revolution scholarship ultimately developed on his ideas of a revolutionary situation and the nuances between coups, civil wars, and revolutions (Tilly 1978:198). Counterrevolution is not explicitly engaged with as a case study in his work but can be roughly defined as: an action contextualised in a situation of dual power with multiple conglomerations fighting for the capture of power. In one moment, the state, controlled by a coalition of interested groups may lose power by inaction or inability, but in the next the distribution of resources may differ for a new revolutionary situation to arise, or in this case a potential for reaction. However, this approach is still limited to a domestic understanding of the takeover of power itself. It fails to directly explain the international nature of reaction against the revolutions of 1848.

What Tilly does point towards is the older Marxist literature which accounts for the intertwined nature of societies. Directly cited is Trotsky, but there are others then and now which have stressed the transnational nature of political developments (see Luxemburg 2008; Rosenberg 2013; Trotsky [1936] 2004, [1972] 2008, 2012, [1930] 2017). Building on this, the closest to a true exploration of counterrevolution in this sense has been done by Allinson (2019b) in his work on the counterrevolution in Egypt. It is with this tradition in mind that I set out to understand the counterrevolutionary case of the Second French Republic and its tie to counterrevolution in Europe as a whole at the time.

3.3 A Theory of Intersocial Agents in Revolution and Counterrevolution

Any new theoretical development has to fit into an established web of understanding. The immediate surrounding web constitutes, in so far as this paper is concerned, the recent theoretical developments in Allinson (2019b), the processual ontology pursued by Lawson

(2016:111, 2019), and the established international and structural tradition found in both recent and older scholarship (see Ritter 2015; Rosenberg 2013; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978, 1992, 1993; Trotsky [1930] 2017). It also briefly borrows from network theory in order to contextualise intersocial agent placement between states. The theory is based on the evidence presented in the case study in the next section through an inductive/abductive process.

In the analysis of Egypt, the contribution of Allinson (2019b) has been to push towards an understanding of counterrevolution as tied to social processes that transcend borders; what has been termed “intersocial” by Lawson (2019:8). Allinson’s paper briefly identifies how counterrevolution following the Arab spring in Egypt successfully took power both through the incorporation of revolutionary discourse as well as through intersocial forces organising across borders with a political agenda. He argues that the discourse that elites utilised anchored their actions to a Nasserist tradition, at least in explicit terms. More importantly, he highlights the role of Egyptian elites’ integration in a larger network of financial networks in the Gulf region. This goes beyond the understanding of international pressure in a structural sense (for an example of this, see Skocpol 1979) because its focus is shifted from states as absolute agents to any social element within states. If domestic occurrences are explained on a class-based level, with intra-class divisions as an important part (Guyver 2016; Tilly 1978), then why treat states as unified and coherent bubbles closed on the edges? I do not argue that one should “imagine there’s no countries,” as Lennon put it; states matter in so far as they do conduct policy based on territorial control, but they are not immune to external influence through their component parts. In an unpublished pilot study in which much of the foundation of this paper was laid, I was able to condense the theoretical approach in Allinson’s Egyptian case study (2019b) into a figure. This figure has been reworked slightly into what is now Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Graphical representation of elements of Allinson's (2019b) theoretical framework.

As much as this approach is beneficial on its own, it is primarily based on the contemporary case of Egypt in the Arab Spring. Further, it is focused on demonstrating the international context of counterrevolution in that same case. For 1848 France, the international context has already been described, at least when it comes to the spread of revolutionary fervour (see Körner 2000; Weyland 2009). What is needed is to understand the international context of counterrevolution. In essence, how did counterrevolutionary discourse and action spread across borders? How did groups act when faced with unfolding events not just at home, but abroad? Though important, this paper's focus is not on the historical context or the strategies of international "catch up". Rather, I focus on the specific mechanism of the connection between domestic discourse and international elites through what can broadly be termed as intersocial forces.

I argue that the traditional view of international relations can be illustrated by Figure 2 below. In this view each state constitutes a polity in which interconnected agents, whether collective groups or individuals, attempt to capture control of the polity and guide its internal and external policy. In some sense this is somewhat analogous to Bourdieu's fields, though the agents in his model could exist in many fields simultaneously (see Bourdieu 1989). Nevertheless, external policy in this traditional approach is done through the state mechanism; or at least studied this way. In this lens the state becomes an independent entity tied only by geography and contract to other states. The networks between agents within states here is no coincidence, as it will play a role in the next figure. Here the agents, be they groups or people, only have significant internal ties to one another within each state. It may very well be that they have connections to the outside, but in this traditional approach only internal connections carry any meaning as they are generally the players in a position to take power over their respective polities.

Figure 2: Graphical representation of the traditional view of international relations.

Though more manageable in the sense that it allows for a more defined search area, this model leaves a rather problematic imprint as it obfuscates the reality of an intertwined world. In this model, the international is a black box separate from the complex actions of the agents within. But borders and state control are not physically manifested binaries. What the case of the Catholic clergy in this paper demonstrates is the complex relationship of a group within a state in relation to a “foreign” process, highlighting the lack of borders in a social sense. Thus, states can contend for control over areas, with new polities forming and overlapping in certain groups. Groups and individuals may also identify or qualify to identify with a multitude of state

loyalties. Added to this, there might be non-state collectives that act across state boundaries. In all cases agents can be situated on multiple loyalties and connections, bound more by the bonds to other agents than their immediate polity.

Political fugitives may for instance have conceivably strong ties to the political players in their origin state. Similarly, traders, whether on a local or a global scale, constantly exist within and between traditional political boundaries. In effect, every individual may be positioned between different clusters and realities. The question is the extent to which a group of players finds themselves in a position of leverage between their respective domestic contexts. These interstate connections transmit capital across states through unofficial means. I argue that this is precisely what the Catholic clergy in France during the Second Republic demonstrate as they are forced to navigate both the politics at home and their relation to the Papal politics, the Roman Revolution, and the eventual reaction.

But how does one judge the value of the intersocial position of a group or person? Though one might imagine the majority as mostly “loyal” to one polity, there are surely an infinite number of overlapping combinations and connections between states and groups? Here there are two potential solutions. The first is merely a choice in relation to the process in question. As with any investigation, not every piece of evidence was created equally. In the search for the causes of a plague, it might be more interesting to look at the movement of rodents, people, and lice, than say that of penguins in Antarctica. Secondly, and very much related, the position in this network and the brokerage capabilities are also relevant. The structure of the network affects the average distance between the nodes and their clustering. In the scholarship focused on social networks (on the individual human level) the topology is generally scaled with small average path distances and more preferential attachments (see Barabási 2005; Liljeros et al. 2001; Milgram 1967). Though acting on a larger scale, this paper assumes that the same structural properties apply in the case of social groups as the connections are social in nature. Agents who connect clusters and “fill holes” are generally important transmitters, but also hamper structural integration through the inherent power that the brokerage position awards them (see Burt 2004; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1957; Granovetter 1973). Determining to what degree the French Catholic clergy was in fact the main broker of the French counterrevolution is beyond the scope of this paper. What the results indicate is that the French Catholic clergy do navigate two distinct political realities, and that they thus “fill the hole” between the two clusters that are France and the Papal States.

Figure 3: Graphical representation of unofficial interstate brokers/transmitters (intersocial agents).

Figure 3 above, is a representation of this new theoretical approach which marries the intersocial perspective and the tradition of network theory, moving away from methodological nationalism. The figure, as with the previous ones is only an abstract sketch of the concepts. There may be inner sub-polities within a state, cross border polities, and agents with allegiances to an indefinite number of polities. The actual topology of the networks may not accurately reflect either the assumed scaled ties or the true form of these ties. They do however facilitate in visualising a part of this highly abstract discussion. A similar figure can be seen in the form of Figure 4 in the conclusion section, demonstrating the position of the Catholic clergy in France between these two “worlds”. On the subject of the “true topology”, it is worth pointing out that though it is a worthwhile endeavour for future papers, this work is solely concerned with the broker position of the Catholic clergy between France and the Papal States in the context of the Spring of Nations. A map of social groups and their ties across organisations at a specific point in time is all too large of an undertaking with little immediate relevance.

Nevertheless, the evidence highlighted by the apparent dual relationship of French Catholics in 1848–52 to Rome and Paris demonstrates the complexities that are necessary to consider in the future development of revolution scholarship. Revolutions as processes are more than a statement; it opens up a new understanding of political processes in general, as well as the relations between agents with ties to multiple polities. The theory formulated on the basis of this case study helps to shift the focus of international ties from the official mechanisms of international relations to the unofficial intersocial relations. As with Allinson's (2019b) case study, it shifts from the immediate foreign policy of states, which are nevertheless mentioned, to the impacts of the interests of regional and global agents. In so doing, the theory helps to bridge the understanding of counterrevolution across borders which historians failed to address when dealing with the Spring of Nations.

4. Method

4.1 Abduction & Case Study Methodology

Though originally intended as a comparative case study between various states and processes of revolution and counterrevolution in Europe in 1848, the encounter with the empirical data led the research in a different direction. In its inception, the plan was to perform a straightforward deductive test of Allinson's (2019b) general framework on 1848 France. This was partially explored in the previously mentioned pilot study. Intent on further developing this initial idea, I delved deeper into both the literature on the Second Republic and revolution scholarship. Here the process became abductive in nature, and instead of a clear narrative I was confronted with the need for broader theory on counterrevolution and the cross-border nature of the processes of 1848–52 that goes beyond Allinson's thesis. Previous research, empirical data, and theoretical literature were all read in tandem, in a process of discovery and hermeneutic reinterpretation. It should be quite clear that this, to a large extent, constitutes a theory paper; but one brought about through the empirical evidence rather than deductively constructed and tested. As such it should also be clear that the linear structure of the paper itself does not reflect the nature of how this research was actually conducted. As alluded to in the theory section, the “new” theoretical model presented is drawn from the empirical evidence. However, formal structural requirements favour the presentation of that theory under the same section as the discussion of its theoretical roots. The analysis is largely one of a special case

substantiating general principles, but in practice abductively produced. Caution should therefore be taken when generalising the theory to other cases.

A popular method in the field of revolution scholarship is to apply a comparative historical approach (e.g. Moore [1966] 1993; Ritter 2015; Skocpol 1979). Comparative case studies are more suited to extracting common causal mechanisms that may offer generalisable conclusions, though such generalisability is often also not a primary strive as case selection is made on the basis of themes over the formality of Mill's methods of agreement and difference (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009; Ritter 2014:4; Skocpol 2015:36). Comparative case studies are nevertheless resource intensive endeavours and are often reserved for researchers with the means to dedicate time to monographs. The aim of this paper is after all to explore an element of counterrevolution, not to find any necessary—or sufficient—cause (see Mahoney et al. 2009). A comparative analysis would therefore be ill suited, at least at first, to answer questions not relating to causal mechanisms. The comparative approach would be more suited to understand commonalities between counterrevolutionary movements during the period and beyond rather than understand a specific process.

A case study is therefore a far better approach not only in terms of resources, but in actually addressing the conundrum of counterrevolution across borders between 1848–52. Moreover, case studies not only provide a useful foundation for future research, but, done correctly, may provide generalisable conclusions to a greater extent than is often attributed to the method (Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg 1991; Gerring 2004). Case studies are also established within revolution scholarship, and, as seen in the study of the Egyptian counterrevolution conducted by Allinson (2019b), are highly relevant in the move towards a processual understanding of revolutions. Case studies allow for an in depth understanding that may later prove generalisable. Its main shortcoming, as already mentioned, is the potential for not being explicitly generalisable. But that “flaw” is only a flaw in so far as the researcher seeks generalisability across cases. Though desirable, what is more valuable is that the method applied is transparent and reproducible. Another researcher may in fact draw a slightly different set of conclusions from the material, but the sources are stated, and I try my best to back up my argument with as many independent and reliable sources as possible. Whether conclusions drawn from one case are applicable or have to be modified to suit other cases is for those future case studies to conclude.

4.2 Case Selection & Research Process

As discussed, the abductive nature of the process meant that the case was not preselected and tested against a theory. Rather, the case presented itself along with the theoretical possibilities as I delved into the world of the Second French Republic, Pius IX, and the Roman Republic. Other potential agents that complicate the picture of international relations and revolutionary processes could have presented themselves. At one point the role of the United Kingdom, or rather elites tied to the internal political processes in the UK, seemed an intriguing road to pursue. This became particularly interesting after the relationship of the Catholic clergy and the Papal States with the Second Republic came to light. The direct empirical material, at least through secondary sources, was rather limited however, and the focus fell entirely on the Catholic connection.

It can be rather daunting to imagine all possible international connections flowing through any particular individual or, for the purposes of this paper, group. A disputed border village may in fact constitute a case of a group with cross-polity allegiance, but their overall role in counterrevolutionary processes may be rather low. Here, size and influence—the number of connections to other groups—matter. Moreover, it must be a group for which there are enough records of to provide a substantial narrative. The potential influence of the clergy, their spread, and their multi-class presence (Calfano, Oldmixon, and Gray 2014; Piketty 2020; Smith 2008) as well as the fact that they had a direct relation to the Papal States, means that they probably stood out for good reason. Because of its special relationships the Catholic clergy may therefore end up being a unique case. I can only hope that future research is able to analyse other cases that are not as clear-cut as this one.

The process itself was conducted in an, already discussed, abductive fashion, though formally structured according to the outlined methodology of Ritter (2014). The first step was an initial introductory reading of the topic. This led to preliminary conceptions parallel to the theoretical considerations outlined above. Once the intricacies of the Catholic connection presented themselves, I formalised the process to focus on exploring the Catholic clergy in particular. The most relevant secondary sources on The Second Republic, the Spring of Nations, and the Roman Republic of 1849 were selected. This was done first in relation to recent contributions, but then to common influential works in these more recent contributions. For France, and the Spring of Nations more generally, these were outlined under the historical perspectives section

of this paper. The literature on the Roman Republic of 1849 was not emphasised under previous literature only because it was not the starting point for the questions raised in the paper, though it shares similar theoretical characteristics.

Why is it that this source material is discussed under previous research and not here? Because each one, as was mentioned in that section, ultimately argues for a specific view of the reasons behind the French Revolution of 1848, or otherwise paints a general historiographical picture of the time given epistemological tastes. The list includes the works of Price, Guyver, Fortescue, and Collins, but also others and is too extensive to go into detail about here. Despite divergences of opinion as to what caused “the” revolutions, they all provide historical material that can be cross referenced between themselves. More importantly no one approaches the question of counterrevolution in the sense breached in this case, which leaves the resulting source data untarnished by biases, collective or otherwise. Generally, the information on the clergy in these sources is tangential, precisely because it is ignored, as was illustrated in the introductory section. The exception to this is Collins (1923), who nevertheless, as already discussed, lacks any argument on the why and how, and is more concerned with the chronology of the involvement of Catholic clergy.

One of the pitfalls of historical case study research is that of infinite detail. Therefore, a form of intuitive data saturation constituted the deciding factor in the decision of when to seize further data collection. I analysed the data by relating my notes to different themes that presented themselves as patterns began to emerge. The theoretical framework presented earlier was born out of this. Finally, a narrative was constructed on the basis of the evidence and the theory it presented.

In presenting the narrative, I have attempted to be as mindful of the uninitiated reader as possible, both in how I present the subject and in the clarity of the prose (see Linton 2019:7–13; Orwell [1946] 2004:102–20). In constructing the narrative, I have also to the best of my ability tried to back up any claims relevant to the conclusions with more than one source. This has not always been possible as accounts specific to French clergy in 1848 are limited. The general agreement between sources nevertheless indicates an overall coherence between historical narratives despite differences in their final interpretations.

4.3 Ethics, Reflexivity & Assumptions

Though ethical considerations are often the trademark of the sociologist who ventures into the field and is actively engaged in the production of knowledge through their interaction with their subjects, whether directly or through their surveys, I believe that research that relies on secondary data, as this one does, can also benefit from openly coming to terms with the role of the researcher. Historical case studies, particularly ones that deal with historical subjects no longer living, do not generally need to worry about privacy issues or the interference of observation. In their production they are however still subject to the researcher's temporal and individual gaze. Though neither the historical position of the researcher nor the hermeneutic cycle of interpretation can be nullified (see Gadamer 2013), I hope that the methodology applied is clear enough so that, at the very least, my contemporaries can replicate the results produced and come to a similar conclusion.

Other aspects relating to normative questions on how the conclusions here can come to be applied by different agents are also worth a brief mention. Some academic works can be used to legitimise violence (see Geras 1989). In the same fashion there is a slim chance that an authoritarian or reactionary regime could use the theory in this paper to their own ends. But such considerations are harmful in the long run. They can lead to a form of paralysis by analysis that by extension can incite unwarranted self-censorship. I cannot decide beforehand how someone will interpret me. Moreover, this paper stays away from drawing any normative conclusions and focuses rather on interpreting what was.

5. From Revolutionaries to Reactionaries 1848–52

“...its predecessor in 1789, so celebrated in history, had been but a flash of light in our darkness. Half a century later, however, its twin had every mark of brilliant radiance. We had seen it coming, we studied it, we understood it, we admired it.”

– *Benjamín Vicuña MacKenna* ([1876] 2000:3)

5.1 Disposition

The case study is structured in a chronological fashion. As the material pointed towards the duality of the clergy in relation to the events in France and in the Papal States, the position of the Papal government is contrasted at every moment to the position of the Catholic clergy in France proper and then discussed accordingly. The argument, at its root, boils down to the existence of intersocial agents that transmit and mediate political capital and bridge developments across states. The Catholic clergy in France during the Second French Republic is a clear example of this. By breaking down the case into chronological snapshots I aim to demonstrate to the reader that relationship while also showing its nuances from moment to moment. In the structure and prose, I try to present the case with an uninitiated reader in mind, and so raise not only the directly relevant facts, but also the immediately relevant background. Hopefully this aids in its understanding rather than detract too much from the purely theoretical points. Figure 4, and particularly Figure 5 in the conclusion serve as illustrations of the main findings that arise in this section. Figure 5 can be especially handy to have at hand when reading the following analysis.

The period under observation stretches from the February Revolution of 1848 in Paris to the establishment of the Second French Empire in December 1852; that is to say the life of the Second French Republic. This period of time is divided into five sections in which the positions are compared and contrasted around particular important moments for The Second Republic. These are: the establishment of the Republic and the revolutionary events of February, the period following the decree of a new republican government up until and including the June reaction, the months after the June Reaction up until and including the election in December 1848, the presidency of Louis Napoleon and the invasion of the Roman Republic (April 1849–July 1849), and finally the path to the coup d'état in December 1851 and the proclamation of the Second Empire in January 1852.

5.2 A Tale Between Two Societies

5.2.1 Initial Liberalism (1840s–Spring 1848)

To academics of the twenty-first century, the Papal States, nowadays known as the Vatican, might quickly be treated as an intransigent agent of conservatism and reaction. Viewed in the long run this prejudice may very well approach reality. However, as a polity with a geopolitical presence, the policy positions of the Papal States and their Head of State have had to adapt.

Papal power does not last over a thousand years as it did without at least some flexible political manoeuvring. It might therefore be assumed that political survival and control is the *modus operandi* for Papal power just as much as for any other polity, and thus the constant pursuit of dogmatism a non-pragmatic solution. This is only an assumption however and does not directly explain the position of French Catholic clergy at the time but helps to situate the actions of the Papacy which then permeate to France.

For the events of 1848–52 this is particularly relevant as Pope Pius IX had only recently been installed in 1846. Entering at a time of rising desires for a united Italy, the new Pope looked favourably towards proposals of an Italian state with the Pope as its head of state. To this end, perhaps as a move to garner popularity and to lay some sort of foundation towards a Papal Italian Union, political prisoners were released, and an implicit commitment towards some form of popular representative assembly was made (Bruun 1958:63–64; Collins 1923:148). This liberalism arguably permeated and affected the political position of the French Catholic clergy during the February revolution, as shall be discussed.

This initial Papal position suggests the aforementioned flexibility of the Papacy in its temporal (worldly and secular) concerns. That is, that despite a façade of idealism on the part of the Church, its geopolitical actions were pragmatic. There is no indication that these early set of reforms under Pope Pius IX were made on a purely idealistic ground. If anything, the release of political prisoners, which would come to backfire, was a shrewd geopolitical gamble for Italian unification. Regional powers such as the Habsburg Empire and Sardinia-Piedmont received this latter news with indignation (Bruun 1958:64). Moreover, this pre-revolutionary lull is probably not indicative of any position the Papal States were likely to take against outright revolutionary forces. Given the history of radical revolutionaries to oppose religion and by extension Catholicism, any revolt which reflected those of the First Revolutionary period between 1789–1815 would most likely be met with suspicion and trepid anticipation, as was the case in the revolution of 1830 which overthrew the Bourbons for the “liberal” regime of the Orléanist monarchy (Collins 1923:333). “Support”, if one can call it that, for the Napoleonic regime between 1804–1808 was one done not out of good will but as a result of extensive negotiations in the form of the Concordat of 1801, which secured the legal status of the Catholic church in France and ended the exile of the Catholic clergy that began during the Revolution (Collins 1923:14; Englund 2004:180–85). As such, even that brief stint of support for a semi-revolutionary regime was in essence only an act of pragmatic self-preservation.

When the revolution did break out in Paris in February 1848, things unfolded very quickly, but the local Catholic press was eager to embrace the revolution. On the one hand this was either a reaction to the relatively lukewarm relations between the Catholic church and Louis Phillipe I on a personal and political level (Collins 1923:47), or on the other hand a defensive move based on a recollection of the violent attempts to eradicate the church under the First Republic (Collins 1923:17; Guyver 2016:73). It seems likely that this initial embrace of liberalism reflected an adaptive strategy, also seen in the Papal States relative to its geopolitical ambitions and developing reality. If the legitimacy of the July monarchy under Louis Phillipe I was as hollowed as suggested (see Fortescue 2005; Price 1972), coming out in its defence would only have placed the Catholic Church in further peril. As the Catholic *L'Ére Nouvelle* paper wrote in March 1848:

What divine reason is there why we should oppose the establishment of a Republic in France? Assuredly none.... There is therefore no duty, religious or divine, to oppose the will of France, if at this moment she prefers the republican to the monarchical form. That is a matter of opinion, not of faith. (qtd. in Collins 1923:48)

This embrace of the revolution, though possibly rooted in fear, was invariably aided, or at least not hindered by the liberalism of the Papal States. Pius IX, beset by constitutional concessions in Naples and Sicily that predated Paris, made further liberalisations to the Papal government in March 1848 (Bruun 1958:65). This may very well have been interpreted as a further consent towards a revolutionary embrace. The silent acknowledgment of the revolutionary government in Paris by the Pope may have been rooted in further geopolitical considerations. Given Papal ambitions on Italy, a counterbalance against Austrian incursion and a potential check against Sardinia-Piedmont was welcome in the form of France; so much so that the government in Paris had promised its military support for the Pope even before the Revolution (Guyver 2016:149–50; Taylor 1934:54–55). In the wake of the establishment of the provisional government in Paris, portraying the Papacy as an embracing and even reformist institution may have been the result of centuries of hard-earned lessons. Even though the church was still an important element in the cultural life of French rural society (Guyver 2016:91; Price 1972), this survivalist adaptation was nevertheless embraced, it seems, as a strategy in reaction to the events unfolding

both in Paris and in Rome. The clergy in France embrace the Republic, but only because the Pope had not condemned it.

What this period indicates is the subtleties of revolution and counterrevolution as a process; an intersocial one. The Catholic clergy could justify its embrace of revolution in Paris through the liberalisations in Rome. In a sense the dialogue of liberalism within French clergy was established not from “internal” events only but mediated through their ties to the Papal States. This adds a layer of complexity to a narrative of counterrevolutionaries always being an immediate and permanent feature of a revolution. Moreover, it demonstrates the role of “external” processes in the unfolding “internal” processes. Among the clergy, the Revolution and the Republic were embraced with open arms. As far as their discourse is concerned, there is little in February 1848 that indicates that the clergy was a natural enemy to Republicanism and the revolutionaries. As will be discussed, the Catholic clergy undoubtedly supported reactionary moves in Rome, and eventually the more complex reaction in Paris. Early on however, the liberalism of the new Pope Pius IX, pragmatically fuelled or not, seems to have carried over to the discourse of the clergy in Paris. This highlights the processual nature of revolutions and counterrevolutions which previous scholarship has generally failed to address. If players can change positions throughout, it by definition is more dynamic than the fixed conceptions of it as one event with predefined political boundaries based on the result.

5.2.2 Ambivalence and Cold Feet (Spring 1848–Autumn 1848)

The initially positive attitude of Rome and local French Catholic clergy towards the revolution seems to have sustained for a while. As Catholic influence was largely left to its own devices under the new republic, there was little reason for local clergy to express any desires for more radical reforms. The close relationship between parish priests and the working masses did however seem to make many Catholic clergy in France initially sympathetic to the cause of proto-socialism, or at the very least the welfare of working people, which they justified through the gospel (Collins 1923:84). On the other hand, the clergy quickly fell over on the side of a moderate approach, fearful of the undertones of those who wished for a “social” republic, and moreover actively organised in favour of moderate republicans during the elections for the constituent assembly (Collins 1923:110–12).

Again, at this large scale, individual goodwill as a motive for this should be questioned. As a social group, there is again the hint that this was an adaptive strategy taken with the previous

revolution in mind, thus mirroring the borrowed discourse of revolutionary legacy discussed by Allinson (2019b), but also with interpretations of the liberal positions which the holy mother church had taken under Pius IX. This becomes particularly clear as the clergy and their media quickly shifted their positions toward a more conservative stance over the following months. For though the Catholic clergy and, by extent, the Papal position seemed to embrace the revolution, it should at most be described as an acceptance of the moderate and liberal republic, not the perceived ideological threat of the truly radical; the new atheist Jacobins who wished to usher in a new age (Collins 1923:107).

When the June Days of 1848 broke out, the Archbishop of Paris, Monseigneur Denis Auguste Affre, was mortally wounded in an attempt at an unofficial parley at the barricades—by what seems to have been the act of a lone insurgent (Guyver 2016:126). As a consequence of this episode, the Catholic clergy definitively sided with the winning reactionary forces of “moderation”; though into two camps, one liberal and one more conservative (Collins 1923:127). There was some discussion as to the symbolic meaning of the archbishop’s death (Guyver 2016:126–30), but it was ultimately used as a portrayal of the insurgents barbarity—despite people behind the barricades having been the first to attempt to save the archbishop’s life (Guyver 2016:126). In Marxist readings (Marx [1852] 2012), as discussed under previous interpretations of “1848”, this event (the specific involvement of the clergy excluded) marks the end of the revolution. Yet, despite the bloodshed in France, the rest of Europe was still alight, and the Republic technically still the reigning regime. Without the benefit of hindsight, any number of things could still have happened; particularly given the presidential elections held later in the year.

As for the Church, the government of Pius IX, and the Papal States, the political situation in Italy from March to June 1848 mirrored the same ambivalence seen in Paris (or rather, the ambivalence of the clergy in Paris mirrored that of the Pope). In March, Austria was also beset by political revolt, and Habsburg holdings in northern Italy saw bloody street fights triggered by Italian rebels (Taylor 1934:80–136)—a revolt which the Papal States initially supported militarily but withdrew from within the span of a few weeks (Bruun 1958:65–66). Spurred by continent wide revolutions, and the memory of 1789, the revolutionaries of the Italian Peninsula were treated with increased suspicion and fear by the government of Pope Pius IX, which led to a rapid decrease in the popularity of the, up until then, “liberal” Pope (Bruun 1958:67). It should be said that liberals of the “traditional” Anglo-Saxon bourgeois disposition, which are

often mentioned in the context of this case, were conservative by anachronistic standards; they were often slavers, authors of the racist discourse that bloomed at the time, and promoters of an elitist understanding of the “demos” (see Losurdo 2014). The similarities between the position in Rome and the actions of the Catholic clergy of the church in France are striking, both before and following the first revolutionary months. Once again, the role of Catholic clergy as a form of intersocial player in an unfolding process seems to come to the forefront. As the Papal States grew more reluctant towards revolutionaries, so did the French Catholic clergy. The connection of the clergy transcended borders, and their involvement in political events in Paris thus bridges the politics of Rome and Paris without resorting to the official mechanisms of interstate relations. Through them, counterrevolution is thus spread, and helps to illuminate its eventual success.

5.2.3 Papal Reaction Fuels Louis Napoleon (Autumn 1848–Spring 1849)

With elections in Paris on the horizon in December 1848, the triumphant right was now torn internally. The alliance between the more conservative forces and the moderate republicans was now the new public political line of conflict. Among a small, but not entirely insignificant, minority of ultra-royalist there was even talk about the reinstating the Bourbons (Collins 1923:317; Guyver 2016:108–21). For the most part however, the general focus point was the issue of the upcoming election. Though popular early on among those not directly affected by the repression of socialism, General Cavaignac, who had crushed the June uprising, was first and foremost a republican. This fact did not necessarily sit well with those who wished for a return to a monarchic regime (Guyver 2016:139–40). He was also faced with the rapid rise of Louis Napoleon upon the latter’s return from exile. The self-proclaimed heir to the Bonapartist legacy had popular appeal among both left and right leaning lower classes, which, coupled with universal male suffrage, made him a strong candidate. Shrewd political manoeuvring also brought many from the Orléanist ranks to his side as promises were made but cards held close to the chest (Fortescue 2005:143–54; Price 1972:211–16). Ultimately, even legitimists sided with Louis Napoleon for the sake of unity and opportunism (Guyver 2016:161–64; Price 1972:217–25).

In these months the role of the Catholic clergy came to be fundamental as their organisational contact with such large sections of the populace, particularly in rural areas, meant they were a decisive factor in swaying voters. Especially given that candidates stood, at least superficially, for very similar ideals (Collins 1923:144). For a long time, there was an internal debate as to

which candidate the Catholic clergy would support, if any at all (Collins 1923:145–70). Cavaignac even attempted to offer Pius IX asylum in France in late November 1848 after the Pope had taken refuge in Gaeta (Guyver 2016:150). Though the Pope refused this, Cavaignac nevertheless gained favour with Catholics and the Catholic clergy; a fact which seems to have been the aim of the intervention all together—a boost which was ultimately nullified when his true intentions were made public (Collins 1923:159–63). Louis Napoleon, already favoured by this point (though not unanimously) as a result of an electoral program which safeguarded the interests of the Catholic elites (Collins 1923:169–70; Guyver 2016:150–51) and boosted by the synergy of his underlying popularity from other sectors, wrote a letter to the Papal Nuncio published in the Catholic paper *Ami de la Religion* that in effect put him wholeheartedly behind the “genius of Catholicism” and sealed, together with promises of Catholic friendly educational policies, his commitments towards the holy mother church (Collins 1923:185). Several Catholic newspapers came out in his support, which likely only further boosted the synergies between interclass support, the Bonaparte name, and Catholic sentiments; a fact which is further highlighted by the protestant minority largely voting with Cavaignac (Price 1972:218).

Overall developments begin to tie the Papacy directly to the unfolding developments in Paris at this time through the role of the clergy. Perhaps precisely because the spark of revolutionary fervour finally caught up with the Papal States and the clergy was forced to push their own interests more openly. After retracting support from the Italian nationalist risings, internal political instability in the Papal States forced a series of quick changes of Interior Minister (in effect Prime Minister)—by September 1848 Pellegrino Rossi was appointed, a man whom revolutionaries in Italy saw as a conservative reactionary following his disavowal of the revolution in Paris (Collins 1923:150). He was assassinated on 15 November, setting in motion the flight of the Pope to Gaeta and the subsequent proclamation of the Roman Republic later in February 1849 (Bruun 1958:67; Guyver 2016:149).

Papal authority, with an emerging situation of dual power, began to take a clear reactionary turn in an attempt to re-establish itself (Collins 1923:203). The clergy in France had not directly taken to disavowing their own new-born Republic just yet but did favour anyone who came out in their interest and in the support of the temporal power of the Papacy (Collins 1923:207). The apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, explicit support of the Pope’s desire to crush the revolution in Rome and, on the other, open support of their own republic in Paris was bridged by framing the revolutionaries in Rome as agents of chaos, paralleling the discourse

used against “red” republicans in France, thus portraying the now reactionary Pope as a continued moderate liberal in line with the republican values espoused earlier during the Revolution.

In contrast with the earlier periods discussed above, the direct tie of the clergy to the political life of France is even clearer. Through their explicit support of Louis Napoleon and favour of policies in line with the wishes of the Papal States, Catholic clergymen in France were able to leverage their social position to drive through policies and favour candidates which favoured the counterrevolutionary forces in Rome. They bridge the proverbial gap between the republican forces of France, being themselves supposed republicans, and the nascent reactionaries in the Papal States, being themselves loyal to the Pope. The events in Rome and Gaeta therefore play an important part in understanding the political developments in Paris at that point in time. Had the Papacy embraced the Roman Republic, the pressures on Paris may have been very different. This highlights the processual nature of counterrevolutions (see Allinson 2019b; Lawson 2016, 2019). Revolutions are not “finished”, and neither do counterrevolutionaries necessarily arise as explicit agents of reaction. The clergy’s embrace of the revolution showcases, if anything, that even the agents of counterrevolutions can slide to and from openly pro- and anti-revolutionary positions, as well as mask these through their discourse, something highlighted in Allinson’s case study of Egypt (2019b). Moreover, as this case has so far shown, these agents can exist in a multifaceted network of political developments across borders, which then influence their positions over time. This is vital in understanding how the counterrevolution succeeded in France within a greater European context.

5.2.4 Rome and Paris Bound by Blood (Spring 1849–1850)

With the election of the Prince-President Louis Napoleon, who had now essentially allied himself to the Catholic cause both domestically and on the Italian peninsula, it was only a matter of time before a new French intervention was put in motion. There was geopolitical pressure on the French state in favour of intervention for fear of losing out against advances made by either Austria, Sardinia-Piedmont, or Spain, who all expressed a desire to restore the Pope by force to Rome (Collins 1923:197–200; Taylor 1934). Nevertheless, any such action could only successfully pass off with internal support, particularly from the Catholic clergy. French interests on the Italian peninsula stretch as far back as the French state itself, but it was one thing to proclaim these interests openly and another to veil situations as benevolent acts in the

aid of a foreign “universal” ally—an ally who, ever so conveniently, had influence of opinion in a democratic system.

With the new president in place, the rhetoric of Catholic papers went on to express a unanimous desire for and support of military action against the Roman Republic (Collins 1923:207–10). With direct representation in government, the pressure surmounted to unstoppable levels given that such a move, as General Cavaignac himself had calculated, could bring with it national and international popularity as protector of the faith (Collins 1923:211; Guyver 2016:150–51). Though there were certain national pressures from what remained of the socialists and foreign concerns (Collins 1923:212), action nevertheless materialised on 24 April 1849 as Charles Oudinot, the son of the famed Napoleonic Marshall Nicolas Oudinot, was sent at the head of a military force to capture Rome with support from the National Assembly (Bruun 1958:68; Collins 1923:215–16). Though faced with initial defeat, French forces entered Rome on 3 July 1849 thus re-establishing Papal authority (Bruun 1958:68; Guyver 2016:193). The Montagnards (the more radical republicans and socialists) in Paris would later argue that this intervention had been conducted in breach of constitutional law despite the support of the assembly due to its implicit motives (Collins 1923:218–21; Guyver 2016:195). This was however a mass without an audience as the clergy came out in praise of their great defender, the Prince-President, and the Montagnards were in a numerical minority (Collins 1923:221). As a result of their opposition the left was only further weakened by increased repression (Guyver 2016:196).

Curiously, following the capture of Rome, Louis Napoleon manoeuvred to present his private desire for “a constitutional system [that] would prevail in the Papal States, with secularization of the administration, a general amnesty, and the institution of the Code Napoléon.” (Guyver 2016:194). This was rejected by the reactionary triumvirate of cardinals in Rome but supported by both liberals and Catholic representatives in Paris (Guyver 2016:194). France under a Republican regime had thus been instrumental in crushing a fellow Republican regime in favour of the Church. Yet, the proposal was conciliatory. The question is whether this desire of Louis-Napoleons was serious, or whether it was a way to appease the internal discourse in France. In this regard this period seems curious as it on the surface marks a definite shift between the earlier observed cohesion between the desires of temporal Papal power and the explicit statements of representatives of Catholic opinion in France. However, when placed in a strategic perspective, these apparent discrepancies can in fact be reconciled. As the minister of

public instruction and worship, the Comte de Falloux, a staunch Catholic, remarked: “Catholic convictions were not the only decisive considerations, the Catholic interests and French interests were indissolubly linked.” (qtd. in Collins 1923:216). The intervention in Rome by France was on the one hand a geopolitical gamble, but on the other hand, the “liberally” infused rhetoric of French Catholics meant that they had to balance their Papal loyalties with their domestic realities. To French Catholics, who now after all lived under a Republic whose president they had explicitly supported, and who had anchored their narrative against the backdrop of the liberal reforms of the Pope in earlier years, the “moderate” way was only natural. To praise the intervention but renege on the rhetoric of liberty would be irreconcilable with the realities that faced the clergy at home. Whereas before the relationship seemed to be one of largely mediating the wishes of the Papal States in France, the clergy now manoeuvred in reverse; in effect, it was now the political developments of Paris that mediated the clergy’s relation to Rome. French Catholic clergy attempted to mediate the moderate republic with the hard-line counterrevolutionary Papal authority and failed. But as the Pope had appointed a triumvirate of cardinals and taken a step back from political involvement (Guyver 2016:194), such a position by French Catholics did not have to contradict the authority of the Holy See itself. They would now be forced to find a new way to conciliate this contradictory situation between the discourse in Paris and in Rome. This way would be found in further reneging on republican rhetoric, which would ultimately lead to the end of the Second French Republic.

5.2.5 Catholic Influence and the Fall of the Republic (1850–52)

Though the Revolution in Paris might arguably already have come to an end in June 1848 (Marx [1852] 2012), the Republic officially lived on for a time. The strong position brought on by Louis Napoleon’s popularity put him in conflict with conservative forces out to undo universal suffrage (Guyver 2016:187). It is unclear if these reforms were targeted to undermine the president’s power, if they were a move to consolidate power in the hands of liberal-conservative elites, or if it was a combination of both. Given that the constitution limited the Prince-President’s time in office to one term, it is possible that that the opposition in the assembly hoped to wait him out and elect less of a wildcard in the upcoming elections. Clerical opinions to policies began to diverge more in internal matters during this period. The Falloux laws, which were largely favourable to the clergy by eliminating the state’s monopoly on education, was nevertheless questioned by several Catholic opinion pieces as threatening the independence of clerical education; so much so that an open split in the “Catholic party” was declared in January 1850 (Collins 1923:267–307).

This political split signals a shift in the rather united front of opinion expressed in Catholic papers since the Revolution in 1848. When considered against the backdrop of a rather secure position of Catholic interest, this shift can be seen as a possible natural step. Without a common threat in Paris or in Rome, Catholics could now afford to make their internal differences public as they began to shape the state according to their will. The opposition to the Falloux laws was put to rest once schools began to open and the clergy participated in their success first-hand (Collins 1923:309). Papal opinion on the matter was even brought to bear in a mildly favourable tone that stressed the necessity for compromise (Collins 1923:309).

Placated by the political goodwill of the Prince-President, ecclesiastical power entirely favoured the moves of Louis Napoleon in his 1851 coup, the new constitution, and the Imperial plebiscite of that same year (Collins 1923:310–44; Guyver 2016:245–98). The Second Empire was thus built on expressed placation of the power of the Catholic clergy, an entirely different approach to that of the Revolutionary Empire of the uncle, Napoleon I. Fearing that radical republicans would gain influence in a new election, the Catholic clergy hedged their bets on the powers which had already shown to favour them rather than gamble on a Bourbon restoration (Collins 1923:319; Guyver 2016:245–90).

The Catholic-Imperial political alliance would not last indefinitely (Guyver 2016:293), but that is beyond the boundaries of this case. The papacy itself in the period leading up to dissolution of the Republic had few direct concerns with France. Aside from the support of the Falloux laws, the temporal power of the church shook hands with France, but at an arm's length. The ambitions of imposing a liberal compromise in the Italian region fell on deaf ears as Papal authority rolled back into a conservative and repressive stance (Guyver 2016:194). As a consequence of the perceived let down of the church towards the unification movement, the Pope was ruled out as a possible head of a united Italy. The Papal States had attempted to, as always, play off powers against each other in the hopes of diminishing dependence on any one foreign power (Taylor 1934). Though they were indebted to the French Republic and Louis Napoleon, this was mediated by Austrian interests, with both French and Austrian troops stationed in Rome for a longer period of time (Guyver 2016:193).

In this period the intersocial role of the clergy is not as evident. This is largely due to a lack of sources directly linking the developments in Rome and in Paris. As historians generally focus

on domestic events, the lack of a direct political link in the form of the Roman Revolutionaries and French intervention leads to a deprioritising of the clergy and Papal events in the narrative of French political life. With the victory of the reaction in Rome, this traditional approach to the study of events through a domestic lens effectively closes the chapter on the Roman Revolution. Nevertheless, the little that is discussed does continue to highlight the role of the clergy as an intersocial player. Just as a classic counterrevolutionary reaction triumphed in Rome, French clergy openly began entertaining the idea of a Bourbon restoration (which they ultimately turned down in favour of Napoleon III) and turn against the Republic in fear of a renewed radicalism. Thereby, the very rhetoric that once justified the defence of a republic against radicals is used to entertain and justify the end of the republican regime. It could be argued that the counterrevolution in Rome enabled the rise of the Second French Empire. And here I argue not only in the sense that Louis Napoleon was legitimised internally, but that the very course of political developments, the process if you will, in Rome, enabled the clergy to change their discourse and delegitimise the Republic in favour of the Empire. Counterrevolution was thus conveyed from Rome to Paris through the intersocial role of French Catholic clergy. To tie back to the research question of how counterrevolution succeeded, there was no one factor or moment which defined its triumph, rather it was a process that slowly shifted the political reality away from the initial transformative desires of February 1848. The Catholic clergy is vital in understanding this process, not only on its own, but precisely because they had a direct connection to another counterrevolutionary process which intertwined with the French, and that bridging had an impact on its subsequent development.

6. Conclusion

This paper had two main questions at its heart: *how do counterrevolutions succeed, and how did counterrevolution succeed in France during the Second Republic?* As was made clear these questions are too broad for definitive answers. They did however serve as springboards for exploration, and are, at least answered in part. The intersocial work of the Catholic clergy in France demonstrates a deeper level of interconnectedness between seemingly separate processes. The clergy may likely be only one example of a social agent manoeuvring through cross border developments. It does however definitively establish that such processes existed and were relevant. The Catholic clergy in France during the Second Republic navigated two

disparate political realities and unfolding processes, and in so tie together the processes of counterrevolution in Rome and in Paris, inexorably linking the two together, and demonstrating the European nature of counterrevolution at the time. Without the counterrevolution in Rome, it is difficult to understand the counterrevolution in France and the rise of the Second French Empire.

The study of the French Catholic clergy demonstrates an example of the very things which have been lacking in the history of the Spring of Nations and social movements more generally. State apparatuses are often the focus of event-based approaches of social unrest and conflict, at least as they relate to international effects. These narratives separate the international from the “internal” and “domestic”. This case hopefully demonstrates that this is a false dichotomy. There is a vast complexity of cross border relationships which merit consideration and further investigation. The theoretical ramifications of this are discussed under section three. Above all however, the case highlights the role of counterrevolutionary processes and paints a way forward towards process-based understanding of revolutions as a whole. Instead of a focus on the immediate moments of regime change, revolutions and counterrevolutions should be understood as unfolding processes of contention. Social agents can and do adapt their narratives and strategies under the pressure of revolution.

In the unfolding narrative it becomes clear that even before the proverbial bomb of revolution went off in Paris in 1848, the ideological climate in the Catholic clergy was already shaded by the perceived liberal inclinations of the new Pope Pius IX. It is impossible to say with certainty how the clergy would have reacted to the revolution had a more conservative position been the norm in Rome at the outset. It might be argued that the memory of 1789 and the persecution of Catholicism was enough to make the clergy express their support for the Republic. Yet, if this paper demonstrates anything, it is that Rome invariably had an effect on the position of the Church at home in France. As obvious as it may sound, this does not seem to have been adequately acknowledged in previous research. Had Pius IX been more conservative to begin with, it is not unlikely that clergy members would have felt less compelled to proclaim their immediate allegiance to a new revolutionary government. Was this initial liberalism genuine, or masked? With the wisdom of hindsight, it is easy to claim that the clergy were biding their time, waiting to unveil their counterrevolutionary and monarchist tendencies.

Pursuing an answer to this is somewhat futile, because in practice, whether they wanted to or not, their proclaimed allegiance to the Republic also strengthened the legitimacy of the very same. The result of their actions is all that the empirical material provides in this case. As spring turned to summer in 1848, the clergy continued to defend the Republic, but now their position was a relatively moderate one within their political reality. The Pope simultaneously showed a similar moderation when confronted with the Italian uprisings. The two are not tied directly empirically speaking, but moderation, or retreat from radicalism was simultaneous. The clergy were republicans, but not socialists, and the Pope was liberal, but not ready to permanently side against the established geopolitical order.

It is in the autumn of 1848 that the intersocial work of the clergy becomes the most apparent. Faced with an election at home, and a revolution in Rome, the clergy leverages their power to influence the events in Rome. At the same time, the events in Rome influence their own stances at home. When a Republic was proclaimed in Rome, and the Pope made the decision to flee and take a non-conciliatory stance, the clergy in France was faced with a serious dilemma. To support their earlier Republican proclamations, they would, in principle, have had to embrace the Roman Republic; but doing so would have forced them to contradict the highest authority in their organisation: the Pope himself. To go against Papal authority could have caused a schism in the church. To go against the Republicans in Rome could have caused a backlash of opinion for the church in Paris. The solution was to imbue the critique of the Roman Republic with the language of the ongoing process of counterrevolution in Paris. The Roman Revolutionaries were framed as “too radical”, just as the socialists had been in France. This stance not only won favour and ultimately led to the election of Louis Napoleon and the subsequent invasion of Rome, but fundamentally opened up for a backtracking of discourse in favour of the counterrevolution.

With Rome solidly under a conservative Papal regime in the latter part of 1849, the crushing of the revolution had been effectively executed with revolutionary dialogue. Anyone “too radical” was, by this discourse, a threat to the “real” republican. Thus, it is perhaps not so surprising that the regime that triumphed was not a reversal to the Bourbon or Orléanist monarchies, but a third hybrid monarchy which legitimised itself on the vestiges of the Republic and the first French Empire. While undoing the transformative gains of the February Revolution of 1848, Louis Napoleon effectively used this discourse to frame himself as defender of the Republic, despite undermining it at every turn. Here, I argue that the choice of French Catholic clergy to support

the Pope in opposition to the Roman republic, while utilising an anti- “radical” discourse had a profound impact on the French elections of 1848 and the subsequent future of the country.

The clergy were undoubtedly not the only players but held significant power through their widespread influence. Their support of Louis Napoleon was rewarded during his dictatorship with direct sway over policy, as seen in the Falloux laws episode. As described in the empirical section, the period following the fall of the Roman Republic in 1849 and the end of the French Republic in 1852 presents an unfortunate lack of material on the relations between the Catholic clergy and the Papacy. The explicit Papal support of the Falloux laws has to serve as a guide to the proximity of those relations and their continued influence. Papal support of French legislation under Louis Napoleon must be interpreted as an act of support for the regime, and/or the Prince-President himself. The Catholic church was a strong ally of Louis Napoleon’s, not only abroad, but at home. Undoubtedly, their intersocial work played a major role in the unfolding political processes of counterrevolution in the Second French Republic.

In the theoretical section an abstraction of how an intersocial agent’s social network may bridge two distinct polities was presented in Figure 3. In Figure 4 below, the position of the French Catholic clergy is illustrated more clearly as an intermediary between these two worlds. Note that this continues to be an abstraction, and the “real” network as such is not represented in the figure. What it demonstrates is an easily digestible conceptual framework of the results in this paper. The processes described in the empirical section itself are, by their very nature, more complex than a mere assertion. To make the unfolding processes in France and the Papal States described in this paper more accessible, I have condensed these into the flowchart seen in Figure 5 below. To “box” a process into component parts is to by its very definition limit and define it. These boxes should not be seen as absolutes or chronologically bound even though the figure is, for the most part, chronologically defined. Being processes and reactions, they do overlap other processes in both time and space. Moreover, it is important to not assume that the arrows always signify a direct causal relation. The arrows point to both potential causal relations as well as correlations. By correlated I mean for instance the relation between “anti- ‘radical’ discourse” and “Support for intervention against the Roman Republic”; the discourse does not directly cause the support but is rather a factor that feeds into the process of support—the Clergy adopted an anti-radical discourse, and then used this in legitimising an intervention in Rome.

Figure 4: Graphical representation of the intersocial position of French Catholic clergy.

Further, to be noted in Figure 5, is that it does not make a claim that any of the relationships between the various processes are singular. Rather, it focuses on the role of French Catholic clergy, and to that effect demonstrates the important position of that group as a counterrevolutionary agent in this period. The middle “row” constitutes the actions and positions of the French Catholic clergy, the bottom, the unfolding processes in France, and the top the processes in the Papal States. As is made clear, the invasion of the Roman Republic is the culmination of the interaction and involves all three directly. The only non-chronological arrow can be found between “Catholic influence in legislation” and “Continued support for the regime of Louis Napoleon”. This stems from the fact that the continued support came both before and after direct influence in policy and would have been superfluous to repeat. It rather demonstrates the potential feedback loop involved in rewarding particular groups with influence. What becomes clear in the figure is precisely the intermediary role of the clergy in the counterrevolution in France. As the Papacy went reactionary, so did the clergy in France. And the more influence they received, the more they accepted the end of a Republic they had initially embraced. Invariably the picture, was, as stressed in the empirical section, more complex than this. But Figure 5 captures the essential points in the narrative.

Figure 5: Processes in Second French Republic and the Papal States through French Catholic clergy.

This paper has highlighted the importance of intersocial processes for counterrevolution. Future research should continue to test the ideas in this paper against historical cases and find the limits of its applicability within the new and emerging processual study of political and historical sociology. This is as true of a continued demonstration of the importance of counterrevolutionary processes as for the revolutionary movements themselves. In future it may also prove to be of interests to investigate further cases of revolutionary failure, though not in the sense seen here, but in which revolutionary potential is repressed and never allowed to capture any significant power in the first place. Further, research should aim to explore the role of multiple actors in the same process and their relevancy to each other and the interplay between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary networks. As this paper has relied on secondary sources, an important recommendation also comes in the form of how secondary accounts are presented by the historical community in future; the lack of direct international interstate relations through “events” does not necessarily, as seen, mean a lack of impact—“domestic” policy can have a direct impact on the “domestic” life of the citizens of an entirely different polity. Of interest would also be to understand how it is that an initially “liberal” papacy turned reactionary. Here some preliminary ideas of pragmatism are suggested, but ultimately do not explain Roman counterrevolution on its own. Finally, future research must address how social agents navigate disparate political loyalties in practice; this paper demonstrated the impact of the Papal States on the political stances of French clergy, but in future it is important to understand why their loyalties were decidedly with the Pope and not ready to contradict it, as is the case during schisms in the church and in political factions.

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