First 750: As predicted, we found an effect of moral valence on whether people should be held responsible for actions caused by outside forces (a brain tumor). Those who perfumed good acts because of a brain tumor were held more morally responsible for those actions (M = 2.93, SD = 1.314) than if they had performed bad acts (M = 2.608, SD = 1.264, F (1, 742) = 11.649, p < .001, d = .25, 95%CI = .106 to .395). As we failed to find a relationship between the meek subscale of Extraversion and moral responsibility (p > .77), we did not include it in our analysis. Second 750: We replicated the effect found in the first 750 collected data. Those who performed good acts caused by a tumor were still held more morally responsible (M = 3.041, SD = 1.27) than if they had performed bad acts (M = 2.584, SD = 1.219, F(1, 754) = 25.52, p < .001, d = .368, 95%CI = .224 to .511). Though numerically larger, the magnitude of the effect was not statistically larger in the second vs. the first 750 (F(1, 1496) = 1.061, p > .303). Full 1500: Mirroring the results from the first and second replications, pooling the data showed a large effect of asymmetry in judgments of moral responsibility when the agent is not the cause of the behavior. If a brain tumor causes someone to perform morally good acts, they are still held responsible for those behaviors (M = 2.985, SD = 1.292) but are held less responsible if they had been caused to perform bad acts (M = 2.595, SD = 1.24, F(1, 1498) = 35.533, p < .001, d = .308, 95%CI = .206 to .41).