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Description: The framing effect occurs when different presentations of the same problem lead to predictably different preferences. The dual-process framework of higher cognition assumes that the effect violates rational principles, but alternative accounts and recent evidence have contested this interpretation. Contributing to this debate, we tested the dual-process assumption by investigating associations between susceptibility to framing and the willingness and ability to think in line with rational norms, conceptualized as actively open-minded thinking and pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, or the tendency to uncritically accept meaningless statements as profound. We conducted two online studies among North American (N = 259) and Bulgarian (N = 248) university students and administered several framing problems within subjects, presumably a necessary condition for the associations to appear. Confirmatory factor analyses showed that susceptibility to framing was associated with decreased actively open-minded thinking and increased bullshit receptivity in both sites. Exploratory multi-group analyses demonstrated partial strong invariance and showed that the negative association between actively open-minded thinking and susceptibility to framing was stronger among Bulgarians than North Americans. These results support the dual-process account of the framing effect. Our study further contributes to adapting existing measures to a novel setting and expanding the findings across borders and populations.