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<p>The majority of existing studies models corruption using a modified version of a "trust game" in which a player in a role of a company can transfer funds to a second player, called official, who can reciprocate and increase the value of the final profits of the company and herself at the expense of a profit of a third player - the public (e.g., Alatas et al., 2009a, 2009b; Barr & Serra, 2010; Cameron et al., 2009, Drugovo et al., 2012). These games are often played only as one-shot games, sometimes even in a neutral setting that does not have any negative connotations associated with corruption, or with a player in the role of the public being able to punish corrupt companies and officials. As a result, researchers are able to collect only a relatively small amount of relevant data even with a large number of participants. Moreover, these data come often from settings that do not correspond to the real-life corruption situations in many important aspects. </p> <p>The present study eliminates these shortcomings in the following way: 1) by focusing only on the behavior of the actor receiving a bribe (in the role of official), the stimuli that she receives are fully under the control of the experimenter; 2) negative effects (externalities) of corruption are implemented as a reduction of a contribution to an external entity (a charity) (cf. Lambsdorff & Frank, 2010, 2011), 3) the possibility to act corruptly is embedded in the performance of another, functionally independent activity – similarly to real-life situations. Specifically, the study simulates a situation when the official is responsible for sorting objects coming from companies to categories according to a given key. Companies are able to send a bribe with their objects in order to secure incorrect sorting that reduces a profit of a third party – public. </p> <p>The aims of the current project are twofold: first, we want to validate our task as a paradigm for studying corruption. Second, we will test hypotheses about moral licensing and about association between personality traits and corrupt behavior. </p> <p>Specifically, we expect that participants will take the opportunity to cheat, i.e. the proportion of misclassifications will be higher for objects with bribes than for objects without bribes. They will also prefer bigger bribes. We also expect that participants who view misclassification negatively and rejecting bribes positively will accept fewer bribes. </p> <p>The probability of accepting bigger bribes will be higher in a condition where they are offered small and big bribes than in a condition where they are offered middle-sized and big bribes. This is because we expect that participants will turn down small bribes, but after turning down a number of small bribes they will feel entitled to accept a bigger one (i.e., a case of moral licensing). In addition, bigger bribes will be relatively more tempting in the first than in the second condition. </p> <p>We also expect that the propensity to act corruptly will be associated with Honesty-humility scale from HEXACO personality inventory.</p> <p>We will explore several additional associations described in the Analysis node. <br></p> <p><strong>References</strong><br> Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009a). Gender, Culture, and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis. <em>Southern Economic Journal, 75</em>(3), 663-680.<br> Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009b). Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. <em>Experimental Economics, 12</em>(1), 113-132.<br> Barr, A., & Serra, D. (2010). Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. <em>Journal of Public Economics, 94</em>(11-12), 862-869.<br> Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. <em>Journal of Public Economics, 93</em>(7-8), 843-851.<br> Drugovo, M., Hamman, J., & Serra, D. (2012). Intermediaries in Corruption: An Experiment. Retrieved from SSRN: <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838591" rel="nofollow">http://ssrn.com/abstract=1838591</a><br> Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2010). Bribing versus gift-giving - An experiment. <em>Journal of Economic Psychology, 31</em>(3), 347-357.<br> Lambsdorff, J. G., & Frank, B. (2011). Corrupt reciprocity - Experimental evidence he and the men's game. <em>International Review of Law and Economics, 31</em>(2), 116-125.</p>
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