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Description: Bilinguals, in their foreign language, are spared from common decision-making biases. Typically, this “Foreign Language Effect” results in increased accuracy. We examined the Foreign Language Effect in the context of logical reasoning, in which reasoners are required to track the logical status of a syllogism, ignoring its believability. Across two experiments, we found the reverse Foreign Language Effect; foreign language reasoners are less able to evaluate the logical structure of syllogisms, but no less biased by their believability. One path to succeeding in reasoning tasks is always engaging in reflective processing. A more efficient strategy is metacognitively tracking whether belief-based intuitions conflict with logic-based intuitions and only reflecting when such conflict is present. We provide evidence that foreign language reasoners are less accurate because they fail to detect belief-logic conflict, and in turn fail to engage in reflective processing when necessary to override the incorrect, intuitive response. We propose that foreign language reasoners are unable to detect belief-logic conflict either due to weakened intuitions or due to a more conservative threshold for the detection of conflict between multiple competing intuitions.