Context matters: Novel metaphors in supportive and non-supportive contexts

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Abstract

Creative language is defined as linguistic output that is both novel and appropriate. Metaphors are one such example of creative language in which one concept is used to express another by highlighting certain semantic features. While novelty is an inherent property of unfamiliar metaphors, appropriateness depends on the context. The current study tests the hypothesis that the context in which metaphors are encountered affects its processing. We examined the neural effects of comprehending metaphors in context by comparing neural activations in response to novel metaphors and literal sentences that were either embedded in a meaningful narrative or in matched jabberwocky contexts. We found that the neural correlates of processing metaphoric sentences and their literal counterparts are indistinguishable when embedded in a narrative: both conditions activate bilateral areas along the anterior temporal poles, middle temporal gyri, superior temporal sulci, and the angular gyri. Metaphors embedded in a narrative as compared to their identical counterparts embedded in jabberwocky show increased responses in sensorimotor areas that correspond to the modality of the literal meaning of the target word, perhaps reflecting deeper semantic processing. Our results confirm that context affects neural mechanisms for understanding creative ideas.

Keywords: Narrative, metaphor, novelty, creative language, figurativeness, fMRI

Introduction

In this study, we use novel metaphors as an example of creative language and investigate the neural effects of the context in which they are understood. Creativity is characterized by both novelty and appropriateness (or effectiveness or usefulness; (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). New ideas do not arise spontaneously in a vacuum. Instead, they build on existing knowledge and recombinations of knowledge to create new and meaningful associations (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Beaty, Silvia, & Benedek, 2017; Benedek et al., 2014; Benedek & Fink, 2019; Kenett, 2018b; Kenett & Faust, 2019; Volle, 2018). Creating new variations of existing concepts and establishing new relations between distant concepts is one way to yield creative ideas (Kenett, 2018a; Kenett & Faust, 2019; Kenett, Gold, & Faust, 2018; Mednick, 1962).

Because metaphors use semantic features flexibly to express new meaning, metaphors represent an important case of the creative use of language (Faust, 2012; Vartanian, 2012). Creative people have a more flexible memory structure (Kenett & Faust, 2019; Mednick, 1962), a characteristic that might explain why they understand and express novel ideas with ease and why they comprehend novel metaphors better than their less creative peers (Gold, Faust, & Ben-Artzi, 2012; Kenett et al., 2018). Unfamiliar metaphors are, by definition, novel, yet the question of what constitutes their appropriateness remains. One way to characterize appropriateness is the context in which metaphors are apprehended. The role of context in metaphor processing is relatively unexplored. In this study, we investigate the contribution of meaningful context to the neural underpinnings of comprehension of novel metaphors.

Metaphors often use a familiar concept to highlight specific semantic features with partially overlapping meaning to express another concept. The process of comprehending metaphors was conceived initially as having two stages that involve an initial literal interpretation of a word and a reinterpretation after feedback that the literal meaning does not make sense (Ortony, 1993; Schmidt & Seger, 2009). Empirical observations suggest that metaphoric interpretations can be just as automatic as literal interpretations (Glucksberg, 2003). When embedded in a meaningful context, non-literal expressions are processed with equal speed (Glucksberg, 2003), indicating that there is no initial bias for

literal meanings. Conventional metaphors do not seem to be processed differently from literal meanings even when encountered in isolation (Faust, 2012). The Career of Metaphor model argues that with increased conventionality, metaphoric meanings of words are lexicalized as additional senses of a word (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Cardillo, Watson, Schmidt, Kranjec, & Chatterjee, 2012).

Meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies on metaphors and figurative language more generally compared to literal meanings find that while some brain areas show increased activation to figurative language compared to literal language, the reverse contrast does not reveal activations specific to literal language (Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 2012; Rapp, 2012; Rapp, Mutschler, & Erb, 2012). This pattern suggests that literal and non-literal language rely on similar neural structures—and by implication similar cognitive processes—but that figurative language may require more processing than literal language (Bohrn et al., 2012). Similarly, generating new ideas—for instance in problem solving or thinking about new uses for objects—recruits similar brain structures as recalling familiar solutions (Benedek et al., 2014).

While context profoundly affects semantic processing, most metaphor and creative language studies use decontextualized phrases, or sentences with minimal context; conditions that are not typical of how we encounter metaphors (Abraham, 2013, 2018). Supporting context can make metaphors easier to understand (Prat, Mason, & Just, 2012). Context limits possible interpretation and likely facilitates co-activating relevant information and semantically related concepts to ease processing of figurative language (Figure 1). Prat and colleagues (2012) reported that figurativeness itself had no effect on comprehension when metaphors are embedded in a minimal context (one or two preceding sentences), regardless of difficulty (see also Diaz & Hogstrom, 2011).

Figure 1. Contextual embedding significantly reduces ambiguity and prediction violations for non-literal expressions

Coherent discourse elicits more robust activations than isolated sentences in left hemisphere language areas as well as in bilateral anterior temporal cortex, superior temporal sulci, and medial prefrontal regions (Diaz & Hogstrom, 2011; Ferstl, Neumann, Bogler, & Von Cramon, 2008). Similarly, metaphors compared to literal control sentences robustly activate bilateral inferior frontal and temporal areas (Bohrn et al., 2012; Cardillo et al., 2012; Rapp, 2012; Rapp et al., 2012). The anterior temporal poles may play an important role in discourse processing and semantic memory (Diaz & Hogstrom, 2011; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Simmons & Martin, 2009) and may be ideally suited to creating a larger abstract semantic representation from individual words (Ferstl et al., 2008).

Creative thinking often involves the right hemisphere (Aberg, Doell, & Schwartz, 2016; Faust, 2012), which is also hypothesized to play a major role in processing metaphors (Anaki, Faust, & Kravetz, 1998; Brownell, Simpson, Bihle, Potter, & Gardner, 1990; Faust, 2012; Fiore & Schooler, 1998; Schmidt, DeBuse, & Seger, 2007). However, the experimental evidence on lateralization of non-literal language comprehension is mixed (Anaki et al., 1998; Giora, 2007; Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, & Kircher, 2007; Rapp et al., 2012; Winner & Gardner, 1977). Despite several popular theories claiming a special role of right hemisphere in processing figurativeness (Giora, 1997; Jung-Beeman, 2005), the evidence supporting the hypothesis is inconsistent (e.g., Bohrn et al., 2012). Two initial neuropsychological studies supporting right hemisphere dominance theories for processing figurative language (Brownell et al., 1990; Winner & Gardner, 1977) did not confine their tests to language and used pictures to test understanding.

Recent patient studies with well controlled linguistic stimuli have not replicated these neuropsychological observations (Cardillo, McQuire, & Chatterjee, 2018; Ianni, Cardillo, McQuire, & Chatterjee, 2014). Several neuroimaging meta-analyses of metaphor also fail to find evidence for right hemisphere dominance for figurative language (Bohrn et al., 2012; Diaz & Hogstrom, 2011; Rapp et al., 2012; Schmidt & Seger, 2009; Yang, 2014). Instead, they report left fronto-temporal activations and bilateral activations, particularly when stimuli are novel (Bohrn et al., 2012; Faust, 2012; Rapp et al., 2012; Yang, 2014). Diaz, Barrett and Hogstrom (2011) showed that contextual congruence had a greater influence than figurativeness on right hemisphere recruitment. They reported bilateral activations in inferior frontal cortex and the anterior temporal lobes when figurative expressions were preceded by a congruent sentence. Previously reported effects of figurativeness studies may be incongruity effects of an unexpected phrase, a violation experienced when first encountering a novel metaphor.

Some suggest that the right hemisphere recruitment for contextualized complex language might serve as additional resources to support comprehension when demands on working memory increase (Just, Carpenter, Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1996; Schmidt & Seger, 2009). In complex contexts, semantic processing requires integrating broad semantic fields and concepts that are related to each other (Yang, 2014). An alternative hypothesis proposed by Federmeier and colleagues suggests that even if both hemispheres are sensitive to language and sentence-level processes, the right hemisphere integrates language components whereas the left hemisphere predicts language sequences (Federmeier, 2007). In either account, the right hemisphere contribution to sentence processing does not reflect figurativeness, *per se*.

Aim of the study

This study investigates the impact of meaningful narrative contexts on the neural processing of metaphoric and literal sentences. We test the hypothesis that an appropriate narrative context changes how metaphors are processed. We further test the hypothesis that one hemisphere plays a privileged role in processing metaphors. To test these hypotheses, we measured blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD)

brain activity with functional MRI while participants listened to metaphors and literal sentences embedded in narrative and matched jabberwocky contexts. Jabberwocky streams are grammatical well-formed sentences in which content words are replaced by pseudowords that are phonotactic and syllabic possible in the language but bear no semantic meaning. We compared brain activity to literal and novel metaphorical target sentences embedded in narrative and jabberwocky contexts to each other and to a jabberwocky baseline. We predicted that target sentences in meaningful contexts would produce greater activations than jabberwocky embedded sentences in brain areas (e.g., anterior temporal cortex) that integrate semantics. In addition, we predict that neural processing of metaphoric and literal sentences would not significantly differ when embedded in meaningful, supportive contexts.

Methods

Participants

Thirty right-handed individuals were recruited from the University of Pennsylvania participant database (17 women, 11 men, 1 transgender person, 1 genderqueer person). Age of participants ranged from 19-36 (mean age = 24.58 years, SD = 4.27, mean education = 16.37 years, SD = 1.35). Participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and no prior history of psychiatric or neurological disease. Before participation in the study, each individual gave informed consent (IRB approval number 806447 of the University of Pennsylvania). Participants were compensated monetarily for their time. Data from one participant was excluded because of a technical problem with the headphones. Data from three participants were partially excluded because of excessive movement (> 3mm within one run, 25% of total data from 1 participant), headphone malfunction (25% of total data from 2 participants), or scanner synchronization issues (25% of total data from 1 participant). In sum, the exclusion amounted to one participant's entire dataset, 50% of data from another participant, and 25% of data excluded from two other participants.

Stimuli

Stimuli were short narratives constructed around target sentences. Target sentences were sentence-pairs selected from Cardillo, Schmidt, Kranjec, and Chatterjee (2010). Each metaphor-literal sentence pair had the same syntactic form (The *A* is a *B*) and used the same nominalized motion verb for the second term (*B*). Using the published norms of Cardillo et al (2010), we ensured metaphors were novel by limiting our selection to metaphors with a maximum value for familiarity (< 3.5). This selection criteria provided an initial sample of 23 sentence-pairs. For each of these initial 46 target sentences, we created a unique, short narrative (70-100 words) in which the target sentences provided a meaningful closure of the narrative (Table 1, Supplementary Materials S1). After norming (see below), we excluded three narrative pairs, the final stimulus set consisted of 20 narrative pairs (see below for norming details).

While all the target sentences were structured around a motion event noun, the correct interpretation of the noun differed in the literal and metaphoric conditions. In literal sentences, the correct interpretation evoked action semantics. The correct interpretation of the same motion event noun in the matched metaphorical sentence evoked emotion and social semantics. This pattern of associations is typical for metaphors. Metaphors can express abstract and emotional ideas by accessing concrete semantic domains like action semantics (Edwards, 1999; Fainsilber & Ortony, 1987; Jamrozik, McQuire, Cardillo, & Chatterjee, 2016; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; Lubart & Getz, 1997) and metaphors can be experienced as more emotional than their literal counterparts (Citron & Goldberg, 2014; Glucksberg, 2003).

Table 1. Target sentence pairs

Metaphor	Literal sentence
Her stare was a bull charge.	The battle plan was a charge.
The review was a karate chop.	His gesture was a quick chop.
His work experience was a clumsy clamber.	The final ascent was an exhausting clamber.
His smile was a charming dodge.	His move was a quick dodge.
The art major was a glide.	The skater's entrance was a glide.
The test review was a quick jog.	The race course was an easy jog.
The home purchase was a bungee jump.	The fence was a high jump.
The winter was a heartbroken limp.	The gait was a mild limp.
The friendship was a crazy polka.	The dance was a fast polka.
The purchase was a tiger pounce.	The cat's attack was a pounce.
The road was an irresistible pull.	The magnet was a weak pull.
Her inquiries were a nervous scamper.	Her exit was a nervous scamper.
The home purchase was a skydive.	The prize was a free skydive.
The poetry was a teenage slouch.	His posture was a lazy slouch.
The numbers were a brain swarm.	The bees were a black swarm.
The eviction was a mean sweep.	The chore was a quick sweep.
The reception was an icy swim.	The competitive relay was a swim.
The business deal was a hot tango.	The last romp was a Latin tango.
The ceremony was a swamp trudge.	The way back was a trudge.
The shop display was a gentle tug.	The puppy's grasp was a firm tug.
The letter was a goodbye wave.	The tsunami was a giant wave.

Norming

To norm the narratives, 50 raters were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Rater selection was restricted to IP addresses located in the US. All participants (27 women, 23 men) indicated they were native speakers of English. Age of raters ranged from 23-70 years (mean age = 37.85 years, SD = 11.23). Education of raters ranged from 12-20 years (mean education = 15.35 years, SD = 1.99). In the norming task, AMT raters read all 46 narratives in random order and rated each of them on 5-point Likert scales for three qualities: 1) ease of comprehension, 2) interestingness of the story, and 3) naturalness of the writing. The norming experiment took approximately 40 minutes and AMT raters were compensated monetarily. Norming revealed no striking differences in comprehensibility, interestingness, and naturalness leading to no exclusions. We excluded two story pairs based on the norming of the original sentences with a minimum criterion for

interpretability of the metaphor (minimum 75%) which led to exclusion of 2 pairs (*balloon ride*, *trickle*). In addition, because of concerns that one literal item could also be interpreted figuratively (*trudge*, figurativeness rating > 3.01), the two narratives based on this sentence-pair was excluded from the stimulus sample. These exclusions left 20 sentence pairs in the final stimulus set (For details on the norming results see Supplementary material S2, see Supplementary Material S3 for a complete story overview and auditory recordings). No data from the norming task were excluded from analysis.

Stimulus presentation

The experiment was built in OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) using PsychoPy as a backend. Stimuli recordings were presented through MR-compatible headphones combined with hearing protection. Volume was adjusted to the optimal level based on feedback from participants. All visual stimuli (questionnaires, instructions, etc.) were projected onto a screen using a projector outside the MR scanner room, which could be seen by participants through a mirror mounted above the head coil. Responses to the comprehension questions were recorded with a 4-button response device.

Procedure

The experiment consisted of one session. After signing the consent form, each participant was placed in the MRI scanner. Padding was used to minimize movement. The experiment began with a volume test in which participants heard a story which was not used in the experiment; the scanner was switched on to adjust the audio presentation to individual optimal volume. Participants listened to the 40 stories presented randomly, of which 20 were meaningful narratives and 20 were jabberwocky stories. In the jabberwocky condition, the syntactic structure and syllable number were identical to their narrative counterparts, but only the target sentence was sensible. In both the jabberwocky and the story condition, half the target sentences were metaphorical and half were literal. Stimulus presentation was randomized across four scanner runs. Participants listened for comprehension. In 25% of trials, a comprehension probe question followed the audio presentation to ensure participants were paying attention to the task.

Participants responded to the comprehension probes with a 4-button response device with their right hand. After the experiment, a high-resolution anatomical scan (~7min) was taken. After the scanning session, participants were debriefed.

fMRI data acquisition and preprocessing

Images of blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) changes were acquired with a 3T Siemens Magnetom Prisma scanner (Erlangen, Germany) with a 64-channel head coil. We used cushions to minimize participants' head movement. We used two localizing scans and auto-alignment (AAHead_Scout). Functional images were acquired using a fast multiband sequence, with high temporal resolution (TR: 500ms, TE: 25ms, flip angle: 30 degrees, voxel size: $3.0 \times 3.0 \times 3.0$ mm, 48 slices) minimally modified from the Human Connectome Project protocols (Van Essen et al., 2012). High resolution ($0.8 \times 0.8 \times 0.8$ mm) structural (anatomical) images were acquired using an SPC T1 GRAPPA sequence (Milchenko & Marcus, 2013). Data were preprocessed using the Matlab toolbox SPM12 (<http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm>). Images were converted to NIFTI files, motion corrected and registered to the mean image of each scanner run. The motion-corrected images were co-registered with the individual participants' anatomical scan. After segmentation of the anatomical T1 image, we created a mask from the individual participant's normalized tissue probability maps and used the forwards deformations to spatially normalize the functional scans to the standard MNI template. Finally, all images were spatially smoothed using a voxel-wise isotropic 6mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.

fMRI data analysis

In order to create regressors for the analysis, the auditory recordings of the stories were scored for the time windows in which the target sentences were presented (Hartung, Withers, Hagoort, & Willems, 2017). Additionally, we scored the time windows for the story and jabberwocky contexts preceding the target sentences for a control analysis. At the single subject level, statistical analysis was performed using

a general linear model, in which beta weights for the regressor of interest were estimated for the time course of each voxel, using multiple regression analysis (Friston et al., 1994). Regressors were modelled as their true durations, and convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (Friston, Holmes, Poline, Price, & Frith, 1996). The motion estimates of the motion correction algorithm were modelled as regressors of no interest to account for head motion.

For the group level analyses, we used non-parametric statistical inference testing with SnPM (Holmes, Blair, Watson, & Ford, 1996; Nichols & Holmes, 2002; Winkler, Ridgway, Webster, Smith, & Nichols, 2014). No variance smoothing was applied. Results were corrected for multiple comparisons familywise error correction with a combined cluster forming threshold of $p < .001$ and voxel threshold at $p < 0.05$ with Monte Carlo permutation testing in SnPM (7,000 permutations per comparison, cluster defining $T_{df=1,28} = 3.42$).

We compared activations of literal and metaphoric target sentences within and between the narrative and jabberwocky conditions. We used the jabberwocky context preceding the target sentences as a baseline to compare target sentences in each condition. The jabberwocky baseline maintains many aspects of language (syntax, number of syllables, sentence intonation, and narrative structure) but lacks semantics. Since metaphors draw on semantics this baseline was ideal for the research question. We performed an additional control analysis comparing activations to the narrative and jabberwocky contexts preceding the target sentences.

Results

Control analysis

As a control analysis we compared jabberwocky and narrative contexts preceding the target sentences. Narratives compared to jabberwocky contexts activated regions in the anterior and middle temporal gyrus bilaterally and a region in the left posterior middle temporal gyrus (Table 2; Figure 2). Jabberwocky compared to narratives showed increased activation in a bilateral fronto-parietal network including middle frontal gyri and middle and superior orbital gyri, as well as right inferior frontal gyrus,

left superior medial gyrus and medial cingulate cortex, left inferior orbital gyrus extending into left anterior insula, left superior frontal gyrus, and left cuneus (Table 3; Figure 2).

Table 2. narrative > jabberwocky

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Left anterior middle temporal gyrus	48	4.91	-54	6	-26
Right anterior middle temporal gyrus	63	4.64	60	4	-18
Left posterior middle temporal gyrus	8	3.98	-46	-46	6

Table 3. jabberwocky > narrative

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Left middle frontal gyrus, left middle orbital gyrus	87	5.61	-42	52	5
Left superior medial gyrus, Left middle cingulate cortex	141	5.15	-8	32	34
L middle cingulate cortex	9	5.00	-6	-18	36
R middle/superior Orbital gyrus, R inferior frontal gyrus	74	4.83	30	38	-16
R inferior frontal gyrus, R middle frontal gyrus	77	4.82	42	42	-2
Left cuneus	78	4.80	-46	-48	46
Left inferior orbital gyrus/left anterior insula	8	4.56	-22	16	-16
Left superior frontal gyrus	28	4.55	-24	-60	20

Figure 2. Results comparing the context types preceding the target sentences.

Averaging over narrative contexts as compared to jabberwocky contexts showed bilateral activations in anterior middle temporal areas, whereas jabberwocky contexts as compared to narrative contexts activated areas associated with the fronto-parietal attention network.

Metaphor vs. Literal sentences

Comparing metaphorical and literal target sentences in jabberwocky and narrative contexts did not result in BOLD activations surviving statistical thresholding in either condition.

Metaphorical sentences in narrative contexts compared to the jabberwocky baseline bilaterally activated regions along the middle temporal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, as well as the angular gyrus (Table 4; Figure 3). Literal sentences in narrative contexts compared to the jabberwocky baseline similarly activated regions bilaterally along the middle temporal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, as well as the angular gyrus. In addition, we found increased activation in the right superior frontal gyrus (Table 5; Figure 3).

Table 4. Metaphorical sentences in narrative contexts > jabberwocky baseline

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Left angular gyrus	148	5.71	-52	-66	30
Left anterior middle temporal gyrus	243	5.54	-52	10	-26
Right anterior middle temporal gyrus & superior temporal sulcus	149	5.17	52	14	-26
Right posterior middle temporal gyrus	278	4.55	58	-46	14

Table 5. Literal sentences in narrative contexts > jabberwocky baseline

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Right superior frontal gyrus	118	4.94	6	54	24
Left anterior middle temporal gyrus	1043	4.76	-46	6	-30
Right anterior middle temporal gyrus & superior temporal sulcus	552	4.70	48	6	-18
Right angular gyrus	114	4.17	60	-56	16
Right angular gyrus	83	4.16	46	-38	12
Right posterior superior temporal sulcus	91	4.09	50	-22	-10

Figure 3. Activations to literal (yellow) and metaphoric (red) target sentences in narrative contexts and literal target sentences in jabberwocky contexts (green).

Metaphoric target sentences embedded in jabberwocky contexts compared to the jabberwocky baseline did not reveal statistically significant BOLD activations differences. Literal sentences in Jabberwocky contexts compared to the jabberwocky baseline showed increased activation in a region in the left precuneus (Table 6; Figure 3).

Table 6. Literal sentences in jabberwocky contexts > jabberwocky baseline

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Left precuneus	134	4.85	-10	-64	28

Effect of Context on processing Literal and Metaphoric Target Sentences

Metaphoric sentences in narrative compared to metaphoric sentences in jabberwocky revealed increased activation in right premotor cortex as (min k=103; see Table 7 & Figure 4). Such an effect for literal sentences was not present.

Table 7. metaphors in narrative context > metaphors in jabberwocky context

Location	k	T max	X	Y	Z
Right superior frontal gyrus / premotor cortex, BA6	119	4.44	20	-2	56

Figure 4. Increased activations to metaphoric target sentences in narrative as compared to jabberwocky contexts

Discussion

Metaphors, particularly novel ones, represent an important linguistic tool for creativity; metaphors offer new and useful ways of thinking (Faust, 2012). We tested the hypothesis that the appropriateness of metaphors – i.e., the context in which they are encountered – changes how they are processed. We further tested the hypothesis that one hemisphere plays a privileged role in processing metaphors. This latter hypothesis is motivated by the view that the right hemisphere processes narrative and furthermore has been associated with creative acts in general and with metaphor processing in particular.

We found that context matters in metaphor comprehension. Reading sentences in a meaningful narrative, compared to when encountered embedded in jabberwocky, robustly activated (anterior) middle temporal regions bilaterally. The same sentences embedded in jabberwocky activated a fronto-parietal network. We did not find differences between the neural processing of metaphors and matched literal sentences when both were embedded in an appropriate narrative. Finally, we found that both hemispheres were engaged when participants listened to these sentences.

Comparing literal and metaphoric target sentences did not reveal differences in neural processing when embedded in a meaningful narrative. Both types of sentences showed overlapping activations in the anterior temporal poles and the lateral middle temporal gyri and superior temporal sulci bilaterally. This observation is consistent with previous findings (Diaz & Hogstrom, 2011; Glucksberg, 2003; Prat et al., 2012). Why might metaphors and literal sentences share neural instantiations when presented within a narrative? One possibility is that the narrative provides a context in which the reader expects an interpretation that is congruent with some semantic features of the word used metaphorically. These semantic features are likely already co-activated by contextual constraints, which facilitate mapping and minimize any violation of expectation that might otherwise arise.

We only found partial support for right hemisphere processing for metaphors. The view that the right hemisphere processes metaphors preferentially was based on experiments with visual confounds, or used stimuli with inadequately controlled stimuli (Cardillo et al., 2018; Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt & Seger, 2009). We found bilateral semantic processing of metaphors across all our conditions. These observations add to previous reports of bilateral processing of metaphors when encountered in isolation using fMRI (Cardillo et al., 2012) and in patients with focal brain damage (Cardillo et al., 2018; Ianni et al., 2014). A further implication of these findings is that the comprehension of a creative act is instantiated bilaterally. Metaphor sentences did show greater right hemisphere activation when embedded in narrative than jabberwocky. We do not know if the absence of laterality in jabberwocky is because the jabberwocky condition itself produces robust frontal activations or if narration itself preferentially engages the right hemisphere.

Notably, we did not find differences between literal and metaphoric sentences in the jabberwocky condition. The lack of differences in activation between literal and metaphor sentences in the absence of supporting context maybe the result of statistical thresholding or because the target sentences are so closely matched on a wide range of linguistic properties. One area frequently associated with metaphor and complex semantic processing that we did not observe is the inferior prefrontal cortex in either hemisphere. We speculate the reason for this absence of an effect is our baseline comparison. The jabberwocky condition showed increased activation in inferior frontal gyrus. Perhaps the statistical comparison was less likely to exceed threshold activations with background activations produced by the jabberwocky condition. In the narrative condition, the absence of increased inferior frontal gyrus activation is likely because narrative contexts minimize ambiguity, facilitating comprehension, whereas the jabberwocky condition likely involves a search for meaning in an auditory stream that resembles linguistic properties. Narrative contexts facilitate semantic integration and potentially decrease working memory demands by pre-activating relevant semantic information and aiding the resolution of a novel metaphor's semantic ambiguity.

Beyond these claims about our major hypotheses, we make other observations about the neural processing of language. Our target sentences in both the metaphor and literal condition compared to baseline also showed increased activation in the angular gyri. This region likely serves as a supramodal semantic processing hub (Binder & Desai, 2011; Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009).

Metaphor sentences in narrative contexts showed increased activations in premotor cortex compared to the identical sentences in jabberwocky contexts. Novel metaphors are thought to initially draw strongly on the sensori-motor properties of the literal word meaning (Jamrozik et al., 2016). All metaphorical expressions used in this study were constructed with a noun referring to an action event (e.g. '*Their business deal was a hot tango*'). Even when used metaphorically – e.g. to express emotion, metaphors can activate the sensorimotor properties of the original action word meaning. Saygin et al. (2009) suggests that motion semantics are accessed when we read about motion in a fictive manner (Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2008; Desai, Conant, Binder, Park, & Seidenberg, 2013). In line with

this hypothesis, Samur, Lai, Hagoort, and Willems (2015) found that metaphors in highly emotional contexts activate visual motion processing areas and primary motor cortex, and concluded that ‘sensory simulation gets a boost from emotionality in a figurative context, but not in a literal context.’ This observation is congruent with the increased activation in premotor cortex for metaphors in narrative context (which were all emotional) as compared to jabberwocky contexts -that were void of semantics and hence emotional meaning- and suggests deeper semantic processing in narrative contexts.

Literary sentences in jabberwocky contexts activated a region in the precuneus. Bohrn et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis reported precuneus activation for isolated literary sentences, but it is unclear what this increased activation represents. We speculate that this activation could either reflect mental imagery for literary sentences since the literary sentences describe more concrete and have higher-sentence level imageability rating according to a prior norming study (Cardillo et al., 2010), it might be an effect of memorizing the sentence for the comprehension probe. Although metaphors may describe concrete phenomena, they are typically used to express abstract or emotional concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008).

Novel metaphors represent a prime example of the creative use of language by virtue of being novel and—ideally—useful or appropriate. However, they are only useful if understood. Our observations emphasize the role of lateral temporal regions in this comprehension, consistent with a recent study that highlighted the role of temporal regions in creativity (Shen, Yuan, Liu, & Luo, 2017). According to this proposed model, the role of the temporal lobes in the creative process include semantic processing, inhibiting prototypical responses (anterior and posterior MTG), and integrating semantic information (anterior and posterior STG) – all processes involved in comprehending novel metaphors. This framework aligns with behavioral and computational findings relating novel metaphor processing to individual differences in creativity (Gold et al., 2012; Kenett et al., 2018). Our findings demonstrate that context affects neural mechanisms that promote the usefulness of novel language.

Author contribution

FH developed the study concept. All authors contributed to the study design. Testing and data collection were performed by FH. FH performed the data analysis and interpretation under the supervision of AC. FH and YK drafted the manuscript, and AC provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

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