*(same for Study 1a and Study 1b)* Slote (1984) noted there are various types of asymmetry between self and others in moral domain. While some deeds might be judged to be immoral if they are done to others, when done to oneself, the same moral denouncement is missing. The present experiments will study one example of such an asymmetry. We hypothesize that people will be more willing to condemn killing one other person for saving more people than condemn the same deed when done to oneself (i.e. in case of self-sacrifice). On the other hand, we believe that this asymmetry may be in the opposite direction when the question is framed positively, i.e. as what people should do instead of whether something is wrong to do. In this case, people may be less likely to hold a view that they should sacrifice themselves for the sake of others than that they should sacrifice someone else for the same purpose. This difference between moral judgments based on a framing of a question would suggest that people do not hold consistent view of what is morally condemnable and what should they do. *Study 2* Although the main rationale from the previous studies stays the same, in Study 2 we extended the design in order to ask participants not only to evaluate whether the described action was wrong, but also whether it was right and not only whether it should be done, but also whether it should not be done. We expect that the self-sacrifice will be judged as more right and less wrong than other-sacrifice, however participants will be more likely to say that other-sacrifice should be done and that the self-sacrifice should not be done. Moreover, in addition to presenting the dilemma from the 1st person viewpoint, as in the previous studies, we added a 3rd person version in which the participant is not supposed to imagine him- or herself in the described situation. As in previous studies (Christensen & Gomila, 2012), we expect that the point of view will moderate the above described asymetery – the difference between whether self- or other-sacrifice should / should not be done will be smaller among participants presented with the 3rd person point of view version of the dilemma. Additionally, we expect that participants will be generally more likely to endorse the self- and other-sacrifice in the 3rd person point of view version of the dilemma. **References** Christensen, J. & Gomila, A. (2012). Moral dilemmas in cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making: A principled review. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 36*(4), 1249–1264. Slote, M. (1984). Morality and Self-Other Asymmetry. *The Journal of Philosophy, 81*, 179-192.