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The Relevance of Motivations to Wrongdoing for Contributing to Climate Change²

This paper makes progress towards an account of moral wrongdoing for individual contributions to collectively-caused harms and substantial risks of harm, like the harms and risks stemming from climate change. To do so, this paper argues that an agent's motivations can be relevant to whether an agent's contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk is morally wrong. Specifically, this paper argues that an agent's contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk can be wrong in virtue of her motivations even when she does not intend to contribute to the harm or risk, but rather contributes to the harm or risk as a foreseeable but unintended side-effect of her otherwise good end.

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I make progress towards an account of moral wrongdoing for individual contributions to collectively-caused harms and substantial risks of harm. My aim in developing such an account is to evaluate, in a larger work, whether and to what extent ordinary individuals have acted wrongly by performing ordinary greenhouse gas-emitting activities. Ordinary greenhouse gas-emitting activities (henceforth *emitting activities*) include both activities that directly produce greenhouse gas emissions, like driving a car, as well as activities, like purchasing consumer goods and travelling by airplane, that indirectly produce greenhouse gas emissions by incentivizing others to produce (directly) greenhouse gas emissions.

My aim is to provide an account of moral wrongdoing that can help evaluate individuals' past emitting behavior, as opposed to one that (directly) provides advice on what individuals should do now and in the future. While questions of retrospective and prospective evaluations of behavior are obviously closely related, they can also come apart in important ways. My ultimate goal in evaluating individuals' past emitting behavior is to evaluate whether and to what extent these individuals have incurred duties of corrective justice to address climate change in virtue of this behavior. Fulfilling one's duty of corrective justice to address climate change may require different behavior than what one ought to have done to avoid incurring the duty in the first place.

My goal (in the larger work) is to evaluate whether and to what extent individuals acted *all-things-considered* wrongly by performing emitting activities. All-things-considered wrongness is here contrasted with *pro tanto* wrongness. An agent's act is *pro tanto* wrong when the act has at least one wrong-making feature that is not defeated by other normative features of the act.³ An agent's act is all-things-considered wrong when the act is *pro tanto* wrong and the agent does not have an overriding (or outweighing) justification to perform the act.⁴ So, for example, if A breaks B's finger merely because B uses the improper fork at a dinner party, then A acts *pro tanto* wrongly in virtue of wronging B by infringing B's right against bodily harm. Because A also lacks an overriding justification for wronging B in this way, A acts all-things-considered wrongly. By contrast, if A breaks B's finger as an unavoidable side-effect of preventing three other persons from having their legs broken, then it is plausible that A acts *pro tanto* wrongly but not all-things-considered wrongly. A acts *pro tanto*

³ Liability justifications often serve to defeat wrong-making features of acts. For example, while it is typically wrong for me to kill a person, if that person has made himself liable to be killed by me—by, say, culpably threatening me with lethal force, then my killing him does not wrong him, and so is not even *pro tanto* wrong.

⁴ Lesser evil justifications are typically overriding, rather than defeating.

wrongly because A still wrongs B by infringing B's right, but A is nevertheless justified in doing so, given the much greater harm that A prevents. Henceforth, 'wrong' (and cognates) will refer to all-things-considered wrongness, unless otherwise indicated.

The account of moral wrongdoing for individual contributions to collectively-caused harms and substantial risks of harm that I defend in what follows centers on the relevance to wrongdoing of an agent's motivations with which the agent contributes to the harm or risk. According to my understanding, an agent's motivations with which the agent performs some act consists in "the whole mental process that results in the action" (Wedgewood, 2011). Motivations include both intentions, which directly control one's behavior, as well as mental states like desires, beliefs, dispositions, and emotions, which indirectly control one's behavior by leading one to form certain intentions (Wedgewood, 2011).

When I say that an agent's motivations are relevant to wrongdoing, I mean that the following principle is both true and relevant in a wide range of cases:

the *Motivations Principle*: An act performed with certain motivations can be more seriously *pro tanto* morally wrong than an act performed with different motivations, other things being equal.

If some act A_1 is more seriously *pro tanto* morally wrong than some alternative act A_2 , then A_1 is harder to justify than A_2 , other things being equal. Moreover, one might be liable to bear greater compensatory or punitive costs in virtue of performing A_1 rather than A_2 , other things being equal.⁵ Note that saying that A_1 is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than A_2 does not imply that A_2 is *pro tanto* wrong. It does imply that A_1 is at least *pro tanto* wrong, though A_1 may be all-things-considered permissible.

Note also that the Motivations Principle makes a claim about the (relative) moral status of *acts*, rather than about, e.g., the goodness or badness of the characters of the agents who perform the acts or the goodness or badness of the states of affairs in which the acts are performed. It is uncontroversial that motivations can be relevant to the evaluation of an agent's character, at least. It is far more controversial whether motivations can be relevant to the evaluation of acts.⁶

Finally, the 'other things being equal clause' is crucial. The Motivations Principle

⁵ Though whether someone is liable to bear any such costs might depend on whether the act is all-things-considered wrong.

⁶ Among philosophers who argue that motivations are relevant to wrongdoing include Quinn (1989), McMahan (2009a, 2009b), Tadros (2011), and Liao (2012). Philosophers who have argued that motivations are irrelevant to wrongdoing include Thomson (1991, 1999), Kamm (2007), Scanlon (2008), and Norcross (1991).

holds that one act can be more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than another act holding everything constant except for the motivations with which the agents perform the respective acts (e.g., the acts are performed with the same bodily movements and have the same actual and expected consequences).

Although the Motivations Principle is controversial among moral philosophers, I will argue that the principle is both true and relevant in many cases in which an agent contributes to a collectively-caused harm or substantial risk of harm. In particular, I will argue that the Motivations Principle is relevant in cases that can help us evaluate whether and to what extent ordinary individuals acted wrongly by performing emitting activities.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly considers two accounts that seek to explain why performing an emitting activity can be wrong. My discussion of these accounts will help motivate the importance of considering an agent's motivations when evaluating the moral status of contributions to collectively-caused harms and risks. Section 3 provides support for the relevance of the Motivations Principle in some cases featuring collectively-caused harms and risks, though these are cases in which the motivations of the contributing agents are very different from those with which individuals typically perform emitting activities. Section 4 argues that the Motivations Principle is relevant in cases in which the agents' motivations more closely align with those of individuals who perform emitting activities. In particular, it argues that there can be morally relevant differences among the motivations of agents who contribute to a collectively-caused harm or risk as a side-effect of pursuing some good end. Section 5 briefly considers some additional questions concerning the relevance of motivations in such cases, including the relevance of self-interested versus benevolent motivations, as well as whether wrongdoing can depend on one's culpable ignorance. Section 6 briefly concludes.

2.

In this section, I briefly consider two accounts that seek to explain why performing an emitting activity can be wrong. My discussion of these accounts will help motivate the importance of taking into consideration an agent's motivations when evaluating the moral status of the agent's contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk.

The accounts that I discuss in what follows are motivated in large part by the widely-accepted assumption that although anthropogenic climate change has already caused harm to persons and will, in the absence of significant and costly preventative action, cause harm to many more persons, it seems highly unlikely

that an individual's performance of an emitting activity makes any difference to whether or the extent to which any actual climate change-induced harm has occurred or will occur.⁷ Therefore, to explain why performing an emitting activity can be wrong, one cannot simply appeal to the harm that performing the activity would individually cause, in the sense that performing the activity would be necessary for the harm to occur.

Now even though it is *highly unlikely* that an individual's performance of an emitting activity makes a difference to whether or the extent to which any climate change-induced harm occurs, it seems implausible that the probability is *zero*. Accordingly, some philosophers argue that to explain why performing an emitting activity can be wrong, we should instead focus on the fact that performing an emitting activity increases the *risk* that some persons will suffer climate change-induced harm they would not otherwise suffer.⁸ Thus, these philosophers endorse a principle like the:

Risk Principle: An act is *pro tanto* morally wrong when the act individually increases the risk that a person will suffer harm, other things being equal; the extent to which the act is *pro tanto* morally wrong is determined by the extent to which the act individually increases the magnitude of expected harm, other things being equal.⁹

Given the Risk Principle, and if we assume that performing an emitting activity individually increases the risk that some persons will suffer climate change-induced harm that they otherwise would not suffer, then performing an emitting activity is *pro tanto* wrong, other things being equal. Moreover, if we assume that performing an emitting activity increases the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm in proportion to the amount of emissions produced by the performance of the activity, then the extent to which performing the activity is *pro tanto* wrong is also proportional to the amount of emissions produced by the performance of the activity. So whether performing any particular emitting activity is all-things-considered wrong depends both on the amount of emissions produced by the performance of the activity, as well as on the strength of the reasons the agent has

⁷ See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, Sandberg 2011, and Cripps 2013. In his 2012, Broome seems to deny this assumption, although in his 2019 he defends the claim that an individual's emissions individually increase *expected* (climate change-induced) harm.

⁸ See, e.g., Hiller 2011, Lawford-Smith 2016, and Broome 2019. Some consequentialists have appealed to expected *utility* to explain why contributing to climate change can be wrong. See, e.g., Morgan-Knapp and Goodman (2015).

⁹ Roughly, the magnitude of expected harm is a weighted average of the magnitude of the harm in each possible outcome multiplied by the probability that the outcome will occur.

for performing the activity (e.g., determined by, e.g., the magnitude of the harm prevented or good produced by performing the activity).

It is not my goal to evaluate fully either the Risk Principle or the broader account of wrongdoing for performing an emitting activity that relies on it.¹⁰ I will, however, briefly note three potential problems with the account, some of which have been noted by others. First, it is not obvious that it is always *pro tanto* wrong to increase the risk that a person will suffer harm.¹¹ Virtually everything one does increases risks of harm to others. For example, when I enter my apartment, I (ever so slightly) increase the probability that the floor beneath me will collapse on my neighbors, injuring them. But it does not seem to be even *pro tanto* wrong for me to enter my apartment. Although I do not think that this problem is insurmountable, it indicates that the Risk Principle needs either additional defense or modification.

Second, and relatedly, it is unclear to what extent performing an emitting activity individually increases the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm. Although I think that we can confidently state that performing an emitting activity individually increases the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm to *some* degree, there may be reason to think that the extent that performing an emitting activity individually increases the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm is so small that the *pro tanto* wrongness of performing the activity will be outweighed by virtually any normative reason in favor of performing the activity.¹² There is obviously much more that can be said here, but my aim is simply to note the potential problem.

Third, and most importantly for my purposes in this paper, it seems that whether and to what extent it is *pro tanto* wrong to contribute to a collectively-caused harm or substantial risk of harm (like the harms and risks stemming from climate change) does not depend *solely* on whether and to what extent the contribution individually increases the magnitude of expected harm. This is not a problem for the Risk Principle as such, but it does show that a complete account of why it can be wrong to perform an emitting activity likely has to go beyond the Risk Principle.

¹⁰ For a recent extended defense of this basic account, see Broome 2019.

¹¹ Versions of this objection have been put forward by Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, Posner and Weisbach 2010, and Jamieson 2014 among others. For potential solutions to this problem, see Hiller 2011 and Lawford Smith 2016.

¹² There may be multiple factors that reduce the extent that performing an emitting activity otherwise individually increases the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm. For example, one's performing an emitting activity may have certain (expected) market effects (e.g., increasing the expected price of oil, thereby decreasing expected aggregate demand). See Hale 2011 for an interesting discussion of some relevant issues.

To illustrate, consider the following case:

Unnecessary Contribution: Each of three agents—A, B, and C—independently dumps a bucket of the same kind of chemical waste from his malfunctioning heating unit (which is far too expensive to replace at this time) into a creek that feeds into V's water supply. The wastes completely mix before reaching V's water supply. Each dumps the waste in the creek to avoid an otherwise unavoidable moderately expensive disposal cost. At the time of acting, each agent knows for certain that (a) if one or fewer buckets of waste is dumped, then V will not suffer any harm at all, but (b) if more than one bucket of waste is dumped, then V will go permanently blind. Each agent also knows for certain that no one else is at risk of being harmed, and that V will not suffer a harm greater than blindness, no matter how much waste is dumped. Finally, each agent knows for certain that the other two agents will dump their waste close to the same time that he does and that he cannot affect what the other agents do. V drinks the waste-laced water and goes permanently blind.

It is highly plausible that each agent acts seriously wrongly by contributing to V's blindness, even though, at the time of acting, no agent's contribution individually increases the risk of harm to V, given that each knows for certain that V would go blind even if he does not dump the waste. (Henceforth, I will call a contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk of harm that does not individually increase the magnitude of (expected) harm an *unnecessary contribution*).¹³

Although *Unnecessary Contribution* is not intended to be closely analogous to the circumstances in which individuals perform emitting activities, the case suggests that even if performing an emitting activity does not individually increase the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm, or only increases it by a trivial degree, performing the activity may nevertheless be wrong. Conversely, if performing an emitting activity *does* increase the magnitude of expected climate change-induced harm by a non-trivial degree, then performing the activity may be wrong for other reasons as well, thereby contributing to the *overall* extent that performing the activity can be seriously wrong.

¹³ Here and throughout, I focus on cases that might be best described as cases of *overdetermination*, i.e., cases in which more than one agent contributes to the harm, but a smaller number of these contributions would have been sufficient for the harm to occur. We can contrast these with *preemption* cases in which more than one agent contributes to the harm, but a smaller number of these contributions would not have been sufficient for the harm to occur; however, had one or more agents not contributed, then others would have provided the necessary contributions for the harm to occur. I think that there may be morally relevant differences in the moral status of contributions to these different kinds of case, but I cannot explore this issue here. At the very least, I think that some climate change-induced harms are overdetermined.

Let's consider, then, a second account that seeks to explain why it can be wrong to perform an emitting activity and that seems well-suited to accommodate the intuitive verdict in *Unnecessary Contribution*. This account centers on the:

Bare Contribution Principle: An act is *pro tanto* morally wrong when the act contributes to a collectively-caused harm or substantial risk of harm; the extent to which the act is *pro tanto* wrong depends on (a) the extent of the contribution (independently of the extent to which the contribution individually increases the risk), and (b) the magnitude of the overall harm or expected harm to which the act contributes, other things being equal.¹⁴

Notice that the Bare Contribution Principle implies that contributing to a collectively-caused harm or risk is *pro tanto* wrong even if the contribution is unnecessary. Thus, the Bare Contribution Principle straightforwardly supports the conclusion that in *Unnecessary Contribution*, each agent acts at least *pro tanto* wrongly. Moreover, because (a) each agent makes a substantial contribution to the harm to V, (b) the harm to V is very large, and (c) each agent has, at best, only a very weak reason in favor of contributing to the harm (avoiding a moderate disposal cost), the Bare Contribution Principle plausibly supports the conclusion that each agent acts all-things-considered wrongly.

In addition, the Bare Contribution Principle supports the conclusion that performing an emitting activity is at least *pro tanto* wrong, given that performing an emitting activity contributes to climate change-induced harms and substantial risks of harm, even if performing the activity does not individually increase the magnitude of climate change-induced (expected) harm. According to the Bare Contribution Principle, whether any particular emitting activity is all-things-considered wrong depends on the overall magnitude of (expected) climate change-induced harm to which one's performance of the activity contributes, the amount of greenhouse gas emissions the performance of the activity produces, and the strength of the reasons the agent has for performing the activity.

Notice, however, that the strength of the duty, given by the Bare Contribution Principle, to avoid contributing to a collectively-caused harm or risk seems to be relatively weak, at least in comparison to the duty given by the Risk Principle, other things being equal.¹⁵ For example, in *Unnecessary Contribution*, it seems that if one of the agents could, by dumping his waste, prevent even a modest harm to a different

¹⁴ The Bare Contribution Principle is similar to a principle endorsed by Barry and Overland (2016). Cripps (2013) also seems to endorse a principle like the Bare Contribution Principle.

¹⁵ A similar point is made by Barry and Overland (2016).

person (a bad stomach ache, say), then he might be permitted to do so given that he knows for certain that V will suffer the same harm regardless. But if his dumping the waste would individually increase the risk that a person would go blind by even a small amount, then it seems that he would need a much stronger reason to dump his waste than preventing a stomach ache.

Yet there is a bit of a puzzle here. It seems that each of the agents in *Unnecessary Contribution* act in a way that is *seriously* wrong. For example, it seems that each of the agents is liable to severe punishment for dumping his waste. And yet, as I have said, the duty given by the Bare Contribution Principle appears to be relatively weak. It is puzzling how three agents could act seriously wrongly by contributing to an innocent person going blind but each of them violates only a weak duty to refrain from contributing to the harm.

In the next section, I will argue that the Bare Contribution Principle is false. An act that contributes to a collectively-caused harm or substantial risk of harm is not sufficient to make the act *pro tanto* wrong. Nevertheless, I think that the Bare Contribution Principle is close to the truth. I will argue that whether and the extent to which making an unnecessary contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk is *pro tanto* wrong can depend on the motivations with which the agent makes the contribution.¹⁶ Showing that, and how, motivations are relevant to wrongdoing in these cases will also help resolve the puzzle I sketched above.

3.

In this section, I argue for the

Motivations Principle: An act performed with certain motivations can be more seriously *pro tanto* morally wrong than an act performed with different motivations, other things being equal.

More specifically, I argue that the Motivations Principle is relevant in cases featuring unnecessary contributions to collectively-caused harms and risks of harm. To do so, I consider a pair of cases, first presented and discussed by Victor Tadros (2011), in which it is highly plausible that the agents' motivations are relevant to the moral status of their acts. I then defend the relevance of the Motivations Principle in these cases against those who reject the principle.

¹⁶ Barry and Overland (2016) argue that the stringency of the duty to avoid making an unnecessary contribution to a collectively-caused harm depends on the motivations with which one acts, but their arguments are very different than the ones presented in what follows.

It should be noted at the outset that the behavior represented in these cases is not intended to be analogous to most individuals' emitting behavior. The cases are primarily intended to establish the broader relevance of the Motivations Principle in cases featuring unnecessary contributions to collectively-caused harms and risks. Additionally, as we shall see, one of the cases serves as a counterexample to the Bare Contribution Principle. In subsequent sections, I will present and discuss cases that represent behavior that is more closely analogous to the emitting behavior of many individuals (at least in some relevant respects), and in which, I argue, the Motivations Principle is also relevant.

As I noted above, the Motivations Principle is controversial among moral philosophers. Philosophers who accept the principle argue that it can help explain a number of widely-held judgments in a range of cases. Consider, for example, the following familiar pair of cases:

Strategic Bomber: A pilot in a just war bombs a munitions factory intending to destroy its productive capacity in order to induce the enemy to surrender. The pilot foresees that bombing the factory will kill some number of innocent civilians who live nearby.

Terror Bomber A pilot in a just war intends to kill some number of innocent civilians living near a munitions factory in order to induce the enemy to surrender. The pilot bombs the munitions factory because bombing this location will ensure that the intended number of innocent civilians are killed.

Suppose that the strategic bomber and the terror bomber perform exactly the same physical movements with exactly the same actual and expected consequences. It is plausible that there are some such circumstances in which the strategic bomber's act would be permissible while the terror bomber's act would be impermissible (e.g., the respective bombings would save 1000 innocent lives by ending the war but kill 100 innocents living nearby). The Motivations Principle appears to help explain this judgment—the bombers act with different motivations. Whereas the strategic bomber kills the civilians as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of destroying the munitions building to end the war, the terror bomber kills the innocent civilians as an intended means of ending the war.

More central to my purposes in this paper, the Motivations Principle appears to be relevant in some cases featuring unnecessary contributions to collectively-caused harms and risks of harm. Tadros (2011) presents a pair of such cases.

Consider, first, the following case, which is adapted from Tadros (2011, p. 159):¹⁷

Intentional Contribution: A mob boss offers a substantial reward for killing V. Each of three agents—M, N, and P—intends to kill V by pouring a vial of lethal poison into V's water supply in order to earn the reward. Each agent knows for certain that each of the other agents will pour her vial close to the same time that she does, and that the poisons will mix before reaching V. Each agent knows that one vial of poison is sufficient to kill V. Each agent also knows that if either one or two vials of poison are poured into V's water supply, V will suffer a very long and agonizing death, but if three or more vials are poured, then V will die very quickly and painlessly. While each agent knows that she cannot affect what any other agent does, each would strongly prefer that no other agent pours their vial (because each wants the reward entirely to herself). Each agent pours her vial of poison into V's water supply, and V dies a quick and painless death as a result.

It is highly plausible that each agent acts seriously wrongly by pouring her vial of poison into V's water supply, even though no agent's act is necessary for V's death, and even though had any one agent refrained from pouring her vial, V would have been significantly worse off as a result.

Yet now consider the following variation (also adapted from Tadros 2011, p. 159):

Palliative Contribution: The same set-up as *Intentional Contribution*, but the third agent is Q (rather than P). While each M and N pours her vial in order to kill V (to collect the reward, as before), Q pours her vial solely to reduce V's suffering. Q would not have poured her vial if doing so would not have reduced V's suffering, and Q will not collect the reward.¹⁸

It is intuitively plausible that Q's act is morally permissible, even though Q contributes to V's death.

Compare, then, P's act in *Intentional Contribution* to Q's act in *Palliative Contribution*. Intuitively, P acts wrongly whereas Q acts permissibly. Yet the agents perform the same physical movements with the same actual and expected consequences. The only difference between P's behavior and Q's behavior is the motivation with which each agent performs her act. P is motivated to kill V as a means of

¹⁷ Much of my subsequent discussion of these cases builds on Tadros' important, though somewhat brief, discussions in his 2011 and 2013.

¹⁸ I assume that V is unable to consent to Q's choice to pour the poison.

earning the reward, whereas Q is motivated to reduce V's suffering.¹⁹ It is plausible, then, that the Motivations Principle is relevant in at least some cases featuring unnecessary contributions to a collectively-caused harm (Tadros, 2011).

Those who reject the Motivations Principle typically claim that although an agent's motivations are not relevant to the moral status of the agent's act, an agent's motivations are often relevant to the evaluation of the agent's moral *character* (how morally good or bad the agent is) and, perhaps, how morally *blameworthy* the agent is.²⁰ These philosophers would therefore respond to the pair of cases presented above by claiming that although we may naively believe that our intuitive judgments are tracking differences in the moral status of the acts of P and Q, our judgments are really tracking differences in the agents' moral characters or moral blameworthiness.²¹ So these philosophers would claim that the pair of cases give us strong evidence that P is a bad person and that Q is a good person, or that P but not Q is liable to blame. But regarding the moral status of the acts themselves, either both acts are morally permissible or both are morally impermissible.

One problem with this position is that it is genuinely unclear whether we should say that P's act and Q's act are both permissible or that both are impermissible (cf. Tadros, 2013). Are both acts wrong because both contribute to killing an innocent person, or are both permissible because both save an innocent person from suffering a horribly painful death? Neither option is appealing.

Suppose that both acts are morally permissible. Given that in *Intentional Contribution*, M, N, and P are identically situated, each of their acts would be morally permissible. This implies that an innocent person is killed by three agents acting independently, each of whom intends to kill V for money, and yet no agent does anything wrong. This implication is highly counterintuitive. Moreover, if wrongdoing is necessary for liability to pay compensation (as seems plausible), then none of the agents would owe compensation to V's family.²² If wrongdoing is necessary

¹⁹ There is perhaps a question concerning whether Q intends to *kill* V in order to reduce V's suffering. I'm not sure (perhaps we can describe the case in different ways), but I do not think that it matters morally, given that Q's sole, *ultimate* aim is to reduce V's suffering.

²⁰ See, for example, Thomson 1999, Scanlon 2008, and Norcross 1991. I should note that those who wish to hold that an agent's motivations are relevant to their blameworthiness must specify for *what* the agent is blameworthy. It seems implausible that an agent could be blameworthy for performing a permissible act. Therefore, it seems that the agent would have to be blameworthy either for their bad motivations (e.g., bad intentions or desires), or perhaps for acting on their bad motivations (if indeed this can be distinguished from blameworthiness for performing the act itself).

²¹ See esp. Norcross (1991) who argues that those who judge that intentions (or motivations) are relevant to wrongdoing are mistaken as to what their judgments are tracking.

²² Perhaps one could say that each agent acts *pro tanto* wrongly, but not all-things-considered wrongly. Since it is plausible that an agent can be liable to pay compensation on the basis of acting merely *pro tanto* wrongly, this would allow one to say that each can be liable to compensate V's family. First, this response does not address the question of liability to punishment, which plausibly requires all-things-

for punishment (as seems even more plausible), then none of the agents would be liable to punishment. Again, these implications are highly counterintuitive.

Suppose instead that the acts of P and Q are both morally impermissible. This would mean that Q acts wrongly even though Q intentionally saves V from suffering a horrible death. Moreover, because Q is a fully responsible moral agent (we can assume) who knows all of the relevant non-moral facts about the situation, presumably Q is also *culpable* for wrongly contributing to V's death—that is, Q does not have either justification or excuse for her wrongful act. Insofar as she is culpable for wrongly contributing to V's death, presumably Q would be liable both to compensation and to punishment. These implications are counterintuitive.

Yet if the Motivations Principle is true, then we can provide the following straightforward and compelling evaluation of P and Q's behavior. In *Palliative Contribution*, Q's act is morally permissible, and Q is morally praiseworthy for saving V from horrible suffering (despite the fact that Q's act also contributes to V's death). By contrast, in *Intentional Contribution*, P's act is morally impermissible, and P is culpable for wrongly contributing to V's death (despite the fact that P's act also saves V from horrible suffering). Moreover, because P (but not Q) is culpable for wrongly contributing to V's death, P (but not Q) is liable both to compensation and to punishment.

Consider now the question of whether Q's act is even *pro tanto* wrong. It seems to me that Q's act does not wrong V and so is not *pro tanto* wrong. Q's situation seems to be relevantly similar to a situation in which an agent harms a person in a respect in order to prevent a worse harm to that person. In these cases, the agent typically does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly. Suppose, for example, that I cut off your leg because if I do not, then you will die from infection. Although I harm you in a respect by cutting off your leg, I do not wrong you, given that cutting off your leg prevents a greater harm (this assumes, of course, that I am motivated to prevent this greater harm and not, for example, to cause you great agony).²³ Similarly, we should say that Q does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly by pouring her poison.

If I am correct, then despite contributing to a collectively-caused harm, Q does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly. Thus, *Palliative Contribution* is a counterexample to the Bare Contribution Principle. That an act contributes to a harm or substantial

considered wrongdoing. Second, it seems odd to hold that a person is harmed by an action in a way that wrongs the person, but that the person is simultaneously benefited by the action in a way that makes the wrongdoing permissible. It is of course common for a permissible act to both harm someone in a respect but benefit the person overall (e.g., cutting off one's leg to stop the spread of infection). But typically in such cases, it does not seem that the act wrongs the person. It does not, for instance, seem that compensation is owed in these cases. See my discussion of whether Q acts *pro tanto* wrongly, below.

²³ This judgment also presupposes that the person either consents to the procedure or is unable to give consent.

risk of harm is not sufficient to make the act even *pro tanto* wrong. Whether a contribution to a harm or risk is *pro tanto* wrong can depend on the motivations with which the agent makes the contribution.

It is important to say something about why motivations are relevant to wrongdoing in *Intentional Contribution* and *Palliative Contribution*. Consider the following, familiar account of the relevance of motivations to wrongdoing, which we can call *the respect account*.²⁴ According to the respect account, acting with certain motivations can be tantamount to disrespecting a being who, in virtue of the being's high moral status (their *personhood*), deserves respect. Given that agents have a strong moral reason to respect beings who deserve respect, that one's act disrespects a person is a significant wrong-making feature of the act. Therefore, acting with certain motivations can be a significant wrong-making feature of one's act.

The respect account is compatible with different theories concerning which motivations are morally significant to which acts. It is plausible, and also widely held among philosophers who endorse the respect account, that an agent can disrespect a person by harming the person as an intended means of fulfilling the agent's ends.²⁵ Typically, to harm a person as an intended means of fulfilling one's ends is to regard and treat that person as an object, available for use by the agent, rather than as a being who is an end-in-herself.²⁶ For example, when the terror bomber kills the innocent civilians as a means of ending the war, the bomber arguably regards and treats these civilians as objects and not as persons with ends of their own. It is plausible, then, that harming a person as an intended means of fulfilling one's ends can be more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than other forms of harming, other things being equal.²⁷

The respect account, together with the claim that it is disrespectful to harm a person as an intended means of fulfilling one's ends, can accommodate the judgment that in *Intentional Contribution*, P acts wrongly by pouring the vial of poison into V's water supply, while in *Palliative Contribution*, Q acts permissibly by doing the same. P contributes to killing V as an intended means of fulfilling P's end of securing the reward. Therefore, P acts in a way that is tantamount to disrespecting V, which is seriously *pro tanto* wrong. By contrast, even though Q contributes to V's

²⁴ This basic account is endorsed, in some form, by Quinn (1989), Liao (2012), Nelkin and Rickless (2014) among many others. Tadros (2011, Ch. 7) also appears to endorse a version of the account. My presentation of this account draws on Liao's (2012) presentation of it. Liao attributes the account to Kant and Quinn.

²⁵ E.g., Liao 2012, Quinn 1989, Nelkin and Rickless 2014, Tadros 2011.

²⁶ Liao 2012, cf Quinn 1989.

²⁷ This claim is captured, more formally, by the well-known Doctrine of Double Effect, which (in one of its formulations) holds that harming as an intended means of fulfilling one's ends is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than harming as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of pursuing one's ends, other things being equal.

death, Q is motivated solely to benefit V. Q does not regard or treat V as a means of fulfilling Q's end. Rather, Q regards and treats V as an end-in-herself, as a being who deserves respect. So although Q contributes to V's death, Q does not act in a way that is tantamount to disrespecting V. Therefore, Q's act lacks a significant wrong-making feature that P's act has.

Note again that neither P's act nor Q's act is (or is intended to be) analogous to the performance of emitting activities by ordinary individuals. Virtually no one, I assume, performs emitting activities intending to cause climate change-induced harm as a means of fulfilling their ends. Moreover, relatively few people perform emitting activities intending to ameliorate the climate change-induced harms that others have suffered or are at risk of suffering. Rather, it seems that most individuals who perform emitting activities are motivated to benefit themselves or those specially related to them, and contribute to climate change-induced harms and risks as foreseen (or at least foreseeable) side-effects of pursuing these ends.

In the next section, I will discuss cases that are, in some important respects, more analogous to the performance of emitting activities by ordinary individuals. More specifically, I will argue that there are morally relevant differences among the motivations of agents who contribute to a collectively-caused harm or risk as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of pursuing their ends. I will also extend the respect account to explain why these differences are morally relevant.

4.

To begin examining the morally relevant differences among the motivations of agents who contribute to a collectively-caused harm or risk as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of pursuing their ends, consider the following case. The reader will notice that this case is *Unnecessary Contribution* from Section 2 but with a few additional details.

Indifferent Contribution (Self-Interest): Each of three agents—A, B, and C— independently dumps a bucket of the same kind of chemical waste from his malfunctioning heating unit (which is far too expensive to replace at this time) into a creek that feeds into V's water supply. The wastes completely mix before reaching V's water supply. Each dumps the waste in the creek to avoid an otherwise unavoidable moderately expensive disposal cost. At the time of acting, each agent knows for certain that (a) if one or fewer buckets of waste is dumped, then V will not suffer any harm at all, but (b) if more than one bucket of waste is dumped, then V will go permanently blind. Each agent knows for certain that no one else is at risk of being harmed, and that V will not suffer a harm greater than

blindness, no matter how much waste is dumped. Finally, each agent knows for certain that the other two agents will dump their waste close to the same time that he does and that he cannot affect what the other agents do. Each agent dumps his waste solely to avoid the disposal cost, and each agent would have dumped his waste to avoid the cost even had his contribution been individually necessary for V's blindness.²⁸ For example, each would have dumped his waste even had one (or both) of the other agents failed to dump his waste. V drinks the water and goes permanently blind.

Each agent makes an unnecessary contribution to V's blindness as a foreseen but unintended side-effect of benefiting himself (avoiding the disposal cost). Nevertheless, it is highly plausible that each agent acts wrongly. Here is a short argument for that conclusion. Given that all agents perform the same act with the same actual and expected consequences and the same motivations, either all of the agents act wrongly or all act permissibly. It is implausible that all act permissibly. This is because it is implausible that three agents can act in ways that jointly cause a person to go blind while generating only modest benefits for themselves but no agent acts wrongly. Therefore, each agent acts wrongly.

In this case, what makes each of their acts wrong is not, or is not merely, that each is motivated by self-interest, though it is at least plausible that this is relevant to the extent to which the act is wrong. I will say more about the relevance of self-interest below. For now, it will be helpful to introduce and consider a case similar to *Indifferent Contribution (Self-Interest)*, but where each agent is instead motivated by benevolence. Doing so will help focus our attention on a feature that is common to the agents' motivations in both variations and that is morally significant.

Consider, then, a variation of the case in which three agents (G, H, and J) each dumps his waste not to avoid the disposal cost, but solely in order to soothe a stranger's very painful stomach ache (each agent's dumping his waste soothes the stomach ache of exactly one stranger; three strangers in total have their stomach aches soothed).²⁹ As before, each agent would have dumped his waste to soothe the stomach ache even had his contribution been individually necessary for V's blindness. Call this variation *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)*. It is highly plausible that each agent acts wrongly in this variation as well. As before, it is hard to believe that three agents can act in ways that jointly cause a person to go perma-

²⁸ Assume, also, that each agent would know that his contribution is necessary for the harm.

²⁹ We can tell a story about how this is supposed to work. Suppose that each agent dumps his waste into the creek at a different point. Before mixing with the other waste, a tiny bit of the waste seeps into the stranger's water supply. The bit of waste mixes with a certain chemical in that person's pipes, and the resulting mixture has stomach-ache soothing effects. Yet enough of the agent's waste makes its way into V's water supply to mix with the other agents' waste, resulting in V's blindness.

nently blind while producing modest benefits for three different persons but no agent acts wrongly.

I suggest that in both variations of *Indifferent Contribution*, it is morally significant that each agent *would have* dumped his waste in pursuit of his end (either the self-interested one or the benevolent one) even in circumstances in which his contribution is necessary for the harm to occur. More formally, I suggest that the following principle is both true and relevant in both variations of *Indifferent Contribution*:

Counterfactual Independent Impermissibility Principle (CIIP): An act that causes or contributes to a collectively-caused harm or substantial risk of harm as a foreseen (or foreseeable) *side-effect* of pursuing some end can be more seriously *pro tanto* wrong when and to the extent that the agent would have performed the act in pursuit of the end in circumstances in which the act is independently impermissible, other things being equal.

Let me clarify a few aspects of CIIP before arguing for its relevance in *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)*. (I will focus primarily on this variation since it does not have a potentially confounding factor—the self-interested motive—that the *Self-Interest* variation has).

First, an act is *independently impermissible* if the act is all-things-considered morally impermissible independently of the motivations with which the agent performs the act.³⁰ For example, an act is typically independently impermissible when the act foreseeably causes harm to an innocent person but does not prevent a much greater harm or produce a much greater good.³¹

Second, CIIP describes a respect in which motivations can be relevant to wrongdoing. This is because there is an important relationship between an agent's motivations with which she performs an act and what the agent would have done in

³⁰ I borrow the term “independently impermissible” from Walen 2006. Walen’s “Doctrine of Illicit Intentions” has some overlap with my CIIP. Roughly, the Doctrine of Illicit Intentions holds that it is impermissible to form an intention that would direct one to perform independently impermissible acts in various circumstances, even if one only performs independently permissible acts. Walen denies, however, that forming such an intention is directly relevant to the wrongdoing of the (independently permissible) acts that one does perform. CIIP, by contrast, holds that acting with such an intention can be directly relevant to the wrongdoing of one’s act.

CIIP also has some overlap with a proposal put forward by Pinkert (2015). Pinkert argues that act consequentialism should be supplemented with a principle that holds that agents ought to be such that they would act optimally in counterfactual scenarios. However, Pinkert interprets this principle as a requirement of moral virtue. So it seems to me that failing to meet this requirement is a defect in moral *character* (rather than a defect in one’s act).

³¹ Moreover, the terror bomber’s bombing is independently impermissible in all and only the circumstances the strategic bomber’s bombing is independently impermissible.

different circumstances. We can describe this relationship in at least two different ways, depending on one's underlying theory of action. First, we can say that, in general, an agent's intention with which she performs some act is very complex, directing an agent's behavior in pursuit of some end across a range of circumstances. So, for example, an agent's intention with which the agent performs an act A_1 to achieve some end E_1 in circumstances C_1 directs the agent to perform A_1 to achieve E_1 if C_1 , (or C_2 or C_3) obtains, and to perform A_2 to achieve E_1 if C_4 , C_5 , or C_6 obtains, but to abandon E_1 if C_7 , C_8 , or C_9 obtains, etc.³² Thus, an agent's intention with which the agent performs an act to achieve some end in some circumstances also determines which acts the agent would have performed to achieve that end had different circumstances obtained. An agent's underlying motivational mental states—her beliefs, desires, dispositions, etc.—determine the precise character of this complex intention.

Alternatively, we might say that an agent's intention directs the agent to perform an act for an end across a range of circumstances. So an agent's intention with which the agent performs an act A_1 to achieve some end E_1 in circumstances C_1 directs the agent to perform A_1 to achieve E_1 if C_1 (or C_2 or C_3) obtains. But had C_4 , C_5 , or C_6 obtained, the agent would have had a different intention directing the agent to perform A_2 to achieve E_1 . Had C_7 , C_8 , or C_9 obtained, the agent would have had yet a different intention directing the agent to perform A_3 to achieve a different end E_2 , and so on. On this picture, which intention an agent has, and hence which act the agent performs for which end in which circumstances, is determined by an agent's underlying motivational mental states—her beliefs, desires, etc. Moreover, which intention the agent would have had, and hence which acts the agent would have performed to achieve the same end had different circumstances obtained, is also determined by the agent's underlying motivational mental states.

To show that CIIP is relevant in *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)*, let's take a closer look at the act of one of the agents, J. Recall that the case stipulates that J would have dumped the waste in order to prevent the stomach ache even in circumstances in which dumping the waste is necessary for V's going blind (e.g., circumstances in which exactly one of G or H dumps their waste). It is clearly impermissible, independently of one's motivations, to make a necessary contribution to a person's going blind where the only benefit is the prevention of a different person's stomach ache. So if J's act is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than an otherwise identical act in which the agent would not have performed an independently impermissible act had different circumstances obtained, other things being equal, then this is strong evidence that CIIP is relevant in *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)*.

³² This is, roughly, how Walen (2005) describes intentions.

To test this, consider now a variation of the case. Suppose that, as in *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)*, each G and H dumps his waste to prevent a stomach ache, and each would have dumped his waste had doing so been necessary for V's blindness. However, suppose now that the third agent—K, rather than J—also dumps his waste, but would not have done so in any circumstances in which dumping the waste individually increases the risk that V, or anyone else, suffers harm. Call this case *Conditional Contribution (Benevolent)*.

It is plausible, I believe, that K (though *not* G or H) acts permissibly. Suppose that K justifies his choice to dump the waste as follows: "I am certain that V will go blind regardless of whether I dump the waste. Additionally, I am certain that dumping the waste will not result either in V suffering a harm greater than blindness or in anyone else suffering any harm. On the other hand, if I dump the waste, then I will prevent someone from suffering a comparatively small though morally significant harm. Moreover, I choose to dump the waste only *because* I am certain that my action will not individually make things worse for anyone. So I am permitted to dump the waste in order to prevent the stomach ache." This justification strikes me as compelling. Moreover, it seems like a justification that even V herself could accept. I suggest, then, that K acts permissibly.

Note that this result does not overgeneralize. Neither G nor H can make equivalent claims to justify *their* actions, for two reasons. First, neither G nor H can claim that he chooses to dump his waste only because he is certain that his action will not individually make things worse for anyone. As the case stipulates, each would have dumped his waste even in circumstances in which his contribution is necessary for V's going blind. Second, given that K would not have dumped his waste unless he could be certain that he would not individually make anyone worse off, neither G nor H can claim that V will go blind regardless of what the agent himself does. Consider, for example, that if (counterfactually) G were to refrain from dumping his waste, then K would not dump his waste either. A situation in which G refrains from dumping his waste is one where K cannot be certain that *his* dumping would not individually cause harm to V. Therefore, K would not dump his waste, and V would not suffer any harm. Therefore, G cannot assert that V would suffer the same amount of harm regardless of what G does. The same reasoning applies to H, *mutatis mutandis*.³³

If I am correct, then while J's act is morally impermissible, K's act is morally permissible. CIIP explains why. K would have not have dumped his waste to prevent the stomach ache in circumstances in which dumping the waste to prevent the

³³ This also shows that if even two of the agents were properly motivated, such that, for example, each would have dumped his waste only in circumstances that his act does not individually increase the risk of harm to anyone, then V would not have suffered any harm.

stomach ache individually increases the risk of harm to anyone. Therefore, K would not have dumped his waste to prevent the stomach ache in circumstances in which dumping his waste to prevent the stomach ache is independently impermissible. On the other hand, J would have dumped his waste to prevent the stomach ache in many circumstances in which dumping the waste is independently impermissible.

The respect account can provide some theoretical support to CIIP and its relevance in *Indifferent Contribution* and *Conditional Contribution*. Recall that the respect account holds that acting with certain motivations can be tantamount to disrespecting a being who, in virtue of their moral status, deserves respect. And because we ought not to disrespect beings who deserve respect, an act performed with certain motivations can make the act more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than an act performed with different motivations, other things being equal.

Following many other philosophers, I claimed that harming a person as an intended means of pursuing one's ends is tantamount to disrespecting the person.³⁴ To harm a person as an intended means of pursuing one's ends is to regard and treat the person as an object, available for one's use, rather than as a being with ends of her own. But harming a person as an intended means of pursuing one's end is not the only way that acting with certain motivations can be tantamount to disrespecting a person. It is also disrespectful to a person to regard and treat them as a being whose ends do not matter morally, or do not matter as much as they actually do, and thus whose ends can be ignored or discounted in pursuit of one's own ends. To regard and treat a person this way is not, or need not be, equivalent to regarding and treating the person as a being who is available for one's use. Compare: an object can be something that is useful to me, but it can also just be something that can be ignored or even destroyed as I pursue my ends, given that the object has no morally significant ends of its own. Similarly, one can regard and treat a person as an object of this latter sort. To do so is to regard and treat the person as a being whose ends, even their most important ends, can be ignored or discounted, and thus can be reliably *sacrificed* as a side-effect of pursuing one's ends, even one's lesser ends.

This account can accommodate our judgments in *Indifferent Contribution (Benevolent)* and *Conditional Contribution (Benevolent)*. Because J contributes to a harm to V as a side-effect of pursuing his end, and would have contributed for the sake of that end even had his contribution been individually necessary for the harm to V, it seems that J ignores or at least significantly discounts V's interests in service of J's own ends. J regards and treats V as if V's interests do not matter, or matter very little, which is tantamount to disrespecting V. By contrast, although K contributes to a harm to V, K would have constrained his behavior had doing so made a differen-

³⁴ E.g., Liao 2012, Quinn 1989, Nelkin and Rickless 2014, Tadros 2011.

ce to whether or the extent to which V is harmed or at risk of being harmed. Thus, it seems that K is motivated to consider fully V's interests in deciding what to do. Thus, K's contribution does not seem to be tantamount to disrespecting V.³⁵

5.

There are three further questions that I will raise in this section. I shall only be able to address each of them briefly, and my conclusions will be correspondingly sketchy. I hope to say more in the larger work.

First, should we say that K acts even *pro tanto* wrongly? Does K *wrong* V, even if he does so permissibly? If K does not act *pro tanto* wrongly, then *Conditional Contribution (Benevolent)* would serve as a second counterexample to the Bare Contribution Principle.

I am doubtful that K acts *pro tanto* wrongly. But to address this question, it will be helpful first to introduce the second question, which is this: What is the relevance to wrongdoing of an agent's contributing to a harm or risk as a side-effect of pursuing a self-interested end as opposed to a benevolent one? How, for example, should we evaluate *Indifferent Contribution (Self-Interest)* and the corresponding *Conditional Contribution (Self-Interest)*? Recall that in *Indifferent Contribution (Self-Interest)*, each A, B, and C dumps his waste to avoid paying a moderate disposal cost, and each would have dumped his waste to avoid paying the cost even in circumstances in which the contribution is individually necessary for the harm to V. By contrast, in *Conditional Contribution (Self-Interest)*, the third agent, D (rather than C) would have refrained from dumping his waste to avoid the cost in circumstances in which his contribution individually increases the risk that V, or anyone else, suffers harm.

Let's compare the acts of C and D. It seems clear that C acts wrongly. It also seems that C's act is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than D's act. As with the difference between J's act and K's act, CIIP can help explain why. D would not have dumped his waste to avoid the disposal cost in many circumstances in which dumping the waste to avoid the cost is independently impermissible, while C would have dumped his waste to avoid the cost in those circumstances (but not vice versa). Unlike C, D takes into consideration V's interests in his choice to dump his waste, and so does not seem to regard and treat V as if his interests do not matter, or matter very little. So D's act lacks a significant wrong-making feature that C's act has.

Yet D's act seems more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than K's act (in *Conditional Contribution (Benevolent)*). I suspect that this judgment primarily concerns the fact

³⁵ Although I have not discussed the relevance of CIIP to ordinary individuals' performance of emitting activities, I hope that the reader can anticipate—if only in broad strokes—what I will argue. As I've said, I'm developing this account for a larger work.

that the interest for which K acts is more important, morally, than the interest for which D acts, rather than whether the act is motivated by self-interest or benevolence. Holding all else equal, if D instead dumps his waste to prevent his *own* stomach ache, then it no longer seems that D's act is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than K's act. Similarly, if K instead dumps his waste to ensure that someone else is able to avoid a monetary cost equivalent to the disposal cost that D avoids, then it does not seem that K's act is more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than D's act.

Yet the fact that D's act (dumping the waste to avoid the disposal cost to himself) seems more seriously *pro tanto* wrong than K's act (dumping the waste to prevent the stranger's stomach ache) indicates that D's act is *pro tanto* wrong. This also seems to accord with my intuitions regarding D's liability to pay compensation. D seems liable to compensate V, at least if G and H are unwilling or unable to pay.

However, we might think that D has a duty to compensate V, but still reject the claim that D owes compensation for acting *pro tanto* wrongly, i.e., for wronging V.³⁶ It seems possible that D's duty to compensate V is part of a more complex duty to V, which can be fulfilled *either* by (a) avoiding contributing to the harm in the first place, or (b) contributing to the harm with appropriate motivations *and* sharing the benefits of contributing with V in some way. This picture is attractive, since fulfilling the duty to V by choosing (b) would ensure that V is better off than she would have been had D not contributed (and D is better off as well). Thinking of the duty in this way also accords with the judgment that in *Palliative Contribution*, Q does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly by pouring her poison with the intention to limit V's suffering. Q could have fulfilled her duty to V either by (a) not contributing to the harm, or (b) contributing with the appropriate motivations and benefitting V in some way. By choosing (b), Q fulfills her duty to V, and thus does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly.³⁷

It is more difficult to figure out how this complex duty would apply to K, if it even does. Suppose that K's duty to V is complex and can be fulfilled either by (a) not dumping the waste, or (b) dumping the waste with appropriate motivations and compensating V. Yet perhaps because K is not the one who ultimately benefits from K's act, it should be the person whose stomach ache was prevented that should pay some compensation to V. On the other hand, because K's act was not sanctioned by the beneficiary, perhaps K should make the payment after all. Still yet, perhaps we should just reject that *either* K or the beneficiary has a duty to compensate V.

These are difficult questions that I cannot resolve here. My inclination is to say

³⁶ At least initially; If D fails to compensate V, then D would incur a more stringent duty (of corrective justice) to compensate V in virtue of having wronged V.

³⁷ On this picture, the intuition that D acts at least *pro tanto* wrongly would be explained by the fact that D has not yet compensated V.

that neither K nor the beneficiary has a duty to compensate V, and that K does not act even *pro tanto* wrongly by contributing to the harm with appropriate motivations. However, I might think differently if the benefit were fungible and thus could be more easily distributed between the beneficiary of K's act and V (e.g., if the benefit was a monetary benefit, rather than a prevented stomach ache). There is obviously much more to say here.

The final question I will briefly address is whether, and how, motivations are relevant to wrongdoing when an agent makes an unnecessary contribution to a collectively-caused harm or risk, but is culpably ignorant that her act has these effects. In short, it seems that CIIP is relevant in such cases as well. An agent who causes or contributes to a harm or risk as a side-effect of pursuing some end but is culpably ignorant that her act would have these effects would have performed the act for that end across a range of circumstances, including many in which performing the act for that end is independently impermissible. Hence, the act has a significant wrong-making feature.

We can support the application of CIIP to cases of culpable ignorance by appealing to the respect account. Respecting a person involves determining, in accordance with one's abilities and available evidence, the effects that one's acts will or may have on the person. One need not necessarily aim for certainty as to whether one's acts will cause or contribute to harm or risks of harm, but one should at least take reasonable steps to determine whether they will. If one does not take these steps and one's act does cause or contribute to a harm or risk, then one treats and regards the person who is harmed or put at risk as if their interests do not matter, or matter very little, even if one's contribution is unnecessary for the harm or risk to occur. This is tantamount to disrespecting the person who is harmed.

6.

I have drawn some conclusions about how motivations can be relevant to wrongdoing in cases featuring unnecessary contributions to collectively-caused harms and risks of harm. I have not, however, said much about how these conclusions apply to the evaluation individuals' emitting behavior. That will be the project for the larger work.

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