Moralization of rationality can stimulate sharing of hostile and false news, but intellectual humility inhibits it

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This manuscript has not been peer-reviewed yet

Running Head: Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and news sharing

Data availability statement: All data and code are available at <https://osf.io/udj6t/>

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Word count: 7836 words for main text (excluding abstract, statements, references, etc.)

Data availability statement: All data and R code are available at <https://osf.io/udj6t/>

Abstract

Many assume that if citizens were more inclined to moralize the values of evidence-based and logical thinking, they would be less likely to share politically hostile, conspiratorial and false claims. On the basis of theories of status-seeking and persuasion, we in contrast argue that moralization of rationality may actually *stimulate* the spread of hostile partisan news, including fabricated claims. Across two large surveys ($N = 3675$) run on U.S. respondents (one exploratory and one pre-registered), we provide empirical evidence for this prediction and demonstrate that the moralization of rationality can be a form of moral grandstanding by status seekers inclined to spread hostile (mis)information. In contrast to such grandstanding with respect to rationality, our studies find robust evidence that intellectual humility—i.e., the awareness that intuitions are fallible, and that trusting others is often desirable—may protect people from both sharing and believing hostile and false news.

Keywords: Conspiracy theories; critical thinking; fake news; hostility; intellectual humility; morality; social media; status

Introduction

In recent years, there have been growing concerns in the U.S. and other Western countries about the viral spread of news and posts that combine political denigration and low-quality evidence, such as ungrounded conspiracy theories or fabricated attacks on out-party leaders and voters (Howard et al., 2017; Petersen et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018). When they get shared in ideologically homogenous networks on social media (Marie et al., 2023; Osmundsen et al., 2020a), such hostile and false claims can pose a threat to social trust and cohesion. By portraying out-partisans as excessively stupid or evil, and by covering complex issues in simplistic ways, hostile (mis)information can exaggerate discrepancies in worldviews and affective polarization between liberals and conservatives (Finkel et al., 2020), anti-system sentiments (Uscinski et al., 2021), or distrust towards beneficial technologies such as vaccines against COVID-19 (Jensen et al., 2021).

Social scientists have pinned down numerous processes potentially facilitating adherence to and diffusion of hostile and false partisan claims. Some reflect individual-level cognitive biases such as negative intent ascriptions or simplistic storytelling (Gottschall, Jonathan, 2021; Lees & Cikara, 2020; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Other risk factors are social and institutional in nature. They include feelings of low or declining status among demographic groups (Obradović et al., 2020; Petersen et al., 2018), interference by rogue foreign powers (Simchon et al., 2020), lack of democratic accountability and politicians' misconduct (Alper, 2021), and social media platforms not incentivizing people to think about content veracity (Pennycook et al., 2021b).

In this debate, one assumption frequently made by public intellectuals (e.g., Harris, 2013-present) and some scholars (Ståhl et al., 2016a) is that susceptibility to hostile and false information may be facilitated by citizens failing to regard reason, evidence, logic and critical thinking as *moral virtues*. More generally, rationalist philosophers and intellectuals since at least Socrates believe that cultivating an *ethos* of dispassionate search for truth, and reliance on the best arguments and evidence, could only help citizens make wiser decisions (Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997; Habermas, 1985). With a populace more morally educated to value forming one's beliefs through careful examination of the facts and methodic thinking, so the optimistic narrative goes, political conversations would become more fact-based and less toxic because less emotional. False news and conspiracy theories would circulate less. And trust in democratic institutions could be preserved.

In this manuscript, we challenge this optimistic rationalist narrative. Previous research has shown that individuals with strong status seeking orientations are motivated to share hostile and false news, in particular news attacking their political opponents (Osmundsen et al., 2020b; Petersen et al., 2018). Theories of persuasion suggest that status-oriented individuals might be inclined to moralize epistemic rationality—i.e., to see the grounding of one’s beliefs in evidence and logic as a virtue (Ståhl et al., 2016b)—as a way of making their debate tactics appear more laudable. In other words, we predict that moralizing rationality constitutes a form of *moral grandstanding*: that status seekers and partisans may try to persuade themselves and others that the political tactics they want to pursue—such as trying to discredit political enemies—are accomplished in the name of unobjectionable virtues (Grubbs et al., 2019a, 2020; Nietzsche, 1998; Tosi & Warmke, 2016).

Prima facie evidence supporting this hypothesis is that many political activists who disseminate hostile and conspiratorial claims are in search of political influence and adamantly claim to be motivated by reason, “research”, the truth, the facts, critical thinking, etc. That is, they invoke precisely those epistemic virtues the pursuit of which, according to the optimistic rationalist narrative, should protect people against hostile and false political views. As ethnographers recently observed, Dutch “conspiracy theorists appropriate the image of the radical freethinker to differentiate themselves from the ‘sheeple’ who simply follow the crowd. [...] Our respondents collectively use the pejorative mainstream label of ‘conspiracy theorists’ to distance themselves from the ‘really’ irrational ones in the conspiracy milieu. ‘I am not a conspiracy theorist’ is the collectively shared adage to emphasize one’s own superiority/rationality” (Harambam & Aupers, 2017, p. 6). Other researchers similarly emphasize how conspiracy theorists, contrary to popular images, often strive to be evidence-oriented (Dentith, 2019) and rational (Coady, 2007).

Below, we unpack psychological arguments and evidence suggesting that status-seekers might be drawn towards sharing hostile, including false, partisan claims in polarized contexts, and explain why they might be motivated to cast themselves as being on the side of the virtues of truth and rationality. We then present two studies corroborating those predictions.

Status seeking in politics and the sharing of claims hostile to political opponents

In group-living species like humans, individuals are strongly incentivized to improve their place in the social hierarchy, defined as one's influence on the allocation of resources and mates, group decisions, and the coordination of collective action (Anderson et al., 2015; Brown, 1991; Cheng et al., 2013). In mass modern societies, politics is a key domain towards which individuals concerned with status acquisition should be expected to gravitate. It is through the constitution of political coalitions that the rules of the social game—e.g., the laws and norms regulating the distribution of resources and power between groups—can be changed. Politics is thus *the* arena where opportunities to improve the rights and economic standing of oneself and one's group can be seized. In particular, because they involve the public exchange of ideas about what the proper order of society should be, political discussions, for instance on social media, are a privileged place in which to try and recruit for one's side, discredit opponents, and display desirable values such as how good at debating, informed or devoted one is. Accordingly, a wealth of empirical findings corroborates the notion that status-oriented individuals are driven towards politics, including radical forms of political engagement. For instance, status seeking is a key predictor of online bullying and hostility (Bail, 2022; Bor & Petersen, 2022; Buckels et al., 2014) and of participation in violent activism in Western and African countries (Bartusevičius et al., 2020), including jihadism (Kruglanski et al., 2014).

As part of this arsenal of political activism, the sharing of rumors and posts hostile to one's political rivals—including false hostile rumors—is particularly attractive to individuals seeking to acquire status and engage in political conflict. Conspiracy theories and ethnic rumors demonizing enemy groups thrive in circumstances of ethnic tensions and warfare (Horowitz, 2020; Uscinski, 2020; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Animosity towards out-partisans is the primary driver of false news sharing on a U.S. Twitter rife with affective polarization between Democrats and Republicans (Osmundsen et al., 2020b). Political cynicism and motivations to subvert the entire political order (not just out-party elites) predict the circulation of conspiracy theories hostile to both political opponents and one's own party's leaders (Osmundsen et al., 2020b; Petersen et al., 2018). Those associations reflect that claims and content depicting outgroup members as malevolent or incompetent are uniquely useful material for partisans' coalitional goals. For instance, sharing news hostile to opponents (e.g., anti-Biden fake news from Republicans' perspective) may be believed to effectively persuade neutral audiences to engage against, or at least stop supporting, the outgroup. Rumors demonizing the outgroup

can also help credibly signal who one is siding with (Iyengar et al., 2012, 2018), a personal motivation to aggress against the outgroup (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Petersen & Laustsen, 2020) or a dominant personality (de Araujo et al., 2020). All these traits and mechanisms may be believed by strong partisans to facilitate mobilization and victory in conflict. Incidentally, strategies aiming to undermine support for one's opponents may sometimes be best served by claims that, within limits of minimal plausibility, *invent* the misdemeanors they accuse opponents of having perpetrated, because fictitious actions can be made juicier than those typically occurring in reality (Marie & Petersen, 2022; Petersen, Osmundsen, & Tooby, 2020; Petersen, 2020a).

Willingness to attack political opponents may be facilitated by convictions to be on the side of virtue and truth

While our minds may be inclined to see political conflicts as opportunities for status acquisition, the logic of persuasion entails that those tactics may be most successful if they appear anchored in virtues and universal principles rather than self-interest. Audiences are inclined to trust individuals who appear motivated by prosocial and disinterested goals, such as universal moral values (Everett et al., 2016; Petersen, 2013; Singh & Hoffman, 2021). This is because universal principles propose to protect the interests of everyone impartially, regardless of one's position in a situation (Skitka, 2010; Stanford, 2018). As a result, agents who sincerely follow such universal principles pass as being less likely to deviate, and thus as more trustworthy—even in cases where they are also motivated, unconsciously, by instrumental goals (Schwardmann & van der Weele, 2019; Singh & Hoffman, 2021, 2021; Sperber & Baumard, 2012). In this respect, there is prior evidence that the vocal expression of moral and political claims in public discussions can be underpinned by unconscious attempts to gain prestige, mobilize followers, and bully opponents—tactics that Grubbs et al., (2019b) have called *moral grandstanding*. Indeed, believing that tactics of personal affirmation or mobilization of allies for power are in fact motivated by virtue may make them appear more laudable to observers (Tooby & Cosmides, 2010).

In this paper, we suggest that moralizing rationality may be a form of moral grandstanding. Namely, that status seekers motivated to spread rumors intended to hurt political opponents may seek to increase their success in reaching these goals by broadcasting their hostility as a reflection of the virtues of truth-seeking and rationality (DeScioli et al., 2014; Grubbs et al., 2019a, 2020; Petersen, 2020b; Singh &

Hoffman, 2021; Tosi & Warmke, 2016; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). Conversely, people who are not motivated to engage in rough discussions about politics (e.g., by sharing hostile partisan news) may feel less of a need to present themselves as moral arbiters of the truth.

Contra the optimistic rationalistic narrative mentioned above that moralizing rationality should protect people against hostile (mis)information, we thus made two pre-registered hypotheses. First, that moralizing rationality would be associated with greater willingness to share true and false news hostile to one's political outgroup (H1). We focus our predictions on news targeting the outgroup (rather than the ingroup) because status-seekers who engage in political hostility generally identify with one group more than the other(s), as opposed to targeting every political group indiscriminately. Second, we predict the relationship H1 between moralizing rationality and sharing of news attacking the outgroup to be largely explained by status-seeking (H2). (Note that we do not claim that *all* cases of moralization of rationality are grounded in status-seeking. Some individuals low in self-assertion or partisanship but with strong motivations to pursue the truth might moralize rationality highly as well).

Intellectual humility as a protection against hostile and false claims

If moralizing rationality should not typically be expected to make people less susceptible to share politically hostile and false claims, then what might? Drawing on empirical findings on the illusion of knowledge (Fernbach et al., 2013, 2019; Rozenblit & Keil, 2002), status acquisition (Cheng et al., 2013), and on philosophical theories of expertise (Popper, 2019; Tetlock & Gardner, 2016; Whitcomb et al., 2017), we contend that what may be key is *intellectual humility* (pre-registered H3). That is, that dispositions to acknowledge one's ignorance, and take others' judgment into account (on complex political topics in particular), may reduce susceptibility to hostile (mis)information (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Porter et al., 2022; Whitcomb et al., 2017). One possible mechanism is that intellectual humility may operate as a psychological counterweight to the need for recognition that is central to status-seeking strategies, thus making it a better antidote to aggressive inclinations than the moralization of rationality. Furthermore, intellectual humility, as a disposition to distrust intuitions and to trust others' views, may make it easier to inhibit cognitive biases such as negative intent ascriptions, monocausal explanations, etc., which are signature features of politically hostile and conspiratorial discourses (e.g.,

Marchlewska et al., 2018). Hence, we made the pre-registered prediction that intellectually humble people would be *less* susceptible to share true and false news hostile to their political outgroup (H3).

Studies overview

We tested those three hypotheses in two large surveys (one exploratory and one pre-registered) run on U.S. participants (total N = 3675) in the fall 2021, following a divisive Trump term and ten months into a polarizing Biden presidency. The primary outcome we set out to explore in the preregistrations were intentions to share news items hostile to participants' political outgroup. However, we also examined intentions to share the news hostile to their ingroup and the true neutral news for comparison. Some of the hostile news presented completely fabricated claims (false news), while others reported events that actually took place (true news). Our hypotheses were primarily about intentions to *share* the news, examined in Study 1-2. However, Study 2 widened the scope by looking at the associations between moralization of rationality, status seeking and intellectual humility on *belief* in the news as well.

Studies 1-2

Studies 1 and 2 jointly aimed to test our hypotheses about sharing of both true and false news hostile to the outgroup. We predicted a positive association between moralization of rationality and motivations to share news hostile to the outgroup (H1), and that relationship to be largely explained by status-seeking (H2). By contrast, we predicted intellectual humility (H3) to negatively predict sharing of news hostile to the outgroup. While Study 1 focused on willingness to share false hostile news only, Study 2 included true hostile news as well, and explored participants' propensity to believe the news, not just share them.

Method

Pre-registration

Study 1 relied on data that was collected for another project to provide initial exploratory tests of our hypotheses H1-H3. As part of the other project, the design, materials, and sample size of Study 1 were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework at <https://osf.io/haq72>. Study 2 was an enhanced replication of Study 1. Its design, materials, and sample size were pre-registered at <https://osf.io/dfm6y>,

together with our key hypotheses H1-H3 and the statistical analyses required to test them.

Participants

For Study 1, a pre-registered, *a priori* power analysis in GPower estimated that 1000 participants were needed to detect a small effect size of Cohen's $d = 0.2$ at 90% power (alpha level = 5%). We recruited 1104 partisan participants ($M_{\text{age}} = 45$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 15.7$, 49% women). In contrast with Study 1, Study 2 had two conditions: sharing vs. belief in the news stories. To maintain statistical power, we decided to more than double the sample size of Study 1. This led us to recruit 2571 partisan participants ($M_{\text{age}} = 40$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 15$, 55% women). Importantly, both samples, requested on Prolific, included only people identifying as either Democrat or Republican partisans (i.e., no Independents). The samples were representative of the U.S. national population on age, sex, and ethnicity in Study 1 and close to representativeness along those dimensions in Study 2. To preserve cognitive diversity of respondents, no attention filter was applied.

Designs

Participants had to give their informed consent to participate and were paid £1.60 for their time. The first part of the surveys requested them to fill batches of political attitudes and personality questions, which constitute our key independent variables. The batches and the items they contain were presented in a random order. Afterwards, the second part of the studies exposed participants to a range of news items, in a random order. While Study 1 only probed participants on their willingness to share the news, Study 2 randomly asked them to report either their willingness to share, or how accurate they perceived each item to be (to capture belief). Sharing and belief are our key dependent measures. The surveys ended with demographic questions: sex, age, and level of education, used as control variables.

Measures

Outcomes. Both Study 1¹ and 2 probed participants on their willingness to share each news items on social media on a [0] Extremely unlikely to [5] Extremely

¹ For a purpose unrelated to the present project, the questionnaire of Study 1 also contained a manipulation of the audience respondents were invited to imagine sharing the news to before seeing the items. The vignettes employed varied whether the imagined audience was the political ingroup or

likely scale. To capture belief, Study 2 also asked a random half of the participants to report how accurate, to the best of their knowledge, they perceived each item as being on a [0] Extremely inaccurate to [5] Extremely accurate scale (cf. Supplementary Materials (SM), section D).

Covariates. To test hypothesis H1, stipulating a positive association between moralized rationality and news sharing, we relied on the “moralized rationality” scale (9 items, Ståhl et al., 2016) (Studies 1-2). It contains items such as “It is a moral imperative that people can justify their beliefs using rational arguments and evidence” or “Holding on to beliefs when there is substantial evidence against them is immoral.”

To test the hypothesis H3 of a negative association between intellectual humility and hostile news sharing, we employed a self-report scale of intellectual humility (22 items, Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016) in Study 2. This scale was designed to tap intellectual humility in the broad sense of being disposed to override intuition, to separate one’s beliefs from one’s self-worth, and to take others’ judgment into account—skills which are central to normative definitions of epistemic rationality (Fernbach et al., 2013; Popper, 2019; Porter et al., 2022; Tetlock & Gardner, 2016; Whitcomb et al., 2017). The scale contains items like “I am willing to change my position on an important issue in the face of good reasons” or “I am willing to hear others out, even if I disagree with them.” We were also interested in comparing the associations between intellectual humility and hostile news sharing to associations with the frequently used cognitive reflection test, a measure of analytical thinking, which we captured with the CRT-2 (3 items, Thomson & M. Oppenheimer, 2016) in both studies.

To test H2 about the role of status-seeking motivations in moralizing rationality, we relied in both studies on two indexes. First, a scale of moral grandstanding (10 items, Grubbs et al., 2019), which captures tendencies to dominate others through the heralding of moral beliefs (e.g., “I share my moral/ political beliefs to make people who disagree with me feel bad”). Second, we used a scale of status-driven risk taking (14 items, Ashton et al., 2010), which taps inclinations to take risks

the outgroup, and whether participants had to imagine sharing the news from their personal or an anonymous social media account (2x2 design, between-subjects). See SM, section F, for vignettes. Crucially, the vignettes had almost no influence on intentions to share the news, and in particular, no statistically significant moderation effect on the relationships between our key covariates and intentions to share the news. This is shown in SM, section F, under the subheader “Demonstration that vignettes manipulating the sharing context had little influence on sharing”. Accordingly, we analyzed the associations between our main covariates of interest and intentions to share the news by pooling the data in Study 1, and are able to compare the results of Study 1 and Study 2.

in exchange for social status (e.g., “I would enjoy being a famous and powerful person, even if it meant a high risk of assassination”).

To obtain our key dependent measures of sharing of (Studies 1-2) and belief in (Study 2) the news stories, participants were randomly exposed to a number of news items after the attitude and personality questions. Each story was composed of a headline and a picture, and no source was displayed. Respondents saw 10 news stories in Study 1: 4 false stories hostile to Democrats, 4 false stories hostile to Republicans, and 2 true neutral news. In Study 2, the set of news stories of Study 1 was supplemented with 4 true news hostile to Democrats, and 4 true news hostile to Republicans, leading to 18 items in total.

Stimuli

All news items were tested for perceived hostility in two pretest studies run on Prolific. The study that pretested the false hostile news contained a total of 18 candidate items (12 hostile and 4 neutral), and the one that pretested the true hostile news contained 22 candidate items (all hostile; some were borrowed from Pennycook et al., 2021). To be selected for the pretesting study, the candidate hostile news needed to meet the following requirements. First, all had to express overt hostility to Democrats or Republicans—either prominent politicians or voters—in the sense of ascribing malevolence or incompetence to members of one of the two groups. Second, the false hostile news had to report on events that did not take place (which we invented, inspired from false news circulating online). By contrast, the true hostile news had to report on events that actually took place, in the sense of having been reported by reliable media sources such as the *New York Times* or *The Guardian*. As to the true neutral news, they reported on animal biology and were retrieved from <https://www.nature.com/>. Sources were never visible in order to focus attention on the claims.

The pretest studies asked the raters two questions about each news: “To what extent does this news headline reflect negatively on supporters of the Democratic party?” and “To what extent does this news headline reflect negatively on supporters of the Republican party?” (from [0] Not at all to [100] Extremely with [0] as default slider position). The hostility of a news item was determined as the average between three metrics of hostility: an absolute score (e.g., hostility of item X to Democrats), a difference (hostility of item X to Democrats – hostility of item X to Republicans), and a ratio (hostility of item X to Democrats / hostility of item X to Republicans). The items

we retained for our studies were the 4 false and 4 true news that were perceived as being most hostile to Democrats, the 4 false and 4 true news perceived as being most hostile to Republicans, and the 2 least hostile true neutral news. See Figure 1 for examples of news. Refer to SM, sections A-C, for the full set of items used in the studies.

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

False hostile partisan news (Study 1 & 2)

Recent upsurge in COVID-19 due to Biden Letting Thousands of Illegal Immigrants into US Without tests

Dozens of Nazi flags and uniforms found in Republican Party headquarters in Mississippi

True hostile partisan news (Study 2)

How Joe Biden failed the people of Afghanistan — and tarnished US credibility around the world

Republican who ousted Democratic NJ Senate President called Mohammed a "pedophile" and Islam a "false religion" and a "cult of hate" in 2019

True neutral news (Study 1 and 2)

On Ecstasy, Octopuses Reached Out for a Hug

By administering MDMA to these sea creatures, researchers found they share parts of an ancient messaging system involved in social behaviors with humans.

When this sea cucumber (*Pannychia moseleyi*) is stimulated, it produces a frenzy of bioluminescent light

Technological advances in video cameras and low-light sensors allowed scientists to reveal the existence of a worm-like predator living in the deep sea shooting off rings of blue light.

Figure 1: Examples of news items used in Studies 1 and 2. Top and middle: items on the left are hostile to Democrats and those on the right to Republicans.

Statistical analyses

All data analyses in this paper were run in R using R Studio. Data and code are available on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/udj6t/?view_only=6c35259a0d0f4f3b95ee2d75fffd639c. The analyses we preregistered were based on linear mixed effects models. However, we encountered convergence issues related to our demographic control variables. All effects reported here are consequently based on the similar analysis strategy of standard regression models of intentions to share and belief with robust standard errors clustered around participant ID. This latter data fitting approach is also the one favored in prior work in the field (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2021).

Models that explore relationships between personality covariate and sharing or belief in the news items include one covariate at a time (e.g., moralized rationality). Models that report relationships between two personality covariates are estimated based on the full dataset of each study. All models control for sex, age, and education. All coefficients are standardized (based on scaling of independent and dependent variables) and 95% confidence intervals are specified in square brackets.

Our primary pre-registered hypotheses H1-H3 and the associated analyses focus on the associations of moralized rationality and intellectual humility with intentions to share true and false news hostile to participants' *outgroup*. However, a comprehensive account of the influences of our covariates on news sharing also required examining how they affect sharing of true and false news hostile to a participant's *ingroup*, and *true neutral news*, for comparison. Doing this would allow us to disentangle a potential taste for hostile claims in general from specifically partisan biases, and from news sharing propensities in general. We thus systematically report the association of each personality covariate of interest (e.g., moralized rationality) with news sharing in the following order: associations of moralized rationality with sharing of false and then true news hostile to the *outgroup*, with false and then true news hostile to the *ingroup*, and then with *true neutral news*, before reporting the covariate x hostility target interaction for false and then true news (with hostility to the outgroup defined as baseline of the hostility target factor). We then proceed in the same way when reporting the associations between our covariates and belief in the false and true news.

Results

Main results are graphically displayed in Figure 2-5 below. Regression tables for Studies 1 and 2 can be found in SM, sections F-G.

Willingness to share the news stories

Figure 2: Associations between moralized rationality and willingness to share each news type in Studies 1 and 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Testing H1. Is there a positive relationship between moralizing rationality and sharing of news hostile to the *outgroup* (pre-registered H1)? Yes. As shown in Figure 2 above, the more participants claimed to moralize rationality, the more likely they were to pass along news hostile to the political *outgroup*, both false (Study 1: $\beta = 0.16$, [0.10, 0.22], $p < 0.001$; Study 2: $\beta = 0.12$, [0.06, 0.18], $p < 0.001$), and true (Study 2: $\beta = 0.11$, [0.06, 0.16], $p < 0.001$). This provides support for H1.

By contrast, the positive association between moralizing rationality and intentions to share false news hostile to one's *ingroup* was weaker yet significant in Study 1 ($\beta = 0.06$, [0.02, 0.11], $p < 0.004$) but no effect emerged in Study 2 ($\beta = 0.01$, [-0.02, 0.04], $p = 0.4$). Moralizing rationality was also associated with slightly more sharing of true news hostile to one's *ingroup* (Study 2: $\beta = 0.04$, [0.01, 0.07], $p < 0.017$).

In summary, moralizing rationality thus had a markedly stronger association with sharing of false news hostile to the *outgroup* than hostile to the *ingroup* in both Study 1 (moralized rationality x hostility target: $\beta = -0.07$, [-0.12, -0.02], $p = 0.008$) and Study 2 (moralized rationality x hostility target: $\beta = -0.09$, [-0.14, -0.04], $p < 0.001$), and the same association was observed on true hostile news in Study 2 (moralized rationality x hostility target: $\beta = -0.06$, [-0.10, -0.02], $p = 0.001$).

Moreover, moralizing rationality also predicted more sharing of true neutral news (Study 1: $\beta = 0.09$, [0.03, 0.14], $p < 0.002$; Study 2: $\beta = 0.11$, [0.06, 0.17], $p < 0.001$).

Figure 3: Associations between status seeking (status-driven risk taking and moral grandstanding) and willingness to share each news type in Studies 1 and 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Testing H2. Is the relationship between moralizing rationality and sharing of news hostile to participants' *outgroup* underpinned by status-seeking tendencies (pre-registered H2)? Overall, H2 is supported. First, we examine the relationship between hostile news sharing and our indexes of status seeking. As shown in Figure 3 above, status-seeking tendencies strongly predicted sharing of false news hostile to the *outgroup* in Study 1 (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.40$, [0.35, 0.45], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.19$, [0.13, 0.25], $p < 0.001$). In Study 2, status-seeking tendencies also positively predicted sharing of hostile news hostile to the *outgroup* both false (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.36$, [0.31, 0.41], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.08$, [0.01, 0.14], $p = 0.017$), and true (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.30$, [0.25, 0.34], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.08$, [0.03, 0.13], $p = 0.002$)².

² Effects of the moral grandstanding index reported in the manuscript average both prestige strivings and dominance strivings items (Grubbs et al., 2019; see also SM, section D). Associations between moral grandstanding and sharing of news hostile to the outgroup in both studies, and with moralized rationality (*cf.* below), were qualitatively similar whether the index of moral grandstanding contained all items, only the prestige strivings items, or only the dominance strivings items.

Status seeking also clearly predicted sharing of news hostile to the *ingroup*, both false (Study 1: moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.30$, [0.25,0.35], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.24$, [0.19,0.29], $p < 0.001$; Study 2: moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.09$, [0.05,0.12], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.07$, [0.03,0.10], $p < 0.001$) and true (Study 2: moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.14$, [0.11,0.17], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.07$, [0.03,0.10], $p < 0.001$).

Moral grandstanding thus tended to have a much stronger positive associations with sharing of news hostile to the *outgroup* than news hostile to the *ingroup*, whether the news were false (moral grandstanding x hostility target: Study 1: $\beta = -0.06$, [-0.11,-0.01], $p = 0.021$; Study 2: $\beta = -0.26$, [-0.31,-0.22]) or true (Study 2: $\beta = -0.15$, [-0.18,-0.12], $p < 0.001$). By contrast, status-driven risk taking was overall associated with an equal tendency to share news hostile to the *outgroup* and news hostile to the *ingroup* (status-driven risk taking x hostility target: Study 2: false news: $\beta = 0.01$; true news: $\beta = 0.0$; sharing of hostile false news was even slightly greater when the target was the *ingroup* in Study 1: $\beta = 0.06$, [0.01,0.11], $p = 0.014$).

Moreover, status seeking was also associated with more sharing of true neutral news (Study 1: moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.24$, [0.18,0.29], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.13$, [0.07,0.19], $p < 0.001$; Study 2: moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.14$, [0.08,0.20], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.08$, [0.02,0.14], $p = 0.014$). That said, relationships between status-seeking and hostile political news sharing tended to be greater overall than with neutral news sharing.

Figure 4: Associations between status-seeking (moral grandstanding and status-driven risk taking) and moralized rationality in Studies 1 and 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the

dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Then, we examine the relationship between status seeking and moralized rationality. As shown in Figure 4 above, the two status-seeking constructs positively predicted moralizing rationality in both Study 1 (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.29$, [0.27, 0.31], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.13$, [0.11, 0.15], $p < 0.001$) and in Study 2 (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.23$, [0.22, 0.24], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.02$, [0.01, 0.03], $p = 0.002$). Moral grandstanding was a markedly stronger predictor of moralizing rationality than status-driven risk taking.

Status seeking largely explains the relationship between moralized rationality and news sharing. Moreover, and in support of H2, we observe that the association between moralized rationality and sharing of news (true or false) hostile to the *outgroup* is largely explained away by status seeking. We demonstrate it using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) tests of difference between the moralized rationality coefficient before vs. after controlling for moral grandstanding and status-driven risk taking together.³ In Study 1, compared to when they are absent, including the status-seeking variables in the model causes the association between moralized rationality and sharing of false news hostile to the *outgroup* to drop from $\beta = 0.11$, SE = 0.01, $p < 0.001$ to $\beta = 0.05$, SE = 0.01, $p = 0.001$ —that is, a 54% decrease ($X^2(1, N = 8778) = 24.66$, $p < 0.001$). In Study 2, adding status-seeking variables in the model caused the coefficient of moralized rationality on sharing of false news hostile to the *outgroup* to drop from $\beta = 0.12$, SE = 0.016, $p < 0.001$ to $\beta = 0.04$, SE = 0.016, $p = 0.005$ —a 66% fall ($X^2(1, N = 9744) = 11.15$, $p < 0.001$). Still in Study 2, adding status seeking indexes caused the association between moralized rationality and sharing of true news hostile to participants' *outgroup* to decrease from $\beta = 0.11$, SE = 0.014, $p < 0.001$ to $\beta = 0.04$, SE = 0.015, $p = 0.004$ —a 64% reduction ($X^2(1, N = 9752) = 10.41$, $p = 0.0012$).

³ Note that in R, this procedure yields slightly different estimates for the associations between moralized rationality and sharing than the regression with robust standard errors clustered around participant ID otherwise reported in our analyses.

Figure 5: Associations between intellectual humility and willingness to share each news type in Study 2 (the scale was absent from Study 1). Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Testing H3. Finally, we ask whether intellectual humility reduces sharing of news hostile to respondents' *outgroup* (pre-registered H3)? Associations are visualized in Figure 5 above. As predicted, the intellectual humility scale, present only in Study 2, was strongly negatively associated with sharing of false ($\beta = -0.16$, $[-0.21, -0.10]$, $p < 0.001$) and true ($\beta = -0.13$, $[-0.17, -0.08]$, $p < 0.001$) news hostile to the political *outgroup*.

Intellectual humility's influence on sharing of news hostile to the *ingroup* was markedly smaller: it was null on false hostile news ($\beta = -0.03$, $[-0.07, 0.01]$, $p = 0.1$) but negative on true hostile news ($\beta = -0.06$, $[-0.09, -0.02]$, $p = 0.002$). Intellectual humility was thus more strongly negatively associated with sharing of news hostile to the *outgroup* than to the *ingroup*, whether false (intellectual humility $\times$ hostility target: $\beta = 0.11$, $[0.06, 0.16]$, $p < 0.001$) or true ($\beta = 0.05$, $[0.02, 0.09]$, $p = 0.003$).

Finally, intellectual humility had no influence on sharing of true neutral news ($\beta = 0.02$, $[-0.03, 0.08]$, $p = 0.4$).

As shown in SM, F-G, high performance at the cognitive reflection test was negatively correlated with willingness to share all news types: news hostile to the *outgroup* (both false and true), hostile to the *ingroup* (both false and true), and true neutral news. However, the negative associations between sharing of news hostile to the *outgroup* and intellectual humility were *greater* than with cognitive reflection, even when both intellectual humility and cognitive reflection were included in the

model. Intellectual humility and cognitive reflection were only weakly correlated (Study 2: $\beta = 0.10$, [0.06, 0.14], $p < 0.001$). All this suggests intellectual humility and cognitive reflection tap distinct psychological processes, and that intellectual humility is a better inhibitor of motivations to share hostile (mis)information than the widely studied cognitive reflection construct.

Associations between personality covariates. In the two studies, controlling for demographics, moralized rationality was weakly negatively correlated with both intellectual humility (Study 2: $\beta = -0.09$, [-0.11, -0.08], $p < 0.001$) and cognitive reflection (Study 1: $\beta = -0.09$, [-0.15, -0.04], $p = 0.001$; Study 2: $\beta = -0.04$, [-0.05, -0.03], $p < 0.001$). This further confirms that moralizing rationality is not as such associated with more epistemically desirable dispositions.

Intellectual humility was moderately negatively associated with status seeking (Study 2: moral grandstanding: $\beta = -0.34$, [-0.38, -0.30], $p = 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = -0.19$, [-0.24, -0.14], $p = 0.001$). Controlled regression models from which those coefficients are taken as well as matrices of raw correlations between personality covariates can also be found in SM, F-G, under the headers “Relationships between personality covariates”.

Belief in the news

Analyses of accuracy judgments of the presented news items—run only for Study 2—were exploratory (not pre-registered) and followed the same analysis scheme as intentions to share. The relationships between our personality covariates and belief were overall markedly smaller than with sharing.

Figure 6: Associations between moralized rationality and willingness to believe each news type in Study 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Associations between moralized rationality and belief. As illustrated in Figure 6 above, moralized rationality was not associated with belief in the false news hostile to the *outgroup* ($\beta = 0.01$, [-0.03, 0.06], $p = 0.5$), but it was weakly positively associated with belief in the true news hostile to respondents' *outgroup* ($\beta = 0.04$, [0.01, 0.07], $p = 0.013$).

Moralized rationality had a small *negative* association with belief in the false news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = -0.04$, [-0.08, -0.01], $p < 0.008$), and no association with the true news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = 0.02$, [-0.01, 0.05], $p = 0.1$). Thus, moralizing rationality was not associated with more belief in news hostile to the *outgroup* than hostile to the *ingroup*, neither false (moralized rationality x hostility target: $\beta = -0.04$, [0.09, 0.01], $p = 0.1$) nor true ($\beta = 0.0$).

Finally, moralizing rationality was also associated with slightly more belief in the true neutral news ($\beta = 0.05$, [0.02, 0.09], $p < 0.004$).

Figure 7: Associations between status seeking (status-driven risk taking and moral grandstanding) and belief in each news type in Study 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Associations between status-seeking and belief. See Figure 7 above. Status-seeking inclinations positively predicted belief in false news hostile to the *outgroup* (moral grandstanding: $\beta = 0.14$, [0.10, 0.18], $p < 0.001$; status-driven risk taking: $\beta = 0.08$, [0.04, 0.12], $p < 0.001$). However, only moral grandstanding ($\beta = 0.06$, [0.03, 0.09], $p < 0.001$), but not status-driven risk taking ($\beta = -0.02$, [-0.05, 0.01], $p = 0.2$), was positively correlated with belief in true news hostile to the *outgroup*.

Status-driven risk taking was positively predictive of believing false news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = 0.12$, [0.08, 0.15], $p < 0.001$) but not moral grandstanding ($\beta = 0.01$, [-0.02, 0.05], $p = 0.5$). Similarly, status driven risk taking was positively associated with believing in the true news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = 0.04$, [0.01, 0.07], $p = 0.004$) but not moral grandstanding ($\beta = -0.01$, [-0.04, 0.02], $p = 0.4$). In sum, moral grandstanding's influence was markedly greater on news hostile to the *outgroup* than to the *ingroup*, whether false ($\beta = -0.11$, [-0.16, -0.06], $p < 0.001$) or true ($\beta = -0.06$, [-0.09, -0.02], $p = 0.003$). By contrast, however, status-driven risk taking was associated with slightly more belief in news hostile to the *ingroup* than the *outgroup*, both false ($\beta = 0.05$, [0.01, 0.10], $p = 0.30$) and true ($\beta = 0.07$, [0.03, 0.10], $p < 0.001$).

Neither moral grandstanding ($\beta = 0.00$) nor status-driven risk taking ($\beta = 0.03$, $[-0.01, 0.07]$, $p = 0.1$) had any significant association with belief in the true neutral news.

Relationship between moralized rationality, status seeking and belief. By contrast with intentions to share, moralized rationality only had a very weak-to-null relationship with belief in the news hostile to the *outgroup*. In consequence, jointly controlling for moral grandstanding and status-driven risk taking in the relationship between moralized rationality and belief in news hostile to the *outgroup* almost did not reduce the coefficient of moralized rationality (the SUR method described above was consequently not applied). On belief in false news hostile to the *outgroup*, there was no relationship between moralized rationality and belief in the hostile news to start with ($\beta = 0.01$, $[-0.03, 0.06]$, $p = 0.5$), so controlling for status-seeking dispositions made no difference ($\beta = -0.03$, $[-0.07, 0.02]$, $p = 0.24$). On belief in true news hostile to the *outgroup*, the control caused moralized rationality to drop marginally from $\beta = 0.04$, $[0.01, 0.07]$, $p = 0.013$ to $\beta = 0.03$, $[-0.01, 0.06]$, $p = 0.12$.

Figure 8: Associations between intellectual humility and belief in each news type in Study 2. Regression coefficients denote the standardized regression coefficient of each personality covariate on the dependent variable with robust SEs clustered around participant ID, while controlling for age, sex, and education. Whiskers are 95% confidence intervals.

Associations between intellectual humility and belief. See Figure 8 above. As regards intellectual humility, it had a moderate negative relationship with belief in false news hostile to the *outgroup* ($\beta = -0.18$, $[-0.21, -0.14]$, $p < 0.001$) and a very small negative association with belief in true news hostile to the *outgroup* ($\beta = -0.03$, $[-0.06, -0.00]$, $p = 0.029$).

Intellectual humility was also negatively predictive of belief in false news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = -0.06$, $[-0.10, -0.03]$, $p < 0.001$) but uncorrelated with belief in true news hostile to the *ingroup* ($\beta = 0.03$, $[-0.00, 0.06]$, $p = 0.07$). In sum, the negative relationship between intellectual humility and belief in news hostile to the *outgroup* was markedly bigger than on news hostile to the *ingroup*, whether false (intellectual humility $\times$ hostility target: $\beta = 0.11$, $[0.05, 0.16]$, $p < 0.001$) or true ($\beta = 0.05$, $[0.01, 0.09]$, $p = 0.018$).

Finally, intellectual humility was weakly positively associated with belief in true neutral news ($\beta = 0.05$, $[0.02, 0.09]$, $p = 0.003$).

Associations between cognitive reflection and belief in the news can be found in SM, G.

General Discussion

Many optimistic observers assume that citizens more morally sensitized to the values of evidence-based and methodic thinking would be better protected from the perils of conspiracy theories, false news, and political polarization. Yet, attention to the discourse of individuals who pass along politically hostile and false conspiratorial claims suggests that they often sincerely believe to be free and independent “critical thinkers”, and to care more about “facts” than the unthinking “sheep” to which they assimilate most of the population (Harambam & Aupers, 2017).

Across two large online surveys ($N = 3675$) conducted in the context of the highly polarized U.S. of autumn 2021, we provide the first piece of evidence that moralizing epistemic rationality—a moral motivation to think in logical and evidence-based ways—may actually *stimulate* the dissemination of hostile views, both true and false. Specifically, respondents who reported viewing rationality as a moral virtue (Ståhl et al., 2016a) were more willing to share news on social media that are hostile to their political opponents than individuals low on this trait. Importantly, those effects generalized to two types of news stories: (true) news anchored in actual events, but also (false) news making entirely fabricated claims. Moralizers of rationality were also occasionally more prone to share news hostile to their political ingroup (false news in Study 1; true news in Study 2) but those relationships were markedly smaller than with news targeting political opponents. Claims to moralize rationality can thus coexist with partisan bias. Ståhl et al. (2016) originally introduced their moralization of rationality scale as predicting motivations to fight against “irrational beliefs” (in the form of donating money to a rationality-oriented charity, cf. their Study 8). We here

observe that this scale positively predicts the dissemination of clearly “irrational” claims: news ascribing entirely made-up plans and misdemeanors to Democrats and Republicans.

To illuminate those counter-intuitive findings, we draw on theories of status seeking and persuasion and provide robust evidence that moralizing rationality, in contemporary United States, can be a form of status-driven grandstanding. First, we observe that inclinations to take risks in exchange for social status—status-driven risk taking—and *a fortiori* tendencies to belittle others through the heralding of moral beliefs—moral grandstanding—predict claims of moralizing rationality. Second, we find that those status seeking dispositions strongly predict motivations to share true and false news hostile to political opponents and also, to a lesser extent, news criticizing the ingroup, corroborating prior work (Petersen et al., 2018). Third, and most importantly, status seeking dispositions jointly explain most of the positive relationship between moralized rationality and sharing of true and false news hostile to the outgroup. Taken together, these findings support the notion that individuals seeking to accrue status and score partisan points may be intuitively drawn to claim to moralize rationality, because doing this allows them to frame those motivations as being anchored in superior virtues of truth-seeking and rationality (DeScioli et al., 2014; Kurzban, 2012; Petersen et al., 2018; Singh & Hoffman, 2021; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014).

Finally, a major contribution of our studies is to show that what may reliably protect people from sharing and believing politically hostile and false news is the underrated virtue of *intellectual humility*. That is, dispositions to reflectively acknowledge that unaided personal intuition is insufficient to grasp complex political issues, and consequently that the right thing to do is often to question one’s own intuitions, and trust others’ judgment, experts in particular. Intellectual humility had inhibiting effects on sharing news hostile to both the ingroup and political opponents—which individuals are most inclined to target—but did not decrease true neutral news sharing. Moreover, intellectual humility was associated not just with less sharing of hostile news but also with less belief in true and false news hostile to the outgroup, and with less belief in false news hostile to the ingroup (Study 2). Taken together, those associations indicate a strong and promising link between intellectual modesty, political tolerance, and protection from misinformation, at the two levels of communication and belief. Now, our data do not reveal why exactly an intellectually modest attitude has those beneficial consequences. One possibility is that intellectual

humility may counteract status seeking and partisan motives, thus leaving more room for truth-seeking motives. This is corroborated by the negative associations we found between intellectual humility and status-seeking variables. Another possibility is that intellectual humility may make it easier to resist inferences of negative intent and simplistic explanations of political failures, and to favor explanations in terms of unanticipated side-effects, incompetence, and chance—which may better approximate the truth (Popper, 1945/2019).

Genuine epistemic rationality is a difficult target. Human thinking, if it is to maximize chances of forming and communicating true political beliefs under uncertainty, requires more than a staunch moral motivation to be rational. It also needs cultivating dispositions to restrain the pretensions of the ego: trusting one's hunches less, trusting others more, and sometimes suspending critique.

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Supplementary Materials

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A. False hostile news

Hostile to Democrats

hos_lib_oil in Study 1

f_lib_oil in Study 2

The Biden administration's mishandling of the economy lead to increased energy dependence for the U.S., and unprecedented surge in oil prices compared to Trump era

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

hos_lib_elec in Study 1

f_lib_elec in Study 2

In a number of recent U.S. Senate elections prior to the 2020 presidential election, Democrats have had illegal voters bused into their home states in order to swing the election in their favor

hos_lib_covid in Study 1

f_lib_covid in Study 2

Recent upsurge in COVID-19 due to Biden Letting Thousands of Illegal Immigrants into US Without tests

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

hos_lib_clint in Study 1

f_lib_clint in Study 2

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's approval of a deal to transfer U.S. uranium deposits to a Russian company was a quid pro quo exchange for donations to the Clinton Foundation

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

Hostile to Republicans

hos_cons_nazi in Study 1

f_cons_nazi in Study 2

Dozens of Nazi flags and uniforms found in Republican Party headquarters in Mississippi

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

hos_cons_medic in Study 1

f_cons_medic in Study 2

Under the Republican tax bill passed in December 2019, Medicare will stop covering cancer and HIV treatments

hos_cons_ment in Study 1

f_cons_ment in Study 2

Republicans voted to allow people with pre-existing mental illness to buy firearms

Republican party Representatives voted to allow people with pre-existing mental illness to buy firearms, yet denied them health insurance to treat their pre-existing mental illness...

hos_cons_hurri in Study 1

f_cons_hurri in Study 2

Trump's federal government intentionally breached flood levees in Florida during the 2018 hurricanes season so that poor neighborhoods would be flooded and middle-class neighborhoods would be spared

B. True neutral news

neut_2

When this sea cucumber (*Pannychia moseleyi*) is stimulated, it produces a frenzy of bioluminescent light

Technological advances in video cameras and low-light sensors allowed scientists to reveal the existence of a worm-like predator living in the deep sea shooting off rings of blue light.

Drawn from: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06660-2?WT.feed_name=subjects_zoology

neut_3

On Ecstasy, Octopuses Reached Out for a Hug

By administering MDMA to these sea creatures, researchers found they share parts of an ancient messaging system involved in social behaviors with humans.

Inspired from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/science/octopus-ecstasy-mdma.html#:~:text=By%20dosing%20the%20tentacled%20creatures,in%20social%20behaviors%20with%20humans.>

C. True hostile news

Hostile to Democrats

r_lib_2

Drawn from (Pennycook et al., 2021b), Exp 5

r_lib_3

Drawn from (Pennycook et al., 2021b), Exp 5

r_lib_4

How Joe Biden failed the people of Afghanistan — and tarnished US credibility around the world

Drawn from <https://theconversation.com/how-joe-biden-failed-the-people-of-afghanistan-and-tarnished-us-credibility-around-the-world-166160>

r_lib_6

Biden administration ponders shutting down another pipeline as gas prices soar igniting new fury

The Biden administration's energy policies have drawn criticism as gas prices surge heading into the winter months

Drawn from: <https://twitter.com/FoxNews/status/1457478870681198599>
<https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-considering-shutting-down-michigan-pipeline>

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

Hostile to Republicans

r_cons_5

Trump Supporter Arrested After Allegedly Threatening To Kill Members of Congress

Drawn from (Pennycook et al., 2021b), Exp 1

r_cons_6

Drawn from: <https://time.com/6102500/donald-trump-gop-control/>

r_cons_9

GOP groups quiet as billionaire donor stands accused of running biggest tax fraud scheme ever

The billionaire accused of running the biggest tax fraud scheme in U.S. history—\$2 billion—was a prolific donor to Republican groups and causes.

The leaders of those organizations have kept quiet on the accusations against him.

Drawn from: <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/05/gop-groups-quiet-as-donor-accused-of-running-biggest-tax-fraud-scheme-ever.html>

r_cons_10

Republican who ousted Democratic NJ Senate President called Mohammed a "pedophile" and Islam a "false religion" and a "cult of hate" in 2019

Drawn from: <https://twitter.com/mattkatz00/status/1456355708795080709?s=20>

D. Measures

All batches of questions can be found in the pre-registrations (Study 1: <https://osf.io/haq72>; Study 2: <https://osf.io/dfm6y>), below, as well as in the Word .doc versions of the Qualtrics questionnaires of Studies 1 and 2 posted on the Open science Framework.

Outcomes

- Willingness to share news stories

Study 1

The questionnaire of Study 1 varied which audience participants were invited to imagine sharing the news to, following a 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup audience) x 2 (anonymous vs. personal social media account) between-subjects design. The news sharing question was thus adapted to each condition:

“How likely would you be to share this headline from an anonymous account [vs. from your personal account], on this Democrat [vs. Republican] Facebook group?”
[0] Extremely unlikely, [1] Unlikely, [2] Somewhat Unlikely, [3] Somewhat Likely, [4] Likely, [5] Extremely likely

Study 2

“Would you consider sharing this story online (for example, through Facebook or Twitter)?”

[0] Extremely unlikely, [1] Unlikely, [2] Somewhat unlikely, [3] Somewhat likely, [4] Likely, [5] Extremely likely).

NB: identical to (Pennycook et al., 2021a)

➤ **Belief in the news stories**

Study 2

“To the best of your knowledge, is the claim in the above headline accurate?”

[0] Extremely inaccurate, [1] Inaccurate, [2] Somewhat inaccurate, [3] Somewhat accurate, [4] Accurate, [5] Extremely accurate

NB: identical to (Pennycook et al., 2021a)

Covariates

➤ **Moralized rationality** (Ståhl et al., 2016a), Study 1 & Study 2

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1. Being skeptical about claims that are not backed up by evidence is a moral virtue.

2. Holding on to beliefs when there is substantial evidence against them is immoral.
3. It is morally wrong to trust your intuitions without rationally examining them.
4. It is morally wrong to rely on anything else other than logic and evidence when deciding what is true and what is not true.
5. It is a moral imperative that people can justify their beliefs using rational arguments and evidence.
6. It is immoral to hold irrational beliefs.
7. A person's moral authority depends on their rationality.
8. A person's morality is in no way determined by their rationality.*
9. Whether a person can be convinced by reason and evidence is in no way indicative of their morality.*

* = reverse coded

Responses collected on 7-point Likert scale: Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

➤ **Cognitive reflection test (CRT 2)** (Thomson & M. Oppenheimer, 2016), Study 1 & Study 2

Here is a number of puzzles. Please provide your answer to each of them in the box below.

CRT1 If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?

_____ [response: 2]

CRT2 A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?

_____ [response: 8]

CRT3 Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter's name?

_____ [response: Emily]_____

CRT4 How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long?

_____ [response: 0] _____

➤ **Intellectual humility scale** (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016), Study 2.

Screenshot from Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, (2016)'s Table 1:

Table 1. Factor pattern of principal-axis factor analysis of retained items with Promax rotation.

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	h^2
73. I feel small when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart. ^a	0.82	0.12	−0.09	−0.09	0.65
50. When someone contradicts my most important beliefs, it feels like a personal attack. ^a	0.80	−0.07	0.01	0.12	0.69
49. When someone disagrees with ideas that are important to me, it feels as though I'm being attacked. ^a	0.78	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.67
53. I tend to feel threatened when others disagree with me on topics that are close to my heart. ^a	0.77	−0.12	0.07	0.08	0.61
68. When someone disagrees with ideas that are important to me, it makes me feel insignificant. ^a	0.75	0.10	−0.03	−0.12	0.56
28. I am open to revising my important beliefs in the face of new information.	0.03	0.77	−0.04	−0.01	0.56
26. I am willing to change my position on an important issue in the face of good reasons.	0.02	0.73	−0.01	0.00	0.53
29. I am willing to change my opinions on the basis of compelling reason.	0.08	0.69	−0.02	−0.04	0.49
25. I have at times changed opinions that were important to me, when someone showed me I was wrong.	−0.07	0.61	0.06	0.04	0.41
33. I'm willing to change my mind once it's made up about an important topic.	−0.01	0.49	0.05	0.14	0.33
61. I can respect others, even if I disagree with them in important ways.	0.02	−0.19	0.84	0.01	0.56
47. I can have great respect for someone, even when we don't see eye-to-eye on important topics.	0.02	−0.02	0.82	−0.08	0.62
39. Even when I disagree with others, I can recognize that they have sound points.	−0.05	0.18	0.64	−0.05	0.54
65. I am willing to hear others out, even if I disagree with them.	0.06	0.21	0.56	−0.09	0.51
45. I welcome different ways of thinking about important topics.	−0.02	0.25	0.47	0.10	0.50
34. I respect that there are ways of making important decisions that are different from the way I make decisions.	−0.06	0.19	0.46	0.10	0.39
1. My ideas are usually better than other people's ideas. ^a	0.02	−0.11	−0.02	0.68	0.42
3. For the most part, others have more to learn from me than I have to learn from them. ^a	−0.09	0.08	−0.06	0.66	0.41
9. When I am really confident in a belief, there is very little chance that belief is wrong. ^a	0.01	−0.05	0.15	0.59	0.43
24. On important topics, I am not likely to be swayed by the viewpoints of others. ^a	0.06	0.06	−0.06	0.50	0.26
21. I'd rather rely on my own knowledge about most topics than turn to others for expertise. ^a	−0.04	0.14	−0.06	0.46	0.24
41. Listening to perspectives of others seldom changes my important opinions. ^a	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.46	0.29
Initial eigenvalue	6.81	2.45	2.11	1.23	
Initial % variance	30.94	11.15	9.58	5.58	
Extraction % variance	28.76	9.27	6.83	3.38	
Rotation sum of squared loadings	4.28	4.70	4.95	3.11	
Correlation with Factor 1	1.00				
Correlation with Factor 2	0.38	1.00			
Correlation with Factor 3	0.41	0.67	1.00		
Correlation with Factor 4	0.33	0.31	0.40	1.00	

Note. $N = 308$. h^2 = communality coefficient. Factor labels are as follows: Factor 1, independence of intellect and ego; Factor 2, openness to revising one's viewpoint; Factor 3, respect for others' viewpoints; Factor 4, lack of intellectual overconfidence. Bold formatting represents factor loadings of items.

^aReverse-coded items.

➤ **Political identification** (American National Election Studies), Study 1 & Study 2

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a...

Strong Democrat (1)

Moderate Democrat (2)

Leaning Democrat (3)

Leaning Republican (4)

Moderate Republican (5)

Strong Republican (6)

I refuse identification with either party (99)

➤ **Moral grandstanding (MG)** (Grubbs et al., 2019b), Study 1 & Study 2

Note: this scale has two facets, one prestige strivings and one *dominance strivings*.

Prestige Strivings = Average of items 1–4, 9 & 10.

Dominance Strivings = Average of items 5–8

<https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0223749#sec048>

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. I hope that my moral/political beliefs cause other people to want to share those beliefs [prestige strivings]
2. I am particularly good at sharing my moral/political beliefs. [prestige strivings]
3. My moral/political beliefs should be inspiring to others. [prestige strivings]
4. I often share my moral/political beliefs in the hope of inspiring people to be more passionate about their beliefs. [prestige strivings]
5. When I share my moral/political beliefs, I do so to show people who disagree with me that I am better than them. [*dominance strivings*]
6. I share my moral/political beliefs to make people who disagree with me feel bad [*dominance strivings*]
7. When I share my moral/political beliefs, I do so to shame people who do not share those beliefs. [*dominance strivings*]
8. When I share my moral/political beliefs, I do so in the hope that people different than me will feel ashamed of their beliefs. [*dominance strivings*]
9. I want to be on the right side of history about moral/political issues. [prestige strivings]
10. Even if expressing my moral/political views does not help anyone, it is important that I share them. [prestige strivings]

Responses collected on 7-point scales

Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neither agree
nor disagree (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7)

➤ **Status-driven risk taking (SDRT)** (Ashton et al., 2010), Study 1 & Study 2

I would rather live as an average person in a safe place than live as a rich and powerful person in a dangerous place. (1) *

I would enjoy being a famous and powerful person, even if it meant a high risk of assassination. (2)

If the pay was really high, I would be willing to work with extremely explosive materials. (3)

I would risk my life for a good chance of finding a huge amount of buried treasure. (4)

If I could become rich and famous by winning a major competition, I would put my life on the line to win it. (5)

I would like to live in a country where people who take huge risks have the chance to gain superior social status. (6)

No matter how good the pay of "perks"; I would not want to be a spy who takes very dangerous assignments. (7) *

I would rather live a secure life as an ordinary person than risk everything to be "at the top". (8) *

For a very high-status job, I would be willing to live in a place that had an extremely high crime rate. (9)

I would take a very high-status job even if I had to live in a place where there are many deadly diseases. (10)

I would volunteer for a risky medical experiment if it paid me enough to retire early. (11)

Being an organized crime boss would be far too dangerous for me. (12) *

To become a billionaire, I would be willing to trade 10 years from my life expectancy. (13)

I would not go to a war zone even if the business opportunities were extremely profitable. (14) *

* = reverse coded

Responses collected on 7-point scales:

Strongly disagree (1) Disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Somewhat agree (5) Agree (6) Strongly agree (7)

➤ **Animus towards Republicans** (Osmundsen et al., 2020a), Study 1 & Study 2

What do you feel when you think about Republicans?

Angry (1)

Frustrated (2)

Afraid (3)

Hopeful (4)

Enthusiastic (5) (reverse coded)

Proud (6) (reverse coded)

Agreement with each adjective rated on 7-point scale:

Not at all (1) Clearly not (2) Somewhat not (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat (5)
Strongly (6) Very strongly (7)

➤ **Animus towards Democrats** (Osmundsen et al., 2020a), Study 1 & Study 2

What do you feel when you think about Democrats?

Angry (1)

Frustrated (2)

Afraid (3)

Hopeful (4)

Enthusiastic (5) (reverse coded)

Proud (6) (reverse coded)

Agreement with each adjective rated on 7-point scale:

Not at all (1) Clearly not (2) Somewhat not (3) Neutral (4) Somewhat (5)
Strongly (6) Very strongly (7)

E. Codebook for regression analyses

Condition or vignette participants were exposed to in Study 1 only:

Audience InOut Account

Account: Anonymous (vs. personal) social media account

Audience: Ingroup (vs. outgroup) audience

sharing: willingness to share

acc: accuracy judgments or belief

CI: 95% confidence intervals for standardized regression coefficient estimate

MR: moralized rationality

CRT: cognitive reflection

IH: intellectual humility scale

SDRT: status-driven risk taking

MG: moral grandstanding

F. Study 1: Regression tables

Vignettes employed in questionnaire of Study 1

Anonymous account, Democrat audience

Imagine that you are navigating on a Facebook group that is dedicated to one of your hobbies (e.g. a game or sport). Most discussions on the group are, of course, related to the hobby.

But often discussions about politics also appear, and people frequently share news stories in the group. You know from reading the stories and the comments that the group's members are quite Democrat. They like to point out that Republican politicians and voters are ignorant, that sexism, racism and transphobia are everywhere, etc.

They stand firm on their political beliefs, which they think are the only right ones. They can be pretty mean to people who don't share their values. On the other hand, they really praise those who agree with them. So if you post and write the kinds of things that they want to hear, you know for sure that they will like you.

Imagine further that, when navigating on this Democrat group, you're using an anonymous account like the one below. When you share or write something in the group, other members will NOT see your profile picture or your real name. They will only see an anonymous avatar. Thus, what you decide to do in the group cannot possibly affect how those Democrat group members think of you, now and in the future.

Personal account, Democrat audience

Imagine that you are navigating on a Facebook group that is dedicated to one of your hobbies (e.g. a game or sport). Most discussions on the group are, of course, related to the hobby.

But often discussions about politics also appear, and people frequently share news stories in the group. You know from reading the stories and the comments that the group's members are quite Democrat. They like to point out that Republican politicians and voters are ignorant, that sexism, racism and transphobia are everywhere, etc.

They stand firm on their political beliefs, which they think are the only right ones. They can be pretty mean to people who don't share their values. On the other hand, they really praise those who agree with them. So if you post and write the kinds of things that they want to hear, you know for sure that they will like you.

Imagine further that when navigating on this Democrat group, you are using your own, personal account. When you share or write something in the group, other members will recognize your profile picture and your name. Thus, what you decide to do in the group can strongly affect how those Democrat group members think of you, now and in the future.

Anonymous account, Republican audience

Imagine that you are navigating on a Facebook group that is dedicated to one of your hobbies (e.g. a game or sport). Most discussions on the group are, of course, related to the hobby.

But often discussions about politics also appear, and people frequently share news stories in the group. You know from reading the stories and the comments that the group's members are quite Republican. They like to point out that Democrat politicians and voters are ignorant, that immigration, abortion and gun control must be opposed, etc.

They stand firm on their political beliefs, which they think are the only right ones. They can be pretty mean to people who don't share their values. On the other hand, they really praise those who agree with them. So if you post and write the kinds of things that they want to hear, you know for sure that they will like you.

Imagine further that, when navigating on this Republican group, you're using an anonymous account like the one below. When you share or write something in the group, other members will NOT see your profile picture or your real name. They will only see an anonymous avatar. Thus, what you decide to do in the group cannot possibly affect how those Republican group members think of you, now and in the future.

Personal account, Republican audience

Imagine that you are navigating on a Facebook group that is dedicated to one of your hobbies (e.g. a game or sport). Most discussions on the group are, of course, related to the hobby.

But often discussions about politics also appear, and people frequently share news stories in the group. You know from reading the stories and the comments that the group's members are quite Republican. They like to point out that Democrat politicians and voters are ignorant, that immigration, abortion and gun control must be opposed, etc.

They stand firm on their political beliefs, which they think are the only right ones. They can be pretty mean to people who don't share their values. On the other hand, they really praise those who agree with them. So if you post and write the kinds of things that they want to hear, you know for sure that they will like you.

Imagine further that when navigating on this Republican group, you are using your own, personal account. When you share or write something in the group, other members will recognise your profile picture and your name. Thus, what you decide to do in the group can strongly affect how those Republican group members think of you, now and in the future.

Demonstration that vignettes manipulating the sharing context had little influence on sharing

As demonstrated in the regression tables and graphs under this subheader, the vignettes manipulating the context of sharing (audience composition x account anonymity) in Study 1 following a 2 x 2 between-subjects design had almost no

influence on intentions to share the news. Accordingly, we analyzed the associations between our main covariates of interest and intentions to share the news by pooling the data in Study 1, as well as the comparison between Study 1's and Study 2's results. Specifically, we first report under subheader (i) the very small effects the vignettes had on intentions to share the news, regardless of news type. In the next subsection (ii), we then show that the vignettes also did not statistically significantly modulate the relationships between our main covariates of interest and intentions to share the news (by reporting covariates X condition interactions effects on intentions to share).

(i) Effects of vignettes on intentions to share news, by news type

There was only a small negative main effect of sharing from an anonymous (vs. a personal) account regardless of audience on news hostile to the outgroup: $\beta = -0.13$, $[-0.23, -0.02]$, $p = 0.016$. The manipulation had no other influence (neither main effect nor interaction) on sharing of news hostile to either the outgroup or ingroup (see boxplots below).

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
Account [personal]	-0.13	-0.23,-0.02	0.016	-0.12	-0.27,0.03	0.104
Audience InOut [Outgroup audience]	-0.06	-0.16,0.04	0.261	-0.05	-0.20,0.10	0.490
edu	0.01	-0.05,0.06	0.724	0.01	-0.04,0.07	0.721
age	-0.19	-0.24,-0.13	<0.001	-0.19	-0.24,-0.13	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.30	-0.41,-0.19	<0.001	-0.30	-0.41,-0.19	<0.001
sex [other]	0.03	-1.00,1.06	0.959	0.03	-1.00,1.06	0.960
Account [personal] *				-0.01	-0.22,0.19	0.890
Audience InOut [Outgroup audience]						
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.058 / 0.057			0.058 / 0.057		

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

Reading: red dots are means with 95Cis, black lines are medians, and violins are histograms of frequencies.

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

Predictors	sharing			sharing		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
Account [personal]	-0.03	-0.12,0.06	0.536	-0.06	-0.19,0.06	0.302
Audience InOut [Outgroup audience]	0.05	-0.03,0.14	0.229	0.02	-0.11,0.14	0.787
edu	0.09	0.05,0.14	<0.001	0.09	0.05,0.14	<0.001
age	-0.14	-0.18,-0.10	<0.001	-0.14	-0.18,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.43	-0.52,-0.34	<0.001	-0.43	-0.52,-0.35	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.36	-1.10,0.38	0.342	-0.35	-1.11,0.40	0.357
Account [personal] *				0.07	-0.10,0.25	0.414
Audience InOut [Outgroup audience]						
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.105 / 0.104			0.106 / 0.104		

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

Reading: red dots are means with 95Cis, black lines are medians, and violins are histograms of frequencies.

(ii) Effects of vignettes on relationships between covariates and intentions to share news, by news type

In this subsection, we show that the vignettes employed in Study 1 did not statistically significantly affect the relationships between our main covariates of interest, and intentions to share the news. Accordingly, we pooled data in Study 1.

Note: The baseline in the regression analyses below was the Ingroup audience, anonymous account condition.

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>w2s</i>		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.18	0.09,0.27	<0.001
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.13	-0.28,0.02	0.082
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.06	-0.20,0.09	0.448

Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.20	-0.35,-0.06	0.006
edu	-0.01	-0.07,0.04	0.636
age	-0.15	-0.21,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.25	-0.36,-0.14	<0.001
sex [other]	0.25	-0.68,1.17	0.601
MR * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.08	-0.22,0.06	0.257
MR * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.02	-0.13,0.17	0.778
MR * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.01	-0.14,0.15	0.944
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.082 / 0.079		

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.07	-0.00,0.14	0.059
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.07	-0.19,0.06	0.285
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.02	-0.11,0.14	0.805
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.02	-0.10,0.14	0.768
edu	0.08	0.04,0.13	<0.001
age	-0.13	-0.17,-0.09	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

sex [female]	-0.42	-0.51,-0.33	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.26	-0.95,0.42	0.450
MR * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.07	-0.18,0.03	0.170
MR * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.03	-0.09,0.14	0.650
MR * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.02	-0.09,0.13	0.678
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.112 / 0.110

Note: The baseline in the regression analyses below was the Ingroup audience, anonymous account condition.

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

Predictors	w2s		
	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.13	-0.23,-0.02	0.019
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.11	-0.25,0.04	0.142
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.05	-0.20,0.10	0.488
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.19	-0.33,-0.04	0.012
edu	0.01	-0.05,0.06	0.745
age	-0.19	-0.24,-0.14	<0.001

sex [female]	-0.29	-0.40,-0.18	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.01	-1.06,1.03	0.979
CRT * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.02	-0.16,0.12	0.796
CRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.01	-0.14,0.15	0.929
CRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.13	-0.02,0.27	0.087
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.070 / 0.067		

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.14	-0.23,-0.05	0.004
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.05	-0.17,0.07	0.433
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.02	-0.11,0.14	0.787
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.03	-0.09,0.15	0.679
edu	0.09	0.05,0.13	<0.001
age	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.42	-0.50,-0.33	<0.001

sex [other]	-0.38	-1.23,0.47	0.383
CRT * Audience InOut	-0.05	-0.18,0.07	0.396
Account [Ingroup, personal]			
CRT * Audience InOut	-0.01	-0.14,0.12	0.840
Account [Outgroup, anonymous]			
CRT * Audience InOut	0.03	-0.09,0.16	0.619
Account [Outgroup, personal]			
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.134 / 0.132

Note: The baseline in the regression analyses below was the Ingroup audience, anonymous account condition.

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.24	0.13,0.35	<0.001
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.12	-0.27,0.02	0.092
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.06	-0.21,0.08	0.413
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.21	-0.36,-0.07	0.004
edu	-0.01	-0.06,0.05	0.753
age	-0.13	-0.19,-0.07	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.16	-0.27,-0.04	0.008
sex [other]	0.27	-0.71,1.24	0.593
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.06	-0.20,0.09	0.453
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.05	-0.19,0.09	0.472
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.05	-0.20,0.09	0.469
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.086 / 0.083		

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.26	0.17,0.35	<0.001
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.07	-0.18,0.05	0.279
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.01	-0.11,0.13	0.886
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.01	-0.13,0.10	0.842
edu	0.07	0.02,0.11	0.003
age	-0.08	-0.12,-0.03	0.001
sex [female]	-0.26	-0.35,-0.17	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.02	-0.78,0.74	0.960
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.06	-0.19,0.07	0.373
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.08	-0.20,0.05	0.225
SDRT * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.05	-0.07,0.17	0.444
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.162 / 0.160

Note: The baseline in the regression analyses below was the Ingroup audience, anonymous account condition.

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

Predictors	w2s		
	Estimates	CI	p
MG	0.44	0.35,0.53	<0.001
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.09	-0.22,0.04	0.176
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.05	-0.19,0.08	0.437
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.23	-0.36,-0.09	0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.11,-0.01	0.020
age	-0.11	-0.16,-0.06	<0.001

sex [female]	-0.14	-0.24,-0.03	0.009
sex [other]	0.36	-0.40,1.13	0.352
MG * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.01	-0.13,0.11	0.819
MG * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.09	-0.22,0.04	0.171
MG * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.04	-0.16,0.08	0.529
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.189 / 0.187		

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.29	0.21,0.38	<0.001
Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	-0.04	-0.15,0.07	0.493
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	0.02	-0.10,0.13	0.780
Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	-0.00	-0.11,0.11	0.978
edu	0.04	-0.01,0.08	0.088
age	-0.08	-0.13,-0.04	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.31	-0.40,-0.23	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

sex [other]	-0.10	-0.76,0.56	0.767
MG * Audience InOut Account [Ingroup, personal]	0.04	-0.08,0.17	0.486
MG * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, anonymous]	-0.03	-0.15,0.10	0.689
MG * Audience InOut Account [Outgroup, personal]	0.02	-0.10,0.13	0.790
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.203 / 0.201		

Study 1: Relationships between personality covariates

Study 1 Matrix of raw correlations between covariates

	<i>MR</i>	<i>CRT</i>	<i>SDRT</i>	<i>MG</i>
<i>MR</i>				
<i>CRT</i>	-0.090 (.003)			
<i>SDRT</i>	0.241 (<.001)	-0.103 (.001)		
<i>MG</i>	0.367 (<.001)	-0.139 (<.001)	0.425 (<.001)	

Computed correlation used pearson-method with listwise-deletion.

Study 1 Moralised rationality as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	MR		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.09	-0.11,-0.08	<0.001
edu	0.14	0.12,0.16	<0.001
age	-0.21	-0.23,-0.19	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.31	-0.34,-0.27	<0.001
sex [other]	-1.36	-1.70,-1.02	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.108 / 0.107		

Study 1 Moralised rationality as DV

MR	MR	MR
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Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.13	0.11,0.15	<0.001				0.03	0.01,0.05	0.003
edu	0.13	0.11,0.15	<0.001	0.09	0.07,0.11	<0.001	0.09	0.07,0.11	<0.001
age	-0.17	-0.19,-0.15	<0.001	-0.15	-0.16,-0.13	<0.001	-0.14	-0.16,-0.12	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.22	-0.26,-0.18	<0.001	-0.20	-0.23,-0.16	<0.001	-0.18	-0.22,-0.14	<0.001
sex [other]	-1.18	-1.52,-0.84	<0.001	-1.10	-1.43,-0.78	<0.001	-1.07	-1.40,-0.74	<0.001
MG				0.29	0.27,0.31	<0.001	0.28	0.26,0.30	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.112 / 0.112			0.174 / 0.174			0.175 / 0.174		

Study 1: Associations between covariates and sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

MR, CRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.10	-0.15,-0.05	<0.001				-0.08	-0.13,-0.03	0.002
edu	0.01	-0.04,0.07	0.707	-0.01	-0.07,0.04	0.684	-0.01	-0.07,0.04	0.690
age	-0.19	-0.24,-0.13	<0.001	-0.15	-0.20,-0.09	<0.001	-0.16	-0.21,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.29	-0.39,-0.18	<0.001	-0.24	-0.35,-0.13	<0.001	-0.24	-0.35,-0.13	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.01	-1.05,1.03	0.986	0.22	-0.79,1.24	0.668	0.20	-0.78,1.18	0.693
MR				0.16	0.10,0.22	<0.001	0.15	0.09,0.21	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.062 / 0.061			0.075 / 0.074			0.081 / 0.080		

MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.19	0.13,0.25	<0.001				0.06	0.00,0.12	0.046
edu	-0.01	-0.06,0.05	0.815	-0.06	-0.11,-0.01	0.024	-0.06	-0.11,-0.01	0.019

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

age	-0.13	-0.19,-0.07	<0.001	-0.10	-0.15,-0.05	<0.001	-0.09	-0.14,-0.04	0.001
sex [female]	-0.16	-0.27,-0.04	0.008	-0.13	-0.24,-0.03	0.009	-0.10	-0.21,0.01	0.068
sex [other]	0.25	-0.78,1.27	0.640	0.33	-0.50,1.17	0.435	0.39	-0.44,1.23	0.356
MG				0.40	0.35,0.45	<0.001	0.38	0.33,0.44	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.080 / 0.079			0.182 / 0.181			0.184 / 0.183		

MR while controlling for MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.05	-0.00,0.11	0.074
SDRT	0.06	-0.00,0.12	0.050
MG	0.37	0.31,0.42	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.12,-0.01	0.012
age	-0.08	-0.14,-0.03	0.003
sex [female]	-0.09	-0.20,0.02	0.099
sex [other]	0.45	-0.38,1.28	0.289
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.186 / 0.185		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	-0.10	-0.15,-0.04	<0.001
edu	-0.00	-0.06,0.05	0.887
age	-0.17	-0.22,-0.11	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.24	-0.36,-0.13	<0.001

sex [other]	0.10	-0.99,1.20	0.855
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.060		

Study 1: Associations between covariates and sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

MR, CRT on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001				-0.14	-0.19,-0.10	<0.001
edu	0.09	0.05,0.14	<0.001	0.08	0.04,0.13	<0.001	0.09	0.04,0.13	<0.001
age	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001	-0.13	-0.17,-0.09	<0.001	-0.14	-0.18,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.42	-0.50,-0.33	<0.001	-0.41	-0.50,-0.32	<0.001	-0.40	-0.49,-0.32	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.38	-1.16,0.41	0.346	-0.27	-0.96,0.43	0.451	-0.31	-1.08,0.46	0.433
MR				0.06	0.02,0.11	0.004	0.05	0.01,0.09	0.024
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.131 / 0.130			0.109 / 0.108			0.134 / 0.133		

MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.24	0.19,0.29	<0.001				0.15	0.10,0.20	<0.001
edu	0.07	0.03,0.12	0.002	0.04	-0.00,0.08	0.076	0.03	-0.01,0.08	0.124
age	-0.08	-0.12,-0.03	0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.05	-0.09,-0.01	0.021
sex [female]	-0.26	-0.35,-0.17	<0.001	-0.31	-0.40,-0.23	<0.001	-0.22	-0.31,-0.13	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.06	-0.83,0.72	0.885	-0.11	-0.74,0.52	0.741	0.04	-0.66,0.75	0.906

MG		0.30	0.25,0.35	<0.001	0.26	0.21,0.30	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.158 / 0.157	0.202 / 0.201			0.221 / 0.220		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 1 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	-0.38	-0.42,-0.33	<0.001
edu	0.03	-0.01,0.07	0.106
age	-0.09	-0.13,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.23	-0.31,-0.15	<0.001
sex [other]	0.02	-0.71,0.75	0.957
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.258 / 0.257		

Study 1: Associations between covariates and sharing of true neutral news

MR, CRT on sharing of true neutral news

Study 1 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.07	-0.12,-0.02	0.005				-0.07	-0.12,-0.02	0.011
edu	0.06	0.01,0.11	0.025	0.05	-0.00,0.10	0.073	0.05	-0.00,0.10	0.072
age	-0.15	-0.20,-0.10	<0.001	-0.13	-0.18,-0.08	<0.001	-0.13	-0.19,-0.08	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.17	-0.27,-0.07	0.001	-0.15	-0.25,-0.04	0.005	-0.15	-0.25,-0.04	0.006
sex [other]	-0.68	-1.36,-0.01	0.048	-0.55	-1.19,0.08	0.086	-0.57	-1.23,0.08	0.088
MR				0.09	0.03,0.14	0.002	0.08	0.02,0.14	0.005
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.045 / 0.043			0.047 / 0.044			0.051 / 0.049		

MG, SDRT on sharing of true neutral news

Study 1 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.13	0.07,0.19	<0.001				0.05	-0.01,0.11	0.086
edu	0.05	-0.00,0.10	0.068	0.02	-0.03,0.07	0.491	0.02	-0.04,0.07	0.540
age	-0.11	-0.16,-0.06	<0.001	-0.10	-0.15,-0.05	<0.001	-0.09	-0.14,-0.03	0.001
sex [female]	-0.08	-0.20,0.03	0.143	-0.08	-0.18,0.02	0.121	-0.05	-0.16,0.06	0.370
sex [other]	-0.51	-1.19,0.17	0.140	-0.48	-1.05,0.10	0.106	-0.42	-1.02,0.18	0.166
MG				0.24	0.18,0.29	<0.001	0.22	0.17,0.28	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.053 / 0.051			0.093 / 0.091			0.095 / 0.093		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of true neutral news

Study 1 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	-0.15	-0.21,-0.10	<0.001
edu	0.04	-0.02,0.09	0.171
age	-0.12	-0.18,-0.07	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.10	-0.20,0.01	0.075
sex [other]	-0.52	-1.19,0.14	0.123
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.060 / 0.058		

Study 1: Covariates x hostility target interactions on sharing false news

MR x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 1 Sharing of false news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.15	0.09,0.21	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.49	-0.54,-0.44	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.03	-0.08,0.03	0.394
edu	0.04	-0.00,0.08	0.054
age	-0.14	-0.18,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.29	-0.37,-0.21	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.13	-0.90,0.64	0.743
MR * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.07	-0.12,-0.02	0.008
MR * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.07	-0.14,-0.01	0.021
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.127 / 0.126		

CRT x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 1 Sharing of false neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.09	-0.14,-0.04	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.49	-0.54,-0.44	<0.001

news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.03	-0.08,0.03	0.396
edu	0.05	0.01,0.09	0.008
age	-0.17	-0.20,-0.13	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.32	-0.39,-0.24	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.29	-1.10,0.52	0.481
CRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.06	-0.10,-0.01	0.010
CRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.02	-0.03,0.08	0.432
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.129 / 0.128		

SDRT x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 1 Sharing of false news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.19	0.13,0.24	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.49	-0.54,-0.44	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.03	-0.08,0.03	0.390
edu	0.04	-0.00,0.08	0.073
age	-0.10	-0.14,-0.06	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.19	-0.27,-0.10	<0.001

sex [other]	-0.03	-0.83,0.78	0.948
SDRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.06	0.01,0.11	0.014
SDRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.07	-0.13,-0.02	0.009
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.148 / 0.147		

MG x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 1 Sharing of false news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.38	0.33,0.43	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.49	-0.54,-0.44	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.03	-0.08,0.03	0.384
edu	-0.00	-0.04,0.03	0.823
age	-0.09	-0.13,-0.06	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.19	-0.27,-0.12	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.00	-0.66,0.65	0.991
MG * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.06	-0.11,-0.01	0.021
MG * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.20,-0.10	<0.001
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.212 / 0.212		

G. Study 2: Regression tables

Study 2: Relationships between personality covariates

Note: Since they are not specific to any news item type or dependent variable (sharing or accuracy judgment), those matrices and models include the full dataset of Study 2

Study 2 Matrix of raw correlations between covariates

	<i>MR</i>	<i>IH</i>	<i>CRT</i>	<i>SDRT</i>	<i>MG</i>
<i>MR</i>					
<i>IH</i>	-0.105 (<i><.001</i>)				
<i>CRT</i>	-0.022 (.276)	0.101 (<i><.001</i>)			
<i>SDRT</i>	0.087 (<i><.001</i>)	-0.184 (<i><.001</i>)	-0.058 (.005)		
<i>MG</i>	0.247 (<i><.001</i>)	-0.352 (<i><.001</i>)	-0.074 (<i><.001</i>)	0.147 (<i><.001</i>)	
<i>Computed correlation used pearson-method with listwise-deletion.</i>					

Study 2 Moralised rationality as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	MR			MR			MR		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
<i>CRT</i>	-0.04	-0.05,-0.03	<0.001				-0.03	-0.04,-0.02	<0.001
<i>edu</i>	0.07	0.06,0.08	<0.001	0.07	0.06,0.07	<0.001	0.07	0.06,0.08	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

age	-0.16	-0.17,-0.15	<0.001	-0.15	-0.16,-0.14	<0.001	-0.15	-0.16,-0.14	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.31	-0.33,-0.30	<0.001	-0.32	-0.34,-0.30	<0.001	-0.32	-0.34,-0.30	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.20	-0.28,-0.12	<0.001	-0.24	-0.32,-0.16	<0.001	-0.23	-0.31,-0.15	<0.001
IH				-0.09	-0.10,-0.08	<0.001	-0.09	-0.09,-0.08	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.046 / 0.045			0.052 / 0.052			0.053 / 0.053		

Study 2 Moralised rationality as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	MR			MR			MR		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.02	0.01,0.03	0.002				-0.02	-0.03,-0.01	0.001
edu	0.07	0.06,0.07	<0.001	0.06	0.05,0.07	<0.001	0.06	0.05,0.07	<0.001
age	-0.16	-0.17,-0.15	<0.001	-0.13	-0.14,-0.12	<0.001	-0.13	-0.14,-0.13	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.31	-0.33,-0.29	<0.001	-0.30	-0.32,-0.28	<0.001	-0.32	-0.34,-0.30	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.20	-0.28,-0.12	<0.001	-0.26	-0.34,-0.18	<0.001	-0.28	-0.36,-0.20	<0.001
MG				0.23	0.22,0.24	<0.001	0.23	0.22,0.24	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.046 / 0.046			0.097 / 0.097			0.098 / 0.098		

Study 2 Intellectual humility as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	IH			IH			IH		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	-0.19	-0.24,-0.14	<0.001				-0.15	-0.19,-0.10	<0.001
edu	0.01	-0.02,0.05	0.503	0.02	-0.02,0.05	0.342	0.02	-0.02,0.05	0.375
age	0.08	0.04,0.12	<0.001	0.10	0.06,0.14	<0.001	0.06	0.02,0.10	0.004
sex [female]	-0.20	-0.29,-0.12	<0.001	-0.11	-0.19,-0.04	0.003	-0.20	-0.28,-0.12	<0.001
sex [other]	-0.52	-0.78,-0.26	<0.001	-0.32	-0.56,-0.08	0.009	-0.41	-0.65,-0.18	<0.001
MG				-0.34	-0.38,-0.30	<0.001	-0.32	-0.36,-0.28	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.057 / 0.056			0.142 / 0.142			0.159 / 0.159		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

MR, IH, CRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

Predictors	sharing			sharing			sharing			sharing		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.10	-0.15,-0.04	<0.001							-0.08	-0.13,-0.02	0.004
edu	-0.05	-0.11,0.01	0.079	-0.06	-0.12,-0.01	0.023	-0.07	-0.13,-0.01	0.014	-0.07	-0.12,-0.01	0.016
age	-0.04	-0.09,0.02	0.179	-0.01	-0.06,0.05	0.783	-0.02	-0.07,0.04	0.585	0.00	-0.05,0.06	0.864
sex [female]	-0.03	-0.14,0.09	0.657	-0.02	-0.13,0.09	0.743	0.04	-0.07,0.15	0.493	0.01	-0.10,0.13	0.817
sex [other]	-0.14	-0.56,0.28	0.521	-0.19	-0.62,0.23	0.369	-0.12	-0.52,0.28	0.565	-0.18	-0.58,0.21	0.362
IH				-0.16	-0.21,-0.10	<0.001				-0.14	-0.20,-0.08	<0.001
MR							0.12	0.06,0.18	<0.001	0.11	0.05,0.17	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.011 / 0.010			0.022 / 0.021			0.015 / 0.014			0.037 / 0.036		

MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

sharing	sharing	sharing
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Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.08	0.01,0.14	0.017				0.02	-0.04,0.09	0.443
edu	-0.05	-0.11,0.00	0.054	-0.06	-0.12,-0.01	0.017	-0.06	-0.12,-0.01	0.020
age	-0.01	-0.07,0.05	0.673	-0.01	-0.06,0.04	0.765	-0.00	-0.06,0.05	0.958
sex [female]	0.03	-0.09,0.15	0.635	-0.00	-0.11,0.11	0.986	0.01	-0.10,0.12	0.899
sex [other]	-0.09	-0.53,0.35	0.685	-0.27	-0.72,0.17	0.226	-0.26	-0.71,0.18	0.248
MG				0.36	0.31,0.41	<0.001	0.36	0.31,0.41	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.008 / 0.007			0.105 / 0.104			0.106 / 0.105		

MR while controlling MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

sharing			
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.05	-0.01,0.10	0.103
SDRT	0.02	-0.04,0.09	0.459
MG	0.35	0.30,0.40	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.12,-0.01	0.015
age	0.00	-0.05,0.06	0.876
sex [female]	0.03	-0.08,0.15	0.600
sex [other]	-0.25	-0.69,0.19	0.261
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.109 / 0.108		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to outgroup as DV

sharing			
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.12	0.07,0.18	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.12,-0.01	0.016

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

age	-0.05	-0.11,0.00	0.073
sex [female]	-0.02	-0.14,0.09	0.694
sex [other]	-0.22	-0.66,0.21	0.309
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.015 / 0.014		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and sharing of true news hostile to outgroup

MR, IH, CRT on sharing of true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to the outgroup as DV

Predictors	sharing			sharing			sharing			sharing		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.06	-0.11,-0.02	0.008							-0.05	-0.10,-0.00	0.034
edu	-0.04	-0.08,0.01	0.135	-0.05	-0.10,0.00	0.044	-0.06	-0.10,-0.01	0.019	-0.05	-0.10,-0.01	0.026
age	0.01	0.04,0.05	0.805	0.03	0.01,0.08	0.165	0.03	0.02,0.08	0.251	0.04	0.01,0.09	0.097
sex [female]	-0.11	-0.20,0.01	0.029	-0.11	-0.20,0.01	0.025	-0.05	0.15,0.05	0.314	-0.07	0.16,0.03	0.189
sex [other]	-0.07	0.44,0.30	0.711	-0.12	0.49,0.26	0.535	-0.05	0.41,0.30	0.771	-0.10	0.46,0.26	0.574
IH				-0.13	-0.17,0.08	<0.001				-0.12	-0.16,0.07	<0.001
MR							0.11	0.06,0.16	<0.001	0.10	0.05,0.15	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

R ² / R ² adjusted	0.008 / 0.007	0.019 / 0.018	0.015 / 0.014	0.030 / 0.028
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MG, SDRT on sharing of true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to the outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.08	0.03,0.13	0.002				0.04	-0.01,0.09	0.119
edu	-0.04	-0.09,0.01	0.095	-0.05	-0.09,-0.00	0.034	-0.05	-0.09,-0.00	0.041
age	0.04	-0.01,0.09	0.149	0.04	-0.01,0.08	0.129	0.05	-0.00,0.10	0.058
sex [female]	-0.06	-0.16,0.04	0.268	-0.09	-0.18,0.00	0.050	-0.07	-0.16,0.03	0.153
sex [other]	-0.02	-0.40,0.36	0.912	-0.21	-0.59,0.18	0.288	-0.18	-0.57,0.20	0.353
MG				0.30	0.25,0.34	<0.001	0.29	0.25,0.34	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.009 / 0.008			0.087 / 0.086			0.088 / 0.087		

MR while controlling for MG, SDRT on sharing of true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.04	-0.01,0.09	0.085
SDRT	0.04	-0.02,0.09	0.174
MG	0.29	0.24,0.33	<0.001
edu	-0.05	-0.10,-0.01	0.024
age	0.05	0.00,0.10	0.046
sex [female]	-0.04	-0.14,0.05	0.390
sex [other]	-0.17	-0.55,0.21	0.378
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.090 / 0.089		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.09	0.04,0.14	<0.001
edu	-0.05	-0.10,-0.00	0.035
age	-0.00	-0.05,0.05	0.989
sex [female]	-0.11	-0.21,-0.01	0.024
sex [other]	-0.14	-0.51,0.24	0.469
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.012 / 0.011		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

MR, IH, CRT on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.09	-0.13,-0.05	<0.001							-0.09	-0.13,-0.05	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.11,-0.03	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
age	-0.12	-0.15,-0.08	<0.001	-0.11	-0.14,-0.07	<0.001	-0.11	-0.15,-0.07	<0.001	-0.11	-0.15,-0.08	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.04	-0.11,0.03	0.258	-0.03	-0.11,0.04	0.378	-0.03	-0.10,0.05	0.491	-0.04	-0.11,0.04	0.303

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

sex	-0.03	-	0.818	-0.04	-	0.771	-0.03	-	0.835	-0.04	-	0.775
[other]		0.31,0.			0.32,0.			0.31,0.			0.32,0.	
		24			24			25			24	
IH			-0.03	-	0.103					-0.02	-	0.341
				0.07,0.							0.06,0.	
				01							02	
MR						0.01	-	0.499	0.01	-		0.727
							0.02,0.				0.03,0.	
							04				04	
R ² / R ² adjust	0.051 / 0.050		0.037 / 0.036			0.036 / 0.035			0.052 / 0.051			
ed												

MG, SDRT on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.07	0.03,0.10	0.001				0.05	0.01,0.09	0.009
edu	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.08	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001	-0.08	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
age	-0.09	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001	-0.11	-0.14,-0.07	<0.001	-0.09	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	0.01	-0.06,0.08	0.824	-0.02	-0.09,0.05	0.633	0.02	-0.06,0.09	0.671
sex [other]	0.01	-0.27,0.30	0.920	-0.05	-0.35,0.25	0.735	-0.01	-0.31,0.29	0.943
MG				0.09	0.05,0.12	<0.001	0.08	0.05,0.12	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.041 / 0.040			0.050 / 0.049			0.054 / 0.053		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	-0.18	-0.22,-0.14	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

edu	-0.07	-0.11,-0.03	<0.001
age	-0.09	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.00	-0.07,0.07	0.949
sex [other]	0.11	-0.16,0.38	0.435
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.086 / 0.085		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and sharing of true news hostile to ingroup

MR, IH, CRT on sharing of true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to ingroup as DV

Predictors	sharing			sharing			sharing			sharing		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.08	-0.11,-0.05	<0.001							-0.08	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.09,-0.03	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001	-0.06	-0.10,-0.03	<0.001
age	-0.07	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001	-0.05	-0.09,-0.02	0.003	-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.002	-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.001
sex [female]	-0.08	-0.15,-0.01	0.032	-0.07	-0.14,-0.00	0.045	-0.05	-0.12,0.02	0.184	-0.06	-0.13,0.01	0.090
sex [other]	-0.07	-0.31,0.17	0.574	-0.09	-0.33,0.15	0.471	-0.06	-0.30,0.18	0.626	-0.08	-0.32,0.16	0.505
IH				-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.002				-0.04	-0.08,-0.01	0.017

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

MR	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.017	0.03	-	0.057
					0.00,0.06	
R^2 / R^2 adjust ed	0.029 / 0.028	0.022 / 0.021	0.018 / 0.018	0.035 / 0.033		

MG, SDRT on sharing of true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of true news hostile to the ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.07	0.03,0.10	<0.001				0.05	0.01,0.08	0.010
edu	-0.07	-0.10,-0.03	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001
age	-0.04	-0.08,-0.00	0.029	-0.05	-0.09,-0.02	0.003	-0.04	-0.07,-0.00	0.041
sex [female]	-0.03	-0.10,0.04	0.459	-0.06	-0.13,0.01	0.100	-0.03	-0.10,0.04	0.444
sex [other]	-0.02	-0.26,0.22	0.869	-0.15	-0.40,0.10	0.231	-0.11	-0.36,0.13	0.370
MG				0.14	0.11,0.17	<0.001	0.13	0.10,0.17	<0.001
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.022 / 0.021			0.049 / 0.048			0.052 / 0.051		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Sharing of news hostile to the ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.09	0.04,0.14	<0.001
edu	-0.05	-0.10,-0.00	0.035
age	-0.00	-0.05,0.05	0.989
sex [female]	-0.11	-0.21,-0.01	0.024
sex [other]	-0.14	-0.51,0.24	0.469
R^2 / R^2 adjusted	0.012 / 0.011		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and sharing of true neutral news

MR, IH, CRT on sharing of true neutral news

Study 2 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

Predictors	sharing			sharing			sharing			sharing		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.02	-0.07, 0.04	0.567							-0.02	-0.07, 0.04	0.536
edu	-0.04	-0.10, 0.02	0.170	-0.04	-0.10, 0.01	0.148	-0.06	-0.11, 0.00	0.052	-0.05	-0.11, 0.00	0.071
age	-0.11	-0.16, -0.05	<0.001	-0.11	-0.17, -0.05	<0.001	-0.09	-0.14, -0.03	0.002	-0.09	-0.15, -0.03	0.002
sex [female]	0.06	0.06, 0.17	0.351	0.05	0.06, 0.17	0.363	0.11	0.01, 0.22	0.075	0.11	0.01, 0.23	0.066
sex [other]	0.47	0.04, 0.90	0.033	0.48	0.05, 0.91	0.029	0.48	0.06, 0.91	0.026	0.50	0.07, 0.93	0.023
IH				0.02	-0.03, 0.08	0.440				0.02	-0.04, 0.08	0.435
MR							0.11	0.06, 0.17	<0.001	0.12	0.06, 0.17	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.016 / 0.014			0.017 / 0.015			0.027 / 0.025			0.028 / 0.025		

MG, SDRT on sharing of true neutral news

Study 2 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing			sharing			sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.08	0.02,0.14	0.014				0.06	-0.00,0.12	0.068
edu	-0.04	-0.10,0.01	0.143	-0.05	-0.10,0.01	0.108	-0.05	-0.11,0.01	0.106
age	-0.08	-0.14,-0.02	0.007	-0.09	-0.15,-0.04	0.001	-0.07	-0.13,-0.01	0.016
sex [female]	0.09	-0.03,0.21	0.144	0.05	-0.06,0.17	0.369	0.08	-0.04,0.20	0.199
sex [other]	0.51	0.06,0.95	0.025	0.46	0.02,0.91	0.043	0.49	0.04,0.94	0.035
MG				0.14	0.08,0.20	<0.001	0.14	0.08,0.20	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.021 / 0.019			0.033 / 0.031			0.036 / 0.033		

Outgroup animosity on sharing of true neutral news

Study 2 Sharing of true neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	sharing		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.02	-0.03,0.08	0.424
edu	-0.05	-0.10,0.01	0.105
age	-0.11	-0.16,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	0.06	-0.06,0.17	0.326
sex [other]	0.46	0.02,0.89	0.039
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.017 / 0.015		

Study 2: Covariates x hostility target interactions on sharing false news

MR x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of false neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.11	0.06,0.17	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.64	-0.69,-0.59	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.25	0.19,0.31	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.11,-0.03	<0.001
age	-0.07	-0.11,-0.03	<0.001
sex [female]	0.03	-0.05,0.11	0.514
sex [other]	0.04	-0.25,0.32	0.795
MR * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.09	-0.14,-0.04	<0.001
MR * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.00	-0.06,0.06	0.994
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.137 / 0.137		

IH x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>

IH	-0.14	-0.20,-0.09	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.64	-0.69,-0.60	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.25	0.19,0.30	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.10,-0.03	0.001
age	-0.07	-0.11,-0.03	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.01	-0.09,0.07	0.802
sex [other]	0.00	-0.29,0.30	0.994
IH * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.11	0.06,0.16	<0.001
IH * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.15	0.10,0.21	<0.001
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.139 / 0.138		

CRT x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.09	-0.15,-0.04	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.64	-0.69,-0.60	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.25	0.19,0.31	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.004

age	-0.08	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	-0.02	-0.09,0.06	0.690
sex [other]	0.03	-0.27,0.32	0.860
CRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.00	-0.04,0.05	0.910
CRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.08	0.02,0.13	0.007
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.139 / 0.138		

SDRT x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.06	0.00,0.12	0.035
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.64	-0.69,-0.60	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.25	0.20,0.31	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.002
age	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.004
sex [female]	0.03	-0.05,0.11	0.425
sex [other]	0.07	-0.23,0.37	0.646
SDRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.01	-0.04,0.07	0.674

SDRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.02	-0.04,0.07	0.610
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.137 / 0.136
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MG x hostility target interaction on false hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.35	0.30,0.40	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.65	-0.69,-0.60	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.25	0.19,0.31	<0.001
edu	-0.07	-0.10,-0.03	<0.001
age	-0.06	-0.10,-0.03	<0.001
sex [female]	0.00	-0.07,0.08	0.936
sex [other]	-0.04	-0.35,0.27	0.809
MG * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.26	-0.31,-0.22	<0.001
MG * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.20	-0.26,-0.15	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.183 / 0.183		

Study 2: Covariates x hostility target interactions on sharing true news

MR x hostility target interaction on true hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of true news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.10	0.06,0.15	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.34	-0.37,-0.30	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.46	0.40,0.51	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.10,-0.03	0.001
age	-0.03	-0.07,0.01	0.138
sex [female]	-0.02	-0.10,0.06	0.636
sex [other]	0.05	-0.20,0.30	0.686
MR * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.001
MR * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.01	-0.05,0.07	0.736
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.100 / 0.099		

IH x hostility target interaction on true hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of true news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>

IH	-0.11	-0.16,-0.06	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.34	-0.37,-0.31	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.46	0.40,0.51	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.003
age	-0.03	-0.07,0.01	0.126
sex [female]	-0.06	-0.14,0.01	0.109
sex [other]	0.01	-0.25,0.27	0.923
IH * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.05	0.02,0.09	0.003
IH * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.11	0.06,0.17	<0.001
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.099 / 0.098		

CRT x hostility target interaction on true hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of true news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.06	-0.11,-0.01	0.011
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.34	-0.37,-0.30	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.46	0.41,0.51	<0.001
edu	-0.05	-0.08,-0.01	0.013
age	-0.05	-0.08,-0.01	0.013

sex [female]	-0.06	-0.14,0.01	0.105
sex [other]	0.04	-0.22,0.30	0.776
CRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.227
CRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.04	-0.01,0.10	0.139
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.098 / 0.098		

SDRT x hostility target interaction on true hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.07	0.02,0.12	0.005
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.34	-0.38,-0.31	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.46	0.41,0.52	<0.001
edu	-0.05	-0.09,-0.01	0.007
age	-0.02	-0.06,0.02	0.376
sex [female]	-0.02	-0.09,0.06	0.697
sex [other]	0.08	-0.18,0.35	0.538
SDRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.00	-0.03,0.04	0.839
SDRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.01	-0.04,0.07	0.593

R ² / R ² adjusted	0.099 / 0.099
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MG x hostility target interaction on true hostile news sharing

Study 2 Sharing of true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	w2s		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.29	0.25,0.34	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.34	-0.37,-0.31	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.46	0.41,0.51	<0.001
edu	-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.002
age	-0.03	-0.06,0.01	0.164
sex [female]	-0.05	-0.12,0.02	0.187
sex [other]	-0.05	-0.33,0.22	0.715
MG * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.15	-0.18,-0.12	<0.001
MG * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.14	-0.19,-0.08	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.140 / 0.140		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and belief in false news hostile to outgroup

MR, IH, CRT on belief in false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to outgroup as DV

Predictors	acc			acc			acc			acc		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.003							-0.05	-0.08,-0.01	0.022
edu	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.03	<0.001
age	-0.07	-0.10,-0.03	0.001	-0.04	-0.08,-0.01	0.026	-0.06	-0.10,-0.02	0.003	-0.05	-0.09,-0.01	0.011
sex [female]	0.05	-0.02,0.13	0.172	0.04	-0.04,0.11	0.334	0.06	-0.02,0.14	0.137	0.03	-0.05,0.10	0.483
sex [other]	0.09	-0.20,0.38	0.559	-0.00	-0.26,0.26	0.998	0.07	-0.23,0.37	0.635	0.01	-0.24,0.26	0.954
IH				-0.18	-0.21,-0.14	<0.001				-0.18	-0.22,-0.14	<0.001
MR							0.01	-0.03,0.06	0.527	-0.01	-0.05,0.03	0.563
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.018 / 0.017			0.045 / 0.044			0.014 / 0.013			0.049 / 0.048		

MG, SDRT on belief in false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to outgroup as DV

	acc	acc	acc
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Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.08	0.04,0.12	<0.001				0.06	0.02,0.10	0.004
edu	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001	-0.08	-0.12,-0.04	<0.001
age	-0.04	-0.08,0.00	0.053	-0.03	-0.07,0.00	0.085	-0.02	-0.06,0.02	0.409
sex [female]	0.10	0.02,0.19	0.014	0.07	-0.01,0.14	0.072	0.10	0.02,0.19	0.013
sex [other]	0.12	-0.18,0.41	0.432	0.08	-0.22,0.37	0.617	0.11	-0.17,0.40	0.435
MG				0.14	0.10,0.18	<0.001	0.14	0.10,0.18	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.019 / 0.018			0.033 / 0.032			0.037 / 0.036		

MR while controlling for MG, SDRT on belief in false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to outgroup as DV

acc			
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	-0.03	-0.07,0.02	0.243
SDRT	0.06	0.02,0.10	0.004
MG	0.15	0.10,0.19	<0.001
edu	-0.08	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
age	-0.02	-0.06,0.02	0.312
sex [female]	0.10	0.01,0.18	0.023
sex [other]	0.10	-0.19,0.39	0.487
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.038 / 0.036		

outgroup animosity on belief in false news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to outgroup as DV

acc			
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.11	0.07,0.15	<0.001
edu	-0.09	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

age	-0.07	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
sex [female]	0.05	-0.03,0.12	0.211
sex [other]	0.02	-0.30,0.33	0.916
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.029 / 0.028		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and belief in true news hostile to outgroup

MR, IH, CRT on belief in true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to outgroup as DV

Predictors	acc			acc			acc			acc		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	0.00	-0.03,0.03	0.86							0.01	-0.02,0.04	0.598
edu	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.161	-0.02	-0.04,0.01	0.265	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.198	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.195
age	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.004	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.003	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.002	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.001
sex [female]	-0.03	-0.08,0.03	0.384	-0.04	-0.09,0.02	0.212	-0.02	-0.08,0.04	0.455	-0.02	-0.08,0.04	0.519
sex [other]	0.21	0.02,0.43	0.070	0.19	0.02,0.41	0.080	0.22	0.01,0.43	0.040	0.21	0.00,0.42	0.046
IH				-0.03	-0.06,0.00	0.029				-0.03	-0.06,0.00	0.076

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

MR	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.013	0.04	0.00,0.07	0.023
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.004 / 0.003	0.005 / 0.004	0.006 / 0.005	0.007 / 0.005		

MG, SDRT on belief in true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc			acc			acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.204				-0.03	-0.06,0.00	0.062
edu	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.202	-0.02	-0.04,0.01	0.253	-0.02	-0.04,0.01	0.243
age	0.03	0.00,0.06	0.025	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.001	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.007
sex [female]	-0.05	-0.12,0.01	0.084	-0.02	-0.08,0.04	0.526	-0.05	-0.11,0.02	0.142
sex [other]	0.18	-0.04,0.41	0.110	0.21	-0.00,0.42	0.054	0.18	-0.03,0.40	0.097
MG				0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.004 / 0.003			0.009 / 0.008			0.010 / 0.008		

MR while controlling for MG, SDRT on belief in true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in hostile true news hostile to outgroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.03	-0.01,0.06	0.120
SDRT	-0.03	-0.06,-0.00	0.042
MG	0.06	0.02,0.09	0.001
edu	-0.02	-0.04,0.01	0.243
age	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.006
sex [female]	-0.04	-0.11,0.02	0.200
sex [other]	0.19	-0.02,0.40	0.072

R² / R² adjusted 0.010 / 0.009

Effect of outgroup animosity on belief in true news hostile to outgroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to outgroup DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.18	0.15,0.21	<0.001
edu	-0.03	-0.06,-0.00	0.032
age	0.03	0.01,0.06	0.019
sex [female]	-0.06	-0.12,-0.01	0.021
sex [other]	0.11	-0.11,0.34	0.328
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.054 / 0.053		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and belief in false news hostile to ingroup

MR, IH, CRT on belief in false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc			acc			acc			acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.08	-0.11,-0.05	<0.001							-0.08	-0.11,-0.05	<0.001
edu	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.229	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.227	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.190	-0.01	-0.04,0.02	0.458

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

age	-0.16	-0.19,- 0.13	<0.0 01	-0.15	-0.18,- 0.12	<0.0 01	-0.16	-0.19,- 0.14	<0.0 01	-0.17	-0.19,- 0.14	<0.0 01
sex	0.02	-	0.568	0.02	-	0.615	0.01	-	0.765	-0.01	-	0.835
[female]		0.04,0. 08			0.05,0. 08			0.05,0. 07			0.07,0. 05	
sex	0.03	-	0.877	-0.02	-	0.893	-0.02	-	0.906	-0.03	-	0.871
[other]		0.31,0. 36			0.36,0. 32			0.35,0. 31			0.35,0. 30	
IH				-0.06	-0.10,- 0.03	<0.0 01				-0.07	-0.10,- 0.03	<0.0 01
MR							-0.04	-0.08,- 0.01	0.008	-0.05	-0.09,- 0.02	0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.051 / 0.050			0.048 / 0.047			0.045 / 0.044			0.061 / 0.060		

MG, SDRT on belief in false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to ingroup as DV

Predictors	acc			acc			acc		
	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
SDRT	0.12	0.08,0.15	<0.001				0.12	0.08,0.15	<0.001
edu	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.164	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.169	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.192
age	-0.12	-0.15,-0.09	<0.001	-0.16	-0.18,-0.13	<0.001	-0.13	-0.16,-0.10	<0.001
sex [female]	0.11	0.04,0.17	0.001	0.02	-0.04,0.09	0.428	0.11	0.04,0.17	0.001
sex [other]	0.09	-0.24,0.42	0.600	0.00	-0.34,0.34	0.996	0.09	-0.24,0.42	0.602
MG				0.01	-0.02,0.05	0.505	-0.01	-0.04,0.03	0.659
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.060			0.042 / 0.041			0.061 / 0.060		

Effect of outgroup animosity on belief in false news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in false news hostile to ingroup as DV

acc

Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.11	0.07,0.15	<0.001
edu	-0.09	-0.12,-0.05	<0.001
age	-0.07	-0.11,-0.04	<0.001
sex [female]	0.05	-0.03,0.12	0.211
sex [other]	0.02	-0.30,0.33	0.916
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.029 / 0.028		

MR, IH, CRT on belief in true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to ingroup as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc			acc			acc			acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	0.01	-0.02,0.03	0.607							0.00	-0.02,0.03	0.750
edu	0.02	-0.01,0.05	0.115	0.02	-0.01,0.05	0.120	0.03	-0.00,0.05	0.063	0.02	-0.00,0.05	0.109
age	-0.07	-0.09,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001	-0.06	-0.09,-0.04	<0.001	-0.07	-0.09,-0.04	<0.001
sex [female]	0.01	-0.04,0.06	0.685	0.01	-0.04,0.06	0.713	0.01	-0.04,0.07	0.645	0.02	-0.03,0.08	0.433
sex [other]	0.27	-0.00,0.54	0.053	0.28	0.00,0.56	0.050	0.28	0.01,0.55	0.044	0.29	0.01,0.57	0.041
IH				0.03	-0.00,0.06	0.071				0.03	-0.00,0.06	0.064
MR							0.02	-0.01,0.05	0.179	0.03	-0.01,0.06	0.119
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.009 / 0.008			0.010 / 0.009			0.009 / 0.009			0.011 / 0.010		

MG, SDRT on belief in true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to ingroup as DV

acc	acc	acc
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Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.04	0.01,0.07	0.004				0.04	0.01,0.07	0.004
edu	0.02	-0.00,0.05	0.073	0.02	-0.00,0.05	0.078	0.03	-0.00,0.05	0.062
age	-0.06	-0.09,-0.03	<0.001	-0.07	-0.10,-0.04	<0.001	-0.06	-0.09,-0.03	<0.001
sex [female]	0.04	-0.02,0.10	0.215	0.00	-0.05,0.06	0.864	0.04	-0.02,0.09	0.248
sex [other]	0.30	0.04,0.56	0.026	0.26	-0.01,0.53	0.056	0.29	0.03,0.55	0.028
MG				-0.01	-0.04,0.02	0.433	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.194
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.011 / 0.010			0.009 / 0.008			0.012 / 0.011		

Effect of outgroup animosity on belief in true news hostile to ingroup

Study 2 Belief in true news hostile to ingroup DV

acc			
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.008
edu	0.03	-0.00,0.05	0.055
age	-0.07	-0.09,-0.04	<0.001
sex [female]	0.01	-0.04,0.06	0.680
sex [other]	0.28	0.02,0.55	0.034
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.011 / 0.010		

Study 2: Associations between covariates and belief in true neutral news

MR, IH, CRT on belief in true neutral news

Study 2 Belief in true neutral news as DV

acc	acc	acc	acc
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Moralization of rationality, intellectual humility and hostile news sharing

Predictors	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
CRT	0.05	0.01,0.08	0.006							0.04	0.01,0.07	0.013
edu	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.001
age	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.013	-0.05	-0.08,-0.02	0.001	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.016	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.021
sex [female]	0.03	-0.04,0.09	0.412	0.03	-0.04,0.09	0.390	0.04	-0.03,0.10	0.247	0.05	-0.01,0.12	0.118
sex [other]	0.21	-0.03,0.45	0.081	0.24	-0.01,0.50	0.060	0.25	0.02,0.47	0.030	0.26	0.03,0.50	0.026
IH				0.05	0.02,0.09	0.003				0.06	0.02,0.09	0.002
MR							0.05	0.02,0.09	0.004	0.06	0.03,0.10	0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.010 / 0.008			0.011 / 0.010			0.012 / 0.010			0.018 / 0.016		

MG, SDRT on belief in true neutral news

Study 2 Belief in true neutral news as DV

Predictors	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p	Estimates	CI	p
SDRT	0.03	-0.01,0.07	0.111				0.03	-0.01,0.07	0.109
edu	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001
age	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.022	-0.05	-0.08,-0.01	0.004	-0.04	-0.07,-0.01	0.023
sex [female]	0.04	-0.02,0.11	0.204	0.02	-0.05,0.08	0.552	0.04	-0.03,0.11	0.236
sex [other]	0.24	0.00,0.48	0.047	0.22	-0.02,0.46	0.075	0.24	-0.00,0.48	0.051
MG				0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.998	-0.01	-0.04,0.03	0.771
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.009 / 0.007			0.008 / 0.006			0.009 / 0.006		

outgroup animosity on belief in true neutral news

Study 2 Belief in true neutral news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
animosity outgroup	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.004
edu	0.06	0.03,0.09	<0.001
age	-0.05	-0.08,-0.02	0.001
sex [female]	0.01	-0.06,0.07	0.789
sex [other]	0.19	-0.05,0.44	0.114
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.011 / 0.009		

Study 2: Covariates x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

MR x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

Study 2 Belief in false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	acc	
		<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.01	-0.04,0.05	0.737
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.85	-0.90,-0.80	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.42	0.37,0.47	<0.001
edu	-0.03	-0.05,-0.01	0.005
age	-0.10	-0.12,-0.08	<0.001
sex [female]	0.03	-0.01,0.08	0.120
sex [other]	0.07	-0.14,0.28	0.509
MR * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.04	-0.09,0.01	0.148
MR * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.04	-0.02,0.09	0.193
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.256 / 0.255		

IH x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

Study 2 Belief in false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	acc	
		<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>

IH	-0.18	-0.21,-0.14	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.85	-0.90,-0.80	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.42	0.38,0.47	<0.001
edu	-0.02	-0.04,-0.00	0.015
age	-0.09	-0.11,-0.07	<0.001
sex [female]	0.03	-0.02,0.07	0.220
sex [other]	0.04	-0.15,0.23	0.690
IH * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.11	0.05,0.16	<0.001
IH * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.24	0.19,0.29	<0.001
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.270 / 0.270		

CRT x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

Study 2 Belief in false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.06	-0.10,-0.03	0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.85	-0.90,-0.80	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.42	0.37,0.47	<0.001
edu	-0.03	-0.05,-0.01	0.007
age	-0.10	-0.12,-0.08	<0.001

sex [female]	0.03	-0.01,0.08	0.126
sex [other]	0.09	-0.11,0.29	0.387
CRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.01	-0.06,0.04	0.692
CRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.11	0.06,0.16	<0.001
<hr/>			
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.259 / 0.259		

SDRT x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

Study 2 Belief in false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	0.07	0.03,0.11	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.85	-0.90,-0.81	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.42	0.37,0.47	<0.001
edu	-0.03	-0.05,-0.01	0.005
age	-0.07	-0.10,-0.05	<0.001
sex [female]	0.09	0.05,0.14	<0.001
sex [other]	0.13	-0.06,0.32	0.187
SDRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.05	0.01,0.10	0.030
SDRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.05	-0.10,0.00	0.058

R ² / R ² adjusted	0.265 / 0.265
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MG x hostility target interactions on belief in false news

Study 2 Belief in false hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.14	0.10,0.17	<0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.85	-0.90,-0.81	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.42	0.37,0.47	<0.001
edu	-0.03	-0.05,-0.01	0.004
age	-0.08	-0.11,-0.06	<0.001
sex [female]	0.04	-0.00,0.08	0.058
sex [other]	0.07	-0.13,0.28	0.484
MG * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.11	-0.16,-0.06	<0.001
MG * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.14	-0.19,-0.09	<0.001
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.263 / 0.262		

Study 2: Covariates x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

MR x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

Study 2 Belief in true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	acc	
		<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MR	0.03	0.00,0.06	0.043
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.45	-0.49,-0.41	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001
edu	0.02	-0.00,0.03	0.134
age	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	0.130
sex [female]	0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.856
sex [other]	0.25	0.09,0.41	0.003
MR * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.864
MR * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.02	-0.02,0.07	0.286
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.060		

IH x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

Study 2 Belief in true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	acc	
		<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>

IH	-0.03	-0.06,0.00	0.076
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.45	-0.48,-0.41	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001
edu	0.01	-0.01,0.03	0.169
age	-0.02	-0.04,-0.00	0.034
sex [female]	-0.01	-0.04,0.03	0.800
sex [other]	0.24	0.06,0.41	0.009
IH * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.05	0.01,0.09	0.018
IH * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.08	0.04,0.12	<0.001
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.060		

CRT x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

Study 2 Belief in true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
CRT	-0.00	-0.03,0.03	0.857
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.45	-0.49,-0.42	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.19,-0.12	<0.001
edu	0.01	-0.01,0.03	0.222
age	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	0.075

sex [female]	-0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.982
sex [other]	0.23	0.06,0.41	0.009
CRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.01	-0.02,0.05	0.461
CRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.05	0.01,0.09	0.012
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R ² / R ² adjusted	0.060 / 0.059		

SDRT x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

Study 2 Belief in true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
SDRT	-0.02	-0.05,0.01	0.169
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.45	-0.49,-0.42	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001
edu	0.01	-0.01,0.03	0.144
age	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	0.097
sex [female]	0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.937
sex [other]	0.24	0.07,0.41	0.005
SDRT * news hostile to [Ingroup]	0.07	0.03,0.10	<0.001
SDRT * news hostile to [True Neutral]	0.05	0.01,0.09	0.028

R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.061
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MG x hostility target interactions on belief in true news

Study 2 Belief in true hostile news as DV

<i>Predictors</i>	acc		
	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>CI</i>	<i>p</i>
MG	0.05	0.02,0.08	0.001
news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.45	-0.49,-0.42	<0.001
news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.15	-0.19,-0.11	<0.001
edu	0.02	-0.00,0.04	0.122
age	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	0.075
sex [female]	-0.00	-0.04,0.04	0.932
sex [other]	0.23	0.06,0.40	0.008
MG * news hostile to [Ingroup]	-0.06	-0.09,-0.02	0.003
MG * news hostile to [True Neutral]	-0.05	-0.09,-0.01	0.013
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.061 / 0.061		