**Cultural capital and social revolution:
Arts consumption in a major Russian city, 1991–2017 ¹**

Mikhail Sokolov

European University at Saint Petersburg,

6/1A Gagarinskaya street,

191187 St. Petersburg, Russia

phone/fax +7(812)386-7633

E-mail: msokolov@eu.spb.ru

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Abstract

What happens to cultural capital comprised of “prestigious cultural resources” when the whole system of economic inequality changes, and the group regarded as the major possessor and guardian of traditional status culture finds itself at the bottom of the new income distribution? The answer to this question may shed some light on two widely debated issues: (1) Is cultural capital essentially an instrument of exclusion adopted by economic-based classes, with the status dimension of social stratification being an epiphenomenon of class structure? (2) Is cultural participation governed by strategic status-seeking? This paper argues that possible combinations of answers to these questions suggest three different scenarios of reactions to the loosening of links between distribution of cultural and economic capital: “meltdown” (the failure of high culture to mark boundaries of an economically privileged group results in a considerable decline in cultural participation, particularly among younger individuals (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004), “transfer” (status culture being taken over by the descendants of the new economically advantaged groups), and “permanence” (no significant change occurs). In this paper, we analyse a unique database which allows tracing arts participation rates by major categories of consumers in Saint Petersburg, Russia, between 1991 and 2017—the period of the emergence of capitalism, also widely regarded as the time of economic decline of the traditional Soviet *intelligentsia*. We argue that the evidence supports the permanence scenario, thus demonstrating the existence of an autonomous status hierarchy that can reproduce in generations irrespective of processes of re-distribution of wealth.

Keywords: sociology of culture, arts participation, social stratification, cultural capital, social status, Russian culture

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What happens to cultural capital, comprised of “prestigious cultural resources” (DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985, pp.1232–1235; Lamont and Lareau, 1988), when the whole system of economic inequality changes abruptly and the group that is regarded as the major possessor and guardian of traditional status culture experiences economic decline? The answer to this is important as it sheds light on the relation between status culture, and, more broadly, the status dimension of stratification, with class defined through “market chances”. It also arguably provides some clues concerning the degree of strategic thinking involved in drawing status boundaries, an issue that has become a subject of many recent theoretical debates. The value of the Russian case for studies of cultural consumption and status culture lies in the fact that Russia’s troubled social history over three decades offers a perfect natural-historical experiment testing the strength of competing approaches to these issues. One of the crucial elements of Soviet society was the highly visible group of *intelligentsia* concentrated in particular occupations (mostly professional—engineers, doctors, school and university teachers, scientists, but also artists, journalists and writers), and distinguished by education, certain political stances, and a lifestyle in which arts participation played a prominent role. Studying participation in cultural consumption practices associated with the intelligentsia when it was regarded as one of the principal victims of economic reforms, one can appreciate the consequences of the perceived loosening of links between the distribution of cultural and economic capital.

We start this paper with a brief description of the intelligentsia’s role in Russian history, and then discuss how its fate over the last 30 years could be treated as a historical quasi-experiment in isolating status culture from economic privilege. Then we present the data and methods from a

survey of arts participation in Saint Petersburg between 1991 and 2017. Then we will present our evidence and proceed to discussion and conclusions.

1. The case of the Russian intelligentsia

In the Soviet era one could have undoubtedly identified the intelligentsia in Russia and other USSR republics as an exemplary Weberian status group. Characterized by a distinctive “mode of living”, formal training, “monopolistic appropriation of privileged economic opportunities” and endogamy, it also arguably enjoyed societal prestige (Weber, 1964: 428). The history of the intelligentsia in Russia can be traced to the early nineteenth century (Berlin, 1997 [1996]; Pipes, 1960), but in Soviet Russia the term had a somewhat ambivalent meaning. On the one hand, it was used as a census category that included occupations requiring higher levels of training. At the same time, it designated a normative ideal of a knowledgeable, cultivated, polite, and morally concerned individual, qualities referred to as *intelligentnost’*. In this second usage, one could talk about “manual workers’ intelligentsia” (*rabochaja intelligentsia*)—a popular catchphrase in Soviet ideological jargon. The official position on this apparent contradiction was that professionals were the first group likely to attain these desirable qualities, but, with socialist society moving towards Communism and with the technical revolution increasing the demand for qualified employees, workers and peasants were to increasingly become professionalized. Any lifestyle differences between occupational categories were to wither away, with all Soviet citizens becoming *intelligent* (Kotkin, 1995: 180-192). This withering away was treated as one of the major targets of Soviet cultural policy and, at the same time, as an indicator of its success.

Most studies conducted by Soviet sociologists of culture to evaluate this success, however, provided rather discouraging results. Audiences of cultural establishments still mostly comprised of professionals and workers were slow to embrace their patterns of cultural consumption (Dmitrievskii, 2013). Even more annoying for the Soviet leadership, there were clear tendencies

towards generational inheritance of cultural capital and the reproduction of membership within the intelligentsia. Despite policies aimed at increasing working-class enrolment at universities, the children of intelligentsia still prevailed at them (Yanowitch & Dodge, 1968). Overall, by Russian standards, the intelligentsia remained a remarkably persistent group. Thus, a few intelligentsia families concentrated in major Russian cities produced up to four generations of academics, able to trace their genealogy to nineteenth-century university professors; such families often forming tightly knit groups. This is, remarkably, the only kind of “old families” one finds in Russia, where first the Civil War, then Stalin’s purges, and later Perestroika resulted in several radical changes of the elite.

The issue of whether the intelligentsia was an economically privileged group during the Soviet period is widely debated. Members of the intelligentsia felt humiliated by the higher salaries of some groups of qualified manual workers and especially by the privileges held by Communist Party functionaries who had access to various deficit goods. However, statistics show that the intelligentsia was still economically much better off than the vast majority of the population, and enjoyed much-envied living and working conditions. Indeed, an influential theory in Soviet studies stated that boundaries were blurred in state-socialist societies between the Communist Party, *nomenclatura* and intelligentsia, with all being component parts of the dominant class (Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979; Voslensky 1984). Unsurprisingly, occupational prestige surveys invariably listed mass intelligentsia occupations such as engineers, doctors or scientists near the top, showing that intelligentsia occupations were considered socially desirable regardless of the group’s self-perception (Yanowitch and Dodge, 1969; Voznesenskaya 2015). Overall, the intelligentsia in Soviet society fitted perfectly the description of an advantaged group, monopolising access to attractive economic niches and using both status culture and control over educational channels to maintain its privileges.

Then Perestroika came. In spite of this privileged position, intelligentsia members were the vanguard of the anti-Communist movement which resulted in the collapse of the Soviet regime. What followed may be rightfully described as a fully-fledged “social revolution”, understood as a “rapid, basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures... accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below” (Skocpol, 1979, p.3).² In addition to the disintegration of the USSR and radical political changes, the whole planned economy system was destroyed by liberal reforms. In the course of the 1990s, Russia’s GDP nearly halved. Those employed in intelligentsia occupations were universally perceived as the major victims of these events.³ Stereotypical images of the miserable intelligentsia and the ignorant, criminal, but prosperous “New Russians” became part of urban folklore and were reproduced in the mass media. Surveys documented a significant drop in the attractiveness of traditional intelligentsia occupations (teachers, engineers, scientists, with the partial exception of doctors [Timirova, 2008; Voznesenskaya 2015]). In the early 1990s, universities previously sieged by armies of prospective students faced a fall in enrolment (Klijachko and Mau, 2015). Enrolment did recover by the end of the decade, but specializations that led to traditional intelligentsia occupations were now among the least popular, replaced by subjects such as management and finance. The consensus among researchers was that during the depression, the perceived economic insecurity of intelligentsia occupations made them an unattractive career prospect (Timirova, 2008).

² Interestingly, the term was widely used by the participants of Perestroika movement itself (e.g., Rakitskij and Rakitskaya, 1989: 348).

³ Whether this perception was accurate is debatable. Studies in other post-socialist countries showed that groups endowed with cultural capital survived the transition period with fewer losses than other groups (Borocz and Southworth, 1996; Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta, 2000). However, while evidence on Russia is scarce, the available data suggest that in Russia many core intelligentsia occupations suffered much heavier blows, than, say, industrial workers. For example, the average salary of an associate professor at a public university in Russia was 159% of an average salary in industry in 1980, 119% in 1990, but only 64% in 1992 (Tikhonov, 1996: 59).

The social revolution in Russia thus resulted in a perceived decrease in economic benefits of belonging to intelligentsia-monopolized occupations and a worsening of the overall economic standing of intelligentsia members. Has this change in economic fortunes reduced the attractiveness of the intelligentsia lifestyle? When it lost the ability to promise economic advantage and be a signal of wealth, did it also lose appeal as a status culture? The answers to these questions may serve as a critical experiment opposing various theories of status and status culture.

2. Theoretical considerations

2.1 The autonomy of status

Max Weber's excerpt that famously introduced the notion of status groups (*Stand*) received at least three different interpretations which could be called *alternativist*, *autonomist* and *reductionist* (Weber, 1978: 299-307). The alternativist interpretation regards class and status groups as two alternative ideal-typical forms of stratification: a society may have very little of class (e.g., in medieval Europe), or very little of status, or their elements may co-exist in various combinations. Both class and status stratification allow elites to monopolize economic resources, albeit by different means. In the case of class, wealth is secured through market mechanisms and property laws, in the case of status groups, through legal restrictions, educational credentials and social exclusion. Weber and those following this interpretation believed that while Western capitalist societies are moving away from status to class order, although the former is still visible in certain sectors of the economy (Starr, 1982). Possibly because of the general belief that status order exists as a relic of social organization from the past, the alternativist interpretation has so far played only a minor role in studies of cultural consumption.

The autonomist interpretation holds that rather than two historical alternatives, class and status are two different dimensions of stratification present in all modern societies, with each individual

and each group occupying positions at both dimensions. “Class” is defined through property and/or market chances, and “status” through lifestyle, taste, membership in social networks , and its associated prestige. Edward Shils (1965) voiced the extreme autonomist position that occupational prestige correlates with this occupation’s perceived “order-generating properties” in the cosmological belief system of a given group. That is why occupations regarded as “important” (doctors, judges, scientists) are rated more highly than “less important” (managers), even if the latter are paid equally well. Indeed, most societies’ idea of an honourable or good life are not fully derivable from income or economic security. While Shils did not discuss the prestige associated with lifestyles or consumption patterns, one can easily project his line of thought and argue that some choices in this sphere confer status because they are regarded as more virtuous or worthy, irrespective of the economic standing of the person making these choices.

Finally, the reductionist position can be traced to Thorstein Veblen’s ideas on pecuniary culture (Veblen, 2017 [1899]), and, further, to Karl Marx and Henri de Saint Simone. It holds that status groups are “classes in disguise”, and that status cultures are but an instrument for upper classes to draw boundaries, and, possibly, legitimize hereditary advantage. For Veblen, pecuniary culture is a form of conspicuous consumption. Participation in it is valued and prestigious only as far as it can signal wealth and idleness. It may form a relatively consistent lifestyle, but its attractiveness is fully derivative from its being available only to the economically privileged.

Greatly simplifying, the difference between the value attached to status culture by reductionist and autonomist theorizing may be compared to the difference between gold watches and being cheerful. If gold falls in value, people who used to wear huge gold watches (such as the proverbial “New Russians” of the 1990s), stop doing this and shift to using a better symbol of wealth. However, many personal qualities, such as being good-looking, witty or cheerful, are valued and admired regardless to their connection with wealth. While those having greater economic

resources may have an advantage in acquiring these qualities, they are not valued *because* of this fact. Thus, although the rich may have better chances of being cheerful, partly because they have fewer reasons to be depressed, and partly because they have the benefits of modern psychotherapy and psychopharmacology at their disposal, being cheerful is not regarded as attractive only because it signals wealth.

The example of cheerfulness demonstrates why it may be difficult to empirically establish what cultural capital is like in these terms. Most forms of capital gravitate towards each other because they are convertible—anyone endowed with one can acquire the rest. While the rich have better chances of becoming cheerful, the cheerful may convert their social attractiveness into becoming wealthier (e.g., by making friends who can offer them a job). Nevertheless, recognizing the possibility of conversion does not mean the end of the debate. The autonomist position implies that forms capital are symmetrical in regard to such conversions: neither will lose value if convertibility stops, but in the reductionist position characteristics of lifestyle and class position are fundamentally asymmetric in their convertibility. Elements of lifestyle are valued only as long as class privileges are convertible into them (then they function as symbols) and they are convertible into class position (then they function as investments). They are doomed to disappear if they fail to fulfil these functions.

Pierre Bourdieu's position on this issue, to which both sides in the debate appeal, seem somewhat ambiguous. His earlier work seems largely reductionist in arguing that formal education and cultural consumption are means of class reproduction (Bourdieu, Darbel and Schnapper, 1997[1966]). Thus, in the English translation of *Distinction* he promises "to rethink Max Weber's opposition between class and *Stand*" (Bourdieu, 1984: XII), arguing that class lifestyles reflect their members' habitus, derived from their place in the class hierarchy. The elite habitus predisposes the upper classes to develop tastes for the most inaccessible goods, in terms

of price and cultural sophistication. The working classes develop a “taste for necessity”—an appreciation of whatever their limited means can afford. Caught between these two opposites, the *petit bourgeoisie* strive to imitate the elites without the necessary resources, instead demonstrating a pathetic “cultural goodwill”. In Bourdieu’s earlier work, economic wealth and security largely seem to be the sole source of *habitus* (Holt, 1997; Atkinson, 2011; Lizardo and Skiles, 2012). Bourdieu’s later work, however, ascribed progressively more importance to the composition of capital (predominance of either economic or cultural) opposing different “factions” of the elite (cf. Holt, 1998; Lizardo and Skiles, 2012). Both factions participate in a form of conspicuous cultural consumption, but while the high-economic-capital elites specialize in costly cultural forms (visiting opera premieres with their expensive tickets and dress codes), high-cultural-capital elites demonstrate their abilities to decipher sophisticated cultural codes. Gradually, it seems, Bourdieu came to embrace the dimensional interpretation of status allowing for the relative autonomy of hierarchy based on possession of cultural capital from distribution of economic capital, with “classes” meaning groups of individuals sharing overall amount and composition of different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1985).

Other theorists allow for status and class relations to be historically contingent. Thus, Paul DiMaggio and John Mohr (1985; see also Goffman, 1951) sought to show how status culture could develop historically to become independent of class. In their interpretation of US status culture, in the beginning there was class. The nineteenth-century East Coast elites invented a consumption model that was costly and accessible only for those with economic resources, education and leisure time. Later, however, participation in status culture became progressively more open. Membership in it and in capitalist elites gradually became less correlated, but without cultural capital suffering total devaluation.

Due to the recognized convertibility of class and status, studying their autonomy presents a formidable problem. Empirically, John Goldthorpe and his colleagues made the most systematic attempt to prove status as independent from class, demonstrating that status boundaries, as measured by marital selection or strong friendship ties, are relatively independent from class position characterized by type of working contract. Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe (2004) noted that status seems to be related to traditional distinctions between “dirty” manual and “clean” non-manual professions, with many jobs associated with belonging to the upper classes (e.g., supervisory) occupying the middle of the status spectrum. A few studies following in their steps demonstrated that cultural consumption is more strongly associated with status than with class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; Bukodi, 2007).

These and other studies usually used statistics to demonstrate that social hierarchy is not reducible to a single dimension and that some characteristics of societal prestige are only moderately correlated with wealth. While important, such demonstrations offer only relatively weak proof of ultimate independence between class and status. A stronger demonstration would be to find a historical instance in which status becomes inconvertible to class. If status is independent from class, there is no reason to expect many changes in participation in status culture. If it is dependent on it some changes are inevitable, although what these changes are likely to be cannot be projected unless we add one more variable into our equations: the degree of awareness we ascribe to agents.

2.2. The awareness problem

Those who deny the autonomy of status disagree on what is likely to happen with cultural capital when it is no longer associated with economic capital. The two major positions here emerge from another theoretical debate, which touches on the degree of awareness of the derivative nature of status culture. The intuitively appealing imagery behind much theorizing on consumption is that

of strategic boundary-drawing., possibly presented most elegantly in Erving Goffman's early "Symbols of Class Status" paper (1951), which presumed that agents are highly strategic in their consumption choices. According to Goffman, the upper classes develop a set of symbols to easily identify their members. There is a list of requirements for such symbols, the most important being that they must be resistant to imitation by non-members or appropriation by parvenus. Ideally, they should not only serve as signals of privilege, but also offer a legitimation of it. High culture is a perfect set of symbols from the point of view of established elites, because the mastery of codes necessary to decipher it and participate in "culture talk" (Lizardo, 2016) requires extensive training, and, in contrast to, say, emeralds, cannot be stolen, forged, leased, or bought too easily by the new rich. Even better, it presumably explains one's privileged position by pointing to valued internal qualities—intelligence, breadth of interests, sophistication. Goffman imagined the development of class symbolism as an outcome of strategic interaction in which non-elite groups attempt to imitate the elites, who then stop using compromised symbols, after which non-elites stop using them as well; this creates an eternal cycle in which specific signals are constantly devalued. In studies of cultural consumption, this logic is implied by those who believe that elites constantly redraw boundaries between "high" and "low" culture in order to devalue objects that become too accessible to less privileged groups, (Savage and Gayo, 2011; Jarness, 2015)

The opposite position in the strategizing debate was voiced, among others, by Douglas Holt (1997; 1998), Will Atkinson (2011), and Omar Lizardo and Sarah Skiles (2012). Holt and others claimed that individuals are unaware of the social consequences of cultural consumption and regard art primarily as a source of emotional gratification. However, their upbringing and labour conditions determine what experiences they value, with upper class children enjoying economic security and a more stimulating environment develops cognitive schemata that allows them to

appreciate formal aspects of art, rather than its particular contents (e.g., style of prose, rather than plot or characters) and to develop broad and diverse tastes. Rather than intentional boundary-drawing by elites, this theoretical model suggests that mutual expulsion occurs because of differences in aesthetic socialization, of which the agents themselves may not even have an intuitive understanding.

Together with the position on the issue of status autonomy, the precise degree of awareness one ascribes to actors defines the consequences of economic decline of a group that has the strongest association with status culture. These consequences can be formulated as three scenarios—meltdown, transfer, and permanence (see Table 1).

2.3. The three scenarios

If status is ultimately derivable from class, and if agents are aware of this fact (e.g., they know that artistic consumption may serve to establish connections with members of certain classes and they know which consumption patterns are characteristic of which group), we might expect a loss of interest in traditional status culture when its guardians become economically disadvantaged. What happens in such conditions was termed a **meltdown scenario** in an influential paper by Paul DiMaggio and Toqir Mukhtar (2004). In such cases, they predicted

a dramatic deflation in the value of the arts as cultural capital (the “meltdown scenario”) [manifesting] itself in (1) large declines in high arts participation rates (2) especially among the youngest cohorts that (3) are not evident in participation in middlebrow activities and (4) are concentrated among groups for whom cultural capital is most important, i.e. (4a) highly educated people and (4b) women. (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004, p.172)⁴

⁴ Preceding the argument of this paper, DiMaggio and Mukhtar describe the awareness presupposition on which this expectation is based in the following way:

If, however, status is immanently linked with class, the changing economic fortunes of previously privileged groups are unlikely to immediately change their habits. If individuals are unaware that status groups are in fact classes in disguise, their choice of cultural consumption is not governed by the strategic rationality assumed in the “meltdown scenario”. The older members of a declining group will continue following practices associated with their initial privileged position, but their children, whose upbringing occurred in a less favourable environment, will be unlikely to reproduce it. At the same time, the children of the new rich will acquire an elite habitus and gradually develop disinterested “Kantian aesthetics” following from it, eventually taking over cultural capital. Such a script may be dubbed a “**transfer scenario**”, suggesting that economic mobility breaks the reproduction of cultural consumption patterns within families. Empirically, this scenario gives rise to three expectations. First, one can expect an interaction between time period and economic resources as independent variables explaining high culture activity: correlation between economic position and cultural activity will reduce immediately after the radical economic change, but will gradually increase later. Second, as the correlation re-emerges mostly due to the new generation of consumers coming of age, one can expect to find an interaction between cohort and wealth: wealth will better predict cultural activity by younger, rather than older groups. Third, if new groups take over cultural consumption, one can expect older cohorts’ cultural activity to be better predicted by parental education. This hypothesis is based on the supposition that for younger people who were socialized after the social revolution,

Actors are, first, knowledgeable and, second, reasonably rational. With respect to the first, we believe that most people are aware, consciously or unconsciously, of the extent to which involvement in the arts is part of the complex of prestigious cultural dispositions and practices that help people get ahead (i.e. cultural capital). With respect to the second, we assume that if the status payoff of participation in the arts declines, people will have reduced incentive to participate and will participate less. (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004, p.172)

the educational achievements of their parents will serve as a poorer predictor of their family's class membership than for those who grew up in less turbulent times.

Finally, if status is autonomous from class, neither meltdown nor transfer scenario is likely to occur in a situation of social revolution similar to the one described at the start of this paper. Instead, what might be called a “**permanence scenario**” is more plausible, holding that status culture continues to be reproduced by the same social groups even though the economic position of these groups radically change. There may be some decline in participation rates, reflecting the reduction of purchasing power by traditional audiences, but this decline is likely to be moderate compared to the consumption of other cultural offerings not associated with high status, and is likely to be reversed after economic recovery.

Within the permanence scenario, one can also discriminate between two variations: one holding that status is autonomous and individuals are aware of the social consequences of consuming high culture, and another presuming that status is autonomous, but cultural consumption is not a form of strategic status-seeking. Given that status hierarchy is regarded as an entity in its own right, not as a derivative of class, individuals may consciously invest in “bettering themselves”, developing qualities that allow them to participate in prestigious lifestyles and social networks, or they may regard such qualities fatalistically as inborn and deny themselves the possibility of developing them through conscious effort. However, our historical experiment has little value for discriminating between these options as they do not offer conflicting predictions on what happens when the autonomous status becomes divorced from class.

Table 1 summarizes the three positions and major empirical expectations arising from the consequences of social revolution.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Studies that tried to find out if the “meltdown scenario” is really taking place in Western countries have found some traces of it (Purhonen, Gronow and Rahkonen, 2011), particularly in the decline of traditional high culture participation by younger individuals (Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016, p.132). The reasons for this decline are unclear, however. It may have happened for causes other than the perceived loosening of association between status culture and economic privilege. Rather than disenchantment with the prospect of social mobility offered by high culture, declining participation rates could be due to the emergence of alternative forms of cultural capital not captured by traditional survey questions (Prieur, Rosenlund and Skjott-Larsen, 2008), some of which, however, could be still recognized as “high culture”. Distant forms of participation offered by the Internet and television could also be causes of decline in live event attendance among younger cohorts (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004).

To compare the empirical adequacy of our scenarios, we thus need a historical episode in which the position of the group associated with traditional status culture would markedly worsen over a short period of time. Returning to the start of this paper, the Russian intelligentsia’s evolving position over the last 25 years arguably offers us such a historical experiment.

3. Data and measures

3.1. The Saint Petersburg Surveys of Arts Participation

The series of surveys analyzed, the *Saint Petersburg Surveys of Arts Participation* (SPSAP), was started three months before the fall of the USSR in October 1991 by Mikhail Ille, a researcher at the Saint Petersburg Centre for Scientific Sociological Research. Overall, 14 waves took place between 1991 and 2011, each involving on average around 1000 subjects: October, 1991 (N=722), June 1993 (N=1254), June 1994 (N=1177), June 1995 (N=1039), June 1996 (N=1056), June 1998 (N=979), June 2000 (N=950), November, 2005 (N = 1000), November 2006 (N=1022), November 2007 (N=3046), November 2008 (N=954), November 2009 (N=978), November 2010

(N=998), November 2011 (N=1000). Most unluckily, the data from 1991 to 2000 were lost. They survived only as crosstabs representing relations between major variables in earlier publications using the same dataset. The sample covered the adult population (above 18 years of age) of Saint Petersburg, interviews were conducted over landline phones with one respondent per household, phone numbers drawn randomly from the list of all city private home phones.

In April–May 2017, when the next survey was conducted, the situation had changed considerably due to mobile phones having replaced landline phones for many households. We followed the advice of leading Russian poll specialists and implemented a multi-frame survey design to adequately cover the general population. We used three sample bases: landline phones, mobile phones, and face-to-face interviews, and received 700 completed interviews in each sub-sample, 2100 overall (the study is discussed in Kazantsev and Sokolov, 2017).

The major battery of questions has not changed since 1991. Interviewees were asked if in the past 12 months they had visited “dramatic theatre”, “musical theatre, including opera, ballet, operetta”, “concerts of music of academic genres” (a widespread designation for classical music), “popular music concerts (including rock and jazz)”, “folk music concerts”, “museums and art exhibitions” and “movie theatres” (question on movie theatres was not asked in 1993). From the point of view of comparative research, it was most infelicitous that some of the categories merged different genres, such as operetta and opera into “musical theatre”, or jazz and pop music into “pop concerts”, but we had to follow the established formulations to obtain comparable data (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004). No attempts were made to gauge if new forms of cultural capital had evolved, and while on an anecdotal level one could suggest that many have,⁵ this study can only tell us what has happened to the older ones.

⁵ One can notice that the “culture talk” of younger Russian professionals mostly centers on TV series such as “Westworld”, “Black Mirror” or “Game of Thrones”, as well as—in some circles—on architecture and urban design.

The response categories were “never”, “once”, “twice”, three times”, “four to six times”, “seven to nine times” and “ten or more times”. In addition, questions were asked about age, education, parents’ education (in 2007–2009 and in 2017), income, and general occupation. Regretfully, the categories used for describing education, income and occupation varied from year to year (see section 4.3). Nevertheless, we were able to group them into categories for each year.

3.2. Dependent variables

Calculating a dependent variable for this study posed a remarkable difficulty. To measure participation in high culture in a given society, one needs to establish whether a distinction between “high-”, “low-” or “middle-brow” exists within it and then which art forms belong where. One also needs to take into account the possibility that the content of high culture changes over time and across generations. An analysis reported in the Appendix demonstrated, however, that (1) genres traditionally defined as “high” in Western societies do form a single consumption bundle in Russia, meaning that consuming one of them increases the probability of consuming the rest to a greater degree than consuming middle- or low-brow genres; (2) no significant changes occurred in the content of this consumption bundle in the period studied; (3) no significant differences exist between generations.

After much experimentation, briefly described in the Appendix, we decided to use a very simple scale of consumption as a dependent variable in further analysis. We divided the survey subjects into (a) active high culture consumers (those who attended at least three events of drama, musical theatre and classical music in the last 12 months); (b) casual consumers (those who attended at least one such event, but less than three); (c) non-consumers.

4.3. Independent variables

Gender was coded as a binary variable.

Age (which subjects were asked to report in full years) measures two conceptually different but, empirically, strongly correlated variables—belonging to a cohort or generation and passing a certain life cycle stage. Regretfully, as our observations cover a relatively short time span, decomposing the effects of age into that of life cycle and generation presents a problem that we do not attempt to solve here. As cohorts figure prominently in literature on cultural consumption (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; Rossman and Peterson, 2015), we divided survey subjects into those born in 1938 or earlier, 1939–48, 1949–58, 1959–68, 1969–78, 1979 or later.⁶ In addition, we calculated *cohort* as a binary variable (0 = born 1968 or earlier, 1 = born 1969 or later). Those born in 1968 turned 17 in 1985 when Perestroika started, and 23 in 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated; we can thus assume that their principal socialization occurred before the social revolution. This variable was intentionally left coarse to avoid multicollinearity between interaction terms.

For *education*, we had three categories available for all years—“incomplete secondary” (9 years of formal schooling or less), “full secondary or vocational” (10–11 years), “higher or incomplete higher” (13 years or more).

Income posed a greater problem, as for some years we have a precise estimate of income per family member in rubles, while for other years survey subjects had to choose from a list of five to seven income categories (e.g., “below 10 thousand rubles”, “5-10 thousand rubles”, etc.). Due to high inflation in the 1990s and subsequent economic growth in the 2000s, the categories were changed from year to year, with the share of those falling within each category also changing. As

⁶ Where possible, we also used a longer scale adding categories for those born in 1928 or earlier, and those born in 1989 or later. However, members of the former cohort are almost absent in the final survey waves, and the members of the latter cohort are absent from the first ones, which makes their use problematic for regression computations (but see Table 4).

a remedy, we calculated for each individual in each year the share of subject who earned less than him or her—for example, for those who had chosen the lowest category (sparsely populated) the number was 0, for those one category up the number was equal to the share of individuals falling within the lowest category, etc. This approach produced a distribution that was fairly similar to the Gaussian for a pooled sample, with a minimum of 0 and maximum of 1 and was, presumably, characterizing the relative financial standing of each individual.

Parents' education was estimated by asking if an individual had two, one or no parents with higher education.

Questions about *occupation* were not included in most survey waves. However, in 2017 subjects were asked to give details of their present employment (or their last one prior to retirement). The answers were coded in accordance with the ISCO 08 schema.

In addition, we included the *period* in which the interview was taken in some models as a binary variable (0 = interview taken in 2005–2011, 1 = interview taken in 2017) to capture the difference between the periods closer and farther from 1991. Again, the second variable was left intentionally coarse to avoid multicollinearity with interaction terms.

4. Results

Figure 1 presents what is possibly the most important result of our research: changes in the share of adults participating in various cultural activities at least once during the previous 12 months during the period covered by this study. Three observations are immediately striking. First, while some decline in participation did occur in the 1990s, for most art forms it remained within a 10% limit—quite moderate considering the vast majority of Russians' real income dropped by at least 50%. Demand for high culture proved remarkably income-inelastic.

The second point worth noting is that while the relative popularity of many art forms changes very little—museums are more popular than rock and pop concerts, dramatic theatre next, and folk music the least popular—the one exception to this rule is cinema.⁷ The most popular form of cultural participation in the Soviet times (Dmitrievskii 2013: 151-169), cinema attendance fell from 65% in 1991 to 10% in 1998—below the level of classical music (11%). The decline of cinema attendance in the 1990s may be attributed to the emergence of commercial television, which was more responsive to audience demands than Soviet public television had ever been. However, this does not explain its regained popularity in the early 2000s. The rise of cinema-going is particularly striking as it occurred in the period when cinemas had to compete for audiences not only with television, but also when illegal DVDs and torrents had the widest currency in Russia, particularly among younger generations. It seems that in contrast to classical music, and possibly even rock concerts, cinema-going, considered “mere entertainment”, is much more reactive to changes in the population’s economic fortunes.

The third point worth noting is the rise in popularity of all high arts that occurred in the 2000s. After the worst of the economic crisis was left behind, high arts not only easily regained their audiences, but significantly increased them. After unprecedented heights were reached in 2009, a decline followed possibly caused by the consequences of the global crisis, but its effects did not prove long-lasting. In the case of museums, we could partially attribute new heights in their popularity to the rise of new forms, such as science museums, which have attracted a lot of interest since 2015. Nevertheless, more traditional arts museums also witnessed a drastic increase in attendance, with more than half a million people visiting exhibitions of Russian

⁷ More variation in museum attendance than other cultural forms may be a result of drastic changes in ticketing policies (e.g., for several years visiting the Hermitage was free for retirees, but later tickets were reinstated).

nineteenth- and early twentieth-century painters Valentin Serov and Ivan Aivazovskii in 2016 and 2017.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.

Which social and demographic groups were the most avid consumers? Table 2 provides some answers, specifically evaluating DiMaggio and Mukhtar's claim that younger cohorts are likely to turn their backs on culture when they understand that it is not likely to provide them many opportunities for class mobility. What we see is exactly the opposite: during the whole period covered by this study, young people were the most avid consumers and, with only minor aberrations, each successive age group becomes less and less active.

Table 2 displays the percentage of individuals within each category who took part in at least one high-brow activity in the preceding year. It also lists odd's ratios of participation rather than non-participation for polar categories. While the numbers are volatile as the size of many subgroups does not exceed 200 members, some tendencies are clear. Those with higher education are more active than those who only attended secondary school or received vocational training, women more active than men, and younger people are more active than senior ones.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Income adds some detail to this picture. Regretfully, no estimates are available for 1991 and 1995, but the 1993 data show that those better off were not significantly more likely to participate than those at the bottom of the income distribution. This obviously fits well with the view of the intelligentsia as the most affected group: those with the strongest passion for artistic participation possibly had the fewest resources for satisfying this passion, which put them at the same level with wealthier groups who could afford much more of everything. The following years, however, witnessed an increasing gap between rich and poor. Regretfully, as such calculations

depend on cut points between income categories specific for a particular year, a precise estimation of statistical significance is not possible. Nevertheless, it seems that we could say with some confidence that while in 1993 arts consumption probably failed to mark boundaries of economically privileged groups, by the end of the 1990s the share of the culturally active among the richest group being two or even three times greater than among the poorest group. This could be seen as an argument in favour of the “transfer scenario”, although until we control for effects of other variables no decisive verdict can be reached.

All in all, as a tentative conclusion it seems that the “meltdown scenario”, as described by DiMaggio and Mukhtar, never materialized in Russia. That participation in status culture showed no visible positive correlation with economic wealth, and thus could not bring pecuniary benefits, has neither reduced significantly the number of consumers nor lead to a decrease in cultural activity by the youngest cohort. This means that the art lovers either participated in an artistic life non-strategically, without looking for the status benefits such participation could bring, or the relevant status benefits were not directly related to the market chances associated with class. The next stage of analysis was to reveal, using the surviving data from 2005–2017, if a “transfer scenario” or “permanence scenario” was realized.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

At the next stage of our analysis, we used multinomial logistic regression with participation in high-cultural events as a dependent variable (Tables 3 and 5). As the previous analysis demonstrated that there is no evidence of dramatic changes in the dependent variable occurring during the studied period, all cases for 2005–2017 were pooled together. The first model shows the main effects of the most traditional variables in cultural consumption analysis (gender, age/cohort, education and income [Katz-Gerro, 2011]). All of the odd's ratios are highly significant, with women approximately 3 times more likely than men to be active rather than inactive, those with higher education 3.6 times more likely than the vocationally educated , and those with the highest income having the chance to participate 4.57 times greater than those belonging to the lowest income category. As for age groups, two effects are present in our data. First, members of the youngest group have a much higher chance of being active, rather than inactive, compared with older individuals, particularly those belonging to the oldest group. However, those born in the 1940s and 1950s have a better chance than the youngest group to be active rather than be casual consumers. This effect mostly occurs because casual cultural consumption is rarer among members of these cohorts than among the younger ones. The numbers of active cultural consumers are not significantly higher among those born in the '40s or '50s than among those born in the '80s or '90s, although the number of casual consumers among them is significantly lower. Table 4 illustrates this effect. Thus, among those born in 1939–1948 the ratio of casual and active consumers is 1:1.4, and in the cohort of 1949–1958 it reaches 1:1.6. In the youngest cohorts it drops to 1:1.2 (1979–1988) and even 1:1 (1989 and after). However, the total number of active consumers seems fairly stable in every generation except the oldest ones, oscillating between 23% and 26%. This picture may be easily interpreted as a life

cycle effect. Individuals for whom cultural consumption is an important part of their identity and who are likely to be active consumers continue being active until senior age, while casual consumers stop participating when they reach mid-life. The most important thing these data demonstrate is that the number of dedicated consumers of traditional high culture remains fairly constant in all age groups, and we obviously have no reason to conclude that high culture has lost its appeal among younger generations.

INSERT TABLE 4 HERE

The next, second model adds parents' education, which proves highly significant. The variable was excluded from the previous analysis as the corresponding question was not asked in all waves of the survey. Adding it, however, improves the explanatory power of the model. We find out that having at least one parent with higher education increases the probability of being culturally active. Despite all changes, there is still an important tendency towards reproduction of participation in an intelligentsia lifestyle.

The third model added interactions between cohort and income and between period and income to the list of independent variables in the first model. Counter to the hypothesis associated with the "transfer scenario" correlation between period and wealth is insignificant: while income is highly important in predicting probability of consumption, there is no reason to believe it became *more* important than it used to be, as time passes since the era of the social revolution and new generations of cultural consumers mature. Equally significant, the association between wealth and consumption is not stronger among the younger cohorts than among the older ones (if anything, the opposite is true—having greater income allows people to stay culturally active for a longer time). In other words, there is no indication that status culture was taken over by the children of the new economically advantaged groups.

INSERT TABLE 5 HERE

The final, fourth model introduces the interaction between the cohort one belongs to and parents' education. It provides some indication that for those socialized during the Soviet era, parents' education may better predict cultural consumption than for those who are younger. This observation fits into the expectation following from the "transfer model". However, the coefficients are significant for only one of the interactions (those having one parent with higher education are more likely to be highly, rather than moderately, culturally active, than those having no parents with a university diploma if they were socialized in the USSR) and this observation allows alternative interpretations. Authors of a study conducted in Finland making a similar observation interpreted it as an indication that the meltdown scenario occurred in Finland (Purhonen, Gronow and Rahkonen, 2011), although in the context of the evidence presented so far this is unlikely to be the case in Russia. What could also be important is the fact that higher education has expanded in recent decades, and that having a university diploma was probably a much stronger predictor of belonging to the intelligentsia one or two generations ago than it became later (Meyer and Schofer, 2005).

Finally, one can notice that structural variables such as education, parents' education, or income generally predict cultural consumption better among the elder cohorts than the younger.⁸ However, as far as the time span of our study allows such a conclusion, this pattern does not signal secular growth in the individualization of lifestyles, as the explanatory strength of our independent variables have not declined in the past decade.⁹ In other words, it seems that younger people are less constrained in their experimentation with different lifestyles, but which of the experiments they ultimately embrace as a part of their identity and reproduce in their later

⁸ E.g., Cox and Snell pseudoR² for multiple logistic regression model with gender, self and parents' education, and income as dependent variables is 0.125 for the youngest age group (18–29), but increases considerably to 0.169 for subjects of 60 and older.

⁹ If anything, the opposite is true. Cox and Snell R² for the model with gender, age, self and parents' education, and income is 0.229 for 2017, but 0.167 for 2007.

life is predetermined by the starting point of their social trajectory as characterized by their and their parents' education . In other words, it seems that overall the permanence scenario receives much stronger support from our data than the other two scenarios.

5. Discussion and conclusions

The major conclusion this analysis brings us to is that neither meltdown nor transfer scenario necessarily follow from a situation where ties between participation in status culture and economic advantage are broken and convertibility of cultural capital into economic is put into question. While the perceived economic miseries of the intelligentsia probably led to a decline in popularity of its traditional occupations, there is no evidence that it also resulted in the mass abandonment of the cultural consumption patterns most strongly associated with it. We have seen that participation in "high culture" is much more resistant to economic adversity than participation in "mere entertainment", which could probably be explained by the former's role as an important element of one's social identity. The boundaries of high culture itself also remained fairly constant.¹⁰ There is also no evidence that participation in status culture has been taken over by the children of the new economically advantaged group. If anything, the data suggests the opposite: cultural consumption is less dependent on income among younger than it is among older cohorts. In fact, the strong correlation between one's arts participation and the education of one's parents suggest that there is a fair degree of reproduction of intelligentsia

¹⁰ Due to questions about subjects' occupations being asked in 2017, we could discover that the occupational boundaries of the intelligentsia have also not shifted much. More than half (50.5%) of all active consumers belong to the ISCO category 2 ("professionals"), which predominantly consists of traditional mass intelligentsia occupations such as doctors, teachers, engineers, scientists, etc. Overall, 39.8% members of this category fitted our definition of active cultural consumers, with 22.1% being casual consumers and 38.1% non-active. All other occupational categories showed considerably lower results, with the respective numbers for category 8 (skilled workers) being 6.1%, 10.3% and 83.6%. At the same time, the income of "professionals" has not differed significantly from that of the city population in general; their median income per family member remained in the same 10–15 000 ruble category (around 300 euro) as that of skilled and semi-skilled workers or technicians. The intelligentsia occupations remain associated with a cultured lifestyle, but not with economic advantage.

families, the succession of which was not broken by the social revolution. All this speaks for a significant autonomy of status culture from the realities of economic inequality, and for its power to reproduce its prestige independently of its ability to signal wealth. The permanence scenario seems much more plausible than the other two models.

If participation in status culture in Russia is not valued for its association with economic wealth and class privilege, what, then, stands behind its lasting prestige? Two types of explanations are possible here. One of them points to universal mechanisms, another to the specificity of Russian society. The universalistic explanation suggests accepting a radical Shilsian (Shils 1965) or Goldthorpean (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007) view of status as a totally independent dimension of social stratification rooted in a group's ideas of a good life and ritual cleanliness. According to it, being culturally sophisticated is ultimately closer to being cheerful than to wearing a gold watch. Supporting this interpretation of our data, one might notice that our data provides no evidence to substantiate the claim that the Russian case is strikingly dissimilar to the European ones. Looking at Table 3, a reader may notice that all the traditional predictors of cultural participation—gender, age, education, and income—are significant in the Russia sample as well, and the effects generally go in the same direction. The exception is age, which, counter to what is observed in most European cases (Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016), has a strongly negative effect—the younger, the more, generally, culturally active. This contrasts sharply with what we observe in many comparative contexts where people are most active in consuming traditional high culture when in their 40s or 50s (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004; Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016). This tendency is often interpreted as a sign of decline in traditional cultural capital and its replacement with other cultural forms (Prieur, Rosenlund, and Skjott-Larsen, 2008). In Russia, however, while new forms of cultural capital have possibly emerged and spread among the younger generations, they did so as an addition to its already existing forms, not as a replacement for them. The same

pattern—greater activity of the youngest cohorts—could be observed, however, in a few South and East European countries such as Portugal or Greece and new EU post-socialist member states (Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016, p.135), which also demonstrates a similar persistence of traditional cultural capital. It might thus be that the Russian case just offers a critical experiment that tells us something that is true for all modern societies: status is an autonomous dimension of stratification that is not reducible to any other.

Another explanation of the persistence of Russian status culture points to the possibility that Russia's stratification system is different from its Western counterparts in several crucial points. A few hypotheses on that count can be found in the literature. One of them implies a return to the first, alternativist interpretation of Weberian status: a form of stratification that is an alternative, rather than a complement, to the class system. A few observers, both Russian and international, noted that estates (*soslovija*) were a persistent part of Russian social organization present in Soviet (e.g., Fitzpatrick, 1993), as well as in post-soviet times (Kordonskii, 2008). According to this interpretation, the view of status groups as having little place in a modern society may be completely wrong, and Russia offers an example of that. One can go on to suggest that in a status-based society, one's loyalty to his or her status group may persist in spite of any temporary loss of economic advantage group membership provides. When access to sectors of the economy the group has appropriated declines, the group members do not react with their immediate refusal to renew their symbolic membership within it, as belonging to the group also provides them with an identity and feelings of personal worth.

Other possible explanations suggest that, while prestige ascribed to status culture in Russia is derivable from its ability to signal belonging to privileged groupings that are not status groups as such, these groupings need not coincide with "classes" in the Western sense of the word. In non-Western societies European status culture may be used to mark boundaries of a totally different

kind of elite. Groups created by territorial stratification are candidates for this role. While intelligentsia occupations were not necessarily the most well paid relative to other occupations in the same locality, many of them (especially higher education and research) were disproportionally located in major Russian cities, where cultural life was also concentrated. To give only one example, the 2010 census revealed that 50% of those holding a “doctor of science” upper academic degree reside in Moscow, the capital city and the wealthiest Russian region. These findings are to be seen in light of the fact that in Russia it is region, rather than occupation, that explains more variation in salaries (Oschepkov, 2011). Thus, while for the Saint Petersburg population participating in status culture would not signal economic privilege, for the country as a whole, it would. In a way, for a territorially stratified society, cultural capital may be important as a symbol of metropolitan residence—an important dimension of stratification in its own right (Zubarevich, 2013).

Rather than a decisive conclusion, we thus end up with a variety of options. It may be that participation in status culture in modern societies is valued irrespective of its correlation with wealth because it is believed that artistic consumption signals possession of certain admirable personal qualities. It might be also that traditional “Western” cultural capital may be used by totally different, non-class dominant groups. Further research is necessary to establish which of these interpretation holds. What we can say, speaking from Russia’s experience, is that an invariable vision of status culture as a cultural façade for economic-based class is probably misleading.

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	Status derivative from class	Status autonomous from class
Individuals aware of functions of status culture	Meltdown scenario (e.g., Goffman, 1951; DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arts participation declines - Its decline is strongest among the youngest cohorts 	Permanence scenario (e.g., Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arts participation stable or insignificant decline - No interaction between wealth, period, and age - No interaction between parents' education and age
Individuals non-reflexive	Transfer scenario (e.g., Holt, 1998; Atkinson, 2011) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Arts participation may temporarily decline - Income better predicts cultural consumption among younger cohorts - Correlation between income and participation increases as time passes after transformative period - Parents' education better predicts cultural consumption among senior cohorts - Artistic classifications are likely to change 	

Table 1. Major scenarios and subsequent expectation

CULTURAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

	1991	1993	1995	1998	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2017
Men	45	43	32	38	48	40	45	43	42	49	44	43	56
Women	51	48	43	42	48	39	53	52	50	62	51	58	72
Odds men/women	0.79	0.82	0.62	0.85	1.00	1.04	0.73	0.70	0.72	0.59	0.75	0.55	0.49
18–29 years	66	64	51	56	63	50	60	63	61	73	63	66	76
30–39 years	52	55	49	51	61	47	62	55	48	65	49	60	62
40–49 years	53	42	43	35	51	43	53	54	56	60	53	55	73
50–59 years	45	32	29	33	35	38	48	45	43	56	44	46	65
60 years	26	28	15	17	25	21	28	31	28	33	34	33	51
Odds youngest/oldest	5.52	4.57	5.90	6.21	5.11	3.76	3.86	3.79	4.02	5.49	3.31	3.94	3.04
Secondary (vocational)	46	39	29	29	38	28	44	35	39	44	39	37	51
Higher	62	60	56	59	66	55	61	63	64	69	60	66	78
Odds higher/secondary (vocational)	1.92	2.35	3.12	3.52	3.17	3.14	1.99	3.16	2.78	2.83	2.35	3.31	3.41
Lowest income ¹¹		37		24	31	14	37	27	28	38	32	35	46
2 nd income group		42		31	27	33	36	37	36	42	48	42	49
3 rd income group		44		45	42	42	57	48	47	63	52	44	62
4 th income group		41		53	57	45	52	58	52		60	64	70
Highest income		42		70	67	52	60	63	59	78	68	68	80
Odds highest/lowest income		1.23		7.39	4.52	6.65	2.55	4.60	3.70	5.78	4.52	3.95	4.70
Total non-zero participation	48	46	38	40	48	39	50	48	47	56	48	51	64
N	722	1 254	1 039	979	950	1 000	1 022	3 046	954	978	998	1 000	2 100

Table 2. Per cent participating in high-cultural activities in the previous 12 months, by category, by year, and odd's ratios for selected categories

¹¹ For years for which more than five income categories were used, the groups having the fewest observations were merged with the neighboring groups.

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Dependent variable					
	1/0	2/0	2/1	1/0	2/0	2/1
Constant	.229	.137	.598	.184	.085	.463
Income	2.190*** (1.729-2.773)	4.398*** (3.495-5.533)	2.008*** (1.522-2.649)	2.612*** (1.914-3.565)	5.185*** (3.820-7.039)	1.985*** (1.380-2.855)
Gender: male	.624*** (.560-.694)	.340*** (.305-.378)	.545*** (.479-.619)	.610*** (.532-.699)	.312*** (.272-.359)	.512*** (.435-.604)
Education: higher	1.981*** (1.782-2.203)	3.675*** (3.306-4.086)	1.855*** (1.631-2.110)	1.921*** (1.665-2.216)	3.167*** (2.742-3.658)	1.648*** (1.386-1.960)
Education: incomplete secondary	.481** (.305-.760)	.234*** (.114-.477)	.486 (.213-1.110)	.521* (.284-.956)	.058** (.008-.416)	.111* (.014-.861)
Cohort: 1938 or earlier	.339*** (.271-.424)	.329*** (.261-.415)	.971 (.725-1.301)	.417*** (.308-.565)	.451*** (.325-.624)	1.081 (.723-1.616)
Cohort: 1939-1948	.623*** (.513-.756)	.907 (.756-1.089)	1.458** (1.162-1.829)	.594*** (.458-.771)	1.183 (932-1.500)	1.990*** (1.474-2.686)
Cohort: 1949-1958	.635*** (535-.754)	.928 (.790-1.088)	1.460*** (1.200-1.777)	.692** (.554-.865)	1.195 (.968-1.474)	1.726*** (1.338-2.228)
Cohort: 1959-1968	.962 (.823-1.125)	1.106 (.948-1.291)	1.150 (.961-1.375)	1.092 (.865-1.332)	1.402** (1.149-1.710)	1.284* (1.024-1.611)
Cohort: 1969 -1979	.872 (.749-1.015)	.970 (.836-1.126)	1.112 (.936-1.322)	.979 (.808-1.185)	1.072 (.885-1.297)	1.095 (.881-1.360)
Parents: both with HE				1.163 (.973-1.391)	2.105*** (1.783-2.486)	1.810*** (1.484-2.208)
Parents: one with HE				1.266** (1.069-1.498)	1.735*** (1.471-2.048)	1.371** (1.128-1.667)
N	11049			6679		
Cox and Snell pseudo-R ²	0.155			0.181		
Note	*P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 Confidence intervals for independent variables are given in parentheses Categories of dependent variable: 0 – non-consumers, 1 – casual consumers, 2 – active consumers Reference categories for gender – female, for education – complete secondary/vocational, for cohort – born in 1979 or later, for parents’ education – both without higher education					

Table 3. Multinomial logistic regression of cultural activity of selected demographic and social variables, pooled sample (2005–2017), models 1-2

	None	Casual	Active
1928 and earlier	249 89.9%	13 4.7%	15 5.4%
1929–1938	830 80.3%	107 10.3%	97 9.4%
1939–1948	896 65.4%	196 14.3%	277 20.2%
1949–1958	1106 61.5%	270 15.0%	423 23.5%
1959–1968	1055 53.7%	402 20.5%	506 25.8%
1969–1978	1184 53.4%	446 20.1%	588 26.5%
1979–1988	924 54.4%	359 21.1%	417 24.5%
1989 and later	374 52.7%	165 23.2%	171 24.1%
Total	6618 59.8%	1958 17.7%	2494 22.5%

Table 4. Cultural activity of members of different cohorts, by level (2005–2017)

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	Model 3			Model 4		
	Dependent variable					
	1/0	2/0	2/1	1/0	2/0	2/1
Constant	.214	.111	.619	.170	.093	.544
Income	2.967*** (1.737-5.068)	6.716*** (3.818-11.813)	1.844* (1.010-3.368)	3.344*** (2.480-4.510)	6.237*** (4.645-8.374)	1.865*** (1.313-2.648)
Gender: male	.607*** (.529-.695)	.314*** (.273-.360)	.542*** (.477-.616)	.606*** (.528-.694)	.312*** (.271-.358)	.515*** (.437-.606)
Education: higher	1.957*** (1.709-2.240)	3.803*** (3.319-4.359)	1.864*** (1.640-2.119)	1.846*** (1.603-2.127)	3.107*** (2.694-3.582)	1.683*** (1.417-1.999)
Education: incomplete secondary	.397** (.218-.723)	.039** (.005-.278)	.439* (.193-1.000)	.405** (.222-.737)	.043** (.006-.308)	.106* (.014-.819)
Cohort: 1968 or earlier	.485*** (.329-.715)	.803 (.542-1.188)	1.253 (.880-1.785)	.843 (.688-1.031)	.988 (.795-1.228)	1.178 (.804-1.725)
Period: 2011 or earlier	1.081 (.730-1.601)	1.014 (.685-1.503)	.988 (.544-1.517)	.809** (.702-.932)	.869* (.756-.999)	1.074 (.913-1.264)
Cohort: early *Income	2.060* (1.123-3.779)	1.348 (.742-2.450)	.942 (.549-1.615)			
Period: early *Income	.632 (.344-1.160)	.802 (.442-1.454)	1.168 (.624-2.188)			
Parents: both with HE				1.232 (.967-1.568)	1.922*** (1.511-2.444)	1.561** (1.181-2.062)
Parents: one with HE				1.462** (1.152-1.855)	1.558** (1.210-2.006)	1.066 (.801-1.419)
Parents: both with HE				1.035 (.735-1.458)	1.220 (.886-1.679)	1.178 (.804-1.725)
*Cohort: early						
Parents: one with HE				.807 (.577-1.129)	1.250 (.899-1.739)	1.549* (1.049-2.286)
*Cohort early						
N	11049			6679		
Cox and Snell pseudo-R ²	0.143			0.179		
Note	*P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P < 0.001 Confidence intervals for independent variables are given in parentheses Categories of dependent variable: 0 – non-consumers, 1 – casual consumers, 2 – active consumers Reference categories for gender – female, for education – complete secondary/vocational, for cohort – born in 1979 or later, for parents’ education – both without higher education					

Table 5. Multinomial logistic regression of cultural activity of selected demographic and social variables, pooled sample (2005–2017), models 3-4

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Figure 1. Percent attending various cultural events in the previous 12 months, by year.