Justifying Unparticipated Causality in Proclus

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Jonathan Greig (LMU / Munich School of Ancient Philosophy)

jonathan.greig@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

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1. Unparticipated/Participated Entities for Proclus

[T1] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 23

All that is unparticipated (P1) gives substance (ὀφίστησιν) out of itself to the participated (P2); and all participated substances (P2) are linked upwards to unparticipated existences (P1).

(A) For on the one hand the unparticipated, having the relative status of a monad (as being its own [5] and not another's, and as transcending the participants),¹ generates terms which are able to be participated. For either it will remain fixed in sterility and by itself, and so may not have honour; or else it will give something from itself, whereof the receiver becomes a participant, whilst what is given attains substantial existence as a participated term.

(B) Every participated term, on the other hand, becoming a property (τινός) of that by which it is participated, is secondary to that which in all is equally present and has filled them all out of itself. [10] For that which is in one is not in the others; while that which is present to all alike, that it may illuminate all, is not in [any] one, but is prior to them all. For either it is in all, or in one out of all, or prior to all. (B1) But a principle which was in all [15] would be divided amongst all, and would itself require a further principle to unify the divided; and further, all the particulars would no longer participate the same principle, but this one and that another, through the distribution of its unity. (B2) And if it be in one out of all, it will be a property no longer of all but of one. Inasmuch, then, as it is both common to all that can participate and identical for all, (B3) it must be prior to all: [20] that is, it must be unparticipated. (trans. Dodds, modified)

Πᾶν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον ὀφίστησιν ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὰ μετεχόμενα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ὑποστάσεις εἰς ἀμεθέκτους ὑπάρξεις ἀνατείνονται.

¹ Established in the previous *ET* Prop. 21: 'Every order has its beginning in a monad and proceeds to a manifold co-ordinate therewith; and the manifold in any order may be carried back to a single monad' (trans. Dodds). (Πᾶσα τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχομένη πρόεισιν εἰς πλῆθος τῇ μονάδι σύστοιχον, καὶ πάσης τάξεως τὸ πλῆθος εἰς μίαν ἀνάγεται μονάδα.)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέθεκτον, μονάδος ἔχον λόγον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ ὄν καὶ [5] οὐκ ἄλλου καὶ ὡς ἐξηρημένον τῶν μετεχόντων, ἀπογεννᾷ τὰ μετέχεσθαι δυνάμενα. ἢ γὰρ ἄγονον ἐστήξεται καθ' αὐτό, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔχοι τίμιον· ἢ δώσει τι ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν λαβὼν μετέσχε, τὸ δὲ δοθὲν ὑπέστη μετεχομένως.

τὸ δὲ μετεχόμενον πᾶν, τινὸς γενόμενον ὑφ' οὗ μετέχεται, δευτέρον ἐστὶ τοῦ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως παρόντος καὶ πάντα ἄφ' ἑαυτοῦ [10] πληρώσαντος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ὡσαύτως παρόν, ἵνα πᾶσιν ἐλλάμπῃ, οὐκ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν πάντων. ἢ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν ἢ ἐν ἐνὶ τῶν πάντων ἢ πρὸ τῶν πάντων. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ὄν, [15] μερισθὲν εἰς πάντα, πάλιν ἄλλου ἂν δέοιτο τοῦ τὸ μερισθὲν ἐνίζοντος· καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄλλου, τὸ δὲ ἄλλου, τοῦ ἐνὸς μερισθέντος. εἰ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ τῶν πάντων, οὐκέτι τῶν πάντων ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐνός. εἰ οὖν καὶ κοινὸν τῶν μετέχειν δυναμένων καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντων, πρὸ τῶν πάντων [20] ἔσται· τοῦτο δὲ ἀμέθεκτον.

The proposition is split into two parts—(A) and (B). (A) argues for the unparticipated term as productive. This suggests that Proclus wants to move away from the idea of the unparticipated merely being 'present' as a kind of potentiality/δύναμις,² but that it actually has some activity in relation to its participants. Thus it 'gives' something (τι) of itself to the participants.³

(B) provides the initial justification for the unparticipated's role:

1. Every participated term (P2) directly corresponds to its participating individual (P3).
 - 1.1. Therefore, 'in' one only, and not all, by definition.
2. (P2) is secondary to the unparticipated (P1).
 - 2.1. For something is (B1) 'in all', (B2) 'in one', or (B3) neither senses of 'in'—before all.
 - 2.1.1. If (B1)—taken literally, divided between all. Another principle needed to unite.
 - 2.1.1.1. 'In all' may refer to the sum total of all participated (P2) terms—if so, this is an extra argument for 'some other principle'.
 - 2.1.2. If (B2)—logically not in all, but belonging to one particular, like the participated term (P2).
 - 2.1.3. Therefore, (B3)—before all.
 - 2.2. Out of (B1)–(B3), (B1) cannot stand in for 'that which is present to all alike', since the latter does not imply division, for Proclus, as the former does.

So to list a particular example of [T1]'s principles:

[T2] Commentary on Parmenides, 628.36–39 (Cousin)/628.26–27 (Steel)

² This might be following on a general response against Aristotle's interpretation of Platonic Forms as δυνάμεις (potentialities) rather than productive ἐνέργειαι as efficient causes are, as in e.g. *Met.* Λ.6, Λ.9. For direct responses, see e.g. Syrianus, *In Metaph.* [...].

³ Cf. e.g. *Elements of Theology* Prop. 18: 'Everything which by its existence bestows a character on others itself primitively possesses that character which it communicates to the recipients' (trans. Dodds). (Πᾶν τὸ τῷ εἶναι χορηγοῦν ἄλλοις αὐτὸ πρῶτως ἐστὶ τοῦτο, οὗ μεταδίδωσι τοῖς χορηγουμένοις.)

[...] for intellect is either universal (ὀλικός) and unparticipated, or universal (ὅλος)⁴ and participated,⁵ or particular (μερικός) and participated. For there is no intellect that is particular (μερικός) and unparticipated. (trans. Morrow/Dillon)

πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς ἢ ὀλικός ἐστι καὶ ἀμέθεκτος, ἢ ὅλος μεθεκτός, ἢ μερικός καὶ μεθεκτός, μερικός γὰρ ἀμέθεκτος οὐκ ἔστι.

Some things to note about the nature of the unparticipated and participated:

- The unparticipated is not correlated to the participants (P3) in the same way that the participated entities (P2) are.
- One-to-one correspondence between each particular participated entity (P2) and participant (P3).
 - However, *what* the nature of (P2) is in relation to (P3) is not clear—immanent or ontologically distinct? (Likely the latter, *as* a participated entity)
- One-to-many correspondence between the unparticipated (P1) and participated (P2) (and implicitly participant (P3))
 - [By implication, individual, participated soul, although having separate existence, could not be unparticipated (P1) relative to the body as participant (P3).]

2. Problem: Unparticipated as a Superfluous Cause or Efficient Cause?

Proclus describes the participated terms (P2) coming from the unparticipated (P1). However, as absolutely transcendent over its participants and therefore disconnected, (P1) has no relation to the participants (P3) except mediately through (P2).⁶ If (P2) is directly correlated to (P3) in a way (P1) is not,⁷ what role does (P1) play?

In this respect, the line between 15-20 in Proclus' response to (B1) is important: 'all the particulars would no longer participate the same principle, but this one and that another, through the distribution of its unity'.

⁴ [How significant is the ὀλικός vs. ὅλος distinction? On my interpretation (next fn.), ὅλος could suggest an abstract sense of 'universal', applying to all participants generally, whereas ὀλικός suggests something specific—e.g. the unparticipated as the locus of universal application.]

⁵ Tentatively, I take this ('universal and participated') to be the potency issued from the unparticipated (adapting *ET Prop.* 81—which I'll explicitly consider later in this paper), which is the same for all participated entities (P2) and participants (P3). The power issued becomes converted into each distinct participated entity (P2), which then falls into the 'particular and participated' category—for instance, particular soul's relation to a particular body.

⁶ Cf. De Rijk (1994) 18–9: 'Hence the following picture arises: out of itself, not qua partaking, that is, of something else superior to it, the unshareable generates shares which attain subsistence by participation and each uniquely belong to their own participant. This would mean, I presume, that the privative noun ἀμέθεκτος should dispose of any notion of sharing actually accomplished both in the upward and in the downward direction, so that *qua* unshareable the unshareable is independent of any superior source of participation and transcends the entities coming after it.'

⁷ *Contra* Dodds (1963) 211, who conceives of an essential linking between the unparticipated and participated; see De Rijk (1994) 1: 'Most unfortunately Dodds joins (ibid.) Emile Bréhier in suggesting that "the ἀμέθεκτον is the intension of the concept, the μετέχοντα are its extension, and the μετεχόμενα are that which links intension with extension". Rosán is quite right in rejecting such a comparison.' In this case, the proposed problem is the reverse: an **un**-essential link between unparticipated and participated.

- This seems to be saying that participated entities (P2) are not of the same kind, but entirely distinct. E.g.: your participated humanity is, strictly speaking, distinct from my participated humanity;⁸ the commonality in the two is derived from a separate, unparticipated Form of ‘Man’.

Two views of unparticipated (P1) and participated (P2) terms’ causality:

1. Strong view — (P2) as efficient cause / (P1) only as paradigmatic: (P1) is merely the guarantor of ‘unity’—e.g. paradigmatic cause. Efficient causality of (P3) lies with (P2).
 - Reasons for strong view: each participant (P3) is directly informed by (P2). (P1)’s existence merely ensures the collective unity of (P2) as one of a kind, but has no essential role in the causation of (P3).
 - e.g. *ET Prop.* 80, where body is properly acted on by the immanent incorporeal which acts on it—thus, individual soul (P2) is responsible for action on the living body (P3). Monadic, unparticipated Soul (P1) plays no direct role here in this process.⁹
 - Internal tension in *ET Prop.* 23: talk about (P1) generating (P2) is then superfluous, if (P2) is sufficient as a complete efficient cause of (P3).
 - Therefore: *Prop.* 23 (and other proofs for the unparticipated) won’t work if (P1) adds nothing to the causal explanation of (P2) and (P3).
2. Weak view — (P2) as an analogous ‘instrumental’ efficient cause / (P1) as primary efficient cause
 - (P2) is not a sufficient as primary efficient cause for (P3), but rather is the ‘individual determiner’ for (P1)’s action on (P3). (P2) then only has a sub-ordinate role in efficient causality, serving as an instrumental cause of (P1).

Ultimately I want to defend the weak view as a justification for unparticipated causality. In this model, I read the unparticipated (P1) as a primary efficient cause in relation to (P3).

3. Efficient Causality for Proclus

Efficient Cause as Greater/Transcending its Effect¹⁰

[T2] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, *Prop.* 7

⁸ In conversation with Peter Adamson, this conception of universals—at this point, without reference to the unparticipated—mirrors trope theory. Lowe (2002) 361–2: ‘The trope theorist holds that the blueness of a particular blue chair is something that really exists just as much as the chair itself does, but that it is not something that can be identified with the blueness of any other blue chair, even if the two chairs resemble each other exactly in respect of the colour that each of them has. In short, on this view, each blue chair possesses its own distinct property of blueness, which is a particular, just as the chair itself is a particular.’ Cf. *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on ‘Tropes’: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/>.

⁹ *Elements of Theology* *Prop.* 80, 74.27–30 (Dodds ed.): ‘The proper nature of all bodies is to undergo action (πάσχειν), and of all incorporeals to act (ποιεῖν), the former being in themselves inactive: and the latter impossible; but through association with the body the incorporeal too undergoes action, even as through participation of the incorporeals bodies too can act’ (trans. Dodds, modified). (Πάν σῶμα πάσχειν καθ’ αὐτὸ πέφυκε, πᾶν δὲ ἀσώματον ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἄδρανές ὄν καθ’ αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἀπαθές· πάσχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν, ὥς δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ σῶματα διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων μετουσίαν.)

¹⁰ See Lloyd (1976) for an analysis of Proclus’ argument in *ET Prop.* 7, and a general history of the concept.

[*Proposition:*] Every productive cause of another is greater than the nature of the produced thing. (trans. mine)

Πάν τὸ παρακτικὸν ἄλλου κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως.

In this, Proclus is making a universal claim about productive/efficient causes—they are necessarily greater by nature than their effects. Now, here one might dispute Proclus and say, look: fire produces fire; man produces man; etc—yet the nature of none of these is greater than that which is produced. However, peeling back how Proclus is understanding this requires looking at distinctions in efficient causes—specifically between primary and instrumental causes. Proclus is almost certainly thinking of the former compared to the latter.

Antecedents for the Efficient Cause's Superiority

To begin with the Platonic context, the *Timaeus* gives us the background of this distinction between primary causes (αἰτίαι) and contributory, or instrumental, causes (συναίτια—literally, ‘con-causes’).¹¹ Whereas the latter do not have the full ‘reason’ or shape of what happens compared to true causes, true, primary causes (αἰτίαι) like the soul (e.g. of the craftsman) have the final reason why in causation. *Philebus* 27a8–9 makes a more straightforward distinction by stating that what is subservient to the cause (τὸ δουλεῦον...αἰτίαι) is not the same as the cause (αἰτία).¹²

Now if we look at Aristotle, there may be initial reason to deny that this is the case with every efficient cause:

[T4] Aristotle, *Physics* II.3, 194b30–32

Again, the primary source (or ‘principle’) of the change or rest, as the man who deliberated is a cause, the father of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed. (trans. Hardie/Gaye, modified)

ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμίσσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλευσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου.

[T5] *ibid.*, 195a21–23

The seed and the doctor and the one who deliberated, and generally the maker, are each the principle from which the change or rest [or motion] originates. (trans. mine)

τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρός καὶ ὁ βουλευσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ στάσεως [ἢ κινήσεως]¹³.

¹¹ Plato, *Tim.* 46c7–e2: ‘Now all of the above are among the auxiliary causes (τῶν συναιτίων) employed in the service of the god as he does his utmost to bring to completion the character (ιδέαν) of what is most excellent. But because they make things cold or hot, compact or disperse them, and produce all sorts of similar effects, most people regard them not as auxiliary causes, but as the actual causes of all things (οὐ συναίτια ἀλλὰ αἴτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων). Things like these, however, are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about anything. We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that properly possesses understanding. [...] So anyone who is a lover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes (αἰτίας) those that belong to intelligent nature, and as secondary all those belonging to things which are moved by others and that set still others in motion by necessity’ (trans. Zeyl).

¹² Proclus draws directly on this in *ET*, Prop. 75 (line 8), as well as *In Tim.* I, 298.26, 369.8; *In Eucl.* 139.20. Cf. Steel (2003) 178, esp. n. 9.

¹³ [Haven’t yet ascertained why κινήσεως was added by Ross; TBD.]

Unlike the Platonic context, Aristotle takes any beginning of motion or generation *in some way* as an efficient cause. Exactly in what way is irrelevant to the basic definition. By comparison, the *Timaeus* account (and that of *ET Prop.* 7) so far holds little currency as a universal rule, when any of these earlier examples each count as an efficient cause.

However, this is not the end of the story: we eventually get a distinction between types of efficient causes—reciprocally affected and non-affected causes—which indicates a concession to the primary/subordinate types in Plato. First, we should note Aristotle’s initial definition of motion from *Physics* III.1 as the actuality of the potential *as potential*,¹⁴ in which model he understands all causation. This leads to the following observation at the end of *Physics* III.2:

[T6] Aristotle, *Physics* III.2 202a3–11:

Every mover too is moved, as has been said—every mover, that is, which is capable of motion, and whose immobility is rest (for when a thing is subject to motion its immobility is rest). For to act on [the movable] as such is just to move it. But this it does by contact, so that at the same time it is also acted on. Hence motion is the fulfillment (ἐντελέχεια) of the moveable as moveable, the cause being contact with what can move, so that the mover is also acted on. The mover will always transmit a form, either a ‘this’ or such or so much, which, when it moves, will be the principle and cause of the motion, e.g. the actual man begets [or makes] man from what is potentially man. (trans. Gaye/Hardie, modified)

κινεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ κινουὶν ὥσπερ εἴρηται πᾶν, τὸ δυνάμει ὄν κινήτῳ, καὶ οὐ ἡ ἀκίνησις ἡρεμία ἐστίν (ὃ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει, τούτου ἡ ἀκίνησις ἡρεμία). τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ τοιοῦτον, αὐτὸ τὸ κινεῖν ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ θίξει, ὥστε ἅμα καὶ πάσχει· διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ κινήτου, ἢ κινήτου, συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο θίξει τοῦ κινήτου, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει. εἶδος δὲ αἰεὶ οἴσεται τι τὸ κινουὶν, ἥτοι τόδε ἢ τοῖόνδε ἢ τοσόνδε, ὃ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τῆς κινήσεως, ὅταν κινή, οἷον ὁ ἐντελεχέας ἄνθρωπος ποιεῖ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπον.

Of immediate impact is the line ‘every mover too is moved’, since causation happens by ‘contact’ or ‘touch’ (θίξει). So given immediate ‘contact’ between mover and moved, an immanent relation is necessitated which means the cause itself undergoes reciprocal action: hot water heats the cold stone, but *vice versa* the cold stone will also cool the hot water. [Fire and cold stone is even better example...] This sense of efficient causality, however, is not the only one Aristotle is content with:

[T7] Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I.6 323a25–32

As a rule, no doubt, if A touches B, B touches A. For indeed practically all the movers within our ordinary experience impart motion by being moved: in their case, what touches must, and evidently does, touch something which touches it. Yet it is possible—as we sometimes say—for the mover merely to touch the moved, and that which touches need not touch a thing which touches it. Nevertheless it is commonly supposed that touching must be reciprocal, because movers which belong to the same kind as the moved impart motion by being moved. Hence if anything imparts motion without itself being moved, it may touch the moved and yet itself be touched by nothing—for we say sometimes that the man who grieves us touches us, but not that we touch him. (trans. Joachim)

¹⁴ E.g. *Physics* III.1 201b6–15: ‘Take for instance the buildable: the actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality must be either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable is no longer there. On the other hand, it is the buildable which is being built. Necessarily, then, the actuality is the process of building. But building is a kind of motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also’ (trans. Hardie/Gaye).

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἀπτόμενον ἀπτομένου ἀπτόμενον· καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδῶν, ὅσοις ἀνάγκη καὶ φαίνεται τὸ ἀπτόμενον ἄπτεσθαι ἀπτομένου· ἔστι δ' ὥς ἐνιότέ φαμεν τὸ κινεῖν ἄπτεσθαι μόνου τοῦ κινουμένου, τὸ δ' ἀπτόμενον μὴ ἄπτεσθαι ἀπτομένου· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν κινούμενα τὰ ὁμογενῇ, ἀνάγκη δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπτομένου ἄπτεσθαι. Ὡστε εἴ τι κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐκείνο μὲν ἂν ἄπτοιτο τοῦ κινήτου, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐδέν· φαιμέν γὰρ ἐνίστε τὸν λυποῦντα ἄπτεσθαι ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνου.

Considered as movers, Aristotle mentions a certain class of efficient causes which are not affected in action on moved/affected things. For instance: the form of health remains unaffected as the first cause of action, while it brings about specific secondary actions: the food, for instance, prescribed by that form which is transformed as it acts on the body.¹⁵ Later, Aristotle specifies that these kinds of causes do not share the matter which they affect—so implicitly they are immaterial.¹⁶

The distinction of movers suggests priority, and therefore distinction in nature, between unaffected and affected causes, where enmattered causes imply reciprocity, whereas causes that are not in matter are not affected. What does Aristotle have in mind here? As seen in the earlier example, forms in thinking (like in the case of the deliberator) are one; soul and the unmoved movers of *Physics* VIII.6–10 and *Metaphysics* Λ also fit this category. Soul as the actuality of life in a potentially-living body fits this category.¹⁷ The unmoved movers causing the motion of the world spheres in *Metaphys.* Λ.7–9, assuming this is seen in line with *Physics* VIII.10, also fit this category.

Altogether this forms the backdrop for Proclus' appropriation of Aristotle's causal model.

Aristotle in Agreement with Plato? The Neoplatonic Exploitation of Aristotelian Efficient Causality

Bearing this latter distinction in mind, we can see what led Alexander of Aphrodisias to make the distinction explicit between primary and instrumental efficient causes—exploited, as we will see, by Proclus. Commenting on [T5]:

[T8] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics II*, 321.1–12

Thirdly he again enumerates the efficient cause [τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον], giving examples here too, by means of which, I think, he demonstrates the distinctions within the efficient cause, as he did earlier with the material and formal. For the person who has given advice [or who deliberated; ὁ βουλευσας], the doctor and the seed are all efficient causes in different ways. The first of them

¹⁵ *De Gen. et Corr.* I.7 324a35–b3: '... thus the art of healing produces health without itself being acted upon in any way by that which is being healed. But the food, in acting, is itself in some way acted upon: for, in acting, it is simultaneously heated or cooled or otherwise affected. Now the art of healing corresponds to an origin, while the food corresponds to the last (i.e. contiguous) mover' (trans. Joachim). (... οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ· αὐτὴ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ὑγίαν οὐδὲν πάσχει ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιαζομένου. Τὸ δὲ σιτίον ποιοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ πάσχει τι· ἡ γὰρ θερμαίνεται ἢ ψύχεται ἢ ἄλλο τι πάσχει ἅμα ποιοῦν. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὡς ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ σιτίον τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ ἀπτόμενον.)

¹⁶ *De Gen. et Corr.* I.7 324b4–12: 'Those active powers, then, whose forms are not embodied in matter, are unaffected; but those whose forms are in matter are such as to be affected in acting. For we maintain that one and the same matter is equally, so to say, the basis of either of the two opposed things---being as it were a kind; and that which can be hot must be made hot, provided the heating agent is there, i.e. comes near. Hence (as we have said) some of the active powers are unaffected while others are such as to be affected; and what holds of motion is true also of the active powers. For as in motion the first mover is unmoved, so among the active powers the first agent is unaffected' (trans. Joachim). See further the excellent article on efficient causality in *De Gen. et Corr.* I.6–7 in Buchheim (2007).

¹⁷ *De Anima* II.2, 414a19ff. By implication, soul as form and actuality of body must be something 'distinct' over and above the material which it forms; see *Metaph.* Z.17 1041b6ff. Cf. Buchheim (2007) 84--5.

initiates the process without putting his head to the task; the doctor acts by doing the work himself; but the seed is, in a way, intermediate between the efficient and the material, since it acts by coming-to-be something else through a change to itself; the true agent, as Alexander [of Aphrodisias] agrees, must be distinguished from the product. We should not construe the word ‘all’ [πάντα, from [T5]] with the word ‘acts’ [ποιούν], but should read it separately and take it as referring to the three types of efficient cause.¹⁸ (trans. Fleet, lightly modified)

Τρίτον πάλιν ἀπαριθμεῖται τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον παραδείγματα καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρατιθεῖς, δι’ ὧν ὡς οἶμαι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ποιητικοῦ αἰτίου διαφοράς, ὡς τὰς τοῦ ὑλικοῦ καὶ τὰς τοῦ εἶδους πρότερον, ἐνεδείξατο· ἄλλως γὰρ ὁ βουλευσας ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλως ὁ ἱατρὸς καὶ ἄλλως τὸ σπέρμα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσας τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς ποιήσεως οὐκ ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτὸς τοῦ ἔργου, ὁ δὲ ἱατρὸς αὐτὸς ἐργαζόμενος ποιεῖ, τὸ δὲ σπέρμα μέσον πως τοῦ τε ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὑλικοῦ ἐστίν, εἴπερ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ μεταβολῇ καὶ γινόμενον ἅμα ποιεῖ, τοῦ κυρίως ποιοῦντος, ὡς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁμολογεῖ, ἐξηρησθαι τοῦ γινομένου ὀφείλοντος. τὸ δὲ πάντα οὐ χρή συντάξαι τῷ τοῦ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ ἀπολύτως ἀναγινώσκοντα περὶ τῶν τριῶν τρόπων τοῦ ποιητικοῦ αἰτίου ἐκδέχεσθαι.

Aristotle doesn’t explicitly bring out these three distinctions (the deliberator (1), doctor (2), and seed (3)), but Alexander likely draws evidence for these distinctions from the different kinds of movers mentioned in *Physics* VIII.5, with the distinction between moved movers (3), self-movers (2) and unmoved movers (1)—the self-moved man pushing the stick pushing the stone.¹⁹ What is distinct is Alexander calling the first mover—the unmoved mover (1)—of any motion series a primary efficient cause, which language we do not see in Aristotle.

Proclus almost certainly draws from Alexander for his position in [T2], insofar as the primary efficient cause has priority over the other, subordinate kinds of efficient causes (2 and 3). As such, if we recall what Aristotle said about unaffected causes in [T7], they do not share the same matter of the moved or changed thing. Proclus draws this out more explicitly:

[T9] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 75

Every cause properly spoken (κυρίως λεγόμενον) transcends its finished product.

For [if such a cause were] immanent in its effect, either it would be a complementary part of the latter or it would in some way need it for its own existence (prop. 64), and it would in this regard be inferior to the effect. That which exists in the resultant is not so much a cause (αἴτιον) as a contributory cause (συναίτιόν), being either a part of the thing produced (μέρος ὄν τοῦ γινομένου) or an instrument of the maker (ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος): for the several parts of the thing exist within it, but are less perfect than the whole; and the instrument serves the maker for the process of production, but is unable to determine for itself the limits of creation. Accordingly every cause properly so called, inasmuch as it both is more perfect than that which proceeds from it (prop. 7) and itself furnishes the limit of its production, transcends the instruments, the elements, and in general all that is described as a by-cause. (trans. Dodds, modified)

Πᾶν τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον ἐξήρηται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος.

ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ὄν, ἢ συμπληρωτικὸν αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχον ἢ δεόμενόν πως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, ἀτελέστερον ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ. τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀποτελέσματι ὄν συναίτιόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ἢ

¹⁸ i.e., from the examples listed, of the person who gave advice, or deliberated (1), the doctor (2), and the seed (3).

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.5 256a10–18.

αἴτιον, ἢ μέρος ὄν τοῦ γινομένου ἢ ὄργανον τοῦ ποιούντος· τό τε γάρ μέρος ἐν τῷ γινομένῳ ἐστίν, ἀτελέστερον ὑπάρχον τοῦ ὅλου, καί τὸ ὄργανον τῷ ποιούντι πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν δουλεύει, τὰ μέτρα τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφορίζειν ἑαυτῷ μὴ δυνάμενον. ἅπαν ἄρα τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον, εἴ γε καὶ τελειότερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ μέτρον αὐτὸ τῇ γενέσει παρέχεται, καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων ἐξήρηται καὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ πάντων ἀπλῶς τῶν καλουμένων συναιτίων.

This passage is a further specification of [T2], which follows in line with Alexander/Simplicius' placement of primary efficient causality as distinct from the other moved movers/instrumental causes. This can be seen in the mention of the contributory cause (συναίτιόν) as 'either a part of the thing produced or an instrument of the maker'. (Assumedly being 'part of the thing produced' is either the immanent form or matter of the thing.)

4. Causal Actuality/Active Potency (δύναμις) for Proclus

Proclus goes on to adapt Aristotle's causal structure in terms of actuality/potentiality:

[T10] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 77 (1–11)

All that exists potentially is brought to act (εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) from that which is by actuality what this [the former] is by potentiality: that which is by partial potentiality from that which is partially by actuality what the same by potentiality; and that which is wholly by potentiality from what is wholly according to actuality.

For it is not the nature of that which potentially is to bring itself forward to actuality, being imperfect (ἀτελές): for if, being imperfect, it became the cause of its own perfection even by actuality, the cause would be more imperfect than the effect. Thus what is potential, as potential, is not its own cause of being by actuality: for by being imperfect, it will be the cause of perfection, since everything which is by potentiality, as potential, is imperfect, and everything which is by actuality, as actuality, is perfect. (trans. Dodds, modified)

Πᾶν τὸ δυνάμει ὄν ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄντος δ' τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν πρόεισι· τὸ μὲν πῃ δυνάμει ἐκ τοῦ πῃ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἢ αὐτὸ δυνάμει· τὸ δὲ πάντῃ δυνάμει ὄν ἐκ τοῦ πάντῃ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὄντος.

αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑαυτὸ τὸ δυνάμει προάγειν εἰς ἐνέργειαν οὐ πέφυκεν, ἀτελές ὄν· εἰ γὰρ ἀτελές ὄν αἴτιον ἑαυτῷ γίνοιτο τοῦ τελείου καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, τὸ αἴτιον ἔσται τοῦ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότος ἀτελέστερον. οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δυνάμει, ἢ δυνάμει, ἑαυτῷ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴτιον· ἔσται γὰρ, ἢ ἀτελές, τοῦ τελείου αἴτιον, εἴπερ τὸ δυνάμει πᾶν, ἢ δυνάμει, ἀτελές, τὸ δ' ἐνεργεῖν πᾶν, ἢ ἐνεργεῖν, τέλειον.

So far, familiar territory coming from Aristotle: this mirrors the definition of motion from the end of *Physics* III.1 as ‘the actuality of the potential as such’ in the moved thing,²⁰ where the actuality between mover and moved is the same—given that the mover already has the power of effecting change.^{21 22} Proclus, however, makes a shift from Aristotle by emphasizing that every actuality (ἐνεργεία) proceeds from a given potency/power (δύναμις):

[T11] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 79

All that comes to be arises out of the twofold potency.

For it should itself be fitted for it and so possess an imperfect potency (δύναμιν ἀτελή); and the producer (τὸ ποιοῦν), being already in actuality what the subject is by potentiality, is beforehand a perfect potency (δύναμιν [...] τελείαν). For every actuality proceeds from the indwelling potency; if the producer (τὸ ποιοῦν) should be without potency, how shall it act (ἐνεργήσει) and produce (ποιήσει) another? and if what is generated does not have the receptive potency, how may it come about? For the producer always produces that which is able to be affected, but not even any chance thing whose nature is not affected by it. (trans. Dodds, modified)

Πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τῆς διττῆς γίνεται δυνάμεως.

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ δεῖ ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι καὶ δύναμιν ἀτελῇ ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ὃ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὑπάρχον, δύναμιν προειληφέναι τελείαν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἐκ δυνάμεως τῆς ἐνούσης πρόεισιν· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν μὴ ἔχοι δύναμιν, πῶς ἐνεργήσει καὶ ποιήσει εἰς ἄλλο; εἴτε τὸ γινόμενον μὴ ἔχοι τὴν κατ’ ἐπιτηδειότητα δύναμιν, πῶς ἂν γένοιτο; τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν εἰς τὸ παθεῖν δυνάμενον ποιεῖ πᾶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν καὶ ὃ μὴ πέφυκεν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ πάσχειν.

The principle that there are two kinds of potencies—perfect and imperfect δύναμις—is essentially a parallel of Aristotle’s distinction between active and passive δύναμις in *Metaph.* Θ.1: for every (passive) potentiality of B to be acted on by A, there is a corresponding (active) potentiality for A to act on B. Given this, all senses of passive potentiality are derived from active potentiality—which Aristotle indicates as the source of motion (paralleling the definition of efficient cause in *Phys.* II.3).

What’s missing with Aristotle’s account is that he does not anywhere explicitly, or even implicitly, affirm Proclus’ principle. For Aristotle, all active potency implies actuality (at some point, if not always), but not every actuality necessarily implies active potency. This is almost certainly the case on looking at the later *Metaph.* Θ.8, where Aristotle establishes the primacy of actuality to potency/δύναμις, without specifying which sense, if any. More so with the proof for the unmoved mover being completely in act and without any sense of potency in *Metaph.* Λ.6.

So with Prop. 79 [T11], by contrast to Aristotle, Proclus is thinking of actuality as contingent on having a perfect potency. This suggests that the potency itself is brought about by some prior actuality, if

²⁰ Aristotle, *Phys.* III.1 201a28ff.

²¹ Aristotle, *Phys.* III.3 202a12–16: ‘The solution of the difficulty is plain: motion is in the movable. It is the fulfilment of this potentiality by the action of that which has the power of causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable; for it must be the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable of causing motion because it can do this, it is a mover because it actually does it’ (trans. Hardie/Gaye).

²² Minor note in passing: where Aristotle speaks of the ‘fulfilment’ (ἐντελέχεια) of the potential in motion, from *Phys.* III.1, Proclus speaks of the ‘perfection’ (τέλειος) of the potential in causation. The choice of words might illustrate a subtle metaphysical difference of view, esp. if Proclus assumes qualities and perfections immanently found in things come from prior, ontologically distinct intelligible entities (i.e. Intellect, etc.).

Proclus is being consistent and following Aristotle.²³ One can easily see this, e.g.: if each particular, participated soul is in act in relation to body, that particular soul's perfect potency, from which it acts on body, must be derived from the unparticipated monad, Soul, which gives it its being—recalling *ET* Prop. 23 [T1].²⁴

This leads to a further distinction in causation for Proclus—the producer implanting a potency within its participant:

[T12] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 81

All that is participated separately is present to the participant through an inseparable potency which it implants.

For if it is itself something separate from the participant and not contained in it, something which subsists in itself, then they need a mean term to connect them, one which more nearly resembles the participated principle than the participant does, and yet actually resides in the latter. For if the former is separate, how can it be participated by that which contains neither it nor any emanation from it? Accordingly a potency or irradiation, proceeding from the participated to the participant, must link the two; and this medium of participation will be distinct from both. (trans. Dodds, modified)

Πᾶν τὸ χωριστῶς μετεχόμενον διὰ τινος ἀχωρίστου δυνάμεως, ἢ ἐνδίδωσι, τῷ μετέχοντι πάρεστιν.

εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] αὐτὸ χωριστὸν ὑπάρχει τοῦ μετέχοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ὥς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κεκτημένον, δεῖ δὴ τινος αὐτοῖς μεσότητος συνεχούσης θάτερον πρὸς θάτερον, ὁμοιοτέρας τῷ μετεχομένῳ καίτοι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μετέχοντι οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο χωριστόν ἐστι, πῶς τοῦτο μετέχει, μήτε αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ἔχον μήτε ἄλλο ἀπ' αὐτοῦ; δύναμις ἄρα ἀπ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἔλλαμψις εἰς τὸ μετέχον προελθοῦσα συνάψει ἅμφω· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔσται δι' οὗ ἡ μέθεξις, τὸ δὲ μετεχόμενον, τὸ δὲ μετέχον.

Intriguingly, we are faced with the same problem of the cause's separation as seen with the unparticipated from *ET* Prop. 23 [T1]. Prop. 75 [T9] made it clear that true efficient causes necessitate ontological separation and transcendence over their effects. However, immanence is also shown as necessary for action—or participation, here. So in the case of the individual, particular soul's action on body, the body must contain an immanent potency (or irradiation/ἔλλαμψις) received from soul to have life immanent in it. Proclus states as much in the previous prop., with the necessary presence of an incorporeal in the body for body to be able to act:

[T13] *ibid.*, Prop. 80, 11–17

Again, every agent has an active potency; but body in itself is without quality and without potency: therefore it cannot act in virtue of being body, but only in virtue of a potency of action residing in it—that is, it acts, when it does act, by participation of potency. Further, even

²³ Gersh (1978) also makes this point: 'Clearly this active potency could not also be described as a potency prior to act, for Proclus spoke of the cause as 'remaining in itself' while in general he views the actualization of potency as a variety of motion. In fact, when the Neoplatonists speak of the relation between cause and effect they abandon the notion that the former is being gradually actualized and, to underline the idea that it is already fulfilled before the process of causation begins, refer to it only as causing through its activity. Thus Proclus states that "producing and begetting are likewise activity" (καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ γεννᾶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐστίν).' Of particular note, to be addressed later, see *ibid.* n. 45: 'The notion of an actualization of potency is, however, retained when the "cause" is not yet viewed as a cause but still only as an effect of a prior term in the spiritual hierarchy'.

²⁴ Cf. [T1]'s proposition: 'All that is unparticipated gives substance (ὑφίστησιν) out of itself to the participated...'

incorporeals participate passive affections when they come to be in a body, because they are then divided along with their bodies and feel the effect of the divisible nature of the latter, although in their own being they are without parts. (trans. Dodds)²⁵

ἐπεὶ καὶ πᾶν τὸ ποιοῦν δύναμιν ἔχει ποιητικὴν· ἄποιον δὲ καὶ ἀδύναμον τὸ σῶμα καθ' αὐτό· ὥστε οὐ καθὼς σῶμα ποιήσει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιῆν ἐν αὐτῷ δύναμιν· μεθέξει ἄρα δυνάμεως ποιεῖ, ὅταν ποιῇ. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα παθῶν μετέχει ἐν σώματι γεγόμενα, συνδιαιρούμενα σώμασι καὶ ἀπολαύοντα τῆς μεριστῆς ἐκείνων φύσεως, ἀμερῇ ὄντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν οὐσίαν.

By contrast, Proclus thinks the Aristotelian causal model is insufficient, if all that is required for motion/causation is the existence of a prior source of actuality. Demonstrated in his implicit critique of the Aristotelian unmoved mover(s) of *Metaph.* Λ.7–9:²⁶

[T14] Proclus, *Commentary on Parmenides*, 922.1–19

This is what we traditionally reply to those who do not make the intelligible creative causes of secondary entities: how could the heaven have appellation of the divine realm, if it be not derived from that source? Appetition would then be a result of chance, if the one is not the generative cause, and the other does not derive its existence from that quarter. As things are, it is reasonable that the thing generated should strive towards its own source and cause, and it is according to nature that the secondary should turn towards the power that creates and cognizes it. ... So that if nothing is added from the object of appellation to the appetitors, the process of appetition once again becomes superfluous, seeing that nothing can be acquired. (trans. Morrow/Dillon)

Conclusions:

- Proclus confirms the Aristotelian thesis—all that exists potentially (δυνάμει) is brought to act by what is already in complete actuality. [T10]
- All causality is characterized by the interaction of active and passive potency [T11]
 - Consequently, that which is in act (τὸ ποιοῦν, κατ' ἐνέργειαν) *always* has active/perfect potency beforehand.
 - Suggesting a descending series of potencies (e.g. unparticipated Intellect provides perfect potency for unparticipated Soul—latter itself provides perf. potency for participated soul(s)—later for bodies)
- Every cause implants an immanent *potency* into its effect—makes possible the actualization of the effect. [T12]
 - e.g. particular, separate soul implants potency in body by its activity (ἐνέργεια), which in turn brings body to act as a living, acting body [T13]

In sum: The causal model of [T12] (with [T13] as specific e.g.) suggests that the two terms of cause and effect—perfect and imperfect potency [T11]—necessitates a third, intermediary term with the potency transmitted from the cause in actuality. This 'potency', which Proclus identifies as the 'incorporeal' in

²⁵ Restating Prop. 80's thesis: 'The proper nature of all bodies is to undergo action (πάσχειν), and of all incorporeals to act (ποιεῖν), the former being in themselves inactive: and the latter impassible; but through association with the body the incorporeal too undergoes action, even as through participation of the incorporeals bodies too can act' (trans. Dodds, modified). (Πᾶν σῶμα πάσχειν καθ' αὐτὸ πέφυκε, πᾶν δὲ ἀσώματον ποιεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἀδρανὲς ὄν καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἀπαθές· πάσχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν, ὥς δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων μετουσίαν.)

²⁶ Cf. the further analysis of Steel (1987) comparing/contrasting Proclus and Aristotle on the unmoved mover's causality.

[T13], matches the ‘instrumental cause’ (συναίτιον) of Prop. 75 [T9], which depends on a prior actuality.

By analogy, I now want to argue the ‘participated’ cause (P2) plays the same role of the transmitted ‘potency’ as intermediary, and therefore subordinate, between the unparticipated (P1) and receiving participants (P3):

5. Confirmation: the Unparticipated as a Primary Efficient Cause

[T15] Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 64

Every monad gives rise to two series, one consisting of substances complete in themselves, and one of irradiations which have their substantiality in something other than themselves.

For if the outgoing proceeds by a declension through terms akin to the constitutive causes (prop. 28), from the wholly perfect (P1) must arise things complete in their kind (P2), and by these latter the origin of things incomplete must be mediated in due sequence: so that there will be one order of complete in themselves, and another of incomplete substances. The latter are upon such a level that they belong to their participants: for being incomplete they require a substrate for their existence. The former make the participants belong to them: for being complete they fill the participants with themselves²⁷ and establish them in themselves, and for their substantial existence they have no need of inferior beings.

Accordingly those substances which are complete in themselves, while by their discrimination into a manifold they fall short of their original monad, are yet in some wise assimilated to it by their self-complete existence; whereas the incomplete not only as existing in another fall away from the monad which exists in itself, but also as incomplete from the all-completing monad. But all procession advances through similars until it reaches the wholly dissimilar.²⁸ Thus each of the original monads gives rise to two series.

Cor. From this it is apparent that of the henads some proceed self-complete from the One, while others are irradiated states of unity; and of the intelligences some are self-complete substances, while others are intellectual perfections; and of souls some belong to themselves, while others belong to ensouled bodies, as being but phantasms of souls. And so not every unity is a god, but only the self-complete henad; not every intellectual property is an intelligence, but only the existential; not every irradiation of Soul is a soul, but there are also reflections of souls. (trans. Dodds)

Πᾶσα ἀρχικὴ μονὰς διττὸν ὑφίστησιν ἀριθμόν, τὸν μὲν αὐτοτελῶν ὑποστάσεων, τὸν δὲ ἐλλάμψεων ἐν ἐτέροις τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένων.

εἰ γὰρ καθ’ ὕφεςιν ἡ πρόοδος διὰ τῶν οἰκείων τοῖς ὑποστατικοῖς αἰτίοις, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παντελείων (P1) τὰ τέλεια καὶ διὰ τούτων μέσων τὰ ἀτελῆ πρόεισιν εὐτάκτως· ὥστε αἱ μὲν ἔσονται αὐτοτελεῖς ὑποστάσεις, αἱ δὲ ἀτελεῖς. καὶ αὗται μὲν γίνονται ἤδη τῶν μετεχόντων (ἀτελεῖς γὰρ οὔσαι δέονται τῶν ὑποκειμένων εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὑπαρξιν)· αἱ δὲ ἑαυτῶν ποιούσι τὰ μετέχοντα (τέλεια γὰρ οὔσαι πληροῦσι μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἐδράζουσιν ἐν ἑαυταῖς, δέονται δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν καταδεεστέρων εἰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν). αἱ μὲν οὖν αὐτοτελεῖς ὑποστάσεις, διὰ τὴν εἰς πλῆθος διάκρισιν ἡλαττωμένοι τῆς ἀρχικῆς αὐτῶν μονάδος, διὰ τὴν αὐτοτελῆ ὑπαρξιν ὁμοιοῦνται πῇ πρὸς ἐκείνην· αἱ δὲ ἀτελεῖς καὶ τῷ ἐν ἄλλοις εἶναι τῆς καθ’

²⁷ Cf. *ET* Prop. 25.

²⁸ Cf. *ET* Prop. 28.

αὐτὴν ὑφεστῶσης καὶ τῷ ἀτελεῖ τῆς πάντα τελειούσης ἀφεστήκασιν. αἱ δὲ πρόοδοι διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ἄχρι τῶν πάντη ἀνομοίων. διττὸν ἄρα ὑφίστησιν ἀριθμὸν ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχικῶν μονάδων.

(*Cor.*) ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἐνάδες αἱ μὲν αὐτοτελεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς προῆλθον, αἱ δὲ ἐλλάμψεις ἐνώσεων· καὶ νόες οἱ μὲν οὐσίαι αὐτοτελεῖς, οἱ δὲ νοεραὶ τινες τελειότητες· καὶ ψυχαὶ αἱ μὲν ἐαυτῶν οὔσαι, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψυχουμένων, ὡς ἰνδάλματα μόνον οὔσαι ψυχῶν. καὶ οὕτως οὔτε πᾶσα ἐνωσις θεός, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτοτελεῖς ἐνάς, οὔτε πᾶσα νοερά ἰδιότης νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσιώδης μόνον, οὔτε πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἐλλάμψις ψυχὴ, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τὰ εἶδωλα τῶν ψυχῶν.

Conclusion: [T15] follows the same analogical causal structure as [T13].

- 'Wholly perfect' monads/unparticipated (P1) generate 'those complete in their own kind', yet belonging to their participants.
- The line: 'But all procession advances through similars until it reaches the wholly dissimilar' — same principle for the cause implanting immanent potency in the effect [T12].
- Participated terms (P2) are separate from participants (seen in [T1]/[T15]), *unlike* immanent potency in the effect.

Accordingly: since the immanent potency from [T12] fits the role of an instrumental cause (συναίτιον) from *ET* Prop. 75 [T9], the participated term (P2) fits the *analogical* role of an instrumental cause as an intermediary between the monad/unparticipated term and the participant. [T15] confirms this approach.

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