Presidents possess vast authority to shape policy outcomes. They can defer deportations for hundreds of thousands of young people, attack foreign countries, protect land from commercial development, and raise wages for federal employees---all without seeking prior approval from Congress or the Supreme Court. Under the dominant theoretical paradigm, separation of powers fails to provide an effective constraint on this behavior---leading recent scholarship to suggest the public can provide it. While recent research has examined how the public reacts when presidents act unilaterally, these studies fail to account for presidents' varied success in implementing unilateral orders and do not contextualize their findings within the media landscape that shapes the information available to the public. Experiments on public reactions to unilateral policy change vary the means presidents pursue policy reform to test whether the public prefers presidents to act unilaterally or through Congress. These studies have important limitations. They vary the means of policy action, without comparing approval under action relative inaction. Moreover, they imply that unilateral orders are successfully implemented. In reality, a sizable share of presidential directives are never implemented or are reversed by the Supreme Court. President Truman, for example, nationalized the steel industry due to an imminent strike, but the order was overturned by the Supreme Court. More recently, President Obama directed the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to conduct research into gun violence and issued a directive closing the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay---neither were carried out. Without understanding both whether presidents have something to gain from unilateral action (relative to no action)---and if they pay a cost for failed actions---we have an incomplete picture of their strategic incentives. More broadly, all prior research on public opinion of presidential policymaking assumes their causal effects have purchase in the contemporary media environment. But the public learns about executive actions via the news media, which does not necessarily provide clear attribution for every policy change or symmetric coverage of policy proposals and outcomes. If the signal of responsibility is weaker or not clearly attributable to the president, the public cost of unilateral action may only operate in researchers' surveys. This would inform their strategic incentives---to act unilaterally, knowing they will never be blamed for a bad outcome. They can have their cake and eat it too. We investigate these potential dynamics by conducting a panel survey and companion media study. The survey will evaluate whether presidents receive a benefit or pay a cost for pursuing unilateral policy change and test whether this relationship depends upon the successful implementation of the order. In the first panel, respondents will receive information regarding a policy issue. They will be told the administration's position; that the president took unilateral action; or that both the president and Congress took action. In the second wave, the treatment will consist of information regarding the implementation of the policy: that the policy was successfully implemented, unsuccessfully implemented. Post-treatment in each wave, they will be asked to report their level of support for the president and level of support for their handling of the policy. We complement this experiment with a media study that contextualizes its findings. We will examine whether the press provides clear attribution in reporting on executive action and symmetric coverage of issuance and implementation. Using a random sample of unilateral orders and the full text corpuses of the The New York Times and other prominent national newspapers, we will compare the number of articles addressing the issuance of a given order to the number of articles discussing the implementation of that order. We will also analyze the content of the articles to see if they hold the president accountable for unsuccessfully implemented orders by attributing blame to the president or his administration. Overall, we expect that respondents will support unilateral presidential actions that align with their own partisan identity and policy preferences, but that reversal or unsuccessful implementation will result in lower support. While these results suggest a possible pathway by which presidents can be held to account, we also expect that the media provides little-to-no coverage of the implementation of unilateral actions. Consequently, although there exists a mechanism by which presidents can be held accountable for issuing unfeasible orders, it does not occur in practice because of the realities of the contemporary media environment.