Semanticists and philosophers of fiction that formulate analyses of contensive statements of the form ‘In/According to *s*, ϕ’, usually treat the ‘In *s*’-operator (**In**) and the ‘According to *s*’-operator (**Acc**) on a par. I argue that there are in fact three clusters of linguistic observations that suggest that the **In** and **Acc** operators require separate semantic analyses. These observations concern (I) preferences for **In** or **Acc** in contensive statements about fictional or non-fictional media, (II) preferences for **In** or **Acc** in contensive statements about implicit or explicit content and (III) tense use preferences in contensive statements with **In** and **Acc**. To account for these three clusters of observations I propose to, firstly, adopt the Lewisian (1978) possible world analysis for contensive statements with **In**. Roughly: ‘**In** *s*, ϕ’ is true iff in the worlds compatible with *s*, ϕ. Secondly, I propose to analyze contensive statements with **Acc** as indirect speech reports. Roughly: ‘**Acc** *s*, ϕ’ is true iff *s* asserts that ϕ.