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NEVER-ENDING LOCKDOWN

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For those who want to break free, but can't.

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Today animals are recognised as sentient beings in various countries. We acknowledge "There is somebody *there* behind those canine eyes, somebody with wants and needs, memories and frustrations."¹ People are slowly becoming more sensitised to the plight of animals who are being confined and instrumentalised by all sorts of institutions. In contrast to the 17th Century philosopher René Descartes, who misunderstood and reduced animals to inanimate objects. As a result, he and others thought that, for example, performing vivisections on captured animals without any form of anaesthesia was justifiable:

Descartes and his followers performed experiments in which they nailed animals by their paws to boards and cut them open to reveal their beating hearts. They burned, scalded, and mutilated animals in every conceivable manner. When the animals reacted as though they were suffering pain, Descartes dismissed the reaction as no different from the sound of a machine that is functioning improperly. A crying dog, Descartes maintained, is no different from a whining gear that needs oil.²

Today's 'zoo' is another widely accepted example of animals being kept in captivity.³ Descending from so-called 'menageries', these 19th century wildlife parks did not show any compassion towards the caged animals resulting in improper care. Through the years, zoos evolved and learned to design artificial sceneries inspired by the animal's natural habitat, the outcome of 'environmental enrichment'.⁴ Nowadays, more and more people take significant measures to improve the living standards of animals in captivity. For example, in 2023, an amendment to the law in the Netherlands will prohibit pens, cages and stables in which animals (pets and livestock) are not given enough room to express normal behaviour.⁵

¹ Tom Regan, *Empty Cages* (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 55.

² Gary L. Francione, 'Animals-Property or Persons?', *The Berkeley Electronic Press (Bepress)*, 2004, 5.

³ Greg Miller, 'Today's Zoos - the Last Menageries', *New Scientist*, accessed 20 August 2021, <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17323265-000-todays-zoos-the-last-menageries/>.

⁴ 'Environmental Enrichment: A Review', *Animal Welfare Institute*, accessed 20 August 2021, <https://awionline.org/content/environmental-enrichment-review>.

⁵ 'Dutch Senate Approves Amendments to the Animal Law, Farmers Concerned | NL Times', accessed 20 August 2021, <https://nltimes.nl/2021/06/02/dutch-senate-approves-amendments-animal-law-farmers-concerned>.

Nevertheless, the word 'captive' or 'confined' still has a negative connotation. Especially after having experienced a temporary confinement ourselves due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Now imagine a never-ending lockdown. While we, humans, focused on returning to our idea of 'normal' – having the ability to move around without any restrictions – as quickly as possible, most captivated animals are stuck in a lockdown forever. Today, there are billions of wild and domesticated animals not only deprived of their freedom but some of them also subjected to mistreating, tormenting and abuse, frequently resulting in horrible deaths.⁶ Their living conditions are often dreadful — an undeserved yet everlasting punishment.

In general, this article investigates whether or not we can justify keeping animals in captivity. First, I will zoom in on the concept of 'captivity'. After, I will discuss different views on keeping animals confined according to several moral theories. As a starting point, in the second chapter, Tom Regan's 'rights theory' serves as the main focus debating a deontological approach. In line with care ethics, I will not only shed light on animal *rights* but also on our *relationship* with animals. In the third chapter, utilitarianism highlights the outcome of certain actions and the importance of consequences, resulting in a discussion on the impact of captivity on both animals and humans. Again, in relation to *care ethics*, albeit a more political kind. To conclude, following Gary Francione's abolitionist approach, an empathetic attitude towards animals is regarded as essential in order to even consider the views of any moral theory.

"THE OKAY THING ON SUNDAY IS WALKING IN THE ZOO"⁷

The reality of non-human animals in captivity

⁶ Some examples:

<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/25/industrial-farming-one-worst-crimes-history-ethical-question>
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/waza-zoos-accused-of-mistreating-animals-wap-report>
<https://www.eurogroupforanimals.org/news/intolerable-suffering-research-animals-revealed-belgium>

⁷ John Berger, *About Looking* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 20.

'Captivity' generally means being deprived of freedom and can be defined as: "The situation in which a living being is kept somewhere and is not allowed to leave."⁸ According to animal organisation PETA, captivity is "The state of being held, imprisoned, enslaved, or confined."⁹ We force animals to live under constant surveillance of human agents; as philosopher Lori Gruen confirms, she states: "Captivity involves the confinement and control of others who are otherwise perfectly capable of living freely and satisfying their own interests."¹⁰ When we lock up human criminals, this generally means they have done something wrong or illegal and possibly cause a risk to society. Animals, on the other hand, are being held captive for no other reason than being who they are.

Animals soon became indispensable in Western culture. They now fulfil a multitude of roles and are of use in all kinds of situations and places: as food, as pets in private homes or shops, as working tools, as clothing, in sanctuaries, in farms, in zoos, in wildlife markets, in circuses, in laboratories, etc. Most of these institutions are non-essential and can be shut down easily. However, according to philosopher Martha Nussbaum, these practices will continue to exist only for the sake of maintaining "[...] the comforts of a way of life that includes the use of other animals as objects for our own gain and pleasure."¹¹ She states that, as we benefit from their exploitation, we often forget to keep the animals' interest in mind. Keeping them in our power has become a habit difficult to unlearn since "Once people get used to a certain luxury, they take it for granted."¹²

As captivity can include all living beings in all kinds of situations, this article does not only focus on wild but also domesticated animals, while "When considering the 'captivity of animals', most writers are referring to wild animals – that is, species who predominantly live elsewhere and otherwise than with humans, and members of that species who are now confined."¹³ Domesticated animals are born in captivity and

⁸ 'Captivity', Cambridge Dictionary, n.d., <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/captivity>.

⁹ PETA, 'Tilikum: Casualty of Confinement (Grades 3-5)', PETA, 5 October 2017, <https://www.peta.org/teachkind/lesson-plans-activities/tilikum-confinement-grades-3-5/>.

¹⁰ Lori Gruen, 'The Ethics of Captivity « On the Human', 2011, <https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2011/06/the-ethics-of-captivity/>.

¹¹ Martha C Nussbaum, 'The Moral Status of Animals', The Chronicle of Higher Education, 3 February 2006, 1, <https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-moral-status-of-animals/>.

¹² Yuval Noah Harari, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind*, trans. John Purcell and Haim Watzman, Popular Science (London: Vintage Books, 2015), 98.

¹³ Lori Gruen, ed., *The Ethics of Captivity* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 9.

have, therefore, no understanding of a free life. On the other hand, wild animals do, they were stripped away from their natural habitat. For example, in 'Blackfish', the famous documentary on the confinement of performing orca Tilikum, John Crowe reveals how they took the animal away from his mother in the wild and states "It felt like kidnapping a little child". Tilikum was forced to trade his rightful ocean home in a lifetime of confinement.¹⁴ Domesticated and wild animals in captivity have something in common: the lack of freedom; therefore, their circumstances are similar.

Nevertheless, humans often make the assumption that some animals live a better life in confinement.¹⁵ However, this assumption is based on the image of a happy dog in a happy household rather than an unhappy pig in a cramped cage awaiting his awful death. In this sense, we can point out the following distinction: "The confinement may be literal – as in a cage or pen – or more figurative – as with an uncaged animal who is nonetheless kept by humans."¹⁶ Hence the difference in circumstances can be striking. We exhibit rather complex, even paradoxical feelings towards animals; we rely on our intuition to decide what species we like to eat, play or work with. We label animals as a result of 'speciesism'¹⁷, being "A prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species."¹⁸ Humans and animals are not equal; moreover, not all animals are equal. In our opinion, some animals are morally more significant than others.¹⁹

In her book, *The Ethics of Captivity*, philosopher Lori Gruen formulates two reasons why, as a direct result of speciesism, animal captivity is generally accepted. First, certain institutions, including slaughterhouses and animal testing labs, are hidden from the public eye. While everyone is aware of the practices of these institutions, many never set foot in any of these places and, therefore, will never know what truly happens behind closed doors.²⁰ In other words, "Few people are aware of the ways in which they [animals] are mistreated and even fewer actually see the abuse."²¹ As a result, we (un)willingly agree with captivity as it eventually improves our daily life quality.

¹⁴ Gabriela Cowperthwaite, *Blackfish* (Magnolia Pictures, 2013).

¹⁵ Heather Browning and Walter Veit, 'Freedom and Animal Welfare', *Animals* 11, no. 4 (17 April 2021): 2, <https://doi.org/10.3390/ani11041148>.

¹⁶ Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 9.

¹⁷ The term is created by Richard Ryder in 1970s and later often used by philosopher Peter Singer.

¹⁸ Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New rev. es (New York, NY: Avon Books, 1990).

¹⁹ Peter Singer, ed., *In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006), 3.

²⁰ Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 1-2.

²¹ Singer, *In Defense of Animals*, 24.

Second of all, other institutions have been ingrained in our culture for such a long time that they are no longer questioned. "Pet keeping and zoos are central parts of our culture."²² However, recently, the SEA LIFE Trust released two beluga whales back into the 'wild'.²³ This seems contradictory; Sea Life is responsible for the captivity of various animals species, why are they not freed? We, humans, are used to the containment of fish and care about the impressive whales. In other words, "the forms of animal captivity that cause the most public controversy are undoubtedly those involving wild animals. Many feel deeply uncomfortable about holding majestic wild animals in captivity."²⁴ Alongside Gruen's distinctions, I added another one. While we approve of 'regular' institutions like zoos and circuses, we, in the West, often condemn the treatment of animals in other cultures. Specifically, we deeply disapprove of wildlife markets, dogs for dinner and, for example, the polar bear living in an artificial room in China just to entertain hotel guests.²⁵ In the West, we often publicly express our rage towards these activities that, in our opinion, should be banned immediately.

Given the distinction between animals and the different ways in which we keep them captivated, several questions arise. To begin with, does our treatment of animals differ from that in other cultures? Philosopher Peter Singer states, "[...] the public will no longer accept, for public display, ways of caging animals that were common fifty years ago (although the public will continue to buy pork, chicken and veal from animals kept in much worse condition)."²⁶ We strongly disagree with China caging polar bears but do not have a problem walking into a local zoo where the animals are kept in a similar way. In the end, every single one of these animals lives in confinement. Which factors determine whether captivity is a 'bad' thing? Should not all animals be better off living in their natural habitats? Discussing the notion of freedom, can we ever be completely free? And, therefore, are rescued animals in sanctuaries free or in a different kind of containment? In case of the latter, is this a life worth living?

²² Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 2.

²³ Merlin, 'SEA LIFE Trust: Conserving Marine Wildlife throughout the World', SEA LIFE Trust, accessed 22 August 2021, <https://www.sealifetrust.org/en/>.

²⁴ Gruen, 156.

²⁵ Agence France-Presse in Beijing, 'Chinese Hotel with Polar Bear Enclosure Opens to Outrage', the Guardian, 12 March 2021, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/12/chinese-hotel-with-polar-bear-enclosure-opens-to-outrage>.

²⁶ Singer, *In Defense of Animals*, 8.

"FOR WHAT YOU HAVE TAMED, YOU BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOREVER"²⁷

Or duty/obligation towards animals

According to philosopher Alasdair Cochrane, animals do not have an intrinsic interest in liberty.²⁸ He states, "It seems initially plausible to propose that for non-autonomous animals, their interest in liberty is only instrumental; whereas for autonomous humans it is intrinsic."²⁹ Moreover, Cochrane argues that keeping animals captive, and therefore preventing them from controlling their own life, is not necessarily harmful. In his own words, "To deny an animal freedom does not in itself setback that animal's interests."³⁰ On the other hand, the fact that their interest in freedom is merely 'instrumental' does not result in the justification of their abuse, the animal's well-being "[...] is dependent on its facilitation of other goods, such as the avoidance of suffering."³¹ Cochrane states that captivity itself does not necessarily result in suffering. Hence, he concludes that while our obligations towards animals might well be pressing, they do not always include animal liberation. In certain cases, he argues that it is morally permissible to confine animals for specific purposes.³²

I believe that some animals, given the appropriate care, could live a happy life in a restricted environment. However, this can never be used as a valid argument pro confinement. It seems plausible to be content, satisfied and pleased with a life you are not in control of, but "Even if these animals were not made to suffer, that would only show that they were not hurt, not that they were not harmed."³³ moreover, "We can never give them back what was taken from them: the right to be free and live autonomously."³⁴ Using two normative theories, deontology and care ethics, I will demonstrate that captivity in itself, regardless of other consequences, does cause harm.

²⁷ Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *The Little Prince*, trans. Irene Testot-Ferry, Wordsworth Classics (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1995), 82.

²⁸ Liberty = "the absence of external constraints on movement – Is generally a benefit for sentient animals, permitting them to pursue what they want and need" David DeGrazia, *The Ethics of Confining Animals* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 738, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0028>.

²⁹ Alasdair Cochrane, 'Do Animals Have an Interest in Liberty?', *Political Studies* 57, no. 3 (October 2009): 10, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00742.x>.

³⁰ Cochrane, 15.

³¹ Cochrane, 2.

³² Cochrane, 17.

³³ Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, Updated with a new preface, [2004 ed.] (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 98.

³⁴ Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 225.

A duty

Immanuel Kant strongly influenced ethics by means of his deontological approach, focusing on the principle of 'autonomy' and the idea of doing one's duty.³⁵ Humans are the authors of their own lives – meaning – we should never treat ourselves nor other human beings as 'means' but always as 'ends'. Human dignity must be defended at all costs, as defined: "To have dignity, according to this ethical tradition, is to have intrinsic worth, an inherent value that entitles one to moral consideration or respect."³⁶ It suffices to imply that one uses another human being as a 'means' when the latter does not or cannot provide their voluntary and informed consent.³⁷ Kant's moral laws explicitly refer to us, humans, as he claimed we were the only rational creatures, following: "Central to the Kantian sense of autonomy is the idea that autonomous individuals can rise above thinking about their individual preferences and think about where their moral duty lies by bringing impartial reasons to bear on their deliberations."³⁸ When an individual can be held morally accountable, he or she is an autonomous moral agent who is never to be used as a mere 'means'.³⁹ Kant never considered animals as moral agents; thus, they cannot obtain any rights. As a result, marking this distinction between human and non-human animals can be used to allow differences in their treatment. Moreover, keeping animals in captivity is justifiable since they do not have an interest in governing their own lives without the interference of humans. We can use animals as we please. Nevertheless, Kant stated that considering our own best interest: the development of our characters, humans should avoid being cruel to animals.⁴⁰

On the other hand, philosopher Tom Regan (1938-2017) followed a similar deontological approach but argued that animals too are 'ends in themselves'. The moral right not to be harmed would therefore also apply to them. According to his 'rights theory' animals are 'subjects-of-a-life':

³⁵ Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, Updated with a new preface, [2004 ed.] (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 84, 142-143.

³⁶ Suzanne Laba Cataldi, 'Animals and the Concept of Dignity: Critical Reflections on a Circus Performance', *Ethics and the Environment* 7, no. 2 (2002): 108.

³⁷ DeGrazia, *The Ethics of Confining Animals*, 753.

³⁸ Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 86.

³⁹ Larry Alexander and Michael Moore, 'Deontological Ethics', in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2016), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ethics-deontological/>.

⁴⁰ Nussbaum, 'The Moral Status of Animals', 2.

Individuals are subject of a life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference-desires and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.⁴¹

Animals live, just like humans, a life that matters to them. And as they are 'subjects-of-a-life' they have a strong interest in continuing this life. Subjecthood consists of having the right not to be harmed; which includes to be free of boredom, the freedom to exercise common behaviour, the freedom of movement, and, in general, the right to live.⁴² Most important, human benefits cannot override these rights:

As subjects-of-a-life, we are all the same because we are all in the world.

As subjects-of-a-life, we are all the same because we are all aware of the world.

As subjects-of-a-life, we are all the same because what happens to us matters to us.

As subjects-of-a-life, we are all the same because what happens to us (to our bodies, to our freedom, or to our life) matters to us, whether anyone cares about this or not.

As subjects-of-a-life, there is no superior or inferior, no higher or lower.

As subjects-of-a-life, we are all morally equal.⁴³

According to Regan, animals are no different from humans.⁴⁴ Therefore, every statement in the list above applies to humans as well as animals. Both deserve equal treatment. In this sense, Regan provides a substitute for Kant's theory of autonomy. Regan's 'preference autonomy' is based on the following statement: "An alternative

⁴¹ Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 243.

⁴² Elizabeth M Anderson, 'Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life', in *Animal Rights Current Debates and New Directions*, by Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum (Oxford University Press, 2005), 1, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001>.

⁴³ Regan, *Empty Cages*, 51.

⁴⁴ Tom Regan, *Empty Cages* (United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 2.

view is that individuals are autonomous if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them."⁴⁵ Subsequently, it seems unlikely that animals would voluntarily offer to live their lives in captivity. Animals never chose to be captivated; humans made this decision.

In Kant's deontology, showing dignity and respect towards other human beings is considered essential. Philosopher David DeGrazia applies the concept of 'respect' not only to humans, like Kant, but also to animals. Showing respect towards non-human animals can be construed independently of the concept of harm: "Consider the idea that it is wrong, because disrespectful, to *use* people. one might similarly argue that it is wrong, because disrespectful, to use animals."⁴⁶ In this view, confining animals for our own use is considered wrong even if they are given extraordinary lives without any harm. Nussbaum emphasises the importance of animals being in power of their own life. She further claims that animals should be able to flourish, which can only be accomplished when they are treated with dignity, in her own words, "The fact that so many animals never get to move around, enjoy the air, exchange affection with other members of their kind — all that is a waste and a tragedy, and it is not a life in keeping with the dignity of such creatures."⁴⁷

In *The Ethics of Captivity*, Gruen also expresses her opinion on the idea of 'dignity' and animals in captivity.⁴⁸ In the following statement, she argues that animals are captivated only to satisfy human desires and interests.

Often, in captivity animals are forced to stop doing the things that make them indecent according to human norms and made to do things that they don't ordinarily do because humans want them to. this form of control is another feature of captivity that threatens dignity [...].⁴⁹

In short, we deprive animals of being their own authentic selves. Gruen claims that even though animals themselves might not care about the concept of 'dignity', it still is morally wrong to take it away from them. Hence, it makes sense that giving animals

⁴⁵ Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 80.

⁴⁶ DeGrazia, *The Ethics of Confining Animals*, 752.

⁴⁷ Nussbaum, 'The Moral Status of Animals', 4.

⁴⁸ Lori Gruen, ed., *The Ethics of Captivity* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 235-45.

⁴⁹ Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 243.

the liberty to do as they please is inherently valuable, even if their containment does not cause any obvious suffering. Denying animals the freedom to exercise their autonomy by keeping them under constant surveillance is thus ethically problematic. In Regan's words, "The truth of animal rights requires empty cages, not larger cages."⁵⁰

*A different voice*⁵¹

Frequently, people that are part of an institution keeping animals enclosed (in a zoo, in a farm, in a circus, etc.) claim they 'care for their animals' or even 'love their animals'. This seems contradictory. How can people love an animal that they have bred or captured to confine, exploit, use as entertainment or slaughter?

Today, care ethics has become an essential part of the animal ethics theory. Care ethics focuses on important values for maintaining and allowing (care) relationships to flourish, considering: involvement, dependence, vulnerability, responsibility, etc. Our unique relationship with non-humans animals results in us being responsible for their general well-being.⁵² In this sense, care ethics serves as an alternative to the dominant moral theories; deontology and utilitarianism, namely "The reason to oppose animal suffering from the perspective of care ethics is not because we wish to maximise utility or consistently apply our rights theory across species, but because we have relations with animals and care about them."⁵³ According to political philosopher Daniel Engster, a relationship can count as a basis for particular moral obligations. Therefore, captivated animals should be able to rely on this 'special relationship' with the people responsible for their lives. Given that these animals are kept in environments mainly determined by us, humans, we have a 'specific duty of care'. This 'specific duty of care' is not applicable to animals in the wild who do not directly rely on humans. Instead, since they are not interdependent creatures, we speak of a 'non-specific duty of care', meaning humans still have to ensure that their living

⁵⁰ Regan, *Empty Cages*, 10.

⁵¹ Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, 38. print (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003).
: The upcoming of the ethics of care

⁵² Daniel Engster, 'Care Ethics and Animal Welfare', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 37, no. 4 (14 November 2006): 526.

⁵³ Engster, 521.

environments are not being degraded.⁵⁴ Engster argues that all animals under our responsibility have to be provided with basic needs, meaning: "[...] food, water, and shelter, enjoy a clean and healthy environment, have the opportunity to develop and practice their basic capabilities for movement, sensation, companionship and the like, and live as much as possible free from pain."⁵⁵

Whether adopting a dog or caring for farm animals, neglecting their primary care is always considered morally wrong. As previously mentioned, we are responsible for those we take under our care. Hence, Engster states that various institutions keeping animals, such as factory farms, should be banished since they cannot properly care for these living beings.⁵⁶ In his own words:

If we think it is morally wrong to deprive pets of necessary care, and more generally agree that we have moral obligations to care for animals that we have made dependent upon us, then we logically must conclude that human beings' treatment of most animals currently under our care is morally deplorable."⁵⁷

However, Engster argues that our obligations towards animals are still limited to the degree to which animals are dependent on humans.⁵⁸ What does 'to depend on' mean? Does it include wild animal markets? Does care ethics consider confinement itself as a problem? In most circumstances, it appears that care ethics allows captivity as long as the animals are treated with care.

According to philosopher Josephine Donovan, a caring agent should be concerned about the interests of all those capable of suffering: "It is not so much, I will argue, a matter of caring for animals as mothers (human and non-human) care for their infants as it is one of listening to animals, paying emotional attention, taking seriously—caring about—what they are telling us."⁵⁹ This indicates that we should not only 'take care' of animals but also try to understand their personal wants and needs. She further addresses the duties we have towards the animals we are responsible for as well as

⁵⁴ Engster, 527.

⁵⁵ Engster, 530.

⁵⁶ Engster, 530.

⁵⁷ Engster, 529.

⁵⁸ Engster, 528.

⁵⁹ Josephine Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31, no.2 (January 2006): 305, <https://doi.org/10.1086/491750>.

towards those in the wild, who are independent. If we only cared about those with whom we have a close relationship with, we would care for very few beings.⁶⁰

While the theory of rights remains rather impersonal, care ethics appears to be more empathetic. In the next chapter, the latter will be further explained and compared to utilitarianism, since not everyone *cares* for non-human animals. However, what if humans also suffer the consequences of animal captivity?

"MAN IS CONDEMNED TO BE FREE"⁶¹

consequences of a never-ending lockdown

In general, humans feel superior to non-human animals. We often claim to be more intelligent and more powerful than any other creature on earth due to the invention of technical devices. Consequently, according to philosopher Yi-Fu Tuan, animals are in our possession and should obey our wants and needs.⁶² We, animal owners, possess animals and turn them into 'property' that is at our constant service.

According to many, we have to take notice of the benefits of animal captivity, meaning; food, clothing, entertainment and medicine, but, as we will discover, the benefits do not outweigh the negative consequences.

The outcome

Utilitarianism is a moral theory often described as 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. The theory *only* looks into *the outcome* of an act; in other words: "Consequentialist ethical theories hold that the rightness or wrongness of what we do

⁶⁰ Josephine Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals: From Care to Dialogue', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31, no. 2 (January 2006): 310, <https://doi.org/10.1086/491750>.

⁶¹ Jean-Paul Sartre - existentialism is a humanism p 29

⁶² Yi-fu Tuan, *Dominance & Affection: The Making of Pets* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 10.

ultimately depends on the consequences (the effects, results) of what we do and only the consequences."⁶³ Most utilitarian philosophers take the interest of animals into account as animals are sentient beings capable of experiencing pleasure or pain as a consequence of particular circumstances. Therefore, the well-being of humans and the well-being of animals must be given equal consideration.⁶⁴ The answer to the question of whether captivity is harmful is inevitably based on the consequences of animal confinement on both humans and animals. As animal captivity is often beneficial to humans, the moral theory cannot be entirely against the idea. According to philosopher Gary Francione, we suffer from 'moral schizophrenia', in his own words, "Although we claim to take animals seriously and to regard them as having morally significant interests, we routinely ignore those interests whenever it benefits us. "⁶⁵

Regarding utilitarianism, the justification of animal captivity must be debated based on its consequences. First, I will look into the reaction to the loss of freedom of animals. After, I will discuss the indirect effects on humans. To conclude, the importance of taking on a more caring approach will be analysed.

For animals

Domesticated animals have been living alongside humans for a long time. Therefore, they are more suited to live in captivity than animals taken from their natural habitat. Moreover, most domesticated animals have the ability to adapt to their confinement and often do not show apparent signs of poor well-being.⁶⁶ However, this does not necessarily mean that the animals prefer to be in captivity any more than wild animals; it means that the animal adapts to and fits the specific purpose they are domesticated for. Generally, "The vast majority of domesticated animals are created to endure short miserable lives for the sake of often trivial benefits to humans."⁶⁷ On the other hand, a significant argument in favour of animal captivity states that, however animals are

⁶³ Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 141.

⁶⁴ Peter Singer, ed., *In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006), 14-16.

⁶⁵ Francione, 'Animals-Property or Persons?', 1.

⁶⁶ Tarjei Tennesen, 'Coping with Confinement — Features of the Environment That Influence Animals' Ability to Adapt', *Applied Animal Behaviour Science*, Behaviour and Welfare, 22, no. 2 (1 February 1989): 139-49, [https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1591\(89\)90050-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1591(89)90050-6).

⁶⁷ Gruen, *The Ethics of Captivity*, 172.

taken away the ability to make their own decisions, they do no longer have to fear predators or worry about the possibility of starvation.⁶⁸

Regarding this argument, the following question arises: "Is exercising one's natural capacities - or species-typical functioning - intrinsically valuable, in the sense of being conducive to well-being, independently of effects on experiential well-being? [...] Thus, he is better off in the wild despite the fact that he suffers more in the wild." Even though animals can live a more leisurely life in captivity (if, in addition, they do not get exploited), their confinement cannot be fully justified. Safety does not equal well-being. Eventually, whether domesticated or wild, animals obtain abnormal behaviour due to captivity in itself. Back in the days, Friedrich Nietzsche already seemed to understand the impact of captivity on animals in zoos:

To call the taming of an animal 'improving' it, sounds to our ears almost like a joke. He who knows what goes on in menageries, doubts very much whether an animal is improved in such places. It is certainly weakened, it is made less dangerous, by means of the depressing influence of fear, pain, wounds, and hunger, it is converted into a sick animal.⁶⁹

The term 'zoochosis' defines animals' stereotypical behaviour in captivity, meaning pacing, bar biting, self-harm, etc. Zoochosis mainly describes the behaviors of caged wild animals but can also relates to domesticated animals unable to cope with confinement.⁷⁰ In that case, their mental and physical health is affected as they turn into 'sick animals'. Although the living conditions of confined animals are often dismal, even the most realistic artificial environments do not come close to the space, diversity and freedom animals experience in their natural habitats. This kind of deprivation — combined with boredom, loneliness, fear, anxiety and often even abuse — causes animals to feel miserable. That is to say, "The animals isolated from each other and without interaction between species, have become utterly dependent upon their keepers. Consequently, most of their responses have been changed. What was

⁶⁸ 'Captivity and Suffering | UCLA Research Safety & Animal Welfare Administration', accessed 20 August 2021, <https://rsawa.research.ucla.edu/arc/captivity-and-suffering/>.

⁶⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, Anthony Mario Ludovici, and Ray Furness, *Twilight of the Idols: With The Antichrist and Ecce Homo*, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature (Ware: Wordsworth Ed, 2007), 37-38.

⁷⁰ 'STEREOTYPIC BEHAVIOUR: ZOOCHOSIS', accessed 20 August 2021, <https://www.bornfree.org.uk/zoochosis>.

central to their interest has been replaced by a passive waiting for a series of arbitrary outside interventions."⁷¹ Their behaviour would be different in the wild; the animals would be hunting, roaming natural habitats for miles each day, choosing their own companions or forming their own families.⁷²

Utilitarians allow harm if 'absolutely necessary'.⁷³ For example, animal experimentation could possibly improve our scientific knowledge and eventually cure various diseases. As this might save a vast amount of people, the confinement and use of animals could be justified. In short, the benefits might outweigh the harm.⁷⁴ If this were not the case, animal captivity would be considered 'unnecessary' and, thus, unjustifiable. In this respect, the meat and dairy industry should be abolished immediately as we do not necessarily need animal products in our diet. Although it appears to be difficult to determine what is absolutely necessary, logically, entertainment, animal products (such as wool and leather) and even pets do not count as vital elements in our lives. To conclude, we often ignore the idea of 'necessity' when we confine animals. In most cases, the harm outweighs the benefits since "Fullness of being is a state hard to sustain in confinement."⁷⁵

For humans

The confinement of animals can also result in adverse effects on humans. People in favour of animal captivity might still change their minds and end the abuse in order to avoid causing harm to themselves. In the introduction, I referred to today's pandemic, the circulation of a virus affecting our health. Several viruses, so-called 'zoonotic diseases', have been transmitted from caged animals to humans through the years.⁷⁶ An unfortunate byproduct of keeping animals confined, resulting in the suffering of numerous human beings. The infections are not only caused by wild animals, also factory farms and other places where animals are crammed together, serve as hotbeds for infectious diseases. In general, "More than 60% of human infectious

⁷¹ Berger, *About Looking*, 25.

⁷² JO-ANNE MCARTHUR, *CAPTIVE*. (Place of publication not identified: LANTERN Books, 2017), 40, <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1481636>.

⁷³ Gary L. Francione, *Animals Property & The Law* (Temple University Press, 1995), 23.

⁷⁴ DeGrazia, *The Ethics of Confining Animals*, 748.

⁷⁵ John Maxwell Coetzee, *The Lives of Animals*, University Center for Human Values Series (Princeton: Princeton university press, 2016), 33.

⁷⁶ William B Karesh et al., 'Ecology of Zoonoses: Natural and Unnatural Histories', *The Lancet* 380, no. 9857 (December 2012): 1936-45, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(12\)61678-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61678-X).

diseases are caused by pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals."⁷⁷ Should we continue to keep animals captive if our own health is at risk? Scientists claim that viruses will continue to affect humans as long as we do not change our ways of interacting with non-human animals.⁷⁸ For example, the growth of animal agriculture causes wild animals to live in smaller territories, increasing the chance of human encounters, the interaction can contribute to another disease spillover.⁷⁹ Moreover, animal agriculture is the largest source of methane emissions, which have been proven to damage both humans and the environment in general.⁸⁰ Although it is too late to completely avoid climate change or to prevent the current pandemic, we must tackle the cause in order to undo any further damage.

The care

Animals do play a vital role in our lives, not because we can captivate them in order for them to fulfil a specific purpose, but because animals are living creatures inhabiting the planet. After discussing the consequences of animal containment, we should also include a more caring approach. Utilitarianism ignores certain essential values in its utility calculus; in other words, "Utilitarians consider together diverse aspects of lives, reducing them all to experienced pain and pleasure. But we might think that a good life, for an animal as for a human, has many different aspects: movement, affection, health, community, dignity, bodily integrity, as well as the avoidance of pain. Some valuable aspects of animal lives might not even lead to pain when withheld."⁸¹ Care ethics values different aspects of society; instead of encouraging general thinking and obeying to objective rules, the theory relies on an interdependent and personal world in which emotions, compassion and knowledge count as important factors.⁸²

Care ethics is not only considered as a normative ethics but also as a political ethics. Their approach emerged into a political theory as it focuses on a fair distribution of responsibilities: "Care becomes a tool for critical political analysis when we use this

⁷⁷ Karesh et al., 'Ecology of Zoonoses'.

⁷⁸ Interesting papers on this topic:

Karesh et al.

Elizabeth H. Loh et al., 'Targeting Transmission Pathways for Emerging Zoonotic Disease Surveillance and Control', *Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases* 15, no. 7 (July 2015): 432-37, <https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2013.1563>.

⁷⁹ Karesh et al., 'Ecology of Zoonoses', 1941.

⁸⁰ 'Methane Facts and Information', *Environment*, 23 January 2019, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/methane>.

⁸¹ Nussbaum, 'The Moral Status of Animals', 3.

⁸² Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals', 306-310.

concept to reveal relationships of power."⁸³ Political philosophers Joan Tronto and Bernice Fisher define 'care' as: "A species of activity that includes everything we do to maintain, contain, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web."⁸⁴ Tronto's definition is praised for extending the notion of 'care' beyond family and domestic spheres. However, some critics imply that it is too broad as she defines almost every human activity as 'care'.⁸⁵ Donovan claims that even though Tronto did not address her theory of care directly to animals, it can easily be applied to them; "If one feels sympathy toward a suffering animal, one is moved to ask the question, Why is this animal suffering? The answer can lead to a political analysis of the reasons for the animal's distress. Education in critical thinking, these thinkers emphasise, is therefore imperative if an ethic of care is to work."⁸⁷ Although non-human animals have always been excluded from the political sphere, it might be useful to reconsider this idea. Protecting an animals' interests will not only benefit the animal but will also positively affect the bigger picture, including the environment and our health, but this requires a political-economic and value-laden approach.⁸⁸

⁸³ Josephine Donovan, 'ATTENTION TO SUFFERING: A FEMINIST CARING ETHIC FOR THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS', *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (March 1996): 172, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1996.tb00228.x>.

⁸⁴ Joan C. Tronto, 'An Ethic of Care', *Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging* 22, no. 3 (1998): 16.

⁸⁵ Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals'.

⁸⁶ Maureen Sander-Staudt, 'Care Ethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy', accessed 17 August 2020, <https://iep.utm.edu/care-eth/>.

⁸⁷ Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals', 324.

⁸⁸ Tronto, 'An Ethic of Care', 16.

"WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE ..."

The end of captivity?

For a long time, many scientists believed that humans are the only conscious and, more important, sentient beings on earth. Nowadays, it appears that we still act upon this idea. Captivated animals are treated as badly as they were treated many years ago, or even worse, as stated, "[...] a series of brutal practices that only became crueler with the passing of the centuries."⁸⁹ How can we protect confined animals? How can we free captive animals forever?

A slave?

Philosopher Gary Francione is famous for his deontological approach, advocating the abolition of all non-human animal use. According to him, animals are still viewed as property, a role they acquired once we started to domesticate, tame and confine them.⁹⁰ Does the captivity of animals serve human needs? Francione compares animal captivity to human slavery, he states:

We all agree that the use of humans exclusively as resources—the condition known as human slavery—is morally abhorrent. Similarly, if people think that animals are members of the moral community, then we ought not to be treating them exclusively as resources either and we ought to oppose animal slavery.⁹¹

Regarding this analogy, Francione wants to clarify that as long as animals are controlled by humans, they will always be considered objects rather than subjects.

⁸⁹ Harari, *Sapiens*, 105.

⁹⁰ Francione, *Animals Property & The Law*, 17-32.

⁹¹ Gary L. Francione, 'Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, and the Slavery Analogy - Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach', accessed 19 August 2021, <https://www.abolitionistapproach.com/animal-rights-animal-welfare-and-the-slavery-analogy/>.

The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals as things. We treat animals as the moral equivalent of inanimate objects with no morally significant interests. We bring billions of animals into existence annually simply for the purpose of killing them. Animals have market prices. Dogs and cats are sold in pet stores like compact discs; financial markets trade in futures for pork bellies and cattle. Any interest that an animal has represents an economic cost that may be ignored to maximise overall social wealth and has no intrinsic value in our assessments. That is what it means to be property.⁹²

Treating animals in a more 'humane' way will not put an end to the 'never-ending lockdown' that is their life.⁹³ As a result, Francione opposes to welfare organisations fighting the improper treatment of animals, he states, "Encouraging the public to feel good about exploiting animals 'nicely' just perpetuates the unjustified use of non-human animals. If we continue to see animals as tools, even when using them nicely, we impede the path to justice for non-human."⁹⁴ He explains that giving nine slashes to a slave is no better than ten. This reduction does not make the practice more 'humane'. Regarding animals in confinement, the theory can be applied to the initiative to, for example, enlarge the cages in a zoo or promote 'free range' chicken.⁹⁵ Francione emphasises that, in this case, animal exploitation is still being promoted, he continues, "If slavery is bad, then you do not promote 'humane' slavery."⁹⁶ Many laws inflicted by welfare organisations are not meant to eliminate the use of animals but simply improve their living standards.⁹⁷ As we brighten up the animals' lives, we feel less guilty for exploiting them.

In the previous chapter, we discussed utilitarianism (defining right and wrong based on the consequences of an action) in relation to animal experimentation. According to the utilitarians, confining animals for lab experiments is considered justifiable as it serves a greater good: human health. Francione, on the other hand, would argue that

⁹² Francione, 'Animals-Property or Persons?', 21.

⁹³ Francione, *Animals Property & The Law*, 25.

⁹⁴ Francione, 27.

⁹⁵ Gary L. Francione, *Animals Property & The Law* (Temple University Press, 1995), 17-23; Gary L. Francione, 'Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, and the Slavery Analogy – Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach', accessed 22 August 2021, <https://www.abolitionistapproach.com/animal-rights-animal-welfare-and-the-slavery-analogy/>.

⁹⁶ Francione, 'Animal Rights, Animal Welfare, and the Slavery Analogy – Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach'.

⁹⁷ Francione, *Animals Property & The Law*, 168.

however slaves were of use in our society, they were eventually banned. Following the utilitarian approach, even human slaves should be allowed if the benefits outweigh the harm. However, usefulness should not be the only criterion applied; in other words, "Consequences simply do not matter when certain interests are involved."⁹⁸

Besides utilitarianism, Gary Francione also criticises the way care ethics approach animal welfare. He states that this theory does not sufficiently acknowledge the moral significance of animals. Care ethics should take their views to another level. All animals are equal; therefore, we are responsible for all animals, not only for those we have a close relationship with. For instance, people advocate that big, wild animals 'belong in the wild' but continue to eat meat; thus, they make a distinction between certain species.⁹⁹ In addition, Francione argues that care ethics would never be applied to fundamental issues involving humans, in his own words:

[...] no advocate of the ethic of care would argue that the morality of rape was dependent on whether that conduct was undertaken with 'care' in a particular situation. Rape is always wrong because it violates a *right* of bodily integrity. Similarly, where fundamental animal interests are involved, we must use a similar analysis and cannot say that 'care' suffices¹⁰⁰

In general, people care about a small number of animals, including their pets, cuddly animals or impressive animals in the wild. As a result, what happens to the animals for whom humans do not care at all? Francione claims that as long as humans show no interest in our moral obligation towards all animals, little change will be inflicted.¹⁰¹ As change requires a paradigm shift concerning our attitude towards all sentient beings in captivity, cages should be eliminated rather than enlarged.

Empathetic?

⁹⁸ Gary L. Francione, *Animals Property & The Law* (Temple University Press, 1995), 169.

⁹⁹ Gary L. Francione, 'Morality and Logic in Vegan Advocacy', *Medium* (blog), 13 July 2019, <https://gary-francione.medium.com/morality-and-logic-in-vegan-advocacy-e4b8a0377af9>.

¹⁰⁰ Gary L. Francione, 'Moral Concern, Moral Impulse, and Logical Argument in Animal Rights Advocacy - Animal Rights The Abolitionist Approach', accessed 20 August 2021, <https://www.abolitionistapproach.com/moral-concern-moral-impulse-and-logical-argument-in-animal-rights-advocacy/>.

¹⁰¹ Francione, 'Morality and Logic in Vegan Advocacy'.

In 1974, philosopher Thomas Nagel wrote a famous essay entitled *What is it like to be a bat?*¹⁰² In which he states that it is rather difficult or even impossible to put ourselves in the 'shoes' of a bat. While humans might have an idea of what it feels like to fly, we will never actually know what it feels like for a bat (who flies through a cave with eyes closed, guided by ultrasound waves).

According to German philosopher Richard David Precht, we humans cannot be considered unique. Precht abolishes the long withstanding and strong distinction between humans and animals¹⁰³ ; "We are not only a little like animals, we are animals."¹⁰⁴ Although Precht implies that we are all very similar, he admits that, as Nagel states, we have no idea how animals feel. In earlier years, humans even assumed that animals were not capable of communicating, speaking, laughing, etc.¹⁰⁵ Although, nowadays, philosophers and activists fight for animal rights by referring to all that we know about them, Precht suggest an 'ethic of nescience'.¹⁰⁶ In his opinion, we must recognise that our judgment cannot be based, with absolute certainty, on the inner life of animals, including their sensibility, capacity to suffer, and consciousness. Moreover, "What we know about them [animals] is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates us from them. The more we know, the further away they are."¹⁰⁷ Instead, we must acknowledge that we can only interpret the external factors of their being and that we must keep in mind that these interpretations are often incorrect.¹⁰⁸ In order to do that, humans must cultivate an open, anti-authoritarian way of thinking.¹⁰⁹ If we assume we know nothing about other living beings, this will result in a more empathetic attitude concerning animal welfare.¹¹⁰ 'Empathy' can be defined as, "A stimulated emotional state that relies on the ability to perceive, understand and care about the experiences or perspectives of another person or animal."¹¹¹ If humans try to understand the emotions, experiences and needs of an animal, this might result in an improvement of their care and overall wellbeing.¹¹² As an example, Precht

¹⁰² Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-50, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914>.

¹⁰³ Richard D. Precht, *Denken over Dieren* (Ten Have, 2017), 7.

¹⁰⁴ Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, 2.

¹⁰⁵ Precht, *Denken over Dieren*, 11.

¹⁰⁶ Precht, 140.

¹⁰⁷ Berger, *About Looking*, 16.

¹⁰⁸ Precht, 11.

¹⁰⁹ Precht, 13.

¹¹⁰ Precht, *Denken over Dieren*, 13.

¹¹¹ 'Do Animals Show Empathy? - OneKind Planet Biology', *OneKindPlanet* (blog), accessed 20 August 2021, <https://onekindplanet.org/animal-biology/do-animals-show-empathy/>.

¹¹² Precht, *Denken over Dieren*, 12.

explains that, however, we do not know how insects experience pain, we can emphasise with these living beings and understand that all insects prefer not to lose any limbs.¹¹³ Precisely because we will never know what an animal feels, we must not inflict any form of violence upon them as it might cause them to feel bad.

It seems as if ethics care more about the notion of 'sensibility' than about great reasoned values as freedom and justice. People need to adopt a more empathic attitude towards all living beings, a task many need to overcome. Precht compares this paradigm shift to other evolutionary changes, including the abolition of slavery and the rise of feminism.¹¹⁴

Nevertheless, today, after having been exposed to temporary restrictions ourselves, we still dominate many animals' lives even though we can easily empathise with their circumstances. This can be explained as follows, "Understanding that an animal is in pain or distress- even empathising or sympathising with him-doesn't ensure, however, that the human will act ethically toward the animal."¹¹⁵ Moreover, as an example: "The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their victim."¹¹⁶ It is not vital whether humans have something in common with animals other than being alive. We have to open our hearts to their well-being, that is to say, "The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at times the being of another."¹¹⁷

Free?

Most captivated animals, especially domesticated animals, can never return to their natural habitat. The idea of 'liberating' domestic animals would be meaningless and impossible, as they are not capable of taking care of themselves. In contrast to wild animals being held captive, domesticated animals are bred to be docile and dependent.

¹¹³ Richard D. Precht, *Denken over Dieren* (Ten Have, 2017), 12.

¹¹⁴ Precht, 19.

¹¹⁵ Donovan, 'Feminism and the Treatment of Animals', 323.

¹¹⁶ Coetzee, *The Lives of Animals*, 35.

¹¹⁷ Coetzee, *The Lives of Animals*, 14.

Humans control the lives of animals and therefore contribute to their unworthy existence. Animals are often regarded as resources rather than individuals in control of their own lives. As we strip animals of their being-ness, we turn them into objects. However, we should note that captivating animals for their own well-being, as sanctuaries rescue abused wild and domesticated animals, can be considered ethical, even necessary. In this case, the animals should be given proper care without providing anything for their caretakers. In any other case, the confinement of animals can never be justified; even when the animals do not suffer from any other consequences, the captivity on its own results in the deprivation of a worthy life.

On the other hand, animals, like humans, generally do not miss what they do not know. Nonetheless, what they do not know — freedom — remains a crucial part of a happy life. To deprive animals of their space, movement and social interaction, equals an impoverished existence. Gruen emphasises the importance of empathy and states:

I think it is valuable to conceptualise what it might be like to be another animal, with a very different way of making meaning in the world, in order to empathise with their plight in captivity and to understand the magnitude of what they lose when they are stripped of their freedom to be who they are and do what they do.¹¹⁸

Animals communicate; they speak, so we have to make an effort to listen in order to understand them and gain knowledge on their interests, wants and needs since their faith is often still decided on by humans. In Shakespeare's *King Lear*, the King, asks a very relevant question to the blind earl of Gloucester; "How to you see the world?", to which he replies, "I see it feelingly". (4.6.142-45)¹¹⁹

ENDING

Conclusion

¹¹⁸ MCARTHUR, *CAPTIVE.*, 18.

¹¹⁹ William Shakespeare, *King Lear* (New York: The Norton Shakespeare, 2015).

In this article, I questioned whether or not animal captivity can be considered ethical, stressing the importance of empathy before turning to any other moral theory relating to this debate. Humans must acknowledge that animals live for themselves. The fact that they are autonomous beings or that they are able to fulfil certain purposes within their relationships with humans is irrelevant for their treatment. We must acknowledge that human actions negatively affect the lives of non-human animals; therefore, we must break certain habits. Einstein once stated, "The most important decision we make is whether we believe we live in a friendly or hostile universe."¹²⁰ In this regard, the ethics of animal captivity should not even be a question.

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¹²⁰ Andreas Moritz, *Lifting the Veil of Duality: How to Be Free and without Judgment* (Place of publication not identified: Ener-Chi Wellness Press, 2010), 97.

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