RESEARCH PAPER

PRAGMATIC INTRUSION INTO WHAT IS SAID: IN WESTERN LINGUISTICS AND TRADITIONAL ARABIC LINGUISTICS

*Hisham Ibrahim Abdulla

Asst. Prof. Iraqi University, Iraq

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 29th December, 2015
Received in revised form
25th January, 2016
Accepted 27th February, 2016
Published online 16th March, 2016

Key words:

Pragmatics,
Semantics,
What is Said,
Implicature,
Mantüq Ghair Sareeh.

ABSTRACT

The present study is an attempt to answer the question about whether Arab linguists of the past were acquainted with the problem of pragmatic intrusion into the semantic or truth-conditional content of what is said. Using many quotations from the traditional Arabic books of "usül" (Islamic jurisprudence) and "balagha" (rhetoric), sufficient evidence was found to support the hypothesis that Arab linguists of the Middle Ages were well acquainted with the central ideas of the problem. They engaged in debates and controversies very similar to those we find in modern pragmatic literature.

Copyright © 2016, Hisham Ibrahim Abdulla. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Hisham Ibrahim Abdulla. 2016. "Pragmatic intrusion into what is said: in western linguistics and traditional Arabic Linguistics", *International Journal of Current Research*, 8, (03), 27906-27917.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, many pragmaticists and language philosophers have started rethinking the semantics/pragmatics interface because of what has come to be known as "the pragmatic intrusion into what is said, or into semantics". This was the subject of heated debate in recent years, especially among pragmaticists and philosophers like Laurence Horn, Stephen Levinson, Relevance theorists, Kent Bach and Francios Recanati. The notion of pragmatic intrusion into the truth conditions of semantic meaning has rendered the task of drawing the line between semantics and pragmatics very difficult and not without problems. Even Grice himself allowed for pragmatic processes such as disambiguation, reference assignment and deixis fixing before the determination of what is said. In the first part of this paper, an account is given of the modern notion of pragmatic intrusion as it appears in the literature with some concentration on Levinson's version. The second part is a description of traditional Arabic Linguistic ideas and debates that are similar to the modern pragmatic ones. The modern notion of pragmatic intrusion contains clear echoes of the traditional Arabic notion of "mantüq ghair sareeh" i.e. the

inexplicit said, which subsumes the pragmatic aspects of what is said. The method adopted in the present study is to use many quotations from traditional Arabic books and compare the notions and visions of classical Arab linguists with those of contemporary pragmaticists.

Part I

The Semantics-Pragmatics interface

Many pragmaticists and language philosophers tried to draw the dividing line between semantics and pragmatics in terms of dichotomies such as: conventional/non-conventional meaning, truth-conditional/ non-truth-conditional meaning, decontextualized/ contextualized meaning, decoded/inferred meaning, what is said/what is implicated, sentence/utterance, etc. However, this way of cutting the semiotic pie has recently been reconsidered. The emphasis had shifted from the distinction between semantics and pragmatics to the interface or overlap between them. A radical response to the resulting pragmatic intrusion into semantics was to abolish the distinction between the two (e.g. Lakoff 1987, Jackendoff 1990). Levinson (2000) rejects what he calls the "pragmatics" cocktail that results from the conflation of pragmatics and semantics, because pragmatic inference is nonmonotonic and defeasible, whereas semantic inference is monotonic and nondefeasible.

*Corresponding author: Hisham Ibrahim Abdulla,
Asst. Prof. Iraqi University, Iraq.

The overlap or interaction between the two areas is uncontroversial. However, the way to characterize it was the subject of debate. We are going to give very brief accounts of how Grice, Relevance theorists, Bach, Recanati and Levinson characterize the relation between the two areas.

Grice's what is said and what is implicated

Grice's (1975, 1989) classical account distinguishes between what is said and what is implicated (or implicature) by characterizing the first as follows: (Levinson 2000: 170)

1. U said that P by uttering x iff:
 - a. X conventionally ("timelessly") means p
 - b. U speaker-meant p (this condition serves, e.g. to select one of a number of ambiguous readings)
 - c. P = the conventional meaning of x minus any Conventional implicatures (i.e., any non-truth-conditional but conventional aspects of meaning that 'indicate' but do not contribute to 'what is said').

(U = utterer, P = proposition, X = linguistic expression)

Thus, what is said includes the truth conditional or propositional content of the sentence and the conventional meaning of the sentence minus any conventional implicature. However, before determining what is said, one has to identify the reference and to fix deixis and to resolve the ambiguity, and these are cases of pragmatic intrusion into what is said (see examples 21-25 below).

By contrast, implicature is defined as follows:

2. By saying P, utterer U conversationally implicates q if:
 - a. U is presumed to be following the maxims,
 - b. The supposition q is required to maintain (a), and
 - c. U thinks the recipient will realize (b).

In other words, what is said is the input to what is implicated, which is the output or product of the comprehension process with the help of the cooperative principle and Grice's maxims.

Relevance Theorists: Explicature and Implicature

Relevance theorists abandoned the Gricean concept of what is said. They described the explicit-implicit distinction in terms of their notion of explicature and implicature. The relevance-theoretic concept of explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual features. It is an inferential development of one of the incomplete logical forms encoded by an utterance to yield fully propositional content. Thus, in the relevance-theoretic frame, there is the semantic representation or logical form, and that is the semantic component. There is also the explicature, which is the logical form after it has been fleshed out inferentially (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995, Carston 1998). As an example of pragmatic enrichment of the semantic component, they give the often quoted utterance "It will take some time to repair your watch", where "some time" is enriched to mean: "considerable or more than expected" (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 139). We shall see that traditional Arab linguists dealt

with this kind of enrichment under the rubric of (iqtidha), which is the inferential enrichment "necessary for the truth or acceptability" of the utterance. Similar examples are "He is somebody" and "It is something" in the way of praise, and "It is not a thing" in the way of dispraise. Relevance theorists reserve the term implicature for what Grice and neo-Griceans would call particularized conversational implicature (PCI). As for generalized conversational implicature (GCI), many of Grice's examples (e.g. implicatures triggered by conjunctions and numerals) have been reanalyzed as pragmatically determined aspects of explicit content (Carston, 1998). Relevance theorists rejected Gazdar's definition of pragmatics as "meaning minus truth conditions", which conflated linguistic semantics with truth-conditional semantics, and resulted in the claim that pragmatic processes should be post-semantic, and should not intrude into truth conditions.

Bach: Implicature

Bach (1994) claims that there is a middle area of speaker meaning between what is said and what is implicated, which he calls "implicature" (with an i) by analogy with Grice's implicature. On his account, there is no pragmatic intrusion into what is said, because the so-called pragmatic intrusion takes place in the middle ground, which is neither what is said nor what is implicated. Like Sperber and Wilson's explicature, it contributes to the enrichment of the incomplete proposition expressed by a sentence in the form of what Bach calls "completion" and "expansion", so that it can be truth-evaluable. Bach (1994) gives the following examples of underdeterminate propositions or "proposition radicals", and their *completion* between square brackets:

3. Gentlemen prefer blondes. [to brunettes]
4. Tipper is ready. [to dance]
5. Steel isn't strong enough. [to support the bridge]
6. Al has finished. [speaking]
7. Strom is too old. [to be a good senator]
8. That lamp is cheap. [relative to other lamps]
9. The king has arrived. [at the palace]

According to Bach, completion is a pragmatic process that enriches the propositional radicals to yield minimal but truth-evaluable propositions.

However, the following sentences do express complete, though minimal propositions. Nevertheless, they do not express all the intended meaning; therefore, they need the *expansion*, added between square brackets:

10. You're not going to die. [from this cut]
11. I have nothing [appropriate] to wear [to the wedding]
12. Everybody [in my class] is coming [to my party]
13. Jack and Jill are married. [to each other]
14. John has three cars. [at least]
15. He took the medicine and [as a result] he recovered.

The bracketed information in both cases are implicatures. They are built out of what is said and they are truth-conditionally relevant.

However, they are cancellable like implicatures, which are additional information external to what is said (Bach, 1994, 2001 Horn, 2004):

- 16.a. John and Mary are married, but not to each other.
- b. He took the medicine and he recovered, but the latter is not the result of the former.

Recanati: Saturation, Free Enrichment and Transfer

Recanati's account of the interface between semantics and pragmatics is similar to that of Relevance theorists. In his view, what is said involves unarticulated constituents. Three types of primary pragmatic processes are needed to bridge the gap between sentence meaning and what is said. They are Saturation, free enrichment and semantic transfer. In saturation, a slot or variable is contextually filled or saturated to complete the proposition expressed by the linguistically decoded logical form. Saturation is linguistically triggered by expressions like possessive constructions, unspecified comparison sets and free variable slots, as in the following saturated sentences: (Recanati in Huang 2007):

- 17. I enjoyed reading John's book [the book written by John]
- 18. Elizabeth is cleverer. [than Naomi]
- 19. John was late [for the seminar]

By contrast, free enrichment is not linguistically but pragmatically mandated. It is optional because it does not fill a gap in the sentence, but only enrich it conceptually. It is subdivided into strengthening and expansion. The examples given to illustrate free enrichment are very similar to Bach's and relevance theorists' above-mentioned examples of expansion and enrichment. The third type of primary pragmatic process is semantic transfer. The typical examples are taken from Nunberg (1979) and Fauconnier (1985)

- 20.a. I am parked out back.

- b. Shakespeare is on the top shelf.
- c. The ham sandwich left without paying.

Obviously, they are cases of metonymy, which according to Leech (1969), can be regarded as a kind of ellipsis. Thus, "Shakespeare" is used to refer to a book written by him, and the "ham sandwich" refers to the customer who ordered the sandwich.

Levinson: Generalized Implicature

According to Levinson (2000), neither of the three accounts we have surveyed is tenable. Pragmatic intrusion is neither an explicature nor an implicature, nor the pragmatically enriched said. It is a case of generalized implicature. On Levinson's view, implicature can intrude into what is said. He argues that implicatures play a role not only in the post-semantic determination of additional propositions, but also in the pre-semantic assignment of reference, resolution of indexicals, ellipsis unpacking, disambiguation and generality-narrowing etc. Below are some examples given by Levinson (2000):

Disambiguation

- 21.a. The administrators barred the demonstrators because they advocated violence.

- b. The administrators barred the demonstrators because they feared violence.

- 22.a. What are they doing in the kitchen?

- b. What kind of apples are those?
- c. They are cooking apples.

- 23.a. He is an indiscriminate dog-lover; he likes [some cats] and dogs.

- b. He likes [[some cats] and dogs]
- c. He likes [some [cats and dogs]]

According to Levinson (2000), arbitrary amounts of world knowledge and the maxim of relevance are involved in disambiguating the referent of "they" in examples (21. a,b). Examples (22. a,b,c) involve morphological ambiguity, which is resolved via relevance and prosody. As for examples (23. b,c), scalar GCI is involved in disambiguating the semantic structure. The GCI in (23. b) is "he likes some- but- not- all cats"; and the GCI in (23. c) is "he likes some- but- not- all cats and some-but-not-all dogs". The difference is that in (23. b), he likes dogs in general.

Indexicals Resolution

- 24. The meeting is on Thursday

*Q-implicates: "not tomorrow" when tomorrow is Thursday. Levinson (2000) points out that the temporal deictic expression (Thursday) said on Wednesday will Q-implicate "not tomorrow", because the speaker did not use (tomorrow) which is more informative and because there are many Thursdays, but only one tomorrow at the time of speaking. Levinson gives other examples of place and person deixis resolution, involving GCIs and other pragmatic processes.

Reference Identification

- 25 a. John came in and he sat down.
- b. John came in and the man sat down.

According to Levinson (2000), the pronoun (he) in (25. a) is coreferential with John due to the NeoGricean I-principle (Grice's "don't say more than necessary"). Thus the speaker uses a semantically general anaphoric expression (he), and the hearer gets the semantically more specific interpretation (he)= John. By contrast, the definite description (the man) in (25. b) is disjoint in reference with John due to the M-principle (the speaker uses a marked more prolix anaphoric expression (the man), and the hearer gets a marked interpretation (the man) ≠ John)

*In neoGricean terms, (Q) in Q-implicature stands for quantity; (I) in I-implicature stands for informativeness; (m) stands for (manner) or (marked).

Ellipsis Unpacking

26 a. Who came?

- a'. John [came].
- b. I will, if you will. (by a swimming pool)
- b'. I will jump into the swimming pool, if you jump into the swimming pool.
- C. They won't visit May's parents.
- C' Old grudge.

Levinson (2000:183) says "Just as the second maxim of Quantity (don't say more than necessary) or my I-principle motivates minimal expressions like pronouns, so, together with a maxim of relevance, it motivates ellipsis". Thus, in (26.a), we supply the missing predicate from the preceding context. Many cases of ellipsis are semantic or syntactic rule-governed processes, where the missing material can be recovered from the linguistic context using syntactic or semantic rules. However, in example (26.b) the elided part is recovered from the physical context (by a swimming pool) with the help of implicature. Nevertheless, that is not the case in (26.c), where no rule application, but complex pragmatic reasoning is responsible for recovering elided constituents.

Generality Narrowing

Levinson (2000) points out that according to Horn, both Q-narrowing and I-narrowing play a systematic role in semantic change, and he gives the following examples of implicature-based narrowing (the examples in (27) are based on Q-implicature, and those in (28) are based on I-implicature):

27a. I ate a few of the cookies.

- +> not all of them. (Q- narrowing)
- b. He hurt a finger.
- +> not a thumb. (Q- narrowing)
- c. It's a **big** city.
- +> not enormous. (Q)
- d. I put the **warm** pot on the table and left the hot one on the stove.
- +> I put the warm-but-not-hot pot on the table. (Q)

28 a. He had a drink

- +> alcoholic drink. (I- narrowing)
- b. This is a bread knife.
- +> for slicing bread. (I)
- c. This is a steel knife.
- +> made of steel. (I)
- d. Larry's book is about negation
- +> the book Larry wrote. (I)

Levinson (2000) remarks that despite appearances, expressions like (or, not, possible, some, etc.) are univocal, not ambiguous. Hence, many natural language expressions are so general that

they border on vacuity if pragmatic narrowing of their generality is not taken into account. In order to be truth-conditional, a proposition should be more specific. Thus, in (28.d) the generality of the possessive in "Larry's book" should be pragmatically narrowed with the help of Gricean principles and contextual information. *

Grice's Circle: Finally, Levinson's account gives rise to what has come to be known as "Grice's circle", namely the paradox that what is said seems to both determine and be determined by implicature. Levinson's solution to the problem is to reject the view that output of semantics is input to pragmatics. Instead, he suggests that the two are overlapping areas.

Summary

To sum up, all four views agree that what is said, at least partly, involves more contribution of pragmatics than Grice recognized. However, Bach, unlike the others, rejects the idea of pragmatic intrusion because he believes that there is an intermediate level between what is said and implicature, namely "implicature". Levinson disagrees with the others, who think that the pragmatic inference under question is of a special kind. He thinks that it is not different from conversational implicature.

Part II

Traditional Arab Linguists: The Inexplicit Said

Prefatory Remark

In what comes, we are going to deal with the traditional Arabic version of pragmatic intrusion into what is said. The literature on this topic is so immense that we have to be selective, and our account cannot do justice to the subject. We use "traditional Arab linguists" as an umbrella term that includes Arab and Muslim jurisprudents (usūlies) and rhetoricians (balaghies), as well as logicians and grammarians.**The method adopted in this study is to use quotations (sometimes long ones) from Arab linguists and compare their notions and views with those of modern pragmaticists.

Classification of Types of Meaning

There are several classifications of communicational content, proposed by "usūlies", who were the philosophers of Islamic law. The aim of "usūl fiqh" (principles of jurisprudence) was to achieve precision in interpreting the intended meaning of the holy texts, i.e. the Quran and Hadeeth (prophetic tradition). For lack of space, we focus on one classification, that of Ibn-hajib (D. 646/1248) in his (Mukhtasar) and the glosses of his commentators. The majority of usūlies, especially the shafiite, followed his model.

According to him, meaning falls into two main types: "mantūq" (the uttered or said) and "mafhum" (the understood or inferred). Mantūq is further subdivided into explicit (mantūq

*see also Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and Recanati (2004)

** These separate designations are often misleading because most traditional Arab scholar were walking encyclopedias.

sareeh) and inexplicit (mantüq ghair sareeh). As we shall see, roughly speaking, "mantüq" corresponds to Grice's "what is said" in modern pragmatics, whereas "mafhum" constitutes part of GCI, specifically generalized Quantity implicature, which includes the NeoGricean Q- and I- implicatures. Mafhum is also subdivided into "mafhum muwafaqa" (positive or congruent) and "mafhum mukhalafa" (negative or opposite) implicatures. Let us quote Taftazani (D.793/1390) in his gloss on Igie (vol.2, p.171), which is a summary of Ibn-Hajib's (Mukhtasar): (Text A)

*Mantüq is what words mean under the aspect of being uttered, i.e. it is a proposition of what is mentioned or one of its states, whether the proposition was mentioned and uttered or not. Mafhum is otherwise; it is what means not under the aspect of being uttered, to be a proposition of what is not mentioned or one of its states. The first [type of mantüq] is explicit, it is what the words were instituted to mean. The inexplicit [type of mantüq] is otherwise, i.e. it is its implications.

The Inexplicit Said (Mantüq Ghair Sareeh)

Then Taftazani addressed the most important notion in this classification, namely the inexplicit "mantüq": (Text A cont.)

The explicit [mantüq] is what words were instituted to mean. Thus, it means by way of identity [mutabaqa] or inclusion [tadhammun]; and the inexplicit... by way of implication [iltizam]. The inexplicit is divided into "iqtidha'a", "ima'a" and "ishara", because it is either intended by the speaker or not. If it is intended by the speaker then, by induction, it is divided into two types: the first is "iqtidha", upon which logical truth and legal truth depend..., the second is that which is related to a proposition (or predication) as an explanation or justification, without which it would be unexplained. It indicates causation though inexplicitly. This is called "tanbeeh" or "ima'a",... and if it is not intended by the speaker it is called "ishara", and he gave examples.

It is important to notice that Taftazani, unlike Razi, adopts the arguable view that inclusion is part of the explicit said. Now we select some examples given by usülies, mostly Quranic verses, to illustrate the different types of inexplicit said or mantüq Ghair sareeh (henceforth, MGS).

29 Iqtidha:

- Forbidden to you are your mothers. (verse 23, surat 3)
iqtidha: forbidden to you [for marriage] are your mothers.
- Forbidden to you are carrion, blood, the flesh of swine. (verse 3, surat 5)
iqtidha: forbidden to you [for food] are carrion and the flesh of swine and [for drink] blood.
- And ask the town. (verse 82, surat 12)
iqtidha: and ask [the people of] the town.
- There is no god but Allah.

Iqtidha: there is no god [worthy of worship] but Allah.
e. There is no prayer for a mosque neighbor except in the mosque.

Iqtidha: there is no [preferred] prayer for a mosque neighbor except in the mosque.

30 Ima'a (Tanbeeh)

a. Surly the pious shall be in bliss, and the wicked shall be in hell. (v.13,14, s.82)

Ima'a: Surly the pious shall be in bliss [for their piety], and the wicked shall be in hell [for their wickedness].

b. Respect the knowledgeable, and disrespect the ignorant.
Ima'a: Respect the knowledgeable [for his knowledge] and disrespect the ignorant [for his ignorance].

c. Bedouin: I have had intercourse on the day of the fasts.
The Prophet: Set free a slave.

Ima'a: Set free a slave [as an expiation because you have had intercourse].

31 Non- Original Intention Ibara (NOI Ibara)

a. They say: "Trading is like usury". But God has permitted trading and forbidden usury. (v. 275, s.2)

(NOI Ibara): Trading is permitted and usury is forbidden.

b. But if you fear you will not deal equitably, then only one. (v.3, s.4)

(NOI Ibara): One should deal equitably with one's wives.

32 Ishara:

- Permitted to you, upon the night of fasts, is to have intercourse with your wives. (v.187, s.2)

Ishara: ritual impurity (janaba) is permitted on the day of fasts.

Interpretation of the (MGS) Examples

The usülie literature is full of highly sophisticated analyses of those three types of (MGS). The debates about their nature and where they should be placed on the semiotic map are endless. Our account cannot but be sketchy and we refer the reader to the literature.

According to usülies, iqtidha refers to unarticulated meaning components that are necessary for the truth of the utterance. Thus, strictly speaking, the sentences in (29) are not only

*The quotations are translated into English by the researcher. The original Arabic texts are shown in the appendix at the end of the paper

subpropositional or incomplete but also literally odd: in (29. a,b) forbidding takes as object, entities such as mothers, carrion, blood, etc., whereas it usually applies to actions. The action variable must be pragmatically supplied by the hearer in context, as is shown in square brackets in each sentence, above.

For example, in (29.b) the action variable forbidden in relation to blood is supplied as "drinking" because it occurs in the "Table" sura, which deals with what is "halal" (lawful food and drink) and what is not. However, "blood" was used in a different context in the Prophet's last sermon. He said "forbidden to you is your blood". The action that was supplied in relation to blood in that context was "shedding". The example in (29.c) is a familiar case of metonymy: one cannot ask the buildings of the town but its inhabitants. As for (29. d,e), they are literally false because we all know for a fact that there were many gods other than Allah, worshipped by different peoples of the world, and that many mosque neighbors do not pray in the mosque. Hence, we supply the missing relevant information to make the utterance true and acceptable.

Obviously this type of (MGS) or inexplicit said is behind many of the examples of pragmatic enrichment provided by Bach, Recanati, Relevance theorist and Levinson, under the rubrics of saturation, expansion, completion, ellipsis unpacking and enrichment. The other examples are explained by other Usūlie concepts such as (hathf) = ellipsis, (urf amali) = practical convention and (urf qawli) = speech convention. (See below). Moving on to consider (Ima'a) or (Tanbeeh), we notice that usūlies always give its details in the last chapters of their books, which are usually devoted to kinds of deduction, especially analogy. The reason is that (ima'a) indicates the relevant cause behind the judgment whether of similarity or dissimilarity of causes. So if the Quran says that wine is forbidden, by (ima'a) we know that intoxication is the cause, and by analogy, that hashish is forbidden, too, because it is also an intoxicant. According to usūlies, (attributes) vary in the degree of transparency and relevance, and they are more transparent and relevant than nouns of entities. Thus, the attributes: pious, wicked, knowledgeable and ignorant in (30. a,b) are so transparent and relevant that their(ima'a) verges on explicitness. Such attributes or descriptions "smell of causality" as usūlies used to say.

As for (30. c), it is an example of the role (ima'a) plays in coherence: if the (ima'a) shown between square brackets was not supplied, the Prophet's move would have been irrelevant and the exchange incoherent. As we shall notice (ima'a) has a very important role to play in the Arabic equivalent of Q-implicature, namely "mafhum mukhalafa" (negative or opposite implicature), which depends on restrictive modification. If the modifier is causal, then the predication or judgment will be negated when the modifier is negated. Before we leave (ima'a), let us quote an usūlie, Subki (D. 756/1355) in his gloss (Ibhaj vol.3, p. 41) on the role of relevance in (ima'a): (Text B).

If building the judgment on the attribute has a sense of causality, the relevance of the attribute is a necessary condition. The author inferred that it is not necessary, from the fact that if one says: "Respect the ignorant and disrespect the knowledgeable", it will be disapproved

by convention, and not because of the command by itself, for respecting the ignorant may be approved of, due to his nobility or religion and so on, and disrespecting the knowledgeable may be approved of due to immorality or stinginess etc. Thus, it turns out that the disapproval is due to the immediacy of inference that respecting the ignorant is for his ignorance, and disrespecting the knowledgeable is for his knowledge, because by default, there is no other cause; and hence, it is true that building the judgement on the attribute definitely implies causality.

An usūlie from the recent generation, Muzaffar (1966) gives a wide range of examples as cases of (ima'a), but some of them are indirect speech acts and others are implicatures. Among his other interesting examples are the following:

33a. I reached the river and drank.

(ima'a): I drank water and specifically from the river.

b. I stood up and gave a speech.

(ima'a) I gave the speech while standing.

(Ima'a) explains the enrichments that have to do with causality such as the expansion examples in (10, 15) above. Cases like (15) have been the subject of dispute among Usūlies. Some argued that the presence of (and) may give preference to an explicit linguistic meaning rather than inexplicit (ima'a). The various senses of the conjunction (and) have been elaborately discussed in the Usūlie literature. Usūlies almost agreed that the common core basic literal meaning of (and) is "absolute coordination or conjunction" (absolute= neutral, unspecified). Thus, they consider the additional meanings of (and) as non-literal. According to context, it may implicate temporal ordering or simultaneity of conjuncts as in the following examples from (Izmiri) (D. 1165/1752) (Hashiya on Mira'at, P.3) "... such as (*Bakr and Khalid quarrelled*) and (*Zaid came and Amr before him or after him*)... Fourthly: to say (*Don't eat fish and drink yoghurt*) means forbidding doing them together, so that it is permitted to drink yoghurt after eating fish". Obviously, these additional meanings are what Atlas and Levinson (1981) term "conjunction buttressing".

Coming to the usūlies' concepts of non-original intention (**NOI Ibara**) and (ishara), we learn from their account and the examples they give, that Ishara it is an unintended assumption entailed by mantuq(what is said). The examples cover a wide range of cases including presupposition, entailment and general assumptions.

The (**NOI**) **Ibara** in (31. a) is part of the given information not the new. The focus of the Quranic verse or its intended message is to refute the unbelievers' claim that trading is like usury. As an unintended by-product of the refutation, we learn the (**NOI**) **Ibara** that trading is permitted and usury is forbidden, but that is not the point of the verse. The point is to deny that they are similar. In (31.b), the (**NOI**) **Ibara** comes in the context of the previous verse, which permits the marriage of more than one women. Again, the precept that one should be equitable is a given assumption or presupposition, which is not the main point of the verse. As for Ishara (32), we need to supply the information that after coitus, both partners are in a state of (janaba) or ritual impurity due to sex pollution, and then one cannot say his prayers before complete washing or

bathing. In the case of fasting, there is (ishara) in this verse that one is permitted to be in (janaba) on the day of fasts. The verse only permits coitus on the night of fasts. Thus, one can have coitus at the last moments of night (which are, strictly speaking, part of the night), but then one would not have enough time for bathing. Practically, the verse permits (janaba) on the day of the fasts. This information is not intended but is learned by (ishara).

However, these inferences were not without disputes. For instance, some usūlies argued that when one has coitus at night, one should assume the allocation of enough time for bathing before daybreak, and this expected assumption can be considered as pragmatic enrichment of the Quranic verse, an alternative (ishara). Another example of (ishara) involves the combination of two separate verses together and to deduce from their combination some information as an unintended by-product (ishara).

Finally, it is worth mentioning that presupposition and non-original intention are related in a part-whole relationship. What usūlies mean by saying that it is "unintended inference" is that it is not part of the focal point of the utterance, but only part of what is given. It is assumed or entailed, but not asserted or explicitly said. This property is what is common to both phenomena.

Mafhūm and GCI

As we have said above, "mafhūm" correspondes to GCI. "Mafhūm muwafaqa", henceforth "mafhūm (+)", and "mafhūm mukhalafa", henceforth "mafhūm (-)", correspond to the Neo-Gricean Q- and I- implicatures respectively. Mafhūm (+) is *a fortiori* inference. For instance, the Quranic verse enjoining children not to disrespect their parents:

34. Say not to them "uffin!" (v. 23, s. 17) ("uffin" is a sign of impatience).

Mafhūm (+): *a fortiori* do not harm them more disrespectfully by beating them or swearing at them, etc.

According to Amidi (D. 631/1233), in mafhūm (-), unlike mafhūm (+), the inference is in contrast to what is said. It arises when we use a restrictive modifier in the predication so that when the modifier is negated the predication is negated, too. The following are the often quoted usūlie examples:

35. a. Payment of (zakat) legal alms is obligatory on unfoddered sheep.

Mafhūm (-): It is not obligatory on foddered sheep.

b. Procrastination of the wealthy (debtor) is unfair.

Mafhūm (-): Procrastination of the poor (debtor) is not unfair.

As an example of the use of the intrusion of mafhūm (-) into what is said à La Levinson, we quote an example from Shirazi (D. 476/1083) in his (Sharh Luma'a, vol. 1, p.436), where he gives an example from the Prophetic tradition "The land was made a mosque to me and its soil pure", where the Prophet avoided the brief and general alternative "the land was made a mosque and pure to me", and used the elaborate and particular

to implicate that only the soil of the land is pure. An alternative analysis might be via the M-principle. For lack of space, we cannot do justice to the (mafhūm) implicature. (for more details, see Abdulla, 2015).

The Distinction Between Mafhūm and Mantūq Ghair Sareeh (MGS)

In his gloss (Sharh on Ibn-Hajib) (vol. 2, p. 171), Igie (D.756/1355) raises the important question concerning the difference between (mafhūm) and (mantūq Ghair sareeh) (MGS). He says that it is a question for deep speculation and he draws the fine line between the two types of inference using vague terms. Attar in his gloss on Subki's (Jami Jawami, vol. 1, p. 308) undertakes to clarify it: (Text C).

Thus, the distinction between (mantūq Ghair sareeh) and (mafhūm) is that although both are unmentioned judgments, mafhūm is not a judgment of something mentioned nor one of its states. Rather it is a judgment of something unmentioned, such as beating in the "uffin" verse, *unlike (mantūq Ghair sareeh), which is a judgment of something mentioned or one of its states.

Bach (1994: 135) used this very criterion of "mentioning" for the distinction between implicature and implicateure, which is, according to him, "a conceptually independent proposition, a proposition with perhaps no constituents common with what is said". Since mafhūm (-) is equivalent to Q- implicature, it plays a role in Levinson's examples of generality Q- narrowing in (27. a-b) above. As for Levinson's examples of I- narrowing in (28. a-d), they are explained via the Usūlie concepts of (urf amali) = practical convention, (hathf) = ellipsis and (idhafa) = genitive, and to these we turn now, but not before we give an idea of the Arabic concept of "tareedh"(PCI).

Tareedh and Particularized conversational Implicature (PCI)

The traditional Arabic term for (PCI) is (Tareedh), which Maghribi (D. 1110/1698) (Mawahib vol.4, p.268) defines as "using context to cause people to understand", i.e. meaning or conveying one's intention by the use of context or contextual clues. Alawi (D. 749/1348) (Tiraz, vol. 1, p. 382) defines it as "the meaning that is conveyed *when* the words are said but not *by* them... It is the meaning that is signified by the contextual clues, not by the words". (my emphasis). The often-quoted example is the use of the Prophetic tradition enjoining Muslims not to harm their fellow Muslims, to implicate criticism of a particular Muslim who was known for harming Muslims:

36. [Said in the presence of Mr. X, who harms Muslims]

"A Muslim is he from whose tongue and hands Muslims are safe."

Mafhūm (-), (GCI): Anyone who harms Muslims is not a Muslim.

Tareedh, (PCI): Mr. X is not a Muslim.

*The verse in (35) above, which is an example of mafhūm (+).

The interesting thing in the *usūlie* account is the layering of meaning: first, the literal sense; second, the figurative metonymy (hands = action, tongue = speech), third: the *mafḥūm* (-) or (GCI), the denial of the faith of anyone who harms Muslims in general; fourth, the (*tareedh*) (PCI) that the particular person (Mr. X) is not a Muslim. Attar (D.1250/1834) in his gloss on (Jami jawami, vol. 1, p. 434) refers to Sharif Jurjani's (D. 816/1413) account, where he points out that the metonymic meaning or the *mafḥūm* (-) "counts as literal meaning" to the (*tareedh*) because, unlike these meanings, "in *tareedh* the words are not used, so it [*tareedh*] is neither literal nor non-literal... and it is not the source of truth or falsity, because the words are not [conventionally] used to convey it". For the lack of space, we skip the highly sophisticated accounts of (*tareedh*), and stress that, with (*tareedh*), there are four layers of meaning in the Traditional Arabic model: (1) the explicit said (*mantūq sareeh*) (2) the inexplicit said (*mantūq Ghair sareeh*) (MGS) (3) *mafḥūm* (-/+) (GCI) (4) *Tareedh* (PCI). However, the relationship between (MGS) and *mafḥūm* is vague and needs clarification. Some Arab scholars (e.g. Ghazzali and Amidi) considered (*mafḥūm*) on a par with (MGS) in the same way that Relevance theorists reanalyzed (GCI) as explication. Nevertheless, there were scholars who tried to make a distinction (e.g. Attar and Subki).

Practical Convention, Speech Convention and Generality Narrowing

One of the very important pragmatic notions in the *usūlie* linguistic tradition is (*urf amali*), which means practical or pragmatic convention. Another one is (*urf qawli*), which means speech convention and is equivalent to semantic change. These notions are behind an *usūlie* pragmatic phenomenon known as (*takhsis umūm*), which literally means generality particularizing or restriction, which closely resembles Levinson's term. Sometimes, they work in the opposite direction of *mafḥūm* (-) or scalar implicature (Levinson's Q-implicature). Scalar implicature in its narrow sense (Horn's and Levinson's) is based on semantic scales of informativeness. In this regard, the more specific expression is informatively stronger than the more general one because the specific entails the general, and the hyponym entails the superordinate, and not vice versa. Thus, Levinson's examples in (27. a-d) are cases of narrowing due to *mafḥūm* (-), or Q-implicature: using weaker expressions implicates the negation of the stronger ones.* However, example (28. a) is due to the *usūlie* notion of (*urf amali*), using the general weaker expression to refer to the specific stronger one.

Now let us quote (Padishah) in his commentary on Ibn-Humam's (Tahrir, vol.1 p.317) explaining generality narrowing via (*urf amali* and *urf qawli*): (Text D)

Custom is a repeated practice or usage though without a logical connection. What is meant here is the (*urf amali*) or practical convention of a people. According to Hanafite, in contrast to Shafiite, it is "*mukhasis lil aam*" i.e., it specifies the general which occurs in the

discourse of interlocutors, such as saying "Food is forbidden" when their custom is eating bread, then the word "food" is understood as referring to bread. This is the Hanafite view. As for specifying the general by (*urf qawli*) or speech convention, which is the agreement among some people that in saying a word, only some of its extensions are meant, so that nothing is understood from hearing it but those[extensions], it is agreed upon, e.g. the use of "beast" to refer to an ass, and the use of "dirham" to refer to common currency. In our opinion, there is an agreement on interpreting the order "buy some meat" as specifically and exclusively referring to lamb if the custom was to eat it (i.e. lamb); therefore practical convention ought to be specifying, like speech convention, because the reason behind both is the same, namely the specific is what first comes to mind when hearing the utterance...

The important concepts in this text explain more than Levinson's examples of generality narrowing. They also explain cases of semantic change and some other pragmatic inferences. Actually, the above text is a summary of an earlier elaborate account of Qarafi (D. 684/1285) in his (Furuq, No.28), where he gives a detailed legal and linguistic distinction between (*urf qawli*) and (*urf fi'ili*)**. We are not interested in the legal concept, but it is intertwined with the linguistic. According to Qarafi, only speech convention (semantic change) can specify the general legally. He divides it into two types: lexical and structural, and exemplifies the first using similar words to those of Padishah's text, but he adds structural or sentence conventions and, as examples, he gives the same (*iqtidha*) examples in (29. a, b, c,) above.

Then, he set a rule to the effect that all the judgments that originally used to go with actions but then were conventionally used only with entities, became conventionally instituted to mean forbidding only the actions related or relevant to those entities and not any other action. However, he says that there are structural conventions that are not legal, such as the convention in Egypt to say "Zaid killed Amr" to indicate beating, not murdering, (Amr). Moreover, he adds interesting examples such as saying "He pressed the wine" and "He ground the flour" and "He killed the killed (the murdered victim)". Then, Qarafi makes a distinction between "linguists" and "conventionalists". Linguists argued that these sentences are not semantically or linguistically true without recovering the ellipted elements: "He pressed the wine grapes", and "He ground the flour wheat", and "He killed the living body of the murdered". However, conventionalists argue that they are true sentences as they are because they are cases of conventional change, and the alleged ellipted elements do not come to mind. Qarafi then defines (*urf fi'ili*)=pragmatic convention as the frequent conventional use of a word to denote some types of its extensions to the exclusion of the others. For instance, the word (garment) is true of linen, cotton, silk, wood, etc. garments. However, in Egypt, only the first three are used. Similarly, the word (bread) is true of wheat, chickpeas, and broad beans bread. However, conventionally, people only use the last one. Therefore, these are pragmatic conventions, but the exclusive use of a word to denote one of its extensions to the exclusion of the others, does not nullify or abolish its

* (Actually *mafḥūm* (-), unlike Q-implicature, does not depend on entailment scales. However, both types are negative inferences depending on contrast sets. For details see Abdulla (2015)).

** Qarafi uses the word (*fi'ili*) = pragmatic instead of Padishah's (*amali*) = practical.

institution for the whole category, because it may denote the other extensions in other contexts. Then Qarafi goes into sophisticated analyses and discusses interesting hypothetical cases, which, for lack of space, cannot be covered here.

The (Mujmal) and Pragmatic Intrusion

Another interesting *usūlie* notion is (mujmal) = ambivalent and (ijmal) = ambivalence. It was used by Shafiite as a cover term subsuming all the different types of ambiguity and indeterminacy that are classified individually in the literature under rubrics such as (khafi)= vague, (mushtarak)= ambiguous, (mujmal) = ambivalent, etc.

In the following quotation from Gazzali (D. 505/1111) (Mustasfa, vol.1, p.360), we can find examples of almost all the cases of ambiguity and reference indeterminacy that we quoted from Levinson in (21-23) and (25) above: (Text E).

(summing up) know that ijmal" (indeterminacy) occurs sometimes in a single lexical item and sometimes in a structural item, and sometimes in the syntax, the inflection, anaphoric reference and the boundaries that demarcate the ends and beginnings of sentences. As for the single lexical item: it may mean different things, e.g. the word "ain" (eye) may mean the sun or gold or an eye or a scale... As for ambiguity in a structural item, it is such as in the Quranic verse: (Or he, in whose hands is the marriage tie, agrees to forgo and give her full dower)), for these words can equally refer to the husband or the protector. As for that in inflection, it is such as using "mukhtar" (choosing, chosen) which can refer to the present participle or past participle. As for that due to anaphoric reference, it is such as saying "whatever the wise knows, then huwa = (it/he)* is as huwa knows", for your saying "then huwa (it/he) is as huwa knows" can equally refer back to "whatever" or to "the wise" so that one can say "the wise knows the stone, then he is like stone"

Then Gazzali goes on to address the ijmal in sentence boundaries: (Text E, cont.)

Or it can be due to sentence boundaries, for to stop at the word "heavens" in the Quranic verse ((and He is Allah in the heavens and on earth He knows what you conceal and what you reveal)) gives a different meaning from stopping at the word "earth" and restarting at ((He knows what you conceal and what you reveal)). Similarly, reciting the holy verse ((but no one knows its hidden meanings except Allah and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge [say "we believe in it"]))** without a pause or stop is different from stopping at ((except Alla)), because the "and" can be a conjunction or initial; therefore the statement that "five is odd and even" is true because it is two and three, and so is the statement that "man is an animal and a body" because man *is* an animal and a body, too. However, neither... is true because man is not an animal and a body, and five is not even and odd, too, since the conjunction "wa" (and) can be used to combine parts as well as attributes.

It is worth mentioning that (ijmal) is the term used for ambiguity and indeterminacy before they are resolved. *Usūlies* always say that when (ijmal) is resolved, it will be called by other names according to the degree of its resolution. We quoted the above text simply because it contains a wide variety of examples of ambiguity. Now, the anaphoric referent ambiguity in example (21), the inflectional ambiguity in (22) and the constituents' bracketing in (23), as well as lexical ambiguity are all there in the Gazzali text. Tahanawi (D. 1158/1745) in (kashaf, vol. 2, p. 1477) gives some of the causes of (ijmal) such as lexical ambiguity, ellipsis, difference of referent, etc. For referent ambiguity, he gives the clear example, "Zaid beat Amr, and I beat him", where the referent of (him) is indeterminate between (Zaid) and (Amr). Before the above text quoted from Gazzali, he outlines the argument of some *usūlies* who claimed that the (iqtidha) examples such as those in (29) above are cases of (mujmal). According to Gazzali (Mustasfa, vol.1 p.346), those (iqtidha) examples are not (mujmal) but are cases of conventional use: (Text F).

Quranic verses like ((forbidden to you are your mothers)) and ((forbidden to you are carrion...etc.)) are not (mujmal). Some Qadarites***argued that they were (mujmal) because forbidding cannot be predicated of entities, but what is forbidden is the action, which is related to the entity, and that action is not known, e.g. whether a carrion is forbidden for touching, eating, seeing, selling or benefitting from; therefore it is (mujmal)... So an action has to be assumed. But actions are numerous and none takes priority over the others.

Then he undertakes to refute their argument:

However, that is wrong because conventions of use are like linguistic establishment, and that is why we divided nouns into conventional and established... and they [linguists] have no doubt that whoever says "I have forbidden to you food and drink", means eating and not seeing or touching; and if he says "I have forbidden to you this garment", he means wearing...Some people said it is a kind of ellipsis as in the Quranic verse "and ask the town", i.e.(its people)... but if by this they mean to subsume it under (mujmal), then that is wrong; and if they mean understanding it although it is ellipted, then that is right; and if they mean to subsume it under non-literality (majaz), then they must consider conventional nouns non-literal.

The reason behind Gazzali's response is that (mujmal), according to *usūlie* terminology, is indeterminate between two or more interpretations with equal probability, while the (iqtidha) examples are conventionally interpreted. The interesting thing in Gazzali's text is the suggestion to consider (iqtidha) as non-literal in a sense. Earlier (p.342), he classifies non-literality or (majaz) into three types, the third being "ellipsis non-literality or majaz, which does not hinder understanding", and he gives the same Quranic verse as an example. Later (p. 344), Gazzali gives another interesting example of ellipsis non-literality: "As for the case when he says (I have read Muzani and Sibawayhi) and he means their books, it is just like the verse (and ask the town). It is through

*In Arabic the animate/ inanimate distinction is replaced by the feminine/masculine distinction, and that is the source of indeterminacy.

**I added the rest of the verse between square brackets for the sake of clarity.

***Qadarites are upholders of free-will.

ellipting the noun (book) that it means (I have read Muzani's book) Thus, it is majaz of the third type above".

Obviously, Gazzali's last example of ellipsis majaz is a typical case of what is known in Arabic rhetoric as (majaz mursal)= non-resemblance majaz. It is also Recanai's very concept of semantic transfer, which we exemplified in (20. a-c) above. Gazzali's extension of the explanatory power of the concept (iqtidha) to explain cases of ellipsis and semantic transfer, is also echoed in Recanati's examples of saturation (17-19) and free enrichment and in most of Bach's cases of implicature (3-15) above, whether they are completions or expansions. Even Gazzali's idea that (iqtidha) can be seen as "ellipsis majaz or non-literality" is revisited by Bach (1994: 134): "Even so, leaving words out is a kind of non-literality in its own right". He gives example (11) above and similar examples to illustrate this idea, and then goes on:

Even though, we may not intuitively think of this phenomenon as non-literality because no specific words are being used figuratively, it is a way of not being literal, because what the speaker says is one thing and the expanded version of it to be identified by the hearer is another.

That most cases of Bach's implicature are actually cases of inexplicit said, is supported by the fact that most cases of (iqtidha) and (ima'a) are, like the cases of implicature (e.g. 16. a,b), cancellable as can be seen from the examples in (37.a-c), which are cancellations of the (iqtidha) and (ima'a) in (29. b,c) and (30. a) above respectively:

37a. Forbidden to you is blood [but for shedding, not for drink].
b. And ask the town [but its remains, not its people].
c. And surely the wicked shall be in hell [but not for their wickedness].

Of course, we know that blood is forbidden for drink from another text. However, the cancellation of (ima'a) in (36. c) sounds more difficult because it reflects the relevance of the "transparent" attribute (wicked), which cannot be easily ignored. As for cases like Recanati's example of saturation of the possessive construction in (17) above, and Levinson's I-narrowing example in (28. d) and other similar cases of pragmatic enrichment, they were addressed and pragmatically explained by traditional Arab grammarians under the rubric of (idhafa) = the genitive. They classify it into various types, the meanings of which are shown by (unarticulated) prepositions that relate the (mudhaf ilayhi) = the superordinate noun phrase (SNP) to the (mudhaf) = the genitive noun phrases (GNP).

Thus, in (lamiya) type = possessive genitive*, the unarticulated preposition which we provide is (of), e.g., Ali's book, (the book of Ali). In (dharfiya) = adverbial genitive, the preposition is (in), e.g., a summer's day (a day in summer), space flight (flight into space). In (bayaniya) = (partitive?), the preposition is (from, of), e.g., gold ring (made of gold), milk products (made from milk). Obviously, in English grammar, this last type is not considered as genitive, but as a noun used

attributively. It is certainly behind the I- narrowing in Levinson's example (28. C)

However, these and other types of genitive can be reduced to the first type (lamiya). According to traditional Arab linguists, the point is that there has to be an implicit relation of some kind between the (SNP) and the (GNP) which modifies it and narrows its generality: the (book) is a general (SNP) but, when it is related to the (GNP) (Ali) by the relation (X), its generality is narrowed. Moreover, generality can be narrowed even further when the free variable of the nature of the relation between the book and Ali is investigated. It is a linguistically triggered process, which results in pragmatic enrichment, as Recanati pointed out.

Ellipsis and Pragmatic Enrichment

A large proportion of the cases of pragmatic enrichment that were dealt with above can be attributed to ellipsis. This can be shown by the fact that the example of (iqtidha) in (29. c) above: "And ask the town", was classified under different rubrics by different kinds of scholars. According to Usūlies, it was an instance of iqtidha and conventions of use, whereas to (balaghies)=rhetoricians, it is (majaz mursal) = metonymy (the use of the name of a place to refer to its inhabitants). To grammarians, it was a clear case of (hathf) = ellipsis.

The reason behind ellipsis and brevity are Grice's maxim of relevance and the second maxim of quantity "do not say more than is required". Levinson (2000: 37) suggests a heuristic that guides hearers to enrich interpretations: "minimal specifications get maximally informative or stereotypical interpretations".

Traditional Arab grammarians' approach to the subject emphasized the notion of rule-governed recoverability of the missing element from context, especially the linguistic context, as in Levinson's example of ellipsis unpacking in (26. a,a') above. This shows that they think in terms of complete sentences as the norm. However, Arab rhetoricians' approach was more pragmatic and they had some awareness of the modern notion of non-sentential utterances advocated by Yanofsky (1978) and Stainton (2004). We often use subsentential or non-sentential utterances to perform full-blown speech acts in the suitable context, as in the following examples:

38a. Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the US.
b. Fast relief for arthritic pain.
c. Water!
d. Out!

Taftazani in his gloss on (Mutawal, P. 186) gives a very long list of various contexts and reasons behind "ellipsis" of the subject or the predicate. Here is a sample about subject ellipsis: (Text G)

It requires two things: first the context clues that help the hearer to recover it, second the reason that motivates its ellipsis.. Another [motive] is deniability, i.e. ease of denial when needed, such as: "wicked! Transgressor!" meaning (Zaid), so that you find it easy to say that you didn't mean him.. and also like the hunter crying "A

*In Arabic, the genitive is not marked by inflection and the (SNP) is postmodified by the (GNP)

deer!", for the situation does not allow time for saying "That is a deer; so hunt it". And for concealing of information from the audience other than the hearer such as "[he has] arrived" and abiding by a conventional use of ellipsis in certain expressions, e.g. " One of his old mantras!"*

Rhetoricians often give very interesting examples of non-sentential utterances, such as:

39a. By God, the crescent! [that's the crescent!]

b. Sweet patience! [come sweet patience!]

c. In the name of God [I start]

To this category belongs Levinson's example (26. C,C') above, which Levinson says it requires "complex reasoning and not rule application" to recover. However, many Arab rhetoricians believed that these were elliptical utterances to be enriched pragmatically. Nevertheless, many other rhetoricians had other explanations of utterances where the subject of the transitive verb does not appear in the sentence. Suyuti (D. 911/1505) in his (Itqan, Vol. 2, P. 58) reports previous rhetoricians such as Ibn-Hisham (D. 761/1360) and Jurjani (D. 471/1078): (Text H)

Ibn-Hisham said that grammarians are used to assert the object's ellipsis by way of (ikhtisar)= summary or (iqtisar)= limitation. By the first, unlike the second, they mean the omission of parts specifiable by evidence. The example they give [for the second] is such as "Eat and drink.", which means "perform these two acts". The truth is, as rhetoricians say, sometimes the intention is to inform only of the occurrence of the act without specifying the subject or the object, in such a way that the infinitive is a general unattributed event, as in saying, "Fire broke out and looting took place". And sometimes the intention is to inform only of attributing the action to the subject; therefore, only they are mentioned and the object is not mentioned nor is it intended because the intended is like the mentioned. And it is not considered ellipted because for this purpose the verb counts as having no object, e.g. "My Lord is He who makes to live, and makes to die" [v. 258, s. 2] and "Are those who know equal to those who know not?" [v. 9, s. 39] and "Eat and drink but waste not by extravagance" [v. 31, s. 7] ..., for the meaning is: "My lord is he who does the act of making to live and making to die" and "are those who have the property of knowledge equal to those who do not" and "perform eating and drinking, and leave off wasting"...

According to this type of analysis, ellipsis by way of (iqtisar) is not real ellipsis because the alleged "ellipted" part is not intended and does not come to mind, as if there were a change of verb class from transitive to intransitive. Does that mean (iqtidha) is blocked in this case, and no unarticulated element is assumed or imagined, and consequently, that it is a case of (mujmal)? If the answer is yes, it will amount to denying pragmatic intrusion in this case, or maybe denying that it is linguistically mandated. However, there seems to be some sort of unarticulated element (though of a very general and

unspecified character); but the fact that it is general does not negate it (cf. Gazzali's position above).

Grice's Circle and the Nature of Mafhüm

Finally, a form of Grice's circle (the paradoxical relation between implicature and what is said) did not escape the Usülies' attention. That was in the context of their disputes over the nature of mafhüm (-), which is the equivalent of the Neo Gricean concept of Q- implicature. There was a divide between upholders of mafhüm(-) and its rejecters or deniers. Contrary to what might seem plausible, the rejecters of mafhüm (-) are closer to Griceans than its upholders. The first think that it is almost failsafe and reliable in interpreting the holy text (for legal purposes). The second, by contrast, think that it is an (istis'hab) = default inference based on what has been said in contrast to what might have been said, but it is far from being certain. The deniers of mafhüm (-) reject their opponents' claim that the negative inference is among the significations that motivate the restricted modification of what is said. Amidi in his (Ihkam, vol. p.145) was a rejecter of that claim because it led to a vicious circle: (Text I)

Because negating the unsaid predication, according to the upholders of mafhüm mukhalafa [-], is a subset of the signification of what is said. So if the signification of what is said, which negates the unsaid were dependent on it [the unsaid] in some way, it would have been a vicious circle.

Amidi used the vicious circle as a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against his opponents, but for lack of space, the details of the sophisticated arguments and debates of the Usülies cannot be covered here.

Conclusion

We have seen that the main ideas behind pragmatic intrusion into what is said were common among Arab jurists and rhetoricians. Using quotations from those pioneer pragmaticists, we have shown that most of the concepts proposed by modern pragmaticists under the rubric of pragmatic intrusion into what is said were familiar to traditional Arab linguists. They were acquainted with the substance of notions such as what is said, implicature, explicature, implicature, completion, expansion, saturation, free enrichment, disambiguation, ellipsis unpacking, generality narrowing, etc. The striking similarity of examples, concept and analyses is telling. Pragmatic concepts seem to have a longer history than is commonly assumed. It is recommended that further research be carried along the same lines on similar topics.

REFERENCES

- Alawi, 1914. Tiraz. Cairo: Dar Kutub Khidaywia.
Amidi, Sayfuddin, 1983. Al-Ihkam. Al-Ilmiya Press, Beirut.
Attar, H. 1828. Hashiya on Jami Jawami. Egypt: Maktaba Tijaria Kubra.
Ghazzali, Abu- Hamid 1904. Al-Mustasfa. Ameeria Press, Bulaq.
Ibn – Humam, Kamaluddin (undated) Al- Tahrir. Beirut: Dar al Kutub Al- Ilmia

*This is a functional non-literal translation of the utterance.

- Igie, A. 1899. Sharh Mukhtasar Ibn-Hajib. Bulaq: Ameeria Press.
- Izmiri, M. 1868. Hashiya on Mira'at. M Bosnawy Press.
- Jurjani, S.S. 1912. Hashiya on Mutawal. Istanbul: Kamil Press.
- Maghribi, I. Y. 1924. Mawahib Al-Fattah. Cairo: Al-Saada Press.
- Muzaffar, M. R. (1966) Usul Fiqh. Najaf: Numan Press.
- Padishah, A. (undated) Taysir Tahrir. Beirut: Dar Kutb Ilmiya
- Qarafi, S. (undated) Al-Furūq. Beirut: Dar Al-Marifa.
- Sakkaki, A. Y. (1937) Miftah Al-Uloom. Cairo: Al-Halabi Press.
- Shawkani, muhamed Ali 1937. Irshad Al- Fuhul. Egypt: Halabi Press.
- Shirazi, A. I. 1988. Sharh Luma'a. Beirut: Dar Gharb Islami.
- Subki, T. A. 2004. Ibhaj Sharh Minhag. Beirut: Dar Kutub Ilmiya.
- Suyuti, Jalaluddin 1973. Al-Itqan. Beirut: Al-Thaqafia Press.
- Taftazani, Sa'adudin 1899. Hashia on Igie's Gloss. Bulaq: Ameeria Press.
- Taftazani, Sadudin 1912. Mutawwal. Istanbul:Kamil Press.
- Tahanawi, M.A. 1963. Kashaf Istilahat Al-Funūn. Cairo: Al-Nahdha Press.

OTHER REFERENCES

- Abdulla, H.I. 2015 Scalar Implicature. European Academic Research, Vol. III/ 71: 7358-7386
- Atlas, J. and Levinson S. 1981. It-clefts, informativeness, and logical form. In Cole, P. 1981. Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic Press
- Bach, K. 1994. Conversational Implicature. Mind and Language 9: 124-62
- Bach, K. 2001. You Don't Say? Synthese 127: 11-31.
- Carston, R. 1998 Informativeness, relevance and scalar implicature. In R.Carston and s. Uchida (eds.) Relevance theory: application and implications.
- Carston, R. 2004. Relevance theory and the saying/implicating distinction. In Horn, L. R. and Ward, G. (eds.) 633-56
- Fauconnier, G. 1985. Mental spaces. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Grice, H.P. 1975. Logic and Conversation. In Cole and Morgan (eds) Syntax & Semantics.vol.3, New York Academic Press.
- Grice, H.P. 1989. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
- Horn, L. 2004. Implicature. In Horn, L. and Ward, G. (eds.) 3-28
- Huang, Y. 2007. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jackendoff, R. 1990. Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire and dangerous things. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leech, G. N. 1969. A Linguistic guide to English poetry. London: Longman.
- Levinson, S.C. 2000. Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Nunberg, Geoffrey 1979. The non-uniqueness of semantic solutions: Polysemy. Linguistics and philosophy 3: 143-84
- Recanati, Francois 2004. Pragmatics and semantics. In Horn, L. R. and Ward, G. (eds.) 422-62.

- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1986. Relevance. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 1995. Relevance. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Stainton, R. 2004. The pragmatics of non- sentences. In Horn, L. R. and Ward, G. (eds.) 266-287
- Yanofsky, N. 1978. NP utterances. CLS 14, 491-502.

APPENDIX : THE ORIGINAL ARABIC TEXTS QUOTED IN TRANSLATION

Text A

... فالمنطوق ما دل عليه اللفظ في محل النطق أي يكون حكماً للمذكور وحالاً من أحواله سواء ذكر ذلك الحكم ونطق به أو لا والمفهوم بخلافه وهو ما دل لا في محل النطق بأن يكون حكماً لغير المذكور و حالاً من أحواله.. قال (والأول صريح، وهو ما وضع اللفظ له، وغير الصريح بخلافه وهو ما يلزم عنه ... أقول: المنطوق ينقسم إلى صريح وغير صريح فالصريح ما وضع اللفظ له فيدل عليه بالمطابقة أو بالتضمن وغير الصريح ... فيدل عليه بالالتزام. وغير الصريح ينقسم إلى دلالة اقتضاء، وإيماء وإشارة لأنه إما أن يكون مقصوداً للمتكلم أو لا فإن كان مقصوداً للمتكلم فذلك بحكم الاستقراء قسمان : أحدهما أن يتوقف الصدق أو الصحة العقلية أو الشرعية عليه وتسمى دلالة اقتضاء ... وثانيها أن يقتدر بحكم لو لم يكن للتعليل لكان بعيداً فيفهم منه التعليل ويدل عليه منه التعليل وإن لم يصرح به ويسمى تنبيهاً وإيماءً... وإن لم يكن مقصوداً للمتكلم سمي دلالة إشارة وضرب لها أمثلة فمنها ...

Text B

إذا ثبت أن ترتيب الحكم على الوصف يشعر بالعلية فهو يشترط مناسبة الوصف . واستدل المصنف على أنه لا يشترط بأن القائل لو قال "أكرم الجاهل وأهن العالم " استقبح هذا الكلام منه عرفاً ، وليس الاستقبح لمجرد الأمر بذلك ، فإن الجاهل قد يحسن إكرامه في الجملة لنسب أو دين أو غير ذلك ، والعالم قد يحسن إهانتة لفسق أو بخل أو غيره ، فثبت أن استقبح ذلك إنما هو لسبق الفهم إلى تعليل إكرام الجاهل بالجهل وإهانة العالم بالعلم لأن الأصل عدم غيره فيكون حقيقة في أن ترتيب الحكم على الوصف يقتضي العلية مطلقاً

Text C

هذا والفرق بين المنطوق غير الصريح والمفهوم أنهما وإن اشتركا في أن كلاهما حكم غير مذكور إلا أن المفهوم ليس حكماً للمذكور ولا حالاً من أحواله بل هو حكم للمسكوت كالضرب في آية التأنيب بخلاف المنطوق غير الصريح فإنه حكم للمذكور وحال من أحواله

Text D

العادة: وهي الأمر المتكرر ولو من غير علاقة عقلية والمراد هنا العرف **العملي** لقوم, مختصّ للعام الواقع في تخاطبهم, عند الحنفية خلافاً للشافعية ك(حرث الطعام), وعادتهم, أي المخاطبين, أكل البَر, انصرف (الطعام) إليه أي البَر, وهو قول الحنفية الوجه, أما تخصيص العام **بالعرف القولي** وهو أن يتعارف عند قوم في إطلاق لفظ إرادة بعض أفرادهم مثلاً, بحيث لا يتبادر عند سماعه إلا ذلك... فتخصيص العام به عند ذلك متفق عليه كالعادة على الحمار, والدرهم على النقد الغالب. لنا: الاتفاق على فهم لحم الضأن بخصوصه في (اشترِ لحماً) وقصر الأمر بشراء اللحم عليه أي الظأن إذا كانت العادة أكله فوجب كون العرف العملي مختصاً بالقولي لاتحاد الموجب وهو تبادره بخصوصه من إطلاق اللفظ...

Text E

(خاتمة جامعة) اعلم أن الإجمال تارة يكون في لفظ مفرد وتارة يكون في لفظ مركب, وتارة في نظم الكلام والتصريف وحروف النسق ومواضيع الوقف والابتداء. أما اللفظ المفرد فقد يصلح لمعان مختلفة كالعين للشمس والذهب والعضو الباصر والميزان... أما الاشتراك مع التركيب فكقوله تعالى ((أو يعفو الذي بيده عقدة النكاح)) فإن جميع هذه الألفاظ مرددة بين الزوج والولي. وأما الذي بحسب التصريف فكالمختار للفاعل والمفعول. وأما الذي بحسب نسق الكلام فكقوله (كل ما علمه الحكيم فهو كما علمه) فإن قولك (فهو كما علمه) متردد بين أن يرجع إلى (كل ما) وبين أن يرجع إلى (الحكيم) حتى يقول (فالحكيم يعلم الحجر إذاً فهو كالحجر). وقد يكون بحسب الوقف والابتداء, فإن الوقف على (السموات) في قوله تعالى (وهو الله في السموات وفي الأرض يعلم سرهم وجهركم) له معنى يخالف الوقف على (الأرض) والابتداء بقوله (يعلم سرهم وجهركم), وقوله تعالى (وما يعلم تأويله إلا الله والراسخون في العلم) من غير وقف يخالف الوقف على قوله (إلا الله) وذلك لتردد الواو بين العطف والابتداء. ولذلك قد يصدق قولك الخمسة زوج وفرد أي هو اثنان وثلاثة, ويصدق قولك (الانسان حيوان وجسم) لأنه حيوان وجسم أيضاً ولا يصدق قولك (الانسان حيوان وجسم) ولا قولك (الخمس زوج وفرد) لأن الانسان ليس بحيوان وجسم وليس الخمسة زوجاً وفرداً أيضاً, وذلك لأن الواو تحتل جمع الأجزاء وجمع الصفات...

Text F

قوله تعالى حرمت عليكم امهاتكم وحرمت عليكم الميتة ليس بمجمل وقال قوم من القدرة هو مجمل لان الاعيان لا تتصف بالتحريم وانما يحرم فعل ما يتعلق بالعين وليس يدرى ما ذلك الفعل فيحرم من الميتة مسها او اكلها او النظر اليها او بيعها او الانتفاع بها فهو مجمل ... ولا بد من تقدير فعل وتلك الأفعال كثيرة وليس بعضها أولى من بعض وهذا فاسد إذ عرف الاستعمال كالوضع ولذلك قسمنا الأسماء إلى عرفية و وضعية... ومن أنس بتعارف أهل اللغة واطلع على عرفهم علم أنهم لا يستريون في أن من قال (حرمت عليك الطعام والشراب) أنه يريد الأكل دون النظر والمس, وإذا قال (حرمت عليك هذا الثوب) أن يريد اللبس... وقال قوم هو من قبيل المحذوف كقوله تعالى ((واسأل القرية)) أي أهل القرية... وهذا إن أراد به إلحاقه

بالمجمل فهو خطأ, وإن أراد به حصول الفهم به مع كونه محذوفاً فهو صحيح. وإن أراد به إلحاقه بالجاز فيلزمه تسمية الأسماء العرفية مجازاً. (التوكيد لي)

Text G

والحذف يفتقر إلى امرين احدهما قابلية المقام وهو ان يكون السامع عارفاً به لوجود القرائن. والثاني الداعي الموجب لرجحان الحذف ... أو تأني الإنكار أي تيسيره لدى الحاجة نحو: (فاسق! فاجر!) أي: (زيد), ليتيسر لك أن تقول: ما أردته بل غيره.. أو ما أشبه ذلك كقول الصياد: (غزال!), فإن المقام لا يسع أن يقال: (هذا غزال فاصطادوه), وكالإخفاء من غير السامع من الحاضرين مثل: (جاء!), وكاتباع الاستعمال الوارد على تركه مثل: (رمية من غير رام!) و (شنشنة أعرفها من أخزم)...

Text H

قال ابن هشام جرت عادة النحويين أن يقولوا بحذف المفعول **اختصاراً واقتصاراً**. ويريدون بالاختصار الحذف للدليل, ويريدون بالاقتصاد الحذف لغير دليل, ويمثلونه بنحو ((كلوا واشربوا)) أي أوقعوا هذين الفعلين. والتحقيق أن يقال يعني كما قال أهل البيان تارة يتعلق الغرض بالإعلام بمجرد قوع الفعل من غير تعيين من أوقعه ومن أوقع عليه, فيجاء بمصدره مسنداً إلى فعل كون عام, فيقال: (حصل حريق أو نهب), **وتارة يتعلق بالإعلام بمجرد إيقاع الفعل للفاعل فيقتصر عليهما ولا يذكر المفعول ولا ينوي إذ المنوي كالثابت ولا يسمى محذوفاً لأن الفعل ينزل لهذا القصد منزلة ما لا مفعول له**, ومنه: ((ربي الذي يحيي ويميت)), ((هل يستوي الذين يعلمون والذين لا يعلمون)), ((كلوا واشربوا ولا تسرفوا)) إذ المعنى: (ربي الذي يفعل الإحياء والإماتة) و (هل يستوي من يتصف بالعلم ومن ينتفي عنه العلم) و (أوقعوا الأكل و الشرب وذروا الإسراف) .

(Text I)

فإنما يلزم من ذلك نفي الحكم في محل السكوت، أن لو كان نفي الحكم فيه من جملة الفوائد الموجبة لتخصيص محل النطق بالذكر، وليس كذلك. وذلك لأن نفي الحكم في محل السكوت عند القائلين بمفهوم المخالفة إنما هو فرع دلالة اللفظ في محل النطق عليه؛ فلو كانت دلالة اللفظ محل النطق على نفي الحكم في محل السكوت متوقفة عليه بوجه من الوجوه كان دوراً ممتنعاً.