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**What I Saw on the Road to Insurrection: Internal
Political Efficacy, Conspiracy Beliefs and the Effect of
Depression on Support for the January 6th Storming of
the Capitol**

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What I Saw on the Road to Insurrection: Internal Political Efficacy, Conspiracy Beliefs and the Effect of Depression on Support for the January 6th Storming of the Capitol

Depression can affect individuals' attitudes by enhancing cognitive biases and altering perceptions of risk. Some evidence suggests an association between depression and endorsing mass violence. This linkage, however, is undertheorized by social science, tentatively empirically supported, with little attention to conditions impacting the relationship. We investigate whether and how mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic influenced Americans' attitudes regarding domestic extremist violence surrounding the 2020 election and the January 6th US Capitol riot. We develop a theory regarding the circumstances under which depression will be positively associated with supporting extremist violence. We posit that it depends on internal political efficacy, conspiracy beliefs, and their combination. We test our theory using a two-wave national survey, from November 2020, and January 2021. We find that among efficacious individuals holding conspiracy beliefs, depression is positively associated with support for the Capitol stormers and for violence in response if the respondent believed the election was decided unfairly.

Major depression can affect individuals' attitudes by amplifying cognitive biases and altering perceptions of risk (Ackermann and DeRubeis 1991; Park et al. 2016). This can have important political implications. Indeed, researchers have found links between depression and reduced political participation (Landwehr and Ojeda 2021; Ojeda 2016), increased gun ownership (Simonson et al. 2021) and reduced support for rightwing parties (Bernardi 2020). Others look at how politics affects mental health, showing, for example, that the current highly polarized state of American politics may lead to stress, sleep loss, and emotional distress (Smith et al. 2019). On the other hand, despite media attention to the possible role of mental illness in mass shootings, academic research suggests only a weak, and not necessarily causal, association between depression and committing acts of violence (Skeem and Mulvey 2020). Even less certain is

whether depression may increase support for political violence, and if so, under what circumstances. Notwithstanding these examples, most political science research largely ignores mental health as an explanatory factor. The present study seeks to fill this gap, by investigating whether and how mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic influenced Americans' attitudes regarding domestic extremist political violence in the context of the 2020 election and the January 6th storming of the US Capitol. Ultimately, this provides insight into whether and when the mental health of individuals affect the nation's political health.

We specifically assess the relationship between depressive symptoms (henceforth “depression”) and support for political violence in the United States, which is of increasing concern to political scientists (e.g., Kalmoe and Mason (2019), Arceneaux and Truex (2021)), the government (Doxsee and Harrington 2021), and the public (Frankovic 2021). We exploit the co-existence of two defining events of 2020-21 in American politics. First, the COVID-19 pandemic is associated with an unprecedented threefold spike in depression among US adults (Perlis et al. 2021), and proliferation of misinformation, and conspiracy theories (Douglas 2021; Druckman et al. 2021)¹. Second, the January 6th US Capitol insurrection created an opportunity to explore whether this mixture of depression and conspiratorial beliefs (note that we use “conspiracy” and “conspiratorial” interchangeably in this context) contributed to public support for political violence. This provides an ideal empirical test case, and furthermore, our framework and findings generalize beyond these particular events.

We begin by developing a theoretical framework, drawing on research that shows the complexity of depression in its effects on cognition and behaviors. While rarely treated as such in the social science literature, major depressive disorder is remarkably heterogeneous in its presentation and effects (Fried and Nesse 2015). In some instances, it is associated with fear and inhibition, or passivity (O'Connor et al. 2002), while in others it is associated with anger and aggression (Biaggio and Godwin 1987; Fava 1998; Perlis et al. 2005).

How a person responds to depression—whether with fear/passivity or anger/aggression —may mediate the linkage between depression and support for extremist violence. But what determines the

¹Additional research (Van Prooijen and Douglas 2017) indicates that historically, the proliferation of misinformation has increased during pandemics.

emotions and reactions that a person with depression will experience in political contexts? We argue that one important factor determining whether an individual suffering from depression responds with passivity or anger in political contexts is internal political efficacy, defined as feelings of personal competence to understand and participate in politics (Craig et al. 1990). High levels of internal political efficacy are associated with anger in individuals, which can, in turn, motivate them to participate in politics (e.g., campaign activities such as donating or attending a rally) (Valentino et al. 2009). It does so because people feel emboldened to act or be reactive in response to a negative mental state. Conversely, individuals with low internal political efficacy are more likely to be fearful of their ability to cope with stressful situations, which is associated with passivity and avoidance of political participation (Bandura 1977; Landwehr and Ojeda 2021).

Internal political efficacy also mediates the link between conspiracy beliefs and violent extremist intentions (Rottweiler and Gill 2020). That is, individuals who are prone to holding conspiracy beliefs are most likely to support violent extremism if they are also high in internal political efficacy. This suggests an additional connection between conspiracy beliefs and support for violent extremism. It raises the possibility that efficacy may strengthen the effect of conspiratorial beliefs, in the presence of depression, on beliefs regarding violent extremism. We argue that it is the combination of these two factors—internal political efficacy and conspiracy beliefs—that determines whether and to what extent depression will influence the likelihood of supporting violent extremism. Put another way, depression, when combined with internal political efficacy, generates a more aggressive response. The same, we argue, holds for the combination of depression with conspiratorial beliefs. When all three are combined, in turn, we expect the strongest support for violence against the government.

From our theoretical framework, we derive a series of hypotheses concerning the relationships between these factors, which we test with a unique panel survey on attitudes regarding the January 6th US Capitol insurrection. We interviewed 19,766 Americans from all 50 states plus the District of Columbia in November 2020, prior to the events of January 6th. We then re-interviewed 2,044 of these same respondents, beginning a week after January 6th (from January 13 - 20, 2021). This allows us insight into not only the association between depression and support for the insurrection, but also into the direction of causality since our measures of depression, internal political efficacy, and

conspiratorial beliefs precede the insurrection.

The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing the pertinent literature, developing our theoretical framework and deriving our hypotheses. Then, we describe our data and methods. We next present the results from a series of statistical tests using our panel survey of U.S. adults surveyed before and after the events of January 6th, as well as, in several instances, the full November survey. Finally, we discuss our findings and draw conclusions.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Estimates in the United States put the percentage of the population expressing support for political violence at about 10%, albeit with some variance (Kalmoe and Mason 2019). A February 2021 data collection suggested about 8% to 13% of partisans thought it was occasionally justified to respond with violence when the opposing party wins an election (Bright Line Watch 2017). Scholars have begun to explore the psychological correlates of political violence in America with some work going back to the Civil War era (Kalmoe 2020) and others focusing on contemporary actions (Kalmoe and Mason 2019; Webber et al. 2020)².

Here we focus on support for violence in response to a specific event (the January 6th Capitol insurrection) or in a specific context (the 2020 election) rather than generalized support or behavioral intent to engage in violence. That is, we are not looking at engaging in violent behavior but rather what leads one to offer attitudinal support for actual – rather than abstracted – violent actors (the Capitol stormers) or hypothetical violence in response to actual events (the 2020 election). These types of supportive attitudes are problematic given the popular support for the unlawful removal of democratic leaders and institutions can signify democratic backsliding (Bermeo 2016). As Diamond et al. (2020) note, “public approval of political violence [can] potentially creat[e] a vicious cycle even if violence is sparked in only a few spots”. We specifically look at attitudes towards the Capitol insurrection on

²Some people engage in political violence while others support but do not engage in it. As Webber et al. (2020, 108) state, “Simply prescribing violence as an acceptable means, however, is often insufficient to motivate one to undertake violence as their personal obligation. Indeed, the adherents of violence-justifying ideologies who sit idly on the sidelines far outweigh those who act on behalf of the cause.”

January 6, 2021, and in response to a belief that the 2020 election was decided unfairly. We do so because the event and its participants, as well as the constitutive belief that motivated them, represented a fundamental threat to American democracy. As mentioned, people who are sympathetic to it also pose a challenge as they normalize political violence and could become a target population for those trying to activate further violent action.

Our question is what psychological factors lead them to positively assess others who engage in violence. We build our theory by starting with the proximate factor of conspiratorial beliefs, moving to a discussion of internal political efficacy which we posit moderates the impact of conspiracy beliefs. Then, we turn to depression—our main focus—and explain how its effects depend on conspiratorial beliefs and efficacy.

CONSPIRATORIAL BELIEFS

A conspiracy theory is “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role” (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 205). Conspiracy ideation comes in many guises—for example, believing that NASA faked the moon landing, that the government suppressed evidence that the MMR vaccine causes autism, or that an international cabal of elites (such as the Trilateral Commission) secretly controls the world’s governments and economies. Many conspiracy theories involve allegations that the government or other elites are taking action for nefarious purposes. When this occurs people are likely to feel a heightened sense of threat or risk, which, in turn, reduces their capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood (Newman et al. 2021). When people hold conspiracy beliefs, they may want to take action to address the conspirator, potentially including violent action (van Prooijen and Van Vugt 2018). Webber et al. (2020, 108) point out that violence can be a “remedy for the grievance(s) that caused an individual’s motivational imbalance.” Along these lines, Jolley and Paterson (2020) found that belief in an association between 5G antennas and incidence of COVID-19 was positively associated with expressions of support for hypothetical and real-world violence. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: All things being equal, holding conspiratorial beliefs will be positively associated

with support for political violence.

Given our empirical focus on 2020, conspiratorial beliefs are likely to be particularly relevant. National elections are highly salient events that are routinely framed by candidates as urgent crises where the wrong decision will lead to disaster (Lacatus and Meibauer 2021). The 2020 election represented an extreme case in point, as both candidates repeatedly argued that the “soul of America” was at stake in the election (Dias 2021). For supporters of then-President Trump, the potentially extreme perceived threat/risk associated with a Trump defeat—which the candidate repeatedly decried as illegitimate—may have rendered these voters particularly susceptible to conspiracy beliefs (Newman et al. 2021). This, in turn, could lead to support of violent action to overturn the election.

Though this case appears to tilt in a single partisan direction, it is important to recall that in at least one critical respect, the likely effects of the campaign may be relatively symmetric. That is, supporters of President Biden may have responded with similarly extreme perceptions of threat/risk to his repeated warnings—and those of his allies—that the very survival of democracy in America was on the line in the 2020 election. Furthermore, conspiracy theories by their very nature may lead people to support positions that appear to outside observers to contradict their ideology or revealed policy preferences. Biden voters who bought into conspiratorial myths may not have believed the Capitol violence was directed against their candidate or may harbor a grudge against anyone they identify with “the government.”

EFFICACY

Psychologists define “self-efficacy” as “personal beliefs in one’s competence” (Tahmassian and Moghadam 2011). Here we focus on an especially relevant dimension of self-efficacy known in the political psychology literature as “internal political efficacy”, defined as “personal beliefs in one’s competence to understand and participate in *politics*” (Craig et al. 1990, 290; italics added). While internal political efficacy strongly influences one’s political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), it also has the potential to shape one’s support for other people taking action. Consider an individual faced with a disconcerting political threat, such as expecting a certain presidential candidate, whose

victory would make the country substantially worse off, will win the upcoming election. Valentino et al. (2009) found that individuals with high internal political efficacy were more likely to feel anger toward that candidate, while those with low internal political efficacy were more likely to fear them. Similarly, Rico et al. (2020) find a positive relationship between high internal political efficacy and anger towards, and critical views of, politicians³.

We expect anger to amplify the link between conspiratorial beliefs and support for political violence in two ways. First, anger tends to provoke a strong desire to take action (Valentino et al. 2011). Second, anger has been shown to make individuals even more susceptible to misinformation (Greenstein and Franklin 2020; Han et al. 2020), thereby strengthening one's beliefs in a conspiracy. For instance, when faced with a "stolen" election, we would expect a person with high internal political efficacy to feel anger, making them more likely to support people taking extreme actions. In contrast, we would expect a person with low internal political efficacy to experience fear, uncertainty, and indecision, potentially negating the impact of their conspiratorial beliefs. Thus, while conspiracy beliefs may provide the underlying basis for supporting violent action, internal political efficacy acts as a leavening agent, generating an even stronger desire for drastic action. This leads to the following hypothesis.

H2: All things being equal, among individuals with conspiratorial beliefs, high internal political efficacy will be positively associated with support for political violence.

WHEN DOES DEPRESSION EXACERBATE SUPPORT FOR VIOLENCE?

It would be a mistake to assume that depression necessarily enhances support for violence. Rather, in some instances, depression generates fear and passivity (O'Connor et al. 2002), while in others it leads to anger and aggression (Biaggio and Godwin 1987; Fava 1998). Thus, while the correlation between depression and support for political violence may be weak or even negative on average, we can expect to see a strong association in the presence of underlying personality factors that tip the symptomatology of depression away from fear/passivity and toward anger/aggression.

³Magni (2017) also finds a positive relationship between internal anger and political action, though he argues that internal political efficacy mediates between these two variables, with anger leading to political action only among respondents with high political efficacy.

In political settings, for depression to enhance support for violence requires added ingredients that lead it to manifest as aggression. One such factor is conspiracy beliefs, which research has shown to be positively associated with depression (Druckman et al. 2021; Fountoulakis et al. 2021). As mentioned, those with conspiracy beliefs about an event or situation (e.g. an election or the COVID-19 pandemic) will believe that the machinations of elites pose a threat. They thus will react by feeling a need to support overturning these elites (Hypothesis 1). Such beliefs will also lead those who are depressed to pivot to anger at the subjects of these conspiracies and thus support violence.

Further, just as efficacy increases support for violence among those with conspiratorial beliefs (Hypothesis 2), it can influence the attitudinal direction of depression. Efficacy can lead to anger in general; it can do so acutely among depressed individuals by inducing them to become angry rather than fearful or passive, which may then lead to greater support for violence. Conversely, a depressed individual who is low in efficacy seems more likely to respond with fear/passivity and hence to avoid political action entirely (Landwehr and Ojeda 2021), or at a minimum, avoid any forms of it entailing aggression. That would likely include also supporting aggressive participation by others (Kruglanski et al. 2014). In contrast, those high in efficacy are more likely to be emboldened, react with anger, and support aggressive participatory activities, including violence. Finally, the combination of both efficacy and conspiratorial beliefs will reinforce one another and cause even stronger support for violence among depressed individuals. This leads to our final hypothesis.

H3: All things being equal, depression will be positively associated with support for political violence if and only if accompanied by:

- a high levels of internal political efficacy,
- b high levels of conspiratorial beliefs, or
- c both (particularly so).

DATA AND METHODS

The COVID States Survey

To analyze the effects of depression, efficacy, and conspiracy beliefs on support for violence, we draw on data from a massive online panel survey which ran monthly throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. We invited respondents who completed the November wave ($N = 19,766$) following the 2020 Presidential Election to join a follow-up wave immediately after the January 6 insurrection ($N = 2044$). We collected all predictors of interest in the November wave, thus avoiding the risk that the insurrection itself may have influenced depression, efficacy, or conspiracy beliefs, while some demographic information was already stored from earlier waves. Note that sample size varies slightly by model, due to occasional item non-response.

We recruited respondents through the PureSpectrum survey recruitment platform, which aggregates and deduplicates paid panelists from multiple sources⁴. Emerging evidence suggests this methodology can perform as well as traditional probability sampling (Enns and Rothschild 2020; Lehdonvirta et al. 2021; Radford et al. 2020). To minimize topical selection bias, we did not inform respondents of the topic of the survey when they entered it, and questions covered a broad range of topics, mostly related to public health. We also filtered out inattentive and semi-automated respondents through multiple closed- and open-ended attention checks. Though not a probability sample, the large scale of the November wave ($N = 19,766$) and its demographic breadth allows considerable flexibility for including quotas for gender, race, and age at the state level, and reweighting of observations to match official U.S. census figures. It thus serves as a representative sample.

Support for Violence: Four Outcome Measures

Our main point of interest concerns support for violent action. The January 6 insurrection offers a unique opportunity to explore this issue. We assess support for political violence four distinct ways. First, we asked about the insurrection itself: “Did you support or oppose the storming of the Capitol building on January 6th?” We call this outcome support attack, recoding the original 5-point scale

⁴See Appendix C for discussion of survey methods and ethical considerations

into three discrete categories: support, oppose, and neither support nor oppose. Our second outcome, sympathize stormers, is one of 16 items on a 100-point “feeling thermometer” in which respondents were told “ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest).” Item 11 out of the 16 groups listed was “The people who stormed the Capitol building on Jan 6.” The distinction between these two questions is non-trivial: in a free-response textbox asking how respondents felt about the events that day, many respondents indicate that they felt sympathy for the stormers and their demands, even if they did not condone their actions. Furthermore, survey respondents who support violence may nevertheless avoid condoning violence explicitly but still express sympathy with its perpetrators if they see the latter as more socially (or legally) acceptable (Hayes and McAllister 2005). In our survey, two additional factors may lead this item to be a better reflection of true preferences: (1) the item appears prior to any other mention of January 6, and (2) the item was embedded in a list of unrelated individuals and groups (e.g., Asian people, Biden supporters, scientists, police). These two outcomes appeared on the January survey.

Our third and fourth outcomes appeared on both the November and January survey waves. We asked respondents, “If it became clear to you that the 2020 presidential election was not conducted fairly, would you approve or disapprove of other people who reacted by . . .”, followed by a list of four options starting with “protesting on social media” and culminating in “using violence”. We recode the original 5-point scale into three discrete categories—approve, disapprove, and neither approve nor disapprove—and designate the last of these items as hypothetical violence, since it does not refer to the actual events of January 6. That said, responses to the January wave were undoubtedly colored by the actual insurrection, while responses to the November wave occurred in the immediate aftermath of the election, the time at which it was likely most salient to respondents⁵. Both sets of responses are likely to be influenced by whether respondents thought the hypothetical precondition—an unfair election—had actually occurred. In both waves, the wording of this item directly relates to Cruz and Kloppe-Santamaría’s (2019) finding that people are more likely to support extralegal violence when

⁵That said, because, in the November wave, this outcome variable is measured contemporaneously with the key causal variables, we cannot draw any inferences regarding the direction of the causality.

they have lost confidence in the legitimacy of state institutions.

Thus, our four outcomes each measure support for political violence along slightly different dimensions. Support attack measures straightforward support for or opposition to the actual attack on the U.S. Capitol, sympathize stormers measures feelings towards the individuals who carried it out, hypothetical violence (November) measures support for responding to an unfair election with violence (prior to any such violence taking place in the real world, but immediately after the election's conclusion), and hypothetical violence (January) measures such support following an actual manifestation of such violence on January 6. Under our three hypotheses, we expect higher scores (and positive interactions) on all four outcomes for the subpopulation of interest. We employ OLS for the sympathize stormers models and unordered multinomial logit for the support attack and hypothetical violence models. In the latter two cases, we employ an unordered estimator because statistical testing indicated that the scales violated the assumptions of ordered logit models (that is, the categories are not both ordinally sequential and cardinally equidistant as well as non-overlapping).

Measuring Depression with the PHQ-9

We measured participants' experiences with depression via the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9), a widely used tool to screen patients for depression upon arrival at a hospital (Bhatt et al. 2016). The module begins by asking respondents, "Over the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following problems?" and then presents nine items such as whether the respondent has "little interest or pleasure in doing things" (all on four-point scales from "not at all" to "nearly every day"). (See Online Appendix A for all items included in the scale.) We follow common practice by summing the responses to create an additive scale and then using thresholds to define different levels of depression (Kroenke and Spitzer 2002). Specifically, to facilitate analytic clarity, we elected a priori to define three groups: *not depressed* ($\text{PHQ-9} \leq 4$), *mildly to moderately depressed* (PHQ-9 between 5 and 14), and *moderately-severely to severely depressed* ($\text{PHQ-9} \geq 15$)⁶. (For simplicity, we

⁶Republicans might be more likely to be depressed during Democratic administrations and vice versa for Democrats. Yet, Republicans are statistically significantly less depressed than Democrats in both survey waves, and throughout the period of the COVID-19 pandemic.

subsequently refer to the latter two categories as moderate and severe depression, respectively.) In our empirical investigations we primarily focus on the effects of severe depression ($\text{PHQ-9} \geq 15$), which is sometimes used as a threshold for referral to psychiatric treatment (Arroll et al. 2010).

Measuring Efficacy through Political Activity

For internal political efficacy, our theory focuses on the confidence one has that they can participate in politics. Respondents' internal self-conceptions, including their internal political efficacy, can be difficult to measure directly. People may exaggerate or underestimate how capable they feel of participating in politics, either to themselves or to the interviewer. To minimize this potential for bias, we turn instead to participants' revealed preferences (or more precisely, "revealed efficacy") by asking them which concrete political actions they have taken in the past six months (e.g., volunteering for a candidate, posting about politics on social media). In essence, then, we use a revealed preference of actual participation. Our reasons for this choice are both practical, as explained above, and theoretical. On the theoretical end, Niemi et al. (1991) draw a distinction between internal efficacy (e.g., "I would be competent if given the chance") versus external efficacy (e.g., "an ordinary person has a realistic chance of making an impact"). From their definitions, both appear likely to shape patterns of political participation, though internal political efficacy seems more likely to be a prerequisite. Voicing one's political opinions on social media, attending a protest, or donating to a campaign all suggest that participants believe themselves sufficiently competent to undertake these actions. Yet a protester, for instance, may or may not think their actions are actually likely to make a difference, since there are a variety of social and affective reasons why one might attend a protest (Simonson, Chenoweth, Baum, and Lazer Simonson et al.). Thus, while the level of one's political participation may be influenced by a multitude of factors, we contend that whether a person is politically active at all is indicative of that person having surpassed some threshold of internal political efficacy. Conversely, while a person with high internal political efficacy may not participate in politics in a given time period, the six months from May to November 2020—encompassing the COVID-19 lockdowns, Black Lives Matter protests, and 2020 Presidential election—seems to be a very likely period for such a person to take at least one political action (donation, protest, political tweet, etc.). Thus, in our study, we interpret a person's

status as politically active (or not) from May to November 2020 as a sign of their internal political efficacy.

Also on the practical side, the surveys that provide our data—around this unique confluence of events—include the aforementioned participation items but not a direct measure of internal efficacy (e.g., a la the American National Election Study [ANES] four-item internal political efficacy scale developed by Niemi et al. (1991) and validated by Morrell (2003)). We thus conducted two small follow-up studies to assess the correlation between the ANES items and ours. The first, on a student population, found a correlation of 0.81, and the second, on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, found a correlation of .77. Therefore, we are confident that our participation variable effectively captures internal political efficacy.

Our predictor politically active is coded 1 if the respondent participated in any of the six activities listed and 0 if they did not. We, again, used this binary classification scheme for both practical and theoretical reasons. Practically, by far the largest threshold distinction is between “no” political activity and engaging in “any” of the six political activities (around 30% of respondents in both the November and January surveys). Theoretically, a score of at least one reveals whether the respondent had enough confidence to actually take action, regardless of the specific nature of that action. Higher scores may be more subject to situational factors (e.g., not everyone had a town hall meeting in their constituency or had time to join a campaign), but nearly all Americans should be physically capable of engaging in at least one of the six actions listed (e.g., posting on social media, writing a letter to an elected official). If the person actually has taken action in the past, it suggests they may do so again (perhaps, if our theory is correct, in response to depression). While our approach differs from other internal political efficacy measures that focus on understanding of politics or qualifications to participate in politics (e.g., Niemi et al. [1991]), we believe that self-reported actions will be more predictive of future action than self-assessments or opinions.

Measuring Conspiracy Beliefs

To measure the degree to which a respondent holds conspiracy beliefs, we presented respondents with 12 statements about politics and the pandemic—10 of them false—and counted the number about

which they had incorrect beliefs (relative to the best available information at the time). Nine of the statements focused on COVID-19 (e.g., “There is a cure for coronavirus that is being withheld from the U.S. public”) and three focused on American politics (e.g., “Thousands of election ballots were found in dumpsters.”) (See Online Appendix A for the full list of items⁷; see also Druckman et al. (2021) for a more thorough discussion of these items.) While we treat conspiratorial beliefs as continuous in our regressions, when generating predicted probabilities we simulate a conspiratorial respondent by setting the variable equal to the top decile. In assessing the statistical significance of the effects of holding conspiratorial beliefs on our outcome variables, we compare these respondents against those set to the lowest decile⁸.

Controls

In our primary model specifications we control for race, age, gender, education, household income, party, ideology, interest in politics (political interest), whether respondents voted for (or, if a non-voter, supported) President Trump (Trump supporter), confidence in the fairness of the election (election confidence), and the number of types of social media used to get election information (social media scale). Summary statistics appear in Appendix A, while exact question wording and variable definitions appear in Online Appendix A. In order to maintain the hypothesized temporal direction of causality, all causal variables, except the social media scale, are measured in the November wave⁹.

⁷While not all of the statements directly concerned conspiracies, we argue that all may, at least indirectly, involve or relate to conspiratorial beliefs. Moreover, when we replicate our models using a narrower operationalization of conspiratorial beliefs, limited to three conspiracy belief items that unambiguously entail conspiracies, the patterns remain robust (see below discussion of robustness checks, and Online Appendix B)

⁸The exception is models that do not interact conspiracy beliefs either with politically active or depression, in which case we set conspiracy beliefs to its mean value. Prevalence of conspiracy beliefs around COVID-19 and the 2020 election (our 12-point scale) correlate with party or ideology (7-point scales running from liberal/Democrat at the low end to conservative/Republican at the high end) at .21 and .25, respectively. This suggests a moderate, but not overly strong, correlation with conspiracy beliefs. In Online Appendix B, we report, as robustness checks, models limited to partisan and ideological subgroups, finding only moderate differences between them.

⁹Social media scale is the only causal variable that is measured in January, but not available in November.

RESULTS

Table 1 provides robust support for Hypothesis 1, indicating that conspiratorial beliefs increase the likelihood of support for political violence across all four of our indicators ($p < 0.001$ in each case). The magnitudes of the effects are also substantial and, in every case, significant at $p < .01$. An increase from the 10th to 90th percentile in conspiratorial beliefs is associated with an 8-percentage point increase in the probability of approving of the attack on the capitol (approve attack), an increase of 14 “degrees” on the 0-100 degree feeling thermometer about the capitol stormers (sympathize stormers), as well as 4- and 7-point increases in the probability of approving of hypothetical violence (if the election were decided unfairly), for November and January, respectively.

Interestingly, ideology, which is coded such that higher values indicate a more conservative respondent, does not have a positive effect on support for violence, nor does being a Republican or a Trump Supporter. Although right-leaning respondents were more likely to support overturning the election of President Biden—they score higher on all four outcomes—this effect disappears once conspiratorial beliefs are taken into account. Thus, conditional on one’s level of conspiratorial beliefs, party, ideology, and Trump support do not appear to be associated with greater support for violence. In fact, the only other control variables that are significant across at least three outcomes are age and male, with younger and male respondents being more likely to support violence.

Additionally, we note that being severely depressed is associated with being more likely to support violence, all else constant. As we shall see, however, this main effect is misleading as it is driven by depressed individuals who have conspiratorial beliefs and/or have high internal political efficacy and vanishes for depressed individuals without those conditions. Finally, being politically active (our measure of internal political efficacy) is positive and significant at the $p < 0.01$ level or better for three of the four outcomes. Though we do not hypothesize this direct effect of being politically active, it is worth recalling that some research has linked high levels of internal political efficacy to anger/aggression in individuals, which itself can motivate political activity (Rico et al. 2020; Valentino et al. 2009). This pattern appears consistent with that finding.

TABLE 1. Full model without interactions for all four political violence outcomes. Support attack and the two hypothetical violence outcomes use unordered multinomial logit models, showing the probability of the category listed relative to the omitted category (“Oppose”). Sympathize stormers uses an OLS regression.

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.317 (0.248)	0.794* (0.309)	2.979+ (1.678)	-0.00421 (0.0710)	0.674*** (0.108)	0.00158 (0.220)	0.658+ (0.364)
Severely Depressed	-0.644 (0.485)	0.975* (0.422)	4.105 (2.868)	0.293** (0.0897)	1.172*** (0.118)	0.464 (0.325)	1.317** (0.425)
Politically Active	-0.114 (0.280)	1.176*** (0.296)	5.032** (1.835)	-0.0261 (0.0677)	0.597*** (0.0951)	0.0712 (0.239)	-0.131 (0.315)
Conspiracy Beliefs	0.783 (0.797)	3.635*** (0.808)	31.63*** (6.547)	0.748*** (0.212)	4.371*** (0.209)	1.061 (0.899)	4.207*** (0.811)
Democrat	-1.386* (0.662)	1.918 (1.553)	-2.697 (5.681)	-0.302* (0.127)	0.147 (0.218)	0.708 (0.564)	1.014 (0.810)
Republican	-1.540* (0.680)	2.748+ (1.612)	5.129 (6.206)	-0.288+ (0.150)	0.165 (0.242)	0.537 (0.630)	1.113 (0.827)
Independent	-0.686 (0.622)	2.239 (1.534)	2.009 (5.673)	-0.262* (0.124)	-0.219 (0.219)	0.918+ (0.545)	0.718 (0.756)
Ideology	0.366** (0.112)	-0.0594 (0.106)	0.615 (0.632)	-0.0847*** (0.0249)	-0.126*** (0.0308)	-0.102 (0.0880)	0.0166 (0.100)
Political Interest	-0.175+ (0.104)	0.178 (0.136)	-0.186 (0.700)	0.00804 (0.239)	-4.564*** (0.379)	-0.420*** (0.0902)	0.0295 (0.128)
Trump Supporter	0.639+ (0.342)	1.135* (0.484)	4.251 (5.964)	-0.246* (0.105)	-0.220 (0.152)	-0.309 (0.358)	-0.215 (0.525)
Black	0.579 (0.660)	-0.195 (1.048)	-1.004 (5.625)	0.627*** (0.167)	0.872*** (0.261)	-0.261 (0.530)	-0.886 (0.595)

White	0.274 (0.602)	-0.611 (0.973)	4.064 (6.269)	0.140 (0.154)	0.0778 (0.245)	-0.742 (0.478)	-1.373* (0.554)
Asian American	-0.126 (0.727)	-0.431 (1.070)	4.160 (6.179)	0.376 ⁺ (0.200)	0.565 ⁺ (0.296)	-0.441 (0.628)	-1.029 (0.777)
Hispanic	1.182 ⁺ (0.660)	-0.521 (1.025)	-0.310 (0.355)	0.506** (0.172)	0.469 ⁺ (0.267)	-0.877 (0.549)	-1.515* (0.601)
Household Income	-0.0762 (0.0650)	0.0950 (0.0620)	-0.266 (0.709)	-0.0483** (0.0151)	0.0331 (0.0214)	0.0283 (0.0495)	-0.0400 (0.0703)
Education	-0.190 (0.127)	0.102 (0.141)	-0.238*** (0.0514)	-0.0169*** (0.00213)	-0.0238*** (0.00336)	-0.0336 (0.104)	0.136 (0.149)
Age	-0.0398*** (0.00820)	-0.0394*** (0.00980)	3.859** (1.494)	-0.0606* (0.0255)	0.0957* (0.0375)	-0.0291*** (0.00724)	-0.0604*** (0.00948)
Male	0.0688 (0.232)	0.768** (0.286)	4.049 (2.608)	0.469*** (0.0622)	0.905*** (0.0852)	0.630** (0.210)	0.979*** (0.281)
Social Media Scale	0.568* (0.222)	0.123 (0.279)	3.222* (1.513)			0.663** (0.203)	1.000** (0.320)
Election Confidence	-0.325** (0.108)	-0.174 (0.129)	-0.563 (0.883)	-0.217*** (0.0284)	0.0863 ⁺ (0.0483)	-0.133 (0.119)	-0.0397 (0.172)
Constant	0.268 (0.941)	-6.082*** (1.556)	12.72 (8.306)			0.691 (0.856)	-2.298 ⁺ (1.182)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1,771	18,872	18,872	1,769	1,769
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$							

Figure 1 (derived from Appendix Table B1) presents the results of our tests of Hypothesis 2. In panel A, we see that in the baseline condition (neither politically active nor holding conspiratorial beliefs), with all controls held constant at their mean values, the probability of supporting the attack on the Capitol (support attack) is only about 1%. If respondents are politically active, their likelihood of support rises to 4.3%, whereas if they have a high level of conspiratorial beliefs, their likelihood rises to 5.7%. However, if they are both politically active and have a high level of conspiratorial beliefs – our focal condition – their likelihood rises to 15%. This result strongly supports the confluence of internal political efficacy and conspiracy beliefs intensifying approval of the storming of the capitol (hypothesis 2).

We find similar patterns for the other three outcomes. In panel B, a typical baseline individual – that is, with all individual characteristics set to their mean values – rates their sympathy toward the stormers

as 11 out of 100, while a typical individual in the focal condition assigns a rating of nearly 31. Approval of hypothetical violence increases from 2% in baseline to 10% in the focal condition in the November survey (panel C), and from 1.4% to 14.7% in the January survey (panel D). The difference between a typical baseline individual and a typical focal individual is significant in all models. Additionally, in all but the last case (panel D), the differences between the intermediate conditions and the focal condition are also statistically significant and in the predicted direction¹⁰. Taken together, these results offer strong support for H2.

We turn next to Hypothesis 3a. Figure 2 (derived from Appendix Table B2) presents the results of our tests of this hypothesis, again offering strong support. In panel A, we see that a typical individual in the baseline condition (neither depressed nor politically active) has a 1.9% chance of supporting the attack on the capitol (support attack). If they are depressed, their likelihood of support rises to 3.2%, whereas if they have recently participated in politics, their likelihood rises to 3.5%. However, if they are in the focal condition (both depressed and politically active), their likelihood climbs dramatically to 13.8%, a 7-fold increase relative to baseline. This represents strong support for the confluence of internal political efficacy transforming depression into support for violence (H3a).

The other three outcomes tell a similar story. In panel B, a typical baseline individual rates their sympathy toward the stormers as 12 out of 100, while a typical individual who in the focal condition assigns a rating of 23. Approval of hypothetical violence climbs from 2.1% in baseline to 11.4% in the focal condition if measured in November (panel C), and from 3.0% to 11.5% if measured in January (panel D). The difference between a typical baseline individual and a typical focal individual is once again significant in all models^{11 12}.

¹⁰In the fourth case, among respondents with high levels of conspiracy beliefs, variations in political activity do not significantly influence the probability of supporting hypothetical violence (in January).

¹¹Note that the difference between the focal condition and high depression alone does not reach $p < 0.05$ in panels B or D (the two right-hand panels). The difference between the focal condition and politically active alone does not reach $p < 0.05$ in the top right panel, though their confidence intervals overlaps by only 0.02 points (out of 100). Thus, a different seed value for the monte carlo simulations might yield a $p < 0.05$ result.

¹²The coefficient estimates in Appendix Table B2 mirror these findings. The interaction term for severely depressed $\times$ politically active is significant at $p < 0.05$ in the support attack model, at $p < 0.001$ in the hypothetical violence (November) model, and at $p < 0.1$ in the sympathize stormers model. The interaction term for moderately

FIGURE 2. Predicted probabilities for Hypothesis 3a comparing a severely depressed, politically active respondent to typical respondents without one or both of these conditions. Lines show 95% empirical confidence intervals based on 1000 simulations.

Turning to Hypothesis 3b, as predicted, a combination of severe depression and conspiratorial beliefs is strongly associated with supporting political violence. As shown in Figure 3 (derived from Appendix Table B3), panel A, a typical respondent who is severely depressed and conspiratorial is 13 times more likely to support the attack on the capitol than a typical baseline respondent. Their sympathy for the stormers rises by nearly 20 points (panel B), their approval of violence in the event of an unfair election increases 16-fold in November (panel C) and 15-fold in January (panel D). In fact, we predict with a high degree of confidence that a typical severely depressed respondent with conspiratorial beliefs would have nearly a one in five chance of endorsing hypothetical violence in November (roughly one in four in January). In every instance, these differences are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level or $\text{depressed} \times \text{politically active}$ is significant at $p < 0.01$ or better for all three of models and both interaction terms have approximately the same magnitude (neither is significant in the fourth model).

better, not only between the focal condition and baseline, but also between the focal condition and the two intermediate conditions¹³.

FIGURE 3. Predicted probabilities for Hypothesis 3b comparing a severely depressed, conspiratorial respondent to typical respondents without one or both of these conditions. Lines show 95% empirical confidence intervals based on 1000 simulations.

Turning now to the final element of our critical hypothesis (H3c), we find substantial evidence that, as predicted, a three-way combination of being severely depressed, politically active, and conspiratorial is associated with greater support for political violence than we observe in any other combination. As shown in Figure 4 (derived from Appendix Table B4), we predict that a typical respondent in the focal condition will sympathize more strongly with the stormers (panel B) and endorse hypothetical violence in November (panel C) than typical respondents in any other condition. We find large and statistically significant evidence for this prediction in all four models. Our coefficient estimates in Table 3 again tell largely the same story: moderately depressed x conspiracy beliefs is significant in all four models at $p < 0.001$ and severely depressed x conspiracy beliefs is significant (and has a significantly higher magnitude than the moderate interaction term) in three of them.

significant effects in the predicted directions in both cases. This pattern generally holds with the other two outcomes as well – that is, we find the highest support for violence in the focal group in which all three threshold conditions are present – except that we cannot distinguish with 95% confidence between the focal condition and being both severely depressed and politically active in panel A (with support attack as the outcome variable) and being both severely depressed and conspiratorial in panel D (with hypothetical violence in January as the outcome variable).

Interestingly, in these latter two models, when we compare the focal conditions from our tests of H3a and H3b, with those for our tests of H3c, across all four outcome measures we find substantially – and in all but one instance, statistically significantly – higher support for violence when all three critical threshold conditions are met (Figure 4) than when we account for only two of the three critical threshold conditions (Figures 2 and 3). Regardless, we can conclude that either H1 or H3 is substantiated by the support attack outcome (panel A) and either H2 or H3 is substantiated by the hypothetical violence (January) outcome (panel D). These findings are consistent with our earlier findings (see Figure 1, panel A and Figure 2, panel D, respectively). Note also that despite our limited statistical leverage with three of the four three-way interaction models (those utilizing the January wave), we find continued support for H3a in panels A and C and for H3b in panels A, C, and D¹⁴.

Once again, the magnitudes of the associations are very substantial. A typical respondent who is severely depressed, politically active, and conspiratorial would have a nearly a one in four chance of supporting the attack on the Capitol—compared to less than 1% for a typical respondent with none of these mindsets—and would rate their sympathy toward the stormers 25 points higher. They would also have roughly a one in three chance of endorsing violence in the event of an unfair election both in November and January. A baseline respondent, in contrast, would have less than a 2% probability of endorsing violence¹⁵.

¹⁴With only 2044 respondents in the January survey, of whom 23% were politically active and depressed, our power to detect such effects is extremely limited.

¹⁵The coefficient estimates in Appendix Table 4 appear somewhat less definitive than those for the previous hypotheses, with some of the multiple interaction terms not reaching significance. Yet, it is the combined effects of baseline variables plus interaction terms that determines the substantive significance of the interactions. Consequently, coefficients on interaction terms are insufficient to assess the significance of the interactive

FIGURE 4. Predicted probabilities for Hypothesis 3c comparing a severely depressed, politically active, conspiratorial respondent to typical respondents without all three of these conditions. Lines show 95% empirical confidence intervals based on 1000 simulations.

relationships. This distinction is even more acute in our three-category unordered multinomial logistic regression,

Robustness Checks

All models reported above are robust to alternative specifications, excluding all controls, or limiting control variables to demographic and SES factors, or to political characteristics, attitudes and behaviors (see Online Appendix Tables B1 to B4)

It is possible that the effects described in this study could be importantly influenced by political partisanship in general, and support for then-President Trump in particular. More specifically, the hypothesized relationships might be stronger for individuals who supported then-President Trump. Alternatively, perhaps those Trump supporters were already maximally inclined, by predisposition (relative to non-Trump supporters), to support the January 6th insurrection, and so not amenable to significantly increasing their support based on depression, efficacy, or conspiracy beliefs. In other words, these factors may be “baked in” to being a supporter of both Trump and the insurrection. If so, then we might anticipate stronger effects among non-Trump supporters.

To test these possibilities, we re-ran all hypothesis tests with models limited to (a) only self-reported Trump supporters, and (b) only self-reported non-Trump supporters. The results, shown in Online Appendix Figure B2 (derived from Online Appendix Table B6) for Trump supporters and Figure B3 (derived from Online Appendix Table B7 for non-Trump supporters), largely fail to support either conjecture. For only one out of four outcome variables (sympathize with stormers, in the 3-way interaction model) are the effects stronger when Trump supporters are excluded. Similarly, for only one outcome variable (hypothetical violence, measured in November), and in only one model specification (3-way interaction model) are effects larger when the models are limited to Trump supporters only. In both of these latter instances the main effects are larger, but so too are the confidence intervals, suggesting that the “true” effects may be similar to those reported from the models that include all observations. In short, our evidence suggests that the effects of depression, in interaction with efficacy and conspiratorial beliefs, are substantially orthogonal to political partisanship.

While the lack of a partisan effect is in some way surprising, it may be less so in the presence of depression, conspiratorial thinking, and high efficacy. As previously noted, the 2020 campaign primed where it is especially challenging to interpret the substantive effects at different values of the outcome variables across categories of the causal variables.

partisans on both sides of the aisle to believe that the very survival of democracy was at stake in the election, perhaps leading some to believe that violence in response to their candidate's defeat might be justifiable. Moreover, conspiratorial thinking may be associated with holding beliefs that seem illogical or contradictory to outsiders. For instance, in open-ended responses to the question "How did the events of Jan 6 make you feel?", a number of Republicans who said they supported the attack also claimed that the attackers were antifa activists in disguise.

Another possibility is that our measure of conspiracy beliefs – based on belief in 10 false and 2 true claims – is overly broad and fails to capture the more narrow theoretical effects of belief in true conspiracies. As previously noted, to assess this possibility, we re-ran our models using a reduced version of our conspiracy beliefs scale, limited to three clear-cut conspiracies. The results, presented in Online Appendix Figure B1 (derived from Online Appendix Table B5), largely replicate the main findings reported above. This suggests that our results are quite robust to varying the precise operationalization of conspiracy beliefs.

CONCLUSION

Depression has reached unprecedented proportions during the COVID-19 pandemic (Perlis et al. 2021). To the extent that depression has important effects on political attitudes or behavior, this could have profound ramifications for American politics going forward. The relative dearth of research by political scientists into the possible attitudinal or behavioral effects of depression makes it difficult to assess the likely nature or extent of any such effects. Our study aimed to help extend this nascent literature by assessing the effects of depression on an aspect of politics with significant implications for democracy: support for political violence. The dramatically heightened climate of polarization in the US in recent years arguably renders the confluence of rampant pandemic-induced depression with dropping support for democratic institutions particularly worrisome, and makes this an area of research with potentially important real-world implications. The seeming explosion of misinformation surrounding both the pandemic and the 2020 election, in turn, and resulting widespread conspiracy beliefs among voters, heightens the sense of crisis surrounding American politics in 2021.

We argued that it is the combination of internal political efficacy and conspiracy beliefs that

moderate whether and to what extent depression will enhance support for political violence. We explored this question both in response to the general circumstance of the 2020 election and to the event-specific circumstance of the January 6th Capitol insurrection. We found clear and consistent evidence that both efficacy and conspiracy beliefs play an important role in driving support for political violence, both in the general population and in depressed individuals in particular. This result holds up regardless of whether we are talking about hypothetical violence (in response to believing that the election was unfair), the actual violence that took place January 6th at the Capitol, or sympathy for the people who committed it. While our data come from a particular confluence of events—COVID-19, the 2020 election, and the January 6th insurrection—we suspect that the hypotheses generated from our theoretical framework hold more generally, and encourage further tests in other settings. In so doing, it would be useful to directly test the psychological processes we posit. For example, we suggest that internal political efficacy triggers anger among depressed individuals. An alternative possibility is that it leads individuals to believe actions by those like themselves will be impactful. The exact psychological pathway warrants further investigation.

Our study represents an initial foray into one pathway through which depression might negatively impact politics not only in the United States but in less consolidated democracies. Our findings show how depression and conspiracy beliefs can represent a gateway of sorts into something even more worrisome – their combination, particularly among efficacious individuals, leads to the normalization of political violence. That said, depression and efficacy typically have an inverse relationship (Landwehr and Ojeda 2021), and thus the three variables do not necessarily typically go hand in hand. Regardless, our results add even more urgency to efforts to address mental health and misinformation: their mix has crucial, and potentially quite worrisome, democratic implications.

The clear implication is that policymakers and public health officials should prioritize a major policy response to the current epidemic of depression, not only to limit the social and economic costs such an epidemic might engender, but also to mitigate the potential exacerbation of the current crisis facing American democracy. The nation's democratic institutions were under great stress and confronting widespread skepticism even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting wave of depression. Our data clearly show that by facilitating the legitimization of political violence, mass

depression represents yet another potential crisis point for democracy, one we ignore at our peril.

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APPENDIX

A. SUMMARY STATISTICS

TABLE A1. Summary Statistics: Respondents who completed both the November and January surveys

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
PHQ-9 (Full Scale)	6.19	0.23	0	27
Not Depressed	0.533	0.016	0	1
Moderately Depressed	0.328	0.015	0	1
Severely Depressed	0.139	0.012	0	1
Misperceptions	0.19	0.005	0	1
Social Media Scale	0.479	0.016	0	1
Sympathize Stormers	15	0.837	0	100
Support Attack	0.132	0.01	0	1
Election Confidence	2.85	0.037	1	4
Hypothetical Violence (January)	0.15	0.01	0	1
Political Interest	3.3	0.042	1	5
Politically Active	0.297	0.014	0	1
Republican	0.295	0.014	0	1
Democrat	0.388	0.016	0	1
Independent	0.276	0.014	0	1
White	0.629	0.016	0	1
Black	0.122	0.01	0	1
Hispanic	0.157	0.014	0	1
Asian American	0.063	0.007	0	1
Income	3.94	0.066	1	10
Ideology	4.03	0.052	1	7
Education	3.01	0.043	1	7
Age	48.53	0.653	18	99
Male	0.477	0.016	0	1
Trump Supporter	0.337	0.015	0	1

TABLE A2. Respondents who completed the November survey

Variable	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
PHQ-9	6.86	0.064	0	27
Not Depressed	0.484	0.005	0	1
Moderately Depressed	0.361	0.004	0	1
Severely Depressed	0.155	0.003	0	1
Misperceptions	0.205	0.002	0	1
Election Confidence	2.8	0.01	1	4
Hypothetical Violence (November)	0.134	0.003	0	1
Political Interest	3.36	0.012	1	5
Politically Active	0.357	0.004	0	1
Republican	0.294	0.004	0	1
Democrat	0.379	0.005	0	1
Independent	0.276	0.004	0	1
White	0.644	0.005	0	1
Black	0.124	0.003	0	1
Hispanic	0.149	0.004	0	1
Asian American	0.061	0.002	0	1
Income	4.03	0.02	1	10
Ideology	4	0.015	1	7
Education	3.01	0.012	1	7
Age	47.51	0.177	18	99
Male	0.472	0.005	0	1
Trump Supporter	0.36	0.004	0	1

B. COEFFICIENT TABLES

TABLE B1. Full model testing Hypothesis 2, with interactions between conspiracy beliefs and political activity for all four political violence outcomes. Support attack and the two hypothetical violence outcomes use unordered multinomial logit models, showing the probability of the category listed relative to the omitted category (“Oppose”). Sympathize stormers uses OLS regression.

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.297 (0.250)	0.803** (0.304)	2.463 (1.633)	0.00267 (0.0713)	0.676*** (0.109)	-0.0524 (0.220)	0.677+ (0.377)
Severely Depressed	-0.657 (0.474)	0.964* (0.420)	3.636 (2.776)	0.303*** (0.0895)	1.170*** (0.120)	0.433 (0.329)	1.342** (0.433)
Politically Active	-0.852+ (0.493)	1.517** (0.579)	-5.201* (2.316)	-0.334** (0.104)	0.406** (0.153)	-0.687* (0.343)	-0.133 (0.562)
Conspiracy Beliefs	0.115 (0.860)	4.451*** (1.216)	9.110 (6.732)	0.157 (0.274)	4.019*** (0.381)	-0.446 (0.957)	4.296*** (1.297)
Democrat	-1.303+ (0.667)	1.926 (1.566)	-1.229 (5.636)	-0.183 (0.128)	-0.0267 (0.221)	0.825 (0.561)	1.007 (0.813)
Republican	-1.534* (0.673)	2.790+ (1.621)	4.971 (6.073)	-0.222 (0.150)	0.0405 (0.244)	0.545 (0.617)	1.139 (0.813)
Independent	-0.647 (0.620)	2.263 (1.544)	2.689 (5.583)	-0.199 (0.125)	-0.291 (0.220)	0.993+ (0.543)	0.714 (0.752)
Ideology	0.354** (0.109)	-0.0509 (0.105)	0.568 (0.609)	-0.0972*** (0.0253)	-0.0991** (0.0315)	-0.113 (0.0850)	0.00660 (0.0989)
Political Interest	-0.173 (0.106)	0.176 (0.134)	-0.128 (0.676)	-0.200*** (0.0286)	0.0552 (0.0498)	-0.422*** (0.0912)	0.0275 (0.127)
Trump Supporter	0.669* (0.336)	1.139* (0.479)	4.776+ (2.558)	-0.322** (0.109)	-0.0190 (0.161)	-0.249 (0.341)	-0.242 (0.515)
Black	0.635	-0.200	4.160	0.609***	0.812**	-0.276	-0.854

	(0.677)	(1.053)	(6.065)	(0.166)	(0.261)	(0.536)	(0.594)
White	0.316	-0.613	-0.902	0.123	0.0435	-0.745	-1.365*
	(0.621)	(0.982)	(5.751)	(0.152)	(0.245)	(0.481)	(0.555)
Asian American	-0.117	-0.408	3.130	0.342 ⁺	0.592*	-0.478	-0.999
	(0.745)	(1.081)	(6.265)	(0.199)	(0.295)	(0.595)	(0.748)
Hispanic	1.227 ⁺	-0.503	4.371	0.496**	0.413	-0.844	-1.513*
	(0.683)	(1.032)	(6.324)	(0.170)	(0.267)	(0.555)	(0.603)
Household Income	-0.0758	0.0899	-0.353	-0.0306*	0.0451*	0.0211	-0.0392
	(0.0645)	(0.0618)	(0.349)	(0.0156)	(0.0207)	(0.0499)	(0.0696)
Education	-0.188	0.102	-0.331	-0.0795*	0.0632	-0.0368	0.138
	(0.125)	(0.142)	(0.710)	(0.0332)	(0.0468)	(0.101)	(0.150)
Age	-0.0391***	-0.0402***	-0.227***	-0.0167***	-0.0229***	-0.0282***	-0.0605***
	(0.00812)	(0.0100)	(0.0494)	(0.00214)	(0.00336)	(0.00701)	(0.00917)
Male	0.0601	0.776**	3.408*	0.463***	0.877***	0.592**	1.005***
	(0.231)	(0.290)	(1.463)	(0.0624)	(0.0865)	(0.209)	(0.263)
Social Media Scale	0.545*	0.136	3.102*			0.636**	0.998**
	(0.222)	(0.279)	(1.490)			(0.202)	(0.325)
Election Confidence	-0.337**	-0.148	-1.081	-0.109**	0.266***	-0.154	-0.0327
	(0.107)	(0.130)	(0.853)	(0.0363)	(0.0548)	(0.119)	(0.171)
Conspiracy Beliefs ×	2.815 ⁺	-0.996	49.84***	1.408***	0.754 ⁺	3.762**	0.277
Politically Active	(1.604)	(1.502)	(11.05)	(0.385)	(0.440)	(1.438)	(1.619)
Constant	0.378	-6.419***	17.33*	0.219	-4.948***	1.004	-2.359 ⁺
	(0.945)	(1.566)	(8.298)	(0.255)	(0.398)	(0.870)	(1.240)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1,767	18,879	18,879	1,769	1,769
R-squared			0.216				

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

TABLE B2. Full model testing Hypothesis 3a, with interactions between depression and political activity for all four political violence outcomes. Support attack and the two hypothetical violence outcomes use unordered multinomial logit models, showing the probability of the category listed relative to the omitted category (“Oppose”). Sympathize stormers uses OLS regression.

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.141 (0.281)	0.311 (0.470)	1.016 (1.809)	-0.241** (0.0889)	0.671*** (0.165)	-0.306 (0.282)	0.587 (0.491)
Severely Depressed	-0.614 (0.536)	0.394 (0.593)	1.772 (3.161)	0.100 (0.110)	1.029*** (0.191)	0.684+ (0.378)	1.395* (0.613)
Conspiracy Beliefs	0.730 (0.799)	3.534*** (0.809)	30.16*** (6.496)	0.655** (0.217)	4.433*** (0.212)	0.910 (0.871)	4.168*** (0.825)
Democrat	-1.365* (0.671)	1.908 (1.636)	-2.605 (5.660)	-0.204 (0.128)	-0.0188 (0.216)	0.728 (0.590)	0.993 (0.805)
Republican	-1.483* (0.687)	2.725 (1.697)	4.914 (6.141)	-0.228 (0.151)	0.0423 (0.241)	0.585 (0.659)	1.124 (0.837)
Independent	-0.660 (0.630)	2.236 (1.625)	1.978 (5.651)	-0.203 (0.125)	-0.283 (0.217)	0.930 (0.573)	0.705 (0.756)
Ideology	0.361*** (0.109)	-0.0500 (0.107)	0.694 (0.630)	-0.0892*** (0.0254)	-0.0963** (0.0313)	-0.107 (0.0872)	0.0149 (0.101)
Political Interest	-0.171 (0.105)	0.195 (0.134)	-0.126 (0.705)	-0.198*** (0.0286)	0.0507 (0.0500)	-0.414*** (0.0926)	0.0304 (0.128)
Trump Supporter	0.630+ (0.339)	1.168* (0.482)	3.726 (6.019)	-0.320** (0.108)	-0.00475 (0.160)	-0.317 (0.358)	-0.238 (0.520)
Black	0.579 (0.695)	-0.265 (1.057)	-1.470 (5.711)	0.623*** (0.169)	0.815** (0.261)	-0.290 (0.536)	-0.902 (0.596)
White	0.280 (0.641)	-0.670 (0.977)	3.628 (6.308)	0.139 (0.155)	0.0499 (0.245)	-0.793 (0.489)	-1.386* (0.555)

Asian American	-0.108 (0.756)	-0.505 (1.074)	3.720 (6.236)	0.363 ⁺ (0.201)	0.571 ⁺ (0.296)	-0.461 (0.622)	-1.030 (0.768)
Hispanic	1.200 ⁺ (0.696)	-0.570 (1.033)	-0.334 (0.353)	0.513** (0.173)	0.412 (0.266)	-0.886 (0.554)	-1.523* (0.600)
Household Income	-0.0764 (0.0643)	0.0894 (0.0638)	-0.354 (0.704)	-0.0484** (0.0151)	0.0272 (0.0219)	0.0204 (0.0485)	-0.0413 (0.0694)
Education	-0.194 (0.127)	0.0813 (0.145)	-0.237*** (0.0515)	-0.0166*** (0.00214)	-0.0231*** (0.00339)	-0.0256 (0.104)	0.141 (0.153)
Age	-0.0401*** (0.00825)	-0.0397*** (0.00994)	4.044** (1.485)	-0.0524* (0.0255)	0.0724 ⁺ (0.0381)	-0.0299*** (0.00720)	-0.0606*** (0.00959)
Male	0.0866 (0.232)	0.813** (0.296)	4.154 (2.582)	0.468*** (0.0623)	0.880*** (0.0866)	0.640** (0.208)	0.985*** (0.287)
Social Media Scale	0.577** (0.223)	0.123 (0.289)	3.229* (1.518)	-0.106** (0.0365)	0.265*** (0.0546)	0.710*** (0.202)	1.015** (0.329)
Election Confidence	-0.334** (0.108)	-0.200 (0.133)	-0.746 (0.878)	-0.106** (0.0365)	0.265*** (0.0546)	-0.155 (0.119)	-0.0460 (0.171)
Not Depressed × Politically Active	-0.477 (0.453)	0.548 (0.394)	1.369 (2.329)	-0.528*** (0.125)	0.519** (0.177)	-0.200 (0.333)	-0.187 (0.570)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active	0.324 (0.380)	1.567*** (0.466)	8.277** (2.958)	0.302** (0.101)	0.585*** (0.133)	0.777* (0.366)	0.0350 (0.442)
Severely Depressed × Politically Active	-0.686 (0.828)	1.621* (0.717)	9.040 ⁺ (5.453)	0.154 (0.139)	0.786*** (0.172)	-0.928 (0.606)	-0.384 (0.564)
Constant	0.346 (0.970)	-5.690*** (1.654)	14.48 ⁺ (8.464)	0.289 (0.260)	-5.106*** (0.410)	0.864 (0.886)	-2.242 ⁺ (1.238)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1,767	18,841	18,841	1,769	1,769

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

TABLE B3. Full model testing Hypothesis 3b, with interactions between depression and conspiracy beliefs for all four political violence outcomes. Support attack and the two hypothetical violence outcomes use unordered multinomial logit models, showing the probability of the category listed relative to the omitted category (“Oppose”). Sympathize stormers uses OLS regression.

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	-0.559 (0.375)	0.828 (0.562)	-4.296 ⁺ (2.233)	-0.236* (0.110)	0.724*** (0.185)	-0.770* (0.367)	0.562 (0.756)
Severely Depressed	-0.472 (0.753)	1.853** (0.690)	-6.672 ⁺ (3.671)	-0.0921 (0.132)	0.738*** (0.204)	-0.424 (0.486)	0.345 (0.915)
Politically Active	-0.176 (0.290)	1.166*** (0.296)	4.618* (1.803)	-0.0232 (0.0680)	0.614*** (0.0960)	0.0236 (0.235)	-0.101 (0.317)
Democrat	-1.361* (0.645)	1.974 (1.599)	-2.377 (5.905)	-0.201 (0.128)	-0.0209 (0.217)	0.756 (0.587)	1.039 (0.832)
Republican	-1.603* (0.645)	2.809 ⁺ (1.659)	4.600 (6.489)	-0.230 (0.150)	0.0340 (0.241)	0.498 (0.639)	1.165 (0.839)
Independent	-0.706 (0.598)	2.322 (1.577)	2.142 (5.928)	-0.209 ⁺ (0.125)	-0.292 (0.217)	0.974 ⁺ (0.571)	0.741 (0.774)
Ideology	0.359*** (0.104)	-0.0556 (0.110)	0.805 (0.623)	-0.0925*** (0.0254)	-0.0960** (0.0314)	-0.0941 (0.0858)	0.0172 (0.103)
Political Interest	-0.173 ⁺ (0.105)	0.180 (0.135)	-0.0903 (0.677)	-0.196*** (0.0286)	0.0515 (0.0499)	-0.425*** (0.0931)	0.0247 (0.129)
Trump Supporter	0.624 ⁺ (0.320)	1.151* (0.486)	3.983 (6.071)	-0.305** (0.108)	-0.000392 (0.161)	-0.282 (0.335)	-0.250 (0.504)
Black	0.721 (0.703)	-0.131 (1.077)	-1.257 (5.765)	0.622*** (0.168)	0.797** (0.260)	-0.264 (0.541)	-0.910 (0.588)
White	0.410 (0.663)	-0.615 (1.004)	3.400 (6.322)	0.144 (0.155)	0.0308 (0.244)	-0.740 (0.492)	-1.383* (0.552)

Asian American	0.00786 (0.772)	-0.423 (1.104)	4.023 (6.306)	0.370 ⁺ (0.201)	0.563 ⁺ (0.294)	-0.471 (0.609)	-1.029 (0.720)
Hispanic	1.359 ⁺ (0.716)	-0.500 (1.049)	-0.389 (0.347)	0.519 ^{**} (0.173)	0.405 (0.265)	-0.879 (0.564)	-1.563 ^{**} (0.601)
Household Income	-0.0809 (0.0637)	0.0908 (0.0641)	-0.428 (0.701)	-0.0488 ^{**} (0.0150)	0.0253 (0.0220)	0.0179 (0.0502)	-0.0410 (0.0677)
Education	-0.173 (0.122)	0.109 (0.146)	-0.239 ^{***} (0.0521)	-0.0170 ^{***} (0.00213)	-0.0233 ^{***} (0.00340)	-0.0408 (0.0981)	0.121 (0.149)
Age	-0.0417 ^{***} (0.00804)	-0.0385 ^{***} (0.00949)	3.371 [*] (1.471)	-0.0537 [*] (0.0254)	0.0717 ⁺ (0.0380)	-0.0291 ^{***} (0.00708)	-0.0621 ^{***} (0.00974)
Male	0.0677 (0.229)	0.774 ^{**} (0.289)	4.235 ⁺ (2.512)	0.466 ^{***} (0.0623)	0.874 ^{***} (0.0868)	0.605 ^{**} (0.210)	0.962 ^{***} (0.271)
Social Media Scale	0.562 [*] (0.220)	0.126 (0.279)	3.450 [*] (1.499)			0.698 ^{***} (0.200)	1.000 ^{**} (0.311)
Election Confidence	-0.370 ^{***} (0.109)	-0.145 (0.135)	-1.144 (0.833)	-0.109 ^{**} (0.0366)	0.262 ^{***} (0.0542)	-0.159 (0.118)	-0.0409 (0.163)
Not Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	-0.639 (0.949)	4.519 ^{***} (1.157)	5.952 (7.101)	-0.215 (0.362)	4.137 ^{***} (0.428)	-1.594 (1.223)	3.353 ⁺ (1.870)
Moderately Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	3.567 ^{**} (1.123)	4.748 ^{***} (1.273)	45.85 ^{***} (10.48)	1.014 ^{**} (0.312)	4.017 ^{***} (0.296)	2.930 [*] (1.249)	4.007 ^{***} (1.080)
Severely Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	-1.727 (3.078)	1.871 (1.347)	58.83 ^{***} (12.93)	1.656 ^{***} (0.392)	5.589 ^{***} (0.358)	3.309 [*] (1.324)	6.954 ^{***} (1.582)
Constant	0.664 (0.980)	-6.605 ^{***} (1.588)	19.09 [*] (8.507)	0.374 (0.264)	-5.007 ^{***} (0.412)	1.208 (0.900)	-1.974 (1.274)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1767	18,841	18,841	1,769	1,769
Note:	Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ <i>p</i> = .1, [*] <i>p</i> = .05, ^{**} <i>p</i> = .01, ^{***} <i>p</i> ≤ .001						

TABLE B4. Full model testing Hypothesis 3c, with interactions between depression, political activity, and conspiracy beliefs for all four political violence outcomes. Support attack and the two hypothetical violence outcomes use unordered multinomial logit models, showing the probability of the category listed relative to the omitted category (“Oppose”). Sympathize stormers uses OLS regression.

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	-0.647 (0.405)	0.729 (0.980)	-3.164 (2.578)	-0.370** (0.131)	1.009*** (0.277)	-0.656 (0.412)	0.659 (1.038)
Severely Depressed	-0.271 (0.768)	0.871 (1.369)	-3.816 (4.614)	-0.0943 (0.157)	0.707* (0.316)	-0.344 (0.561)	-0.206 (1.424)
Politically Active	-1.147+ (0.613)	0.994 (0.718)	-4.379 (2.825)	-0.736*** (0.201)	0.607* (0.278)	-0.584 (0.481)	-0.234 (1.028)
Conspiracy Beliefs	-0.981 (1.013)	4.940*** (1.353)	-3.083 (6.992)	-0.373 (0.415)	4.291*** (0.658)	-2.245 (1.368)	3.310 (2.513)
Democrat	-1.337* (0.649)	2.029 (1.677)	-1.327 (5.762)	-0.196 (0.128)	-0.0363 (0.221)	0.910 (0.613)	1.165 (0.867)
Republican	-1.602* (0.633)	2.864+ (1.738)	4.580 (6.208)	-0.240 (0.150)	0.0100 (0.245)	0.633 (0.669)	1.327 (0.871)
Independent	-0.702 (0.592)	2.393 (1.661)	2.556 (5.730)	-0.204 (0.125)	-0.312 (0.221)	1.095+ (0.599)	0.861 (0.796)
Ideology	0.344*** (0.101)	-0.0347 (0.112)	0.746 (0.602)	-0.0916*** (0.0253)	-0.100** (0.0319)	-0.106 (0.0836)	0.0198 (0.103)
Political Interest	-0.170 (0.106)	0.192 (0.132)	-0.00768 (0.666)	-0.195*** (0.0287)	0.0536 (0.0500)	-0.424*** (0.0962)	0.0184 (0.131)
Trump Supporter	0.652* (0.309)	1.198* (0.480)	4.883* (2.473)	-0.312** (0.107)	-0.00473 (0.163)	-0.237 (0.332)	-0.288 (0.485)
Black	0.741	-0.207	3.578	0.608***	0.799**	-0.276	-0.869

Conspiracy Beliefs							
Severely Depressed ×	7.725 ⁺	-2.110	51.61 [*]	1.878 [*]	0.568	0.746	-4.277
Politically Active ×	(3.992)	(3.330)	(25.55)	(0.745)	(0.806)	(2.848)	(3.387)
Conspiracy Beliefs							
Constant	0.801	-6.522 ^{***}	21.79 [*]	0.422	-4.904 ^{***}	1.333	-2.199
	(1.018)	(1.697)	(8.560)	(0.262)	(0.443)	(0.924)	(1.425)
Observations	1,771	1,771	1,767	18,879	18,879	1,769	1,769
R-squared			0.227				
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ <i>p</i> = .1, [*] <i>p</i> = .05, ^{**} <i>p</i> = .01, ^{***} <i>p</i> ≤ .001							

C. RESEARCH METHOD AND ETHICS

As we restricted participation to adult U.S. citizens who consented to participate and did not employ deception, this research was determined to be exempt by the IRB. Participants gave consent to participate on the first page of the survey, and we did not collect any information from those who did not consent. Participants were recruited via PureSpectrum, a firm that draws participants from numerous survey vendors. We did not compensate participants directly; participants were compensated by the survey vendors that recruited them. The risks of participation were minimal and we do not believe participation differentially benefitted any participants. The survey design employed quota sampling to approximate a representative sample within each state by race, gender, and age group. The only deviation was allowing for oversampling of respondents who identify as Black, Latinx, or Asian. All data necessary to reproduce the results will be made available upon publication. As the raw data we collected through Qualtrics contains information that could potentially be used to identify participants (e.g., IP addresses and ZIP codes), we will remove all potentially identifying information before making such data available.

Online Appendix: What I Saw on the Road to Insurrection: Internal Political Efficacy, Conspiracy Beliefs and the Effect of Depression on Support for the January 6th Storming of the Capitol

A Survey Items

A.1 Support Attack

Question: “Did you support or oppose the storming of the Capitol building on January 6th?”

- Strongly support
- Somewhat support
- Neither support nor oppose
- Somewhat oppose
- Strongly oppose

We grouped responses into three discrete categories: support, neither support nor oppose, and oppose.

A.2 Sympathize Stormers

Question: “We’d like to get your feelings towards different groups on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a “feeling thermometer.” On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other. How would you rate each of the following groups?”

- Republicans
- Democrats
- Trump supporters
- Biden supporters

- Asian people
- Black people
- Hispanic people
- White people
- Scientists
- Police

PAGE BREAK IN SURVEY

- The people who stormed the Capitol building on Jan 6
- Black Lives Matter protesters
- Younger Americans (age 18 to 29)
- Baby boomers (age 56 to 76)
- People who wear face masks
- People who do not wear face masks

The sympathize stormers variable is equal to the rating the respondent gave to “The people who stormed the Capitol building on Jan 6.”

A.3 Hypothetical Violence

Question: “If it became clear to you that the 2020 presidential election was not conducted fairly, would you approve or disapprove of other people who reacted by...”

- Protesting on social media
- Joining an in-person protest
- Violating laws but without violence (e.g., defacing public property, trespassing)
- Using violence

Response categories were “strongly approve,” “somewhat approve,” “neither approve nor disapprove,” “somewhat disapprove,” and “strongly disapprove.” Using only the final item in the list (“using violence”) we grouped responses into three discrete categories: approve, neither approve nor disapprove, and disapprove.

A.4 Moderately Depressed and Severely Depressed (PHQ-9 Scale)

Question: “Over the last two weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems?”

- Little interest or pleasure in doing things
- Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless
- Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much
- Feeling tired or having little energy
- Poor appetite or overeating
- Feeling bad about yourself - or that you are a failure or have let yourself or your family down
- Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or watching television
- Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed – or so fidgety or restless that you have been moving a lot more than usual
- Thoughts that you would be better off dead, or thoughts of hurting yourself in some way

Responses are coded as 0 =not at all, 1=several days, 2=more than half the days, and 3=nearly every day. After summing responses, respondents with total scores from 5 to 14 were coded as moderately depressed while those with scores 15 or higher were coded as severely depressed. Note that this terminology differs slightly from the original PHQ-9 categories where 0-4 is no depression, 5-9 is mild depression, 10-14 is moderate depression, 15-19 is moderately severe depression, and 20+ severe depression.

A.5 Politically Active (Internal Political Efficacy measure)

Question: “Which of the following, if any, have you done in the last 6 months? (Please select all that apply)”

- Volunteered for a candidate, political party, or other political organization
- Attended a rally or protest
- Called or wrote to an elected official
- Attended a town hall held by an elected official
- Posted about politics on social media
- Made a donation to a candidate, party, or other political organization

Respondents who selected at least one item were coded 1; otherwise, 0.

A.6 Conspiracy Beliefs

Question: “Below are some statements about the current health crisis. To the best of your knowledge, are those statements accurate or inaccurate?”

- Only people older than 60 are at risk for coronavirus
- Coronavirus was created as a weapon in a Chinese lab
- Humans originally got coronavirus by eating bats
- President Trump has declared a national emergency
- There is currently no approved vaccine against the coronavirus
- There is a cure for coronavirus that is being withheld from the U.S. public
- Flu vaccines increase the chance of getting coronavirus
- Hydroxychloroquine is an effective treatment for coronavirus
- Wearing a face mask increases the chance of getting coronavirus
- Osama bin Laden is still alive today
- Thousands of election ballots were found in dumpsters
- Joe Biden used his post as Vice President to gain profit for his family

Participants were asked to indicate whether each item was “accurate”, “inaccurate”, or that they “don’t know”. Each inaccurate item is coded 1 for a response of “accurate” and 0 otherwise. The two claims that were accurate as of November 2020 (Trump’s national emergency declaration and the lack of an approved vaccine) were coded with 1 for “inaccurate” and 0 otherwise. These scores were then summed to create the conspiracy beliefs variable, which we treat as linear.

A.7 Trump Supporter

Question if respondent indicated they had voted:

“Which candidate did you vote for in the 2020 U.S. presidential election?”

Question if respondent did not vote:

“Which candidate do you support in the 2020 U.S. presidential election?”

Respondents were coded as 1 if they chose “Donald Trump (Republican)”, 0 otherwise.

A.8 Party

Question: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a . . .”

- Democrat
- Republican

- Independent
- Other

We treat “other” as the reference category.

A.9 Ideology

Question: “In general, do you think of yourself as...”

- Extremely liberal (1)
- Liberal (2)
- Slightly liberal (3)
- Moderate, middle of the road (4)
- Slightly conservative (5)
- Conservative (6)
- Extremely conservative (7)

We treat this 7-point scale as linear.

A.10 Political Interest

Question: “How interested are you in US politics and government?”

- Not at all interested (1)
- Not very interested (2)
- Somewhat interested (3)
- Very interested (4)
- Extremely interested (5)

We treat this 5-point scale as linear.

A.11 Election Confidence

Question: “How confident are you in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election?”

- Not at all confident (1)
- Not very confident (2)
- Mostly confident (3)
- Very confident (4)

We treat this 4-point scale as linear.

A.12 Education

Question: “What is the highest level of education you have completed?”

- Grade 9 or less (1)
- Some high school, did not graduate (2)
- High school graduate (diploma, GED, or equivalent) (3)
- Some college, no degree (4)
- Associate degree (AA, AS) (5)
- Bachelor’s degree (BA, BS) (6)
- Graduate degree (master’s, PhD, or professional degree beyond bachelor’s) (7)

We treat this scale as linear.

A.13 Age

Question: “What is your current age?”

Responses range from 18 (18) to 110 (110).

A.14 Social Media Scale

Question: “In the last 24 hours, did you get any news or information related to the 2020 U.S. election from the following sources?”

- Facebook (website or app)
- Twitter (website or app)
- Youtube(website or app)
- Reddit (website or app)
- Instagram (website or app)
- Snapchat (website or app)
- Wikipedia (website or app)
- Facebook Messenger app
- WhatsApp app
- TikTok app

Scale (1-10) is equal to the total number of items selected. Some respondents were not shown this question in November and thus we do not include the scale in our regressions for the Hypothetical Violence (November) outcome.

A.15 Race

Question: “What racial or ethnic group best describes you? (Please select all that apply).”

- Asian or Asian-American
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native American or Alaska Native
- Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
- White or Caucasian
- Other: _____

Responses are transformed into four dummy variables for Black, White, Hispanic, and Asian American, with the other items serving as the reference category.

B Robustness Check Results

Due to the loss of statistical leverage and relative infrequency of supporting the storming of the capitol, the estimates should be interpreted with caution.

Table B1: Robustness Checks: Sympathy for Capitol Stormers with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Sympathesize Stormers		
	0 - 100 Scale		
Moderately Depressed	5.111** (1.722)	2.840 (1.751)	5.174** (1.663)
Severely Depressed	6.160* (2.817)	2.931 (3.064)	6.913* (2.790)
Conspiracy Beliefs	45.75*** (6.331)	44.30*** (6.189)	37.78*** (6.781)
Politically Active	3.989* (1.820)	3.548* (1.795)	5.538** (1.907)
Black		1.750 (6.009)	
White		1.164 (5.769)	
Asian American		3.908 (6.313)	
Hispanic		3.739 (6.245)	
Household Income		-0.523 (0.360)	
Education		0.162 (0.539)	
Age		-0.203*** (0.0501)	
Male		3.262* (1.507)	
Democrat			-3.502 (5.422)
Republican			3.462 (6.043)
Independent			0.604

			(5.457)
Ideology			0.0130
			(0.654)
Political Interest			-0.733
			(0.685)
Trump Supporter			2.405
			(2.768)
Social Media Scale			3.415*
			(1.535)
Election Confidence			-0.528
			(0.933)
Constant	2.529 ⁺	12.54 ⁺	5.108
	(1.312)	(6.503)	(6.502)
Observations	1,778	1,776	1,767
R-squared	0.121	0.149	0.149
<hr/>			
<i>Note:</i>	Robust standard errors in brackets.		
	⁺ <i>p</i> = .1, * <i>p</i> = .05, ** <i>p</i> = .01, *** <i>p</i> ≤ .001		

Table B2: Robustness Check: Support for Capitol Stormers with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Support Storming of Capitol		Support Storming of Capitol		Support Storming of Capitol	
	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support
Moderately Depressed	0.552* (0.246)	0.821** (0.288)	0.201 (0.245)	0.584+ (0.323)	0.635* (0.254)	0.950** (0.296)
Severely Depressed	-0.0261 (0.413)	0.890* (0.403)	-0.696 (0.490)	0.614 (0.416)	-0.195 (0.416)	1.203** (0.442)
Conspiracy Beliefs	1.896** (0.703)	5.436*** (0.690)	1.935* (0.776)	5.102*** (0.709)	1.214 (0.818)	4.467*** (0.756)
Politically Active	-0.671** (0.236)	1.323*** (0.268)	-0.652** (0.241)	1.197*** (0.269)	-0.127 (0.276)	1.263*** (0.287)
Black			-0.0906 (0.611)	0.321 (1.240)		
White			0.224 (0.515)	0.733 (1.201)		
Asian American			-0.673 (0.616)	0.666 (1.277)		
Hispanic			0.602 (0.563)	0.459 (1.220)		
Household Income			-0.115* (0.0564)	0.0553 (0.0597)		
Education			-0.109 (0.0981)	0.0795 (0.0931)		
Age			-0.0330*** (0.00760)	-0.0269** (0.00987)		
Male			0.0301 (0.229)	0.666* (0.272)		
Democrat					-1.378* (0.579)	0.925 (1.193)
Republican					-1.700**	1.879

Table B2: Robustness Check: Support for Capitol Stormers with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Support Storming of Capitol		Support Storming of Capitol		Support Storming of Capitol	
	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support
Independent					(0.568) -0.849 (0.542)	(1.274) 1.341 (1.220)
Ideology					0.256* (0.0999)	-0.169+ (0.0977)
Political Interest					-0.290** (0.112)	0.173 (0.123)
Trump Supporter					0.333 (0.324)	1.029* (0.496)
Social Media Scale					0.613** (0.228)	-0.0329 (0.270)
Election Confidence					-0.322* (0.128)	0.0269 (0.125)
Constant	-2.411*** (0.251)	-4.850*** (0.293)	0.0513 (0.732)	-4.977*** (1.319)	-1.107 (0.776)	-6.589*** (1.372)
Observations	1,782	1,782	1,780	1,780	1,771	1,771
R-squared						
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$						

Table B3: Robustness Check: Support for Violence in January Wave with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Hypothetical Violence (January)		Hypothetical Violence (January)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.337 (0.225)	1.065** (0.333)	0.0340 (0.218)	0.589 (0.360)	0.205 (0.225)	0.961** (0.325)
Severely Depressed	0.888** (0.302)	1.719*** (0.344)	0.465 (0.347)	1.216** (0.414)	0.630* (0.312)	1.603*** (0.356)
Conspiracy Beliefs	0.297 (0.857)	4.760*** (0.787)	0.415 (0.799)	4.511*** (0.886)	1.324 (0.981)	4.973*** (0.757)
Politically Active	-0.248 (0.213)	0.357 (0.252)	-0.256 (0.220)	0.117 (0.280)	0.108 (0.224)	0.129 (0.281)
Black			-0.0993 (0.489)	-0.473 (0.615)		
White			-0.752 ⁺ (0.444)	-0.976 ⁺ (0.566)		
Asian American			-0.273 (0.578)	-0.615 (0.896)		
Hispanic			-0.767 (0.524)	-0.982 (0.612)		
Household Income			-0.0230 (0.0432)	-0.0277 (0.0632)		
Education			-0.0919 (0.0765)	0.0478 (0.114)		
Age			-0.0328*** (0.00714)	-0.0543*** (0.00939)		
Male			0.405 ⁺ (0.210)	0.822** (0.277)		
Democrat					0.486 (0.581)	-0.285 (0.827)

Table B3: Robustness Check: Support for Violence in January Wave with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Hypothetical Violence (January)		Hypothetical Violence (January)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Republican					0.203 (0.685)	-0.0900 (0.841)
Independent					0.665 (0.579)	-0.456 (0.776)
Ideology					-0.165 ⁺ (0.0891)	-0.102 (0.0959)
Political Interest					-0.431*** (0.0903)	-0.000687 (0.117)
Trump Supporter					-0.392 (0.381)	-0.244 (0.473)
Social Media Scale					0.541* (0.211)	0.645* (0.305)
Election Confidence					-0.142 (0.119)	0.117 (0.178)
Constant	-2.016*** (0.235)	-4.352*** (0.400)	0.537 (0.622)	-1.304 (0.872)	-0.471 (0.764)	-4.188*** (0.972)
Observations	1,780	1,780	1,778	1,778	1,769	1,769
R-squared						
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$						

Table B4: Robustness Check: Support for Violence in November Wave with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (November)	
	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.249*** (0.0668)	0.933*** (0.0996)	0.0297 (0.0699)	0.737*** (0.106)	0.130 ⁺ (0.0686)	0.817*** (0.104)
Severely Depressed	0.736*** (0.0797)	1.519*** (0.105)	0.371*** (0.0882)	1.264*** (0.114)	0.496*** (0.0834)	1.342*** (0.113)
Conspiracy Beliefs	-0.0286 (0.192)	4.125*** (0.181)	0.178 (0.192)	4.049*** (0.194)	0.798*** (0.220)	4.828*** (0.203)
Politically Active	-0.199** (0.0617)	1.019*** (0.0821)	-0.189** (0.0631)	0.764*** (0.0881)	0.0157 (0.0668)	0.780*** (0.0916)
Black			0.582*** (0.158)	1.052*** (0.259)		
White			0.0188 (0.145)	0.114 (0.244)		
Asian American			0.323 ⁺ (0.192)	0.651* (0.293)		
Hispanic			0.411* (0.164)	0.564* (0.265)		
Household Income			-0.0645*** (0.0149)	0.0352 ⁺ (0.0209)		
Education			-0.0724** (0.0252)	0.136*** (0.0366)		
Age			-0.0210*** (0.00205)	-0.0254*** (0.00319)		
Male			0.412*** (0.0611)	0.906*** (0.0830)		
Democrat					-0.237 ⁺ (0.123)	-0.0845 (0.215)

Table B4: Robustness Check: Support for Violence in November Wave with Limited Sets of Control Variables

Outcome	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (November)	
	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Republican					-0.325* (0.145)	-0.0156 (0.239)
Independent					-0.234 ⁺ (0.120)	-0.295 (0.216)
Ideology					-0.0987*** (0.0252)	-0.121*** (0.0305)
Political Interest					-0.249*** (0.0275)	0.0380 (0.0461)
Trump Supporter					-0.477*** (0.108)	-0.143 (0.162)
Social Media Scale						
Election Confidence					-0.112** (0.0364)	0.353*** (0.0526)
Constant	-2.051*** (0.0641)	-4.720*** (0.111)	-0.781*** (0.192)	-5.002*** (0.311)	-0.319 (0.199)	-5.226*** (0.314)
Observations	19,082	19,082	19,037	19,037	18,879	18,879
R-squared						
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

Figure B1: Robustness Checks: Conspiracy Beliefs

Table B5: Robustness Checks: Conspiracy Beliefs

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	-0.00832 (0.342)	0.782 (0.707)	-0.200 (1.954)	-0.327*** (0.0987)	1.022*** (0.208)	-0.421 (0.319)	0.877 (0.707)
Severely Depressed	-0.720 (0.619)	0.796 (0.853)	-1.740 (3.166)	0.0546 (0.126)	1.107*** (0.223)	0.104 (0.477)	1.035 (0.914)
Politically Active	-1.010* (0.472)	1.103* (0.553)	1.346 (2.738)	-0.564*** (0.142)	0.779*** (0.211)	-0.602 (0.382)	-0.344 (0.772)
Conspiracy Beliefs	-0.352 (0.759)	3.082*** (0.929)	2.216 (5.074)	0.0343 (0.271)	3.028*** (0.449)	-1.218 (0.849)	2.407+ (1.300)
Democrat	-1.246+ (0.661)	1.896 (1.554)	-1.529 (5.705)	-0.160 (0.126)	0.131 (0.215)	0.899 (0.600)	1.081 (0.883)
Republican	-1.481* (0.657)	2.736+ (1.580)	5.003 (6.164)	-0.232 (0.146)	0.218 (0.240)	0.526 (0.668)	1.290 (0.853)
Independent	-0.592 (0.609)	2.245 (1.525)	2.514 (5.676)	-0.187 (0.123)	-0.171 (0.216)	1.048+ (0.586)	0.769 (0.796)
Ideology	0.373*** (0.109)	-0.0323 (0.114)	0.961 (0.614)	-0.0881*** (0.0248)	-0.0931** (0.0316)	-0.0716 (0.0839)	0.0541 (0.102)
Political Interest	-0.138 (0.101)	0.302* (0.124)	0.388 (0.681)	-0.192*** (0.0283)	0.0924+ (0.0496)	-0.393*** (0.0922)	0.142 (0.133)
Trump Supporter	0.598+ (0.334)	1.297** (0.442)	4.748+ (2.441)	-0.294** (0.104)	0.177 (0.154)	-0.357 (0.343)	-0.253 (0.471)
Black	0.400 (0.677)	-0.271 (1.008)	2.925 (5.995)	0.588*** (0.164)	0.827** (0.256)	-0.331 (0.529)	-0.881 (0.582)
White	0.0548 (0.628)	-0.743 (0.951)	-2.191 (5.720)	0.0944 (0.151)	0.0953 (0.242)	-0.779 (0.477)	-1.417* (0.562)
Asian American	-0.368 (0.744)	-0.621 (1.032)	2.100 (6.224)	0.300 (0.195)	0.623* (0.289)	-0.546 (0.588)	-1.045 (0.685)

Table B5: Robustness Checks: Conspiracy Beliefs

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Hispanic	1.046 (0.690)	-0.687 (1.006)	3.813 (6.281)	0.464** (0.169)	0.441 ⁺ (0.263)	-0.840 (0.541)	-1.545* (0.611)
Household Income	-0.0777 (0.0633)	0.0907 (0.0677)	-0.448 (0.354)	-0.0294 ⁺ (0.0154)	0.0449* (0.0199)	0.00349 (0.0497)	-0.0412 (0.0680)
Education	-0.190 (0.125)	0.128 (0.141)	-0.436 (0.684)	-0.0741* (0.0328)	0.104* (0.0446)	-0.0274 (0.101)	0.199 (0.152)
Age	-0.0400*** (0.00797)	-0.0413*** (0.0101)	-0.237*** (0.0530)	-0.0163*** (0.00212)	-0.0222*** (0.00333)	-0.0303*** (0.00702)	-0.0632*** (0.00979)
Male	0.0727 (0.232)	0.928** (0.296)	3.332* (1.396)	0.452*** (0.0618)	0.908*** (0.0845)	0.532** (0.204)	1.095*** (0.268)
Social Media Scale	0.539* (0.222)	0.114 (0.296)	2.878 ⁺ (1.474)			0.687*** (0.198)	0.900** (0.313)
Election Confidence	-0.385*** (0.106)	-0.254 ⁺ (0.139)	-1.686* (0.818)	-0.125*** (0.0355)	0.228*** (0.0549)	-0.199 ⁺ (0.117)	-0.108 (0.160)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active	0.955 (0.712)	0.0243 (0.841)	2.203 (4.007)	0.772*** (0.182)	-0.405 (0.269)	1.016 ⁺ (0.568)	0.515 (0.926)
Severely Depressed × Politically Active	0.320 (1.058)	1.128 (1.079)	2.580 (7.392)	0.528* (0.211)	-0.0304 (0.291)	-0.993 (0.825)	0.371 (1.120)
Moderately Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	0.718 (1.219)	-2.288 (1.716)	6.226 (9.427)	0.748 ⁺ (0.398)	-1.715** (0.618)	0.915 (1.425)	-1.666 (1.834)
Severely Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	0.154 (1.675)	-1.562 (1.865)	19.53 (11.87)	0.470 (0.440)	-0.426 (0.610)	3.294* (1.433)	1.716 (1.988)
Not Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	2.412 ⁺ (1.374)	-2.372 (1.442)	0.906 (12.48)	0.122 (0.507)	-0.784 (0.577)	3.204* (1.340)	0.833 (1.794)
Moderately Depressed ×	2.062	2.958 ⁺	39.08**	0.416	1.532**	2.659	1.636

Table B5: Robustness Checks: Conspiracy Beliefs

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	(1.808)	(1.795)	(12.96)	(0.418)	(0.482)	(1.643)	(1.677)
Severely Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	0.543 (2.337)	-1.405 (1.925)	25.11 (18.31)	0.998 ⁺ (0.515)	0.582 (0.502)	2.120 (1.719)	-0.933 (1.750)
Constant	0.717 (0.988)	-5.983*** (1.660)	20.44* (8.584)	0.319 (0.252)	-5.009*** (0.411)	1.138 (0.887)	-2.360 ⁺ (1.276)
Observations	1,797	1,797	1,793	19,223	19,223	1,795	1,795
R-squared			0.213				
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, $*p = .05$, $**p = .01$, $***p \leq .001$							

Table B6: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Trump Supporters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	0.0641 (0.642)	1.399 (1.541)	-10.62 ⁺ (5.943)	-0.00431 (0.295)	1.294* (0.536)	0.256 (0.841)	2.992* (1.175)
Severely Depressed	-0.651 (0.890)	1.690 (1.700)	2.402 (12.28)	0.0315 (0.397)	0.134 (0.787)	-0.670 (0.965)	1.883 (2.501)
Politically Active	0.259 (1.001)	1.840* (0.934)	-5.481 (6.938)	-0.532 (0.428)	0.563 (0.511)	-2.442 (1.732)	3.017* (1.195)
Conspiracy Beliefs	-0.948 (1.559)	5.841*** (1.599)	-1.412 (11.02)	0.392 (0.611)	3.518*** (1.019)	-2.588 (1.925)	6.262** (1.974)
Democrat	-0.268 (1.608)	1.787 (1.924)	1.882 (19.88)	-0.235 (0.427)	0.585 (0.575)	-1.229 (1.592)	2.655 (2.030)
Republican	0.290 (1.336)	1.835 (1.918)	6.138 (19.36)	-0.172 (0.303)	-0.0880 (0.495)	-0.203 (1.094)	2.633 (2.164)
Independent	1.254 (1.365)	2.054 (1.938)	5.316 (19.29)	-0.124 (0.312)	-0.399 (0.529)	0.603 (1.122)	2.467 (2.230)
Ideology	0.234 ⁺ (0.133)	-0.106 (0.135)	-1.352 (0.921)	-0.192*** (0.0435)	-0.0977 ⁺ (0.0506)	-0.171 (0.161)	0.216 (0.174)
Political Interest	-0.187 (0.123)	0.225 (0.147)	1.278 (1.097)	-0.161** (0.0578)	0.147 (0.0935)	-0.493** (0.171)	-0.295 (0.227)
Black	-1.009 (0.974)	0.554 (1.582)	-7.291 (11.09)	0.553 (0.482)	1.129 ⁺ (0.596)	-2.073 (1.608)	-2.776 ⁺ (1.430)
White	-0.627 (0.674)	1.592 (1.216)	-5.896 (8.491)	0.408 (0.386)	0.867 (0.528)	-0.114 (1.087)	-1.767 ⁺ (0.992)
Asian American	-0.900 (0.830)	0.973 (1.420)	-7.627 (9.690)	1.176* (0.481)	1.758** (0.650)	0.232 (1.269)	-1.387 (1.199)
Hispanic	-0.930 (0.834)	1.407 (1.276)	-8.855 (9.263)	0.539 (0.432)	1.495** (0.568)	-1.815 (1.501)	-1.336 (1.306)

Table B6: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Trump Supporters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Household Income	-0.0157 (0.0703)	-0.0302 (0.0808)	-0.0867 (0.608)	-0.0338 (0.0304)	0.0822 ⁺ (0.0438)	-0.0440 (0.0998)	-0.153 (0.0976)
Education	0.0503 (0.150)	0.236 (0.192)	2.157 ⁺ (1.172)	-0.177** (0.0610)	-0.0578 (0.0921)	-0.0882 (0.209)	0.251 (0.203)
Age	-0.0467*** (0.00852)	-0.0385** (0.0128)	-0.422*** (0.105)	-0.0105** (0.00359)	-0.0115 ⁺ (0.00605)	-0.0305* (0.0128)	-0.0680*** (0.0162)
Male	0.442 (0.278)	0.709 ⁺ (0.371)	5.209* (2.420)	0.558*** (0.119)	0.980*** (0.167)	0.453 (0.389)	1.805*** (0.528)
Social Media Scale	0.153 (0.296)	-0.0425 (0.355)	5.426* (2.617)			1.282** (0.426)	0.425 (0.425)
Election Confidence	-0.196 (0.142)	-0.142 (0.178)	-1.298 (1.378)	0.173** (0.0645)	0.573*** (0.0819)	0.125 (0.217)	0.610** (0.235)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active	-0.327 (1.321)	-1.458 (1.727)	18.68 ⁺ (10.50)	0.113 (0.608)	-0.523 (0.710)	-9.473*** (2.775)	-3.638* (1.593)
Severely Depressed × e Politically Activ	-2.779 (2.040)	-1.445 (2.339)	-13.46 (19.36)	1.021 (0.728)	1.074 (0.951)	1.391 (2.548)	-4.756 (3.151)
Moderately Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	2.071 (2.234)	-2.687 (3.857)	36.04 (22.81)	-0.476 (1.041)	-1.585 (1.399)	-6.290 (5.220)	-5.568 (3.690)
Severely Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	1.873 (3.049)	-3.094 (3.715)	5.938 (32.51)	-0.305 (1.313)	3.305 ⁺ (1.793)	4.266 (3.342)	0.976 (5.263)
Not Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	-1.874 (3.408)	-3.353 (2.532)	37.84 (28.66)	0.305 (1.155)	-0.0769 (1.334)	6.402 (4.693)	-6.479 ⁺ (3.387)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	2.349 (2.701)	3.001 (4.213)	19.73 (26.17)	1.416 (1.232)	1.510 (1.188)	25.37*** (5.923)	2.293 (3.405)

Table B6: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Trump Supporters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Severely Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	4.445 (3.687)	-0.465 (4.504)	48.47 (47.18)	1.291 (1.694)	-2.081 (1.697)	-2.292 (4.489)	1.583 (5.718)
Constant	0.353 (1.699)	-6.464* (2.511)	36.09+ (21.43)	-0.645 (0.595)	-7.026*** (0.899)	1.910 (1.856)	-6.166* (2.516)
Observations	616	616	615	6,665	6,665	614	614
R-squared			0.229				
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. $^+p = .1$, $^*p = .05$, $^{**}p = .01$, $^{***}p \leq .001$							

Table B7: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Non-Trump Voters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Moderately Depressed	-0.970 (0.602)	0.723 (1.279)	-1.782 (2.864)	-0.533*** (0.147)	0.890** (0.323)	-0.928* (0.463)	0.0920 (1.160)
Severely Depressed	-0.147 (0.769)	-12.85*** (0.876)	-4.422 (4.824)	-0.222 (0.176)	0.898** (0.331)	-0.392 (0.627)	-1.535 (1.820)
Politically Active	-2.208* (0.969)	0.148 (1.069)	-1.340 (2.798)	-0.874*** (0.245)	0.580 ⁺ (0.329)	-0.457 (0.547)	-1.532 (1.241)
Conspiracy Beliefs	-2.234 (1.630)	4.599* (2.256)	-5.571 (9.837)	-1.141 ⁺ (0.585)	4.588*** (0.751)	-2.328 (1.436)	2.128 (2.555)
Democrat	-1.791* (0.716)	17.69*** (1.635)	-0.510 (5.081)	-0.0932 (0.138)	0.0404 (0.244)	1.339* (0.620)	0.481 (0.759)
Republican	-2.281* (0.939)	19.73*** (2.058)	6.836 (6.078)	-0.146 (0.209)	0.224 (0.322)	1.038 (0.693)	0.337 (0.862)
Independent	-1.298* (0.625)	17.71*** (1.763)	1.320 (4.921)	-0.189 (0.138)	-0.251 (0.242)	1.406* (0.596)	0.121 (0.650)
Ideology	0.461** (0.159)	0.0124 (0.195)	1.478* (0.722)	-0.0454 (0.0306)	-0.0910* (0.0423)	-0.0285 (0.0879)	-0.0422 (0.158)
Political Interest	0.00826 (0.174)	0.187 (0.256)	-0.323 (0.744)	-0.162*** (0.0350)	0.0859 (0.0599)	-0.312** (0.117)	0.203 (0.159)
Black	1.656 (1.209)	-1.618 ⁺ (0.892)	4.086 (6.915)	0.593** (0.187)	0.669* (0.290)	-0.396 (0.604)	-1.017 ⁺ (0.599)
White	1.380 (1.147)	-2.968** (0.971)	-1.307 (6.582)	0.0812 (0.177)	-0.107 (0.279)	-0.983 ⁺ (0.573)	-1.496* (0.630)
Asian American	0.550 (1.383)	-2.279* (1.014)	4.306 (7.269)	0.121 (0.224)	0.352 (0.329)	-0.751 (0.663)	-1.025 (0.757)
Hispanic	3.167** (1.177)	-2.802** (1.008)	6.276 (7.192)	0.505** (0.195)	0.170 (0.303)	-0.912 (0.645)	-1.753** (0.609)

Table B7: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Non-Trump Voters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Household Income	-0.135 (0.107)	0.269* (0.119)	-0.225 (0.388)	-0.0285 (0.0180)	0.0245 (0.0233)	0.0364 (0.0577)	0.0698 (0.0781)
Education	-0.542* (0.229)	0.0465 (0.286)	-1.531 ⁺ (0.826)	-0.0512 (0.0399)	0.0995 ⁺ (0.0531)	-0.0944 (0.113)	0.0771 (0.225)
Age	-0.0498*** (0.0132)	-0.0554*** (0.0158)	-0.123** (0.0451)	-0.0186*** (0.00264)	-0.0267*** (0.00397)	-0.0266*** (0.00799)	-0.0604*** (0.0144)
Male	-0.218 (0.357)	0.836 (0.537)	1.063 (1.675)	0.396*** (0.0750)	0.793*** (0.104)	0.524* (0.250)	0.766* (0.361)
Social Media Scale	0.923** (0.332)	0.895 ⁺ (0.529)	2.177 (1.675)			0.544* (0.231)	1.084* (0.472)
Election Confidence	-0.709*** (0.158)	-0.0171 (0.277)	-2.078* (1.011)	-0.254*** (0.0428)	-0.0148 (0.0698)	-0.340* (0.145)	-0.568** (0.191)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active	1.479 (1.416)	1.588 (1.601)	-0.769 (5.036)	0.981*** (0.296)	-0.367 (0.427)	0.893 (0.824)	1.213 (1.533)
Severely Depressed × Politically Active	-1.692 (1.809)	16.58*** (1.376)	-1.886 (7.216)	0.558 ⁺ (0.326)	-0.197 (0.442)	-0.711 (1.193)	3.164 (2.099)
Moderately Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	6.957** (2.565)	-2.697 (5.444)	32.73 ⁺ (19.48)	1.788* (0.805)	-1.195 (1.112)	5.162 ⁺ (2.841)	1.443 (3.775)
Severely Depressed × Conspiracy Beliefs	-3.238 (4.167)	-3.953 (2.572)	34.55 (28.01)	2.456** (0.873)	-0.270 (1.064)	8.884** (3.219)	13.58* (5.961)
Not Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	11.05** (3.367)	-4.708 (5.805)	11.63 (17.04)	2.620* (1.236)	0.547 (1.058)	4.002 (3.479)	5.072 (4.066)
Moderately Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	2.547 (3.657)	2.291 (5.302)	31.71 (24.97)	1.706* (0.782)	2.044* (0.947)	2.527 (2.989)	2.541 (3.253)

Table B7: Robustness Checks: Support for Capitol Stormers among Non-Trump Voters

Outcome	Support Attack		Sympathize Stormers	Hypothetical Violence (November)		Hypothetical Violence (January)	
Outcome Value	Neither Support nor Oppose	Support	0-100 Scale	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve	Neither Approve nor Disapprove	Approve
Severely Depressed × Politically Active × Conspiracy Beliefs	10.79* (4.615)	0.125 (2.470)	65.52* (30.08)	1.488 ⁺ (0.903)	1.873* (0.912)	-0.966 (3.899)	-9.219 ⁺ (5.483)
Constant	1.505 (1.613)	-21.69*** (2.060)	19.55* (8.565)	0.643* (0.301)	-3.963*** (0.503)	0.931 (0.914)	-0.0121 (1.501)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,152	12,214	12,214	1,155	1,155
R-squared			0.246				
<i>Note:</i> Robust standard errors in brackets. ⁺ $p = .1$, * $p = .05$, ** $p = .01$, *** $p \leq .001$

Figure B2: Robustness Checks: Trump Supporters

Figure B3: Robustness Checks: Non-Trump Supporters