Racial Resentment, Prejudice, and Discrimination

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Forthcoming at *Journal of Politics*

Abstract

Political scientists regularly measure anti-Black prejudice in the survey context using racial resentment, an indirect measure that blends racial animus with traditional moral values. Explicit prejudice, a direct measure based in beliefs about the group-level inferiority of Blacks, is used less frequently. We investigate whether these attitudes predict anti-Black discrimination and evaluations of the fairness of intergroup inequality. Study 1 used the Ultimatum Game (UG) to obtain a behavioral measure of racial discrimination and found whites engaged in anti-Black discrimination. Explicit prejudice explained which whites discriminated whereas resentment did not. In Study 2, white third-party observers evaluated intergroup interactions in the UG and explicit prejudice explained racially biased fairness evaluations, but resentment did not. This demonstrates that resentment and prejudice are distinct constructs, and that explicit prejudice has clear behavioral implications. We also find that explicit prejudice is widespread among white Americans and significantly less partisan than resentment.

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Political scientists regularly measure anti-Black prejudice in the survey context using racial resentment, a scale created from four survey items about “Blacks” as a group (e.g., “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve”). Proponents of the scale argue that it captures a blend of anti-Black animus and traditional moral values associated with social conservatism and Republican Party identification (Kinder and Sears 1981). In one view, overt prejudice – based in beliefs about Black inferiority – declined after the Civil Rights movement, only to be replaced by this “new form of racial prejudice” (Kinder and Sanders 1996, p. 97–98). Resentment powerfully predicts a host of attitudes about public policy, including race-based policies like affirmative action, as well as evaluations of political candidates (Pasek et al. 2009, but see Zigerell 2018). But is resentment accurately characterized as a measure of racial prejudice grounded in anti-Black animus?

One view is that the robust associations between resentment and racial policy preferences provide strong evidence of the survey instrument’s validity as a measure of anti-Black prejudice (Henry and Sears, 2002) and that resentful whites oppose government policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality precisely because they benefit Black individuals (Rabinowitz et al. 2009). But others have noted these correlations could arise for multiple reasons, including social conservatism (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986), generic opposition to group-targeted policy (Feldman and Huddy 2005), individual differences in political sophistication (Gomez and Wilson 2006), and differences in beliefs about the role that structural versus individual factors play in explaining racial inequality (Kam and Burge 2017).

Adjudicating among these various perspectives is one of the longest running controversies in the study of race and politics, but has proved especially difficult to resolve with regression analyses of survey data (Brown et al. 2009). In part, this is because even if different survey measures of racial attitudes predict racial policy preferences, it is not evidence they do so for the same reason (Carmines et al. 2011). These associations are therefore theoretically ambiguous. An alternative approach to understanding the meaning of explicit (survey-based) measures of anti-Black prejudice is to move beyond their associations with political attitudes and policy preferences and instead examine their association with intergroup behavior and anti-Black discrimination. Here we use experimental designs that directly examine whether indirect (racial resentment) and direct (explicit prejudice) measures of anti-Black prejudice predict a willingness to engage in anti-Black discrimination and racial bias in intergroup resource allocations.

First, we use a non-anonymous version of the Ultimatum Game (UG) that randomizes the

skin color of interaction partners, along with monetary stakes, to obtain behavioral measures of anti-Black discrimination. In the UG, rational self-interest favors accepting any positive amount, but if a Responder believes the Proposer has offered too little, they may sacrifice their own payoff in order to punish the Proposer for violating a fairness norm (Bowles 2009, Chapter 3). Racial discrimination occurs when a white individual rejects an offer from a Black individual that would be accepted if offered by a white individual. In a second study, we use an experimental design that leverages the random assignment of monetary stakes and the skin color of interaction partners in the UG to examine how white third-party observers judge the fairness of intergroup resource allocations. We use these experiments to assess the explanatory power of racial resentment and explicit prejudice in explaining heterogeneity in anti-Black discrimination and third-party evaluations of intergroup behavior.

Although researchers may disagree about whether anti-Black animus drives resentful whites' opposition to affirmative action, such ambiguities are not present in the experimental environment we use. Instead, we obtain direct behavioral evidence about a willingness to discriminate on the basis of race in a context where many of the other explanations for racial policy preferences—like differences in beliefs about the origins of economic inequality or attitudes about whether race-based policies are procedurally fair, are not in play. The experimental setting therefore provides clearer evidence about potential mechanisms underlying the correlation between racial resentment and racial policy attitudes. We ask two questions. First, does resentment predict a willingness to engage in costly punishment of Black individuals for norm violations that would be tolerated if they were white? Second, are these racially biased standards also imposed on Black individuals by third-party observers of intergroup interactions? If survey measures of resentment predict an individual's willingness to engage in racial discrimination in the UG and to impose higher standards on Black behavior as a third-party observer, then it is appropriate to interpret the correlation between resentment and opposition to policies that advantage Blacks as grounded, at least in part, in a desire to hold Black individuals to a higher standard and punish them for behavior that would be tolerated if they were white. If not, then resentment is not prognostic of racial discrimination in contexts distributing resources between individual Blacks and whites.

In addition to advancing an understanding of the meaning of racial resentment, we also use our design to examine the contemporary importance of explicit prejudice, based in beliefs about the group-level inferiority of Blacks relative to whites. Although a more direct measure of anti-

Black prejudice than resentment, these survey instruments have been used less frequently in academic work in the last three decades (Huddy and Feldman 2009). In part, this is because of concerns that more explicit measures active social image concerns that encourage individuals to censor their true levels of racial prejudice (Hutchings and Valentino 2004), but this apprehension seems less relevant today given the advent of anonymous online surveys (Kreuter et al 2008). In light of the emergence of resentment as a new form of anti-Black prejudice, is explicit prejudice still politically relevant? Do resentment and this more “overt” form of prejudice have similar implications?

Identifying the predictors of anti-Black discrimination and bias against Black individuals is also important in its own right for understanding politics and intergroup relations more generally. For example, does resentment explain why Black individuals are punished more harshly than whites who commit similar crimes? In the political arena, those who prefer Blacks get less than whites may discriminate against minority candidates or punish them for behaviors that would go unpunished if the candidate were white. For example, would resentful whites tolerate Black candidates “going negative” and having extramarital affairs? Moreover, does the strong association between partisanship and resentment imply that white Republicans are more prone to racial discrimination than white Democrats?

This paper offers several empirical contributions relevant to theory building in the measurement of racial prejudice. First, we document both widespread resentment and explicit prejudice among Whites. Approximately 59% of white respondents in our national survey sample were classified as prejudiced and about 52% were resentful (correlation 0.26), and although Republicans were 40 percentage points more likely to be resentful than Democrats, they were only 18 percentage points more likely to be explicitly prejudiced. Second, we identify costly discrimination against Black (versus white) Proposers in the UG, with offers by Blacks more likely to be rejected by whites. We find similar bias when whites act as third-party observers to UG interactions, where offers from Blacks to whites are perceived as uniquely unfair. Third, we find that survey measures of explicit prejudice, but not racial resentment, predict which whites engage in costly discrimination and racially biased fairness evaluations. That resentment does not predict a willingness to engage in individual-level discrimination suggests it is not a measure of racial animus against Black individuals. By contrast, explicit prejudice, which is widespread among both Democrats and Republicans, reliably predicts anti-Black discrimination and likely has broader implications for intergroup relations.

Study 1: Racial prejudice and discriminatory behavior

Study 1 examines the link between anti-Black prejudice and discrimination using a non-anonymous version of the Ultimatum Game (UG). In this game, two players are offered a chance to earn a certain allocation of money. One player, called the “Proposer,” decides how to split the allocation with another player, called the “Responder.” The Responder faces a binary decision: accept or reject the money offered by the Proposer. For example, if a Proposer offers 25 cents out of \$1.00 and the Responder accepts, the Responder receives 25 cents and the Proposer receives 75 cents. However, if the Responder rejects this offer, both receive nothing. The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for the Responder is to accept any positive offer, but Responders frequently reject offers below 20% of the initial endowment, consistent with a social preference for punishing Proposers who make unfair offers (Henrich et al. 2001).

For this study, we recruited 738 white workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) marketplace (Berinsky et al. 2012) to play 30 rounds of the UG with 30 unique male Proposers, each a randomly selected subset of 160 male actors from a research database of neutral faces used in prior studies of racial discrimination (Kubota et al. 2013). Fifteen of the Proposers were white, ten were Black, and 5 were of other races. The Black and white faces were readily identified by race. Subjects were exposed to the same set of 30 actors, presented in random order, with a randomly drawn discrete offer amount (out of an initial endowment of \$1.00) between \$0.00 and \$0.60. Racial resentment was measured using the 4-item battery of questions asked on various waves of the ANES survey since 1986. Responses for each subject are scaled to create a binary *Racial Resentment Indicator (RRI)* via the commonly used transformation that classifies prejudiced whites as those who indicate a level of racial resentment above the (neutral) midpoint (e.g., Pasek 2009). Following conceptions of prejudice in social psychology¹, we measured explicit prejudice using individuals’ beliefs about group-level differences between Blacks and whites (Huddy and Feldman 2009). Subjects were asked to rate “Whites”, “Blacks”, “Hispanics” and “Asians” using a sliding 7-point scale for each of four traits: trustworthiness, violence, work-ethic, and intelligence (see Fig. S3). We take the Black-White difference for each trait scored so that values above zero indicate a belief in group-level Black inferiority (e.g., Blacks are lazier than whites) and create a binary *Explicit Prejudice Indicator (EPI)* that classifies “prejudiced whites” as those who score higher than zero when the Black-White

¹ Prejudice is a negative evaluation of another person based on their group membership, whereas discrimination is a negative behavior toward that person (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986).

differences on all traits are averaged. For example, if a subject ranked “Blacks” as more violent than “Whites” but indicates the two races are indistinguishable on other traits, then this person is coded as endorsing the group-level inferiority of Blacks. The Supplementary Materials (SM) present associations between explicit prejudice and racial resentment (Section 1), and additional design details with robustness checks for alternative measurement and estimation approaches (Section 2).

Analysis and Interpretation

We focus attention on 25 rounds of play involving either Black or White Proposers (738 white subjects x 25 rounds = 18,450 subject-rounds). 69% of these offers were accepted and the likelihood of acceptance increased with offer amount, but whites were less likely to accept offers when the Proposer was Black rather than white (see Fig. S1). We regress decisions (coded Accept = 1, Reject = 0) on an indicator for Black Proposer (Black = 1, White = 0), offer amount, and round of play. In a second model (M1.2), we include an interaction between resentment and Black Proposer (Black Proposer x RRI), and in a third model (M1.3) we include an interaction between explicit prejudice and the Black Proposer (Black Proposer x EPI). Finally, in a fourth model (M1.4) we include both interactions in the same specification. Each interaction term corresponds to a “difference-in-differences” (DiD) in acceptance probabilities for a particular sub-group. For example, the DiD estimate from M1.2 is the difference between resentful and non-resentful participants in the probability of accepting an offer from a Black rather than a White Proposer. A negative DiD estimate would mean that the “Black Proposer effect” reduced the likelihood of acceptance more for resentful whites than for non-resentful whites. Results are summarized in Fig. 1, which plots point estimates and confidence intervals for the overall effect of the Black Proposer (M1.1), as well as the interaction terms in M1.2-M1.4.

Figure 1. Effect of Black Proposer on likelihood of offer acceptance in Study 1

Note: Estimate for main effect from OLS regression of offer acceptance on indicator for Black Proposer (BP) in Model 1.1. Diff-in-diff estimate for resentful whites from BP x RRI interaction in Model 1.2. Diff-in-diff estimate for prejudiced whites from BP x EPI interaction in Model 1.3. Model 1.4 estimates both interactions simultaneously. All regression models include fixed effects for offer amount and round. Thick horizontal lines are 90% CIs and thin horizontal lines are 95% CIs, estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the subject level. Regression output is presented in tabular form in Table S1.1.

The first estimate, a 1.3 percentage point *decrease* ($P < 0.01$) in the probability of acceptance, shows that, on average, White Responders engaged in anti-Black discrimination by rejecting offers they would otherwise accept if the Proposer was white (M1.1). To put this in perspective, 96% of \$.40 offers are accepted, while 99% of equitable (\$.50) offers are accepted. The 1.3 point Black Proposer effect is about one-third of this 3 point difference. The second estimate – a DiD of 0 percentage points (M1.2, $P = 0.99$) – shows that resentful whites (43% of the sample) were no more likely to engage in anti-Black discrimination than non-resentful whites. The third estimate – a DiD of approximately -2 percentage points (M1.3, $P = 0.03$) – shows that prejudiced whites (42% of the sample) were *significantly more likely* to engage in anti-Black discrimination than non-prejudiced whites. Finally, the corresponding estimates from M1.4 confirm these inferences are unchanged in a model that includes both interactions simultaneously.² Overall, racial resentment did not predict anti-Black discrimination in any of the estimation approaches, but the explicit prejudice measure reliably distinguished between

² 180/738 (24%) of subjects were classified as both prejudiced and resentful.

white subjects who engaged in anti-Black discrimination and those who did not.

Study 2: Racial prejudice and third-party evaluations of intergroup inequality

The results from Study 1 establish two important facts. First, whites were significantly less likely to accept offers from Black than White Proposers in the UG. This is a costly behavioral measure of racial discrimination that cannot be explained by offer amount or round of play. Second, explicit prejudice predicts which whites discriminate and racial resentment does not. In Study 2, we examine how whites *perceive* the fairness of proposed resource allocations between Black and white individuals using an experiment where whites acted as third-party evaluators of UG interactions. In this experiment, the Proposer's offer and the skin color of the Proposer and Responder were all randomly assigned. We can therefore identify the joint effects of Proposer and Responder race on the perceived fairness of resource allocations. If prejudiced whites impose uniquely higher standards on Black Proposers' behavior toward White Responders, as suggested by the results from Study 1, then interactions between Black Proposers and White Responders should be viewed as *less fair* than interactions between White Proposers and White Responders. Further, if prejudiced whites disproportionately impose this fairness standard in intergroup interactions where a Black, rather than White, Proposer makes the initial resource allocation proposal, then they should evaluate offers from Black Proposers to White Responders as less fair than offers from White Proposers to Black Responders.

This experiment was administered in the second wave of a nationally representative panel survey of white Americans. Wave 1 measured demographics and the same measures of racial resentment and explicit prejudice used in Study 1. Approximately 10 days later all subjects from Wave 1 (N = 1,715) were invited to Wave 2 and completed (N = 1,029) a putatively unrelated study on decision making. Subjects were shown 41 rounds of play in the UG and evaluated the fairness of the Proposer's offer and the likelihood the Responder accepted, both on 0-100 scales (See Fig. S8). The racial pairs, 82 unique male faces sampled without replacement from the database used in Study 1, were randomly assigned across the 41 unique UG rounds, along with the Proposer's offer amount. SM Section 3 provides additional details about the design of Study 2 along with robustness checks for alternative measurement and estimation approaches.

Analysis and Interpretation

We restrict attention to 741 white evaluators who passed a comprehension test and completed at least 75% of the evaluations assigned to them, focusing on the 36 rounds of UG play involving only Black and White Proposers and Responders (741 x 36 rounds = 26,676 potential

observations). We find a strong association between the perceived fairness of an offer and the predicted likelihood it was accepted (correlation 0.86). White evaluators viewed proposed intergroup resource allocations, as well as interactions between two Black individuals, as systematically less fair than interactions between two whites (see Fig. S2).

We estimate the effect of Proposer and Responder race on the perceived fairness of the Proposer's offer with regression analyses that predict evaluations as a function of offer amount, round of play, and the Proposer Responder (PR) pair: *Black Proposer White Responder* (BW), *Black Proposer Black Responder* (BB), *White Proposer Black Responder* (WB), and the omitted reference category *White Proposer White Responder* (WW). To obtain an estimate of main effects, we regress perceived fairness on the PR pairs, with fixed effects for offer amount and round of play (M2.1). In a second model (M2.2), we include interactions between resentment and the PR pairs (PR x RRI), in a third model (M2.3) we include an interaction between explicit prejudice and the PR pairs (PR x EPI), and in a fourth model (M2.4) we include both sets of interactions simultaneously.

Our primary contrasts of interest are: BW minus WW, WB minus WW, and the intergroup difference BW minus WB. The first contrast identifies the effect that offers from Black, rather than White, Proposers have on the perceived offer fairness to white Responders. These allocations simulate the interactions from Study 1. Negative estimates would indicate that Black Proposers are held to a higher standard than White Proposers when the Responder is white. The second contrast estimates the effect that offers from White Proposers to Black, rather than White, Responders, have on perceived offer fairness. This tests whether all intergroup interactions involving Black players, regardless of their role as a Proposer or Responder, are simply evaluated differently. Negative estimates here would indicate that White Proposers are held to a higher standard when proposing allocations to Black, rather than White, Responders. Finally, the intergroup difference (BW minus WB) corresponds to the difference across the first and second contrasts, and negative estimates here would indicate that offers from Black Proposers to White Responders are perceived as less fair than offers from White Proposers to Black Responders. As in Study 1, the interaction terms correspond to “difference-in-differences” (DiD) across subgroups of individuals classified as resentful or prejudiced. Results are summarized in Fig. 2, which plots the point estimates and confidence intervals for each of the three comparisons across

M2.1-M2.4.³

The first set of estimates (M2.1) shows that offers from Black Proposers to White Responders were, all else equal, perceived as less fair (-0.65 points, $P = 0.01$) than offers from White Proposers (BW - WW). Offers from White Proposers to Black Responders were *also* perceived to be less fair (-1.15 points, $P < 0.01$) than offers to White Responders (WB - WW). Finally, the intergroup difference (BW - WB) shows that, on average, offers from Black Proposers to White Responders were rated as *more fair* than offers from White Proposers to Black Responders (0.50 points, $P = 0.05$). Overall, intergroup interactions were therefore rated less fair than interactions between whites, but in intergroup interactions, the behavior of Black Proposers was seen as *more fair* than the behavior of White Proposers.

The second set of estimates (M2.2) correspond to the differences in fairness evaluations given by resentful versus non-resentful whites across all three contrasts. First, we find a BW-WW DiD of -0.67 points ($P = 0.16$), which shows resentful and non-resentful whites imposed a similar fairness standard on Black and White Proposers' offers to White Responders. The same was true for evaluations of offers from White Proposers to Black rather than White Responders - 0.49 (WB-WW, $P = 0.33$). Finally, the intergroup difference of -0.18 (BW-WB, $P = 0.73$) shows that resentful whites did not rate intergroup offers from White Proposers differently from intergroup offers from Black Proposers, just as in Study 1 they did not discriminate against Black Proposers.

The third set of estimates (M2.3) correspond to differences in fairness evaluations given by prejudiced versus non-prejudiced whites across the three contrasts. First, the BW-WW DiD of -1.52 points ($P < 0.01$) shows that, compared to non-prejudiced whites, prejudiced whites imposed a higher fairness standard on offers from Black, rather than White, Proposers when the Responder was White. Second, the DiD of -0.14 points ($P = 0.78$) for offers from White Proposers to Black, rather than White, Responders (WB-WW) demonstrates that prejudiced and non-prejudiced whites rated these interactions similarly. Finally, relative to non-prejudiced whites, prejudiced whites perceived offers from Black Proposers to White Responders as -1.38 points (BW-WB, $P = 0.01$) less fair than offers from Black Proposers to White Responders. Unlike resentful whites, therefore, prejudiced whites rated intergroup offers from Black Proposers as less fair than intergroup offers from White Proposers, just as in Study 1 they

discriminated against Black Proposers. The corresponding estimates from M2.4 confirm these inferences are unchanged in a model that includes both EPI and RRI interactions simultaneously.

Figure 2. Effect of intergroup pairs on third-party fairness evaluations in Study 2.

Note: Estimates for main effect from Model 2.1, OLS regression of perceived fairness of Proposer's offer on randomly assigned Proposer Responder (PR) interaction: BW, WB, BW, with WW interaction as the reference category. Diff-in-diff estimate for resentful whites from PR x RRI interactions in Model 2.2. Diff-in-diff estimate for prejudiced whites from PR x EPI interactions in Model 2.3. Model 2.4 estimates both interactions simultaneously. The Intergroup Difference (BW-WB) = (BW-WW)-(WB-WW) is calculated using linear combinations of regression coefficients. All regression models include fixed effects for offer amount and round. Thick horizontal lines are 90% CIs and thin horizontal lines are 95% CIs, estimated using robust standard errors clustered at the subject level. Point estimates and standard errors are presented in tabular form in Table S2.1.

Consistent with the individual-level predictors of anti-Black discrimination observed in Study 1, we find that explicit prejudice, but not racial resentment, reliably distinguished which whites imposed racially biased fairness standards on Black individuals. Together, these results suggest that prejudiced whites engage in racially biased costly punishment (Study 1) because they perceive offers from Black Proposers to be less fair than equivalent offers from White Proposers to White Responders (Study 2).

Discussion and Conclusion

Racial resentment, an important predictor of race-related policy attitudes, is also widely used as an indirect measure of anti-Black prejudice; but the validity of this characterization is one of the most contested issues in the study of race and politics. One interpretation is that resentful whites oppose policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality precisely *because* they are perceived to unfairly benefit Black individuals. We used the Ultimatum Game to examine whether resentment

explains anti-Black discrimination and racially biased fairness standards in a generic resource allocation context. We find that whites do engage in anti-Black discrimination, but that resentment does not predict this behavior, nor does it predict how whites evaluate the fairness of intergroup resource allocations. Resentment is therefore an unreliable indicator of a preference for discrimination and racial bias in contexts where the *distribution* of resources between Black and white individuals is detached from the *procedures* that determine these allocations. We instead find that explicit prejudice – a more direct measure of racial animus – reliably identifies whites who will discriminate against Black individuals for failing to meet the higher standards imposed on them, even when doing so is economically costly.

We also find that a majority of white Americans are willing to state their explicit prejudice in the anonymous survey context by endorsing the group-level inferiority of Blacks relative to whites. As an indicator of racial prejudice, this direct measure is also significantly less partisan than resentment. In Study 2, for example, Republicans were 40 percentage points more likely to be resentful than Democrats (72 vs. 33%), but only 18 percentage points more likely to be explicitly prejudiced (69 vs. 51%). Although one interpretation of the partisan difference in resentment is that the Democratic identity has a palliative effect on racial animus (Engelhardt 2019), this indirect measure grossly underestimates levels of racial prejudice among white Democrats. We find that, despite substantial differences in racial resentment, white Republicans are no more likely to discriminate against Black individuals than white Democrats. These results are consistent with a growing body of research that demonstrates direct questioning is the best way to measure racial attitudes in the survey context (e.g. Axt, 2018).

There are important potential limitations of the studies described here. First, we do not experimentally manipulate explicit prejudice or racial resentment and, as with all prior research using these survey measures, therefore cannot identify the casual effects these explicit attitudes have on intergroup behavior. However, the explicit measure of prejudice we use is distinct from a generic form of out-group animosity, which we find does not predict anti-Black discrimination in the UG (see Table S1.11). We also assume the experiments used here provide a reliable context for studying an individual's willingness to engage in racial discrimination. Concerns about whether some subjects discerned the purpose of Study 1 and then controlled their impulse to discriminate are reasonable. If true then the results reported here may underestimate whites' willingness to discriminate. If these social image concerns are higher among resentful individuals this could explain why they did not engage in anti-Black discrimination. Additional

analyses reported in the SM show that increased time pressure did not affect decision making in the UG (Table S1.12), and that subjects behaved similarly across time, regardless of educational background (Table S1.13). This suggests the observed discrimination was not affected by decision constraints or learning effects, but caution about extrapolation beyond the controlled experimental environment is always warranted.

Finally, we have shown that explicit prejudice, and not resentment, predicts discrimination and racial bias in a context that abstracts away from the policy process and instead focuses on resource distributions between Black and white individuals. Whether resentment predicts whites' willingness to impose comparatively higher standards on the behavior of Black individuals through some policy process is contested (see DeSante 2013 and Zigerell 2015), but we find clear evidence that explicit prejudice explains differences in perceptions of the fairness of proposed intergroup resource allocations. We cannot distinguish among other interpretations of resentment that focus on its link to intergroup conflict over the procedural fairness of resources allocations between groups, but this is a clear avenue for future research. Huddy and Feldman (2005), for example, have shown that resentment is a predictor of opposition to any race targeted policy, regardless of beneficiary race, and Kam and Burge (2017) show that resentment distinguishes between individuals who make individual versus structural attributions when reasoning about the social and economic status of Black individuals. Are resentful whites supportive of structural solutions to racial inequality if policies that disproportionately benefit Black individuals do so without explicitly considering race? Similarly, if it becomes known that Black individuals disproportionately benefit from procedurally race-neutral policies, do prejudiced individuals then oppose those policies? Behavioral experiments may be a superior alternative to regression analyses of opinion surveys for disentangling the implications that different racial attitudes have for discrimination and intergroup conflict over distributive and procedural fairness.

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**Supplementary Materials for: “Racial Resentment, Prejudice, and
Discrimination”**

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1. Survey Measures and Correlation with Political Ideology/Partisanship

Our measure of explicit prejudice is derived from subjects' responses to 4 questions about perceived group-level differences in trustworthiness, violence, work-ethic, and intelligence that have previously been included in various public opinion surveys (see Huddy and Feldman 2009). Each Responder provided a measure on each of the four dimensions using a 7-point scale for each of four groups — Asians, Blacks, Hispanics and whites. For each trait individuals were asked to evaluate all four groups simultaneously so that relative differences among groups were both visually and numerically apparent (see Fig. S3). These responses therefore capture beliefs about group-level differences. We scale responses for each item so that a positive difference for “whites” versus “Blacks” indicates belief in group-level white superiority. The white-Black differences for each of the questions are combined by summing and dividing by 4 to create our Explicit Prejudice Scale with range [-6,6].

Racism is a broad term and researchers employ different measurement strategies (see Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986). While contemporary political science research on racial prejudice has emphasized the importance of whites' beliefs about Blacks' commitment to “the work-ethic” (e.g. Gilens, 1999), what we call explicit prejudice refers to perceived racial differences on four stigmatized character traits that have been widely used to caricature Black people as a homogenous group and reinforce narratives of racial inferiority throughout U.S. history (Bobo and Charles, 2009). Combining multiple measures, as opposed to using a single item, has the added advantage of reducing measurement error (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder, 2008).

This approach to measuring explicit prejudice is most similar to Huddy and Feldman's (2009) conception as “negative feelings toward Blacks and a belief that Blacks are inherently inferior to whites.” However, our measure differs in two respects. First, we do not classify respondents on the basis of affect. This is because feelings of affinity could originate in many sources, including, for example, political competition. Second, we do not incorporate why whites believe Blacks to be inferior. Rather, we focus simply on assessments of Blacks as being inferior to whites. Thus, these items are solely about group differences and do not invoke evaluations of existing political outcomes (e.g., getting what one deserves) or explanations for those outcomes (e.g., slavery and discrimination). Our measure is also related to what some have called “old-fashioned” prejudice, although many of those measures interrogate respondents' beliefs about specific causal attributions (see Huddy and Feldman, 2009).

The measure of racial resentment we use is identical to the 4-item battery of questions asked on various waves of the ANES survey since 1986. Respondents were asked to agree strongly, somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or strongly with four statements:

1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

We construct the Racial Resentment Index with the canonical transformation used in prior empirical studies (e.g. Tesler 2012). Responses to each of the questions are coded from 0 to 1 by .25 increments (0.5 a neutral midpoint) then summed and divided by 4 (the number of questions) to make a scale with range [0,1].

Fig. S4 plots the univariate distributions of the explicit prejudice (Panel A) and racial resentment measures (Panel B) for the analysis samples of white subjects from both Study 1 (MTurk, N=738) and Study 2 (SSI sample, N=741), as well as their bivariate relationship (Panel C). In Study 1, 42% of the White Responders endorsed group-level Black inferiority and therefore have positive scores on the explicit prejudice scale (scale reliability alpha of 0.78). In Study 2, 59% of the white evaluators scored above 0 on the explicit prejudice scale (alpha = 0.73). The mean level on the -6 to 6 explicit prejudice scale is 0.44 among White Responders in the MTurk sample and 0.45 among the white evaluators in the SSI sample. These patterns undercut concerns that survey respondents are unwilling to express explicit anti-Black views.

The mean racial resentment score among White Responders in the MTurk sample (alpha = 0.91) was 0.48 and 43% of respondents were coded as resentful (Racial Resentment Index > .5), while in the SSI sample (alpha = 0.88) the results were 0.56 and 52%. The results from the SSI sample are comparable to the average scores among white Americans according to the 2016 wave of the ANES survey (unweighted mean = 0.58). The bivariate correlation between the explicit prejudice and racial resentment scale measures is 0.37 in the MTurk sample and 0.35 in the SSI sample.

In both Studies 1 and 2, our measure of explicit prejudice is based on respondents' perceived group differences between Blacks and whites on four dimensions: hardworking-lazy, intelligent-unintelligent, trustworthy-untrustworthy, peaceful-violent. Fig. S3 provides an example for the hardworking-lazy item. In Study 1, responses on this scale were recorded as discrete integers, while in Study 2 responses were continuous on the range [1,7]. When respondents endorsed differences between groups, this was both visually and numerically apparent on their screens.

Although questions about differences in work ethic have been asked since 1992, the question about group differences in violence that appears in the 2016 ANES is the first time it has been asked in a presidential election year survey since 1992. Questions about differences in intelligence were asked from 1992 to 2012 and questions about differences in trustworthiness were asked in the 1996, 2000 and 2004 versions. The 4-item racial resentment measure is based on the questions that have been asked in the ANES since 1986. In both studies, the question ordering was randomized so that racial resentment items were either asked before the explicit prejudice items, or after the explicit prejudice items.

As many previous studies have noted, racial resentment is strongly associated with political conservatism and this makes it difficult to distinguish between racial prejudice and conservative social value orientations (for example, see Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Schuman 2000). Although it has been suggested that explicit prejudice provides an unambiguous measure of racial prejudice, we know less about the relationship between explicit prejudice and political ideology. If explicit prejudice is also deeply tied to conservative political orientations then it may also be subject to similar criticisms.

Pooling the data across both studies, we find the correlation between conservative ideology (a 7-point scale running from "Very Liberal" to "Very Conservative") and the racial resentment scale is much larger ($\rho = 0.53$) than the correlation between ideology and explicit prejudice ($\rho = 0.20$). Similarly 2012 Republican voting is more strongly correlated with resentment than explicit prejudice ($\rho = 0.46$ versus 0.18). Altogether, these patterns show that explicit prejudice is not simply a proxy for political conservatism or Republican Party orientation.

2. Additional details and Supplementary Analyses for Study 1

Data for Study 1 were collected between 3 November 2015 and 5 November 2015. The advertisement for the study appears in Fig. S5. For all analyses reported in the manuscript, we include only white respondents who do not also identify as being a member of another race. Responses that appeared to be attempts by the same person to take the survey multiple times were excluded. We did this by dropping all

but the first observation if the same MTurk identifier was used more than once, and by also deleting all observations after the first one from any IP addresses that appeared multiple times.

Subjects were told they would always be in the role of the Responder and that they would play 30 rounds of the UG with 30 different Proposers. Subjects were paid a flat fee of \$1.25 plus an additional bonus based on the decisions they made in 5 randomly selected rounds of play. For each randomly selected round, subjects were told they would be paid the amount of any offer they accepted (while the Proposer would get the remainder) and \$0 for every offer they rejected (in this case, the Proposer would also get nothing). All subjects completed a comprehension test by answering questions about a practice round of the UG at the beginning of the study. Subjects answered questions about a second practice round only if they failed to pass the initial comprehension questions (see Fig. S6). Sixty subjects required a second comprehension check and all of them passed.

Subjects played the UG with 15 White Proposers, 10 Black Proposers, and 5 non-white/non-Black Proposers. The putative Proposers were a randomly selected subset of the neutral male faces used in Kubota et al. (2013). The full set of images used in Kubota et al. (2013) were taken from psychology research databases of neutral male faces. All subjects were exposed to the same set of 30 faces, presented in random order, with an offer amount drawn (out of an initial endowment of \$1.00) uniformly from $\{0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60\}$. Each participant saw each face only one time. Like Kubota et al. (2013), we included the 5 rounds with non-white/non-Black Proposers to decrease participants' awareness that the experiment was about responses to offers from Black versus White Proposers, and led subjects to believe the offers received were from real players, but they were instead randomly assigned faces and offer amounts (see Fig. S7). After all subjects completed the study they were all simultaneously debriefed and informed of the deception. Subjects were then paid *as if* they had accepted all offers in the five rounds that were selected for determining their bonus payment, thereby maximizing the bonus they could have received. Average total earnings were \$2.68 (inclusive of the \$1.25 base rate) and the median time to complete the task was 13 minutes (11 minutes for those assigned to the fast condition and 15 minutes for those assigned to the slow condition).

To control for the potential influence of dual process cognition in decision making, subjects were also randomly assigned to a time pressure (4 second) or time delay (10 second) decision constraint for the entire experiment. In the time pressure condition, subjects were allowed a maximum of 4 seconds to decide whether to accept or reject the Proposer's offer. Otherwise, subjects were required to spend a minimum of 10 seconds before deciding. Consistent with studies of arbitrary group distinctions (e.g. Everett et al. 2017), we find that anti-Black discrimination was not greater (a difference-in-difference of

approximately -0.3 percentage points, $P = 0.74$) when subjects were placed under time pressure, relative to time delay (Table S1.12, Column 1).

The main results, presented graphically in the manuscript, are presented in Tabular form in Table S1.1. In the time pressure (4 second) condition, if a respondent did not decide in the allocated time, their response is missing. 1.4% of responses ($N=132$) are missing in this condition, compared to 1.0% ($N=90$) in the time delay (10-second) condition. Table S1.7 reports the robustness of our findings across four different treatments of missing data. The estimated coefficient on the interaction between Explicit Prejudice and Black Proposer is essentially unchanged across all four, with the “extreme values” approach being the most conservative approach. Table S1.8 reports Probit estimates using the same model specification from the manuscript (reported here in Table S1.1). Table S1.10 reports OLS estimates under different choices of cut points for the Racial Resentment Indicator and Explicit Prejudice Indicator.

In addition to this, we added results from a variety of additional regression specifications and robustness checks in response to comments from an anonymous reviewer (enumerated below). These results do not alter the inferences or substantive conclusions presented in the manuscript. Across all alternative specifications, estimates for the Black Proposer effect and the DiD estimates for Resentful whites (interaction between Black Proposer x Racial Resentment Indicator) and Prejudiced whites (interaction between Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice Indicator) are approximately the same as what is reported in Fig. 1 of the manuscript.

- Table S1.2 presents results from a model that treats the randomly assigned discrete offer amount as a continuous variable by estimating a polynomial regression with a quadratic term to account for the concave relationship between acceptance and offer amount.
- Table S1.3 presents results from a model that does not include round fixed effects.
- Table S1.4 presents results from a model with individual fixed effects.
- Table S1.5 presents results from a random effects model.
- Table S1.6 presents results from a model that adds covariates to the specification used in the manuscript.
- Table S1.9 presents results from a model that uses the Logistic link function rather than the Probit link function.
- Table S1.11 presents results from specifications that add interactions for Kinder and Kam’s (2010) measure of “Ethnocentrism” to M1.1-M1.4. This measure is constructed by subtracting a white subjects’ average evaluation of three “out-groups” (Blacks, Asians and Hispanics) from the evaluation of their “in-group” (whites) across four traits: lazy-hardworking, untrustworthy-

trustworthy, violent-peaceful, and unintelligent-intelligent. The measure therefore takes averages across all non-white groups, unlike our explicit prejudice measure which focuses on attitudes toward Blacks (vis-à-vis Whites).

- Table S1.12 presents results from specifications that add interactions with the randomly assigned Time Pressure (1 = 4 seconds, 0 = 10 seconds) decision constraint to M1.1-M1.4. The Black Proposer x Time Pressure interaction in Column 1 tests whether time pressure condition caused white respondents, on average, to discriminate at different rates against the Black Proposer. The three-way interactions in Columns 2-4 estimate whether the time pressure condition caused Resentful/Prejudiced individuals to discriminate at different rates.
- Table S1.13 presents results from a model that partitions the data into different time periods to examine whether subjects might behave differently across rounds of UG play. Columns 1-4 adds binary indicators for Rounds 1-10, Rounds 11-20, Rounds 21-30, and their interactions with Proposer Race (Black = 1, White = 0) to the main specifications used in the manuscript (reported here in Table S1.2). Column 5 adds a binary indicator for subject Education (1 = College or Higher, 0 = Less than College) and its interaction with Proposer Race to the specification reported in column 4 (Model M1.4 in the Manuscript).

3. Additional details and Supplementary Analyses for Study 2

Data for Study 2 were collected in two waves. Data collection for the first wave (the survey) took place between 21 July 2016 and 28 July 2016. Data collection for the second wave (evaluation experiment) took place between 10 August 2016 and 21 August 2016. Wave 1 was advertised as a “study of public opinion” and Wave 2 was advertised as a “study about decision making.” Respondents were not provided with any information that Wave 1 and Wave 2 were tied to the same researchers or related in any way. As with Study 1, we include only white respondents who do not also identify as being a member of another race. Responses that appeared to be attempts by the same person to take the survey multiple times were excluded. We did this by dropping all but the first observation if the same vendor identifier was used more than once.

In Wave 2, subjects were asked to evaluate 41 rounds of play in the Ultimatum Game. Subjects evaluated 41 Proposer/Responder interactions: 9 of each from {Black/Black, Black/White, White/Black, White/White} and 1 of each from {Black/Other, Other/Black, Other/Other, White/Other, Other/White}. Offer amounts were randomly drawn from the set $\{0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50\}$. In order to increase statistical power in the region of the offer distribution where there was the most variation in acceptance behavior in Study 1, offers in $\{0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45\}$

were assigned with probability 0.10 and offers in {0, 0.05, 0.45, 0.50} were assigned with probability 0.05. Fig. S8 illustrates an example round.

Evaluators were told the Proposer saw the Responder prior to deciding on the offer to make, and the Responder likewise saw the Proposer and the offer amount before making their decision. As with Study 1, any subject who failed the first set of comprehension questions was presented with a detailed explanation of the correct answer and given a second opportunity to pass a different version of the same test (see Fig. S9). Subjects who failed the test a second time were not told that they failed the test a second time and were allowed to continue with the study. 267 of the 1029 subjects who returned to complete Wave 2 of Study 2 failed the comprehension test twice in a row and were excluded from analysis.

The significant difference in pass rates between the SSI sample (74%, Study 2) and MTurk samples (100%, Study 1) is consistent with prior research finding MTurk workers are more attentive to instructions than research subjects drawn from other populations (see Hauser and Schwarz, 2016). We also exclude 14 respondents who completed fewer than 75% of their assigned evaluations. These respondents all stopped answering evaluations at some point prior to the end of the experiment. See Table S2.2 for robustness to the treatment of missing data.

We also added results from additional regression specifications and robustness checks in response to comments from an anonymous reviewer (enumerated below). These results do not alter the inferences or substantive conclusions presented in the manuscript. Across all alternative specifications, estimates for the main effects (e.g. Black Proposer to White Responder) and the DiD estimates for Resentful whites (interaction between Black Proposer x Racial Resentment Indicator) and Prejudiced whites (interaction between Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice Indicator) are approximately the same as what is reported in Fig. 2 of the manuscript.

- Table S2.3 presents results from an analysis that includes all subjects in the study sample, including the 267 subjects that failed the pre-treatment comprehension test twice in a row. The model specifications are otherwise equivalent to Models M2.1-M2.4 (those results are reported in Fig. 2 of the Manuscript and Table 2.1 here).
- Table S2.4 presents results from a Tobit regression that specifies a left-censoring limit of 0 and a right-censoring limit of 100 for the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the same measure of perceived fairness (range 0 to 100) of the Proposer's offer used in Models M2.1-M2.4 (those results are reported in Fig. 2 of the Manuscript and Table 2.1 here).

Supplementary Figures S1-S9

Fig. S1: Likelihood of Offer Acceptance by Offer Amount and Proposer Race in Study 1

Notes: Lines denote smoothed conditional means using local weighted regression (loess).

Fig. S2: Fairness Evaluations by Race of Proposer and Responder in Study 2

Notes: Lines denote smoothed conditional means using local weighted regression (loess).

Fig. S3: Example of Explicit Prejudice Survey Item used in Qualtrics

Now we have some questions about different groups in our society. We're going to show you a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in a group can be rated. In the first set of characteristics a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people in that group tend to be 'hardworking.' A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group is 'lazy.' A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards one end or the other, and of course, you may choose any number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.

Hardworking								Lazy
1	2	3	4	5	6			7
Whites								
<div><div></div></div>								
Blacks								
<div><div></div></div>								
Hispanics								
<div><div></div></div>								
Asians								
<div><div></div></div>								

Notes: Evaluations were made for each group using the sliders next to the groups and group order was randomized across participants.

Fig. S4: Associations Between Survey Measures of Racial Attitudes in Study 1 and Study 2

Note: Panels A and B plot the distribution of the Explicit Prejudice and Resentment Scales.
 Panel C plots the bivariate relationships between Explicit Prejudice and Racial Resentment.
 Lines in panel C denote smoothed conditional means using local weighted regression (loess).

Fig. S5: Advertised HIT for Study 1 on Amazon Mechanical Turk

Yale University Research Study

"Decision making in economic games delivered through an Internet based platform"

You will make a series of decisions in an economic game that involves real money and answer a short follow up survey. This HIT will take about 15 minutes and you will be paid \$1.25 for participation and an additional bonus based on the decisions you make in the game. The bonus will be processed and paid to your mTurk account in 5-10 business days. We anticipate bonuses to be delivered sooner than this but must allow for reasonable processing delays and unexpected server issues.

PLEASE NOTE:

1. This HIT is **restricted to workers located in the US.**
2. This HIT **cannot be completed on a mobile device.**
3. The game in this HIT is timed and **requires your full attention.** Please do not accept this HIT unless you can give y our undivided attention for atleast 15 minutes.
4. You will receive a confirmation code at the end of the task. You must **enter this confirmation code in th e box below to receive payment.**

Fig. S6: Explanation of Correct Response to First Comprehension Test in Study 1

TEST RUN

(Proposer) \$0.40

(You) \$0.60

In this example the proposer has offered to split the dollar "sixty-forty". That is, the proposer has offered to give you \$0.60 and keep \$0.40. The amount displayed by the proposer's image (in this case \$.40) reflects the amount they will receive if you decide to accept their offer. Likewise, the amount displayed by your image (on the right) reflects the amount you will receive if you decide to accept the offer. The sum of the two amounts will always add to \$1.00.

If you **accept** the offer then you receive \$0.60 (out of the total \$1.00) and the proposer keeps the remaining \$0.40.

If you **reject** the offer then you and the proposer both receive \$0.00.

We want to make sure you understand how the game works before you start playing for real money. Please proceed to the next screen to try the test a second time.

Fig. S8: Example Round in Study 2: Proposer Offers a 60/40 Split in His Favor

Fig. S9: Explanation of Correct Response to First Comprehension Test in Study 2

Example split: the Proposer offers the Responder \$0.60 out of \$1.00

Proposer keeps: \$0.40

Responder gets: \$0.60

In this example, the Proposer has offered to split the dollar "forty-sixty". That is, the Proposer will keep \$0.40 and give the Responder \$0.60. The amount displayed by the Proposer's image (in this case \$.40) is how much they will keep if the Responder decides to accept their offer. Likewise, the amount displayed by the Responder's image (on the right) is how much they will get if they decide to accept the offer. The sum of the two amounts will always add to \$1.00.

If the Responder **accepted** the offer then they would get \$0.60 (out of the total \$1.00) and the Proposer would keep the remaining \$0.40.

If the Responder **rejects** the offer then the Responder and the Proposer both receive \$0.00.

The Responder and Proposer see a photograph of each other before making their decisions.

We want to make sure you understand how the game works before you begin the evaluation task. Please proceed to the next screen to try the test a second time.

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Table S1. 1: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes, 0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.004]***	-0.013 [0.006]**	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.007 [0.006]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.002 [0.016]		0.011 [0.017]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.000 [0.009]		0.005 [0.009]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.049 [0.016]***	-0.052 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.020 [0.009]**	-0.021 [0.010]**
Constant	0.132 [0.016]***	0.133 [0.018]***	0.153 [0.018]***	0.149 [0.019]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.414	0.414	0.418	0.418

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.2: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 with Quadratic Offer Amount

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Offer Amount in cents	0.032 [0.001]***	0.032 [0.001]***	0.032 [0.001]***	0.032 [0.001]***
Offer Amount squared / 100	-0.031 [0.001]***	-0.031 [0.001]***	-0.031 [0.001]***	-0.031 [0.001]***
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.005]***	-0.012 [0.006]**	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.007 [0.006]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.002 [0.016]		0.012 [0.016]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		-0.001 [0.009]		0.004 [0.009]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.050 [0.016]***	-0.053 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.018 [0.009]**	-0.019 [0.010]**
Constant	0.188 [0.018]***	0.189 [0.020]***	0.209 [0.020]***	0.206 [0.021]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.411	0.411	0.415	0.415

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table S1.3: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 without Round Fixed Effects

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.004]***	-0.013 [0.006]**	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.007 [0.006]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.002 [0.016]		0.011 [0.017]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.000 [0.009]		0.006 [0.009]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.049 [0.016]***	-0.052 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.020 [0.009]**	-0.022 [0.010]**
Constant	0.105 [0.011]***	0.106 [0.013]***	0.126 [0.014]***	0.123 [0.015]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.414	0.414	0.417	0.418

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for offer amount not reported.

Table S1.4: Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 from Fixed Effects Model

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.004]***	-0.013 [0.006]**	-0.004 [0.006]	-0.006 [0.006]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		-0.001 [0.009]		0.005 [0.009]
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.021	-0.022
Constant	0.129 [0.017]***	0.129 [0.017]***	[0.009]** 0.129 [0.017]***	[0.009]** 0.129 [0.017]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
Number of respondents	738	738	738	738
R-squared	0.518	0.518	0.518	0.518

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.5: Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 from Random Effects Model

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.004]***	-0.013 [0.006]**	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.006 [0.006]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.003 [0.016]		0.011 [0.017]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		-0.001 [0.009]		0.005 [0.009]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.049 [0.016]***	-0.052 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.021 [0.009]**	-0.022 [0.009]**
Constant	0.129 [0.016]***	0.131 [0.018]***	0.150 [0.018]***	0.146 [0.019]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
Number of respondents	738	738	738	738

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.6: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 with Covariates

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.013 [0.004]***	-0.013 [0.006]**	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.006 [0.006]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.006 [0.020]		0.002 [0.020]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.000 [0.009]		0.005 [0.009]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.045 [0.017]***	-0.045 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.020 [0.009]**	-0.021 [0.010]**
Constant	0.083 [0.061]	0.082 [0.062]	0.089 [0.061]	0.090 [0.061]
Observations	18208	18208	18208	18208
R-squared	0.422	0.422	0.425	0.425

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients for demographics as well as (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported. Demographic covariates are age, education, work status, gender, party ID, ideology, opposition to affirmative action, 2012 Obama vote, and income.

Table S1.7. Robustness of Study 1 Results to Treatment of Missing Data

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
	Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)			Extreme values: All
	Only respondents without any missing decisions	Assuming all missing values rejected	Assuming all missing values accepted	Black offers accepted, all White offers accepted.
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.014 [0.007]**	-0.006 [0.007]	-0.007 [0.006]	-0.019 [0.007]***
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)	0.017 [0.018]	0.012 [0.017]	0.011 [0.016]	0.011 [0.016]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment	0.013 [0.010]	0.009 [0.010]	0.004 [0.009]	0.010 [0.010]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)	-0.057 [0.018]***	-0.053 [0.017]***	-0.052 [0.016]***	-0.052 [0.016]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice	-0.025 [0.010]**	-0.020 [0.010]**	-0.021 [0.010]**	-0.022 [0.010]**
Constant	0.150 [0.021]***	0.141 [0.019]***	0.168 [0.019]**	0.159 [0.019]***
Observations	15350	18450	18450	18450
R-squared	0.429	0.403	0.411	0.409

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.8: Probit Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Respondents in Study 1

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.065 [0.021]***	-0.066 [0.027]**	-0.026 [0.028]	-0.033 [0.031]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.007 [0.076]		0.062 [0.079]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.002 [0.043]		0.019 [0.044]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.239 [0.076]***	-0.256 [0.079]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.088 [0.043]**	-0.091 [0.044]**
Constant	-1.128 [0.084]***	-1.125 [0.090]***	-1.047 [0.090]***	-1.066 [0.093]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233

Probit coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.9: Logit Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Respondents in Study 1

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes, 0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.107 [0.036]***	-0.105 [0.047]**	-0.038 [0.047]	-0.047 [0.052]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.018 [0.132]		0.098 [0.137]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		-0.004 [0.073]		0.025 [0.077]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.402 [0.132]***	-0.428 [0.137]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.158 [0.073]**	-0.163 [0.077]**
Constant	-1.945 [0.153]***	-1.938 [0.163]***	-1.811 [0.163]***	-1.840 [0.169]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233

Logit coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.10: Robustness of Study 1 Results to Selection of Cut Points for Racial Attitudes Measures

	Offer Accepted (1=Yes, 0=No)											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Black Proposer (1=yes)	Racially Resentful if scale above 0	Racially Resentful if scale above 0.625	Racially Resentful if scale above 1.25	Racially Resentful if scale above 1.875	Racially Resentful if scale above 2.5	Racially Resentful if scale above 3.125	Racially Resentful if scale above 3.75	Racially Resentful if scale above 4.375	Racially Resentful if scale above 5	Racially Resentful if scale above 5.625	Racially Resentful if scale above 6.25	Racially Resentful if scale above 6.875
	0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.007	-0.008	-0.014	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	-0.011	-0.011	-0.012
	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.007]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.006]**	[0.005]**	[0.005]**
Racial Resentment Indicator	-0.032	-0.027	-0.020	-0.016	-0.010	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.002	-0.006	-0.010	0.007
	[0.027]	[0.023]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.018]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment	-0.018	-0.015	-0.015	-0.008	-0.007	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.006	-0.007	-0.004
	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.010]
Constant	0.161	0.155	0.148	0.145	0.139	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.133	0.134	0.135	0.130
	[0.029]**	[0.026]**	[0.024]**	[0.023]**	[0.021]**	[0.020]**	[0.019]**	[0.018]**	[0.018]**	[0.018]**	[0.018]**	[0.017]**
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.415	0.415	0.415	0.415	0.415	0.414	0.414	0.414	0.414	0.414	0.415	0.414
Proportion Racially Resentful	0.900	0.860	0.820	0.780	0.690	0.610	0.540	0.500	0.430	0.390	0.330	0.280

	Offer Accepted (1=Yes, 0=No)											
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	
	Racially Resentful if scale above .75	Racially Resentful if scale above .8125	Racially Resentful if scale above .875	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above -.25	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above 0	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above .25	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above .5	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above .75	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above 1	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above 1.25	Explicitly Prejudiced if scale above 1.5	
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.012 [0.005]**	-0.013 [0.005]**	-0.015 [0.005]**	0.013 [0.013]	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.013 [0.005]**	-0.012 [0.005]**	-0.012 [0.005]**	-0.012 [0.005]**	-0.010 [0.005]**	-0.010 [0.005]**	
Racial Resentment Indicator	0.006 [0.020]	0.000 [0.022]	-0.009 [0.026]									
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment	-0.006 [0.011]	-0.004 [0.013]	0.012 [0.014]									
Explicit Prejudice Indicator				0.037 [0.026]	-0.049 [0.016]**	-0.041 [0.017]**	-0.050 [0.019]**	-0.048 [0.021]**	-0.054 [0.022]**	-0.042 [0.024]**	-0.029 [0.026]	
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice				-0.030 [0.013]**	-0.020 [0.009]**	0.000 [0.010]	-0.007 [0.011]	-0.007 [0.012]	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.025 [0.014]**	-0.032 [0.015]**	
Constant	0.131 [0.017]**	0.132 [0.017]**	0.133 [0.017]**	0.100 [0.028]**	0.153 [0.018]**	0.144 [0.017]**	0.144 [0.017]**	0.141 [0.017]**	0.140 [0.017]**	0.137 [0.017]**	0.135 [0.016]**	
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233	
R-squared	0.414	0.414	0.414	0.415	0.418	0.416	0.417	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.415	
Proportion Racially Resentful	0.200	0.160	0.110	0.890	0.420	0.300	0.240	0.190	0.160	0.130	0.110	

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.11: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 with Ethnocentrism Interactions

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.008 [0.006]	-0.009 [0.007]	-0.005 [0.006]	-0.007 [0.007]
Ethnocentric Indicator (1 = E > 0, 0= else)	-0.022 [0.016]	-0.023 [0.017]	0.014 [0.021]	0.013 [0.021]
Black Proposer x Ethnocentric	-0.012 [0.009]	-0.013 [0.010]	0.001 [0.013]	0.001 [0.013]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		0.003 [0.017]		0.010 [0.017]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.003 [0.009]		0.005 [0.010]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.058 [0.021]**	-0.060 [0.021]**
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.021 [0.013]	-0.022 [0.013]*
Constant	0.141 [0.018]***	0.140 [0.019]***	0.151 [0.018]***	0.147 [0.019]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.415	0.415	0.418	0.419

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1. 12: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Responders in Study 1 with Time Pressure Interactions

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer (1=yes)	-0.012 [0.006]*	-0.015 [0.009]*	-0.001 [0.008]	-0.006 [0.010]
Time Pressure (1 = 4 seconds, 0 = 10 seconds)	0.004 [0.016]	0.023 [0.022]	-0.017 [0.021]	-0.001 [0.024]
Black Proposer x Time Pressure	-0.003 [0.009]	0.003 [0.012]	-0.007 [0.012]	-0.002 [0.013]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		0.020 [0.022]		0.032 [0.022]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment		0.008 [0.013]		0.011 [0.013]
Racial Resentment x Time Pressure		-0.043 [0.032]		-0.049 [0.033]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment x Time Pressure		-0.015 [0.018]		-0.013 [0.019]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.075 [0.022]***	-0.080 [0.022]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice			-0.024 [0.013]*	-0.026 [0.013]**
Explicit Prejudice x Time Pressure			0.052 [0.032]	0.063 [0.033]*
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice x Time Pressure			0.009 [0.018]	0.011 [0.019]
Constant	0.130 [0.018]***	0.122 [0.020]***	0.162 [0.021]***	0.151 [0.022]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.414	0.415	0.419	0.420

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S1.13: OLS Estimates of Acceptance of UG Proposals by White Respondents in Study 1 by Time Period and Education

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4	M1.5
	Offer Accepted (1=Yes,0=No)				
Black Proposer x Early (1 = Rounds 1-10, 0 = else)	-0.030 [0.009]***	-0.029 [0.011]***	-0.021 [0.010]**	-0.022 [0.011]*	-0.023 [0.014]*
Black Proposer x Middle (1 = Rounds 11-20, 0 = else)	0.007 [0.009]	0.011 [0.011]	0.018 [0.011]*	0.019 [0.011]	0.018 [0.014]
Black Proposer x Late (1 = Rounds 21-30, 0 = else)	-0.017 [0.009]*	-0.022 [0.011]**	-0.011 [0.011]	-0.016 [0.012]	-0.017 [0.014]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, else = 0)		-0.002 [0.016]		0.011 [0.017]	0.012 [0.017]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment x Early		-0.003 [0.015]		0.002 [0.015]	0.002 [0.015]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment x Middle		-0.009 [0.015]		-0.001 [0.016]	-0.001 [0.016]
Black Proposer x Racial Resentment x Late		0.012 [0.014]		0.015 [0.015]	0.015 [0.015]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			-0.049 [0.016]***	-0.052 [0.017]***	-0.052 [0.017]***
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice x Early			-0.019 [0.015]	-0.019 [0.015]	-0.019 [0.015]
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice x Middle			-0.028 [0.015]*	-0.028 [0.016]*	-0.028 [0.016]*
Black Proposer x Explicit Prejudice x Late			-0.014 [0.014]	-0.018 [0.015]	-0.018 [0.015]
College Educated Subject (1 = Yes, 0 = No)					0.006 [0.016]
Black Proposer x College Educated x Early					0.002 [0.015]
Black Proposer x College Educated x Middle					0.002 [0.015]
Black Proposer x College Educated x Late					0.001 [0.015]
Constant	0.139 [0.017]***	0.140 [0.018]***	0.159 [0.019]***	0.155 [0.019]***	0.152 [0.022]***
Observations	18233	18233	18233	18233	18233
R-squared	0.415	0.415	0.419	0.419	0.419

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S2.1: OLS Estimates of Third-Party Fairness Evaluations of UG Proposals in Study 2

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
	Perceived Offer Fairness (0-100)			
Black Proposer to White Responder (BW - WW)	-0.649 [0.238]**	-0.302 [0.325]	0.251 [0.334]	0.358 [0.365]
White Proposer to Black Responder (WB - WW)	-1.151 [0.255]**	-0.898 [0.345]**	-1.068 [0.365]**	-0.894 [0.395]**
Black Proposer to Black Responder (BB - WW)	-0.546 [0.242]**	-0.304 [0.346]	-0.030 [0.341]	0.063 [0.380]
Racial Resentment x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)		-0.672 [0.477]		-0.301 [0.500]
Racial Resentment x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)		-0.491 [0.509]		-0.488 [0.536]
Racial Resentment x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)		-0.472 [0.485]		-0.266 [0.513]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, 0 = else)		1.956 [1.020]*		1.172 [1.055]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)			-1.517 [0.471]**	-1.436 [0.497]**
Explicit Prejudice x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)			-0.139 [0.507]	-0.008 [0.534]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)			-0.870 [0.477]*	-0.798 [0.506]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			3.350 [1.001]**	3.037 [1.041]**
Constant	11.858 [0.966]**	10.823 [1.052]**	9.875 [1.106]**	9.436 [1.138]**
Observations	26651	26651	26651	26651
R-squared	0.559	0.560	0.562	0.562
Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)	0.502	0.596	1.319	1.252
Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)	0.259	0.356	0.352	0.399
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)		-0.180		0.187
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)		0.518		0.533
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)			-1.378	-1.428
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)			0.504	0.521

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level. Differences and standard errors of differences reported at bottom of table from linear combination of coefficients tests.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S2.2: Robustness of Study 2 Results to Treatment of Missing Data: Respondents who Provided Evaluations of all 36 Black/White Interactions

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
	Perceived Offer Fairness (0-100)			
Black Proposer to White Responder (BW - WW)	-0.630 [0.239]***	-0.284 [0.326]	0.231 [0.337]	0.346 [0.367]
White Proposer to Black Responder (WB - WW)	-1.148 [0.255]***	-0.860 [0.345]**	-1.096 [0.361]***	-0.890 [0.394]**
Black Proposer to Black Responder (BB - WW)	-0.510 [0.242]**	-0.267 [0.346]	-0.031 [0.338]	0.071 [0.378]
Racial Resentment x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)		-0.674 [0.479]		-0.322 [0.502]
Racial Resentment x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)		-0.561 [0.510]		-0.578 [0.535]
Racial Resentment x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)		-0.475 [0.485]		-0.287 [0.514]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, 0 = else)		1.932 [1.028]*		1.126 [1.062]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)			-1.455 [0.473]***	-1.369 [0.499]***
Explicit Prejudice x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)			-0.088 [0.506]	0.066 [0.531]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)			-0.811 [0.476]*	-0.733 [0.505]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			3.440 [1.007]***	3.141 [1.046]***
Constant	11.879 [0.973]***	10.857 [1.059]***	9.841 [1.115]***	9.419 [1.147]***
Observations	26424	26424	26424	26424
R-squared	0.560	0.561	0.563	0.563
Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)	0.518	0.576	1.327	1.236
Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)	0.260	0.357	0.350	0.398
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)		-0.113		0.256
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)		0.520		0.534
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)			-1.367	-1.435
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)			0.505	0.521

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level. Differences and standard errors of differences reported at bottom of table from linear combination of coefficients tests.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S2.3: Robustness of Study 2 Results to Treatment of Non-Attentive Subjects: Including Subjects who Failed Pre-Treatment Comprehension Tests

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
	Perceived Offer Fairness (0-100)			
Black Proposer to White Responder (BW - WW)	-0.929 [0.269]***	-0.828 [0.390]**	-0.025 [0.383]	-0.079 [0.435]
White Proposer to Black Responder (WB - WW)	-1.233 [0.258]***	-1.403 [0.366]***	-1.360 [0.396]***	-1.474 [0.438]***
Black Proposer to Black Responder (BB - WW)	-0.841 [0.268]***	-1.045 [0.406]**	-0.382 [0.421]	-0.604 [0.479]
Racial Resentment x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)		-0.216 [0.535]		0.166 [0.551]
Racial Resentment x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)		0.358 [0.515]		0.340 [0.535]
Racial Resentment x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)		0.436 [0.530]		0.673 [0.545]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, 0 = else)		-4.587 [1.207]***		-5.807 [1.237]***
Explicit Prejudice x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)			-1.512 [0.526]***	-1.554 [0.546]***
Explicit Prejudice x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)			0.202 [0.522]	0.125 [0.542]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)			-0.779 [0.547]	-0.931 [0.564]*
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			4.191 [1.224]***	5.472 [1.256]***
Constant	20.032 [1.211]***	22.260 [1.452]***	17.390 [1.429]***	19.435 [1.556]***
Observations	35930	35930	35894	35894
R-squared	0.353	0.359	0.358	0.365
Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)	0.304	0.576	1.334	1.395
Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)	0.268	0.379	0.381	0.423
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)		-0.574		-0.173
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)		0.534		0.553
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)			-1.715	-1.679
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)			0.523	0.546

OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at respondent level. Differences and standard errors of differences reported at bottom of table from linear combination of coefficients tests.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.

Table S2.4: Tobit Estimates of Third-Party Fairness Evaluations of UG Proposals in Study 2

	M1.1	M1.2	M1.3	M1.4
	Perceived Offer Fairness (0-100)			
Black Proposer to White Responder (BW - WW)	-0.717 [0.402]*	-0.278 [0.576]	0.619 [0.627]	0.718 [0.694]
White Proposer to Black Responder (WB - WW)	-1.397 [0.402]***	-1.066 [0.576]*	-1.177 [0.627]*	-0.970 [0.693]
Black Proposer to Black Responder (BB - WW)	-0.716 [0.402]*	-0.510 [0.576]	0.006 [0.627]	0.037 [0.694]
Racial Resentment x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)		-0.852 [0.803]		-0.286 [0.830]
Racial Resentment x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)		-0.642 [0.803]		-0.582 [0.830]
Racial Resentment x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)		-0.405 [0.803]		-0.095 [0.830]
Racial Resentment Indicator (1 = RR > 0.5, 0 = else)		1.953 [0.568]***		1.097 [0.587]*
Explicit Prejudice x Black-White Pair (BW - WW)			-2.254 [0.815]***	-2.173 [0.844]**
Explicit Prejudice x White-Black Pair (WB - WW)			-0.370 [0.815]	-0.213 [0.844]
Explicit Prejudice x Black-Black Pair (BB - WW)			-1.219 [0.815]	-1.191 [0.845]
Explicit Prejudice Indicator (1 = EP > 0, 0 = else)			3.610 [0.577]***	3.317 [0.597]***
Constant	-2.396 [1.159]**	-3.423 [1.195]***	-4.507 [1.207]***	-4.919 [1.225]***
Observations	26651	26651	26651	26651
Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)	0.680	0.788	1.795	1.688
Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)	0.402	0.576	0.627	0.693
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)		-0.210		0.296
Racial Resentment x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)		0.803		0.830
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference (BW - WB)			-1.885	-1.960
Explicit Prejudice x Ingroup Difference SE (BW - WB)			0.815	0.844

Tobit coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Differences and standard errors of differences reported at bottom of table from linear combination of coefficients tests.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Note: Coefficients (indicators) for round of play and offer amount not reported.