Women's Fertility Autonomy in Urban China: The Role of Couple Dynamics Under the Universal Two-Child Policy

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Author Note

This manuscript is a preprint. An updated version (available upon request) has been conditionally accepted for publication in the *Chinese Sociological Review*'s special issue on Gender Dynamics in China.

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Abstract

Under China's universal two-child policy, decisions about whether to have a second birth become more dynamic, flexible, and subject to negotiation between the spouses; moreover, how women can maintain their fertility autonomy has far-reaching implications for gender equality. Using valuable, new data from the *2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-Making Processes in Chinese Families*, we examine the relationship between couple dynamics and women's fertility autonomy in urban China. If women want no more than one child and already have one, intending to have a second birth indicates low fertility autonomy. Couple dynamics are measured by conjugal power structure and spousal pressure on fertility. We find that only if women have less marital power than their husbands, greater fertility pressure from husband is associated with a higher likelihood that women intend to have a second birth. In addition, when investigating the determinants of couple dynamics, we find that women's marital power depends on their relative resources, whereas fertility pressure from husband persists regardless. The findings suggest that in post-reform urban China, growing gender inequalities in labor markets likely reduce women's marital power, which in turn negatively affects their fertility autonomy. We urge greater research and policy attention to gender equality issues in the era of the universal two-child policy.

INTRODUCTION

Chinese couples' reproductive choices are profoundly affected and constrained by fertility policies, particularly the well-known one-child policy that was strictly enforced in urban areas for more than three decades (Gu et al. 2007; Wang, Cai, and Gu 2013). A universal two-child policy was launched by the Chinese government on January 1, 2016; since then, all couples have been allowed to have two children, regardless of their household registration type (i.e., urban or rural *hukou*), region, ethnicity, and sibship size (National Health and Family Planning Commission of the PRC 2015; 2016). Because of this major policy change, approximately an additional 90 million women have become eligible to have a second child (Zhai, Li, and Chen 2016). The demographic, social, and economic implications of the universal two-child policy are of great public interest and policy concern. While a few studies have estimated the long-term effects of this new policy on fertility level and population aging (e.g., Zeng and Hesketh 2016; Zheng 2016), little attention has been paid to the important question of how women's status and gender inequality may change in the era of the universal two-child policy.

In a recent paper on gender inequality in post-reform urban China, Ji and colleagues (2017) argue that as China has transitioned from a socialist centralized economy to a profit-driven market economy, the state has retreated from providing socialist welfare such as publicly-funded childcare services and from promoting gender egalitarian ideology. Consequently, public and private spheres have become increasingly separated and gender inequality (e.g., in employment and earnings) has worsened in recent decades (Attané 2012; Ji et al. 2017). Notably even in the era of the one-child policy, women's disadvantages in urban labor markets were strongly and increasingly related to parenthood (Zhang and Hannum 2015; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang 2008). Hence, under the universal two-child policy, given the state-driven privatization of

childcare services and the weakening of gender equity ideology (Ji et al. 2017), women's fertility autonomy, in particular their ability to stop childbearing when they want no more children, has far-reaching implications for gender equality in urban China.

The current study tackles the important and timely issue of women's fertility autonomy in urban China under the universal two-child policy. Women's fertility autonomy can be defined as the ability of women to influence and control their fertility. Before the universal two-child policy was launched, couples' decisions regarding family size varied largely by differential fertility policies that they were subject to (Gu et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2013); hence, fertility decision-making was relatively homogeneous regardless of gender relations between the spouses. In contrast, in the era of the universal two-child policy, whether or not to have a second birth becomes a more flexible decision that is highly subject to negotiation between the spouses. Unfortunately, previous studies on fertility decision-making and outcomes of Chinese couples have almost exclusively focused on the impact of women's characteristics (e.g., Luo and Mao 2014; Zheng et al. 2009). We therefore contribute to the literature by considering the role of couple dynamics. Specifically, based on prior research reviewed in great detail below, we operationalize couple dynamics as conjugal power structure and spousal pressure on fertility, and investigate how they work together to shape women's fertility autonomy.

To be clear, in light of the newly-launched universal two-child policy, the central goal of this study is to investigate the question: how would factors reflecting couple dynamics influence whether or not women intend to have a second birth if they want no more than two children and have already had one child? The correspondence of women's fertility desires and intentions (i.e., desiring and planning *not* to have a second child) indicates their fertility autonomy. China provides a unique social context to explore this question. On the one hand, having long been

influenced by the Confucian culture, Chinese families are in a highly gender-stratified system characterized by patriarchal hierarchy and place a high value on continuing the family line (Slote and DeVos 1998). On the other hand, with dramatic socioeconomic transformations and rapid progress in women's educational attainment in recent decades (Treiman 2013), urban Chinese families seem to have reached a stage where husbands and wives share relatively equal marital power (Xu 2011). In light of the coexistence of traditional familial values and modern couple dynamics (Ji 2015), how would gender relations in the family influence women's fertility autonomy? While the one-child policy hid the heterogeneity in fertility decisions among Chinese families, the implementation of the universal two-child policy opens up the possibility that gender relations and power dynamics in marriage influence fertility behaviors of urban women.

In addition, to advance understanding of couple dynamics, we draw on a resource-based view (Blood and Wolfe 1960) to address the further question: "What factors contribute to women's marital power and perceived fertility pressure from their husbands in urban China?" This part of analysis sheds light on how women could enhance their marital power or alleviate perceptions of spousal pressure on fertility. These insights are crucial to helping women maintain their fertility autonomy under the universal two-child policy, because our empirical results concerning fertility autonomy demonstrate that women's marital power and perceived fertility pressure from their husbands play a central role in shaping their reproductive decision-making.

This paper is organized as follows. We first review relevant work on fertility autonomy and our two measures of couple dynamics (i.e., marital power and spousal pressure on fertility), and derive our hypotheses accordingly. Next, we describe the data and methods, followed by the empirical results for the impact of couple dynamics on women's fertility autonomy as well as the determinants of couple dynamics in urban China. We conclude with a discussion of key findings.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Fertility Autonomy

Women's autonomy is usually defined as "their influence over interpersonal issues…the ability to formulate strategic choices, control resources and participate in decision-making (Upadhyay and Hindin 2005:2643)." Relatedly, women's fertility autonomy refers to the ability of women to influence and control their fertility. In this study, we situate women's fertility autonomy in the context of China's universal two-child policy and operationalize it as whether women's fertility decisions to have a second child align with their fertility desires. Specifically, we focus on whether women *intend to* have a second child, despite the fact that they have achieved their desired family size (i.e., desire no more than one child and already have one child). Ideally, we should measure actual fertility behaviors (i.e., having a second birth or not). However, the universal two-child policy had been implemented for only three months at the time of the survey that we analyze in this study. Due to the short exposure time, very few female respondents had taken action (i.e., having two children or being pregnant) in response to the new policy. Considering the close link between fertility intentions and behaviors (Bongaarts 2001), we instead examine fertility intentions and use the correspondence of women's fertility desires and intentions as an indicator of their fertility autonomy.

In fact, fertility intention, as an essential component of the fertility decision-making process, is an important topic in fertility research (Bachrach and Morgan 2013; Bongaarts 1992). Even though fertility intentions and behaviors do not always correspond (Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003; Hagewen and Morgan 2005), fertility intentions play a central role in understanding observed fertility levels (Bongaarts 2001). Two influential theoretical frameworks—the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991) and the Traits-Desires-Intentions-

Behavior framework (Miller and Pasta 1993; Miller 1994)—both conceptualize fertility behavior as a sequence in which the formulation of fertility intentions occurs prior to childbearing and the implementation of such intentions leads to the corresponding reproductive behavior. Moreover, factors shaping fertility intentions are also shown to influence childbearing behaviors (Balbo and Mills 2011). An investigation into the determinants of fertility intention can therefore advance understanding of fertility decision-making processes.

Couple Dynamics and Fertility Autonomy

If women want no more than one child and have already had one, why would some of them intend to have a second birth, which obviously runs against their fertility desires? It is very likely that the discrepancy between women's fertility desires and intentions arises from the influence of other family members, in particular their husbands. Theoretically, the notion of "linked lives" (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003) highlights the interdependence between the spouses and underscores the need to examine the influence that husbands have on women's fertility decision-making processes and outcomes. Indeed, the role of significant others in shaping women's reproductive attitudes and behaviors has received increased scholarly attention. Miller and colleagues (2004) extend an influential Traits-Desires-Intentions-Behavior framework for modeling fertility motivation and behavior to a couple-based version: they incorporated the interactions between partners and the perceptions of the partner in all stages of the sequence by which motivational traits are translated via conscious desires and intentions into childbearing behaviors. In short, fertility decision-making is never solely upon women; the role of husbands in reproductive decision-making processes should not be neglected.

In addition to theoretical considerations, empirical research also shows that fertility-related decision-making involves family-level, in particularly couple-level, processes of communication, influence, and interaction (Miller, Severy, and Pasta 2004). In some social contexts, husbands may, however, play a dominant role in reproductive decision-making such that spousal influence often operates from husband to wife, rather than being mutual or reciprocal (Ezeh 1993). In patriarchal cultures, men are more likely than women to exert a greater influence on fertility decisions due to gendered power relations in the family systems, in addition to high levels of gender inequality outside the home (Beckman 1983; Testa 2012). One important way that husbands can influence fertility decision-making is to impose pressure upon their wives during their daily interactions as attempts to realize their reproductive preferences (Beckman 1983). How women would act under undue pressure−whether they defer to their husbands or implement their own fertility preferences−likely depends heavily on the intra-household distribution of bargaining power (Jansen and Liefbroer 2006). Taken together, the current study considers two dimensions of couple dynamics—gendered power relations and perceived spousal pressure on fertility, and investigate their implications for women's fertility autonomy in urban China. In doing so, this study helps clarify the mechanisms of fertility decision-making processes through which women's reproductive behaviors and outcomes are influenced by their husbands. Below, we review prior research related to each dimension of couple dynamics and fertility decision-making.

Fertility pressure from husband

Men tend to want more children and report stronger son preferences than do women (See Mason and Taj 1987 for a review); such gender differences in reproductive preferences and goals may

exert pressure and stress on women which in turn change women's fertility behaviors. For example, the husband's pronatalism is important in explaining why women who want no more children fail to use birth control methods or to protect themselves from pregnancy, especially in the more highly gender-stratified contexts (Bankole and Singh 1998; Ezeh 1993; Mason and Smith 2000). Prior research has demonstrated that one spouse's use of pressure serves as a form of social control and helps shape the other spouse's health behavior (Stephens et al. 2009; Westmaas, Wild, and Ferrence 2002). Pressure shapes individuals' perceptions of what significant others approve or disapprove of, which in turn may influence their actions; this is because drawing on those perceptions, individuals weigh the social costs and benefits and then decide to accept or ignore the opinions or attitudes of significant others (Bernardi 2003). Hence, husbands' use of pressure during daily interactions can serve as social control to influence their wives' fertility decision-making, especially in the hierarchical gender system (Beckman 1983). Drawing on this line of research, we hypothesize that:

H1: With increases in fertility pressure from their husbands, women who want no more than one child and have already had one increasingly express an intention to have a second birth.

Marital power

Women's marital power is a key factor that influences women's ability to realize their own desires (McDonald 1980). Marital power refers to the ability of one spouse to influence the other's behavior or to made decisions that affect family life (Safilios-Rothschild 1970). As a multidimensional concept, marital power can be assessed through who make the final decisions in domains such as budgeting daily expenses, children's education, purchasing luxury goods or a house, and engaging in major financial investments (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Safilios-Rothschild 1970; Shu, Zhu, and Zhang 2013; Xu 2011). Nevertheless, the ability to make decisions over

major economic domains, rather than exercising control over trivial, mundane activities, actually symbolizes power (Xu 2011). There is no consensus about how to properly weigh individual items to construct a power scale and how to distinguish decision-making power from divisions of labor (Chien and Yi 2014; also see Xu 2011 for a review). Xu (2011) has recommended a generalized indicator—who possesses more real family power, because it is more effective in capturing marital power than conventional multi-itemed measures.

Power is manifested by who has the final say or ultimately possesses the control (McDonald 1980). In general, the spouse who has more bargaining power in marriage is more likely to make the final decision on many domains of family life, including fertility-related decisions (Safilos-Rothschild 1970; Upadhyay and Hindin 2005). There are theoretical reasons to expect a positive link between women's marital power and fertility autonomy: greater marital power allows women to better negotiate with their husbands and in turn, to be more likely to successfully translate their fertility preferences into actual outcomes, irrespective of their husbands' preferences (Mason 1984). Empirical research indeed finds that women who are able to exercise more decision-making power in marriage have a lower intention to have a second child (Bao, Chen, and Zheng 2017), greater birth control use (Dharmalingam and Morgan 1996; Mason and Smith 2000), higher levels of unintended pregnancy (Abada and Tenkorang 2012), longer birth intervals (Upadhyay and Hindin 2005), and fewer children (Hindin 2000). We draw on this literature to hypothesize that:

H2: Women who want no more than one child and have already had one are less likely to express an intention to have a second birth if they possess greater martial power.

In addition, the distribution of power between the spouses likely moderates the impact of fertility pressure from husband on women's fertility. As far as we know, the interaction effect

between the two types of couple dynamics has not been examined in prior research, and we seek to explore it in this study. While our Hypothesis 1 posits that spousal pressure on fertility decreases women's fertility autonomy, we suspect that marital power would mitigate this negative impact. When women have greater marital power, they may be more likely to plan their fertility based on their own preferences, irrespective of social control from their husbands expressed through spousal pressure. In contrast, when women lack marital power, their fertility intentions are more likely to deviate from their own childbearing desires when they are subject to higher fertility pressure from their husbands. We therefore hypothesize that:

H3: Fertility pressure from husband has a smaller effect on women's fertility autonomy when women possess greater martial power.

Resource-Based Approach to Understanding Couple Dynamics

In advancing understanding of couple dynamics, we also investigate the determinants of marital power and spousal pressure on fertility. While research on contributing factors of spousal pressure on fertility is almost non-existent, marital power is a long-standing question in sociology (see McDonald 1980 and Safilios-Rothschild 1970 for reviews). Research on marital power predominantly draws on the theory of resources (Blood and Wolfe 1960). The central premise of this theory is that the comparative resources that the husband and wife bring to the marriage determine the power distribution between the two spouses: The spouse who contributes greater resources to the marriage tends to have greater marital power (Blood and Wolfe 1960). Resources can possibly refer to anything, including money, physical appearance, affection, and special knowledge or skills, that is provided by one spouse to help the other satisfy needs or achieve goals (McDonald 1980). Most research, however, focuses on economic resources of husbands and wives, such as education, income, and occupational status (Blood and Wolfe 1960;

Lee and Petersen 1983; McDonald 1980). The idea of relative resources is especially important. As Blood and Wolfe (1960:37) put it,

> *"It is desirable to compare the wife and the husband on the same characteristics, for then the comparative resourcefulness and competence of the two partners can be discovered. Once we know which partner has more education, more organizational experience, a higher status background, etc., we will know who tends to make most of the decisions."*

Cross-national research shows that even in patriarchal cultures, women's contribution to their subsistence economies is positively associated with their marital power (Lee and Petersen 1983). Building on this line of literature, we examine how wives' relative education and income—the two most important economic resources—are related to their marital power.

One limitation of existing literature on marital power is the almost exclusive focus on spouses' own attributes while largely overlooking the contributions of other family members to conjugal power structure, especially parents and in-laws (Safilios-Rothschild 1970). This limitation is particularly problematic in Asian contexts. In contrast to Western societies characterized by individualism, nuclear families, and youth autonomy (Thornton 2001), Asian societies, including China, historically emphasize subordination to extended kinship (Jennings, Axinn, and Ghimire 2012). Intergenerational family ties are strong in contemporary Chinese families: although arranged marriages are banned and extreme parental control is rare, parents are still highly involved in their children's marriage choices, fertility preferences, and family lives (Ji 2015; Ji et al. 2015; Qian and Qian 2014; Riley 1994; Yan 2013). In light of the small family size, rising cost of weddings, and roaring housing prices in urban China, young people, many of whom are the only child in the family, increasingly need financial support from their parents to get married and start a nuclear family (Yan 2013). Thus, parents in China likely continue to powerfully affect their children's marital lives, and the relative socioeconomic status

of the husband's and wife's natal families may play an important role in shaping the balance of power between the two spouses. This proposition has yet to be empirically tested in urban China. To fill this research gap, we incorporate relative resources of spouses' natal families into our analysis to assess whether they are determinants of urban Chinese wives' marital power.

Although few studies have directly explored contributing factors of spousal pressure on fertility, some relevant research on fertility and gender provides clues. Men's influence over their wives on contraceptive attitudes can be operated by men's comparative advantage (Ezeh 1993). In other words, men's advantageous position in the society, compared with that of women, may strengthen their influence over their wives' reproduction. Because of the broad gender inequality in the labor market, men on average have higher occupational status and income than women and thus tend to predominate in the couple's negotiation process. Since feelings of spousal pressure can reflect perceptions of spouse dominance and social control (Stephens et al. 2009), relative resources possessed by women may shape their perceived fertility pressure from their husbands. Thus, drawing on a resource-based view (Blood and Wolfe 1960), we hypothesize that:

H4a: Women with higher relative resources tend to have greater marital power.
H4b: Women with higher relative resources tend to perceive lower fertility pressure from their husbands.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

We use data from the 2016 *Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families* (referred to thereafter as SFDP). The 2016 SFDP was conducted by the Center for Population and Development Studies at Renmin University of China, aiming to better understand the impact of China's newly-implemented universal two-child policy on fertility (see Jin, Song, and Chen 2016 for a detailed description of the dataset). The SFDP selected 12 cities in 6

provinces—Zhejiang, Sichuan, Shandong, Guangdong, Liaoning, and Hubei, by jointly considering the total fertility rate, sex ratio at birth, total population size, geographical location, and economic development level. In each city, 500 households were chosen using a multistage probability sampling design. First, three counties were randomly selected from every city. Second, two sub-districts (*jiedao*) in urban areas or townships (*xiangzhen*) in rural areas were selected from each county. Third, 4 to 10 neighborhood communities (*juweihui*) or administrative villages (*cunweihui*) are selected. Finally, 8 to 10 households were selected from each neighborhood community or administrative village. Because China's universal two-child policy mostly affects urban populations, the SFDP oversampled households living in urban areas.

In each household, women were targeted for the main interview, and they needed to meet three major criteria to be eligible to participate: 1) currently married, 2) born between March 1, 1966 and March 1, 1996 (i.e., aged approximately 20 to 49 years old at the time of the survey), and 3) residing in the current location for more than six months. In the end, 5,972 women (5,136 in urban areas and 836 in rural areas) were successfully interviewed. The main interview of the SFDP 2016 collected rich information from female respondents on fertility-related attitudes, behaviors, and histories, socio-demographic characteristics of both spouses, as well as background of their parents and in-laws. Since the SFDP is, to the best of our knowledge, the first fertility survey conducted after the implementation of China's universal two-child policy, it is an ideal, timely dataset to understand women's fertility autonomy in the new fertility context.

Sample

Recall that our major goal is to understand the effect of couple dynamics—marital power and fertility pressure from husband—on women's fertility autonomy in urban China under the

universal two-child policy. We take several steps to identify the most appropriate sample for addressing this question. We first constrain our sample to married mothers in their first marriages who were living in urban areas (N = 4,105). Second, because we measure women's fertility autonomy through the correspondence of their fertility desires and intentions to have a second birth, we further limit our sample to women who had only one child and wanted no more than one child (N = 1,387). Note that only a small number of women (N = 94, or 2.3%) reported zero as their desired family size. We include them in our analysis, but the results (available upon request) were robust to exclusion of them. In addition, because the SFDP did not ask fecundity status, we drop 116 female respondents aged 45 years and older as an attempt to exclude sub-fecund women. We also drop 35 unusual cases in which women's own and/or their husbands' ages at current marriage were under 18 years of age. Lastly, after excluding observations with missing data on the variables used in the analysis, we obtain a final sample of 1,129 married mothers in urban areas.

Variables

Fertility autonomy variable

Second-birth intention. In light of China's newly-implemented universal two-child policy and the negative implications of motherhood for women's labor market outcomes, we measure women's fertility autonomy by examining whether or not women intended to have a second birth among those who only wanted no more than one child and already had one child. Fertility intentions were measured through the question "how many additional children do you intend (i.e., *jihua* in Chinese) to have?" Respondents who intended to have no more children are women with the greatest fertility autonomy and used as the reference group, and we distinguish them from two

other groups of women with lower fertility autonomy, that is, those who intended to have one or more additional children and those who were undecided about this.

Being undecided/uncertain is an important dimension of fertility intention, because intentions represent predictions and plans for the future and are inevitably expressed in uncertainty (Morgan 1981). People who are undecided about having future births can be viewed as "a mixture, 'in the making', of those who say they want and those who say they do not want more births" (Becker and Sutradhar 2006:142). When comparing women's actual reproductive behaviors across fertility intentions, prior research has found that in Morocco, the likelihood of having another birth during subsequent years is highest for women who wanted more children and lowest for women who wanted to stop childbearing, with women who were uncertain in the middle (Bankole and Westoff 1998). Relatedly, in the current study, women who reported being undecided about future births are a distinct group: even though they achieved their desired number of children, they were still debating whether or not to have another birth, which also somewhat deviated from their reproductive desires and thus suggested a lack of fertility autonomy, albeit to a lesser extent than those who more firmly intended to have a second birth.

Couple dynamics variables

Marital power. The SFDP asked women to indicate who had the greatest real power (*shiquan*) in their families, with answer choices of husband, wife, husband's parents, wife's parents. Because only less than 6% of women chose either their parents or in-laws and parents tend to form alliances with their own children rather than their children-in-law (Yan 2013), we measure marital power using two categories: (a) wife has less power (if respondents chose either "husband" or "husband's parents;" = 0) and (b) wife has more power (if respondents chose either

"wife" or "wife's parents;" = 1). This single-itemed, subjective measure is preferred over multi-itemed instruments due to its high validity, reasonable reliability, ease of use, and inclusivity of a domain-free and global judgment of marital power (Xu 2011), and was also asked in the Chinese nationwide surveys on the status of women (Li and Guo 2015; Xu 2004). Our supplementary analysis (available upon request) showed that this measure of marital power was strongly related to being in charge of family property, suggesting that it is a good indicator of control over material resources and major decisions in the family. Note that because respondents were not given the option that the husband and wife had similar levels of family power, our analysis implicitly assumed that one spouse had greater marital power than the other, however slightly.

Fertility pressure from husband. In the SFDP, women were asked to assess the statement: "My spouse places great pressure on me in terms of views on the child's sex" using a four-point scale that ranged from (1) strongly agree to (4) strongly disagree. We reverse-code this item and create a four-point scale ranging from 0 to 3 to measure women's perceptions of spousal pressure on fertility, with higher scores indicating greater pressure. We use a measure of spousal pressure on the child's sex rather than on the number of children mainly because the latter was not asked in the SFDP. We believe, however, our measure is valid. Spousal pressure on the number and sex of children is likely to be closely related, because son preferences tend to be associated with desires for additional children, especially among men (Bongaarts 2001; Mason and Taj 1987). In addition, our supplementary analysis (available upon request) showed that women were more likely to express second-birth intentions if the sex of the first child was not what their husbands had expected, further suggesting that husbands' pressure on sex-composition preferences and that on family size preferences are highly correlated.

Relative resources variables

Relative education. Female respondents were asked to report their own and their husbands' educational attainment ranging from no formal schooling to advanced degrees. Following prior research (Qian and Qian 2014), we group educational attainment into four levels: less than high school, high school, vocational college (*dazhuan*), and four-year university or above. Next, we compare the husband's and wife's four-category education levels and construct a relative measure of education between the spouses. Specifically, adopting prior research practices (e.g., Qian 2017; Schwartz and Han 2014), we code spouses' relative education into three categories: wife has more education than husband, wife and husband have equal education (reference group), and husband has more education than wife.

Wife's income share (%). The SFDP asked every woman to report her own and her husband's earned income in 2015 from wages and salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits, and self-employment. To measure the wife's income relative to that of her husband, we calculate the share of the wife's income of the couple's total income, expressed as a percentage (also see Qian and Qian 2015). Following prior work (Kalmijn, Loeve, and Manting 2007; Shu et al. 2013), we use a spline function to model the effect of relative income after dividing wife's income share into two continuous variables (below 50% as one and 50% and above as the other). The spline function allows for asymmetry in the effect of relative income on couple dynamics; this is advantageous because the effect for women with shares below 50% may be very different from that for women whose share is 50% or greater (Kalmijn et al. 2007).

Relative status of natal families. The SFDP asked women: "prior to marriage, comparing both spouses' families, which one had better family economic conditions?" Respondents could choose one of the four answers ("husband's family," "wife's family," "two families were similar,"

and "hard to say"). We combine the last two categories and generate a series of dummy variable to measure the relative status of spouses' natal families: husband's family had higher status, wife's family had higher status, and two spouses' families had similar status (reference group). Although this variable appears to reflect respondents' subjective assessment of relative economic status of natal families, supplementary analyses confirmed this measure's validity, because it was shown to be strongly correlated with objective indicators of family socioeconomic status, such as relative status of parents and in-laws based on current education and occupation. We prefer this measure over objective indicators because of its ease of use and lower levels of missingness.

Control variables

Wife's education. Women's education may empower women by giving them competence, knowledge, and other cultural resources, and also increase the opportunity costs of childbearing, which in turn shapes women's marital power and fertility (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Martin 1995). We measure women's educational attainment through a set of dummy variables—less than high school, high school, vocational college (*dazhuan*), and four-year university or above.

Wife employed. Both theoretical reasoning and empirical findings have identified the close relationship between fertility and women's employment (Bernhardt 1993; Bongaarts 2001). Thus, we control for women's employment status at the time of the survey: non-employed (=0; including those without a job, students, and homemakers) and employed (=1; including wage earners, the self-employed, and farmers).

Couple's total annual income (logged). We control for combined annual income of the couple to capture household socioeconomic status and the couple's financial ability to raise children. This measure has been shown to be associated with women's higher intentions to have

a second child (Bao et al. 2017; Jin et al.2016). We take the log transformation to correct for the right skewness of the income distribution.

Sex of first child. Within patriarchal family systems, mothers can secure their position and exercise greater power by having a son (Yount 2005). In addition, the sex of the first child is associated with parents' future fertility intentions in China (Jin et al. 2016). Thus, we include a dummy variable indicating the sex of the first child (1 = son, 0 = daughter).

Wife's age. Older women tend to express lower intentions to have additional children, partly due to greater biological constraints (Jin et al. 2016). Hence, we include a continuous variable to measure wife's age at the time of the survey.

Sibship status. The number of siblings individuals have may influence the amount of resources (including help with child care) that they can receive from their parents and also shape their desired family size (Ji et al. 2015). We include a set of dummy variables to measure sibship status at the couple-level: both spouses have siblings (reference group), only husband has siblings, only wife has siblings, neither spouse has siblings.

Living arrangement. Patrilocal postnuptial residence in which a married couple resides with the husband's parents tends to be associated with lower marital power for women, whereas the opposite is true for matrilocal or neolocal residence in which a married couple resides either with the wife's parents or separately from both spouses' parents (Yount 2005). Living with parents and living with in-laws are also found to be differentially associated with women's fertility preferences and behaviors (Yang 2007). Hence, we distinguish three living arrangements: living separately from both parents and in-laws (reference group), living with husband's parents only, and living with wife's parents only.

Hukou type. Prior to the universal two-child policy, fertility policies that married couples were subject to differed by their *hukou* types (Zheng et al. 2009). We include three dummy variables to measure women's current *hukou* types: rural *hukou* (reference group), urban *hukou*, and *jumin hukou* (a newly-created uniform *hukou* type that is used in some cities to abolish the rural and urban *hukou* distinction). We did not create a couple-level measure of *hukou* type because the vast majority of women had the same *hukou* as their husbands.

Province. We include dummy variables to control for any unobservable variation (e.g., in gender relations, fertility culture, and socioeconomic development) across provinces.

Analytical Strategies

Our analysis is conducted in two progressive stages. First, we investigate how marital power and fertility pressure from husband might constrain or facilitate women's fertility autonomy in the era of the universal two-child policy. Specifically, we ask: how do marital power and spousal pressure on fertility shape the likelihood of intending to have a second birth among women who want no more than one child and have already had one? Because the dependent variable, fertility intention, has three categories—no intention for additional children, intending to have a second birth, and undecided, we use multinomial logistic regressions for this analysis.

Second, we take a resource-based approach to exploring the contributing factors of marital power and fertility pressure from husband. Because marital power is a dummy variable, we use logistic regression model to investigate how relative resources (indexed by relative education, relative income, and relative status of spouses' natal families) are associated with women's marital power. Additionally, we use ordered logit model to examine how relative

resources are related to women's perceptions of fertility pressure from their husbands, because the dependent variable here—spousal pressure—is a four-point ordinal variable.

RESULTS

Descriptive Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. In our sample of married mothers in urban areas who wanted no more than one child and already had one child, about 10% of them intend to have a second birth, indicating low fertility autonomy. About 9% of women are undecided regarding whether or not to have additional children, somewhat deviating from their reproductive desires. The rest of women (about 81%) report no intention of having a second child, which aligns with their fertility desires and symbolizes high fertility autonomy.

[TABLE 1 INSERTED ABOUT HERE]

In terms of couple dynamics, about 46% of women have more marital power than their husbands. On the one hand, the balance of marital power between the spouses does not severely lean toward one gender: the percentage of couples in which the wife has greater marital power is not substantially smaller than that of couples in which the husband has greater marital power (less than 9-percentage-point gap). On the other hand, when response options included one that "husband and wife have about the same power," prior research reported that a large share of couples in urban China distributed power equally between the husband and wife (Li and Guo 2015; Shu et al. 2013; Xu 2011). Our result, however, reveals that husbands are still more likely than wives to have greater real power in the family if only one spouse is allowed to be identified as having greater marital power. In this sense, husbands still have the predominant status in most families. Additionally, fertility pressure from husband perceived by women is strong: 33% and

19% of married mothers agree (=2) and strongly agree (=3), respectively, with the statement that "my spouse places great pressure on me in terms of views on the child's sex."

In general, women tend to own fewer resources than their husbands. While the majority of women (70%) have educational levels equal to those of their husbands, the share of wives who have less education than their husbands (22%) still more than doubles the share of wives who have more education than their husbands (8%). Our additional calculation (not presented in Table 1) revealed that the average contribution of wives' income to couple's total income was about 38%, consistent with statistics based on nationally representative samples of urban Chinese couples (Qian and Qian 2015). About three-fourths of wives have husbands of a similar family background, but if two spouses' natal families differed in status, husbands from higher-status families (15%) are still more likely to occur than wives from higher-status families (10%).

In addition, Table 1 informs us of other socio-demographic attributes of the sample. The average age of women in the sample is about 33 years old. 28%, 40%, 24%, and 8% of them have less than a high school education, a high school education, a vocational college education, and a university or advanced degree, respectively. Close to 90% of women are employed. Logged total income of the husband and wife in 2015 has a mean of 11.30 (roughly 80,822 Yuan, exp(11.30) = 80,822). In analysis not shown here, we also calculated the median of couple's total income, which was about 80,000 Yuan. The first child is more likely to be sons (57%) than daughters (43%), likely due to imbalance sex ratios at birth and excess female child mortality in China (Cai and Lavely 2007). More than three quarters of married women live separately from both parents and in-laws (77%), but still married women are more likely to live with their in-laws than to live with their own parents (18% versus 6%). Neither spouse has any siblings in about 30% of the couples, while the rest of the couples have at least one spouse who has

sibling(s). Next, we use multivariate regressions to examine the relationship between women's fertility autonomy and couple dynamics as well as the determinants of couple dynamics.

Multinomial Logit Results for Fertility Autonomy

Our central goal is to examine how marital power and fertility pressure from husband might shape women's intention to have a second birth (viewed as an indicator of fertility autonomy). Since the two-child policy has been implemented nationwide, among married mothers who want no more than one child and already have one child, do they intend to have a second birth although their desired family size has been achieved?

We present the results in Table 2. In the model without the interaction term between marital power and fertility pressure from husband, neither marital power nor fertility pressure is associated with the relative log-odds of intending to have a second birth vs. having no second-birth intention. Marital power and fertility pressure from husband are, however, associated with women's reports of being undecided about future fertility. Switching from wives having less power to wives having greater power, the relative risk ratio for being undecided vs. having no second-birth intention is 0.521 (β = -0.652, exp(β) = 0.521, $p < 0.01$). In addition, with every one-unit increase in fertility pressure from husband, the relative risk ratio for being undecided vs. having no second-birth intention is 1.416 (β = 0.365, exp(β) = 1.441, $p < 0.05$). In other words, the expected risk of being undecided about future childbearing is lower for wives who have more marital power than their husbands, and higher for wives who experience greater fertility pressure from their husbands. Overall, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are partially supported: among women who want no more than one child and already have one, although having less marital power and perceiving high levels of fertility pressure from husband are not significantly associated with a

higher likelihood of firmly intending to have a second birth, these two factors tend to increase the likelihood that women are undecided (still somewhat deviating from their fertility desires).

[TABLE 2 INSERTED ABOUT HERE]

These results, however, mask the potential heterogeneity among these women. As we have explained earlier, the influence of fertility pressure from their husbands on women's fertility intentions might depend on how much power women possess in marriage; greater marital power may enable women to ignore their husbands' opinions or attitudes and thus to plan their childbearing largely based on their own desires. To test our Hypothesis 3, we add the interaction term between marital power and fertility pressure from husband in our next model. As expected, the impact of fertility pressure from husband on women's fertility intentions differs significantly between women with greater marital power and those with less marital power. Specifically, among women who have less power than their husbands, fertility pressure from husband is significantly positively associated with the expected risk of intending to have a second birth and that of being undecided ($\beta_{second\text{-}birth\ intention} = 0.446$, $p < 0.05$; $\beta_{undecided} = 0.481$, $p < 0.01$). In contrast, among women who have more power than their husbands, fertility pressure from husband is not significantly associated with either their second-birth intention or their reports of being undecided ($\beta_{second\text{-}birth\ intention} = 0.446 - 0.624 = -0.178$, $\lambda^2(2) = 0.760$, $p = 0.382$; $\beta_{undecided} = 0.481 - 0.240 = 0.241$, $\lambda^2(2) = 1.480$, $p = 0.223$).

To facilitate interpretation, we calculate the predicted probabilities of having no second-birth intention, intending to have a second birth, and being undecided, respectively, by marital power and levels of fertility pressure from husband, with other covariates set at their means. We present this set of results in Table 3. For women who want no more than one child and already have one child, if they have less power than their husbands, as the fertility pressure from their

husbands increases from the lowest level (= 0) to the highest level (= 3), the probability of having no second-birth intention, or maintaining fertility autonomy in other words, decreases from 93% to 77%, whereas the probability of intending to have a second birth goes up three-fold (increasing from 3% to 9%) and the probability of being undecided more than triples (increasing from 4% to 14%). In contrast, for women who have more power than their husbands, the likelihood of having no second-birth intention does not change with levels of fertility pressure from husband, remaining at 91%. These results support Hypothesis 3 that women's marital power can buffer the negative impact of fertility pressure from husband on their fertility autonomy, suggesting that marital power allows women to plan their childbearing mainly according to their own fertility desires, irrespective of fertility pressure from their husbands.

[TABLE 3 INSERTED ABOUT HERE]

Although it is not the focus of our study, consistent with prior research (Jin et al. 2016), results in Table 2 shows that women's second-birth intentions are constrained by biological and economic realities. For instance, the expected risk of intending to have a second birth decreases with women's age but increases with the couple's total income. In addition, we find suggestive evidence for persistent son preferences in urban areas: the firstborn being a son significantly reduces the expected risk of intending to have a second child.

Regression Results for Marital Power and Fertility Pressure from Husband

Since the results above show that women's marital power and perceived fertility pressure from their husbands play a central role in shaping their fertility autonomy, it is important to know how women could enhance their marital power or alleviate perceptions of spousal pressure on fertility in the era of the universal two-child policy. Next, we take a resource-based approach to examine

the contributing factors of couple dynamics. Because marital power is a dichotomous variable, we use logit regression model to predict the likelihood of women having greater real power than their husbands, and the main variables of interest are characteristics that capture women's relative resources in the family. Results are presented in Table 4. Considering spouses' own attributes, wives' relative income is, but their relative education is not, significantly associated with their marital power. The result based on the spline function shows asymmetry in the effect of relative income on marital power: increases in the wife's income share are not significantly related to change in marital power for women with shares below 50%, whereas for women whose share is 50% or greater, every one-percentage-point increase in the wife's income share is associated with a 4.1% increase in the odds of wives having greater real power than their husbands ($\beta = 0.040$, $\exp(\beta) = 1.041$, $p < 0.01$).

Relative status of the husband's and wife's natal families prior to marriage is strongly associated with the distribution of power between the spouses. Compared with wives whose natal families had similar status to that of their husbands' natal families, wives married to husbands from higher-status families are 39% less likely to have greater power in marriage, whereas wives married to husbands from lower-status families are 75% more likely to have greater marital power ($\beta_{husband's\ family\ had\ higher\ status} = -0.492$, $\exp(\beta) = 0.611$, $p < 0.01$; $\beta_{wife's\ family\ had\ higher\ status} = 0.558$, $\exp(\beta) = 1.747$, $p < 0.05$). Taken together, Hypothesis 4a is partially supported, because women's marital power tends to increase with their relative resources, as indicated by spouses' relative income (but not relative education) and relative status of spouses' natal families.

[TABLE 4 INSERTED ABOUT HERE]

Next, we turn to the determinants of fertility pressure from husband, and the results are presented in Table 5. Contrary to Hypothesis 4b, relative resources, indicated by education,

income, and economic status of natal families, are not significantly related to women's perceived fertility pressure from their husbands. These results suggest that spousal pressure on fertility exists irrespective of socioeconomic resources women possess relative to their husbands.

[TABLE 5 INSERTED ABOUT HERE]

Overall, our results regarding determinants of couple dynamics suggest that the theory of resources, originally developed by Blood and Wolfe (1960) to understand conjugal power structure, is indeed more applicable to the study of marital power but fails to explain variation in spousal pressure on fertility in urban China. Note that although we limit our sample to currently married mothers who want no more than one child and already have one child, our findings concerning the determinants of couple dynamics hold true in a broader population of urban mothers: we removed the sample restriction regarding desired and achieved family size, conducted supplementary analysis in a more general sample—married mothers in urban areas (N = 3,495), and found that the results were similar (see Appendix Table 1).

DISCUSSIONS

China's universal two-child policy has been implemented since the early 2016. This new policy is projected to alleviate some population problems that China is facing now, including rapid population aging, the shrinking workforce, and the imbalanced sex ratio at birth (Zeng and Hesketh 2016). Yet, little research has considered how gender inequality and women's status might change in the era of the universal two-child policy; this question is especially relevant and urgent in light of the broad social, economic, and political context in urban China. Unlike many European countries that use generous family-friendly policies to encourage fertility and facilitate work-family balance (Glass, Simon, and Andersson 2016), the Chinese government has retreated

from providing socialist welfare (e.g., childcare subsidies) during China's transition to a market economy (Ji et al. 2017). Hence, in post-reform urban China, the newly-launched universal two-child policy, combined with the increasing separation of the private and public spheres (Ji et al. 2017), likely imposes the opportunity costs of children disproportionately on women, increases women's work-family conflicts, and negatively affects women's labor market outcomes. Our research on women's fertility autonomy under the universal two-child policy not only advances the fertility literature but also has far-reaching implications for gender inequality in urban China.

In understanding fertility autonomy in China's new policy context, this study emphasizes the role of couple dynamics, as measured by conjugal power structure and spousal pressure on fertility. When the one-child policy was strictly enforced in urban China, reproductive decision-making and outcomes concerning family size were relatively homogeneous, regardless of gender relations within the family. For example, about 86% of urban women aged 35 to 44 in 2005 who spent their prime reproductive years under the one-child policy had only one child (Wang et al. 2013). In the era of the universal two-child policy, decisions about whether to have a second child are more dynamic, flexible, and subject to negotiation between women and their family members (in particular their husbands). Since men tend to desire a larger number of children and express stronger son preferences than do women (Mason and Taj 1987), after the relaxation of the birth control policy, do husbands exert fertility pressure on women through couple-level processes of communication and interaction? Would the intra-household distribution of bargaining power influence how women act under undue pressure? By investigating the role of couple dynamics in women's fertility autonomy and exploring the determinants of couple dynamics, our research thus sheds light on how women could stop childbearing when they want no more children. Considering the lack of family-friendly policies and the negative impact of

motherhood on women's labor market outcomes in urban China (Ji et al. 2017; Zhang and Hannum 2015; Zhao 2016), women's ability to maintain fertility autonomy is integral in enhancing their status and promoting their wellbeing in the era of the universal two-child policy.

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We first examine second-birth intentions, as indicators of fertility autonomy, among women who want no more than one child and already have one. Women who intend to have a second birth, against their own fertility desires, are viewed as having low fertility autonomy. Although having less marital power and perceiving high levels of fertility pressure from their husbands appear not to significantly increase their likelihood of expressing more firm intentions to have a second birth, these two factors indeed tend to increase the likelihood that women report being undecided about future childbearing (still somewhat deviating from their fertility desires). More importantly, as expected, marital power helps mitigate the negative impact of spousal pressure on women's fertility autonomy. When women have greater power in marriage, fertility pressure from their husbands does not increase their likelihood of intending to have a second birth. In contrast, when husbands have greater marital power, with increases in fertility pressure from husband, women's fertility intentions increasingly diverge from their fertility desires, such that women are more likely to intend to have a second child, rather than firmly having no second-birth intention.

Considering the importance of couple dynamics in shaping women's fertility autonomy, we further take a resource-based approach (Blood and Wolfe 1960) to examine the determinants of couple dynamics, in order to shed light on how women could enhance their marital power or alleviate perceived fertility pressure from their husbands. Consistent with the theory of resources (Blood and Wolfe 1960) and empirical research in urban China and other patriarchal societies (Lee and Petersen 1983; Shu et al. 2013), women's income relative to that of their husbands,

especially for women whose income share is 50% or greater, is positively associated with their marital power. Furthermore, broadening the prior conceptualization of relative resources (Blood and Wolfe 1960), we include relative status of spouses' natal families as an indicator of relative resources. As expected, we find that compared with women having husbands of a similar family background, those married to men from higher-status families (i.e., women having fewer relative resources) tend to have less power in marriage, whereas those married to men from lower-status families (i.e., women having greater relative resources) tend to have higher marital power. However, contrary to our expectation, relative resources, indicated by education, income, and economic status of natal families, are not significantly related to women's perceptions of fertility pressure from their husbands, suggesting that spousal pressure on fertility exists irrespective of socioeconomic resources women possess relative to their husbands. The implications of the results are two folds. The finding that relative status of spouses' natal families is a contributing factor of conjugal power structure highlights the continuing influence of parents in the lives of adult children and the importance of moving beyond the nuclear family to gain a more complete understanding of power dynamics and gender relations in Chinese families. In addition, combining the result of the relationship between couple dynamics and fertility autonomy and that of the determinants of couple dynamics, this study suggests that although fertility pressure from husband seems to persist regardless of women's relative status in the family, policies targeted at increasing women's income relative to that of their husbands and changing the cultural norms/practices regarding women marrying men from higher-status families (i.e., hypergamy) likely increase women's marital power, which in turn could buffer the negative impact of fertility pressure from husband on women's fertility autonomy.

This study has several limitations. At the time of our writing, the universal two-child policy has just been implemented for about one year. It is almost impossible for us to gather data on couples' reproductive behavioral responses to the new policy. Therefore, we are unable to examine the actual transition to a second birth as an indicator of fertility autonomy. Admittedly, reported intentions do not always match actual fertility at the individual level due to unintended pregnancies or unrealized fertility intentions (Bongaarts 1992; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003). Second-birth intentions are, however, very likely to match actual childbearing behavior later on among those who have already had a child (Hartnett and Hartnett 2014). Therefore, by limiting our sample to women of productive age with one child, we take an important initial step in exploring the consequences of the universal two-child policy by analyzing second-birth intentions; we leave the task of examining actual fertility behavior to future research. In addition, strictly speaking, the SFDP is not nationally representative, which limits the generalizability of our findings. Provinces and cities in the SFDP were, however, carefully chosen based on a series of socioeconomic and demographic factors. Furthermore, the SFDP was a timely large-scale fertility survey conducted after the implementation of China's universal two-child policy. While we use this dataset to understand women's fertility autonomy in the new policy context, more research using nationally representative data is needed to further understand fertility decision-making processes and implications for gender inequality under the universal two-child policy.

Given the limitations, our research is among the first to call attention to gender equality issues in the era of China's universal two-child policy (also see Zhao 2016). Prior research mostly estimates the demographic and economic consequences of the universal two-child policy or asks why women do not want more children even given the relaxation of the fertility policy in China (e.g., Zeng and Hesketh 2016; Zheng 2016; Zheng et al. 2009). While we acknowledge the

importance of those questions, it is notable that women's fertility autonomy is largely ignored and why women who go against their fertility desires to have additional children remains under-explored. To be clear, gender inequality in the public and private spheres can reinforce each other in contemporary urban China. As the state has retreated from providing childcare subsidies and from promoting gender egalitarian ideology, public and private spheres have become increasingly separated and gender inequality in employment and earnings has worsens in post-reform urban China (Attané 2012; Ji et al. 2017). Our research suggests that the growing gender inequality in urban labor markets likely diminishes relative economic resources women possess in marriage and in turn reduces women's marital power, which further has negative implications for women's fertility autonomy, especially under undue fertility pressure from their husbands. Meanwhile, because mothers are increasingly disadvantaged in urban labor markets (Zhang and Hannum 2015), women's greater reproductive burden and lower levels of fertility autonomy could exacerbate gender inequality in paid work. In short, because appropriate policies to subsidize childcare and promote gender equality are severely lacking in post-reform urban China (Ji et al. 2017), conflicts between work and family responsibilities are likely to worsen and women disproportionately bear the burden and opportunity costs associated with childbearing and childrearing. Thus, in the era of the universal two-child policy, more policies should be developed to lessen the disadvantages that women face arising from reproduction and to enhance women's status in the public and private spheres.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

	Mean/%
FERTILITY AUTONOMY	
Second-birth intention	
No	81.05
Yes	9.65
Undecided	9.30
COUPLE DYNAMICS	
Marital power	
Wife has more power	45.62
Wife has less power	54.38
Fertility pressure from husband	
0	20.28
1	27.72
2	32.68
3	19.31
RELATIVE RESOURCES	
Relative education	
Husband has more education	21.97
Wife and husband equal	69.88
Wife has more education	8.15
Wife's income share (%)	
Below 50%	33.80
	(14.65)
50% and above	52.68
	(7.12)
Relative status of natal families	
Husband's family had higher status	14.61
Wife's family had higher status	10.01
Two spouses' families had similar status	75.38
CONTROL VARIABLES	
Wife's education	
Less than high school	27.72
High school	40.30
Vocational college	24.09
University or above	7.88
Wife employed	89.37
Couple's total income (logged)	11.30
	(0.49)
Sex of first child	
Son	56.95
Daughter	43.05

(Continued on next page)

Table 1
(CONTINUED)

	Mean/%
Wife's age	33.38
	(6.10)
Sibship status	
Both spouses have siblings	50.40
Only husband has siblings	9.39
Only wife has siblings	9.74
Neither spouse has siblings	30.47
Living arrangement	
Living separately	76.71
Living with husband's parents only	17.54
Living with wife's parents only	5.76
Hukou type	
Rural *hukou*	28.34
Urban *hukou*	37.02
Jumin hukou	34.63
Province	
Zhejiang	12.49
Sichuan	21.43
Shandong	8.06
Guangdong	13.99
Liaoning	17.36
Hubei	26.66
Observations	1,129

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The analytic sample includes currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old, were living in urban areas, had only one child, and wanted no more than one child at the time of the survey.
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

Table 2. Multinomial Logistic Regression Models of Second-Birth Intention

	Model without interaction term				Model with interaction term			
	Yes (relative to no)		Undecided (relative to no)		Yes (relative to no)		Undecided (relative to no)	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
COUPLE DYNAMICS								
Marital Power (ref. = Wife has less power)								
Wife has more power	-0.316	0.241	-0.652**	0.241	0.757	0.501	-0.315	0.410
Fertility pressure from husband	0.166	0.147	0.365*	0.144	0.446*	0.189	0.481**	0.174
Wife has more power								
× Fertility pressure from husband					-0.624*	0.255	-0.240	0.231
CONTROL VARIABLES								
Wife's education (ref. = Less than high school)								
High school	0.385	0.309	0.286	0.328	0.437	0.312	0.304	0.329
Vocational college	-0.026	0.371	0.353	0.379	-0.020	0.373	0.342	0.379
University or above	-0.139	0.520	-0.143	0.506	-0.109	0.522	-0.155	0.507
Wife employed (ref. = Wife non-employed)	-0.422	0.359	-0.922**	0.329	-0.370	0.361	-0.921**	0.329
Couple's total income (logged)	0.904***	0.267	0.605*	0.252	0.979***	0.271	0.650*	0.255
Sex of first birth (ref. = Daughter)								
Son	-0.491*	0.239	-0.022	0.236	-0.497*	0.240	-0.022	0.236
Wife's age	-0.120***	0.023	-0.041	0.022	-0.118***	0.023	-0.039	0.022
Sibship status (ref. **=** Both spouses have siblings)								
Only husband has siblings	0.898*	0.383	1.283***	0.351	0.982*	0.386	1.312***	0.352
Only wife has siblings	0.029	0.376	-0.620	0.492	0.060	0.379	-0.610	0.491
Neither spouse has siblings	-0.046	0.297	0.207	0.289	-0.001	0.297	0.220	0.289
Living arrangement (ref. = Living separately)								
Living with husband's parents only	-0.157	0.487	-0.476	0.529	-0.224	0.494	-0.500	0.529
Living with wife's parents only	0.226	0.306	-0.037	0.335	0.211	0.308	-0.0.02	0.335
Hukou type (ref. = Rural *hukou*)								
Urban *hukou*	-0.641	0.336	-0.180	0.396	-0.637	0.339	-0.177	0.396
Jumin hukou	-0.257	0.358	0.225	0.336	-0.249	0.359	0.221	0.336
Constant	-9.390**	3.020	-9.251**	2.903	10.823***	3.097	-9.969***	2.967

Notes: Coef. = Coefficient. SE = Standard Errors in parentheses. Ref. = Reference group.
N = 1,129 (currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old, were living in urban areas, had only one child, and wanted no more than one child). We also control for province dummies, but to save space, we do not present the estimates here (available upon request).
***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Women's Fertility Intentions, by Marital Power and Fertility Pressure from Husband

	No Second-Birth Intention	Intending to Have a Second Birth	Undecided	Total
Wife have less power				
Fertility pressure from husband = 0	93.06%	2.90%	4.04%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 1	89.37%	4.36%	6.27%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 2	84.06%	6.40%	9.54%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 3	76.78%	9.13%	14.09%	100%
Wife have more power				
Fertility pressure from husband = 0	91.06%	6.06%	2.88%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 1	91.24%	5.08%	3.67%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 2	91.09%	4.25%	4.66%	100%
Fertility pressure from husband = 3	90.57%	3.54%	5.90%	100%

Notes: The predicted probabilities are calculated based on the model with the interaction term in Table 2. Variables other than marital power and fertility pressure from husband are set at their means.
N = 1,129 (currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old, were living in urban areas, had only one child, and wanted no more than one child).
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

Table 4. Logit Regression Model of Women's Marital Power

	Coef.	SE
RELATIVE RESOURCES		
Relative education (ref. = Wife and husband equal)		
Husband has more education	-0.262	0.162
Wife has more education	0.085	0.238
Wife's income share (%)		
Below 50%	-0.003	0.005
50% and above	0.040*	0.020
Relative status of natal families		
(ref. = Two spouses' families had similar status)		
Husband's family had higher status	-0.492**	0.190
Wife's family had higher status	0.558*	0.224
CONTROL VARIABLES		
Wife's education (ref. = Less than high school)		
High school	0.122	0.169
Vocational college	-0.057	0.211
University or above	-0.218	0.288
Couple's total income (logged)	0.187	0.155
Sex of first birth (ref. = Daughter)		
Son	0.009	0.127
Wife's age	-0.003	0.012
Sibship status (ref. **=** Both spouses have siblings)		
Only husband has siblings	0.172	0.231
Only wife has siblings	0.220	0.229
Neither spouse has siblings	0.076	0.159
Living arrangement (ref. = Living separately)		
Living with husband's parents only	-0.710***	0.180
Living with wife's parents only	0.144	0.281
Hukou type (ref. = Rural *hukou*)		
Urban *hukou*	0.017	0.202
Jumin hukou	0.190	0.187
Constant	-2.706	1.775

Notes: Coef. = Coefficient. SE = Standard Errors. Ref. = Reference group.
N = 1,129 (currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old, were living in urban areas, had only one child, and wanted no more than one child). We also control for province dummies, but to save space, we do not present the estimates here (available upon request). Because women's income share is controlled for in the mode, we do not control for their employment status here.
***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

Table 5. Ordered Logit Model of Women's Perceived Fertility Pressure from Husband

	Coef.	SE
RELATIVE RESOURCES		
Relative education (ref. = Wife and husband equal)		
Husband has more education	-0.250	0.147
Wife and husband equal	0.078	0.211
Wife's income share (%)		
Below 50%	0.000	0.004
50% and above	0.006	0.014
Relative status of natal families		
(ref. = Two spouses' families had similar status)		
Husband's family had higher status	0.188	0.168
Wife's family had higher status	-0.096	0.195
CONTROL VARIABLES		
Wife's education (ref. = Less than high school)		
High school	0.226	0.154
Vocational college	0.477*	0.191
University or above	0.498	0.258
Couple's total income (logged)	-0.256	0.140
Sex of first birth (ref. = Daughter)		
Son	-0.036	0.115
Wife's age	0.008	0.011
Sibship status (ref. **=** Both spouse have siblings)		
Only husband has siblings	-0.356	0.208
Only wife has siblings	-0.002	0.205
Neither spouse has siblings	-0.184	0.143
Living arrangement (ref. = Living separately)		
Living with husband's parents only	0.217	0.158
Living with wife's parents only	0.216	0.257
Hukou type (ref. = Rural *hukou*)		
Urban *hukou*	0.470**	0.181
Jumin hukou	0.634***	0.172
Constant cut1	-2.570	1.589
Constant cut2	-0.601	1.588
Constant cut3	1.521	1.588

Notes: Coef. = Coefficient. SE = Standard Errors. Ref. = Reference group.
N = 1,129 (currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old, were living in urban areas, had only one child, and wanted no more than one child). We also control for province dummies, but to save space, we do not present the estimates here (available upon request). Because women's income share is controlled for in the mode, we do not control for their employment status here.
***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

Appendix Table 1. Multivariate Regression Models of Women's Marital Power and Perceived Fertility Pressure from Husband, Married Mothers Aged 20 to 44 Years in Urban Areas

	Marital Power (logit model)		Fertility Pressure from Husband (ordered logit model)	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Relative education (ref. = Wife and husband equal)				
Husband has more education	-0.094	0.090	-0.068	0.080
Wife has more education	0.017	0.146	-0.037	0.129
Wife's income share (%)				
Below 50%	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.002
50% and above	0.038***	0.011	-0.012	0.009
Relative status of natal families (ref. = Two spouses' families had similar status)				
Husband's family had higher status	-0.365***	0.104	0.407***	0.091
Wife's family had higher status	0.474***	0.116	-0.031	0.103

Notes: Coef. = Coefficient. SE = Standard Errors. Ref. = Reference group.
N = 3,495 (currently married mothers in their first marriages who were aged 20 to 44 years old and living in urban areas). In the analyses here, we also include all the control variables presented in Tables 4 and 5, but to save space, we do not present the estimates in this table (available upon request).
***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$
Source: The 2016 Survey of the Fertility Decision-making Processes in Chinese Families.

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