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Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah On Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes

*Ala' Alrababa'h, William Marble, Salma Mousa,
and Alexandra Siegel*

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Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice?*

The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes

Ala' Alrababa'h,^{1,2,a} William Marble,¹ Salma Mousa,^{1,2} Alexandra Siegel^{2,3}

¹ Department of Political Science, Stanford University

² Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University and ETH Zurich

³ Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder

^a Corresponding author: alaa@stanford.edu

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Abstract

Can exposure to celebrities from a stigmatized group reduce prejudice toward that group writ large? We estimate the causal effect of Mohammed Salah—a visibly Muslim soccer player—joining Liverpool Football Club on Islamophobia, using hate crime reports throughout England, 15 million tweets from British soccer fans, and a survey experiment of Liverpool F.C. fans. We find that hate crimes in Merseyside (home to Liverpool F.C.) dropped by 16% compared to a synthetic control, and Liverpool F.C. fans halved their rates of posting anti-Muslim tweets relative to fans of other top-flight clubs. Our survey experiment suggests that the salience of Salah's Muslim identity enabled positive feelings toward Salah to generalize to Muslims more broadly. Providing real-world behavioral measures of prejudice reduction and experimental evidence from a naturalistic setting, our findings provide support for the parasocial contact hypothesis, indicating that positive exposure to outgroup celebrities can reduce prejudice.

Keywords: prejudice, migration, intergroup contact, hate crimes

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In February 2018, fans of one of England's most storied soccer clubs, Liverpool F.C., celebrated a decisive victory in soccer's most elite league. A 5 - 0 win over F.C. Porto in the UEFA Champions League previewed an excellent season that saw Liverpool F.C. advance to the final. Mohamed Salah, a young Egyptian striker, was key to the club's success. After the victory, fans chanted:

*If he scores another few
Then I'll be Muslim, too.
If he's good enough for you,
He's good enough for me.
Sitting in a mosque,
That's where I wanna be.*

Fans created more homespun chants as Liverpool F.C. continued their successful season:

*Mohamed Salah
A gift from Allah.
He's always scoring,
It's almost boring.
So please don't take
Mohamed away.*

In the first three seasons that Salah played for Liverpool F.C., the club had been extraordinarily successful, appearing in consecutive Champions League finals and taking the title in 2019. The club was similarly successful in the domestic league, winning the English Premier League for the first time in club history in 2020, with Salah being crowned the league's top goal-scorer two years in a row.

Salah is noteworthy not only for his skill on the soccer field, but also for his conspicuous Islamic identity — arguably unprecedented at the elite level of global soccer Salah occupies. European fans were not accustomed to seeing players prostrate in Muslim prayer (*sujood*) after scoring goals, for example, fueling media speculation that the centrality of Salah's Muslim identity to his public image might be reducing Islamophobia among fans ([The National, 2018](#); [Thomas, 2018](#)).¹ Some pundits argued that Salah portrayed “favorable images of Muslims, helping to reduce stereotypes and break

¹We adopt a relatively expansive definition of Islamophobia: fear, hatred, or dislike of Islam or Muslims, as well as anti-Muslim prejudicial attitudes or behaviors more generally ([Sheridan, 2006](#)).

down barriers within communities” (Monks, 2018). Others disagreed. Despite the fact that “everyone loves a winner,” there was still no systematic evidence that Salah’s fame could “in any way decrease the mainstream Islamophobia in British culture” (Al-Sayyad, 2018). Beyond anecdotes, little is known about whether Salah has had a systematic impact on Islamophobia.

The possibility that exposure to Salah may reduce Islamophobia represents an instance of the parasocial contact hypothesis (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes, 2005) — the idea that mediated contact with celebrities or characters from minority groups has the potential to reduce prejudice toward that group as a whole. This proposed extension to Allport’s (1954) classic contact hypothesis has received support in a plethora of observational studies, laboratory- and survey-based experiments, but not real-world settings with causal purchase. In this paper, we provide a real-world test of the parasocial contact hypothesis. We test the proposition that Salah’s meteoric rise has reduced anti-Muslim attitudes and behaviors among Liverpool F.C. fans. We test this hypothesis using three complementary research designs: an analysis of hate crimes in England, an analysis of anti-Muslim tweets among UK soccer fans, and an original survey experiment.

First, we draw on hate crime data from 25 police departments in England between 2015 and 2018. We employ a variant of the synthetic control method to generate a counterfactual hate crime rate for the Merseyside police force — which covers the city of Liverpool — after Salah signed. We find that Merseyside experienced a 16% lower hate crime rate after Salah was signed relative to the expected rate had he not been signed. Second, we analyze 15 million tweets produced by followers of prominent soccer clubs in the English Premier League. Using the same synthetic control method as in our hate crime analysis, we find that the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets produced by Liverpool F.C. fans after Salah joined was about half of the expected rate had he not joined Liverpool — 3.8% versus 7.3% of tweets related to Muslims. Finally, we implement a survey experiment among 8,060 Liverpool F.C. fans to explicitly test how exposure to Salah might lead to generalized tolerance toward Muslims. In line with the parasocial contact hypothesis, our results suggest that the salience of Salah’s Muslim identity facilitates prejudice reduction toward Muslims writ large. Priming respondents with information about Salah’s religious practices boosted the belief that Islam is compatible with British values by around

5 percentage points, compared to the baseline rate of 18% among the control group. These findings suggest that positive exposure to outgroup celebrities, especially when these celebrities’ minority group membership is highly salient, can reduce prejudice across a range of social contexts.

This “Salah effect” is likely not unique to Salah. Celebrities with role model-like qualities have long been thought to shape social attitudes. When Jackie Robinson broke baseball’s color barrier in 1947, his “efforts were a monumental step in the civil-rights revolution in America ... [His] accomplishments allowed Black and White Americans to be more respectful and open to one another,” according to historian Doris Kearns Goodwin ([Williams and Sielski, 2004](#)). British-Bangladeshi Nadiyah Hussain, the headscarf-clad winner of the most watched program on British television, *The Great British Bake-Off*, was credited with doing “more for British-Muslim relations than 10 years of government policy” after her 2015 win ([Wiseman, 2018](#)). The 2018 reboot of *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy* has similarly been lauded as a “tool for helping people unlearn” homophobia ([Reyes Jr., 2018](#)).

Indeed, exposure to celebrities through mass-media is one of the most common forms of inter-group contact, making parasocial contact an important but understudied frontier of prejudice reduction research ([Park, 2012](#)). This study contributes to our understanding of parasocial contact in four primary ways. First, we study naturally occurring exposure to a celebrity — rather than exposure induced in a laboratory or survey experiment — providing strong claims to external validity. Second, we examine an unexpected and plausibly exogenous increase in exposure to a celebrity from a minority group, allowing us to estimate plausible counterfactuals for the treated units. This research design gives us causal purchase beyond what is typically attainable in observational studies on parasocial contact or the contact hypothesis more generally, where selection bias poses a threat to inference. Third, we study behavioral outcomes, like hate crimes and hate speech, that are of direct interest for policy. Finally, we buttress our observational results with an original survey experiment both to lend further credence to our causal estimates, and to test the critical assumption needed for parasocial contact with one individual to reduce prejudice toward an entire group — the salience of minority group identity.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In [Section 1](#), we draw on the intergroup contact literature to generate empirical hypotheses. [Section 2](#) provides context on Islamophobia in the U.K.

Section 3 presents our analysis of English hate crime data. In Section 4, we analyze tweets produced by Twitter followers of English Premier League clubs. Section 5 provides tests of robustness and generalizability. Section 6 describes our original survey experiment testing the proposition that the salience of Salah’s identity may play a key role in reducing prejudice toward Muslims more generally. Finally, in Section 7 we interpret the results and speak to their generalizability.

1 The Parasocial Contact Hypothesis

A rich literature documents the relationship between various forms of intergroup contact and prejudice. The contact hypothesis posits that personal contact across social lines can reduce prejudice if that contact is positive, endorsed by communal authorities, egalitarian, and involves cooperating to achieve a common goal (Allport, 1954). Such contact has been found to reduce prejudice by alleviating intergroup anxieties, inducing empathy, highlighting commonalities, and forging friendships, among other social, emotional, and cognitive pathways (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew, 1998). Experimental evidence from myriad contexts and countries establishes the effectiveness of positive contact in improving intergroup relations (Burns, Corno and La Ferrara, 2015; Carrell, Hoekstra and West, 2015; Rao, 2019; Lowe, 2017; Barnhardt, 2009). Meta-analyses subsequently conclude that positive contact “typically reduces prejudice” (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Paluck, Green and Green, 2018).

While interpersonal contact presents a promising way to foster intergroup tolerance, its potential may be limited due to a scarcity of opportunities for such contact. Residential and occupational segregation, intergroup anxiety, or the small size of some minority groups can pose social, economic, and psychological barriers to meaningful contact between minority and majority groups (Joyce and Harwood, 2014; Ortiz and Harwood, 2007; Enos, 2017). This has led scholars, including the father of the contact hypothesis, to suggest that mass media may play an important role in shaping and sustaining prejudice (Allport, 1954).

Building on this insight, Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes (2005) propose the “parasocial contact hypothesis” as an analogue of the classic contact hypothesis. This hypothesis stipulates that mediated

contact with members of minority groups has the potential to reduce prejudice toward that group. Numerous observational and experimental laboratory studies document support for the parasocial contact hypothesis. While much of this literature has focused on the role of negative media coverage in exacerbating prejudice ([Ramasubramanian, 2013](#)), exposure to fictional television characters and celebrities has been shown to reduce diverse types of prejudice including racial prejudice, religious prejudice, prejudice based on gender or sexual orientation, and prejudice against individuals with disabilities or mental health disorders ([Park, 2012](#); [Wong, Lookadoo and Nisbett, 2017](#); [Abrams, McGaughey and Haghighat, 2018](#); [Miller et al., 2020](#); [Bond, 2020](#)).

Like face-to-face contact, the quality and quantity of parasocial contact determines the degree to which it might reduce prejudice. While the conditions under which parasocial contact might be successful have yet to be systematically tested, [Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes \(2005\)](#) stress that parasocial contact should involve repeated exposure to likable and clearly identifiable members of a minority group. Studies of traditional intergroup contact similarly highlight the importance of repeated exposure ([Dovidio et al., 2017](#)), a positive portrayal of minority group members ([Aberson, 2015](#); [Barlow et al., 2012](#); [Paolini, Harwood and Rubin, 2010](#)), and a salient group identity ([Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2013](#)). When these conditions are met, individuals appear to use the same cognitive processes underpinning prejudice reduction during parasocial contact — for example, in developing “relationships” with television characters — as they do in real-world interpersonal contact with outgroup members ([Park, 2012](#)).

For Liverpool F.C. fans, exposure to Salah fulfills these criteria. First, fans have sustained contact with Salah over time. Salah is a regular starter for Liverpool F.C.’s games within the English Premier League, which entails 38 weeks of game play every season, in addition to appearances at other domestic and international tournaments. Off the field, Salah is active on social media and appears in high-profile advertisements for corporations like Pepsi, Adidas, and Vodafone. Appearances at sporting events, sports television, and commercials are all known to facilitate parasocial relationships between fans and celebrity athletes ([Brown and Basil, 1995](#)).

Second, with Salah enjoying tremendous success at the individual, club, and national levels during

the period under study, Salah is portrayed positively in the media and receives a great deal of positive attention from fans and teammates. In May 2018, he carried his club to the world's most watched annual sporting event, the UEFA Champions League Final, before leading the Egyptian national side to the FIFA World Cup for the first time in three decades one month later. His remarkable breakout season earned him a nomination for the English Premier League's Player of the Year and the coveted FIFA Puskás Prize for Goal of the Year, satisfying the positive exposure criterion of parasocial contact.

Finally, Salah's Muslim identity is highly salient. His first name is recognizably Muslim, he prostrates in prayer after scoring a goal, and points his index finger to the sky while reciting the *shahada*, the Muslim profession of faith. Die-hard fans will also know that Salah's daughter, Makka, is named after Islam's most sacred site, and his veiled wife can often be seen cheering him on from the sidelines. Salah is distinctive in this way: Europe has seen many excellent players of Muslim heritage, but most are dissociated from Islam in the minds of fans because of their lack of public piety. By contrast, fan chants centered on Salah refer to mosques, Muslims, and Allah while the Liverpool F.C. coach, Jürgen Klopp, has also pointed to Salah's religiosity as an integral part of his identity ([Bascombe, 2019](#)). Given that Salah meets the three hypothesized criteria for parasocial contact to reduce prejudice — positivity, repeated exposure, and salient outgroup identity — he provides an ideal case through which to test the parasocial contact hypothesis.

2 Context: Islamophobia in the U.K

The British Empire has historically perpetuated racism to justify the continued occupation of foreign territories. South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans have subsequently endured a legacy of discriminatory policies and practices, including waves of skinhead violence by far-right, anti-immigrant groups. The government passed the Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1976, and self-reported racist attitudes declined between the 1980s and 2001 ([BBC News, 2014](#)). However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 re-invigorated discrimination against visible minorities, particularly Muslims. Suspicion toward Muslims manifested in the behavior of the British state, media coverage of

Muslims, and public attitudes toward Islam. Scholars have argued that British surveillance of Muslims following terrorist attacks was driven in large part by an irrational fear of Muslims, and “informed by the framing of the terror threat as an Islamic threat, which casts all Muslims as potential terrorists that need to be monitored and categorised” (Qurashi, 2018). The sweeping skepticism toward Muslims ingrained in the British state bureaucracy was such that even Christians from Muslim-majority countries faced additional barriers during immigration and asylum processes (Madziva, 2018).

The British media has also played a role in perpetuating a fear of Muslims and Islam. For instance, in response to a question by the *Evening Standard* about the impact of Islam on life in London, a former *BBC Today* program editor asserted that “Islam is masochistic, homophobic and a totalitarian regime. It is a fascistic, bigoted and medieval religion” (Milly and Khiabany, 2010). A columnist for *The Daily Mail* characterized the veil worn by some Muslim women as an “Islamist symbol which plays a role analogous to the use of the swastika by Nazism” (Milly and Khiabany, 2010). Meanwhile, *The Daily Express* published a column that stated, “Make no mistake, the proliferation of the burka-wearing is a direct threat to the British way of life and in all too many instances is intended to be just that” (Milly and Khiabany, 2010). A study of the print news media between 2000 and 2008 found that 36% of stories about British Muslims overall are related to terrorism, with 32% of all stories about Muslims in 2008 centered on the religious and cultural differences between Islam and British values (Moore, Mason and Wren Lewis, 2008). The rise of negative portrayals of Muslims in mainstream media has been accompanied by an increase in anti-Muslim cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of offline violence (Awan and Zempi, 2016).

Negative attitudes toward Islam are similarly reflected in public opinion data. Figure 1 summarizes polling data, from YouGov, that shows a steady increase in the belief that “there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society” from 2015 to 2017. Despite a slight dip in 2017, over half the respondents continued to affirm this sentiment in 2018, signaling a continued, strong skepticism toward Islam in the U.K.

High levels of prejudice compound other disadvantages faced by British Muslims. Data from the 2014 Office for National Statistics’ Labour Force survey show that Muslim men are up to 76%

Figure 1: Attitudes toward Islam in the British public between 2015 and 2018. The vertical axis is the percentage of survey respondents stating that “there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society.” Points are weighted averages within survey waves; the trend line is a GAM fit to all 34,409 survey respondents using survey weights. Source: The YouGov-Cambridge Center.

less likely to be employed, and Muslim women up to six times less likely, than their White, non-Muslim counterparts (Khattab and Johnston, 2015). A government report concluding that “Muslims experience the greatest economic disadvantages of any group in U.K. society” attributed part of this disadvantage to discrimination in the workplace (Stevenson et al., 2017). Discrimination likely extends beyond the labor market. Over a quarter of British Pakistanis feel discriminated against on the housing market compared to just 1% of White non-Muslim Britons, according to a 2013 survey, and Muslims consistently report poorer health outcomes relative to other religious groups (McLeod, 2013; Elahi and Khan, 2017). Prejudice against Muslims also seems to beget violence. While race or ethnicity already motivated 82% of hate crimes in England and Wales in 2012 (Home Office, 2012), reported abuse against Muslims nearly doubled between 2015 and 2017 according to one watch group (Tell Mama, 2017).

How might parasocial contact operate in the British context? Prior work shows that the macro-

political environment and the tone of media coverage shape the outcomes of intergroup encounters, but that effects are highly contextual. Hopkins (2010) finds that hostile national rhetoric, especially when combined with local demographic change, increases individual and political hostility toward ethnic outgroups. In contrast, Sønderskov and Thomsen (2015) show that hostile national rhetoric can reduce prejudice among individuals with friends and coworkers from outgroups, further suggesting differential effects of national climates on prejudice. Generating expectations as to how intergroup contact might operate in the city of Liverpool is likely to be even more context-dependent. On the one hand, Liverpool is less ethnically diverse than the rest of England (86.2% White vs. the national average of 81.4%), and is located in one of the top five police jurisdictions with the highest prevalence of hate crimes (Liverpool City Council, 2011). On the other hand, Liverpudlians have long boycotted *The Sun*, one of the most influential right-wing tabloids, and therefore have more liberal attitudes on some political issues (Foos and Bischof, 2018). Further complicating our expectations, the study period coincides with a Brexit process fueled by anti-immigrant sentiment (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), but one that was ultimately rejected by 58.2% of Liverpool residents (BBC, 2016). The complex interaction of individual, local, and national forces thus leaves us with ambiguous expectations with regards to the moderating effect of the political climate on intergroup contact in Liverpool during the study period.

3 Analysis of Hate Crimes in the U.K.

We begin our empirical analysis with arguably a hard test of the parasocial contact hypothesis: an analysis of hate crimes in the U.K. If Salah's signing decreased the general public's tolerance of hate crimes, or changed the underlying beliefs of bigots, then we would expect to see fewer hate crimes.² To test this proposition, we use an event-study analysis that exploits Salah's rapid rise to fame. We

²Hate crimes are rare events that are likely to be perpetrated by extreme bigots. Hate crimes are also public acts, and as such are likely to be subject to social pressure. A reduction in hate crimes thus requires either that the underlying beliefs of these bigots have changed, or that hate crimes are less socially acceptable.

consider what happened to the hate crime rate in the area covered by Merseyside’s police force — which covers the city of Liverpool — after Salah joined Liverpool F.C., relative to what we would have expected if prior trends had continued. In particular, we use hate crime statistics from over two dozen other police forces in the U.K. to construct a synthetic control unit for Merseyside. We then compare the actual hate crime rate to the synthetic control as an estimate of the effect of Salah. We find that hate crimes in Merseyside were significantly lower after Salah joined Liverpool F.C. than we would have otherwise expected.

3.1 Data and Research Design

To gather data on hate crimes, we submitted Freedom of Information requests to every police department in England in April 2018. In order to be classified as a hate crime, police should have a clear indication that the perpetrator targeted the victim mainly on the basis of their religious, racial, sexual, or abilities-based identity. We include a police jurisdiction in our analysis if its response provided sufficient information for us to calculate the total number of hate crimes reported in the jurisdiction for each month. We obtained usable data from 25 police jurisdictions out of the 39 contacted, and 936 month-police force observations.

Our main outcome variable is an annualized hate crime rate per thousand residents. For instance, a police jurisdiction with a population of 100,000 that experiences 10 hate crimes in a given month has an annual hate crime rate of $(10 / 100,000) \times 1,000 \times 12 = 1.2$ hate crimes per thousand residents in that month.³ The dependent variable ranges from 0 to a maximum of 4.342, with a mean of 0.951 and standard deviation of 0.767. We consider the Merseyside police force — which covers Liverpool — to be treated after Salah’s official signing in June 2017.⁴ When Salah joined, his transfer fee constituted a club record, stoking interest in the player among the club’s fans, and suggesting that his signing date is an appropriate choice for the start of treatment.⁵ We present descriptive statistics and further discussion

³Any other normalization procedure would yield identical results, up to a multiplicative constant.

⁴Merseyside encompasses both Everton F.C. and Liverpool F.C. fans. A backlash among Everton fans would dilute any treatment effects for the hate crime analysis, biasing against finding an effect.

⁵Figure A-1 shows that public interest in Salah — as measured by Google searches in the U.K. —

of the data in Appendix [A.1](#).

Our goal is to estimate how hate crimes in Merseyside changed after Salah joined Liverpool F.C., relative to what would have happened had he not joined the team. This task requires estimating a counterfactual quantity: the trajectory of hate crimes in Merseyside had Salah not joined Liverpool. To construct such a counterfactual, we use the pre-treatment data from Merseyside and the control group data. Our main analysis uses the matrix completion method of [Athey et al. \(2018\)](#), as implemented in the R package `gsynth` ([Xu and Liu, 2018](#)). This method imputes the unobserved outcomes in the post-treatment period by first looking for structure in the pre-treatment control data that generates good predictions of the treated unit’s outcomes in the pre-treatment period. The same structure is then applied to the post-treatment periods to generate estimates of the counterfactual potential outcomes for the treated unit. To obtain an estimate of the treatment effect on the treated unit, we simply take the difference between the observed outcome for the treated unit in the post-treatment period and the imputed counterfactual outcome.⁶

Statistical inference in the setting of a single treated unit is challenging. Standard methods for computing standard errors based on asymptotic theory obviously do not apply. We therefore implement three complementary approaches to inference. First, we use the nonparametric bootstrap, where we repeatedly resample control units and re-estimate the model to generate a bootstrap distribution and standard error for the treatment effect estimator. Second, we conduct a permutation test where we reshuffle units’ treatment status to generate a null distribution for the treatment effect estimator, analogous to the procedure in [Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller \(2010\)](#). Third, we conduct a placebo test using other types of crime, collected by the U.K. Home Office, that are unlikely to be affected by changes in anti-Muslim sentiment. If we find that the effect size for hate crimes is comparable to that spiked shortly after he was signed in the summer of 2017 and then began to steadily increase afterwards through mid-2018.

⁶Therefore, if there are T post-treatment periods, we obtain T treatment effect estimates. In addition, we compute the treatment effect averaged over the T post-treatment periods as a simple summary of the treatment effect.

for other types of crime, it would suggest that the results are capturing a more general decline in crime, rather than an effect of Salah.

Appendix A provides greater detail on the data, research design, and methods for the hate crime analysis. It also presents the results of an alternative method of estimating the treatment effect — a generalized difference-in-differences regression with two-way fixed effects. This approach yields very similar results.

3.2 Results

The main results are presented in Figure 2. The top plot shows the actual outcome data for Merseyside, along with the imputed counterfactual for Merseyside. The bottom plot shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes in all periods for Merseyside and all other permutations of treatment assignment.⁷ In both plots, the shaded region indicates the post-treatment period. In the post-treatment period, the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes is the treatment effect estimate.

If the matrix completion method is performing well, the imputed estimates should closely match the observed outcomes in the pre-treatment period. Reassuringly, this is the pattern we see. In the top panel, the two lines in the pre-treatment period track each other closely. In the bottom plot, the pre-treatment line is close to 0 in most periods. While it fluctuates at times, there does not appear to be a trending pattern in the pre-treatment period that would cause concern about the validity of the treatment effect estimates.

Moving on to the post-treatment periods, the observed levels of hate crime in Merseyside are consistently lower than the predicted level from the synthetic control unit. Averaging across all months in the post-treatment period, the difference between the observed outcome and the synthetic control is -0.275 annualized hate crimes per 1,000 residents. Compared to the counterfactual imputed average in the post-treatment period, this treatment effect represents a 16% drop in hate crimes. The bootstrap-

⁷That is, each gray line shows the matrix completion results if we pretend that one of the control units was, in fact, treated.

Figure 2: Synthetic control results for hate crimes analysis. The top panel shows the observed (solid line) and imputed (dashed line) monthly hate crime rates in Merseyside. The bottom panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes. In the post-treatment period, this is the estimate of the treatment effect. The red line shows the estimates obtained for Merseyside, while the gray lines show the estimates obtained when we treat each of the control units as if it were treated. The fact that the Merseyside estimates are consistently lower than the control-group estimates provides evidence that our treatment effect estimates are unlikely to be due to chance.

based standard error for the treatment effect, averaging over post-treatment periods, is 0.069 and the central 95% confidence interval is $[-0.401, -0.154]$. Looking at the estimates month-by-month, the differences between the observed and imputed outcomes begin soon after Salah agreed to join Liverpool, in June 2017, and persist through at least April 2018 — the last month in our dataset.

The bottom plot in Figure 2 shows the estimated treatment effect for Merseyside, in red, alongside the placebo treatment effect estimates for every other unit, in gray. This plot shows that the decrease in hate crimes in Merseyside is large, relative to the placebo estimates. No placebo unit’s treatment effect estimates are as consistently negative as Merseyside. When we average across post-treatment periods, Merseyside has the largest decrease in hate crimes. Only two placebo units have treatment effect estimates that are larger in absolute value — and these are increases in hate crimes, relative to their respective synthetic controls. With these statistics, we can calculate one-sided and two-sided p -values. There are 24 possible permutations of the treatment assignment — Merseyside plus 23 placebo units — so the one-sided p -value is $1/24 = 0.042$ and the two-sided p -value is $3/24 = 0.125$. This result suggests that the decrease in hate crimes observed in Merseyside is unusual relative to changes observed in other police jurisdictions.

The change in hate crimes is consistent with a Salah effect, but it is unclear whether Salah was the cause of the decline. Instead, it could also be that there was a general decline in crime in Merseyside that happened to coincide with Salah’s arrival at Liverpool F.C. If this were the case, we might observe a decrease in hate crimes relative to other police jurisdictions, even if Salah’s arrival at Liverpool F.C. had no direct effect on hate crimes.

The placebo outcome analysis helps to address this concern. If there were a general decline in crime, the estimated treatment effect on hate crimes would not be distinctive relative to the treatment effect on other types of crimes. Figure 3 shows the treatment effect estimates for Merseyside for each of 15 different types of crimes — hate crimes, plus the 14 types tracked in the U.K. Home Office police data. The results show that the decrease in hate crimes is larger than changes observed for most other types of crime in Merseyside. Recall that the treatment effect for hate crimes was a 16% decrease, relative to the synthetic control in the post-treatment period. No other crime category saw such a large

Figure 3: Synthetic control results for all crime types in Merseyside. The red line shows the treatment effect estimate for hate crimes and the gray lines show treatment effect estimates for each of 14 types of crimes defined by the U.K. Home Office. To generate estimates on comparable scales across crime types, the treatment effect estimates are expressed as a percent of the pre-treatment mean for each crime type. The estimated treatment effect on hate crimes is consistently more negative than the estimate for any other crime outcome.

relative decrease, and only one, “drugs,” had a change that was larger in magnitude — and it was an *increase* in crime by 19.5%. Thus, the drop in hate crimes after Salah was signed does not appear to be attributable to a general decrease in crimes in Merseyside.

Overall, we interpret these results to support the hypothesis that Salah’s arrival at Liverpool F.C. caused a decrease in extreme acts of bigotry. Hate crimes in Merseyside were lower after Salah was signed than we would expect given prior hate crime trends and the trends of other police jurisdictions after Salah was signed. This decline was more extreme than we would expect based on chance alone, and the decrease in hate crimes was more pronounced than the decrease in any other crime category. Taken together, the evidence points to Salah’s rise in prominence causing a decrease in hate crimes in Liverpool F.C.’s home county.⁸

⁸Some may object to the hate crimes analysis because only about 39% of hate crimes targeted

4 Analysis of U.K. Soccer Fans' Tweets

Our analysis of hate crimes in the U.K. provides evidence that Salah joining Liverpool F.C. may have decreased hate crimes in Merseyside relative to their expected rates if he had not joined Liverpool F.C. Although hate crimes are extremely harmful and consequential, they are quite rare and severe events. As such, they tell us little about how Salah's signing may have impacted more quotidian forms of anti-Muslim behavior among mainstream Liverpool F.C. fans. To gain more purchase on this question, we analyze approximately 15 million tweets produced by U.K.-based soccer fans in the period preceding and following Salah joining Liverpool F.C.

4.1 Data and Research Design

Looking at soccer fans based in the U.K., we compare the frequency of anti-Muslim tweets produced by fans of Liverpool F.C. relative to fans of other English teams over time. We began by using Twitter's API to scrape the account IDs of all followers of the top five most followed teams in the English Premier League: Manchester United F.C. (19 million followers), Arsenal F.C. (14 million), Chelsea F.C. (12 million), Liverpool F.C. (11 million), and Manchester City F.C. (6 million). We also scraped the followers of Liverpool F.C.'s cross-town rival Everton F.C., a smaller team with 1.75 million followers that is also located in the city of Liverpool. Fans of both clubs are nearly identical in terms of demographics: the home stadiums are within walking distance of each other, there are no historic political, religious, or social differences between their fanbases, and many Liverpoolian families are mixed in their allegiances ([Borden, 2014](#)). Evertonians thus constitute the closest comparison group in the sample, with one key difference as a result of their fierce rivalry: exposure to Salah may Muslims (see [Appendix A](#)). Considering that Muslims make up only 5% of the British population, they are significantly overrepresented among hate crime victims. Another objection is that Islamophobia may be underlying some other crime categories that are used in the placebo tests. While this is a possibility, it would bias against our findings, since the trends for all crimes would look more similar to the trend for hate crimes.

skew negative for Evertonians, but is positive and goal-aligned for Liverpool F.C. fans.

After obtaining followers' account IDs, we collected our sample of tweets as follows. First, to ensure that the users in our sample had been soccer fans prior to Salah joining Liverpool, we subset our follower IDs to the oldest 500,000 followers of each club and subsetted to those who live in the U.K. based on the text of their self-reported locations. Once we identified longtime Twitter followers of English Premier League teams that were likely to be located in the U.K., we randomly sampled 10,000 followers from each team. We used Twitter's API to scrape up to 3,200 of the most recent tweets published by each of these 60,000 U.K. soccer fans.⁹ This resulted in a dataset of approximately 15 million tweets produced by the 60,000 English followers of the "Big Five" clubs of English soccer plus Everton F.C.

In order to identify anti-Muslim tweets, we began by identifying all tweets that are broadly about Muslims in the data using generic keyword search and word2vec (a neural network that processes text) to find other relevant terms in the data. We only chose to include relevant keywords that were among the top 50 words that the word2vec model indicated were most similar to the terms "Muslim" and "Islam." About 44,000 of the 15 million tweets in our dataset contained one of these relevant keywords. We then took a sample of about 1,500 of these tweets and asked three native English speakers to code each of these tweets as anti-Muslim or not.

Using this human-coded data, we trained a Naive Bayes classifier to classify all of our tweets containing one of the keywords described above as anti-Muslim or not.¹⁰ We then used this classifier

⁹The 3,200 tweet limit is imposed by Twitter's API. For most Twitter users, we observe their entire Twitter timelines beginning on the day they first joined the platform. For 84% of users in our sample we have tweets from before and after Salah joined Liverpool.

¹⁰Our classifier's out of sample performance yielded scores of 88% Accuracy, 98% Precision, 90% Recall, and an F1 score (harmonic mean of Precision and Accuracy) of 94%. However, because anti-Muslim tweets were relatively rare in our data, and our training dataset was not balanced, Balanced Accuracy (i.e., the average of the proportion of tweets classified correctly in each class individually) is a better and more conservative measure of classifier performance. Our classifier performed with 70%

to classify all 44,000 tweets relevant to Islam or Muslims in our dataset as anti-Muslim or not.¹¹ These classified tweets allowed us to compute a month measure of the proportion of fans’ anti-Muslim tweets in their tweets about Muslims or Islam (relevant tweets).¹² More details about the data collection and coding, as well as descriptive statistics, are presented in Appendix B.

Following the approach we use to analyze hate crime data, our main analysis of the Twitter data again uses the matrix completion method. This method allows us to use the rates of anti-Muslim tweets published by fans of Liverpool F.C. and other clubs in the pre-treatment period to construct a synthetic control unit for Liverpool F.C. fans in the post-treatment period. This, in turn, enables us to estimate how the rates of anti-Muslim tweets among Liverpool F.C. fans' tweets changed after Salah joined the club, relative to what they would have been if he had not joined. The previous section provides more details on this method.

4.2 Results

The results are presented in Figure 4. The top plot shows the actual outcome data for Liverpool F.C. fans, along with the imputed counterfactual for these fans. The bottom plot shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes in all periods for Liverpool F.C. fans as well as for fans of four other large football clubs (Arsenal, Chelsea, Manchester United, and Manchester City) and fans of Everton. In both plots, the shaded region indicates the post-treatment period. In the post-Balanced Accuracy. Given that intercoder agreement among human coders was 76%, we are satisfied that our classifier gives us a reasonable, if imperfect, measure of anti-Muslim sentiment in our tweets.

¹¹Tweets that did not contain relevant keywords were classified as irrelevant.

¹²This measure is less sensitive to changes in the salience of topics related to Muslims or Islam than a related outcome: the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets in fans' total tweets. For example, terror attacks are often followed by an uptick in anti-Muslim language, but this is generally accompanied by much larger increases in tweets defending Muslims and Islam or condemning Islamophobia, as well as upticks in neutral tweets discussing the event (Magdy, Darwish and Abokhodair, 2015). We thus focus only on tweets relevant to Muslims or Islam to alleviate this concern.

(a) Observed and imputed outcomes for Liverpool

(b) Estimated ATT in every period (Liverpool F.C. vs. Other Clubs)

Figure 4: Synthetic control results for Twitter data. The top panel shows the observed (solid line) and imputed (dashed line) monthly proportion of anti-Muslim tweets in Liverpool F.C. fans' tweets that are relevant to Muslims or Islam. The bottom panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes. In the post-treatment period, this is the estimate of the ATT for Liverpool, compared to other prominent English clubs.

treatment period, the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes is our estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated unit (ATT).

As in the hate crime results, if the matrix completion method is performing well, the imputed estimates should closely match the observed outcomes in the pre-treatment period. Again, we observe this pattern: the pre-treatment imputed and observed outcomes for Liverpool tend to be very similar, and there does not appear to be a pre-treatment trend that would threaten the validity of the treatment effect estimates.

Examining the post-treatment periods, the observed monthly proportions of anti-Muslim tweets among Liverpool F.C. fans are consistently lower than what we would predict based on the synthetic control. Averaging across all months in the post-treatment period, the difference between the observed outcome and imputed outcome of the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets is -0.035 (bootstrap-based S.E. = 0.006). Compared to the pre-treatment average among Liverpool F.C. fans, this treatment effect represents a 47.8% drop in the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets in tweets about Muslims (from 0.073 to 0.038). Looking at the estimates month-by-month, the differences between the observed and imputed outcomes begin soon after Salah agreed to join Liverpool, in June 2017, and persist through at least May 2018 — almost a year after Salah joined the team.

When we employ the same permutation inference approach as in the hate crime section, only for Liverpool F.C. followers do we estimate a consistently negative treatment effect in the post-treatment period. The placebo estimates tend to oscillate between positive and negative treatment effects, while the Liverpool treatment effect estimates are negative in every post-treatment month but one — again suggesting that the observed estimate for Liverpool F.C. followers is unlikely to have occurred by chance. As a robustness check, we again present a generalized difference-in-differences approach in [Appendix B](#). That analysis method generates very similar estimates as the ones reported here.

5 Robustness and Generalizability Tests

Overall, these two sets of analyses provide evidence that exposure to Mohamed Salah reduced prejudice in Liverpool, as measured by real-world behavior, providing support for the parasocial contact hypothesis. Hate crimes in Merseyside were lower and anti-Muslim tweets among Liverpool F.C. fans were less common after Salah was signed, relative to what we would have expected based on prior trends and the trends among groups that were less exposed to Salah. In this section, we briefly summarize several extensions and robustness checks to these event study analyses.

First, one potential threat to inference is that there were two Islamist terrorist attacks — the Manchester Arena and London Bridge attacks — roughly one month before Salah was signed by Liverpool F.C. If these attacks led to spikes in Islamophobia in the targeted cities, our results could be driven by the trajectory of the control units, rather than a change in behavior in Liverpool. To verify that our hate crime results are not driven by a spike in hate crimes in these cities, we re-run the analysis but exclude London and Manchester. The hate crime results are virtually unchanged, as shown in Figure A-4.

Robustness checks for the Twitter analysis are more difficult as these two cities contain all four large control teams in the Twitter analysis.¹³ However, there is reason to think that the Twitter results are not driven by upticks in Islamophobia in these cities: the treatment effects we uncover last well beyond the terrorist attacks. The attacks would have had to have caused a long-term, sustained increase in anti-Muslim tweets among just followers of London- and Manchester-based clubs to generate the patterns that we observe. This would run counter to patterns observed in studies of the effect of terror attacks on anti-Muslim tweets, which tend to spike and then re-equilibrate quickly following attacks (Magdy, Darwish and Abokhodair, 2015).

Second, perhaps the Twitter results are driven by an uptick in anti-Muslim sentiment among fans of rival clubs — representing a backlash to Salah. To rule out this possibility, we conduct an additional analysis comparing tweets of rival fans to tweets from people who do not follow any soccer clubs. As

¹³Chelsea and Arsenal are both located in London, and Manchester United and Manchester City are of course located in Manchester.

we detail in Appendix B.5, rival fans did not increase anti-Muslim tweets, relative to non-soccer fans, after Salah’s signing. In short, we find no evidence of a backlash effect.

Third, if parasocial contact is indeed reducing prejudice toward Muslims, we may wonder whether other Muslim players have induced a similar effect. In probing the generalizability of our results, we turn our attention to another Liverpool F.C. player, Sadio Mané — a Senegalese Muslim who joined the squad exactly one year before Salah and who also demonstrates his religiosity to fans on occasion. Did Mané have a similar effect on prejudice as Salah? Ex ante, Mané seems to fit the criteria for the parasocial contact hypothesis somewhat less neatly than Salah — particularly sustained exposure and salient group identity. Mané is not as heavily covered by the international nor local media when compared with his Egyptian teammate. We scraped the headlines of Liverpool’s most widely circulated newspaper, *The Liverpool Echo*, to analyze trends in coverage of the two players. We find that Mané’s signing captured around 3% of headlines relative to Salah’s 9% (Figure A-7), suggesting that exposure to Mané is weaker compared with exposure to Salah. Moreover, Mané’s group identity is likely less salient. His name is not as recognizably as Muslim as “Mohamed,” and Black Muslims tend to be perceived as less representative of Islam (Harvard, 2017). Fans have yet to create chants about Mané’s religious identity (as they have done with Salah), speaking to the difference in group identity salience between the two players. These factors suggest a weaker perceived link between player and Muslim identity, undermining the salience of group identity needed for parasocial contact to take effect.

Nonetheless, we look for evidence of “Mané effect” using the same research designs. We find no such effect on hate crimes when constraining the study period to the pre-Salah era, and taking the date of Mané’s signing as the relevant time break (Figure A-8). We do, however, find a Mané effect on anti-Muslim tweets similar in magnitude to the Salah effect (Figure A-9). Recall that the Twitter analysis focuses only on soccer fans, who are more likely to be familiar with a less publicized player like Mané, shedding some light on why we might detect an effect solely for the Twitter analysis. One response to an open-ended question on our survey of Liverpool F.C. fans (detailed in the next section) underscores the idea that club fans recognize Mané as Muslim: “I think with having Mo Salah and Mané, people should read more into Muslim life and try to understand the kind of people our favourite players are.”

In sum, we find support for the parasocial contact hypothesis in two event studies centered on Salah’s rise to fame. These results are neither driven by backlash to contemporaneous events nor by backlash to Salah among fans of rival clubs. We also stress-test parasocial contact by replicating our analysis for another Muslim player. We find some evidence of generalizability by studying Salah’s teammate Sadio Mané. As expected for a player with weaker media coverage and a less salient Muslim identity, we find evidence of prejudice reduction among Liverpool F.C. fans who closely follow their club players, but not among broader residents of Merseyside. These additional analyses lower the plausibility of factors other than positive parasocial contact driving effects, while increasing confidence in the parasocial contact hypothesis by testing its applicability to another Muslim player.

6 Analysis of Survey Experimental Evidence

The evidence presented thus far suggests that exposure to Salah may have reduced anti-Muslim behavior among Liverpool F.C. fans. As we outlined in Section 1, the parasocial contact hypothesis suggests that sustained, positive exposure to a minority group member can reduce prejudice when that individual’s group membership is salient. The group salience assumption is critical for all theories of intergroup contact — any positive effects should extend beyond the specific contact partner and generalize to *other* members of the outgroup (Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2013; Brown and Hewstone, 2005). This “generalization” of positive effects requires that the contact partner is viewed as representative of their group, without confirming negative stereotypes (Bond, 2020). While we have argued that Salah’s first name, family, and his public displays of religiosity all highlight his identity as a Muslim, our analysis of aggregate-level observational data does not enable us to directly test whether awareness of Salah’s Muslim identity leads individuals to express less prejudice toward Muslims as a whole.

To test the generalization assumption directly, we design a survey experiment to evaluate whether priming Liverpool F.C. fans to think about Salah’s Muslim identity causes them to express more positive attitudes towards Muslims writ large.¹⁴ Our survey experiment does not directly test whether parasocial contact reduces prejudice, as all respondents have received positive and sustained exposure

¹⁴As described in Appendix D, we also attempted to test the positivity condition by providing

to Salah. Instead, this experiment enables us to evaluate, conditional on exposure, whether highlighting Salah’s group identity reduces generalized prejudice toward Muslims, thus testing a necessary condition of parasocial contact.

6.1 Experimental Design

To evaluate this key condition of the parasocial contact hypothesis — the generalization assumption — we conducted a survey targeting people who “like” the Liverpool F.C. page on Facebook and who live in the U.K.¹⁵ These users saw a Facebook advertisement stating: “Help us research L.F.C.! Love Liverpool F.C.? Take 2 mins. to help us research Liverpool fans!” The survey was launched from October 2018 to January 2019, until \$1,500 worth of clicks were exhausted. The survey experiment was approved by the Stanford Institutional Review Board, protocol #47168, and pre-registered with EGAP, #20181115AB. Before taking the survey, respondents were shown a page that explained their rights as research subjects, gave contact information for the investigators and the IRB, and required participants to affirm that they were at least 18 years old.

We presented people in the treated group with a picture of Salah prostrating in prayer and the following text, which highlights Salah’s Muslim identity without affirming negative stereotypes about Muslims:

In addition to his goal scoring, Salah is known for an attachment to his Muslim identity prompts highlighting Salah’s success or casting doubt on his ability to maintain his successful streak. However, our manipulation did not appear to affect respondents’ perceptions of Salah’s performance, as shown in the manipulation check in Figure A-11. This manipulation failure is perhaps because fans already have strong views on players’ performance and because Salah was playing well during the study period, rendering our experimental treatment not credible. For these reasons, we relegate discussion of this arm of the survey experiment to Appendix D.

¹⁵The majority of the respondents were indeed Liverpool F.C. fans. Around 85% mentioned that they follow Liverpool F.C. “Very closely” and over 98% mentioned they follow Liverpool F.C. at least “Somewhat closely.”

both on and off the pitch. After every goal he scores, Salah touches his head to the ground in prayer. He also fasts during Ramadan (except on match days) and shares well wishes with his followers on social media during Islamic holidays. He named his daughter Makka after Islam’s holiest site (Mecca).¹⁶

The control group was assigned to a pure control, and thus did not receive any treatment. All respondents who were not in the control condition saw the following statement, which preceded each of the vignettes: “As you probably know, Mohamed Salah is an Egyptian winger who joined Liverpool F.C. in June 2017.” A table showing balance on pre-treatment covariates is presented in Appendix D.3.

The outcomes variables comprise three survey items that capture whether: (1) the respondent believes there is a “fundamental clash between Islam and British values”; (2) the respondent has “some” or “a lot” in common with Muslims in the U.K.; and (3) the respondent thinks immigrants “generally have a positive influence on the U.K.” All of these outcomes are coded as binary in a pro-tolerant direction. We then used the first principal component generated by these items as a fourth, composite outcome.¹⁷ These outcomes capture three communities linked with Salah to varying degrees: Islam in general, Muslims in the U.K., and immigrants. Salah’s public piety explicitly links him to Islam, but less so to Muslims and immigrants in the U.K. — only 5.8% of U.K. residents born abroad are from the Middle East or North Africa (Office for National Statistics, 2019), tempering expectations around these outcomes.

We estimate the main effect of the religiosity treatment, which is defined as the effect of the religiosity treatment, averaged over the levels of other factors. This definition is directly analogous to the average marginal component effect estimand commonly used in conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Due to randomization of the treatments, the main effects can be esti-

¹⁶As this was a factorial design, people in the treated group were also presented with text portraying Salah as succeeding or failing. See Appendix D.2 for more details. In the analysis below, we pool across both the success and failure treatments.

¹⁷The outcomes were scaled to have mean 0 and unit variance for the principal component analysis. The first principal component explained 76% of the total variance.

Figure 5: Coefficient plots representing the main effect of the religiosity treatment on the four outcomes, relative to the pure control condition. The top outcome represent the first principal component of the other three outcomes and has a mean of zero and unit variance. The other three outcomes are binary. Bars show 95% robust confidence intervals.

mated without bias via linear regression.¹⁸

6.2 Results

Figure 5 shows a coefficient plot from regressions estimating the average treatment effect of the religiosity treatment on the four outcome measures, which are detailed on the y-axis. We find some effects of the *Religiosity* vignette on tolerance. In particular, reading a vignette emphasizing Salah's

¹⁸Due to a coding error in the survey experiment, the control group was initially much larger than the treatment group. We corrected this survey coding error midway through data collection. However, this correction introduced the complication that not all units had equal treatment probabilities. To obtain unbiased treatment effect estimates, we weight all observations by the inverse probability of the realized treatment assignment. All the results presented here represent the weighted results.

Muslim identity sparked a small but statistically significant increase in respondents' belief that Islam is compatible with British values. Reminding respondents of Salah's Muslim identity and practices made them around 5 percentage points more likely to say that Islam is compatible with British values, relative to the control group baseline of 18 percent. The treatment effect on the *Religiosity* vignette also increased the principal component outcome by 8% of one standard deviation. The *Religiosity* prime also moved the outcome capturing tolerance toward British Muslims in the expected direction, although this difference is not statistically significant, while tolerance toward immigrants remained unchanged. These effects are stable across various social and political subgroups.¹⁹

This experiment provides further evidence in support of the parasocial contact hypothesis generally and the importance of group salience in particular. When reminded of Salah's Muslim identity, respondents express more tolerant attitudes towards Islam — consistent with the idea that a contact partner's group identity must be salient in order for positive feelings towards an individual to extend to the outgroup as a whole.

7 Discussion

Taken together, our findings provide diverse sources of evidence for the parasocial contact hypothesis. Our analyses demonstrate that positive and sustained exposure to Mohamed Salah likely reduced hate crimes and anti-Muslim speech on Twitter among Liverpool F.C. fans. Specifically, we find that hate crimes and anti-Muslim tweets decreased among people most exposed to Salah, relative to counterfactual groups that were less exposed. These two outcomes are both costly and public, typically committed by those with high levels of prejudice. Observing such a tangible effect in this context is thus particularly compelling evidence of the effects of parasocial contact, especially given that Liverpool F.C. fans reside in a city that is less ethnically diverse than the rest of England and Wales and that

¹⁹Full regression results are presented in Table A-5. As we show in Appendix D.4, these effects do not differ for those who are more or less inclined to like Salah, be empathetic, or hold right-leaning political views, suggesting a consistent effect of group salience across social and political subgroups.

has a relatively high prevalence of hate crimes ([Liverpool City Council, 2011](#)). These results provide evidence, in a naturalistic setting, that exposure to celebrities from stigmatized groups can decrease prejudice.

Our analyses of observational data provide support for the parasocial contact hypothesis. However, they do not enable us to directly test the assumptions underlying the theory. We therefore use an original survey experiment of Liverpool F.C. fans to test one of the primary assumptions underpinning all theories of intergroup contact — that any positive effects will generalize beyond the contact partner to the entire outgroup when the contact partner’s outgroup identity is salient. In particular, our experiment allows us to examine whether highlighting Salah’s Muslim identity encourages fans to make an inferential leap from Salah to Muslims as a whole, and thus express lower levels of Islamophobia in general. Our survey experiment demonstrates that being reminded of Salah’s strong Muslim identity causes Liverpool F.C. fans to express lower levels of Islamophobia, providing direct evidence of the mechanics underlying the parasocial contact hypothesis.

How generalizable are these results? Our findings suggest that positive and sustained exposure to celebrities should reduce prejudice when the celebrity’s group identity is salient. Indeed, our additional analyses of Salah’s teammate Sadio Mané show the potential for generalizability. However, to further understand the generalizability of the phenomenon we document, future work should unpack three (related) components of the compound treatment we study here: the positive media coverage Salah receives, his success on the pitch, and the fact that he does not take public political stances.

First, following the parasocial contact literature, we expect that positive media is important for the “Salah effect” to unfold. Media commentary about Salah has been almost uniformly positive since his arrival at the club, but it remains unclear how parasocial contact operates when the media stigmatizes a celebrity. Media portrayals — whether they appear in news stories (e.g., [Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000](#)) or entertainment media (e.g., [Mastro and Tropp, 2004](#)) — form the primary basis of attitudes towards outgroups for many individuals. Mass media has often portrayed marginalized groups in negative or otherwise stereotypical ways, further contributing to marginalization ([Ramasubramanian and Murphy, 2014](#)). Laboratory experiments have shown that showing positive media portrayals of celebrities can

help to reduce stated prejudice. For example, [Ramasubramanian \(2015\)](#) uses news stories on celebrities like Kanye West and Beyoncé Knowles to show how Black celebrities exhibiting stereotypical or counter-stereotypical behavior shapes perceptions of African Americans. How and when the media cover a celebrity in a positive light remains hard to predict a priori, however.

Second, another component of the positive exposure to Salah is his success with Liverpool F.C. Anecdotal evidence points to a backlash effect on prejudice when celebrity athletes underperform. Salah has enjoyed phenomenal success at the individual and team level during the study period — so much so that our manipulation check on a treatment arm priming fans to think of him as a failure was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, positive attitudes towards outgroups may be conditional on the success of their public figureheads, a claim made by several elite soccer stars of immigrant descent. When he left the German national team because of alleged racist abuse, Mesut Özil, who is of Turkish descent, stated: “I am a German when we win and an immigrant when we lose” ([Stanley-Becker, 2018](#)). Similarly, Inter Milan star Romelu Lukaku has written that when he plays well, newspapers refer to him as the “Belgian striker,” but when he plays poorly, they refer to him as “the Belgian striker of Congolese descent” ([Lukaku, 2018](#)). This aspect of elite sports and other high-stakes, real-world domains makes them qualitatively different from television shows, the most commonly studied media in the parasocial contact literature (e.g., [Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes, 2005, 2006](#); [Bond, 2020](#)). Future work should study the role that real-world performance has on the potential for parasocial contact to influence behaviors and attitudes.

Third, the extent to which a celebrity takes polarizing political stances may also shape the outcomes of parasocial contact. Consider the American football player Colin Kaepernick, a young Black quarterback who started in two conference championship games and one Superbowl. Since he began protesting against racial injustice by kneeling during the national anthem, he has remained unsigned — reportedly because team owners fear backlash from (mostly White) fans ([Reid, 2017](#)). Taking a stance on divisive political issues may thus lead to a negative parasocial contact experience, in part by fueling negative media coverage. By contrast, as one writer notes, “part of Salah’s charm is that he’s not an outwardly political figure addressing Islamophobia in England” ([Al-Sayyad, 2018](#)). While we

speculate that avoiding polarizing stances can facilitate prejudice reduction, more work is needed to understand where and when we should expect exposure to celebrities to reduce prejudice.

Finally, future work should unpack the social, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms underpinning parasocial contact. In addition to outgroup identity salience, other possible mechanisms at play include undermining negative stereotypes (Ramasubramanian, 2013; Fujioka, 1999), and activating vicarious contact with ingroup members (Wright et al., 1997; Ortiz and Harwood, 2007; Vezzali et al., 2014). To this end, Salah is known to be on friendly terms with White, British-born teammates from Liverpool-adjacent areas, which may reduce intergroup anxiety by proxy. Research disentangling these mechanisms holds important implications for generating scope conditions for “Salah effects” elsewhere.

8 Conclusion

Exposure to celebrities has become a quotidian feature of modern life both online and through traditional media channels. Yet, we know relatively little about how these public figures may influence intergroup relations. In practice, traditional intergroup contact is difficult to orchestrate and rare in the U.K. and beyond. Because most people rarely have meaningful interactions with members of outgroups, positive exposure to public figures through media coverage has the potential to be particularly impactful. We take a first step in quantifying the effect of such exposure by assessing the effect of exposure to a successful Muslim celebrity on Islamophobia. We find evidence that positive exposure to public figures from stigmatized groups can mitigate prejudicial behaviors, such as hate crimes and bigoted speech. We also provide evidence for a key assumption of the parasocial contact hypothesis — that the salient group identity of the public figure allows positive exposure to generalize to the outgroup as a whole. Our survey experiment demonstrates that primes emphasizing Salah’s Muslim identity boosted the expression of tolerant opinions of Islam among Liverpool F.C. fans.

Our work builds upon prior research literature in three key ways. First, we provide causally identified naturalistic evidence in support of the parasocial contact hypothesis. Existing studies primarily rely on correlational evidence from surveys — showing that those who consume media portraying

minority group members have lower levels of prejudice — or from laboratory experiments on non-representative populations. The first research strategy could suffer from reverse causality, if people who already have low levels of prejudice choose to consume media portraying out-group members. The second research strategy, while solving the internal validity problems presented by correlational studies, is limited in its external validity. The artificial laboratory environment may generate larger effects than would be observed in more naturalistic settings and undergraduate students may be particularly receptive to positive portrayals of out-group members. By contrast, our research design — which leverages differential exposure to the celebrity across different subsets of the British public — overcomes the internal validity problem. Additionally, the fact that we study real-life exposure, outside of the artificial experimental context, provides greater external validity.

Second, existing studies focus on self-reported measures of prejudice and behavior, often measured shortly after exposure to experimental manipulation. While these attitudinal measures are undoubtedly important, prior research leaves open the question of whether the effects extend to real-world behavior. Of the three studies we conduct here, two focus on behavioral outcomes, measured by naturally occurring administrative and digital trace data — rather than self-reported measures. We therefore contribute evidence that parasocial contact can change behaviors as well as attitudes.

More broadly, our work contributes to a large literature in political communication documenting the effects of mass media on political attitudes. Political communication scholars have long been concerned with the effect that media portrayal of minorities — especially in the news — has on political attitudes. Experiments have shown that the way media portrays minority groups in the U.S. can shift people’s attribution of responsibility for social issues, their evaluations of political candidates, and their policy attitudes (e.g. [Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000](#); [Iyengar, 1996](#); [Valentino, 1999](#)). We add to this literature by showing that exposure to minorities in nonpolitical media can also influence attitudes and behavior. We hope that future work can adapt a similar research design to explore the impact of other public figures from minority groups on prejudice and assess the underlying mechanisms through which parasocial contact can shape prejudice. Such work will help us to better evaluate the scope conditions of the “Salah effect” and offer new potential avenues for building social cohesion around the globe,

especially where traditional contact across group lines is difficult to achieve.

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Online Appendix for “Can Celebrities
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A Hate Crimes Analysis

A.1 Data Collection

To gather data on hate crimes, we submitted Freedom of Information requests (FOI) to every police department in England in April 2018. We requested a dataset consisting of every hate crime that was reported to the department between January 2015 and April 2018, along with information including the date, location, motivation for the crime, and demographic information about the victim. We include a police jurisdiction in our analysis if its response provided sufficient information for us to calculate the total number of hate crimes reported in the jurisdiction for each month. We obtained usable data from 25 police jurisdictions out of the 39 contacted, and 936 month-police force observations. Hate crimes themselves cover a range of offenses. Common violations include harassment, aggravated common assault, criminal damage to vehicles, and aggravated public fear, alarm, or distress. In order to be classified as a hate crime, police should have a clear indication that the perpetrator targeted the victim mainly on the basis of their religious, racial, sexual, or abilities-based identity.

In our analysis, we use all reported hate crimes. We requested data on hate crimes broken down by victim religion and ethnicity, but the responses were inconsistent. In some cases, police departments do not collect this information; in others, they began collecting it near the end of the study period. As a result, we include all reported hate crimes. The focus on all hate crimes should still reflect trends driven by anti-Muslim incidents: the Home Office reports that 76% of hate crimes perpetrated from January 2017 to January 2018 were religiously or racially motivated.¹ Of these crimes, 52% were categorized as anti-Muslim in particular ([BBC News, 2018](#)).

Our main outcome variable is an annualized hate crime rate per thousand residents. For instance, a police jurisdiction with a population of 100,000 that experiences 10 hate crimes in a given month has an annual hate crime rate of $(10 / 100,000) \times 1,000 \times 12 = 1.2$ hate crimes per thousand residents in that month.² The dependent variable ranges from 0 to a maximum of 4.342, with a mean of 0.951 and standard deviation of 0.767.

A.2 Treatment Assignment

We consider the Merseyside police force — which covers Liverpool — to be treated after Salah’s official signing in June 2017. Merseyside is a metropolitan county that encompasses both Everton F.C. and Liverpool F.C. fans.³ While a Salah effect is likely to be most pronounced after his stellar performances with the team in late 2017, we choose his signing date as the start of treatment for two reasons. First, any other cutoff would be somewhat arbitrary, whereas there is a clear justification for choosing June 2017. Second, when Salah was signed, his transfer fee constituted a club record, stoking interest in the player among the club’s fans. Figure [A-1](#) shows that public interest in Salah — as measured by Google searches in the U.K. — spiked shortly after he was signed in the summer of 2017 and then began to steadily increase afterwards through mid-2018. In Appendix [C](#) we show that

¹Note that the same offense can be categorized as both racially and religiously motivated.

²Any other normalization procedure would yield identical results, up to a multiplicative constant.

³A backlash among Everton fans would dilute any treatment effects for the hate crime analysis, biasing against finding an effect.

mentions of Salah in *Liverpool Echo* headlines follow a similar trend.⁴

Figure A-2 plots the raw time series data for each police force, with Merseyside highlighted. In the pre-treatment period, hate crimes are relatively common in Merseyside. Averaging over all pre-treatment observations, the hate crime rate in Merseyside is higher than 19 of the other 24 police forces in the data.

Figure A-1: Normalized Google Searches for “Salah” in the UK (2014-2018)

⁴We also discuss other events relevant to Islamophobia that occurred around this time — which could complicate interpretation of our estimates — in Section 7.

Figure A-2: Hate crime data across police jurisdictions. The red line shows hate crimes reported by the Merseyside police force.

A.3 Research Design

Our goal is to estimate a counterfactual quantity: the predicted trajectory of hate crimes in Merseyside had Salah not joined Liverpool. A number of methods have been developed for this task, including two-way fixed effects models, interactive fixed effects, the synthetic control method, and matrix completion methods (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010; Doudchenko and Imbens, 2016; Xu, 2017; Athey et al., 2018). Roughly speaking, these methods attempt to impute the unobserved outcomes in the post-treatment period by first looking for structure in the pre-treatment data that generates good predictions of the treated unit’s outcomes in the pre-treatment period. The same structure is then applied to the post-treatment periods to generate estimates of the counterfactual potential outcomes for the treated unit. To obtain an estimate of the treatment effect on the treated unit, we simply take the difference between the observed outcome for the treated unit in the post-treatment period and the imputed counterfactual outcome. Therefore, if there are T post-treatment periods, we obtain T treatment effect estimates. In addition, we compute the treatment effect averaged over the T post-treatment periods as a simple summary of the treatment effect.

This method outperforms others in approximating the outcome in Merseyside prior to the treatment period, so arguably generates a more suitable counterfactual estimate than others. This method attempts to find a low-dimensional matrix structure in the data by minimizing the mean squared error between the observed outcomes and the outcomes predicted by another (low-rank) matrix. To avoid overfitting, the procedure penalizes the complexity of the matrix by adding a penalty term proportional to the

nuclear norm of the matrix, with the scaling factor chosen via leave-one-out cross-validation.⁵

Statistical inference in the setting of a single treated unit is challenging. Standard methods for computing standard errors based on asymptotic theory obviously do not apply. We implement three complementary approaches to inference: the nonparametric bootstrap, a permutation-based method, and a placebo analysis leveraging other types of crimes.

First, by repeatedly resampling control units and re-estimating the model, we generate a bootstrap distribution and standard error for the treatment effect estimator. We can then compute a standard error by taking the standard deviation of bootstrap estimates and obtain confidence intervals by taking the appropriate quantiles of the bootstrap distribution.

Second, we reshuffle units' treatment status to generate a reference distribution for the estimator. For each control unit, we pretend it was in fact treated and estimate the "treatment effect" on the placebo treated unit. By construction, there is 0 treatment effect for these units (since they were not actually treated), so this procedure generates a distribution of the treatment effect estimator under the sharp null of no treatment effect in any period, for any unit. We can then take the actual Merseyside estimates and compare them to the null distribution to generate a permutation-based p -value. This method of inference is proposed by [Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller \(2010\)](#).⁶

Third, we conduct a placebo test using other types of crime that are unlikely to be affected by changes in anti-Muslim sentiment. We collected data from the U.K. Home Office on crime at the police jurisdiction level.⁷ These data are formatted in a standard set of 14 crime types (which does not include hate crimes), such as shoplifting, robbery, possession of weapons, drugs, and so on. There is little reason to believe that these crimes would be affected by a decrease in anti-Muslim sentiment. If we find a significant decrease in these crimes in Merseyside after Salah was signed, it would indicate that a decrease in hate crimes may be explained as part of a more general trend. To conduct this test, we re-run the matrix completion analysis on each of the placebo outcomes, then compare the estimated effect sizes (normalized by the pre-treatment mean for each outcome).

A.4 Generalized Difference-in-Difference

An alternative method of measuring the effect of Salah on hate crimes is to employ a generalized difference-in-differences framework by estimating a two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) regression of the

⁵In each cross-validation iteration, we omit one pre-treatment observation for the treated unit. We then select the penalization parameter that produces the smallest mean-squared prediction error for the held out observations. Because we have 30 pre-treatment periods for Merseyside, we choose $k = 30$ -fold cross validation in the `gsynth` software.

⁶In implementing this method, we omit data from West Yorkshire because we only have data for two pre-treatment months. In all, there are 23 placebo units we use for this procedure.

⁷Data were downloaded from the U.K. police data download page (<https://data.police.uk/data/>). Accessed on May 22, 2019.

form

$$Y_{it} = \tau D_{it} + \delta_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (\text{A-1})$$

where D_{it} is an indicator that switches on for Merseyside in the post-treatment period, δ_i and γ_t are unit and month fixed effects, respectively, and ϵ_{it} is a mean-zero error term. In this framework, given parallel trends for the treated and untreated units in the absence of treatment, τ is the the ATT.

Table A-1 presents the main regression results. The first column reports the plain TWFE model, the second adds police force-specific linear time trends, and the third and fourth add population weights. All specifications give similar results, showing that there was a decrease in the hate crime rate in Merseyside after Salah was signed. The estimates are in the range of -0.2, which is very similar to the estimated ATT yielded by the matrix completion method, which was -0.275 .

In all the regression models, the estimates appear to be significant. However, with only a single treated unit, the standard errors may not be reliable. We therefore undertake an alternative form of inference, whereby we randomly assign a single unit to be treated, with treatment beginning in a randomly chosen month that is at least 4 months after the first observations in our dataset and as late as the actual treatment month. We then estimate the TWFE specification in column (1) of Table A-1. We repeat this procedure 10,000 times to generate a null distribution of the parameter estimate. We then compute a p -value by calculating the proportion of simulated coefficient estimates that are at least as small as the actual observed estimate.

The result of this exercise is presented in Figure A-3, which shows a histogram of the null distribution generated using the placebo approach described above. The vertical line shows the actual estimate reported in column (1) of Table A-1. The estimated one-sided p -value is 0.139. In other words, roughly 13% of simulations generated a point estimate less than -0.296 . We interpret this to be weak evidence in favor of the Salah effect hypothesis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treated	-0.296^{***} (0.0610)	-0.214^{***} (0.0488)	-0.288^{***} (0.0903)	-0.152^* (0.0805)
Observations	969	969	969	969
R-squared	0.896	0.932	0.913	0.942
Police Force FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Unit-specific time trend		✓		✓
Weights			✓	✓

Table A-1: Regression results with monthly annualized hate crime rate as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by police force, are reported in parentheses. For comparison, the estimated ATT yielded by the matrix completion method, averaging across post-treatment months, was -0.275 . $***p < 0.01$, $**p < 0.05$, $*p < 0.1$.

Figure A-3: The histogram shows the simulated null distribution of difference-in-differences estimates. The solid black line shows the observed coefficient for Merseyside. The one-sided p -value is 0.139.

A.5 Are London and Manchester Driving the Results?

As noted in Section 7, there were two terrorist attacks just prior to Salah joining Liverpool F.C. — one in Manchester and one in London. To confirm that our results are not being driven by an increase in hate crimes in these cities in response to the attacks, we re-estimate the matrix completion model for hate crimes without Manchester and London. The results are virtually identical to those obtained from the full data.

Figure A-4 plots the difference between imputed and observed outcomes for each month using the full data (horizontal axis) against the difference when we omit Manchester and London. Each point is a month in the data. The 45-degree line is also plotted. All points fall very close to the 45-degree line, which indicates that the results are not being driven by Manchester and London.

Figure A-4: Difference between observed and imputed outcomes for Merseyside using the full dataset (horizontal axis) and omitting Manchester and London (vertical axis). Each point is a month. The 45-degree line is shown.

B Twitter Analysis

B.1 Data Collection

As of 2018, about one quarter of the U.K.’s population was an active Twitter user. While this constitutes a large subsection of the U.K. population, recent research indicates that U.K. Twitter users are not representative of the U.K. population as a whole. They are disproportionately young, male, and more likely to have managerial, administrative, and professional occupations (Sloan, 2017). However, the platform is widely used by British soccer fans, with 3 of the top 20 most followed accounts in the U.K. belonging to English Premier League teams, alongside popular news accounts like the BBC and celebrities such as Harry Styles and Emma Watson (Social Backers, 2019). Twitter data thus gives us access to public messages produced by a large cross-section of U.K. soccer fans.

Looking at soccer fans based in the U.K., we compare the frequency of anti-Muslim tweets published by fans of Liverpool F.C. relative to fans of other English teams over time. We began by using Twitter’s API to scrape the account IDs of all followers of the top five most followed teams in the English Premier League: Manchester United F.C. (19 million followers), Arsenal F.C. (14 million), Chelsea F.C. (12 million), Liverpool F.C. (11 million), and Manchester City F.C. (6 million). We also scraped the followers of Everton F.C., a smaller team with 1.75 million followers that is also located in the city of Liverpool. Fans of both clubs are nearly identical in terms of demographics: the home stadiums are within walking distance of each other, there are no historic political, religious, or social differences between their fanbases, and many Liverpoolian families are mixed in their allegiances (Borden, 2014). Evertonians thus constitute the closest comparison group in the sample, with one key difference as a result of their fierce rivalry: exposure to Salah may skew negative for Evertonians, but is positive and goal-aligned for Liverpool F.C. fans.

After obtaining followers’ account IDs, we collected our sample of tweets as follows. First, to ensure that the users in our sample had been soccer fans prior to Salah joining Liverpool, we subset our follower IDs to the oldest 500,000 followers of each team. Follower IDs are scraped from Twitter’s API in the reverse order that the users began following the account, with newer users appearing first. This feature of the data enables us to identify long-term fans of each team, given that the team accounts have been popular for almost a decade and now have millions of followers. Then, to ensure that users in our sample were located in the U.K., we again used Twitter’s API to download profile metadata for the 500,000 oldest followers of each team.⁸ We then used their “user.location” metadata field to determine if each user was located in the U.K. based on the text of their self-reported locations.⁹ Once we identified longtime Twitter followers of English Premier League teams that were likely to be located

⁸This method ensures that the sample joined Twitter before the treatment. For instance, the 500,000 most recent followers for Liverpool F.C., and the most recent accounts, were created between 2015 and mid-2016.

⁹Users were classified as being located in the U.K. if their “user.location” metadata field contained either a city or country keyword indicating that the user was located in the U.K. City keywords were obtained using the maps package in R. While this method does not necessarily capture all fans of these soccer teams located in the U.K., as many users do not provide any location metadata at all, it

in the U.K., we randomly sampled 10,000 followers from each team. We used Twitter’s API a final time to scrape up to 3,200 of the most recent tweets published by each of these 60,000 U.K. soccer fans.¹⁰ This resulted in a dataset of approximately 15 million tweets produced by the 60,000 English followers of the “Big Five” clubs of English soccer plus Everton F.C.

In order to identify anti-Muslim tweets, which are relatively rare in this dataset of all tweets produced by soccer fans in the U.K. (approximately .03% of all tweets), we first identified all tweets broadly about Muslims in our dataset. We began with the terms “muslim” and “islam” and used a word2vec model (a neural network that processes text) to find other relevant terms in the data. This yielded the following broad relevant keywords: “arab,” “arabs,” “islam,” “muslims,” “muslim,” “mosque,” and “mosques.”¹¹ About 44,000 of the 15 million tweets in our dataset contained one of these relevant keywords. We then took a sample of about 1,500 of these tweets containing a keyword relevant to Muslims or Islam and used Figure8 (formerly Crowdfunder), a crowd-sourced data enrichment platform, to have three native English speakers code each of these 1,500 tweets as anti-Muslim or not.¹²

ensures that our sample consists only of likely U.K. residents. As [Hecht et al. \(2011\)](#) demonstrate, a user’s country and state can be determined with decent accuracy using self-reported Twitter data, and users often reveal location information with or without realizing it. Similarly, [Mislove et al. \(2011\)](#) explain that because large numbers of users report their location in the “user.location” field and in aggregate these reports are quite accurate, this is a reasonable way to determine a user’s location. This is particularly true given that we are more interested in obtaining a high degree of precision (ensuring that the users are actually U.K. residents) than recall (obtaining the entire population of tweets sent by U.K. residents).

¹⁰The 3,200 tweet limit is imposed by Twitter’s API and for most Twitter users covers their entire Twitter timelines beginning on the day they first joined the platform.

¹¹The word2vec model also identified many irrelevant keywords to our study such as “rohingya” (in reference to the ongoing conflict in Myanmar) and “assad” (in reference to the Syria conflict). We only chose to include relevant keywords that were among the top 50 words that the word2vec model indicated were most similar to the terms “muslim” and “islam.” Although most British Muslims are of South Asian descent, the word “pakistani” did not appear in the top 50 words identified by the word2vec model and therefore we did not use it as keyword to filter our data.

¹²The instructions provided to coders are displayed in [Appendix B](#). For more information on using Figure8 (formerly Crowdfunder) to code data for training classifiers, see [Benoit et al. \(2016\)](#).

Figure A-5: Anti-Muslim tweets as a proportion of tweets mentioning Muslims or Islam, across followers of British soccer clubs. The red line shows anti-Muslim tweets by followers of Liverpool F.C.

B.2 Twitter Coding Instructions

The instructions provided to coders on Figure8 (formerly Crowdfunder) were as follows:

Overview In this job, you will be presented with tweets about Muslims and Islam. Review the tweets to determine the sentiment so that we can have a greater understanding about the overall sentiment expressed by the author.

Steps

- Read the tweet.
- Determine if the tweet is relevant to Muslim people or Islam.
- Determine if the tweet expresses a positive, neutral, or negative attitude towards Muslims or Islam

Rules & Tips

The posts can be classified as positive, negative or neutral:

- **Positive tweets** portray Muslim people or Islam in a positive manner or argue that Muslims and Islam should not be portrayed negatively. For example, tweets that state that Muslims are not terrorists or extremists or that Islam is a peaceful religion or tweets that defend Muslims or Islam are positive.

- **Neutral tweets** are only informative in nature and provide no hint as to the mood of the author. They do not express an opinion about Muslims or Islam.
- **Negative tweets** are tweets in which some aspects of the tweet uncover a negative mood such as, criticism, insults or a negative comparison. These include tweets portraying Muslims as terrorists, extremists, or violent, and those making negative generalizations about Muslims or Islam as a whole.
- **Irrelevant tweets** do not mention Muslims or Islam or are not in English. These include tweets where the word “Muslim” or “Islam” appears in the handle of a Twitter user and tweets in foreign languages, for example.
- **Note:** Tweets that are purely factual (links to news articles without comment) are not necessarily Neutral — consider whether the fact/news itself is Positive or Negative regarding the business and select one of those when possible.

B.3 Twitter Data Descriptive Statistics

Table A-2: Proportion of Anti-Muslim Tweets Pre and Post-Salah

type	team	post_salah	mean
Anti-Muslim / Muslim Relevant	liverpool	0	0.073
Anti-Muslim / Muslim Relevant	liverpool	1	0.076
Anti-Muslim / Muslim Relevant	other teams	0	0.102
Anti-Muslim / Muslim Relevant	other teams	1	0.115

B.4 Twitter Data Additional Data Analysis

As an alternative method of analyzing the effect of Salah joining Liverpool on the monthly proportion of anti-Muslim tweets produced by Liverpool fans, we conduct difference-in-differences estimation as follows:

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 L + \beta_3 (T \cdot L) + \varepsilon \quad (\text{A-2})$$

Here T is a dummy variable for the time period, equal to 1 in the post-Salah period and 0 in the pre-Salah period, and L is a dummy variable for Liverpool group membership, equal to 1 for Liverpool and 0 for other teams. The interacted term $(T \cdot L)$ is a dummy variable indicating when $L = T = 1$. If the coefficient β_3 on $(T \cdot L)$ is negative, as expected, then Liverpool fans tweet less anti-Muslim content in the post-Salah period relative to the pre-Salah period, compared to fans of other teams. We conduct this analysis comparing Liverpool fans’ tweets to tweets produced by fans of other large teams as well as Everton F.C.. We use the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets (anti-Muslim tweets / tweets relevant to Islam or Muslims) as our outcome variable y .

Because there is only one treated unit and standard errors may be misleading, we again undertake an alternative form of inference, whereby we randomly assign a single unit to be treated, with treatment beginning in a randomly chosen month that is at least 4 months after the first observations in our dataset and as late as the actual treatment month. We then estimate the difference-in-difference model above.

We repeat this procedure 10,000 times to generate a null distribution of the parameter estimate. We then compute a p -value by calculating the proportion of simulated coefficient estimates that are at least as small as the actual observed estimate.

The result of this exercise is presented in Figure A-6, which shows a histogram of the null distribution generated using the placebo approach described above. The vertical line shows the actual estimate of the model in equation A-2. The estimated one-sided p -value is 0.07. In other words, roughly 7% of simulations generated a point estimate less than -0.038 . We interpret this to be suggestive evidence in favor of our Salah effect hypothesis.

Figure A-6: The histogram shows the simulated null distribution of difference-in-differences estimates. The solid black line shows the observed coefficient for Liverpool. The one-sided p -value is 0.07.

B.5 Testing for Backlash

In order to increase our confidence that we are indeed measuring a decrease in the use of anti-Muslim discourse by Liverpool fans, relative to fans of rival teams, we conduct a difference in differences analysis comparing tweets of rival team fans to tweets of Twitter users located in the UK who do not follow any soccer teams. If our results are driven by backlash from rival team fans, we would expect to see an increase in anti-Muslim discourse from these fans after Salah joins Liverpool, relative to non-soccer fans in the UK.

To identify these non-soccer fans located in the UK we first collect 30,000 recent tweets from Twitter users who are geolocated in the UK. We then filter these accounts to individuals who do not follow any of the major football team accounts, who had active Twitter accounts during our period of analysis, leaving us with a sample of about 15,000 unique users. We then scrape the 3200 most recent tweets from each of these accounts and use our same method to classify their tweets.

The results of our differences in differences analysis, reported in Table A-3 suggest that there is no “Salah backlash effect” in which fans of rival teams publicly express more anti-Muslim sentiment after Salah joins Liverpool, relative to non-soccer fans in the UK. This increases our confidence that we are actually measuring a decrease in anti-Muslim Tweets by Liverpool fans, rather than a change driven by backlash from rival teams.

Table A-3: Effect of Salah Joining Liverpool on Daily Proportion of Anti-Muslim Tweets

	Proportion of Anti-Muslim Tweets
Constant	0.139*** (0.012)
Non-Liverpool Fans (Treated Dummy)	-0.045** (0.014)
Post-Salah (Post-Treatment Dummy)	-0.014 (0.035)
Non-Liverpool Fans x Post-Salah (DID)	0.047 (0.039)
R ²	0.047
Adj. R ²	0.037
Num. obs.	288
RMSE	0.081

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, · $p < 0.1$

C Mané Effect Analysis

C.1 Liverpool Echo

Figure A-7: Percent of monthly titles in Liverpool Echo that mention Mané or Salah

C.2 Hate Crimes

Here, we repeat the same matrix completion analysis of hate crime data as in the main text, except treating July 2016 — the month in which Sadio Mané signed with Liverpool — as the beginning of treatment. Additionally, to avoid picking up the Salah effect, we truncate the data to before Salah signed.

The results are shown in Figure A-8. Overall, we see no consistent difference between observed and imputed hate crimes in Merseyside after Mané joined Liverpool (but before Salah joined). Averaging across post-treatment months, the estimated ATT is 0.017 (S.E. = 0.049), which corresponds to a 1.3% *increase* in the hate crime rate — though this result is not statistically significant.

C.3 Twitter

We also repeat the same matrix completion analysis of Twitter data as in the main text, except treating July 2016 — the month in which Sadio Mané signed with Liverpool — as the beginning of treatment. Additionally, to avoid picking up the Salah effect, we truncate the data to before Salah signed.

Figure A-8: Matrix completion results for hate crime outcomes, treating Sadio Mané's signing as the beginning of treatment. The top panel shows the observed (solid line) and imputed (dashed line) monthly hate crime rates in Merseyside. The bottom panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes. In the post-treatment period, this is the estimate of the ATT.

The results are shown in Figure A-9. Unlike the hate crime data, here we do observe a significant decrease between observed and imputed anti-Muslim tweets in Merseyside after Mané joined Liverpool (but before Salah joined). Averaging across post-treatment months, the estimated ATT is -0.043 (S.E. = 0.007), which corresponds to a 59.8% *decrease* in the proportion of anti-Muslim tweets.

(a) Observed and imputed outcomes for Merseyside

(b) Estimated ATT in every period

Figure A-9: Matrix completion results for tweet outcomes, treating Sadio Mané's signing as the beginning of treatment. The top panel shows the observed (solid line) and imputed (dashed line) monthly proportion of anti-Muslim tweets produced by Liverpool fans. The bottom panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes in Liverpool fans' tweets (red line) relative to tweets produced by fans of other U.K. football clubs (gray lines). In the post-treatment period, this is the estimate of the ATT.

D Survey Experiment

D.1 Survey experiment design

The survey experiment is a 2×2 factorial design embedded in the survey, in addition to a pure control group. First, we provided the treated respondents with a vignette emphasizing Salah’s success (*Success Condition*) or speculation about his potentially declining performance (*Failure Condition*).¹³ This factor is designed to test the “model minority” dimension of the positivity condition for prejudice reduction. Next, treated respondents saw another vignette emphasizing either Salah’s religiosity (*Religiosity Condition*) or agreeable character (*Character Condition*).

D.2 Vignette Descriptions

Respondents in the success condition saw a picture of Mo Salah holding the Golden Boot with the following text:

In the 2017-18 season, Salah scored 43 goals for Liverpool, setting numerous club and league records along the way. For his efforts, he was named the Premier League’s Player of the Month three times, won the Golden Boot, and was awarded the PFA Players’ Player of the Year award. Along with Cristiano Ronaldo and Luca Modric, he was shortlisted for UEFA Player of the Year. He recently won the FIFA Puskás award for best goal.

Salah was also central in taking Egypt to the World Cup and Liverpool F.C. to the Champions League final.

Respondents in the failure treatment saw an image of Salah looking regretful with the following text:

Despite a successful 2017-18 season, some believe he is underperforming this season. As of late October, he had scored only 4 goals in Premier League play.¹⁴ Due to this lackluster performance, some critics have suggested that Salah will be a ‘one-season wonder.’

After the success/failure treatment, respondents then received a treatment emphasizing either Salah’s character or his religiosity. Respondents who received the character treatment saw a picture of Salah with his daughter and the following text:

¹³In the beginning of the 2018-2019 season, when we fielded the experiment, Salah got off to a slower start than the previous season, which the vignette in the *Failure Condition* emphasized.

¹⁴This statistic was updated for respondents taking the survey in or after January 1, 2019 to read: “As of early January, he had scored in just 62% of Premier League games played — compared to 89% last season.

In addition to his goal-scoring, Salah is known for his character both on and off the pitch. In his native Egypt, Salah privately donated millions of pounds to charity and to a leading anti-drug campaign. Always a sportsman, Salah does not celebrate goals against his former teams and picked up only two yellow cards in 49 matches for Liverpool last season.

Respondents in the religious treatment saw Salah prostrating with this text:

In addition to his goal scoring, Salah is known for an attachment to his Muslim identity both on and off the pitch. After every goal he scores, Salah touches his head to the ground in prayer. He also fasts during Ramadan (except on match days) and shares well wishes with his followers on social media during Islamic holidays. He named his daughter Makka after Islam's holiest site (Mecca).

D.3 Balance Table for Survey Experiment

	Control (N=2887)	Char. - Fail. (N=1463)	Char. - Succ. (N=1454)	Rlgn. - Fail. (N=1421)	Rlgn - Succ. (N=1441)	F-Stat (p.value)
Age (Years)						0.89 (0.47)
N-Miss	136	161	170	204	173	
Mean (SD)	49.90 (12.84)	50.46 (12.22)	49.90 (12.71)	50.23 (12.43)	49.78 (11.44)	
Range	18.00 - 98.00	18.00 - 98.00	18.00 - 98.00	18.00 - 98.00	18.00 - 98.00	
Female						1.95 (0.1)
N-Miss	1	20	0	5	0	
Mean (SD)	0.28 (0.45)	0.27 (0.44)	0.25 (0.44)	0.25 (0.43)	0.28 (0.45)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
University Edu.						1.66 (0.16)
N-Miss	6	18	5	38	14	
Mean (SD)	0.32 (0.47)	0.34 (0.48)	0.31 (0.46)	0.33 (0.47)	0.31 (0.46)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Salah Favorite						0.02 (1)
N-Miss	560	686	466	615	413	
Mean (SD)	0.52 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Karius Empathy						0.5 (0.73)
N-Miss	217	381	274	333	244	
Mean (SD)	0.38 (0.48)	0.36 (0.48)	0.38 (0.49)	0.39 (0.49)	0.38 (0.49)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Liverpool Resident						0.75 (0.56)
N-Miss	0	0	0	0	0	
Mean (SD)	0.22 (0.42)	0.24 (0.43)	0.23 (0.42)	0.23 (0.42)	0.22 (0.41)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	
Conservative						0.24 (0.91)
N-Miss	241	188	193	171	233	
Mean (SD)	0.27 (0.44)	0.27 (0.44)	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	
Range	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	0.00 - 1.00	

Table A-4: Summary statistics for several demographic variables as well as the outcome questions by treatment group. *Female* indicates proportion of respondents who identified as females. *University Edu.* indicates proportion of respondents who have at least some university education. *Salah Favorite* indicates the proportion of respondents who indicated that Salah is their favorite player. *Karius Empathy* indicates those who expressed empathy with Liverpool’s goalkeeper Karius. *Liverpool Resident* indicates whether the respondents live in Liverpool. *Conservative* indicates respondents who indicated they are associated with the Conservative or UK Independence Party.

D.4 Heterogeneous treatment effect

Additionally, we examine heterogenous treatment effects by three subject attributes: (1) choosing Salah as one’s favorite player, (2) residing in Liverpool, and (3) baseline empathy.¹⁵ We leverage an incident familiar to most Liverpool F.C. (and soccer) fans to measure (3). During the 2018 UEFA Champions League final, Liverpool F.C.’s goalkeeper, Loris Karius, committed two blunders that arguably cost his team the championship. Karius was hounded by the international media for what were seen as schoolboy errors on the world’s most prestigious stage in club soccer. Fans were divided on the issue. Some stood by their keeper, referencing their club’s motto of “You’ll Never Walk Alone” and his sincere apology after the game. Others were less forgiving. Some referred to the German player

¹⁵Analyses (1) and (2) are pre-registered, while (3) is an exploratory analysis aimed at capturing a novel measure of empathy.

Figure A-10: The points show the estimated average treatment effect on the compatibility of Islam with British values outcome. Lines are robust 95% confidence intervals.

as a Nazi and sent death threats to his home, prompting police intervention ([Sky News, 2018](#)). We use a question asking whether the respondent believes that Karius deserved the criticism he received as a measure of baseline empathy. Around 62% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the criticism, categorized as an unempathetic response.

Diving deeper on the religious prime, we unpack heterogeneous treatment effects by three respondent traits in Figure A-10. The results suggest that there is not much heterogeneity among any of these subgroups. Empathizing with Liverpool F.C.'s former goalkeeper, Loris Karius, and living in Liverpool generates positive interactive effects, although these effects are not robust. Lastly, selecting Salah as one's favorite player has no added effect on tolerance.

D.5 Additional Analyses

Figure A-11: Effects of treatments on views of Salah's performance

Figure A-12: Coefficient plots representing the average treatment effects on the four outcomes, relative to the pure control condition. The first three outcome variables are binary, while the fourth is a continuous variable with mean of zero and unit variance. Bars show 95% robust confidence intervals.

Figure A-13: Coefficient Plot for the average marginal component effects of the religion/character treatment

Figure A-14: Coefficient Plot for the average marginal component effects of the success/failure treatment

Figure A-15: Average of each outcome by treatment group

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	−0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)
Religion	0.08* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	4997	5361	5168	5032
RMSE	2.14	1.05	0.87	1.06

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-5: Main regressions using the character/religion treatments.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	−0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)
Character - Failure	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Character - Success	0.00 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Religion - Failure	0.09 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Religion - Success	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-6: Average treatment effects for the main outcomes.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)
Character - Failure	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Character - Success	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Religion - Failure	0.09* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Religion - Success	0.08 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.06 (0.06)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Univ. Edu.	0.68*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Character - Failure:Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Character - Success:Age	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religion - Failure:Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Religion - Success:Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Character - Failure:Female	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)
Character - Success:Female	0.02 (0.10)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Religion - Failure:Female	0.17 (0.10)	0.03 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Religion - Success:Female	0.01 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
Character - Failure:Univ. Edu.	0.04 (0.09)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.09 (0.05)
Character - Success:Univ. Edu.	0.02 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.05)
Religion - Failure:Univ. Edu.	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
Religion - Success:Univ. Edu.	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
Num. obs.	7377	7914	7627	7429
RMSE	2.13	1.08	0.87	1.08

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-7: Lin regressions for the main outcomes.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.58*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)
Character - Failure	−0.02 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Character - Success	0.02 (0.07)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Religion - Failure	0.05 (0.07)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Religion - Success	0.11 (0.07)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Salah Fav.	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Character - Failure:Salah Fav.	−0.00 (0.09)	−0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)
Character - Success:Salah Fav.	−0.04 (0.09)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Religion - Failure:Salah Fav.	0.07 (0.10)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Religion - Success:Salah Fav.	−0.06 (0.09)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	7025	7531	7265	7079
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-8: Interacting the treatments with selecting Salah as the favorite player.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	0.08*	0.61***	0.21***	0.51***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Character - Failure	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Character - Success	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religion - Failure	0.10	0.02	0.06*	-0.00
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Religion - Success	0.07	0.03	0.04	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Conservative	-0.38***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.15***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Character - Failure:Conservative	0.12	0.08	0.02	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Character - Success:Conservative	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Religion - Failure:Conservative	-0.03	-0.05	0.01	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Religion - Success:Conservative	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	7372	7900	7617	7417
RMSE	2.22	1.10	0.89	1.11

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-9: Interacting the treatments with an indicator for conservative views. This indicator is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies with the Conservative Party or the UK Independence Party. It is coded as 0 if the respondent identifies with the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, other parties, or none of these parties.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.06 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.02)
Character - Failure	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)
Character - Success	0.01 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Religion - Failure	0.05 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Religion - Success	0.04 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Liverpool Res.	0.15* (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Character - Failure:Liverpool Res.	0.08 (0.11)	0.06 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Character - Success:Liverpool Res.	−0.03 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)
Religion - Failure:Liverpool Res.	0.15 (0.11)	0.07 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Religion - Success:Liverpool Res.	0.13 (0.12)	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.89	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-10: Interacting the treatments with an indicator for residing in Liverpool.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.07)	0.56*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.03)
Character - Failure	−0.11 (0.11)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.06)
Character - Success	−0.13 (0.11)	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.05)
Religion - Failure	0.19 (0.12)	0.04 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
Religion - Success	0.09 (0.12)	0.01 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)
Follow Liverpool	−0.00 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.04)
Character - Failure:Follow Liverpool	0.11 (0.12)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)
Character - Success:Follow Liverpool	0.15 (0.12)	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)
Religion - Failure:Follow Liverpool	−0.12 (0.13)	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.06)
Religion - Success:Follow Liverpool	−0.02 (0.13)	0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.06)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	7513	8057	7768	7569
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-11: Interacting the treatments with an indicator for closely following Liverpool FC. People who follow Liverpool very closely (watch every match, read news almost daily) are coded as 1 and people who follow Liverpool less often are coded as 0.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)
Character	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)
Religion	0.08* (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	−0.00 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.06 (0.06)	0.06* (0.03)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Univ. Edu.	0.68*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Character:Age	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Religion:Age	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Character:Female	0.01 (0.08)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.04)
Religion:Female	0.08 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Character:Univ. Edu.	0.03 (0.08)	0.00 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)
Religion:Univ. Edu.	−0.03 (0.08)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
R ²	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
Num. obs.	7377	7914	7627	7429
RMSE	2.13	1.08	0.87	1.08

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-12: Lin regressions using the character/religion treatments.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	0.08* (0.03)	0.61*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.01)	0.51*** (0.02)
Character	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Religion	0.09 (0.05)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Conservative	-0.38*** (0.06)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.03)
Character:Conservative	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Religion:Conservative	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)
R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Num. obs.	7372	7900	7617	7417
RMSE	2.22	1.10	0.89	1.11

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-13: Interacting the character/religion treatments with an indicator for conservative views. This indicator is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies with the Conservative Party or the UK Independence Party. It is coded as 0 if the respondent identifies with the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, other parties, or none of these parties.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.01)
Failure	0.03 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.02)
Success	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.06 (0.06)	0.06* (0.03)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Univ. Edu.	0.68*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Failure:Age	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Success:Age	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Failure:Female	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)	−0.00 (0.04)
Success:Female	0.02 (0.08)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Failure:Univ. Edu.	−0.02 (0.08)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Success:Univ. Edu.	0.01 (0.08)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
R ²	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
Adj. R ²	0.10	0.06	0.06	0.08
Num. obs.	7377	7914	7627	7429
RMSE	2.13	1.08	0.87	1.08

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-14: Lin regressions using the success/failure treatments.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	0.08*	0.61***	0.21***	0.51***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Failure	0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Success	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Conservative	-0.38***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.15***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Failure:Conservative	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Success:Conservative	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R ²	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02
Num. obs.	7372	7900	7617	7417
RMSE	2.22	1.10	0.89	1.11

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-15: Interacting the success/failure treatments with an indicator for conservative views. This indicator is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies with the Conservative Party or the UK Independence Party. It is coded as 0 if the respondent identifies with the Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, other parties, or none of these parties.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	-0.02	0.57***	0.18***	0.46***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Failure	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Success	0.04	0.00	0.03*	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-16: Main regressions using the success/failure treatments.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.58*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)
Failure	0.02 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Success	0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Salah Fav.	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Failure:Salah Fav.	0.04 (0.08)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Success:Salah Fav.	−0.05 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	−0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	7025	7531	7265	7079
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-17: Interacting the success/failure treatments with selecting Salah as the favorite player.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.06 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.02)
Failure	0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Success	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Liverpool Res.	0.15* (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Failure:Liverpool Res.	0.11 (0.09)	0.07 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Success:Liverpool Res.	0.04 (0.09)	−0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-18: Interacting the success/failure treatments with an indicator for residing in Liverpool.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.56*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.03)
Failure	0.04 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)
Success	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
Follow Liverpool	-0.00 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Failure:Follow Liverpool	-0.00 (0.11)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Success:Follow Liverpool	0.06 (0.10)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	7513	8057	7768	7569
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-19: Interacting the success/failure treatments with an indicator for closely following Liverpool FC. People who follow Liverpool very closely (watch every match, read news almost daily) are coded as 1 and people who follow Liverpool less often are coded as 0.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	-0.02 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)
Character	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Religion	0.08* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-20: Main regressions using the character/religion treatments.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.58*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.02)
Character	−0.00 (0.06)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Religion	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)
Salah Fav.	0.01 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.03)
Character:Salah Fav.	−0.02 (0.08)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Religion:Salah Fav.	0.01 (0.08)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	7025	7531	7265	7079
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-21: Interacting the character/religion treatments with selecting Salah as the favorite player.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.06 (0.03)	0.57*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.02)
Character	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Religion	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Liverpool Res.	0.15* (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Character:Liverpool Res.	0.03 (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Religion:Liverpool Res.	0.14 (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Adj. R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.89	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-22: Interacting the character/religion treatments with an indicator for residing in Liverpool.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.02 (0.07)	0.56*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.03)
Character	−0.12 (0.09)	−0.05 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.06 (0.05)
Religion	0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Follow Liverpool	−0.00 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.04)
Character:Follow Liverpool	0.13 (0.10)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Religion:Follow Liverpool	−0.07 (0.11)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.05)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	7513	8057	7768	7569
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-23: Interacting the character/religion treatments with an indicator for closely following Liverpool FC. People who follow Liverpool very closely (watch every match, read news almost daily) are coded as 1 and people who follow Liverpool less often are coded as 0.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.02)
Character - Failure	−0.08 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Character - Success	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.03)
Religion - Failure	0.05 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Religion - Success	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Karius Empathy	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Character - Failure:Karius Empathy	0.17 (0.09)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)
Character - Success:Karius Empathy	0.12 (0.09)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Religion - Failure:Karius Empathy	0.11 (0.10)	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Religion - Success:Karius Empathy	0.03 (0.10)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	7510	8040	7758	7563
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-24: Interacting the treatments with expressing sympathy with Karius. Respondents are coded as empathetic with Karius if they did not agree with the criticism that Karius received after following the 2018 Champions League final.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.02)
Character	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Religion	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Karius Empathy	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Character:Karius Empathy	0.15 (0.08)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Religion:Karius Empathy	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	7510	8040	7758	7563
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-25: Interacting the character/religion treatments with an indicator for empathy with Karius. Respondents are coded as empathetic with Karius if they did not agree with the criticism that Karius received after following the 2018 Champions League final.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
(Intercept)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.02)
Character	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Religion	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Karius Empathy	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)
Character:Karius Empathy	0.15 (0.08)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
Religion:Karius Empathy	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	7510	8040	7758	7563
RMSE	2.25	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-26: Interacting the success/failure treatments with an indicator for empathy with Karius. Respondents are coded as empathetic with Karius if they did not agree with the criticism that Karius received after following the 2018 Champions League final.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	−0.00 (0.03)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.47*** (0.02)
Day After Victory	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00
Num. obs.	3022	3243	3113	3037
RMSE	2.27	1.12	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-27: Relationship between victory and outcomes. This compares responses on the day after a Liverpool victory with responses on the day before a Liverpool victory).

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	0.01 (0.02)	0.57*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.01)
Day After Victory	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	7515	8060	7771	7571
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-28: Relationship between victory and outcomes. This compares responses on the day after a Liverpool victory with responses on all other days.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	-0.02 (0.03)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.02)
Day After Salah Scores	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	2587	2774	2665	2602
RMSE	2.26	1.11	0.89	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-29: Relationship between victory and outcomes. This compares responses on the day after Salah scored with responses on the day before Salah scored.

	PC Outcome	Muslims Common	Islam Compatible	Immigrant Impact
Constant	-0.01 (0.03)	0.56*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.01)	0.46*** (0.02)
Day After Salah Scores	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Adj. R ²	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	3080	3303	3171	3095
RMSE	2.26	1.12	0.90	1.12

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table A-30: Relationship between victory and outcomes. This compares responses on the day after Salah scored with responses on all other days.