SEPARATING SPHERES? DIVERGING TRENDS IN YOUTH'S GENDER ATTITUDES

ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY

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ABSTRACT

Treating trends in gender ideology as multidimensional constructs, rather than monolithically, is central to gaining insight into the stall in the gender revolution. Using data from Monitoring the Future survey (1976–2015), we examine trends in youth's beliefs about gender in three domains: the marketplace, the family, and the intersection of work with family. Findings show that the gap in beliefs about gender egalitarianism in the workforce and in families converged until the mid-1990s and widened thereafter. The divergence is attributed to changes in gender egalitarian beliefs in the family domain which increased until the mid-1990s, but surprisingly reversed course thereafter. The findings call into question theoretical assumptions about the gender revolution—that women's advancement in one domain will be associated with progress in another. Instead, rising egalitarian ideology in the marketplace has been met with a renewed gender essentialism in the family.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of egalitarian essentialist ideology, a blend of feminist principles of gender equity with beliefs in innate gender dissimilarities, has been an persuasive potential explanation for the persistence of gender inequality and the “stalled gender revolution” starting in the mid-1990s and continuing into the early 21st century (Charles and Grusky 2004; Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Wharton 2015). This ideological frame may be a central mechanism behind diverging outcomes in the workplace and in families, with substantial progress toward gender equality evidenced in the marketplace and gender inequality persisting within families (England 2010). Accordingly, women’s status in the workplace has improved in multiple ways: the gender pay gap has narrowed (O’Neill 2003; Petersen and Morgan 1995), the significance of employer discrimination in promotions has declined (Meyersson Milgrom and Petersen 2006), increasing numbers of mothers remain employed (Klerman and Leibowitz 1999; Percheski 2008), and so forth. In contrast, gender equality in the family has lagged behind: women still do most of the caretaking and housework (Bianchi et al. 2000; Sayer 2005) and stereotypically gendered patterns in romantic relationships pervade (England 2010). Where there has been improvement for women in the family realm, it results more from increased time living apart (marriage delay and divorce) and a reduction in women’s total amount of time spent on housework, rather than from a convergence in gendered behavior (England 2006).

We argue the focus on egalitarian essentialism has overshadowed other facets of gender ideology, such as ideology differences by context. Drawing on structural theory, Risman (2004) aptly argues that “when we conceptualize gender as a social structure, we can begin to identify under what conditions and how gender inequality is being produced within each dimension” (p 435). Certainly, the importance of gender’s multidimensionality and measurement of it has been

thoughtfully articulated by scholars. A notable limitation is that trends in gender beliefs have to date not been systematically analyzed in ways that investigate differences in beliefs about proper roles for women and men in work and family realms over time. If egalitarian essentialist ideology is an increasingly formidable barrier to equality in families, essentialist attitudes should be more prevalent regarding the family compared to public roles and this belief gap should have expanded over time. So far there has been little empirical testing for evidence that such transformation in public beliefs have occurred. While previous studies show that attitudes across domain are uneven, whether this gap widens or narrows over time is less clear.

Cotter and colleagues (2011) appeal for more empirical evidence of changing gender attitudes: “If the turnaround of the 1990s derived from this new ‘egalitarian but traditional’ frame for understanding gender relations, we will need a broader array of attitude questions to tap the public’s multidimensional understanding of gender roles” (p. 286). We answered their call by investigating trends in beliefs about gender in the marketplace, in the family, and at their intersection. To do so, we took advantage of data from the 1976–2015 waves of the Monitoring the Future survey (www.monitoringthefuture.org), which contains a number of survey questions capturing the gender attitudes of American high school seniors.

BACKGROUND

Research on the stalled gender revolution has focused on gender discrepancies in fallback plans for unrealized goals of equality (Gerson 2009; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015); the cooptation of feminist ideology, such as endorsement of *choices* in place of goals of equal opportunity (Percheski 2008; Williams 2000); and beliefs in intensive mothering ideals (Hays 1996). Compiling these findings, scholars have argued that a stall in progressive gender attitudes resulted from the emergence of a new ideology of separate-but-equal gender beliefs, labeled

egalitarian essentialism (Charles and Grusky 2004; Cotter et al. 2011; England 2010). To investigate whether this explanation can account for the diverging outcomes in the marketplace and within families, we empirically examined whether trends in attitudes about gender show evidence of a rise in egalitarian essentialism ideology, analyzed whether these trends varied by domain in ways consistent with the gender stall primarily occurring in the family domain, and discerned potential mechanisms driving such changes in gender attitudes.

We draw on scholarship from two branches of research: trends in gender ideology and theories of gender as a social structure. In so doing, we advance the theory of egalitarian essentialism by comparing egalitarian and essentialist attitude trends regarding women at work and gender in families, and where they intertwine, mothers at work. Our theoretical approach and dataset allow us to make several important contributions to the existing scholarship on the gender revolution, which we detail below.

Multidimensionality of Gender Attitudes

Most gender attitude research treats gender ideology as one dimensional, even though many theorists recognize that gender itself is multidimensional (Coltrane 1994; Connell 2002). This oversight is surprising because gender scholars have long argued that cultural beliefs are context dependent and attitudes about gender cross multiple spheres (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009; Kane and Sanchez 1994; Ridgeway 2006; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Risman 2004). Despite several studies of gender attitudes in various contexts (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Desai and Temsah 2014; Kane 2000; Kane and Sanchez 1994; Plutzer 1988; Yu and Lee 2013), the majority of researchers do not analyze gender attitudes by domain over time, likely a consequence of limited survey data. For instance, Cotter and colleagues (2011) created an index of the four variables consistently available across survey years in the General Social Survey: one item measuring women's leadership potential in the

workplace, two variables measuring attitudes about working mothers, and one family indicator measuring agreement that women should primarily take care of the home. A notable exception is an early study that showed the gap in attitudes between domains initially seemed to be converging (Mason, Czajka, and Arber 1976), though assessment of trends since the 1970s has not been evaluated. Although the gap in attitudes about women's equality in the workforce and persistent beliefs in gender essentialism in families is well established (Desai and Temsah 2014; Kane and Sanchez 1994; Yu and Lee 2013), whether this difference has widened or converged in the last few decades remains untested. Data from the Monitoring the Future survey include a wide range of gender attitude questions asked consistently over the last forty years, allowing for our multidimensional analysis of trends in gender attitudes, an advantage over previous studies.

The endorsement of egalitarian ideology has historically differed by domain, with lower levels of endorsement of gender equality in the family context than in the marketplace (Desai and Temsah 2014; Kane and Sanchez 1994; Mason and Lu 1988; Yu and Lee 2013). There are substantial reasons to suspect a divergence in gender attitudes related to the realm of the marketplace compared to gender within families. The kind of egalitarianism that rapidly increased is rooted in ideology compatible with American cultural ideals of individualism, ideology associated more with the realm of the public sphere than rooted in families (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Charles and Bradley 2009). England (2006) argues the bottleneck to the gender revolution is attributable to the salience of gender as a basis for organizing family behavior, concluding "sexism dies hard in the family" (p. 253). Romantic relationships continue to consist of conventional gender ideology, arguably reinforcing essentialist beliefs in the family domain (Charles and Bradley 2009; Lamont 2014). Consequently, attitudes about gender in the

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marketplace may progress while attitudes about gender in families may remain stalled or even regress in reaction to marketplace progress.

Endorsement of egalitarian attitudes in the family could be lower overall than egalitarianism in the marketplace domain, but they both trend in a similar pattern overall. If attitudes about gender in the family continue to progress, albeit lagging behind the rapid endorsement of egalitarianism in the marketplace, then essentialist beliefs in the family may not adequately explain the stalled gender revolution. Alternatively, attitudes in each domain could be distinctive, changing at different paces and in diverging directions over time. If gender attitudes related to the family domain plateau or even reverse course around the mid-1990s, the evidence would support the hypothesis that renewed gender essentialism in the family was associated with the stalled gender revolution. From the literature discussed above, we derive the following competing hypotheses:

H_{1a}: *Parallel egalitarianism*: Trends in market and family attitudes will exhibit parallel patterns.

H_{1b}: *Separate spheres*: Trends in market attitudes will continue to become egalitarian while family attitudes embrace more essentialism.

Attitudes about Mothers in the Labor Force

In addition to the improvement of analyzing gender attitude trends over time by domain, our analyses expand upon previous research on gender beliefs in another important way. Prior research has largely relied on attitude questions about mothers' employment and children's well-being, without separately investigating attitudes about gender and power in the family (Cotter et al. 2011; Mason et al. 1976). We argue that it is important to make explicit what attitudes about employed mothers signify. Whereas attitudes about women's employment represent ideals of individualism and gender attitudes in the family characterize beliefs about masculinity and

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femininity, mothers' employment denotes the tensions between ideals of individualism and femininity. It is essential to explicitly evaluate the contrast between the market domain's emphasis on self-reliance and the family domain's emphasis on interdependence (Bellah et al. 2008). Mothers' employment distinctively measures competing ideals between these two domains, a third dimension of gender attitudes that warrants purposeful attention.

Facing stalled progress in gender attitudes since the mid-1990s, a number of scholars have zeroed in on a reversal of support for working mothers specifically (Braun and Scott 2009; Ciabattari 2001; van Egmond et al. 2010). As support for women's careers confronted high levels of work-family conflict, a return to stereotypical gender roles may be the result of the rise of intensive mothering ideology (Cotter et al. 2011; Hays 1996). Linking endorsement of essentialist beliefs to rising support for intensive mothering and to challenges in combining work and family responsibilities is untested and potentially flawed. First, increased time demands to care for children is a particularly middle-class concern (Lareau 2003), which doesn't easily account for the stall in progressing egalitarian attitudes across all demographic groups (Cotter et al. 2011). Second, the attitude questions examined thus far fail to distinguish between increasing rhetoric about women's roles as mothers and a return to traditional beliefs about male primacy. A reversal of support for working mothers is theoretically quite different than a return to explicitly endorsing male dominance over women in families (Cotter et al. 2011; Kane and Sanchez 1994). A resurgence of idealization of motherhood may be a reaction to interfacing with resistant institutions, as adults attempt to bring their beliefs into alignment with the realities of adulthood (Gerson 2009, 2011; Pedulla and Thébaud 2015).

It is possible that gender attitudes have been returning to more conventional ideology and that continued support for women's labor force participation is a lingering effect of rising

economic inequality, rather than an indicator of support for gender equality (van Egmond et al. 2010). There is some evidence that endorsement of women's employment remains high because families benefit materially from women's financial contributions (Zuo and Tang 2000).

Therefore, we provide the following competing hypotheses:

H_{2a}: *Intensive mothering*: Attitudes about mothers' working will become more egalitarian and then become more traditionalist after the rise of "intensive mothering" rhetoric in the 1990s.

H_{2b}: *Economic insecurity*: Attitudes about mothers' working will continue to become more egalitarian as families increasingly depend on multiple incomes for financial stability.

Life Course and Gender Attitudes

Ample scholarship on changing gender beliefs documents a substantial increase in egalitarian ideology over the last half-century (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Cotter et al. 2011; Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman 2014; Donnelly et al. 2015; van Egmond et al. 2010; Mason et al. 1976; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001). Support for egalitarian ideology has increased among all sociodemographic groups and across all cohorts (Cherlin and Walters 1981; Cotter et al. 2011; Davis and Greenstein 2009; Mason and Lu 1988; Schnabel 2016). Despite differences in conservative ideology, gender attitudes appear to follow a similar progression over time across various religious groups (Schnabel 2016). Rising public support for egalitarian attitudes across these demographic groups has largely been attributed to cohort succession (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Mason and Lu 1988; Thornton 1989).

Although cohort studies have much to contribute to understanding cultural norms, focusing on youth is important for predicting future trends, as progress or retrenchment may appear falsely delayed in surveys of multiple cohorts (Goldin 1990). By using data from

Monitoring the Future, an annual survey of high school seniors' attitudes, we analyze the beliefs of young adults before they confront resistant institutions and prior to life events associated with changes in gender ideology (Baxter et al. 2015; Gerson 2009). Youth attitudes capture changing cultural ideals that are less likely to have been reconciled with adulthood realities, a viewpoint understudied in the literature (Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004; Gerson 2009, 2011; Plutzer 1988; Tallichet and Willits 1986). If the development of pervasive beliefs in egalitarian essentialist ideology explains some of the stall in the gender revolution, egalitarian essentialism should not only be visible in reaction to unrealized expectations of gender equality in adulthood, but also embraced by youth. Unquestionably, adult attitudes are important to understanding culture as it operates today; the advantage of studying youth is that their ideals provide an indicator of aspirations, potential harbingers of future social change.

Changing demographics may account for cohort replacement effects of gender attitude changes. Increasing proportions of children grow up in single-parent families—youth who do not witness their parents' gendered interactions may have different beliefs about gender than youth who live with both parents. Family structure is intertwined with class and race, which also tend to be associated with differences in commitment to egalitarian principles; these are important considerations as our society becomes more ethnically diverse and economically stratified. The proportion of respondents who live in more religious households, and are therefore more likely to hold more conservative beliefs about gender roles, has diminished over time. Interest-based explanations—that people are more likely to embrace egalitarian attitudes when they personally benefit from this ideology—are also important considerations (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). For example, youth whose mothers are employed may be more supportive of feminist principles if mothers' employment is interpreted as a resource for the family (Damaske 2011).

A particular advantage of focusing on one stage in the life course is the ability to isolate the influence of context-based explanations on changes in cultural norms (Brewster and Padavic 2000). As women's labor force participation and educational attainment has increased in society, youth have been increasingly exposed to the possibility of women's independence and capabilities in the marketplace (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). We theorize that the average rate of mothers' employment and educational attainment should produce support for feminist ideas, independent of one's own mother's employment or education. Because gender equality within families has stubbornly lagged behind, we expect gender attitudes about the marketplace to outpace changes in egalitarian ideology regarding dynamics within families. Therefore, we make the following hypothesis:

H_{3a}: *Exposure*: Increases in the population averages of mothers' employment and educational attainment will be associated with increases in egalitarian attitudes.

Rising egalitarian ideology has occurred for both women and men, albeit women consistently express more egalitarianism than men (Brewster and Padavic 2000; Ciabattari 2001; van Egmond et al. 2010). It is likely that women express greater support for egalitarian ideology than men because feminist principles are in women's interest. Comparatively, men may be more likely to be influenced by the cultural context in which they are situated (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). To test for gender differences in interest and exposure mechanisms, we looked at young men and women's attitudes separately in our analyses, making the following prediction:

H_{3b}: *Gendered Exposure*: Young men's egalitarian attitudes about the public sphere will be more responsive than young women's attitudes to increases in population averages of mothers' employment and educational attainment.

DATA AND MEASURES

We use data from the 1976 through 2015 waves of Monitoring the Future (MTF), an ongoing survey given annually to a nationally representative group of American 12th grade students (Johnston et al. 2016). Beginning in 1976, each MTF dataset contains about 1,400 variables. The respondents are high school seniors, primarily seventeen or eighteen years old, making this a uniquely valuable dataset for studying youth. Under grants from the National Institutes of Health, each spring approximately 16,000 students are administered questionnaires in their classrooms, distributed in 133 public and private high schools across the nation.

While core questions were asked on every questionnaire, the variables pertinent to our research questions were only asked on 1 of 5 versions of the questionnaire distributed to the students. Consequently, the number of respondents in our analytic sample ranged from 1,106 respondents to 3,180 per year. We restricted the analytic sample to White and Black youth because data on ethnicity and other races were not consistently available across years. Given the large total sample size, we used list-wise deletion to address missing cases. Five of the six dependent variables appeared on the same form and thus had 81,630 total respondents. The remaining variable (*h decision*) was asked on a separate form, resulting in 78,330 total respondents.

As described below, we used multilevel modeling techniques which nest individual respondents within years to allow for assessment of the joint effects of respondent characteristics alongside period context.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables consisted of six items: 1) two variables related to the marketplace (women at work); 2) two variables related to family roles (gender in families), and 3) two variables related to their intersection (mothers at work). Marketplace variables include

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attitudes related to women's comparable worth in the labor market and access to job opportunities. Respondents were asked whether they agreed "women should be considered as seriously as men for jobs as executives or politicians" (*leader*) and if "a woman should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man" (*equal job*). Variables about gender in families comprise attitude questions about the division of labor and power between spouses. The two family domain indicators are: "it is usually better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family" (*home*) and "the husband should make all the important decisions in the family" (*h decide*). Attitudes about mothers' employment measure beliefs about the effects of mothers' labor force participation on children: "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work" (*warm*) and "a preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother works" (*suffer*). Agreement was measured on a five-point scale: disagree, mostly disagree, neither, mostly agree, and agree. Where necessary, we recoded the scale so that higher values (5) were associated with egalitarian attitudes.

Four of the six variables are nearly identical to the items used by Cotter and colleagues (2011). Our approach differs from Davis and Greenstein's (2009) categorization of typical gender ideology measures along six dimensions (primacy of the breadwinner, belief in separate spheres, working women and relationship quality, motherhood and the feminine self, household utility, and acceptance of male privilege). We considered differential distributions of power within the family as a part of the "family" domain and equal consideration for leadership and job opportunities as part of the "market" domain, rather than as acceptance of male privilege as in Davis and Greenstein's (2009) categorization. The correlation coefficients between the two marketplace variables and the two mothers' employment variables are each above .50.

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Unfortunately, due to one of the family variables appearing on a different form, testing the correlation coefficient between the two family variables was not possible. We compared the correlation coefficients between the family variable that appears on the same form as the other variables and found that the correlation coefficients was .35 between *home* and both marketplace variables, .36 between *home* and *warm*, and .44 between *home* and *suffer*. Therefore, statistically we felt reasonably confident that the *home* variable was unlike the marketplace or mother's employment categories. For theoretical reasons, we argue the *home* variable measures essentialist ideology within families—that is, the family domain was predominately equated with women whereas the public sphere was men's domain.

Independent Variables

The main independent variable was a level two, continuous measure of year, ranging from 1976 to 2015. To capture changes in endorsement of egalitarian and essentialist ideology over time, we adopted the approach of Cotter and colleagues (2011) and constructed a year spline variable. Including a spline indicator when modeling the data allowed us to measure changes in the slope of the pattern at a midpoint in the data, an advantage over a straightforward linear trend or even a curvilinear model, which would force a slope to continue downwards instead of leveling off. We identified the knot of the spline at 1994, based on statistical analysis and for theoretical reasons. Prior research suggests a stall in attitude changes in the mid-1990s (Cotter et al. 2011), thus we anticipated a change in attitudes occurring during this time point. In analysis not shown, we used a quadratic term to calculate an inflection point for the six dependent variables; 1994 was the earliest inflection point identified within the range of our data. For these two reasons, we began the knot of the spline in the year 1994. The year spline is coded 0 for all years up to 1993 and then increases by 1 each following year. Therefore, the year

coefficient indicated the slope from 1976–1994 and the spline coefficient represented the difference between the 1975–1994 and 1994–2015 slopes.

Level 1. Egalitarian attitudes are expected to vary by race and by gender (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Brewster and Padavic 2000; Kane 2000; Mason and Lu 1988), which we include categorically: young White men (42 percent), young White women (44 percent), young Black men (6 percent), and young Black women (8 percent). Using the highest level of school completed by respondents' mothers, mothers' education was divided into six categories: grade school or less, some high school, high school, some college, bachelor's degree, and more than a bachelor's degree. Mothers' employment status was determined by whether their mother had a paid job, with at least part-time hours, during the time that respondents were growing up. The categorical responses included: not employed, employed sometimes, employed most of the time, and employed consistently.

To address family influences of gender attitudes, we added measurements of family structure and religiosity. Youth were asked separate questions about whether their mother or father currently lived in the same household with them. We combined answers to these items to create a four-category family structure variable: lived with neither their mother nor father, lived with their father only, lived with their mother only, or lived with both parents. Religiosity was measured by respondents' frequency of attendance at religious services: never, rarely, once or twice a month, or about once a week or more. We also include a categorical region variable, constructed from the four Census Bureau regions of the country: North East, North Central, South, and West.

Level 2. We added the yearly average of mothers' employment, calculated as the average percent of mothers employed sometimes, most of the time, or consistently. The average educational attainment was the yearly mean of the six educational levels.

Analytic Strategy

We began our analyses by examining each of the six gender attitude variables over time. For theoretical and practical constraints, we analyzed each of the six dependent variables separately instead of combining the measures to create three domain indexes. Theoretically, by analyzing the dependent variables individually, we used a more conservative test for whether gender beliefs follow similar trends within domains, instead of forcing one attitude pattern per domain. Practically, the two variables for gender in families appeared on different questionnaire forms and thus could not be combined to create one index for this domain.

For our analyses, we first ran a linear regression of each dependent variable adjusting for year and year spline, nesting individuals within years. We graphed the observed means for each year and included a fitted line for year and year spline in the figures. Next, we ran a two-level linear regression model, adjusting for the changing characteristics of the students. We used a multilevel modeling approach in order to not violate the assumption that all observations were independent. In doing so, unobserved characteristics that vary by year were accounted for by adjusting the standard errors of the regression coefficients, providing a more conservative estimation of yearly effects. Finally, we added the macro-level variables—averages of mothers' education and employment status by year—to the model to test whether these contextual changes explained some of trends. The Level 1 model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} OUTCOME\ VARIABLE_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}*(BMALE_{ij}) + \beta_{2j}*(NCENTRAL_{ij}) \dots + \\ & \beta_{19j}*(WEEKRELG_{ij}) + r_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

Again, the survey year and year spline at Level 2 were the primary independent variables of interest in the analyses. The two other macro-level variables included were the average rates of mothers' employment and educational attainment. The Level 2 equation is below:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}*(REYEAR_j) + \gamma_{02}*(YSPLINE_j) + \gamma_{03}*(MOMEMP_j) + \gamma_{04}*(MOMED_j) + u_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}; \beta_{2j} = \gamma_{20}; \beta_{3j} = \gamma_{30}; \dots \beta_{19j} = \gamma_{190}$$

The assumption in our model is that the student characteristics have constant effects, if any, over time. All variables are grand-mean centered in an effort to make the intercept more interpretable. Because we theorized the strength of the effects might differ for young men and women, we presented results separately by gender.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the independent variables for the total sample and by key survey years. In 1976, 13 percent of youth had mothers who held a bachelor's degree, whereas in 2015, 34 percent of their mothers had completed a bachelor's degree. Fewer than 20 percent of respondents' mothers were consistently employed over their childhood in 1976, but more than half of respondents' mothers were consistently employed in 2015. Eighty percent of respondents lived with both their mother and father in 1976. Comparatively, in 2015, 67 percent of youth lived with both parents. Weekly religious service participation also showed a decrease over time, 41 percent of our analytic sample in 1976 compared with 25 percent of the sample by 2015. As expected, the yearly averages of mother's education and employment also showed steady increases over the survey years.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Next, we estimated hierarchical linear regression models with students nested within survey years. For each of the twelve models (six dependent variables multiplied by two genders),

the year coefficients were positive and statistically significant, showing a progression toward more egalitarianism (see Table 2, Panel A). The year spline coefficients were negative and statistically significant in every model, indicating a trend toward less gender egalitarianism after 1994. The three figures below show the means of the dependent variables by year and the best-fitting spline function, with a knot at 1994, following Cotter and colleagues' (2011) approach.

[Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 about here]

Figure 1 displays the gender attitude trends for the marketplace items in each survey year for the young men and young women. From a relatively high baseline, agreement increased over time that women should be considered as seriously as men for jobs as executives or politicians and should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man. Young women's average agreement on the *leader* variable increased from 4.56 in 1976 to 4.81 in 2015. For young men, average agreement in women's leadership started at 3.83 in 1976 and increased to 4.36 by 2015. Similarly, support for women's job opportunities were progressively embraced by both young women and men. Young women increasingly supported women's job opportunities, with average agreement rising from 4.28 to 4.76 across our survey years. For young men, average support for women's equal job opportunities increased from the 1976 average of 3.55 to the 2015 average of 4.26. In other words, on both of these questions, youth's attitudes became more egalitarian and essentially plateaued at a high level of egalitarianism after 1994.

Figure 2 presents the yearly averages for the family domain measures. Broadly, after becoming more egalitarian for almost twenty years, high school seniors' thinking about husbands' authority and gendered divisions of labor became significantly and substantially more conventional. Starting in 1976, average disagreement with the *home* variable, that it is usually better if men work outside the home and women take care of the home and family, was 2.98 for

young women and 2.19 for young men. By 1994, average disagreement had risen to 4.17 for young women and 3.04 for young men. Much of this gain was lost by 2015, falling to an average level of disagreement of 3.83 for young women and 3.0 for young men. A similar pattern emerged for both young women and men when examining the *h decide* variable, showing disagreement with the statement that men should make all of the important family decisions. For young women, disagreement with the *h decide* variable began at 3.97 in 1976, rose to 4.49 by 1994, and then declined to 4.27 by 2015. For young men, average disagreement started at 3.17 in 1976, steadily increased to 3.47 by 1994, and similarly declined to 3.43 by 2015. Agreement with egalitarian attitudes regarding the family domain were comparatively lower than marketplace egalitarianism in the mid-1970s. The two family variables appear to similarly increase until the mid-1990s, then showed a reversal of egalitarian ideology around 1994 rather than continuing to increase, even at a slowed rate.

The trends for the items measuring attitudes about working mothers are depicted in Figure 3. Here, we observed high school seniors becoming more supportive of working mothers up to 1994, slowing for a period, and then becoming more supportive thereafter. Compared to Figures 1 and 2, it is easy to see that average support for working mothers started at a lower baseline compared to the marketplace and family variables. Average agreement with the *warm* indicator, that a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who is not employed, started at 3.45 for young women and 2.76 for young men in 1976. Similarly, disagreement with our *suffer* variable, that a preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother works, averaged 2.67 for young women and 2.06 for young men in 1976. By 2015, average support for the *warm* indicator had increased to 4.31 for young women and 3.78 for young men. Average disagreement had similarly increased for the *suffer* variable by 2015, to

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3.99 for young women and 3.46 for young men. Overall, attitudes about working mothers started with low egalitarian responses and continued on an upward slope over the years, albeit somewhat more slowly after 1994.

These trends suggest that gender attitudes are multidimensional, as the three domains illustrate three different trends over time. The marketplace domain had initially high support and essentially plateaued. On the other hand, family egalitarianism was not widely endorsed in the mid-1970s, but increased until the mid-1990s before losing traction. Support for working mothers increased from the mid-1970s onward, then more slowly after 1994, before picking up again. In general, we failed to find support for hypothesis 1A (*Parallel egalitarianism*), but findings were consistent with hypothesis 1B (*Separating spheres*). Trends in youth attitudes about working mothers showed inconsistent support for hypothesis 2A (*Intensive mothering*). Although findings showed a slowdown in the embrace of working mothers in the mid-1990s, support of working mothers ultimately resumed. The slow but consistent increase in support for working mothers is consistent with hypothesis 2B (*Economic insecurity*), as support for working mothers continued to increase over time.

Notably, these patterns persist for young women and men alike, showing neither convergence nor divergence in their gender attitudes. We present the results of the individual characteristic controls in Table 2. These controls have little effect on the year and year splines. Both the gender revolution, and its stall, are largely robust to the changing composition of American high school students. The Level 1 predictor variables themselves show interesting and important effects on the indicators. Across all variables, young Black men expressed more support for egalitarian attitudes than young White men. Young Black women reported more egalitarian attitudes about working mothers than young White women. Youth who attended

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religious services weekly were more conservative on all gender attitude questions compared to youth who attended rarely. Youth living in the Northeast were more supportive of egalitarian measures than youth living in other regions.

Youth whose mothers were employed consistently were significantly more likely to express egalitarian views than other youth. Interestingly, the effects of mother's employment was associated with gender egalitarianism in the family domain and for mother's working, but was not as consistently associated with youth's attitudes about the marketplace. Mothers' education mattered in some respect for all dependent variables, with youth whose mothers attained higher educational levels being more likely to express egalitarian ideology. Overall, the independent variables were more similar than they were different in predicting egalitarianism for both young women and young men.

[Insert Table 2 about here]

Table 3 includes our tests for the effects of contextual changes over time. We added averages of mothers' education and employment as Level 2 indicators to examine whether changes in increasing levels of women's education and labor force participation explained the attitude trends. If these contextual changes account for the yearly trends, the year and year spline coefficients would be reduced to zero. For the market domain variables, the year coefficients remained positive and statistically significant, indicating contextual changes in mothers' education and employment explain little of the attitude changes in this domain. The year spline coefficients in the market domain remained negative and statistically significant, showing minimal change for the *leader* and the *equal job* indicators. With one exception, the association of population levels of mothers' employment on young women's beliefs about women's

leadership, we see no statistically significant associations of averages of mothers' education and employment on youth's gender beliefs.

Moving to the family domain indicators, the year and year spline coefficients for the *home* indicator remained statistically significant but reduced for the young women, with the addition of the macro-level variables. There was minimal change in the year and year spline coefficients for the *home* and *h decision* indicators. Population averages of mothers' employment were positive and statistically associated with the *home* indicator for young women and men, and the *h decision* variable for young women. Together, these findings suggest average changes in mothers' education and employment are only weakly associated with beliefs about gender in families.

Next, we turned to the measures of attitudes about working mothers. The year and year spline coefficients for the variable *warm* were no longer statistically significant for young women and men with the addition of the contextual variables, indicating changes in mothers' education and employment are associated with trends in attitudes about mothers' labor force participation. For the *suffer* indicator, the year coefficients remained positive and statistically significant, suggesting compositional changes were not associated with youth's beliefs about working mothers' relationships with their preschool children. For young women, population change in mother's employment was statistically significantly associated with beliefs about working mothers' relationships with their children.

[Insert Table 3 about here]

Overall, we found weak support for hypothesis 3A, that increases in the population averages of mothers' employment and educational attainment were associated with increases in egalitarian attitudes. Average population change in mothers' education was not statistically

significantly related to any of the six dependent variables for young men or women. Although averages of mother's employment were associated with young women's gender attitude beliefs across domains, the year and year spline coefficients remained mostly unchanged and statistically significant. We found no evidence that young men's egalitarian attitudes about the public sphere were more responsive to population averages of mother's employment and educational attainment compared to young women's attitudes. Thus, we failed to find evidence which supported hypothesis 3B.

DISCUSSION

Previous scholars argued that a new cultural frame of egalitarian essentialism—a blend of feminist ideology and beliefs that men and women are innately different—explains some of the stall in the gender revolution (Charles and Grusky 2004; Cotter et al. 2011). Although this cultural explanation is promising, we argued that the unitary analysis of gender ideologies obscures complexity associated with gender attitudes. Researchers have long understood gender to be multidimensional (Coltrane 1994; Connell 2002), but there is little research on trends in gender attitudes by domain. We updated the analyses of trends in attitudes about gender over a longer period of time than previous scholarship, illustrated the trends in attitudes by domain, and attempted to account for some of the developments by attending to demographic characteristics of respondents and contextual factors.

Unlike prior findings, which portray an increasing but potentially stalled cultural shift toward egalitarianism (Cotter et al. 2011; van Egmond et al. 2010), we found diverging trends in the endorsement of gender equality. Support for egalitarian ideology regarding the marketplace domain was relatively high at the beginning of our survey years, and remained so throughout. Conversely, agreement with egalitarian ideology in the family domain historically received less

support. In our study, we found movement toward egalitarianism in families was evident until the mid-1990s, at which point conventional ideology rebounded at about the same rate it dissipated. Perhaps surprisingly, we found that the trends of the two family indicators did not indicate a pairing of egalitarian and essentialist ideology within families. Instead, the return to agreement with the statement “the husband should make all the important decisions in the family” suggests a reprisal of endorsement of male supremacy. After 1994, youth were more likely to both express essentialist ideology in the family (“it is usually better for everyone involved if the man in the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family”) and to disavow shared power in decision making within families.

We also found that endorsement of working mothers increased steadily over the survey years, although at a slower pace after 1994. Given that support for mothers’ employment did not diminish while egalitarian ideology within families waned, an increase in expectations for mothering may not substantially explain the stall in the gender revolution in the 1990s—or at the very least, mothering ideals were not the whole story. If mothers’ employment is couched as an expansion of acceptable behavior on grounds that it is best for the family (Damaske 2011), it does little to challenge male primacy. Our findings denote a retreat from egalitarian ideology about men’s and women’s relative roles in the family, not growing concern about women’s responsibilities as mothers. In short, youth increasingly supported women’s labor force participation, even mothers in the workplace, but in the mid-1990s they began questioning that women should have the same power as men in the family.

What structural or cultural forces reversed the direction of the family indicators in the mid-1990s remains a puzzle. The youth in our analyses had diverse experiences with their families, including witnessing their mothers’ work pathways and for many youth, the gendered

dynamics of their parents. These adolescents have not yet entered the labor force full-time, making their opinions of gender at work unique views from below. Early research suggested that changes in women's labor force participation and educational attainment were more predictive than changes in the family in explaining attitude trends (Mason et al. 1976). It is interesting that the youth whose mothers worked at least part-time hours consistently during the time they were growing up were the most likely to endorse egalitarian ideology. The surveys do not capture detailed information about mothers' work pathways, such as distinguishing between part-time and full-time employment, making it difficult to speculate how observing their mothers impacted their gender ideology. Although respondents' mothers' education and employment were significantly associated with more egalitarian gender attitudes, contextual increases in mother's education and employment explained some, but not much, of the trends.

These results, along with others, point to a period effect beginning in the mid-1990s, more so than a cohort replacement effect (Cotter et al. 2011; Donnelly et al. 2015). It is also notable that the trends in youth attitudes are different than that of the heterogeneous adult population, such as those depicted in Cotter and colleagues' (2011) analysis. We often think of change between generations as becoming ever more modern, egalitarian, and tolerant. Yet, our study found youth attitudes about gender in families became more conventional starting in the 1990s, whereas Cotter and colleagues (2011) described a leveling out in the adult population. We are mindful that attitudes about gender change over the life course, and more research that can isolate the period and age effects of these turning points is warranted.

One possible reason egalitarian ideology is highly endorsed in the marketplace is that occupational segregation enables the endorsement of equal opportunity ideals without challenging beliefs that men and women are innately and fundamentally different. In other

words, it endorses the notion of “gendered selves” (Cech 2013; Charles and Bradley 2009), which results in differences such that even though “a woman should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man,” they may *choose* different types of work because it feels more consistent with their constructed identity. Evidence that men and women in gender-atypical occupations compensate by doing more conventional gender tasks when at home further underscores the salience of gender identity cross-cutting domains (Schneider 2012).

Cultural definitions of masculinity continue to be a barrier to transforming men’s place in families, which may be the necessary next step for advancement toward equality within families (Friedman 2015; Yavorsky, Kamp Dush, and Schoppe-Sullivan 2015). The path to blending a belief in equality with a belief in inherent differences between men and women at home is less obvious than occupational segregation in the workplace, which may explain the return to non-egalitarian gender attitudes within families. One way this separate-but-equal ideology may transpire in the family is by men’s greater involvement in housework being considered masculine (Bianchi et al. 2000). It is notable that *most* of the narrowing of differences in time spent on chores has come from reductions in women’s time spent on these tasks (Bianchi et al. 2000). Given the constraints of essentialism, arriving at gender parity in time spent on housework may require redefining what counts as “men’s chores” and “women’s chores,” with men needing to take on tasks that are culturally devalued (cleaning, laundry, and to a lesser extent, cooking).

Although one of the central advantages of the MTF dataset is the inclusion of multiple gender attitude questions over time, it is not without its limitations. Notably, the family items in our analysis explicitly mention men, whereas the other measures focus on women. This limitation in the data reveals a need for research with better measures of gender essentialist

Separating Spheres

attitudes in the marketplace for comparison with essentialist beliefs situated in families. A potential survey question about beliefs in appropriate occupations for men and women may lead to better understanding about essentialism in the marketplace domain, which may also address the ceiling effects of the marketplace variables available to us. Questions about the uniqueness of mothering compared to fathering may also be beneficial to understanding essentialist beliefs at the intersection of marketplace and family domains. Survey questions which measure attitudes about men's roles in the workplace and fathers' employment may provide deeper insights into other dimensions of gender essentialism. Our data, like others, is oriented toward women's changing roles in society, but the path to further progress toward gender equality may be dependent on shifts in beliefs about masculinity.

A multitude of attitude items which differentiate between egalitarian and essentialist beliefs within domains could shed more light on the multidimensional nature of gender attitudes. Using one measurement item for gender ideology or combining attitude questions into one scale may miss important nuances in beliefs about gender (Jacobs and Gerson 2016). For example, despite noticing diverging trends in gender attitudes, Donnelly and colleagues (2015) nevertheless combined items to create an index and generally concluded that gender attitudes are progressively becoming more egalitarian. Yet, the diverging trends observed in our research suggest gender attitudes should no longer be treated monolithically. Though attitudes about women and mothers' employment are progressing, attitudes about gender equality in the family are uniquely digressing. Parallel trends in gender attitudes by domain may have been an anomaly in the 1970s, rather than normative, and future research on gender attitudes should consider and address this complexity (Mason et al. 1976).

It is also possible that the wording of the questions in the MTF dataset took on new meaning since implemented in the 1970s. Donnelly and colleagues (2015) speculated that the diversity of family pathways resulted in marriage being viewed as a traditional option for young people. Prior research suggests, however, that young men and women seek equal partnerships (Gerson 2009), while continuing to express desires to marry (Cherlin 2009). Exploring alternative wording to these questions, such as altering the wording “better for everyone involved” for the *home* indicator, might provide some insight into these trends (Jacobs and Gerson 2016). It is unclear who this phrase references and it is possible youth interpret this arrangement as best for both husbands and children, but not necessarily for wives.

Treating gender attitudes as multidimensional is important for scholarship on the future of the gender revolution. It has long been assumed that gender progress in the marketplace would result in improvement for women in the family (Beauvoir 1949; Engels 1884). Diverging paths in gender outcomes, as England (2006) posited, challenge assumptions that women’s increases in the labor force would eventually be met with men’s changes in the family. Instead, gender enactments may be more intensive within the family, as a reaction to gender becoming less salient in the public sphere (West and Zimmerman 1987). More research is needed on whether progress within one domain produces resistance in another, potentially addressed by cross-national comparisons of domain trends. It would be interesting to test whether individuals who endorsed egalitarian attitudes in the marketplace were more or less likely to also support egalitarian beliefs in the family domain.

If attitudes about gender are a central mechanism of gender differences in outcomes, our findings add to evidence that casts doubt on assumptions that advancement in one domain will result in progress in another. Our results are consistent with Yu and Lee’s (2013) conclusion that

advances in the marketplace may increase a desire to reinforce gender essentialist ideology in the family. Gender ideology may influence women's perceptions of fairness and thus their willingness to accept inequitable divisions of labor and power. If women do not identify gender essentialist ideology within families as unfair, efforts to equalize their standing with men seem unlikely to gain further traction.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Youth Characteristics by Key Years

	Total		1976		1994		2015	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Race & Gender								
White men	0.42		0.45		0.40		0.37	
White women	0.44		0.44		0.46		0.42	
Black men	0.06		0.05		0.06		0.10	
Black women	0.08		0.07		0.08		0.11	
Mom's Education								
Grade school or <	0.02		0.05		0.01		0.01	
Some high school	0.10		0.18		0.09		0.06	
High school	0.37		0.46		0.34		0.22	
Some college	0.20		0.13		0.22		0.21	
College	0.22		0.13		0.23		0.34	
College +	0.10		0.05		0.11		0.16	
Mom's Employment								
Not employed	0.22		0.37		0.18		0.12	
Employed sometimes	0.26		0.32		0.24		0.18	
Employed most of the time	0.17		0.14		0.18		0.18	
Consistently employed	0.35		0.17		0.40		0.53	
Family Structure								
Neither parents	0.05		0.05		0.06		0.06	
Dad only	0.04		0.03		0.04		0.05	
Mom only	0.18		0.12		0.19		0.22	
Both parents	0.74		0.80		0.72		0.67	
Religiosity								
Unknown service attendance	0.04		0.00		0.00		0.13	
Never attend services	0.13		0.11		0.14		0.18	
Rare service attendance	0.34		0.32		0.36		0.30	
Monthly service attendance	0.16		0.16		0.17		0.14	
Weekly service attendance	0.34		0.41		0.33		0.25	
Region								
North East	0.21		0.23		0.18		0.20	
North Central	0.31		0.32		0.30		0.27	
South	0.35		0.32		0.39		0.41	
West	0.13		0.13		0.13		0.12	
Average Mom's Education	3.72	(0.25)	3.26	(0.00)	3.80	(0.00)	4.02	(0.00)
Average Mom's Employment	0.74	(0.08)	0.50	(0.00)	0.78	(0.00)	0.82	(0.00)
N	241,879		6,630		5,712		3,755	

Table 2. Hierarchical Linear Regression Coefficients of Gender Attitudes

	Women in the Marketplace				Gender in Families				Mothers at Work			
	Leader		Equal Job		Home		H Decision		Warm		Suffer	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Panel A. Annual Changes												
Year	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.03 ***	0.06 ***	0.05 ***	0.03 ***	0.01 ***	0.03 ***	0.03 ***	0.05 ***	0.04 ***
Year Spline	-0.02 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.05 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.01 *	-0.03 ***	-0.01 **
Intercept	4.62 ***	3.89 ***	4.27 ***	3.61 ***	3.10 ***	2.32 ***	4.02 ***	3.20 ***	3.65 ***	2.80 ***	2.74 ***	2.06 ***
Observations	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	40,548	37,782	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228
Panel B. Annual + Level 1 Predictor Variables												
Year	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.03 ***	0.01 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.03 ***
Year Spline	-0.02 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.01 **	0.00	-0.02 ***	-0.01
Black	-0.04 ***	0.21 ***	-0.02	0.18 ***	0.09 ***	0.21 ***	-0.04	0.06 *	0.26 ***	0.42 ***	0.33 ***	0.51 ***
Mom's Education (HS ref)												
Grade school or <	-0.10 *	-0.10 *	-0.12 *	-0.07	-0.14 *	-0.15 *	-0.11 *	-0.04	0.02	-0.07	-0.08	0.13 *
Some high school	-0.07 ***	-0.05 *	-0.04 **	-0.08 **	-0.13 ***	-0.03	-0.13 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Some college	0.03 **	0.04	0.08 ***	0.04	0.14 ***	0.13 ***	0.07 ***	0.14 ***	0.01	-0.04 *	0.05	0.01
College	0.04 ***	0.08 ***	0.10 ***	0.08 ***	0.16 ***	0.18 ***	0.08 ***	0.16 ***	0.03	0.00	0.07 ***	0.05 **
College +	0.08 ***	0.13 ***	0.13 ***	0.16 ***	0.31 ***	0.33 ***	0.20 ***	0.24 ***	0.08 **	0.04	0.15 ***	0.09 ***
Mom's Employ. (consistent ref)												
Not employed	-0.06 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.38 ***	-0.34 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.57 ***	-0.77 ***	-0.68 ***	-0.70 ***
Employed sometimes	-0.03 ***	-0.05 **	-0.04 ***	-0.03	-0.22 ***	-0.21 ***	-0.05 **	-0.07 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.47 ***	-0.44 ***	-0.47 ***
Mostly employed	-0.02 **	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.12 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.24 ***
Family Structure (both ref)												
Neither parents	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.06	-0.13 **	-0.14 ***	-0.07	-0.12 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.08 *	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06
Dad only	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.03	-0.09 **	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.04

Mom only	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.02	0.04 *	0.06 **	0.02	0.06 *	0.01	0.03
Religiosity (rarely ref)												
Unknown atten.	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05 *	-0.05	-0.11 *	-0.11 **	-0.43 **	-0.10	-0.07	-0.11 *	-0.18 ***	-0.11 **
Never attend services	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.11 ***	0.11 ***	0.02	0.09 ***	-0.01	0.06 *	0.10 ***	0.06 *
Monthly attend.	-0.01	-0.08 ***	-0.03 **	-0.07 **	-0.10 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.07 *	-0.07 **	-0.04 *
Weekly attend.	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.1 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.31 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.16 ***
Region (North East is ref)												
North Central	-0.04 ***	-0.04	-0.05 ***	-0.06 **	-0.12 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.06 **	0.03	-0.04	0.02
South	-0.09 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.06 *	-0.29 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.27 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.01	-0.11 ***	-0.05
West	-0.06 ***	0.04	-0.12 ***	0.00	-0.28 ***	-0.01	-0.21 ***	-0.07 **	-0.22 ***	-0.02	-0.20 ***	0.00
Intercept	4.80 ***	4.17 ***	4.62 ***	3.98 ***	3.75 ***	2.82 ***	4.33 ***	3.36 ***	4.04 ***	3.27 ***	3.48 ***	2.81 ***
Observations	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	40,548	37,782	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$; Level 1 df 37723; Level 2 df 37; All variables are grand-mean centered; Note: Attitudes scale ranges from 1 to 5; Level 1 weights used in analyses for Panel B.

Table 3. Hierarchical Linear Regression Coefficients of Gender Attitudes (fixed effects)

	Women in the Marketplace				Gender in Families				Mothers at Work			
	Leader		Equal Job		Home		H Decision		Warm		Suffer	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Year	0.01 ***	0.03 **	0.03 ***	0.02 *	0.05 ***	0.04 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 *	0.01	0.02	0.03 ***	0.04 ***
Year Spline	-0.02 **	-0.03 **	-0.03 ***	-0.02 *	-0.08 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.02 **	0.00	0.00	-0.01 *	-0.02
Mom's Employment	0.46 *	-0.41	-0.06	-0.09	1.06 *	1.07 *	0.72 *	-0.36	1.95 ***	0.02	0.92 ***	-0.53
Mom's Education	-0.08	-0.24	-0.09	0.18	-0.47	-0.54 *	-0.20	-0.09	-0.37 *	-0.04	-0.13	-0.24
Black	-0.04 ***	0.21 ***	-0.02	0.18 ***	0.09 ***	0.21 ***	-0.04	0.06 *	0.26 ***	0.42 ***	0.33 ***	0.51 ***
Mom's Education (HS ref)												
Grade school or <	-0.10 *	-0.10 *	-0.12 *	-0.07	-0.14 *	-0.14 *	-0.11 *	-0.04	0.02	-0.07	-0.08	0.13 *
Some high school	-0.07 ***	-0.05 *	-0.04 **	-0.08 **	-0.13 ***	-0.03	-0.13 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Some college	0.03 **	0.04	0.08 ***	0.04	0.14 ***	0.13 ***	0.07 ***	0.14 ***	0.01	-0.04	0.05	0.01
College	0.04 ***	0.08 ***	0.10 ***	0.08 ***	0.16 ***	0.19 ***	0.08 ***	0.15 ***	0.03	0.00	0.07 ***	0.05 **
College +	0.08 ***	0.13 ***	0.13 ***	0.16 ***	0.31 ***	0.33 ***	0.20 ***	0.24 ***	0.08 **	0.04	0.15 ***	0.09 **
Mom's Employ. (consistent ref)												
Not employed	-0.06 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.38 ***	-0.34 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.57 ***	-0.77 ***	-0.68 ***	-0.70 ***
Employed sometimes	-0.03 ***	-0.05 **	-0.04 ***	-0.03	-0.22 ***	-0.21 ***	-0.05 **	-0.07 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.47 ***	-0.44 ***	-0.47 ***
Mostly employed	-0.02 **	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.12 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.22 ***	-0.24 ***
Family Structure (both ref)												
Neither parents	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.06 **	-0.13 **	-0.14 ***	-0.07	-0.12 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.08 *	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06
Dad only	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.05	0.03	-0.09 **	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	0.04
Mom only	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.02	0.02	0.04 *	0.06 **	0.02	0.06 *	0.01	0.03
Religiosity (rarely ref)												
Unknown attend.	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05 *	-0.06	-0.11 *	-0.10 *	-0.43 **	-0.10	-0.07	-0.11 *	-0.18 ***	-0.10 **
Never attend services	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.11 ***	0.11 ***	0.02	0.09 ***	-0.01	0.06 *	0.10 ***	0.06 *
Monthly attend.	-0.01	-0.08 ***	-0.03 **	-0.07 **	-0.10 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.07 *	-0.07 **	-0.04 *
Weekly attend.	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.31 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.33 ***	-0.15 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.13 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.16 ***
Region (North East is ref)												

North Central	-0.04 ***	-0.04	-0.05 ***	-0.06 **	-0.12 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.06 **	0.03	-0.04	0.02
South	-0.09 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.11 ***	-0.06 *	-0.29 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.27 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.01	-0.11 ***	-0.05
West	-0.06 ***	0.04	-0.12 ***	0.00	-0.29 ***	-0.02	-0.21 ***	-0.07 **	-0.22 ***	-0.02	-0.20 ***	0.00
Intercept	4.80 ***	4.17 ***	4.62 ***	3.98 ***	3.75 ***	2.82 ***	4.33 ***	3.36 ***	4.04 ***	3.27 ***	3.48 ***	2.81 ***
Observations	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228	40,548	37,782	42,402	39,228	42,402	39,228

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001; Level 1 df 37723; Level 2 df 37; All variables are grand-mean centered;
Note: Attitudes scale ranges from 1 to 5; Level 1 weights used in analyses.

Figure 1. Trends in Young People's Attitudes about Gender in the Public Sphere

Figure 2. Trends in Young People's Attitudes about Gender in Families

Figure 3. Trends in Young People's Attitudes about Employed Mothers