Social norms have attracted the attention of economists since the beginning of the discipline (Smith, 1759). During thepast few decades, there has been an increasing interest from different angles: Elster (1989), Kandori (1992),Posner (1997). Economists using experimental methods have discussed the role of norms and, early on,appealed to norms as a way to explain or rationalize otherwise puzzling behavior (Fehr and Schurtenberger,2018; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004b,a). Further conceptual developments have witnessed the birth of newtools to elicit/measure norms empirically during the past decade.By now, there is a large and growing empirical and experimental literature that directly manipulatesor elicits/measures either empirical and/or normative expectations (EE or NE) (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009;Krupka and Weber, 2009, 2013; Xiao and Bicchieri, 2010; Bicchieri et al., 2011; Irwin and Horne, 2013;Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016, 2018; G ̈achter et al., 2017; Abbink et al., 2018; Bicchieri and Dimant,2019; Bicchieri et al., 2019b,a).While economists may not agree on a precise definition of social norms, there seems to be a growingagreement on a working definition that it relates to rules of conduct (and not outcomes) whose adoptionis conditional on expectations, both on what others do (empirical) and on what others think one ought todo (normative expectations). This definition is proposed by Bicchieri (2006). For empirical expectations,economists rely on standard belief elicitation methods and their properties have been explored (both theo-retically and empirically). For normative expectations, two methods stand out: the method proposed andused by Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) and the one by Krupka and Weber (2013).Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) uses a two-step incentivized elicitation of second order normative beliefs.After eliciting non incentivized Personal Normative Beliefs (PNB), they use an incentivized elicitation ofbeliefs of others’ responses to PNB. Krupka and Weber (2013) uses an incentivized coordination game(with multiple equilibria) on social appropriateness of behavior. Subjects are incentivized to match themodal responses (regarding social acceptability) of other participants.Each method elicits different aspects about normative expectations, and each relies on implicit assump-tions about behavior and each is subject to potential problems with normative expectations elicitation meth-ods. Bicchieri-Xiao examine second order beliefs regarding the most appropriate action, while Krupka-Weber elicit higher-order/focal beliefs regarding the degree of social appropriateness of alternative actions.Bicchieri-Xiao’s implicit assumption is that individuals report truthfully their PNB and everyone expectsthis, or at least that everyone assumes that individuals report truthfully their PNB. If there is social desirabil-ity bias (SDB) in elicitation of Personal Normative Beliefs and subjects anticipate SDB of PNB responses,elicitation is not related to normative expectations. Krupka-Weber’s assumption is that collectively-sharednorms create focal points in the coordination game. However, since subjects are incentivized to coordinate,they can coordinate on anything (sunspot equilibria), not necessarily on normative expectations.