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Date created: 2023-03-30 05:12 PM | Last Updated: 2023-06-21 08:58 AM

Identifier: DOI 10.17605/OSF.IO/GJSFT

Category: Procedure

Description: In this study, we examine the effect of Congress amplifying (or ignoring) a whistleblower on the approval of Congress. We hypothesize that amplifying the whistleblower increases approval of Congress among their in-party, but that the increase in approval is much larger when the operation fails (compared to when the operation succeeds).

License: GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) 3.0

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