Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game

Martina Testori; Rebecca Hoyle; Hedwig Eisenbarth

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Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game

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Martina Testori
Rebecca Hoyle
Hedwig Eisenbarth

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