University Elections and Political Socialization in the Developing World

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Abstract

Foundational political behavior scholarship posits that institutions of higher education foster the types of attitudes and patterns of civic engagement that sustain liberal democracy. Yet throughout the developing world, authoritarian, ethnosectarian, and clientelist political parties often intervene in university politics, particularly through competition in student elections. We argue this intervention limits the liberalizing effects of participation in university associational life. To test this argument, we measure the effect of political party intervention in university life using a panel survey experiment conducted at the American University of Beirut (AUB) during the university’s annual student elections. Using a choice-based conjoint experiment embedded in a difference-in-differences design—the first of its kind—we estimate the causal effect of participation on non-partisan students. We find that processes of university socialization reproduce status quo politics and limit the ability of these environments to encourage critical, tolerant, and liberal-minded citizens.

Keywords: Middle East; Lebanon; education; ethnic politics; conjoint analysis; elections; voter behavior; survey analysis

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Introduction

How do universities shape the attitudes and political preferences of their students? Does participation in campus associational life—through student groups and campus elections—encourage the political awareness and civic engagement that help sustain liberal democracy? If so, are these processes uniform or conditional on context? Foundational studies of political behavior assert that institutions of higher education and student involvement in university-based activities shape many attitudes thought vital to the welfare of democratic societies. According to [Converse \(1972\)](#), “education is everywhere the universal solvent [...]. The higher the education, the greater the ‘good’ values of the variable. The educated citizen is attentive, knowledgeable, and participatory, and the uneducated citizen is not” (pg. 324).

We challenge this perspective by arguing that the intervention of national political parties in campus life, which occurs across campuses in the developing world, can limit and even reverse participation in university life’s ability to encourage critical, tolerant, and liberal-minded citizens. Most paradigmatic theories about the formative role of higher education in socializing young adults come from studies of political behavior in advanced democracies in the West. Yet in many contexts, authoritarian, ethnosectarian, and clientelist political parties maintain a presence on university campuses. They may host partisan events, disseminate information, distribute resources, and recruit future elites into their ranks. These activities become especially contentious during student elections that, unlike their counterparts in the West, frequently reflect national partisan divisions. As a result, students who participate in campus associational life are more likely to support broadly clientelistic, ethnosectarian national political factions than those who do not. In turn, institutions of higher education are sites where status quo politics are reproduced, rather than institutions that inculcate the norms that help sustain liberal democracy over time.

To test this argument, we investigate the causal effect of participation in the annual student elections at the American University of Beirut (AUB) using an original panel survey conducted shortly before and after one such election in 2017. A central component of the survey is a choice-based conjoint experiment that measures student support for hypothetical candidates running in the 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary elections. While conjoint experiments often assess the causal effect of certain attributes or policy positions on respondent preferences, cross-sectional experiments cannot measure shifts in preferences in response to real-world events. To mitigate this issue, and others related to design sensitivity, we use a difference-in-differences approach—the first of its kind to be coupled with a conjoint experiment—to measure change in support for mainstream parties, coalitions, and candidates.

Three main findings emerge. The cross-sectional conjoint results across both waves show that students enter university life with strong ethnocentric biases. In the first pre-election survey wave, respondents support candidates whose religious sect matches their own at a rate 18 percentage points higher than their support for other candidates. Second, we find observable differences through both descriptive and conjoint-based data between students who identify as party supporters in the first wave of the survey and those who do not. We develop a theoretical framework for why non-partisans, and specifically non-partisans who vote

in the student elections, should be particularly susceptible to on-campus party messaging. Finally, we find that participation in the student elections leads non-partisan student voters to support co-ethnosectarian candidates and mainstream party coalitions. On average, this sub-group of students supports ethnosectarian in-group candidates at a rate 9 percentage points higher in the post-election conjoint, assessed against the pre-election wave. Analogous conjoint findings emerge with regard to non-partisan voters' support for candidates representing Lebanon's main ethnosectarian party coalitions.

Collectively, these findings illustrate that institutions of higher education do not necessarily foster the development and acquisition of attitudes and behaviors that sustain liberal democratic institutions. In fact, they may do precisely the opposite, contingent on the broader political environment in which they are embedded. Much like other important sites of political socialization, universities are prone to intervention and co-optation by existing elite networks. Therefore, they have the capacity to perpetuate the status quo as much as they do to disrupt it.

Theoretical perspectives

A positive relationship between university education and the type of civic engagement that strengthens democratic institutions has been demonstrated in the American and comparative political science literatures alike (Dewey 1916; Converse 1972; Almond & Verba 1989; Verba et al. 1995; Przeworski et al. 2000). Indeed, Lake terms this relationship “one of the most reliable results in empirical social science” (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt 1998, pg. 567), and Putnam asserts that a university education is “the best individual level predictor of participation” (Putnam 1995, pg. 68). Broadly, this scholarship holds that university attendance plays a critical role in the development of political orientations and behaviors (Dennis et al. 1971). These studies argue that the totality of activity encompassing the university experience reinforces the very patterns of civic engagement and critical thinking that sustain liberal democracy. To this effect, others have found evidence of a causal effect of education on voter turnout (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Hillygus 2005; Sondheim & Green 2010), political sophistication (Neuman 1986; Luskin 1990), and political engagement (Nie & Hillygus 2003; Mayer 2011; Larreguy & Marshall 2016).

Much of this literature asserts the effect of a university education without precisely pinpointing which aspect(s) of university life are producing pro-democratic outcomes. Other scholars have worked to unpack the black box of higher education, identifying three main mechanisms linking universities to patterns of adult political behavior. First, proponents of the *civic education* theory take a classroom-centric approach in arguing that universities strengthen students' cognitive and developmental capabilities. The intellectual growth associated with university education lowers the cognitive cost of political engagement and more easily allows for the evaluation of campaigns, candidates, and issues (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; McClosky & Brill 1983; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993). This, in turn, is said to encourage the acquisition of skills, knowledge, and resources that support higher levels of political participation (Hillygus 2005).

Second, political preferences are traced to the *norms and values* disseminated by universities as liberal institutions (Rootes 1986; Pascarella et al. 2005; Sidanius et al. 2008). In the first study of its kind, Newcomb (1943) found that students at Bennington College who were more active and more integrated into campus life were more likely to embrace liberalism. Adoption of these attitudes was due in part to the university’s tacit adoption of liberal economic, social, and political values, particularly among faculty. Participation in associational life on campus can also introduce the relational discontinuities critical to perspective-taking, civic knowledge, and democratic sentiments (Gurin et al. 2002, 2004; Campbell 2008). For example, several studies have found cross-sectional evidence that participation in student government strengthens the acquisition of civic values and pro-democratic sentiments (Astin 1993; Kuh & Lund 1994; Pascarella et al. 2005; Lott 2013). Indeed, students are often conceptualized as a democratic vanguard in non-democratic states, frequently at the forefront of anti-systemic or revolutionary activism (Huntington 1968; Olcese et al. 2014; Dahlum & Wig 2017).

A final set of mechanisms emphasizes the importance of *peer networks* on campus and their ability to introduce politicized students to like-minded peers (Nie et al. 1996; Stoker & Bass 2013). Universities facilitate the coalescence of politically active individuals who use broader networks to recruit and influence others. This is not particularly difficult, as students are often relatively free from the personal constraints that limit or raise the costs of participation (McAdam 1986). Interestingly, students confer status upon more tolerant, knowledgeable, and civic-minded students (Crossley 2008), and this status makes these students targets for recruitment by political elites later (Verba et al. 1995). In sum, university campuses inculcate individual and group interests and propel young citizens into political activity (Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1961; Meyer & Rubinson 1975).

The argument that higher education underpins pro-democratic political engagement is a cornerstone of the political behavior literature. However, an appraisal of the mechanisms underpinning these studies demonstrates the contingency of this empirical relationship on the context in which it is studied. Outside of advanced democracies in the West, this relationship may not be so generalizable. Student groups and associations reproduce elements of the political context in which they are embedded, structuring their ideological orientations and activities accordingly. To that end, studies have found that many non-democratic regimes invest considerable resources in generating and enforcing compliance on university campuses (Germani 1970; Rivetti & Cavatorta 2014; Yan 2014). Mendelberg et al. (2016) challenge this conventional wisdom even in the United States, arguing that the adoption of economically liberal political views is conditional on the campus environment’s ability to shape student identities. Affluent students immersed in environments conducive to affluence adopt more economically conservative views. In other words, while universities may universally socialize students by giving meaning to social identities at a critical time in their lives, the ways in which that meaning is conferred, and to what end, dramatically diverge.

In much of the developing world, nation-building and the expansion of tertiary education began concomitantly, often fusing developmental and partisan objectives (Bourdieu & Passeron

1977; Schofer & Meyer 2005). As a result, contemporary campuses in the Global South are frequently sites of contention not only between the state and anti-system activists, but also between different party agents competing for future electoral supporters and active members. In these contexts, political parties use educational institutions to hold partisan events, selectively distribute resources, and recruit students into party networks.

The way in which political parties penetrate university life in the Global South, and the effect of these efforts on student attitudes, have received scant attention in the political science literature. Indeed, this is likely in part because similar political party involvement in universities rarely occurs in the United States, where most studies of higher education and political behavior are conducted. It may also be a product of selection on the dependent variable: scholars of the developing world often study university politics specifically in those instances where students or the educated class have contributed to anti-systemic uprisings (Olcese et al. 2014; Dahlum & Wig 2017).

While such research is vital, it has obscured a more common trend that our study aims to uncover. As scholars of authoritarianism have acknowledged, institutions that strengthen democratic norms in already democratic contexts may have the opposite effect in non-democratic ones. In Palestine and Jordan, for example, the civil society organizations often lauded in the U.S. and elsewhere as sustaining democratic institutions and civic engagement were instead found to promote support for authoritarian regimes and encourage reliance on patron-clientelism (Jamal 2007). In this vein, our paper highlights how university life in Lebanon is a product of the broader ethnosectarian political environment in which it is situated and how this has, in turn, shaped student attitudes. The following section provides context on Lebanese national politics and student life. Our aim is to illustrate the consequences of political party intervention when these parties compete in student elections.

Ethnosectarianism and Lebanese party politics

Since its founding, the Lebanese political system has been defined by confessionalism, the legally specified distribution of government positions according to estimates of the ethnosectarian demographic composition of the country.¹ All Parliamentary seats, for example, are allotted according to an ethnosectarian quota system based loosely on district-level demographic composition.

Contemporary Lebanese political parties are almost exclusively ethnosectarian in nature. Today, the six most popular parties—the Future Movement, Hezbollah, Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the Lebanese Forces (LF), and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)—draw popular support almost overwhelmingly from one sect, are led by members of that sect, and in several cases claimed to represent that sect as militias during the 1975-1990 civil war (Corstange 2016; Rizkallah 2016b). Since 2005, these parties have organized them-

¹No formal census has been conducted since 1932, in part due to concerns that new demographic figures would lead to competing claims to change this formula of representation. The formula was adjusted in 1990 as part of the agreement that ended the civil war (Abul-Husn 1998).

selves into two competing electoral coalitions. The March 14 Alliance includes several parties that maintained an anti-Syrian stance at that time, predominantly the Future Movement, PSP, and the LF, whereas the March 8 Alliance includes primarily Hezbollah, Amal, and the Free Patriotic Movement.

As with a number of other middle-income countries in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, political parties in Lebanon compete for national electoral representation primarily through patron-clientelism, episodically distributing private material goods such as cash, food, and medical services in exchange for electoral support ([Cammett 2014](#); [Corstange 2016](#)). The fact that Lebanon’s national elite have effectively abdicated their roles as representatives by substituting clientelist goods for public services has been the subject of considerable public debate and popular protest in recent years. During the 2016 municipal elections, a group of politically unaffiliated activists formed a 24-person list under the banner of Beirut Madinati (“Beirut Is My City”), which garnered nearly forty percent of votes in the capital city but failed to gain a seat due to a majoritarian electoral law at the municipal level ([Rizkallah 2016a](#); [Khoury 2016](#)).

Since then, a variety of anti-sectarian coalitions have emerged from the Beirut Madinati campaign. Several of these groups formed candidate lists across numerous districts for the May 2018 Parliamentary elections and have consistently highlighted the government’s poor record of service provision in their campaign platforms. Lebanese universities have also seen a rise in the popularity of anti-sectarian student associations in the past decade, with the AUB Secular Club constituting one well-documented example. By its own billing, the organization claims to promote “secular, democratic, and pluralist values inherently opposed to the current politico-sectarian status quo” ([AUB 2017b](#)).

Sympathetic local observers often hail the AUB Secular Club and similarly anti-systemic student movements as a turnover in generational ideology. They profess a belief that those born after the civil war era—during which time most of the ethnosectarian parties that dominate today were created—will reject status-quo politics ([Chamseddine 2017](#)). Moreover, highly educated individuals within this youth cohort, with their greater political efficacy and financial capacity, should be the most likely to reject the clientelist offers upon which many of these parties’ electoral success rests. This argument about the Lebanese postwar generation is not new: writing shortly after the end of the civil war, the Lebanese historian [Fawwaz Traboulsi \(1990\)](#) predicted that the forthcoming generation of youth, “deeply suspicious of both the traditional leaders and the warlords,” would “speak a new and sincere language” (pg. 10). As the next section details, however, this neat division envisioned between an older generation invested in politics-as-usual and an anti-systemic youth cadre belies a more complex reality.

Student elections at AUB

The American University of Beirut (AUB) provides an ideal setting to understand the role of universities in the formation of political attitudes and preferences. Since its founding in 1866, the American University of Beirut has been a site of vocal student politics that mirror

those of Lebanon and, at times, the broader Middle East ([Anderson 2011](#)). Student politics at AUB since the end of the war in 1990 have remained contentious, due in large part to the annual student elections. Voting takes place in October or November of each year, where (as of 2017) 8,856 students—6,952 of whom are Lebanese—have the opportunity to vote for members of two student government organizations: the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) and the Student Representative Committee (SRC) ([Rabah 2009](#); [AUB 2017a](#)). The USFC operates as a liaison between students and university administrators, while the SRC plans social activities, fosters acquaintances between students, and promotes the discussion of campus issues.

Political parties are explicitly banned from intervening in these elections by name, iconography, or commonly associated slogans. This official university sanction has failed to quell party activities on campus. Rather, every major national ethnosectarian party has established a representative student club on campus. These clubs have adopted neutral, innocuous names (see Table 1 for 2017 affiliations). Yet it is well-understood which clubs are affiliated with which parties, and club members readily identify as supporters of these parties when asked (authors’ observations; see [Harik & Meho \(1996\)](#) for historical perspective). One respondent to our survey² remarks of party participation in the elections:

What is the use of such a democratic voting system if we know upfront how many people vote for a candidate just because of the sect he belongs to or supports? It is no longer a question of which candidates are most fit for such positions, but instead which candidate has the most backup from his or her sect . . . Such tribal tendencies or “mob rule” render democracy useless during the AUB elections.

When these clubs compete in student elections, they form alliances with other clubs that mirror national-level partnerships ([Harik & Meho 1996](#)). From 2005 to 2017, these primarily divided into what are referred to as the March 8 and March 14 coalitions. Lebanese media coverage interprets the AUB student election results as evidence of victory by national-level political parties and coalitions. In 2017, the USFC election largely resulted in a draw: the March 8-backed “Students for Change” list won 6 seats, with 29% of the popular vote; the March 14-backed “Leaders of Tomorrow” list won 6 seats, with 38% of the popular vote; and the Secular Club’s “Campus Choice” list won 6 seats with 28% of the popular vote. Independent candidates won one seat, with 6% of the popular vote. Results from the SRC were similar.

²Throughout our paper, quoted student responses were in English unless otherwise noted. Responses are lightly edited for grammar.

Table 1: Political affiliations of AUB clubs (2017 election)

Student Club	National Political Party (Sect)
Youth Club	Future Movement (Sunni)
Social Club	Lebanese Forces (Christian)
Communication Club	Progressive Socialist Party (Druze)
Cutural Club of the South	Hezbollah (Shia)
Freedom Club	Free Patriotic Movement (Christian)
Lebanese Mission Club	Amal (Shia)
Discovery Club	Kata'eb (Christian)

The intervention of political parties in student elections at AUB and elsewhere could be responsible for the resilience of status quo politics. The assumptions made by political scientists regarding the liberal, anti-systemic tendencies of educated elites deserve closer examination, particular in contexts where process of political socialization are manipulated by party institutions. To our knowledge, we know of no causally identified research on how these processes affect candidate performance in national elections. If we want to know more about how clientelistic, mainstream ethnosectarian parties reproduce their power, we need to start studying how these parties interfere in university life and student elections.

Experimental design and statistical methodology

Survey design

To measure the effect of university life on student preferences, we surveyed a sample of students at the American University of Beirut (AUB) before and after their annual student elections in October 2017. After several months of in-depth fieldwork at AUB, we designed a survey to examine the impact of participation in the student elections on preferences for co-ethnic (sectarian) politicians and politicians from mainstream political parties comprising the March 8 and March 14 alliances.

In order to understand the effect of these elections on students' political preferences, we developed a pre- and post-election panel survey. AUB-CONJOINT was administered online via Qualtrics to students enrolled in PSYC-201, an introductory-level psychology course in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. All 472 students enrolled in the course were invited to participate, though all our analysis is restricted to Lebanese citizens ($N = 331$). Of Lebanese citizens, 310 students completed both waves, with an attrition rate of 4% (13 students) between both waves.³ Table A1 in the Supporting information section shows descriptive statistics in the AUB-CONJOINT sample compared to the AUB student population and the Lebanon sample of the third wave of the Arab Barometer project. The first wave of the survey was conducted from Wednesday, September 27, 2017, to Friday, October 6, 2017.

³Students were offered one extra credit point, which would be added to their final course grade at the end of the semester, for participating in each survey. In accordance with AUB IRB procedures, students were told that they need not complete the survey in order to receive the extra credit points.

Candidates were announced on Monday, October 9; campaigning took place from Tuesday, October 10, to Wednesday, October 11. After a nominal day of silence, the elections were held from 10:00am to 5:00pm on Friday, October 13. The results were announced that evening at approximately 8:00pm. The second wave of the survey began less than 24 hours later, running from Saturday, October 14, to Wednesday, October 18.

In addition to the conjoint experiment administered across both waves, the first wave of the survey asked respondents to complete a battery of demographic questions and answer questions about their activities on campus. The second wave of the survey asked respondents several questions about their participation in the student election, including vote choice, participation in election-related activities, their reasons for voting, and the extent of their contact with candidates and candidate volunteers. Both waves measured attitudes towards democracy, one's sect and its members, and identity on multiple dimensions. The full questionnaires are available in the Supporting information section.

The core of our analysis is derived from a series of choice-based conjoint experimental tasks administered at the conclusion of each wave of AUB-CONJOINT. Conjoint experiments typically present respondents with hypothetical profiles that differ on a set of attributes (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015; Franchino & Zucchini 2015; Sen 2017; Horiuchi et al. 2018). These attributes have two or more levels, each of which are randomly assigned to a profile. Respondents are then asked to choose their preferred profile and (in our design and others) to rank the profiles on a scale of 1 to 7, in addition to briefly justifying their choice.

Our conjoint experiment was conducted roughly six months before the start of the 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary election, held on May 6, 2018. Respondents were asked to choose from among two hypothetical candidates running in this election. Before the beginning of the conjoint sequence, respondents were presented with the following instructions:

Legislative elections are currently scheduled to take place next year, in May 2018. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to act as if you are about to cast a vote for the candidate that will represent you in the Lebanese Parliament. We will describe several pairs of candidates running for election to Parliament in the following pages.

For each pair of candidates, please indicate your attitudes toward each candidate and which one you would prefer to represent you. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you prefer.

Each profile contained five attributes: political affiliation, religion, education, family history, and occupation. Table 2 contains the full list of attribute levels. Levels were randomly assigned to each profile, meaning that respondents were exposed to one of 432 potential combinations.⁴

⁴All candidate combinations were plausible because sect-affiliation combinations are somewhat fluid. For example, Shia candidates are typically March 8, due to affiliation with Hezbollah or Amal, but some candidates can be (and have been) March 14.

Table 2: Attributes for candidate profiles in AUB-CONJOINT

Attribute	Levels
Political affiliation	March 14 March 8 Independent civil society
Religion	Sunni Muslim Shia Muslim Maronite Christian Orthodox Christian Druze Armenian Christian
Education	Bachelor’s degree Master’s degree
Family history	Son of a prominent politician Son of a prominent businessman No prominent family background
Occupation	Lawyer Engineer Businessman NGO manager

Respondents evaluated seven pairs of candidates in each wave (14 total), with each pair displayed on a new screen. At the conclusion of each pair, respondents were asked the following questions:

1. Which of these candidates would you be more likely to support for Parliament?
2. Why do you prefer this candidate? Please answer in a few sentences.
3. If you had to make a prediction, which candidate do you think will win the election?
4. On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate where would you place:
 - Candidate 1
 - Candidate 2

Figure 1 presents a screenshot of the conjoint portion of the online survey. Attributes and levels were chosen to be familiar, credibly realistic, and theoretically relevant. Attribute levels were not randomized to facilitate ease of evaluation, as order effects pose problems for analysis predominantly when a very large number of attributes are being deployed (Hainmueller et al. 2014).

Following the conjoint experiment in the first (pre-election) wave—so as not to prime respondents—we asked participants to identify their official religion (sect). In our analysis, candidate profiles were subsequently coded “in-group” or “out-group” depending on whether or not the candidate profile exactly matched the participant’s official religion (sect). We also employ an alternative in-group coding which uses a broader criteria for in-group status, which is

discussed further in the Results section.

Figure 1: AUB-CONJOINT screenshot

Please do not refresh this page.

Legislative elections are currently scheduled to take place next year, in May 2018. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to act as if you are about to cast a vote for the candidate that will represent you in the Lebanese Parliament. We will describe several pairs of candidates running for election to Parliament in the following pages.

For each pair of candidates, please indicate your attitudes toward each candidate and which one you would prefer to represent you. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you prefer.

	Candidate 1	Candidate 2
Political Affiliation	March 8	March 8
Religion	Druze	Shia Muslim
Education	Bachelor's Degree	Bachelor's Degree
Family Background	Son of a prominent businessman	No prominent family background
Occupation	Engineer	Lawyer

Which of these candidates would you be more likely to support for Parliament?

☐ Candidate 1
☐ Candidate 2

Why do you prefer this candidate? Please answer in a few sentences.

If you had to make a prediction, which candidate do you think will win the election?

☐ Candidate 1
☐ Candidate 2

On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Candidate 1

Candidate 2

Data analysis

We employ several approaches for analyzing our data from AUB-CONJOINT. First, we are interested in identifying the overall salience of five candidate attributes on candidate (profile) choice. This includes measuring attribute significance, i.e. the importance respondents place on each attribute, relative to others, in addition to measuring effect size, i.e. the extent to which specific types of attributes are associated with more or less positive candidate evalu-

ations.

Conjoint experiments randomly assign attributes to pairs of candidate profiles presented to study participants. OLS estimates from a regression of respondents’ binary candidate preference on a set of categorical variables representing each candidate attribute will produce an unbiased estimate of the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) for each attribute-level (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Horiuchi et al. 2018). Conjoint analysis has been employed in a number of studies where the attribute of interest is difficult to understand a uni-dimensional survey question, usually because respondents hesitate to openly admit holding certain preferences regarding the religious, racial, ethnic, or political affiliation of the profile they are evaluating (Hainmueller et al. 2014; Auerbach & Thachil 2018; Liu 2018). Conjoint experiments help overcome systematic measurement error produced by preference falsification by embedding an evaluation of side-by-side profiles in which the respondent is only asked to evaluate the candidate profile rather than the sensitive attribute itself. Through validation against real-world data, conjoint experiments have been shown to be more effective at accurately measuring respondent preferences than vignette and list experiments (Hainmueller et al. 2015).

Most conjoint analyses in political science acknowledge and investigate the heterogeneity of effects across different types of respondents (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2015; Sen 2017). As Horiuchi et al. (2018) point out, however, grouping two types of respondents within a survey who differ on a key variable of interest may produce a misleading AMCE estimate that, while unbiased, cannot link the respondent-level variables to within-group AMCE. We took an inductive approach to identifying these relevant sub-groups in our analysis based on a combination of qualitative observation and analysis of the non-experimental data collected in our survey across both waves.

Second, in an effort to address this concern, we also use a difference-in-differences design to estimate the effect of participation in the student election across several key sub-groups. A central dilemma for single (i.e. cross-sectional) conjoint experiments is that, like many survey experiments, they are sensitive to subtle design features, such as word choice. Moreover, even a carefully designed conjoint experiment cannot measure changes in respondent attitudes as a result of a real event or environmental shift. We say “real” because cross-sectional conjoint experiments can present different hypothetical events or scenarios to respondents and evaluate their relative importance. For example, a conjoint experiment could ask respondents to choose between two candidates for political office, randomly varying whether or not a security incident has just occurred. Yet that research design would not produce a valid evaluation of within-respondent change over time in the event of a security incident *actually occurring* and a subsequent shift in the respondent’s preferences.

To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to address the sensitivity of conjoint experiments using a difference-in-differences design across waves. Using this setup, it is also the first conjoint to isolate the effect of a specific real-world event on the evolution of political preferences over time. Our design allows us to capture changes in respondent attitudes toward party affiliation, religion (sect), and other attributes as a result of an actual political

event. On-site fieldwork and close monitoring of other events taking place at AUB and in Lebanon during that time allow us to confidently assert that the student election, rather than some other politically relevant event, was the only major event that occurred during this 12-day window, from the close of the first wave of the survey on October 6 to the start of the second wave on October 14.

Heterogenous effects framework

We assert that a standard difference-in-differences approach to measuring post-election changes in the AMCE of particular conjoint features fails to sufficiently account for the importance of sub-group differences we previously raise. Therefore, we group several of our conjoint results, and the difference-in-differences analysis, by 1) voter behavior (whether or not the respondent voted) and 2) pre-election partisanship. It is true that by sub-setting our analysis in this way, and by focusing in particular on a sub-population delineated along non-experimental lines, we deviate from a pure experimental design. In the case of our difference-in-differences analysis across waves, this would mean simply measuring changes in political preferences (as measured through the conjoint) for the entire respondent pool. Yet we assert that the combination of a panel conjoint design with an acknowledgment of politically-relevant heterogeneity gives us better leverage for measuring change in a way that accurately captures the diverse and contingent processes of politicization that take place during the election. Here, we briefly lay out why we expect attitudinal shifts to occur within certain intersections of each of these sub-groups.

Prior to the student elections, we asked respondents about the extent of their prior partisan attachments. We asked whether or not “there is a particular national political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties” or if “you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?” A minority of student respondents—approximately 39 percent—identified themselves as supporters of a national political party. We identify these students as “partisans” for ease of interpretation.

Sample partisans differ from non-partisans in the pre-election wave in several important ways. Table 3 highlights these differences: partisan students report higher levels of political knowledge, interest, and media consumption than their non-partisan peers. 59 percent of pre-election partisans are able to answer a question about the number of Lebanese Parliamentary members correctly, compared to 44 percent of their non-partisan peers.⁵ 43 percent of partisans consume political news regularly, compared to 17 percent of non-partisans, and nearly twice as many partisans identify as being interested in current events. The starker differences, however, emerge regarding the belief that one’s sect is superior and strong identification with one’s sect. 36 percent of partisans believe their sect is superior in the baseline survey, compared to 8 percent of non-partisans (and 19 percent of the entire sample).

In summary, a minority of AUB students enter the student elections period with an un-

⁵There are 128 Parliamentary representatives; student answers were evaluated as correct if they fell between 110 and 140.

usually well-developed partisan belief system, which we assert makes them less susceptible to the election-specific socialization process we aim to investigate. As such, we expect to see little change in attitudes among this group, comparable to their non-partisan peers.

Table 3: Baseline means by partisanship and voting

	All	Voters	Non-voters	Partisans	Non-partisans
<i>pol-news</i>	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.43	0.17
<i>pol-info</i>	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.59	0.44
<i>pol-interest</i>	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.38	0.20
<i>leb-is-dem</i>	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.47	0.39
<i>dem-for-leb</i>	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.61
<i>sect-superior</i>	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.36	0.08
N	331	224	107	130	196

Note: Numbers represent means for each sub-group; variables have been scaled from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. *Pol-news*, *pol-info*, and *pol-interest* represent respondent interest in political news, level of political knowledge, and level of political interest, respectively. The remaining variables indicate the extent to which respondents agree with a set of statements on a scale of 0 (disagree) to 10 (agree). See “Survey instruments” in the Supporting information section for more information.

We also subset our analysis by voting and non-voting respondents. Our justification of this choice is simpler: we consider observation of and engagement in the AUB student elections to be the key driver of preference changes between our first and second survey waves, and student voters have by definition done both. Approximately 68 of respondents report having voted in the election, cohering with a 62 percent turnout rate reported by the university. The descriptive data suggest that while partisan and non-partisan students differ on a number of attitudinal measures determined prior to the student elections, voters and non-voters do not. In terms of political knowledge, political interest, political news consumption, and attitudes toward democracy and sectarianism, voters and non-voters are virtually identical in our descriptive comparison (see Table 3).

Neither of these two sets of subgroups were subject to a “treatment” not related to the student elections during the period in question. Specifically, our difference-in-differences analysis focuses on non-partisan voters. So if this particular sub-group experienced an alternative process of political socialization not related to the student elections during this two week period—one that other sub-groups did not—the validity of our panel findings beyond that sub-group would be called into question. We have do not suspect this is the case. All sub-groups were subject to a similar variety of party appeals and campaign exposure (see Table A2 in the Supporting information section for a descriptive table). Therefore, we are confident that the differences between waves we observe among non-partisan voters in political attitudes are a result of socialization processes driven by participation in the student election itself.

Results

This section presents the main findings from our empirical analysis. First, we analyze the degree of heterogeneity in respondent preferences with respect to the candidate profiles presented during both waves of AUB-CONJOINT. In particular, we are interested in estimating the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of March coalition and in-group status on candidate choice, grouping respondents by partisanship and voter participation. We then estimate changes in the preferences of these sub-groups between the pre- and post-election waves of the survey.

Candidate choice results by wave and sub-group

Figure 2 displays the effect of each conjoint attribute on respondent candidate choice during the each wave of the survey.⁶ This indicates the probability of respondents preferring candidates with a given attribute value (compared to other attributes within that same trait), taking the average over all combinations of candidate attributes across other traits. For complete results, see Table A3 and Table A4 in the Supporting information section.

⁶Because both the independent and dependent variables are binary, we use OLS to estimate these effects rather than a binomial logistic regression, which is often employed when the dependent variable is binary.

Figure 2: Overall AUB-CONJOINT attribute effects, by wave

Note: Average effect of candidate attributes on respondents' preferences for hypothetical MP candidates. Each circle in the plot represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. Horizontal bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust.

First and foremost, we find that ethnosectarian in-group affiliation exerts the single most powerful effect on respondent preferences. Being of the same ethnosectarian background as the candidate increased respondents' probability of choosing that candidate by 18 percent among all respondents in both the pre- and post-election waves. Second, at the same time, students expressed disapproval of candidates from both of the mainstream (March 8 or 14) party coalitions. Students were 12 percent less likely to support March 14-affiliated candidates and 13 percent less likely to support March 8-affiliated candidates relative to an "independent civil society" baseline in the first wave. In the second wave, students are 9 percent less likely to support March 14 candidates, and 11 percent less likely to support March 8 candidates. Not surprisingly, students also tend to favor more educated candidates, and those with experience in non-governmental work. Candidates from prominent political or business family backgrounds are also marginally disfavored in the pre-election wave, but not in the post-election wave.

Figure 3: Differences in attribute effects, by sub-group and wave

Note: Average effect of candidate attributes on respondents' preferences for hypothetical MP candidates. Each circle in the plot represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. Horizontal bars represent 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust.

Figure 3 displays differences in candidate choice between sub-groups within each wave of the survey. Here, we highlight a few key points. First, in the first wave, voters and non-voters are virtually indistinguishable in their candidate preferences as measured by the conjoint. In the second wave, however, marginal divergences begin to appear. The probability of voters supporting March 8 and March 14 candidates in the post-election wave is lower than the civil society baseline by 17 and 10 percentage points, respectively, compared to 12 and 11 percentage points lower in the pre-election baseline. Among voters, the probability of supporting candidates was lower than the baseline by 9 percentage points for both coalitions, shifting from 13 and 12 percentage points power in the pre-election wave. For March 8, the average effect of coalition status on candidate preference between voters and non-voters significantly differs $p = 0.05$.

Next, we look at differences within each wave between partisans and non-partisans. In

the pre-election wave, in-group status increased non-partisan students' probability of choosing a candidate by 12 percent, compared to 26 percent for partisan students, a difference that is significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. While affiliation with either of the March coalitions decreases the probability of candidate selection even for partisan students in the first wave, it does so at much lower rates for partisans (7 and 10 percent for March 8 and 14, respectively) than for non-partisans (17 and 13 percent for March 8 and March 14, respectively). After the election, however, partisan and non-partisan preferences begin to converge in important ways. While the average effect of in-group status differed between non-partisan and partisan students by 14 percentage points in the pre-election wave, it is virtually identical following the elections (18 percent for each). Average levels of support for each of the main March coalitions and differences therein between partisans and non-partisans remain largely stable.

Our results are robust to a variety of model specifications, full results of which can be found in the Supporting information section. First, we perform the analysis for the overall and pre-election wave samples using a broader coding of religious in-group, separating students into simpler Christian, Sunni, Shia, and Druze categories (Table A5). Second, we run the analysis defining the dependent variable with a Likert scale, rather than a binary variable (Table A6). Finally, we look at the overall conjoint findings across waves within each major religious sect to confirm that in-group bias is the main driver of candidate preference across religious sects, and that our findings are not being driven by outlier behavior within one group (Table A7). In the following section, we examine changes across waves in candidate choice within key sub-groups of relevance.

Student election effects on candidate choice

Having examined heterogeneous effects in each wave of the election by partisanship and voter participation, we now examine more closely the post-election effects on preferences for in-group and March coalition candidates among our groups of interest in the difference-in-differences framework. Figure 4 visualizes these differences for in-group support among voters and non-partisans. On the left, among voters, we see that partisan and non-partisan voters display divergent rates of in-group favoritism in the pre-election wave, with probabilities of choosing an in-group candidate measured at 58 and 72 percent, respectively. Yet their preferences converge following the elections and even reverse slightly, with non-partisan and partisan probabilities of in-group support measuring at 67 and 61 percent, respectively. The dotted counterfactual line visualizes the results we would have expected to see if non-partisan voters were affected in the same way as partisan voters by the elections period: if they had seen similar trends, non-partisan voters would have supported in-group candidates at a rate of 46 percent, not 67.

On the right, similarly, we visualize differences between non-partisan voters and non-partisan non-voters. While coming from similar baselines of in-group bias (supporting in-group candidates at rates of 58 and 55 percent, respectively), voters exhibit a slightly greater increase of in-group favoritism (13 percentage points) than non-voters (10 percentage points) in the post-election survey wave.

Figure 4: Post-election effects on in-group support

Note: Average effect of in-group candidate status on respondents' preferences for hypothetical MP candidates. Each point represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality.

Figure 5 shows an analogous visualization of post-election shifts in March coalition support, combining the average effects of March 8 and 14 into a single variable. While partisan and non-partisan voters come from a similar baseline of support rates (34 and 33 percent respectively), non-partisan voters become markedly more likely to support March coalition candidates (42 percent) than their partisan voter peers (34 percent) following the elections. Similarly, among non-partisans only, voters see much more dramatic positive shifts in March coalition support than their non-voting peers. Voter non-partisans move from a support rate of 33 percent to 42 percent, while non-voter non-partisans move from 32 to 34 percent. These results strongly suggest, consistent with our theoretical framework, that it is the interactive effect of voting and non-partisanship that creates the strongest impetus for shifts in candidate preferences, albeit with each dimension exerting an independent effect.

Figure 5: Post-election effects on March coalition support

Note: Average effect of March coalition candidate status on respondents' preferences for hypothetical MP candidates. Each point represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality.

Table 4: DID election effects on in-group and March coalition support

	Candidate choice					
	Non-partisan voters	Non-partisans	Voters	Non-partisan voters	Non-partisans	voters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.453*** (0.126)	0.448*** (0.126)	0.428*** (0.113)	0.498*** (0.125)	0.490*** (0.094)	0.451*** (0.115)
Post-Election	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.014)	-0.058** (0.029)	-0.034 (0.024)	-0.047** (0.023)
In-Group	0.126*** (0.033)	0.122*** (0.033)	0.205*** (0.025)			
In-Group*Post-Election	0.092** (0.046)	0.068 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.035)			
March				-0.168*** (0.025)	-0.160*** (0.021)	-0.136*** (0.020)
March*Post-Election				0.091** (0.036)	0.056* (0.030)	0.057** (0.028)
Observations	3,494	5,208	5,864	3,494	5,208	5,864

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. All model specifications include individual-level fixed effects. Other conjoint attributes are included as controls in each model, but coefficients are not reported in the paper.

Table 4 provides difference-in-difference estimates for the average treatment effect of elections on in-group and March coalition support among each of our key sub-populations of interest—non-partisans and voters—and their interaction. The logic derived from our theoretical framework is that these two respondent characteristics should have an interactive effect that leads to shifts in candidate preferences across waves. We find that the election has a positive and statistically significant effect on non-partisan voter preferences for in-group candidates of approximately 9 percent ($p = 0.05$). Results for all non-partisans and all voters, by contrast, are not statistically significant.

We conduct a similar difference-in-differences analysis for March coalition support, again grouping the coalitions into a single variable and looking particularly at non-partisan voter respondents. Here, too, we find a positive and statistically significant effect on unaligned voters of approximately 9 percent ($p = 0.05$). We do not see similar results among all non-partisans; we do, however, see a significant post-election bump in March coalition support among all voters, albeit of a smaller magnitude (approximately 6 percent).

We include two other falsification tests to substantiate these findings. First, post-election shifts in conjoint preferences among non-voters, both pertaining to in-group and March coalition support, are null. If we observed differences between waves among members of this group, it might concern us in the sense that it would signal that voting itself is not an action that feeds independently into students’ on-campus socialization. Additionally, post-election shifts for the partisan student population are also null, again providing some confirmatory evidence of our expectation that incoming partisans are less susceptible to ethnosectarian party appeals. Full results for both of these tests can be found in Table A8 and Table A9 in the Supporting information section. In the following section, we discuss threats to validity and corresponding analyses.

Validity Checks

Respondent fatigue and satisficing

Critics of conjoint experiments have expressed skepticism that respondents can devote adequate energy to more than a handful of conjoint tasks. They propose that, beyond a certain number of conjoint tasks, respondents begin to provide responses that do not reflect their true preferences, thus resulting in inaccurate AMCE estimates. Despite these concerns, a recent study has demonstrated that respondents are capable of partaking in a large number of conjoint tasks before satisficing becomes a threat to inference (Bansak et al. 2018). With seven tasks in each wave, our survey falls well below this threshold. Additionally, we run our analysis of the entire respondent population across each wave with the inclusion of task order fixed effects, the significance of which are null. Finally, we include task order fixed effects in our difference-in-differences analysis of the non-partisan voter population, for both in-group and March coalition support. Our key findings remain unchanged: full results can be found in Table A10 and Table A11 in the Supporting information section.

Contamination between religion and party coalition

Another concern is that respondents might suspect a connection between two or more attributes. Specifically, some respondents might suspect a connection between religion (sect) and March coalition. The concern is that the respondent may react to particular March coalition not because she supports that coalition, but because that coalition is tied to a particular religious sect. March 8 is often perceived as a Shia coalition due to its affiliation with Lebanon’s two major Shia parties. March 14 is often perceived as a Sunni coalition for analogous reasons. Preferences for these coalitions might therefore be a product of perceived coalition linkages to sect.

Despite these common caricatures, in practice, these coalitions are cross-sectarian. For example, March 14 includes Shia candidates and March 8 includes Sunni candidates. In the electoral context, these candidates are unlikely to disorient respondents. The inclusion of a Shia-March 14 or Sunni-March 8 candidate in our conjoint task, therefore, likely did not cause any confusion. To address this concern, we also limited our analysis in the pre-election wave to those observations that were not presented with a possible “contaminated,” or “most-likely,” pair (Shia-March 8 or Sunni-March 14). These represent about 10 percent of all candidates seen by respondents, or 20 percent of all observations (i.e. tasks). Our results hold when these pairings are eliminated, and the magnitudes of both in-group favoritism and March coalition support remain unchanged (see Table A12 in the Supporting information section).

A similar concern is that observed increases in support for March coalition candidates are a result of March coalition status interacting with increased in-group support. In other words, the concern is that March coalition status is only preferred when the affiliation is paired with an in-group candidate. To address this concern, we ran a difference-in-differences analysis for non-partisan voters using only those observations where no in-group candidate profile was presented to the respondent (roughly 69 percent of observations). Our findings regarding positive changes in March coalition support hold and remain similar in magnitude (see Table A13 in the Supporting information section).

Discussion

Can student elections help explain the persistence of partisanship?

We assert that participation in the AUB student election leads one key sub-group of students, non-partisan voters, to favor in-group and mainstream party candidates relative to pre-election attitudes measured just two weeks prior. Our experimental research design, however, has clear limitations that we address in this section. We identify two questions about external validity that are relevant to our paper. First, to what extent do the causal effects we uncover plausibly explain the persistence of partisanship beyond AUB in contemporary Lebanon? And second, to what extent does the politicization of campus politics we

observe occur in other contexts beyond Lebanon?

We preface answering the former question by emphasizing that the causal effects of participation we identify are sizable and observed over only a period of 12 days. That being said, the experiment was only an abstract representation of the electoral decision. In reality, a limitless number of factors guide preferences for candidates. Although we can confidently assert that the effects identified in our analysis are causal, the conjoint flattens much of the complexity and volatility of a real-world election. Looking beyond our experiment, our data allow us to make causal inferences about neither the individual-level persistence of these effects over time, nor why national political factions continue to win elections by large margins in Lebanon. In the remainder of this section, however, we present additional descriptive evidence to strengthen the within-case validity of our findings.

First, although we are cautious in generalizing our findings to other universities in Lebanon, AUB is unexceptional with respect to electoral competitiveness and degree of political party intervention. Many universities throughout Lebanon hold similar elections. Shortly after the AUB election, a coalition of March 14-backed student groups was victorious at Saint Joseph (USJ), where over two-thirds of the student body voted. Each year, similar elections with high turnout are held at Notre Dame University (NDU), Lebanese University, Holy Spirit University of Kaslik (USEK), and most others. In many ways, AUB provides a hard test of our theory: it is one of only a small number of private, non-sectarian universities in the country, with a student population broadly representative of the national population in terms of ethnosectarian composition. As such, we might expect student elections at AUB to be less polarized along ethnosectarian lines than at other universities less committed to a reputation of secularism.

Second, we cannot claim that the shifts we observe are lasting. Future panel studies that track the stability of respondent preferences over longer periods of time could mitigate these threats to external validity. But studies that do not take a snapshot of these preferences in the shorter-term aftermath of an election risk confounding the effect of the election itself with other intervening political developments. The introduction of a third panel (or more) to our study would pose additional challenges by heightening the risk of effects being confounded by political events or conditions not directly related to student politics. We present two additional sets of observational data in an effort to gain some analytical leverage in this regard.

If campus life plays as formative a role in changing student preferences as we have argued, we should expect Lebanese citizens with a university education to be more partisan than their peers and more likely to support the influence of religion in public and political life. To evaluate this hypothesis, we analyze data from the third wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted from 2012-2014 in twelve Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon. We subset individuals with a bachelor's degree or higher from the rest of the population. We then look at the average level of high or moderate support for several statements related to the relationship between religion and politics. Consistent with our findings, we find that respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher are less likely to agree that 1) religious leaders should not

interfere with voter decisions during elections, 2) religious practices should be purely private and separated from political life, 3) religious associations should not interfere in elections, and 4) mosques and churches should not be sites of political campaigning. Descriptive data can be found in Table A14 in the Supporting information section.

Next, recall that our hypothetical conjoint profiles were presented in the context of an actual upcoming election, which was held in May 2018. Both the conduct and actual results of the election lend support to our findings. Survey data linking educational attainment to vote choice in this election is unavailable. But we do know, generally, that mainstream political parties performed very well. Nearly 50% of eligible voters participated in the election. Out of 128 seats, only one seat was won by an independent candidate unaffiliated with a major national political party or faction. Kollouna Watani, Lebanon's premier anti-sectarian, civil political coalition, contested seats in 9 out of 15 electoral districts. Among these 9 districts, Kollouna Watani received less than 4% of the popular vote. As has been the case since 2005, mainstream political coalitions have dominated national elections. Though not exclusively a consequence of political party intervention on university campuses, these campuses serve as powerful forces that generate interest in ethnosectarian political parties for years to come.

Looking beyond Lebanon, to what extent can the causal effects revealed above help explain the reasons behind education's blunted effect on positive political attitudes in the developing world? Comparing AUB to other universities can be challenging. In the following paragraphs, we discuss external validity in a discussion of campus experiences in other contexts. The low attrition rate, large sample size (over 5% of the AUB student population), and representativeness of our sample support the internal validity of our findings. Yet is the experience of AUB representative of other campuses in the Middle East and North Africa and elsewhere in the developing world?

As we discuss above, the expansion of education and evolution of universities from elite to mass institutions were deeply partisan processes across the Global South. Partisan competition within these institutions led campuses to become sites of contention between party agents and future recruits, not between the state and anti-state revolutionary activists. Indeed, in much of the developing world, student elections are politicized, often due to the continued interference of national political parties and factions. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, for example, partisan student elections are the norm. In Kuwait, Islamist, pro-government and liberal factions at the national level liaise with student leaders at Kuwait University and the Gulf University for Science and Technology during annual student elections ([Rabbani 2008](#)). Participation in these elections and membership in student unions is considered a benchmark for a future career in politics. Fatah and Hamas contest student elections at universities in Palestine, often drawing as many as 75% of students to the polls. Before 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood and liberals competed in student elections in Egypt ([Utvik 2005](#); [Kohstall 2015](#)). In the 1990s, the Jordanian government attempted to counter Islamist electoral successes at the University of Jordan ([Schwedler 2003](#)). Similarly contentious student elections have been held in Algeria and Morocco.

Methodological contribution and avenues for future research

To our knowledge, this paper is the first to combine a choice-based conjoint experiment with a difference-in-differences approach to measure preference changes as a result of a political event. Separately, each method has its advantages and drawbacks. Conjoint experiments allow researchers to causally identify the effect of sensitive traits, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, on respondents' preferences without directly inquiring about these characteristics. Yet conjoint experiments, like other types of survey experiments, are sensitive to design features, such as attribute ordering and word choice. Interpreting results from a single conjoint experiment, therefore, requires taking into account precisely how the attributes were interpreted by respondents. Moreover, a single conjoint experiment provides little leverage for understanding changes in preferences over time as a result of non-experimental interventions.

A difference-in-differences approach, by contrast, is often used to causally identify the effect of a key event, such as a policy change, on a certain “treated” population, in comparison to an unaffected “control” group. Such an approach can help researchers gain causal leverage in the absence of purely experimental data. Yet this strategy is often subject to concerns that the “parallel trends” assumption has been violated, i.e. the assumption that absent treatment, both treated and control groups would have seen parallel trajectories. It is precisely because one group was subject to a treatment the other was not that raises concerns regarding endogeneity and, therefore, disparate trends along other politically relevant dimensions of the treated and control groups.

Combining conjoint methods with a difference-in-differences design ameliorates key weaknesses in each approach. Because we are measuring change between the conjoint results across two waves, any observed differences due solely to word choice or attribute order are theoretically “differenced out,” in the sense that we would not expect to see change as a result of a politically relevant event in this case. Additionally, because the treatment in both waves is experimental assignation to a particular set of conjoint attributes, we need not be concerned that the two groups being compared differ in some way. In other words, the parallel trends assumption is satisfied through the conjoint design. The result is that we are able to causally identify both the effect of particular attributes on respondent preferences, and the effect of a non-experimentally assigned event on changes in those preferences over time.

More work is needed on how higher education contributes to the political socialization of students in developing contexts. In order to precisely identify the effect of one particular event on student preferences, our study looks only at a roughly month-long time interval in the lives of university students. This strategy has clear limitations. Longer-term panel studies that track students before, during, and after their time at university would provide additional information about the key moments in which political preferences coalesce and evolve. Such studies might also include episodic experimental interventions, as ours does. Additionally, more multi-method and qualitative observation of how national-level political parties reproduce their power on university campuses is needed. How do parties penetrate the university sphere in cases like AUB, where such practices are officially banned? How

do party officials themselves perceive the stakes of these student elections? Qualitative and observational evidence from our survey, in addition to conversations with students and party activists, suggests more research is necessary to address these questions.

Finally, we maintain that our time-series conjoint approach has far-ranging potential to causally identify the effect of key events on changes in political preferences. Elections, policy shifts, and other non-experimental political interventions are often difficult to evaluate in a causal inference framework because they affect individuals differently based on a variety of endogenous characteristics. Separating individuals into “treatment” and “control” groups thereafter is thus an often problematic, if necessary way of evaluating the effect of major events on subsequent change. Our method addresses this issue by integrating an experimental component into the pre- and post-event waves of a panel survey aimed at assessing the evolution of preferences. This approach may allow researchers to produce findings that are not only well-identified, but also provide insight into determinants of longer-term political change.

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Supporting Information

The Supporting Information includes the following materials:

1. [Table A1](#): Summary statistics and sample comparisons
2. [Table A2](#): Campaign exposure by partisanship and voting
3. [Table A3](#): Complete pre-election conjoint results (wave 1)
4. [Table A4](#): Complete post-election conjoint results (wave 2)
5. [Table A5](#): Complete conjoint results using alternative in-group coding
6. [Table A6](#): Complete conjoint results using Likert scale candidate coding
7. [Table A7](#): Pre-election conjoint results by religious sect (wave 1)
8. [Table A8](#): DID election effects on in-group support, additional subgroups
9. [Table A9](#): DID election effects on March coalition support, additional subgroups
10. [Table A10](#): Complete conjoint results with task order fixed effects
11. [Table A11](#): DID election effects on in-group and March coalition support with task order fixed effects (non-partisans only)
12. [Table A12](#): Pre-election conjoint results without “contaminated” pairs (wave 1)
13. [Table A13](#): DID election effects on March coalition support (excluding in-group matches)
14. [Table A14](#): Attitudes towards religion and politics among Lebanese citizens
15. [Survey Instruments](#)

Table A1: Summary Statistics and Sample Comparisons

	AUB-CONJOINT (1)	AUB Students (2)	Lebanon (3)
Demographic			
<i>female</i>	0.610	0.52	0.498
<i>shia</i>	0.307	—	0.27
<i>sunni</i>	0.254	—	0.28
<i>maronite</i>	0.136	—	0.22
<i>orthodox</i>	0.059	—	0.07
<i>catholic</i>	0.037	—	0.05
<i>druze</i>	0.108	—	0.06
<i>other</i>	0.090	—	0.05
Academic			
<i>faculty-fas</i>	0.677	0.381	—
<i>faculty-fea</i>	0.079	0.317	—
<i>faculty-osb</i>	0.024	0.142	—
<i>faculty-fm/hson</i>	0.097	0.069	—
<i>faculty-fafs</i>	0.076	0.056	—
<i>faculty-fhs</i>	0.048	0.035	—
<i>freshman</i>	0.127	0.188	—
<i>sophomore</i>	0.640	0.362	—
<i>junior</i>	0.187	0.255	—
<i>senior</i>	0.030	0.195	—
Key variables			
<i>voted</i>	0.677	0.623	—
<i>partisans</i>	0.399	—	—
<i>Year</i>	2017	2017	—
<i>N</i>	331	—	—

Note: Table compares means for demographic, academic, and key covariates across the AUB-CONJOINT sample, the population of students at AUB, and national statistics. The composition of the AUB-CONJOINT sample proves loosely comparable to that of the AUB population as a whole. AUB data taken from [AUB 2017a](#); sect demographics taken from [IFES 2011](#).

Table A2: Campaign exposure by partisanship and voting

	All	Voters	Non-voters	Partisan voters	Non-partisan voters	Non-partisan non-voters
<i>voted</i>	0.68	1	0	1	1	0
<i>stand-interaction</i>	0.45	0.45	0.43	0.52	0.41	0.50
<i>attended-debate</i>	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.23	0.13	0.21
<i>e-contact</i>	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.86	0.85
<i>personal-contact</i>	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.92
<i>attended-results</i>	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.39	0.20	0.38
<i>friend-persuade</i>	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.72	0.65	0.72
<i>volunteer</i>	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.26	0.13	0.25
<i>clientelism</i>	0.30	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.27	0.33

Note: Numbers represent means for each sub-group; variables have been scaled from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. See “Survey instruments” in the Supporting information section for more information.

Table A3: Complete pre-election conjoint results (wave 1)

	Candidate Choice				
	All	Voters	Non-voters	Partisans	Non-partisans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.444*** (0.022)	0.467*** (0.027)	0.393*** (0.038)	0.428*** (0.034)	0.453*** (0.028)
In-Group	0.182*** (0.019)	0.193*** (0.023)	0.161*** (0.034)	0.258*** (0.028)	0.119*** (0.026)
March 14	-0.118*** (0.018)	-0.123*** (0.021)	-0.105*** (0.031)	-0.099*** (0.028)	-0.128*** (0.023)
March 8	-0.131*** (0.018)	-0.139*** (0.021)	-0.115*** (0.031)	-0.073*** (0.028)	-0.169*** (0.023)
Business Family	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.043** (0.021)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.046** (0.023)
Political Family	-0.060*** (0.018)	-0.080*** (0.021)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.063** (0.028)	-0.059*** (0.023)
Master's Degree	0.124*** (0.014)	0.125*** (0.017)	0.123*** (0.025)	0.118*** (0.023)	0.131*** (0.019)
Engineer	0.030 (0.021)	0.025 (0.025)	0.044 (0.036)	0.0001 (0.032)	0.050* (0.027)
Lawyer	0.129*** (0.020)	0.113*** (0.025)	0.160*** (0.036)	0.117*** (0.033)	0.137*** (0.026)
NGO Manager	0.154*** (0.020)	0.149*** (0.025)	0.163*** (0.037)	0.094*** (0.033)	0.193*** (0.026)
Observations	4,522	3,054	1,468	1,806	2,716

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A4: Complete post-election conjoint results (wave 2)

	Candidate Choice				
	All	Voters	Non-voters	Partisans	Non-partisans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.445*** (0.022)	0.425*** (0.027)	0.493*** (0.038)	0.441*** (0.035)	0.443*** (0.029)
In-Group	0.180*** (0.020)	0.190*** (0.024)	0.162*** (0.037)	0.182*** (0.032)	0.178*** (0.026)
March 14	-0.094*** (0.018)	-0.090*** (0.022)	-0.104*** (0.032)	-0.134*** (0.029)	-0.059** (0.024)
March 8	-0.114*** (0.018)	-0.090*** (0.022)	-0.166*** (0.031)	-0.050* (0.029)	-0.147*** (0.023)
Business Family	0.008 (0.018)	0.008 (0.022)	0.009 (0.032)	0.037 (0.029)	-0.014 (0.023)
Political Family	-0.030* (0.018)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.086*** (0.032)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.040* (0.024)
Master's Degree	0.122*** (0.015)	0.107*** (0.018)	0.156*** (0.026)	0.096*** (0.024)	0.141*** (0.019)
Engineer	-0.002 (0.020)	0.005 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.033)	-0.004 (0.026)
Lawyer	0.093*** (0.020)	0.089*** (0.025)	0.096*** (0.036)	0.103*** (0.033)	0.094*** (0.026)
NGO Manager	0.088*** (0.021)	0.101*** (0.026)	0.057 (0.037)	0.074** (0.033)	0.099*** (0.028)
Observations	4,382	2,972	1,410	1,736	2,604

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A5: Complete conjoint results using alternative in-group coding

	Candidate choice	
	Pre-election	Post-election
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.449*** (0.022)	0.445*** (0.022)
In-Group	0.129*** (0.019)	0.154*** (0.020)
March 14	−0.116*** (0.018)	−0.092*** (0.018)
March 8	−0.130*** (0.018)	−0.109*** (0.018)
Business Family	−0.039** (0.018)	0.011 (0.018)
Political Family	−0.057*** (0.018)	−0.029 (0.018)
Master’s Degree	0.126*** (0.014)	0.121*** (0.015)
Engineer	0.033 (0.021)	−0.0003 (0.021)
Lawyer	0.130*** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.021)
NGO Manager	0.154*** (0.021)	0.088*** (0.021)
Observations	4,522	4,382

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents’ probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A6: Complete conjoint results using Likert scale
candidate coding

	Candidate rating	
	Pre-election	Post-election
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	1.366*** (0.020)	1.360*** (0.020)
In-Group	0.177*** (0.017)	0.129*** (0.019)
March 14	−0.081*** (0.016)	−0.085*** (0.017)
March 8	−0.070*** (0.016)	−0.056*** (0.017)
Business Family	−0.016 (0.016)	−0.018 (0.017)
Political Family	−0.055*** (0.017)	−0.025 (0.017)
Master's Degree	0.008 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)
Engineer	0.010 (0.020)	−0.035* (0.019)
Lawyer	0.048** (0.019)	−0.001 (0.019)
NGO Manager	0.049** (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)
Observations	4,522	4,382
Log Likelihood	−9,032.748	−8,661.653
Akaike Inf. Crit.	18,085.490	17,343.310

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A7: Pre-election conjoint results by religious sect (wave 1)

	Candidate choice			
	Christian (1)	Shia (2)	Sunni (3)	Druze (4)
Intercept	0.413*** (0.044)	0.442*** (0.040)	0.465*** (0.044)	0.439*** (0.067)
In-Group	0.140*** (0.039)	0.175*** (0.032)	0.189*** (0.037)	0.260*** (0.050)
March 14	-0.117*** (0.035)	-0.190*** (0.031)	-0.007 (0.035)	-0.141*** (0.052)
March 8	-0.168*** (0.035)	-0.045 (0.032)	-0.144*** (0.035)	-0.246*** (0.052)
Business Fam	-0.011 (0.035)	-0.041 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.077 (0.050)
Political Fam	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.077** (0.035)	-0.111** (0.053)
Master's Degree	0.163*** (0.029)	0.152*** (0.026)	0.061** (0.029)	0.171*** (0.042)
Engineer	0.044 (0.041)	-0.002 (0.037)	0.007 (0.042)	0.075 (0.062)
Lawyer	0.138*** (0.041)	0.084** (0.037)	0.089** (0.041)	0.226*** (0.059)
NGO Manager	0.184*** (0.041)	0.124*** (0.037)	0.137*** (0.042)	0.152** (0.060)
Observations	1,134	1,400	1,148	490

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents' probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A8: DID election effects on in-group support, additional subgroups

	Candidate choice			
	Partisans	Non-voters	Partisan non-voters	Partisan voters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.416*** (0.096)	0.482*** (0.165)	0.389** (0.168)	0.422*** (0.120)
In-Group	0.284*** (0.029)	0.175*** (0.038)	0.270*** (0.054)	0.300*** (0.036)
Post-Election	0.027 (0.019)	0.044** (0.021)	0.106*** (0.036)	0.002 (0.023)
In-Group*Post-Election	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.011 (0.055)	-0.067 (0.083)	-0.116** (0.055)
Observations	3,444	2,788	1,074	2,370

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. All model specifications include individual-level fixed effects. Other conjoint attributes are included as controls in each model, but coefficients are not reported in the paper.

Table A9: DID election effects on March coalition support, additional subgroups

	Candidate choice			
	Partisans	Non-voters	Partisan non-voters	Partisan voters
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	0.420*** (0.100)	0.526*** (0.189)	0.407** (0.196)	0.427*** (0.119)
March Coalition	-0.067*** (0.026)	-0.120*** (0.030)	-0.050 (0.050)	-0.086*** (0.032)
Post-Election	0.023 (0.030)	0.045 (0.035)	0.129** (0.056)	-0.026 (0.036)
March*Post-Election	-0.028 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.043)	-0.061 (0.070)	0.002 (0.045)
Observations	3,444	2,788	1,074	2,370

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. All model specifications include individual-level fixed effects. Other conjoint attributes are included as controls in each model, but coefficients are not reported in the paper.

Table A10: Complete conjoint results with task order
fixed effects

	Candidate choice	
	Pre-election	Post-election
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	0.438*** (0.028)	0.449*** (0.028)
In-Group	0.182*** (0.019)	0.180*** (0.020)
March 14	−0.118*** (0.018)	−0.094*** (0.018)
March 8	−0.131*** (0.018)	−0.114*** (0.018)
Business Family	−0.039** (0.018)	0.009 (0.018)
Political Family	−0.059*** (0.018)	−0.030* (0.018)
Master’s Degree	0.124*** (0.014)	0.123*** (0.015)
Engineer	0.030 (0.021)	−0.002 (0.020)
Lawyer	0.129*** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.021)
NGO Manager	0.154*** (0.021)	0.089*** (0.021)
Observations	4,522	4,382

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents’ probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A11: DID election effects on in-group and March coalition support with task order fixed effects (non-partisans only)

	Candidate choice: Non-partisan voters	
	(1)	(2)
Constant	0.449*** (0.126)	0.496*** (0.126)
Post-Election	−0.012 (0.019)	−0.058** (0.029)
In-Group	0.126*** (0.033)	
In-Group*Post-Election	0.091** (0.046)	
March		−0.169*** (0.025)
March*Post-Election		0.092** (0.036)
Observations	3,494	3,494

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. All model specifications include individual-level fixed effects. Other conjoint attributes are included as controls in each model, but coefficients are not reported in the paper.

Table A12: Pre-election conjoint results without
“contaminated” pairs (wave 1)

	Candidate choice
Intercept	0.455*** (0.025)
In-Group	0.159*** (0.023)
March 14	−0.124*** (0.020)
March 8	−0.135*** (0.020)
Business Family	−0.039** (0.020)
Political Family	−0.063*** (0.020)
Master’s Degree	0.129*** (0.016)
Engineer	0.024 (0.023)
Lawyer	0.116*** (0.023)
NGO Manager	0.141*** (0.023)
Observations	3,566

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Each coefficient represents the estimated average marginal component effect (AMCE) of a candidate attribute on respondents’ probability of choosing a candidate with that attribute, compared to a candidate with the baseline attribute quality. All standard errors are robust.

Table A13: DID election effects on March coalition support
(excluding in-group matches)

	Candidate choice
Intercept	0.499*** (0.188)
March Coalition	−0.182*** (0.030)
Post-Election	−0.072** (0.035)
March Coalition*Post-Election	0.096** (0.043)
Observations	2,560

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. All model specifications include individual-level fixed effects. Other conjoint attributes are included as controls in each model, but coefficients are not reported in the paper.

Table A14: Attitudes towards religion and politics among Lebanese citizens

	University educated	Other	p-value
No relig. leaders in elections	0.671	0.745	0.021
Relig. leaders in office	0.011	0.025	0.076
Relig. leaders + political influence	0.021	0.027	0.573
Relig. practices separate	0.689	0.777	0.005
No relig. orgs + elections	0.611	0.711	0.002
No mosques/churchs + campaigning	0.696	0.772	0.015

Note: Numbers represent means (percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing) for Lebanese citizens with a university education or higher, and all other citizens in the sample. Variables have been scaled from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. Data taken from the third wave (2012-2014) of the Arab Barometer Survey. Respondents were asked: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” (I strongly agree; I agree; I disagree; I strongly disagree; I don’t know; declined to answer). The following six statements were used in the above analysis: Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections; Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state; Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions; Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and political life; Religious associations and institutions (excluding political parties) should not influence voters’ decisions in elections; Mosques and churches should not be used for election campaigning.

AUB Elections Survey: Wave 1

Questionnaire

Consent to Participate in an Online Research Study

This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study for Dr. Charles Harb at AUB. It is not an Official Message from AUB. You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Charles Harb, Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut, in conjunction with collaborators from Princeton University and Stanford University. Results from the study will be shared with collaborators at all three universities. The conduct of this study will adhere to the IRB approved protocol. The IRB approved method for approaching subjects is detailed in the "Interim Guidance for Access to the Psychology (101/201) Student Pool for Research." All students enrolled in PSYC-201 (approximately 400 students) are eligible to participate. The survey will be administered online, via Qualtrics. The purpose of the study is to assess participants' social and political preferences and participation in student clubs. Participants will be asked to participate in a second wave of this survey in October 2017.

Procedures

This message invites you to read the consent document and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.

1. Participation is completely voluntary.
2. Completing the questionnaire will take less than 30 minutes.
3. Only the data you provide in the questionnaire will be collected and analyzed. The research team will not have access to your name or contact details.
4. The results of the survey will be published in a research article available in printed form and electronically from AUB Libraries.

-- Page Break --

Potential Benefits to Subjects and Society

You will not receive payment for participation in this study. The results of the study will contribute to our understanding of student life at AUB.

Potential Risks to Subjects and Society

The risks of the study are minimal.

Confidentiality

The collected data will remain confidential. If the study is monitored or audited by the IRB, results will remain confidential. Results of the study will be stored online via Qualtrics. Records will be monitored and may be audited by the IRB while assuring confidentiality.

Participation and Withdrawal

If you voluntarily consent to take part in this study, you can change your mind and withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. Refusal to participate in this study will involve no loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. Alternatively, please consult your course instructor(s) if you wish to earn extra credit through writing brief reports on articles in psychology journals. If you choose to withdraw from the study at any point, your

submissions may still be included in the study. You may skip any question without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Questions about the Study

If you have any questions about the study, please contact the research team at charles.harb@aub.edu.lb.

Access to the Survey

After reading the consent document and having your questions answered, you may voluntarily agree to take part in the study.

Concerns or Questions about your Rights

If you have concerns about the study or questions about your rights as a participant, you can contact the AUB IRB Office at email-irb@aub.edu.lb, or via telephone at 01-350000 (5445).

-- Page Break --

Section 1: Demographic Information

Please note: you cannot click "back" or return to previous questions once you have clicked the "next" button at the bottom of each page. Please do not refresh your browser at any point during the survey.

q100. Gender:

<1> Female

<2> Male

q101. Are you a citizen of Lebanon? If you have a Lebanese passport, please click "Yes."

<1> Yes

<2> No

q102. Year of birth: **[Dropdown list]**

<1> 2004

<2> 2003

<3> 2002

<4> 2001

<5> 2000

<6> 1999

<7> 1998

<8> 1997

<9> 1996

<10> 1995

<11> 1994

<12> 1993

<13> 1992

<14> 1991

<15> 1990

<16> Before 1990

q103. Are you a:

<1> Part-time student

<2> Full-time student

<99> Other (Specify):

q103.other. **[If <99> in q103; Open-ended]**

q104. When did you graduate high school? **[Dropdown list]**

<1> 2017

<2> 2016

<3> 2015

<4> 2014

<5> 2013

<6> 2012

<7> 2011

<8> 2010

<9> 2009

<10> 2008

- <11> 2007
- <12> 2006
- <13> 2005
- <14> 2004
- <15> 2003
- <16> Before 2003

q105. Did you attend high school in Lebanon? If you attended high school abroad, please check "no" and write the name, city, and country of the school you attended.

- <1> Yes
- <2> No **[Skip Logic: Skip q106-q107]**

q105.other. **[If <2> in q105; Open-ended]**

-- Page Break --

q106. Which high school did you attend? Please provide as much information as possible. **[If <1> in q105; Open-ended]**

q106.school. Name of school:

q106.city. City or village:

q106.qadaa. Qada'a or area:

q107. In the years before high school (before the age of 14), how many years did you live in Lebanon? **[If <1> in q105; Open-ended; numerical value]**

Number of years:

q108. In the years before high school (before the age of 14), where did you spend a majority of your childhood? Please select from the list of places below, or select "Other" at the bottom and enter the name of the location on the following page. Please select "Other" and enter the location if you spent a majority of your childhood outside Lebanon. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Akkar
- <2> Aley
- <3> Baabda
- <4> Baalbek
- <5> Batroun
- <6> Beirut
- <7> Bint Jbeil
- <8> Bsharre
- <9> Chouf
- <10> Hasbaya
- <11> Hermel
- <12> Jbeil
- <13> Jezzine
- <14> Keserwan
- <15> Koura
- <16> Marjeyoun
- <17> Matn
- <18> Miniyeh-Danniyeh
- <19> Nabatiyeh

- <20> Rashaya
- <21> Saida/Sidon
- <22> Tripoli
- <23> Sur/Tyre
- <24> Western Beqaa
- <25> Zahle
- <26> Zgharta
- <99> Other (Specify on the next page):

-- Page Break --

q108.other. [If <99> in q108; Open-ended]

Please enter the name of the location:

-- Page Break --

q109. Did you live more than four years in a place different from the one you selected or listed previously? You may leave this question blank if it is not applicable. If yes, please select from the list of places below, or select "Other" at the bottom and enter the name of the location on the following page. For locations outside Lebanon, please select "Other" and enter the location on the following page. [Dropdown list]

- <1> Akkar
- <2> Aley
- <3> Baabda
- <4> Baalbek
- <5> Batroun
- <6> Beirut
- <7> Bint Jbeil
- <8> Bsharre
- <9> Chouf
- <10> Hasbaya
- <11> Hermel
- <12> Jbeil
- <13> Jezzine
- <14> Keserwan
- <15> Koura
- <16> Marjeyoun
- <17> Matn
- <18> Miniyeh-Danniyeh
- <19> Nabatiyeh
- <20> Rashaya
- <21> Saida/Sidon
- <22> Tripoli
- <23> Sur/Tyre
- <24> Western Beqaa
- <25> Zahle
- <26> Zgharta
- <99> Other (Specify on the next page):

-- Page Break --

q109.other. [If <99> in q109; Open-ended]

Please enter the name of the location:

-- Page Break --

q110. Class year:

- <1> Freshman
- <2> Sophomore
- <3> Junior
- <4> Senior
- <99> Other (Specify):

q110.other. [If <99> in q110; Open-ended]

q111. Faculty:

- <1> Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences (FAFS)
- <2> Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS)
- <3> Faculty of Health Sciences (FHS)
- <4> Faculty of Medicine (FM)
- <5> Rafic Hariri School of Nursing
- <6> Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture (FEA)
- <7> Suliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q111.other. [If <99> in q111; Open-ended]

q112. Intended major:

- <1> Agribusiness
- <2> Agriculture
- <3> Agricultural Economics
- <4> Animal Science
- <5> Anthropology
- <6> Applied Energy
- <7> Applied Math
- <8> Arab and Middle Eastern History
- <9> Arab and Middle Eastern Studies
- <10> Arabic Language and Literature
- <11> Archaeology
- <12> Architecture
- <13> Art History
- <14> Art History and Curating
- <15> Biochemistry
- <16> Biology
- <17> Biomedical Engineering
- <18> Biomedical Sciences
- <19> Business Administration
- <20> Cell and Molecular Biology
- <21> Chemical Engineering

<22> Chemistry
<23> Civil Engineering
<24> Clinical Psychology
<25> Computational Science
<26> Computer and Communications Engineering
<27> Computer Science
<28> Construction Engineering
<29> Economics
<30> Eco-system Management
<31> Education
<32> Education/Elementary
<33> Educational Management and Leadership Diplomas
<34> Electrical and Computer Engineering
<35> Energy Studies
<36> Engineering Management
<37> English Language
<38> English Literature
<39> Environmental and Water Resources Engineering
<40> Environmental Health
<41> Environmental Policy Planning
<42> Environmental Technology
<43> Epidemiology
<44> Executive Master of Business Administration
<45> Financial Economics
<46> Finance
<47> Food Science and Management
<48> Food Security
<49> Food Technology
<50> Geology
<51> Graphic Design
<52> History
<53> Human Morphology
<54> Human Resource Management
<55> Industrial Engineering
<56> Irrigation
<57> Islamic Studies
<58> Landscape Architecture
<59> Mathematics
<60> Mechanical Engineering
<61> Media and Communication
<62> Media Studies
<63> Medical Audiology Sciences
<64> Medical Imaging Sciences
<65> Medical Laboratory Sciences
<66> Medicine
<67> Microbiology and Immunology
<68> Neuroscience
<69> Nursing
<70> Nutrition

<71> Nutrition and Dietetics
 <72> Nutrition and Dietetics - Coordinated
 <73> Orthodontics
 <74> Petroleum Studies
 <75> Pharmacology and Therapeutics
 <76> Philosophy
 <77> Physics
 <78> Physiology
 <79> Plant Protection
 <80> Plant Science
 <81> Political Studies
 <82> Population Health
 <83> Poultry Science
 <84> Psychology
 <85> Public Administration
 <86> Public Health
 <87> Public Policy and International Affairs
 <88> Rural Community Development
 <89> SHARP
 <90> Sociology
 <91> Sociology-Anthropology
 <92> Statistics
 <93> Studio Arts
 <94> Special Education
 <95> Teaching Diploma
 <96> Theoretical Physics
 <97> Transnational American Studies
 <98> Urban Design
 <99> Urban Planning and Policy
 <998> Don't know
 <999> Other (Specify on the next page)

-- Page Break --

q112.other. [If <999> in q112; Open-ended]

Please enter the name of your intended major:

-- Page Break --

q113. Which of the following options best describes your father's employment status?

<1> Public sector employee
 <2> Private sector employee
 <3> Retired **[Skip Logic: Skip q114]**
 <4> Student **[Skip Logic: Skip q114]**
 <5> Unemployed (looking for work) **[Skip Logic: Skip q114]**
 <99> Other (Specify):

q113_99_TEXT. [If <99> in q113; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q114. What is your father's primary occupation at his work? If he has more than one job, answer with regard to his main, or primary, job.

- <1> Government or senior official
- <2> Business executive/manager, banker
- <3> Professional/technical (i.e., doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, lawyer, accountant, nurse)
- <4> Technician, associate professional (i.e., engineering technician, construction supervisor, medical/pharmaceutical technician; sales agent/broker)
- <5> Clerical (i.e., secretary, clerk, office manager)
- <6> Service (i.e., police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker)
- <7> Craft and related trade (i.e., bricklayer, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker, foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, electrician)
- <8> Farm or fishery worker (i.e., farm labourer, tractor driver, fisherman)
- <9> Farm or fishery owner or manager
- <10> Plant/machine operator, assembler, driver
- <11> Elementary employment (i.e., labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)
- <12> Armed forces (officer)
- <13> Armed forces (non-officer)
- <14> Seminary-trained cleric or theologian (imam, sheikh, priest, etc.)
- <15> Not working; homemaker (not working outside the home)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q114.other. [If <99> in q114; Open-ended]

q115. What was the highest grade of schooling or type of degree that your father received?

- <1> Illiterate/no formal education but read and write
- <2> Some/finished elementary
- <3> Some/finished intermediate
- <4> Some secondary (did not graduate high school)
- <5> Finished secondary (graduated high school)
- <6> Some university/college education without a degree
- <7> Achieved bachelor's degree
- <8> Achieved master's degree or PhD
- <9> Seminary or theological education
- <99> Other (Specify):

q115.other. [If <99> in q115; Open-ended]

q116. Where did your father spend a majority of his childhood (i.e., before the age of 18, or before he attended college)? Please select from the list of places below, or select "Other" at the bottom and enter the name of the location on the following page. Please select "Other" and enter the location if he spent a majority of his childhood outside Lebanon. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Akkar
- <2> Aley
- <3> Baabda
- <4> Baalbek
- <5> Batroun
- <6> Beirut

- <7> Bint Jbeil
- <8> Bsharre
- <9> Chouf
- <10> Hasbaya
- <11> Hermel
- <12> Jbeil
- <13> Jezzine
- <14> Keserwan
- <15> Koura
- <16> Marjeyoun
- <17> Matn
- <18> Miniyeh-Danniyeh
- <19> Nabatiyeh
- <20> Rashaya
- <21> Saida/Sidon
- <22> Tripoli
- <23> Sur/Tyre
- <24> Western Beqaa
- <25> Zahle
- <26> Zgharta
- <99> Other (Specify):

q116.other. [If <99> in q116; Open-ended]

Please enter the name of the location:

-- Page Break --

q117. Which of the following options best describes your mother's employment status?

- <1> Public sector employee
- <2> Private sector employee
- <3> Retired **[Skip Logic: Skip q118]**
- <4> Student **[Skip Logic: Skip q118]**
- <5> Unemployed (looking for work) **[Skip Logic: Skip q118]**
- <6> Stay-at-home mother; homemaker **[Skip Logic: Skip q118]**
- <99> Other (Specify):

q117.other. [If <99> in q117; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q118. What is your mother's primary occupation at her work? If she has more than one job, answer with regard to her main, or primary, job.

- <1> Government or senior official
- <2> Business executive/manager, banker
- <3> Professional/technical (i.e., doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, lawyer, accountant, nurse)
- <4> Technician, associate professional (i.e., engineering technician, construction supervisor, medical/pharmaceutical technician; sales agent/broker)
- <5> Clerical (i.e., secretary, clerk, office manager)
- <6> Service (i.e., police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker)

- <7> Craft and related trade (i.e., bricklayer, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker, foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, electrician)
- <8> Farm or fishery worker (i.e., farm labourer, tractor driver, fisherman)
- <9> Farm or fishery owner or manager
- <10> Plant/machine operator, assembler, driver
- <11> Elementary employment (i.e., labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)
- <12> Armed forces (officer)
- <13> Armed forces (non-officer)
- <14> Seminary-trained cleric or theologian (imam, sheikh, priest, etc.)
- <15> Not working; homemaker (not working outside the home)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q118.other. [If <99> in q118; Open-ended]

q119. What was the highest grade of schooling or type of degree that your mother received?

- <1> Illiterate/no formal education but read and write
- <2> Some/finished elementary
- <3> Some/finished intermediate
- <4> Some secondary (did not graduate high school)
- <5> Finished secondary (graduated high school)
- <6> Some university/college education without a degree
- <7> Achieved bachelor's degree
- <8> Achieved master's degree or PhD
- <9> Seminary or theological education
- <99> Other (Specify):

q119.other. [If <99> in q119; Open-ended]

q120. Where did your mother spend a majority of her childhood (i.e., before the age of 18, or before she attended college)? Please select from the list of places below, or select "Other" at the bottom and enter the name of the location on the following page. Please select "Other" and enter the location if she spent a majority of her childhood outside Lebanon. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Akkar
- <2> Aley
- <3> Baabda
- <4> Baalbek
- <5> Batroun
- <6> Beirut
- <7> Bint Jbeil
- <8> Bsharre
- <9> Chouf
- <10> Hasbaya
- <11> Hermel
- <12> Jbeil
- <13> Jezzine
- <14> Keserwan
- <15> Koura
- <16> Marjeyoun
- <17> Matn

- <18> Miniyeh-Danniyeh
- <19> Nabatiyeh
- <20> Rashaya
- <21> Saida/Sidon
- <22> Tripoli
- <23> Sur/Tyre
- <24> Western Beqaa
- <25> Zahle
- <26> Zgharta
- <99> Other (Specify):

q120_99_TEXT. [If <99> in q120; Open-ended]

Please enter the name of the location:

-- Page Break --

What percentage of this year's educational expenses (room, board, tuition, and fees) do you expect to cover from each of the sources listed below? Please list a percentage (0-100) for each possible source. The total sum should equal 100. **[Open-ended; numerical value]**

- q1211.** Family resources (i.e., parents, relatives, spouse)
- q1212.** My own resources (i.e., savings from work, work-study, other income)
- q1213.** Aid (i.e., grants, scholarships)
- q1214.** Bank or other loans
- q1215.** Other

Did you receive any of the following forms of financial aid? Please indicate "Yes," "No," or "Not sure" for each option.

- q1221.** Need-Based Grants (i.e., financial aid grants)
- q1222.** Scholarships (i.e., AUB Merit Scholarships, Lebanese Baccalaureate Merit Scholarships)
- q1223.** US Loans & GI Bill (i.e., US Federal Financial Aid, U.S. Direct Loans)
- q1224.** Need-Based Student Loans (i.e., Lebanese Educational Loan Program)
- q1225.** Work-Study Programs (WSP)

- <1> Yes
- <2> No
- <98> Not sure

-- Page Break --

[If <1> in q122#1_2; Open-ended]

q122.sch. Please tell us the name of the scholarship(s) you received.

-- Page Break --

q123. What is your best estimate of your family's monthly household income? Consider income from all sources.

- <1> Less than LBP 650,000 (less than \$433.33)
- <2> LBP 650,000 - LBP 1,200,000 (\$433.33-\$800)
- <3> LBP 1,200,000 - LBP 2,400,000 (\$800-\$1,600)
- <4> LBP 2,400,000 - LBP 3,600,000 (\$1,600-\$2,400)
- <5> LBP 3,600,000 - LBP 7,000,000 (\$2,400-\$4,666.66)

<6> LBP 7,000,000 - LBP 9,000,000 (\$4,666.66-\$6,000)

<7> LBP 9,000,000 - LBP 12,000,000 (\$6,000-\$8,000)

<8> LBP 12,000,000 or higher (\$8,000 or higher)

<98> Don't know

<99> Other (Specify):

q123.other. [If <99> in q123; Open-ended]

q124. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your family's household income?

<1> Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.

<2> Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.

<3> Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.

<4> Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.

q125. Do you have any concern about your ability to finance your college education?

<1> None (I am confident that I will have sufficient funds)

<2> Some (but I probably will have enough funds)

<3> Major (not sure I will have enough funds to complete college)

q126. How many individuals (including yourself) live with your family at your permanent residence?

<1> 1

<2> 2

<3> 3

<4> 4

<5> 5

<6> 6

<7> 7

<8> 8+

<98> Don't know

-- Page Break --

Section 2. Political Participation

q200. Now we will ask you a few questions about your participation in a variety of activities on campus. Do you consider yourself a member of any of the following non-political clubs? Please check all that apply, if any. The next question will ask if you are a member of any political clubs.

- <1> 180 Degrees Consulting
- <2> African Club
- <3> AIESEC
- <4> Arab Innovation Club
- <5> Archery Club
- <6> Astronomy Club
- <7> AUB Dorms
- <8> AUB Dot Net
- <9> AUB Plus
- <10> Camping & Hiking Club
- <11> Chabab Loubnan Club
- <12> Chess Club
- <13> Cine Club
- <14> Consulting Club
- <15> Cooking Club
- <16> Crossroads Club
- <17> Dabkeh Club
- <18> Drama Club
- <19> Entrepreneurship Club
- <20> Football Club
- <21> Gaming
- <22> Gender and Sexuality Club
- <23> H.O.P.E Club
- <24> Hip Hop Club
- <25> Human Rights and Peace Club
- <26> IAESTE Club
- <27> IEEE
- <28> International Affairs Club
- <29> Investment Club
- <30> Iraqi Cultural Club
- <31> Japanese Cultural Club
- <32> Jordanian Cultural Club
- <33> Jump Start Club
- <34> Junior Chamber International (JCI) Club
- <35> Korean Cultural Club
- <36> Latino Dance Club
- <37> Lebanese Armenian Heritage Club
- <38> Lebanese Food Bank Club
- <39> Lebanese Heritage Club
- <40> Live Love AUB
- <41> Martial Arts Club
- <42> MMKN Club
- <43> Music Club
- <44> Nature Club

- <45> Net Impact Club
- <46> Olympics Club
- <47> Online Collaborative Club
- <48> Organic Chemistry Club
- <49> Palestinian Cultural Club
- <50> Red Cross Club
- <51> RHS Club
- <52> Robotics Club
- <53> Rotaract Club
- <54> Scouts Club
- <55> SSEA
- <56> Syrian Cultural Club
- <57> Tedx Club
- <58> The Citizen Club
- <59> Toastmasters Club
- <60> U Change Club
- <61> UNICEF
- <62> USP Club
- <63> Women's Rights Club
- <64> Youth of the Order of Malta
- <99> Other (Specify):

q200.other. [If <99> in q200; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q201. Do you consider yourself a member of any of the following political clubs? Please check all that apply, if any.

- <1> Civic Welfare Club
- <2> Communication Club
- <3> Cultural Club of the South
- <4> Discovery Club
- <5> Freedom Club
- <6> Insight Club
- <7> Lebanese Mission Club
- <8> Red Oak Club
- <9> Secular Club
- <10> Social Club
- <11> Youth Club
- <99> Other (Specify):

q201.other. [If <99> in q201; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q202. For last year's AUB student elections held on October 18, 2016, which of the following statements best describes you:

- <1> I was not eligible to vote because I was not a student **[Skip Logic: Skip q203-q204]**
- <2> I did not vote in last year's AUB student elections **[Skip Logic: Skip q203-q204]**
- <3> I thought about voting that time, but did not **[Skip Logic: Skip q203-q204]**

<4> I usually vote, but did not that time **[Skip Logic: Skip q203-q204]**

<5> I did vote in last year's AUB student elections

<99> Other (Specify): **[Skip Logic: Skip q203-q204]**

q202.other. **[If <99> in q202; Open-ended]**

-- Page Break --

q203. If you can recall, which political group did you vote for?

<1> Campus Choice (Secular Club)

<2> De-Stress FHS

<3> FM United – Independent

<4> Lead the Change (Youth Club; Social Club)

<5> Lett-uce VOTE

<6> Nursing Campaign

<7> One Voice (Insight Club)

<8> OSB For Change

<9> Students for Change (Civic Welfare Club, Communication Club, Cultural Club of the South, Freedom Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

<10> Towards The Best

<99> Other (Specify):

q203.other. **[If <99> in q203; Open-ended]**

q204. Please tell us why you voted for this particular list (i.e., because your friend was a candidate, because you support the group's political orientation, or another reason). **[Open-ended]**

q205. Did you participate in last year's AUB student elections as a candidate? If so, please tell us about your candidacy and campaign. Did you run as an independent, or with a group? Did you win? *(If not, please skip this question)*. **[Open-ended]**

-- Page Break --

q206. Now we will ask you a few questions about political life in Lebanon. Some people are very interested in politics and some are not at all interested. In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?

<1> Very Interested

<2> Somewhat Interested

<3> Slightly Interested

<4> Not Interested

<98> Don't know

q207. Suppose there was a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent to which Lebanon is democratic, with 0 meaning that Lebanon is not democratic at all and 10 meaning that Lebanon is completely democratic. To what extent do you think Lebanon is democratic?

[<0>-<10> scale; with <98> "Don't know"]

q208. Suppose there was a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for Lebanon, with 0 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for Lebanon and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for Lebanon. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for Lebanon?

[<0>-<10> scale; with <98> “Don’t know”]

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please read each statement carefully. These statements are about democracies in general.

q2091. Under a democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak.

q2092. Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.

q2093. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.

q2094. A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.

q2095. The citizens in your country are not prepared for a democratic system.

q2096. Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.

<1> Strongly agree

<2> Agree

<3> Neither agree nor disagree

<4> Disagree

<5> Strongly disagree

<98> Don’t know

q210. To what extent do you follow political news in Lebanon?

<1> To a great extent

<2> To a medium extent

<3> To a limited extent

<4> I don’t follow political news at all

-- Page Break --

Do you use the following political news sources? How often?

q2111. Television

q2112. Newspaper

q2113. The radio

q2114. The internet

q2115. Social media (or other Internet/mobile applications)

<1> Daily

<2> A few times a week

<3> A few times a month

<4> Rarely

<5> Not at all

-- Page Break --

q212. As far as you know, approximately how many total representatives are in the Lebanese Parliament? [Open-ended with :20 timer; numerical value]

q212.timefirstclick. [in seconds]

q212.timelastclick. [in seconds]

q212.timepagesubmit. [in seconds]

q212.timeclickcount. [numerical value; number of clicks]

-- Page Break --

q213. Municipal elections were held last year, in May 2016. If you can recall, in what year was the most recent legislative election held (for Parliament)? **[Open-ended with :20 timer; numerical value]**

q213.timefirstclick. **[in seconds]**

q213.timelastclick. **[in seconds]**

q213.timepagesubmit. **[in seconds]**

q213.timeclickcount. **[numerical value; number of clicks]**

-- Page Break --

q214. Many people feel close to a particular national political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally support a different party. What about you? Is there a particular national political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties?

<1> Yes **[Skip Logic: Skip q215]**

<2> No

-- Page Break --

q215. Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?

<1> Yes

<2> No **[Skip Logic: Skip q216-q217]**

-- Page Break --

q216. Which party do you feel yourself closest to? **[If <1> in q214 or q215]**

<1> Amal

<2> Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

<3> Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramgavar)

<4> Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Tashnag)

<5> Democratic Left

<6> El Marada

<7> Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)

<8> Future Movement

<9> Hezbollah

<10> Islamic Group

<11> Kataeb Party

<12> Lebanese Democratic Party

<13> Lebanese Forces

<14> Majd

<15> National Liberal Party

<16> Progressive Socialist Party

<17> Social Democrat Hunchakian Party

<18> Solidarity Party

<19> Syrian Social Nationalist Party

<99> Other (Specify):

q216.other. **[If <99> in q216; Open-ended]**

q217. Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

<1> Very close

<2> Somewhat close

<3> Not very close

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [**<1>-<7> scale; with <98>**

"Don't know"; randomized order]

q2181. Hezbollah

q2182. Amal

q2183. Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)

q2184. Lebanese Forces (LF)

q2185. Future Movement

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [**<1>-<7> scale; with <98>**

"Don't know"; randomized order]

q2186. March 8 Alliance

q2187. March 14 Alliance

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [**<1>-<7> scale; with <98>**

"Don't know"; randomized order]

q2188. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)

q2189. Kataeb Party

q21810. Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)

q21811. Lebanese Communist Party

q21812. Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in Lebanon

-- Page Break --

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

q2191. I am proud to belong to my sect

q2192. My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect

q2193. Any decision must take into account the interests of my sect

q2194. My affiliation with my sect is very strong

q2195. I would feel most comfortable marrying someone from my sect.

q2196. I would feel most comfortable working in a professional environment where most people are from my sect.

q2197. My sect should receive a larger share of public or administrative jobs in Lebanon.

q2198. My sect should receive a larger share of private sector jobs in Lebanon.

<1> Strongly agree

<2> Agree

<3> Neither agree nor disagree

<4> Disagree

<5> Strongly disagree

<98> Don't Know

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

q2201. Religion gives me a great amount of security in life.

q2202. I consider myself a religious person.

q2203. My religion influences the way I choose to act in my routine life.

q2204. I feel there are many more important things in life than religion.

q2205. Religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.

<1> Strongly agree

<2> Agree

<3> Neither agree nor disagree

<4> Disagree

<5> Strongly disagree

<98> Don't Know

-- Page Break --

To what extent is your identity defined by your belonging to:

q2211. Self

q2212. Family

q2213. Friends

q2214. Political party

q2215. Region/geography

q2216. Sect/religion

q2217. Lebanon

q2218. Arab World

q2219. Islamic Umma

q22110. Humanity

<1> Not at all

<2> To a limited extent

<3> To some extent

<4> To a large extent

<5> To a very large extent

To what extent are you concerned with the welfare of the following groups?

q2221. Self

q2222. Family

q2223. Friends

q2224. Political party

q2225. Region/geography

q2226. Sect/religion

q2227. Lebanon

q2228. Arab World

q2229. Islamic Umma

q22210. Humanity

<1> Not at all

<2> To a limited extent

<3> To some extent

<4> To a large extent

<5> To a very large extent

Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past year, did you:

q2231. Attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition

q2232. Participate in a protest, march or sit-in

q2233. Help raise money for a cause or campaign

q2234. Discuss politics with your friends

q2235. Discuss religion with your friends

q2236. Socialize with someone from a different sect

<1> Never

<2> Once

<3> More than once

Section 3. Candidate Profiles
Conjoint Experiment (CA01-CA07)

Please do not refresh this page.

Legislative elections are currently scheduled to take place next year, in May 2018. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to act as if you are about to cast a vote for the candidate that will represent you in the Lebanese Parliament. We will describe several pairs of candidates running for election to Parliament in the following pages.

For each pair of candidates, please indicate your attitudes toward each candidate and which one you would prefer to represent you. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you prefer.

Attributes	Values
Political Affiliation	March 8 March 14 Independent Civil Society
Religion	Sunni Muslim Shia Muslim Maronite Christian Orthodox Christian Druze Armenian Christian
Education	Bachelor's Degree Master's Degree
Family history	Son of a prominent politician Son of a prominent businessman No prominent immediate family background
Occupation	Lawyer Businessman Engineer NGO Manager

q310-370. Which of these candidates would you be more likely to support for Parliament?

<1> Candidate 1

<2> Candidate 2

q311-371. Why do you prefer this candidate? Please answer in a few sentences. **[Open-ended]**

q312-372. If you had to make a prediction, which candidate do you think will win the election?

<1> Candidate 1

<2> Candidate 2

q313-373. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place:

Candidate 1

q314-374. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place:

Candidate 2

Section 4. Election Participation

q400. We'd like to know whether or not you plan to vote in the upcoming AUB student election on October 13, 2017. A rating of 1 means that you will definitely not vote in the upcoming election. A rating of 5 means that will definitely vote in the upcoming election. A rating of 3 indicates that you are not sure whether or not you will vote in the election. ." [**1**]-[**5**] **scale**]

-- Page Break --

Section 5. Sectarian Affiliation

q500. Please identify your *official* sect. If "Other," please specify on the following page. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Alawite
- <2> Armenian Catholic Christian
- <3> Armenian Orthodox Christian
- <4> Catholic Christian
- <5> Druze
- <6> Orthodox Christian
- <7> Maronite Christian
- <8> Sunni Muslim
- <9> Shia Muslim
- <10> Other Christian Minority
- <99> Other (Specify):

-- Page Break --

q500.other. **[If <99> in q500; Open-ended]**

Please identify which religion you officially belong to:

-- Page Break --

q501. Please identify your father's *official* sect. If "Other," please specify on the following page. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Alawite
- <2> Armenian Catholic Christian
- <3> Armenian Orthodox Christian
- <4> Catholic Christian
- <5> Druze
- <6> Orthodox Christian
- <7> Maronite Christian
- <8> Sunni Muslim
- <9> Shia Muslim
- <10> Other Christian Minority
- <99> Other (Specify):

-- Page Break --

q501.other. **[If <99> in q501; Open-ended]**

Please identify which religion your father officially belongs to:

-- Page Break --

q502. Please identify your mother's *official* sect. If "Other," please specify on the following page. **[Dropdown list]**

- <1> Alawite
- <2> Armenian Catholic Christian
- <3> Armenian Orthodox Christian
- <4> Catholic Christian
- <5> Druze
- <6> Orthodox Christian

<7> Maronite Christian
<8> Sunni Muslim
<9> Shia Muslim
<10> Other Christian Minority
<99> Other (Specify):

-- Page Break --

q502.other. [If <99> in q502; Open-ended]

Please identify which religion your mother officially belongs to:

Qualtrics data

uniquecode. [Respondent identifier, Wave 1 and Wave 2]

start. [Start date and time]

end. [End date and time]

progress. [Percent of survey completed]

duration. [Seconds]

finished. [<1> if finished, <0> if partial]

recorddate. [Record date and time]

responseid. [Qualtrics ID]

AUB Elections Survey: Wave 2

Questionnaire

Study 2: Introduction

This notice is for an AUB-IRB Approved Research Study for Dr. Charles Harb at AUB. It is not an Official Message from AUB. You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Charles Harb, Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut, in conjunction with collaborators from Princeton University and Stanford University. Results from the study will be shared with collaborators at all three universities. The conduct of this study will adhere to the IRB approved protocol. The IRB approved method for approaching subjects is detailed in the “Interim Guidance for Access to the Psychology (101/201) Student Pool for Research.” All students enrolled in PSYC-201 (approximately 400 students) are eligible to participate. The survey will be administered online, via Qualtrics. The purpose of the study is to assess participants’ social and political preferences. We are interested in your participation in last week's AUB student elections.

Procedures

This message invites you to read the consent document and consider whether you want to be involved in the study.

1. Participation is completely voluntary.
2. Completing the questionnaire will take less than 30 minutes.
3. Only the data you provide in the questionnaire will be collected and analyzed. The research team will not have access to your name or contact details.
4. The results of the survey will be published in a research article available in printed form and electronically from AUB Libraries.

-- Page Break --

Potential Benefits to Subjects and Society

You will not receive payment for participation in this study. The results of the study will contribute to our understanding of student life at AUB.

Potential Risks to Subjects and Society

The risks of the study are minimal.

Confidentiality

The collected data will remain confidential. If the study is monitored or audited by the IRB, results will remain confidential. Results of the study will be stored online via Qualtrics. Records will be monitored and may be audited by the IRB while assuring confidentiality.

Participation and Withdrawal

If you voluntarily consent to take part in this study, you can change your mind and withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. Refusal to participate in this study will involve no loss of benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. Alternatively, please consult your course instructor(s) if you wish to earn extra credit through writing brief reports on articles in psychology journals. If you choose to withdraw from the study at any point, your submissions may still be included in the study. You may skip any question without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

Questions about the Study

If you have any questions about the study, please contact the research team at charles.harb@aub.edu.lb.

Access to the Survey

After reading the consent document and having your questions answered, you may voluntarily agree to take part in the study.

Concerns or Questions about your Rights

If you have concerns about the study or questions about your rights as a participant, you can contact the AUB IRB Office at email-irb@aub.edu.lb, or via telephone at 01-350000 (5445).

-- Page Break --

Section 6. Political Participation

Please note: you cannot click "back" or return to previous questions once you have clicked the "next" button at the bottom of each page. Please do not refresh your browser at any point during the survey.

q600. Do you consider yourself a member of any of the following non-political clubs? Please check all that apply, if any. The next question will ask if you are a member of any political clubs.

- <1> 180 Degrees Consulting
- <2> African Club
- <3> AIESEC
- <4> Arab Innovation Club
- <5> Archery Club
- <6> Astronomy Club
- <7> AUB Dorms
- <8> AUB Dot Net
- <9> AUB Plus
- <10> Camping & Hiking Club
- <11> Chabab Loubnan Club
- <12> Chess Club
- <13> Cine Club
- <14> Consulting Club
- <15> Cooking Club
- <16> Crossroads Club
- <17> Dabkeh Club
- <18> Drama Club
- <19> Entrepreneurship Club
- <20> Football Club
- <21> Gaming
- <22> Gender and Sexuality Club
- <23> H.O.P.E Club
- <24> Hip Hop Club
- <25> Human Rights and Peace Club
- <26> IAESTE Club
- <27> IEEE
- <28> International Affairs Club
- <29> Investment Club
- <30> Iraqi Cultural Club
- <31> Japanese Cultural Club
- <32> Jordanian Cultural Club
- <33> Jump Start Club
- <34> Junior Chamber International (JCI) Club
- <35> Korean Cultural Club
- <36> Latino Dance Club
- <37> Lebanese Armenian Heritage Club
- <38> Lebanese Food Bank Club
- <39> Lebanese Heritage Club
- <40> Live Love AUB
- <41> Martial Arts Club
- <42> MMKN Club

- <43> Music Club
- <44> Nature Club
- <45> Net Impact Club
- <46> Olympics Club
- <47> Online Collaborative Club
- <48> Organic Chemistry Club
- <49> Palestinian Cultural Club
- <50> Red Cross Club
- <51> RHS Club
- <52> Robotics Club
- <53> Rotaract Club
- <54> Scouts Club
- <55> SSEA
- <56> Syrian Cultural Club
- <57> Tedx Club
- <58> The Citizen Club
- <59> Toastmasters Club
- <60> U Change Club
- <61> UNICEF
- <62> USP Club
- <63> Women's Rights Club
- <64> Youth of the Order of Malta
- <99> Other (Specify):

q600.other. [If <99> in q600; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q601. Do you consider yourself a member of any of the following political clubs? Please check all that apply, if any.

- <1> Civic Welfare Club
- <2> Communication Club
- <3> Cultural Club of the South
- <4> Discovery Club
- <5> Freedom Club
- <6> Insight Club
- <7> Lebanese Mission Club
- <8> Red Oak Club
- <9> Secular Club
- <10> Social Club
- <11> Youth Club
- <99> Other (Specify):

q601.other. [If <99> in q601; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q602. Now we will ask you a few questions about political life in Lebanon. Some people are very interested in politics and some are not at all interested. In general, to what extent are you interested in politics?

- <1> Very Interested

- <2> Somewhat Interested
- <3> Slightly Interested
- <4> Not Interested
- <98> Don't know

q603. Suppose there was a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent to which Lebanon is democratic, with 0 meaning that Lebanon is not democratic at all and 10 meaning that Lebanon is completely democratic. To what extent do you think Lebanon is democratic?

[<0>-<10> scale; with <98> "Don't know"]

q604. Suppose there was a scale from 0-10 measuring the extent to which democracy is suitable for Lebanon, with 0 meaning that democracy is absolutely inappropriate for Lebanon and 10 meaning that democracy is completely appropriate for Lebanon. To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for Lebanon?

[<0>-<10> scale; with <98> "Don't know"]

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please read each statement carefully. These statements are about democracies in general.

q6051. Under a democratic system, the country's economic performance is weak.

q6052. Democratic regimes are indecisive and full of problems.

q6053. Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and stability.

q6054. A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.

q6055. The citizens in your country are not prepared for a democratic system.

q6056. Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.

- <1> Strongly agree
- <2> Agree
- <3> Neither agree nor disagree
- <4> Disagree
- <5> Strongly disagree
- <98> Don't know

-- Page Break --

q606. Many people feel close to a particular national political party over a long period of time, although they may occasionally support a different party. What about you? Is there a particular national political party that you feel closer to than all the other parties?

- <1> Yes [Skip Logic: Skip q607]
- <2> No

-- Page Break --

q607. Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?

- <1> Yes
- <2> No [Skip Logic: Skip q608-q609]

-- Page Break --

q608. Which party do you feel yourself closest to? [If <1> in q606 or q607]

- <1> Amal
- <2> Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party

- <3> Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramgavar)
- <4> Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Tashnag)
- <5> Democratic Left
- <6> El Marada
- <7> Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
- <8> Future Movement
- <9> Hezbollah
- <10> Islamic Group
- <11> Kataeb Party
- <12> Lebanese Democratic Party
- <13> Lebanese Forces
- <14> Majd
- <15> National Liberal Party
- <16> Progressive Socialist Party
- <17> Social Democrat Hunchakian Party
- <18> Solidarity Party
- <19> Syrian Social Nationalist Party
- <99> Other (Specify):

q608.other. [If <99> in q608; Open-ended]

q609. Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?

- <1> Very close
- <2> Somewhat close
- <3> Not very close

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [<1>-<7> scale; with <98>

"Don't know"; randomized order]

- q6101. Hezbollah
- q6102. Amal
- q6103. Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)
- q6104. Lebanese Forces (LF)
- q6105. Future Movement

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [<1>-<7> scale; with <98>

"Don't know"; randomized order]

- q6106. March 8 Alliance
- q6107. March 14 Alliance

-- Page Break --

We'd like to know your feelings toward some other political parties and groups in Lebanon. Ratings between 5 and 7 mean that you like the party or group. Ratings between 1 and 3 mean that you do not like the party or group. You would rate the party or group a 4 if you do not particularly like or dislike the party or group. You will need to move the slider for each option, even if you would like to rank the party or group a "1." [**<1>-<7> scale; with <98>**]

“Don't know”; randomized order]

q6108. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)

q6109. Kataeb Party

q61010. Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)

q61011. Lebanese Communist Party

q61012. Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in Lebanon

-- Page Break --

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

q6111. I am proud to belong to my sect

q6112. My sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect

q6113. Any decision must take into account the interests of my sect

q6114. My affiliation with my sect is very strong

q6115. I would feel most comfortable marrying someone from my sect.

q6116. I would feel most comfortable working in a professional environment where most people are from my sect.

q6117. My sect should receive a larger share of public or administrative jobs in Lebanon.

q6118. My sect should receive a larger share of private sector jobs in Lebanon.

<1> Strongly agree

<2> Agree

<3> Neither agree nor disagree

<4> Disagree

<5> Strongly disagree

<98> Don't Know

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements:

q6121. Religion gives me a great amount of security in life.

q6122. I consider myself a religious person.

q6123. My religion influences the way I choose to act in my routine life.

q6124. I feel there are many more important things in life than religion.

q6125. Religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.

<1> Strongly agree

<2> Agree

<3> Neither agree nor disagree

<4> Disagree

<5> Strongly disagree

<98> Don't Know

-- Page Break --

To what extent is your identity defined by your belonging to:

q6131. Self

q6132. Family

- q6133. Friends
- q6134. Political party
- q6135. Region/geography
- q6136. Sect/religion
- q6137. Lebanon
- q6138. Arab World
- q6139. Islamic Umma
- q61310. Humanity

- <1> Not at all
- <2> To a limited extent
- <3> To some extent
- <4> To a large extent
- <5> To a very large extent

To what extent are you concerned with the welfare of the following groups?

- q6141. Self
- q6142. Family
- q6143. Friends
- q6144. Political party
- q6145. Region/geography
- q6146. Sect/religion
- q6147. Lebanon
- q6148. Arab World
- q6149. Islamic Umma
- q61410. Humanity

- <1> Not at all
- <2> To a limited extent
- <3> To some extent
- <4> To a large extent
- <5> To a very large extent

Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part in. During the past year, did you:

- q6151. Attend a meeting to discuss a subject or sign a petition
- q6152. Participate in a protest, march or sit-in
- q6153. Help raise money for a cause or campaign
- q6154. Discuss politics with your friends
- q6155. Discuss religion with your friends
- q6156. Socialize with someone from a different sect

- <1> Never
- <2> Once
- <3> More than once

Section 7. AUB Post-Election Module

q700. Now we'd like to ask you a few questions about your participation in last week's SRC/USFC student elections, held at AUB on Friday, October 13, 2017. Please tell us which faculty you are in:

- <1> Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences (FAFS)
- <2> Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS)

- <3> Faculty of Health Sciences (FHS)
- <4> Faculty of Medicine (FM)
- <5> Rafic Hariri School of Nursing (HSON)
- <6> Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture (FEA)
- <7> Suliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB)

q701. How closely would you say you followed the AUB student elections held on Friday, October 13, 2017?

- <1> Very closely
- <2> Fairly closely
- <3> Not very closely
- <4> Not closely at all

-- Page Break --

This year, elections for both the Student Representative Committee (SRC) and the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) were held on Friday, October 13, 2017.

q702. In talking to people about these elections, we sometimes find that people were not able to vote because they were sick, were busy with coursework and exams, or they did not have the opportunity or ability. Other students do not usually travel to AUB on Fridays. We want to ask you whether or not you voted in the recent AUB student elections on Friday, October 13, 2017. Which of the following statements best describes you:

- <1> I was not eligible to vote in this year's AUB student elections **[Skip Logic: Skip q703-q709]**
- <2> I did not vote in this year's AUB student elections **[Skip Logic: Skip q703-q709]**
- <3> I thought about voting this time, but did not **[Skip Logic: Skip q703-q709]**
- <4> I usually vote, but did not this time **[Skip Logic: Skip q703-q709]**
- <5> I did vote in this year's AUB student elections

-- Page Break --

q703. We would like to ask you about your participation in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate list did you select to represent you in the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election?

- <1> Campus Choice (Secular Club)
- <2> Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)
- <3> Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)
- <4> OSB For Change
- <5> United For Change
- <6> Lett-uce Vote
- <7> Joe Habib (Independent, Joseph Habib)
- <8> One for All (Independent, Hassan Yassine)
- <9> Sarah Farran (Independent, Sarah Farran)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q703.other. **[If <99> in q703; Open-ended]**

-- Page Break --

q704.fafs. [Display logic: Display if <1> Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences (FAFS) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice

<1> Myra Zeineddine

<2> Sara El Samman

Leaders of Tomorrow

<3> Maria Abdel Nour

<4> Nada Yaman

Let's Vote

<5> Maram Al Lahham

<6> Yara El Assaad

<99> Other (Specify):

q704.fafs.other. [If <99> in q704.fafs; Open-ended]

q704.fas. [Display logic: Display if <2> Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice

<1> Farah El Baba

<2> Saad Choeb

<3> Saly El Wazze

<4> Shirine Dimachkie

<5> Yasmina Tabbal

Leaders of Tomorrow

<6> Celine Jeitani

<7> Joseph Bejjani

<8> Karim El Kabbani

Students for Change

<9> Mohamad Ali Diab

<10> Sari Khater

<11> Zainab Nasrallah

<99> Other (Specify):

q704.fas.other. [If <99> in q704.fas; Open-ended]

q704.fhs. [Display logic: Display if <3> Faculty of Health Sciences (FHS) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice

<1> Mirvat Termos

<2> Sabine Hijazi

Leaders of Tomorrow
 <3> Mohamad Kaadan
United for Change
 <4> Alice Harb
<99> Other (Specify):

q704.fhs.other. [If <99> in q704.fhs; Open-ended]

q704.fm. [Display logic: Display if <4> Faculty of Medicine (FM) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice
 <1> Dana Naamani
 <2> Michael Kassis
Joe Habib - Independent
 <3> Joseph Habib
One for All
 <4> Hassan Yassine
Sarah Farran
 <5> Sarah Farran
<99> Other (Specify):

q704.fm.other. [If <99> in q704.fm; Open-ended]

q704.hson. [Display logic: Display if <5> Rafic Hariri School of Nursing (HSON) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice
 <1> Dana Naamani
 <2> Michael Kassis
Joe Habib - Independent
 <3> Joseph Habib
One for All
 <4> Hassan Yassine
Sarah Farran
 <5> Sarah Farran
<99> Other (Specify):

q704.hson.other. [If <99> in q704.hson; Open-ended]

q704.osb. [Display logic: Display if <7> Suliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice

- <1> Nadine Sharaf Aldine
- <2> Rami Zeineddine
- <3> Yara Malke

Leaders of Tomorrow

- <4> Arman Khederlarian
- <5> Hoda Chmaitilly

OSB for Change

- <6> Kassem Salman
- <99> Other (Specify):

q704.osb.other. [If <99> in q704.osb; Open-ended]

q704.fea. [Display logic: Display if <6> Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture (FEA) in q700] Thank you. Students also had the option of selecting an individual candidate within the list they selected to represent them in the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC) election. If you can recall, which candidate was your preferred candidate within the list you selected for the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election? Please select from among the options below:

Campus Choice

- <1> Mohamad Abul Hassan
- <2> Noor Farhat
- <3> Rawane El Jamal
- <4> Tala Salman
- <5> Zouheir Alameddine

Leaders of Tomorrow

- <6> Joseph Matar
- <7> Moustafa Tabbarah
- <8> Saadallah Sarkis

United for Change

- <9> Chahid Yammine
- <10> Firas Atoui
- <11> Mohamad Khalaf
- <99> Other (Specify):

q704.fea.other. [If <99> in q704.fea; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q705. Which of the following statements best describes when you decided who to vote for in the [University Student Faculty Committee \(USFC\)](#) election:

- <1> I decided on election day (Friday, October 13, 2017)
- <2> I decided the day before (Thursday, October 12, 2017)
- <3> I decided during the last day of campaigning (Wednesday, October 11, 2017)
- <4> I decided during the first day of campaigning (Tuesday, October 11, 2017)
- <5> I decided sometime after the start of classes, before campaigning began
- <6> I decided before the start of this academic year

-- Page Break --

We would now like to ask you about your participation in the Student Representative Committee (SRC) election. In this election, students were asked to select from among candidates that belonged to their specific class/track within their faculty. Students could vote for as many candidates as there were seats allotted to their track. Candidates may or may not have belonged to a particular list of candidates.

q7061. If you can recall, to which list, if any, did the candidate or a majority of the candidates you selected to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election belong?

<1> Campus Choice (Secular Club)

<2> Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)

<3> Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

<4> OSB for Change

<5> The candidate or most of the candidates I voted for did not belong to one of the above lists.

<99> Other (Specify):

q7061.other. [If <99> in q7061; Open-ended]

q7062. If the class/track within your faculty was allotted more than one seat to the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#), did you vote for a candidate or candidates that belonged to another list, separate from the one you selected above?

<1> Campus Choice (Secular Club)

<2> Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)

<3> Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

<4> OSB for Change

<5> No. All the candidates I voted for belonged to the same list.

<6> The other candidate or candidates I voted for did not belong to one of the above lists.

<99> Other (Specify):

q7062.other. [If <99> in q7062; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q707.fafs. [Display logic: Display if <1> Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences (FAFS) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election?

Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Agribusiness I & II & III (Select up to 2)

<1> Anastasia Daou (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<2> Hassan Nesr

<3> Lama El Khuja (Campus Choice)

<4> Lana Nadia Koleilat (Campus Choice)

<5> Tarek Al Ghaban

Agriculture I & II (Select up to 2)

<6> Abbass Al Shab

<7> Jad El Chouwani

<8> Mohammad Ali Jaafar

<9> Youssef Beik Saadeh (Campus Choice)

Agriculture III & IV (Select up to 2)

- <10> Mahmoud Fawaz (Campus Choice)
- <11> Rawad El Chouwani (Campus Choice)
- <12> Walid Kabbout

Food Sciences I (Select 1)

- <13> Gaelle Kehdi (Campus Choice)
- <14> Maria Abdel Nour (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Food Sciences II (Select 1)

- <15> Layal Salman
- <16> Mariam Dagher
- <17> Rita Hatem (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Food Sciences III (Select 1)

- <18> Oussaima El Ladki (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Graduate (Select 1)

- <19> Walid Mukahhal (Campus Choice)

Landscaping I & II (Select 1)

- <20> Abdul Halim Hariri
- <21> Yara Sleem (Campus Choice)

Landscaping III & IV (Select 1)

- <22> Jad Salwan (Campus Choice)

Nutrition I (Select 1)

- <23> Ghina Ghayad (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <24> Jenny Rawass (Campus Choice)
- <25> Mike Tabet
- <26> Nour Raya

Nutrition II (Select 1)

- <27> Majd Al Jurdi (Campus Choice)
- <28> Marwa Al Arab (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Nutrition III & IV (Select 1)

- <29> Sarah Challita (Campus Choice)

<99> Other (Specify)

q707.fafs.other. [If <99> in q707.fafs; Open-ended]

q707.fas. [Display logic: Display if <2> Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Freshman (Select up to 3)

- <1> Adam Chaar (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <2> Jad Abdul Reda
- <3> Lara Sabra (Campus Choice)
- <4> Maxwell Richard Tamer Mahoney (Campus Choice)
- <5> Michael Khalid Ghutmi (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <6> Mohamad Chamas
- <7> Mounir Dahdah (Campus Choice)
- <8> Omar Ghandour (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <9> Sarah Harb
- <10> Valeria Hilany
- <11> Yara El Chaar

Sophomore (Select up to 7)

- <12> Ahmad Lamaa (Campus Choice)
- <13> Ali Slim (Campus Choice)
- <14> Bachar Sleiman
- <15> Elias Massouh (Students for Change)
- <16> Elie Khoury Aramouni (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <17> Emile Estephan (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <18> Fouad El Amine (Campus Choice)
- <19> Hadil Mansour (Students for Change)
- <20> Houssam Al Deen Al Zein (Students for Change)
- <21> Hussein Hijazi (Students for Change)
- <22> Joseph Mourad
- <23> Lynn Wahab (Campus Choice)
- <24> Marc Gharios (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <25> Mounia El Khawand (Campus Choice)
- <26> Nour Mounzer (Students for Change)
- <27> Reine Jamali (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <28> Ribal Teeny (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <29> Shadi Tabbarah (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <30> Sofia Chantra (Campus Choice)
- <31> Sophie Kaskas (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <32> Wael Bu Shahli (Students for Change)
- <33> Zakaria Khansa (Campus Choice)
- <34> Ziad Chouaib (Students for Change)

Junior (Select up to 5)

- <35> Aya Lynn Dandan (Campus Choice)
- <36> Charbel Frangieh (Students for Change)
- <37> Christian Sadaka (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <38> Ghadi Khalaf (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <39> Hassan Chamseddine (Students for Change)
- <40> Kamar El Haj Sleiman (Campus Choice)
- <41> Levon Souvalian (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <42> Mohamad Hasan (Students for Change)
- <43> Mohamad Samah Hammoud (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <44> Omar Ibrahim (Campus Choice)
- <45> Sarah Sabbah (Campus Choice)
- <46> Tamara Houeis (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <47> William Azar (Campus Choice)
- <48> Yara Ghandour (Students for Change)

Senior (Select up to 4)

- <49> Ahmad El Saadi (Students for Change)
- <50> Cynthia Hanna (Campus Choice)
- <51> Elissa Khalil (Students for Change)
- <52> Estephan (Steve) Rustom (Campus Choice)
- <53> Georgio Toumieh (Independent)
- <54> Hussein Kharroubi (Students for Change)
- <55> Leen Mohamad Fouad (Campus Choice)
- <56> Tarek Harb (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <57> Tina Daher (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <58> Tony Boutros
- <59> Yara Semaan (Campus Choice)

Graduate (Select up to 3)

- <60> Abdul Sattar Ouayda (Campus Choice)
- <61> Christian Thiele (Campus Choice)
- <62> Mohammad Hadi
- <63> Nour Halaby

- <64> Salwa Ali
- <65> Wassim Sleiman (Campus Choice)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q707.fas.other. [If <99> in q707.fas; Open-ended]

q707.fea. [Display logic: Display if <6> Maroun Semaan Faculty of Engineering and Architecture] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Architecture I & II (Select 1)

- <1> Karim Rifai (Campus Choice)
- <2> Mahmoud Fahs

Architecture III, IV & V (Select 1)

- <3> Dima El Ayache (Campus Choice)
- <4> Rasha Haidar

Engineering I (Select up to 4)

- <5> Abdul Rahman Shatila (Students for Change)
- <6> Ali Ezzeddine (Students for Change)
- <7> Charbel Bou Younes (Campus Choice)
- <8> Edouard Habert (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <9> Elie Melki (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <10> Hassan Zayour (Students for Change)
- <11> Jana El Kouche (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <12> Karim Abou Dib (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <13> Moustapha Ajram (Campus Choice)
- <14> Tala Zeineddine (Students for Change)

Engineering II (Select up to 4)

- <15> Abdul Aziz Abi Haydar (Campus Choice)
- <16> Alexi Habr (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <17> Anastasia Bustros (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <18> Ariane El Gemayel (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <19> Iyad Khaddaj (Students for Change)
- <20> Kareem Ayoub (Students for Change)
- <21> Mohamad Hattab (Students for Change)
- <22> Ramzi Marrouche (Students for Change)
- <23> Rim Soubra (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <24> Salim Chemali
- <25> Serge Nasr

Engineering III (Select up to 4)

- <26> Akram Yassin (Campus Choice)
- <27> Aya Mounzer (Students for Change)
- <28> Johnny El Hajj (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <29> Larissa Abi Nakhle (Campus Choice)
- <30> Michel Kallas (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <31> Mohammad Mahdi (Students for Change)
- <32> Mohammad Omar Fakhreddine (Students for Change)
- <33> Rashad Sultan (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <34> Samir El Boustani (Campus Choice)
- <35> Sandro Zoughaib (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <36> Youssef Al Ashkar (Students for Change)

Engineering IV (Select up to 3)

- <37> Antonio El Kahi (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <38> Bassel Tamim (Leaders of Tomorrow)
- <39> Elie Teeny (Campus Choice)

- <40> Hassan Taan (Students for Change)
- <41> Ibrahim Fawaz (Students for Change)
- <42> Nadim Rmeity (Students for Change)
- <43> Tatiana Hokayem (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Graduate (Select 1)

- <44> Abbas Sidaoui (Students for Change)
- <45> Dana Sobh (Campus Choice)
- <46> Hicham Hayek

Graphic Design (Select 1)

- <47> Roseline El Jabbour (Campus Choice)
- <99> Other (Specify):

q707.fea.other. [If <99> in q707.fea; Open-ended]

q707.fhs. [Display logic: Display if <3> Faculty of Health Sciences (FHS) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Public Health I (Select up to 2)

- <1> Abdullah Al Tali
- <2> Hassan Amro
- <3> Yara Sabbagh (Campus Choice)

Public Health II (Select up to 1)

- <4> Marianne Touma (Campus Choice)
- <5> Stephanie Baltayan (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Public Health III (Select up to 2)

- <6> Adham Makarem (Students for Change)
- <7> Elissa Saliba (Campus Choice)
- <8> Farah Al Hattab
- <9> Leen El Taki (Campus Choice)
- <10> Marwa Berjawi (Students for Change)
- <11> Mohamad El Fateh Shatila (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Graduate (Select 1)

- <12> Akhmad Shanaakh (Campus Choice)
- <13> Fatima Mouzahem
- <14> Stacey Baaklini (Campus Choice)

<99> Other (Specify):

q707.fhs.other. [If <99> in q707.fhs; Open-ended]

q707.fm. [Display logic: Display if <4> Faculty of Medicine (FM) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Medicine I (Select 1)

- <1> Reem Ezzeddine

Medicine II (Select 1)

- <2> Lara El-Jamal (Campus Choice)
- <3> Omran Saifi

Medicine III (Select up to 2)

- <4> Afif Kraitem
- <5> Hiba Ghandour

Medicine IV & Graduate (Select 1)

<6> Rozana El Eid (Campus Choice)

<99> Other (Specify):

q707.fm.other. [If <99> in q707.fm; Open-ended]

q707.hson. [Display logic: Display if <5> Rafic Hariri School of Nursing (HSON) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Nursing II & III (Select 1)

<1> Jaafar Hoteit (Campus Choice)

Nursing IV & Graduate (Select 1)

<2> Mohammad Taha (Campus Choice)

<3> Nour Abdallah

<99> Other (Specify):

q707.hson.other. [If <99> in q707.hson; Open-ended]

q707.osb. [Display logic: Display if <7> Suliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB) in q700] If you can recall, which candidate did you select to represent you in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election? Please select only as many candidates as there were seats allocated to your class/track.

Sophomore (Select up to 3)

<1> Baaker Haidar (OSB for Change)

<2> Hamza Sibai (OSB for Change)

<3> Moussa Charafeddine (OSB for Change)

<4> Nicolas Daddeh (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<5> Pierre Henri Jebara (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<6> Zeina Mikati (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Junior (Select up to 4)

<7> Fawaz El Sayed (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<8> Ghya Hallab (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<9> Hassan Al Horr (Campus Choice)

<10> Jad Soubra (Campus Choice)

<11> Joseph Allam (Campus Choice)

<12> Rayan Antonios (Campus Choice)

<13> Rayan Aridi (OSB for Change)

<14> Sarah Bassil (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<15> Sarah Jane Khoustekian (Leaders of Tomorrow)

Senior (Select up to 3)

<16> Ameer Jabak (OSB for Change)

<17> Gabriel Salibi (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<18> Ghida Dimachkieh (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<19> Judy Abou Nasr El Yafi (Leaders of Tomorrow)

<20> Nadine Fadlallah (OSB for Change)

Graduate (Select 1)

<21> Anwar Abi Abdallah

<22> Joanna Raichouni

<99> Other (Specify):

q707.osb.other. [If <99> in q707.osb; Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q708. Thank you. Which of the following statements best describes when you decided who to vote for in the [Student Representative Committee \(SRC\)](#) election:

- <1> I decided on election day (Friday, October 13, 2017)
- <2> I decided the day before (Thursday, October 12, 2017)
- <3> I decided during the last day of campaigning (Wednesday, October 11, 2017)
- <4> I decided during the first day of campaigning (Tuesday, October 11, 2017)
- <5> I decided sometime after the start of classes, before campaigning began
- <6> I decided before the start of this academic year

-- Page Break --

In talking to people about the AUB student elections, we sometimes find that students vote for particular candidates and lists for different reasons. Can you please tell us which of the following statements apply to you? Please read each statement carefully. You may select "Yes" for more than one statement, if applicable.

q7091. A close friend of mine was a candidate in this election and I wanted to vote her or him.

q7092. The candidate/list member I voted for shared my major, and I wanted to vote for someone within my major.

q7093. I support the activities and/or goals of a particular club at AUB, and I wanted to vote for the club's preferred candidate(s).

q7094. After reading the candidate/list platforms, I vote for the candidate/list with the strongest one.

q7095. I voted for the candidate/list that ran the most effective campaign.

q7096. I voted for the candidate/list because some or all of its members belong to the same official sect as me.

q7097. I voted for the candidate/list because some or all of its members are loosely affiliated with a Lebanese political party or organization that I support.

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

q710. During the campaign period on Tuesday, October 10, and Wednesday, October 11, candidates were invited to campaign at stands located in front of West Hall. Can you tell us approximately how many times you passed by these stands during the campaign period? We are not asking whether or not you visited a particular stand. We would like to know how many times you passed by these stands for any reason.

<1> 0

<2> 1

<3> 2

<4> 3

<5> 4

<6> 5

<7> 6

<8> 7

<9> 8

<10> 9

<11> 10 or more

-- Page Break --

q711. During the campaign period, did you personally interact with candidates or volunteers at these stands?

<1> Yes

<2> No **[Skip Logic: Skip q712]**

-- Page Break --

Approximately how many times did you speak with candidates or volunteers at each of the following stands? Please enter a numerical value: **[Numerical value]**

q7121. Campus Choice (Secular Club)

q7122. Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)

q7123. Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

q7124. Independent candidates

-- Page Break --

q713. Did you attend the election debate sponsored by Outlook on Wednesday, October 11, at 2pm at West Hall?

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

During the campaign, did you use the Internet or your mobile phone to sign up for information or alerts from a candidate, list, or club? Please read each statement carefully. You may select "Yes" for more than one statement, if applicable.

q7141. I followed or added a Facebook page related to a candidate, list, or club.

q7142. I followed a Twitter account related to a candidate, list, or club.

q7143. I followed an Instagram account related to a candidate, list, or club.

q7144. I followed a Snapchat account related to a candidate, list, or club.

q7145. I signed up to receive text message (SMS) updates from a candidate, list, or club.

q7146. I signed up to receive e-mail updates from a candidate, list, or club.

q7147. I signed up to receive WhatsApp messages from a candidate, list, or club.

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

Now we would like to ask you a few questions about how often you were personally contacted during the week of the elections. For each of the following forms of communication, can you tell us how many times did a candidate or volunteer asked you to vote for or support **Campus Choice**? Please enter a numerical value in each cell:

[Numerical value]

q7151. Internet/social media (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Instagram)

q7152. Mobile phone (voice call)

q7153. E-mail

q7154. In person, face-to-face

For each of the following forms of communication, can you tell us how many times did a candidate or volunteer personally asked you to vote for or support **Leaders of Tomorrow?** Please enter a numerical value in each cell:

[Numerical value]

q7161. Internet/social media (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Instagram)

q7162. Mobile phone (voice call)

q7163. E-mail

q7164. In person, face-to-face

-- Page Break --

For each of the following forms of communication, can you tell us how many times did a candidate or volunteer personally asked you to vote for or support **Students for Change?** Please enter a numerical value in each cell:

[Numerical value]

q7171. Internet/social media (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Instagram)

q7172. Mobile phone (voice call)

q7173. E-mail

q7174. In person, face-to-face

For each of the following forms of communication, can you tell us how many times a candidate or volunteer personally asked you to vote for or support **an independent candidate/list?** Please enter a numerical value in each cell: [Numerical value]

q7181. Internet/social media (WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Instagram)

q7182. Mobile phone (voice call)

q7183. E-mail

q7184. In person, face-to-face

-- Page Break --

q719. During the AUB student elections held on Friday, October 13, 2017, did you attend any meetings hosted by a candidate or list separate from those held informally at stands in front of West Hall?

<1> Yes

<2> No

During the campaign, did any of the following people try to persuade you to vote for or against a particular list or candidate? Please read each statement carefully. You may select "Yes" for more than one statement, if applicable.

q7201. A friend who was not a candidate or volunteer

q7202. A roommate or student who lives in your dorm who was not a candidate or volunteer

q7203. A classmate from your faculty or major who was not a candidate or volunteer

q7204. A family member who is not a current student at AUB

<1> Yes

<2> No

q721. During the campaign, did you at any point try to persuade another student to vote for or against a particular list or candidate?

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

q722. Did you participate in this year's AUB student elections as a candidate?

<1> Yes [Skip Logic: Skip q726-729]

<2> No [Skip Logic: Skip q723-725]

-- Page Break --

q723. Please tell us whether or not you ran for a seat in the Student Representative Committee (SRC) or the University Student Faculty Committee (USFC). You may check both if they apply:

<1> Student Representative Committee (SRC)

<2> University Student Faculty Committee (USFC)

-- Page Break --

In talking to candidates about the AUB student elections, we sometimes find that candidates decide to run for different reasons. Can you please tell us which of the following statements apply to you? Please read each statement carefully. You may select "Yes" for more than one statement, if applicable.

q7241. The interests of my academic major are important to me, and I wanted to advocate on behalf of students that share my major.

q7242. The interests of a club that I belong to are important to me, and I wanted to advocate on behalf of other members of the club.

q7243. There are many problems with the student experience at AUB, and I wanted to try and solve them.

q7244. The interests of other students who belong to the same official sect as me are important to me, and I wanted to advocate on their behalf.

q7245. The interests of other students who support the same Lebanese political party as me are important to me, and I wanted to advocate on their behalf.

q7246. Many people encouraged me to run as a candidate because my family name is recognizable and well-known.

<1> Yes

<2> No

q725. We would like to know as much information as possible about your candidacy. In the box below, please tell us about your campaign and your experience observing and participating in the AUB student elections held on Friday, October 13, 2017. [Open-ended]

-- Page Break --

q726. [If <2> in q722] We'd like to know whether or not you volunteered to help encourage others to vote for a particular candidate or list during the campaign period. Did you volunteer for any particular club, candidate, or list during the election campaign?

<1> Yes

<2> No [Skip Logic: Skip q727-729]

-- Page Break --

In talking to people about the AUB student elections, we sometimes find that students volunteer to help encourage others to support particular candidates, lists, and clubs for different reasons. Can you please tell us which of the following statements apply to you? Please read each statement carefully. You may select "Yes" for more than one statement, if applicable.

q7271. A close friend of mine was a candidate in this election and I wanted to encourage others to vote for her or him.

q7272. The candidate/list member I voted for shared my major, and I wanted to encourage others to vote for her or him.

q7273. I am a member of or support the activities and/or goals of a particular club at AUB, and I wanted to encourage others to support this club in the elections.

q7274. After reading the candidate/list platforms, I chose to volunteer to assist the candidate/list with the strongest platform.

q7275. I volunteered for the candidate/list because some or all of its members belong to the same official sect as me.

q7276. I volunteered for the candidate/list because some or all of its members are loosely affiliated with a Lebanese political party or organization that I support.

<1> Yes

<2> No

q728. Which list or candidate did you volunteer for during the week of the AUB student elections?

<1> Campus Choice (Secular Club)

<2> Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)

<3> Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

<4> An independent candidate

q729. Approximately how many hours did you spend volunteering for this list/candidate(s) during election week?

Please enter a numerical value: **[Numerical value]**

-- Page Break --

q730. In general, how would you rate the fairness of the most recent AUB student elections held on Friday, October 13, 2017?

<1> Not free and fair

<2> Free and fair with major problems

<3> Free and fair with minor problems

<4> Completely free and fair

q731. Please tell us why in the space below. **[Open-ended]**

q732. On a scale of 1 to 7, how likely do you think those elected to represent you will meaningfully improve the student experience at AUB? **[Slider]**

-- Page Break --

q733. Results for the recent AUB student elections held on October 13, 2017, were announced soon after polls closed at 5pm. Did you attend the announcement of the results at West Hall from 5:00-6:30pm on Friday, October 13, 2017?

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

q734. Many clubs and their members at AUB are loosely affiliated with or support Lebanese political parties. Do you know which of these political parties, if any, are affiliated with the following lists and clubs that participated in

the AUB student elections held on Friday, October 13, 2017? To the best of your ability, please drag each of the Lebanese political parties that appear on the left panel to the appropriate box on the right. **[Pick, Group, and Rank]**

--

<11> Amal

<12> Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Tashnag)

<13> Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)

<14> Future Movement

<15> Hezbollah

<16> Lebanese Forces (LF)

<17> Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)

<18> Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)

--

Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)

Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)

Campus Choice (Secular Club)

--

q734.lot. Parties dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.sfc. Parties dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.cc. Parties dragged to "Campus Choice (Secular Club)"

q734.lot.amal.rank. Rank of <11> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.tashnag.rank. Rank of <12> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.fpm.rank. Rank of <13> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.future.rank. Rank of <14> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.hezb.rank. Rank of <15> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.lf.rank. Rank of <16> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.psp.rank. Rank of <17> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.lot.ssnp.rank. Rank of <18> if dragged to "Leaders of Tomorrow (Freedom Club, Social Club, Youth Club)"

q734.sfc.amal.rank. Rank of <11> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.sfc.tashnag.rank. Rank of <12> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.sfc.fpm.rank. Rank of <13> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.sfc.future.rank. Rank of <14> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.sfc.hezb.rank. Rank of <15> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.sfc.lf.rank. Rank of <16> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

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q734.sfc.ssnp.rank. Rank of <18> if dragged to "Students for Change (Cultural Club of the South, Civic Welfare League, Communications Club, Lebanese Heritage Club, Lebanese Mission Club)"

q734.cc.amal.rank. Rank of <11> if dragged to "Campus Choice (Secular Club)"

q734.cc.tashnag.rank. Rank of <12> if dragged to "Campus Choice (Secular Club)"

q734.cc.fpm.rank. Rank of <13> if dragged to "Campus Choice (Secular Club)"

q734.cc.future.rank. Rank of <14> if dragged to “Campus Choice (Secular Club)”

q734.cc.hezb.rank. Rank of <15> if dragged to “Campus Choice (Secular Club)”

q734.cc.lf.rank. Rank of <16> if dragged to “Campus Choice (Secular Club)”

q734.cc.psp.rank. Rank of <17> if dragged to “Campus Choice (Secular Club)”

q734.cc.ssnp.rank. Rank of <18> if dragged to “Campus Choice (Secular Club)”

Section 8. Candidate Profiles
Conjoint Experiment (CA01-CA07)

Please do not refresh this page.

Legislative elections are currently scheduled to take place next year, in May 2018. For the next few minutes, we are going to ask you to act as if you are about to cast a vote for the candidate that will represent you in the Lebanese Parliament. We will describe several pairs of candidates running for election to Parliament in the following pages.

For each pair of candidates, please indicate your attitudes toward each candidate and which one you would prefer to represent you. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate which of the two you prefer.

Attributes	Values
Political Affiliation	March 8 March 14 Independent Civil Society
Religion	Sunni Muslim Shia Muslim Maronite Christian Orthodox Christian Druze Armenian Christian
Education	Bachelor's Degree Master's Degree
Family history	Son of a prominent politician Son of a prominent businessman No prominent immediate family background
Occupation	Lawyer Businessman Engineer NGO Manager

q810-870. Which of these candidates would you be more likely to support for Parliament?

<1> Candidate 1

<2> Candidate 2

q811-871. Why do you prefer this candidate? Please answer in a few sentences. **[Open-ended]**

q812-872. If you had to make a prediction, which candidate do you think will win the election?

<1> Candidate 1

<2> Candidate 2

q813-873. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place:

Candidate 1

q814-874. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that you would never support this candidate, and 7 indicates you would always support this candidate, where would you place:

Candidate 2

Section 9. Clientelism

q900. Thank you. We are almost finished with the survey. We'd like to ask you a few additional questions about your participation in the AUB student elections. Before the elections took place on Friday, October 13, 2017, did a candidate, list, or club try to offer you something of value in exchange for your support? For example, were you offered cash, phone credits, a tutor, access to previous exams (test banks), etc. in exchange for your support?

<1> Yes

<2> No

-- Page Break --

q901. Do you personally know of any instances where a candidate, list, or club tried to offer another student something of value in exchange for her or his support? For example, do you know of any instances where another student was offered phone credits, a tutor, access to previous exams (test banks), etc. in exchange for her or his support?

<1> Yes

<2> No **[Skip Logic: Skip q902]**

-- Page Break --

q902. If you feel comfortable, can you describe the incident(s) you are thinking about? If you do not feel comfortable answering this question, you may skip it. **[Open-ended]**

Qualtrics data

uniquecode. **[Respondent identifier, Wave 1 and Wave 2]**

start. **[Start date and time]**

end. **[End date and time]**

progress. **[Percent of survey completed]**

duration. **[Seconds]**

finished. **[<1> if finished, <0> if partial]**

recorddate. **[Record date and time]**

responseid. **[Qualtrics ID]**