Decoupled Rationalisation: Judicial Anticorruption and Fragmentation of Parliament and the Magistracy

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Abstract Anticorruption campaigns rely on a promise and ideal of rationalisation: public officials should—and will—behave in an impersonal, rule-governed, and ultimately predictable manner. So why do anticorruption drives often increase political and administrative chaos, instead of decreasing it? In this paper I address this puzzle by analysing the simultaneous effects of judicial anticorruption on both the legislative and judicial spheres. Using the case of Romania from 2005 to 2020, I first demonstrate that the successful drive to jail corruption politicians has increased legislative instability by causing waves of party switching, thereby perforating the political opportunity structure and making space for new, populist political parties. I then show how the new structures of judicial anticorruption have fractured the career lines of judges and prosecutors, while at the same time giving magistrates a reason to weaponise their growing professional heterogeneity as they struggle for control over the new and scarce professional resources brought by the anticorruption drive. This increasing complexity in both legislative and judicial spheres results in ever-growing discursive commitment to rule-following coupled with a decreasing ability to actually follow those rules as the set of veto players becomes increasingly unstable, an outcome that, following institutional theorists in sociology, I term “decoupled rationalisation.”

Introduction

Anticorruption campaigns are essentially drives for Weberian rationalisation, as they cajole and coerce state officials to follow explicit rules of conduct and to replace personalistic relationships with impersonal ties. Anticorruption, however, may lead to more, not less chaotic politics, as Argentina, Chile and Italy amply demonstrate (Balán 2011; Della Porta and Vannucci 2007). That a movement for official rule-following generates uncertainty is not only a political irony, but also an actually-existing contradiction of rationalisation in need of empirical explanation. This paper begins untangling this contradiction by studying the effects of Romania’s judicial anticorruption drive on both that country’s legislative politics and its magistracy, i.e. the combined corps of judges and prosecutors. In particular, I aim to show that the success of the judicial anticorruption drive in convicting politicians and increasing the resources available to magistrates has fractured both legislative politics and the magistracy in Romania. Consequently, it has both become easier and more important to subscribe to anticorruption, and increasingly difficult to actually implement judicial anticorruption, an outcome that, following sociological neo-institutional theory (Meyer, Krücken, and Drori 2009, 21–25) I term “decoupled rationalisation.”

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This paper is organised as follows. In the first section I analyse the effects of judicial anticorruption on legislative behaviour, in particular political party switching. Using event-history regressions this section shows that convicting party leaders and current or former ministers triggers waves of legislative party switching, ultimately creating opportunities for populist parties to enter parliament. The second section focuses on the effects of judicial anticorruption on the magisterial profession, i.e. on judges and prosecutors *qua* organised groups of legal experts. Leveraging network analysis and case analysis, this section illustrates that the increasing resources that anticorruption has offered to the judiciary have both created a structure prone to divisions within and between judges and prosecutors and generated the opportunities and motivations for magistrates to actualise these divisions through fights over the allocation of further new resources. In the final section I tie the legislative and judicial aspects together and show that the net effect of Romanian judicial anticorruption has been to up the complexity of important social structures—thereby undercutting the anticorruption drive itself—while also increasing the normative commitment of different actors to an absolute ideal of disinterestedness in public affairs. The result is that anticorruption has won the battle for hearts and minds by conceding the field.

Judicial Anticorruption and Domestic Politics: Destabilising Parliament

While there is an academic cottage industry of “clientelism in Romania” there has been comparatively little scholarly attention paid to the effects of judicial anticorruption on domestic political competition: Mungiu-Pippidi (2018) has traced the arc of Romanian judicial anticorruption drive, and Chiru and Gherghina (2012) have tested whether corruption scandals affect the electoral support of Romanian political parties.¹ Scholars have also investigated the political opportunities that anticorruption has created for extra-parliamentary political parties, who have vociferously leveraged anticorruption at the ballot box (Dragoman 2020).² Overall, however, there has been little research on the systematic effects of anticorruption on the nuts and bolts of political competition.

I aim to fill this gap by analysing the effects of anticorruption on one important political behaviour: legislative party switching, or the practice of parliamentarians changing their party affiliation between elections. Students of legislative politics agree that such switching is harmful for democratic party systems, as it fosters clientilistic relations between representatives and the highest bidder, and as principled negotiation over policies gives way to survival-first horse-trading (Mershon 2015). In the Romanian context, legislative party switching is not only rampant, in the right circumstances it can even be politically rewarded, though typically it reduces the chances of re-election (Gherghina 2016). It also leads to government instability, as successful votes of no confidence are frequently accompanied by legislators switching parties to remain the governing coalition, and it perpetuates the confused ideological landscape of Romanian politics.

In other words, legislative party switching is a common practice in the struggle to keep and maintain office in Romania, and is consequential for the political system more broadly. Given that judicial anticorruption in Romania has led to a slew of convictions of party leaders, ministers, and parliamentarians, we should ask whether it has also affected legislative party switching. We might expect that convictions of politicians could influence party switching in four ways.³

1 The conclusion is “sort of.”

2 When it comes to far-right parties, there seems to be an ideological trade-off between nationalist and anticorruption populisms, so that one tends to replace the other (Soare and Tufiş 2019).

3 This is exploratory research trying to feel out an understudied area using a seldom-used theory. It would therefore be theoretically premature to elevate expectations to “hypotheses,” and in any case would be dishonest HARKing, i.e., hypothesising after results are known (Kerr 1998), as I had already taken a more than generous peek at the data before building the statistical models presented below.

First, in a climate of political hierarchy we expect that the conviction of a party leader will trigger a wave of legislative party switches. Both the theories of patronal politics and of oligarchic wealth defence point in the same direction. In the first case, patronal politics are built around personalistic networks of political vassalage (Hale 2015 Ch.2), so that when the top of a patronal network (i.e. the political boss) is forcibly removed subordinate networks/factions either jump ship or stay and fight for the former leader's spot. With regards to legislative politics, leadership removal leads to party switching directly while competition for pole position may increase party switching more slowly as the factions that lose out in the internal struggle trickle out of the party. If the party leader is an oligarch running the show less through personalism and more through direct payment (Winters 2011 Ch.5)⁴ then the oligarch's conviction threatens the financial connection, again giving an incentive for subordinate legislators to switch parties. Of course patronal and oligarchic considerations may combine: in all cases the conviction of a party head should encourage party switching.

Expectation 1: A legislator is more likely to switch parties if their party leader is convicted for corruption.

Second, seeing current or former ministers of one's own party being convicted may also trigger party switching. Again following Hale's lead, one of the major advantages of patronal influence networks is that they offer protection against the law. The conviction of a current or former minister, however, sends a strong signal that the party cannot or will not protect notable members, and therefore that other party members may be unsafe. This is especially true in Romania, because indicting a current or former minister (i.e. sending them to court) requires a parliamentary vote to lift that minister's immunity.⁵ So if a minister is convicted it means at the very least that the party failed to secure a legislative majority against the immunity-lifting vote. Confronted with this state of affairs a natural reaction is for legislators to switch to a party that they think can better protect them.

Expectation 2: A legislator is more likely to switch parties if current or former minister(s) from their party are convicted for corruption.

Finally, we can ask whether the conviction of party heads and/or ministers leads not to party switching but to resignations from the legislature. The logic is similar to the previous two points, but stronger: the conviction of party heads leads to such a destruction of the political machine, be it patronal or oligarchic, that affiliated legislators retire early (i.e. before their mandate is over) because they are so severely off from sources of income and/or patronage. Similarly, the conviction of a minister might send such a strong signal that party colleagues are not safe that legislators may leave early to stop attracting attention to themselves.

Expectation 3: A legislator is more likely to retire before the end of their mandate if their party leader is convicted for corruption.

4 For instance, it has been reported that the official head of the Romanian Conservative Party, Daniel Constantin, is personally indebted to the founder and de facto head of that party, media mogul Dan Voiculescu, to the tune of 200,000 euro. Indeed, the salaries of Voiculescu's loyal reporters and politicians are claimed to be unusually high (Broucher 2016, Ch.5)

5 Strictly speaking parliament only inveighs upon ministers who were also legislators at the time of their mandate, and non-legislative ministers must have their immunity lifted by a presidential decree. The vast majority of Romanian ministers have been legislators.

Expectation 4: A legislator is more likely to retire before the end of their mandate if current or former minister(s) from their party are convicted for corruption.

Data and Methods

Data on legislators, including the date on which they switched parties or left office, come from the website of Romanian parliament.⁶ Information regarding the date on which party leaders were convicted was drawn from media sources and Wikipedia: as of this writing, only four party leaders have ever been convicted of corruption. Finally, data on the conviction of Romanian ministers have been graciously shared by Maria Popova (Popova and Post 2018). I focus only on the three legislatures that featured convictions of party leaders and ministers: 2008-2012, 2012-2016, and 2016-2020.

Temporality is central to the processes outlined above: it matters whether one switches parties or retires early or late in a four-year mandate, just as it matters whether one's party leader is convicted at the beginning or end of one's legislative term. The natural question is therefore whether the conviction of one's party-head increases the chances of switching parties (or retiring), given that one has not switched (retired) already. Such conditional questions—what is the probability of an event occurring given that it has not yet occurred?—are best handled by event history analysis, also known as survival analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). This approach models duration, i.e. the time before an event occurs, which allows for variance in the length of an observation (e.g. the length of a mandate) as well as the amount of time before a decisive event occurs, such as the conviction of one's party head. That said, because legislative politics is fundamentally shaken up by each legislative election, my unit of analysis is the person-legislature, in the present case the four-year period between elections. Therefore each mandate is treated as a separate occurrence with a maximum length of four years. The unit of observation is the person-year, and while some variables are fixed across a mandate (e.g. one's constituency) others can vary (e.g. when a minister from one's own party was convicted).

I begin with the dependent variables, *first party switch* and *early retirement*. *First party switch* is a binary variable indicating whether a legislator in a given year switched from the party on whose ticket they won the election. I look only at first party switches because: a) second, third, and fourth switches are much rarer; b) legislators that engage in multiple switches during the same legislature tend to be qualitatively different, often coming from small parties in constant threat of losing their caucus; and c) the first switch is the most difficult choice, so a model built around this metric generates more conservative estimates. The second dependent variable is *early retirement*, also a binary variable indicating whether in any given year a legislator retired before the official end of their four-year mandate.⁷ In both cases I cut-off observation in June of electoral years, for two reasons. First, all legislators retire at the end of their mandate, which is uninformative and can destabilise statistical estimators. Second, in the periods studied local elections always took place in late summer, shortly before legislative elections in the fall: in order to run in both contests many parliamentarians retired from the legislature, only to return to parliament several months later if they did not win local office. Since this dynamic also adds noise to the present analysis I exclude it by only analysing the first three and a half years of a full legislative term.

6 The Python code used to scrape and process the data from the website of Romanian parliament can be found at https://github.com/r-parvulescu/ro_parliament, while the data tables can be retrieved from <https://osf.io/aem6y/>.

7 Operationally, in both cases the mandate stops when there is an occurrence: thus, if a legislator has their first party switch in the second year of their mandate, for modeling purposes their mandate stops there, since they are no longer at risk of a “first party switch;” likewise for early retirement, since legislators cannot retire twice during a mandate. Technically, when a legislator's mandate ends for other reasons, such as death or the end of the legislature, that mandate is censored.

The principal independent variables are *convicted own-party head*, and *convicted own-party minister*. Regarding the first variable, only four party heads have ever been convicted of corruption in Romania. On the other hand, from 2011 to November 2020 nineteen ministers were convicted in Romania. By “conviction” I mean final conviction without possibility of appeal, which in the Romanian context means either a jail sentence or what is known as a “suspended” conviction, wherein the accused is disbarred from office, loses political rights for a number of years, and gains a permanent criminal record, but is not incarcerated. Convictions of both party leaders and ministers have typically entailed jail time.

Turning to the control variables, two are time-varying: whether one’s party is in *government* (coded categorically as “senior” or “junior” coalition partner, or “opposition”) and whether one’s party suffered a *leadership change* (coded as a binary 1/0) for any reasons besides criminal conviction. The first variable captures legislators’ hesitation to leave the party of power, while the second accounts for the fact that party fracture may occur when leaders changes for reasons besides conviction. *Leadership change* and *convicted own-party head* do not overlap.

Next, I introduce several time-invariant controls. First we have dummies for the *historical regions* of Romania, to control for possible geographic effects.⁸ I control for *legislature* effects by including dummies on for each of the three legislatures. There is a dummy to control for the *chamber* of parliament (Senate or Chamber of Deputies), and a binary dummy for *seniority*, i.e. whether this is one’s first legislative mandate, or the second or more: I choose a dummy variable because around half of the legislature turns over at each election. There is also a dummy for the *start party*, that is the party on whose ticket one entered parliament, which is invariant because I censor observations at the occurrence of the first party switch; the names of the party acronyms are provided in Appendix 1.⁹ For the model of time to retirement, I also include *first party switch* as a independent variable, to see if switching increases the probability of an early retirement. I implement the event-history model in a discrete-time framework using logistic regression (Allison 1982). This model form requires an explicit term for the time-unit, often called the *clock*. I use time dummies for each of the four possible time units: the first, second, third, and fourth years of one’s legislative mandate. The variables are presented in Table 1 below.

Variable	Values
First Party Switch	1/0, 1 = switched in current year
Early Retirement	1/0, 1= retired in current year
Convicted Own-Party Head	1/0, 1 = own-party leader convicted
Convicted Own-Party Minister	1/0, 1 = own-party minister convicted
Government	senior, junior, opposition
Leadership Change	1/0, 1 = leadership change in current year

8 I also fitted models with constituency dummies, but these proved less stable because of the smaller number of observations per constituency. That said, estimates of the independent variables of interest were practically identical across the historical region and constituency specification.

9 For models in which the dependent variable is retirement *start party* could be time-variant, however I have left this variable time-invariant for ease of comparison.

Historical Region ¹⁰	“1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”
Legislature	“2008-2012”, “2012-2016”, “2016-2020”
Senior	1/0, 1 = senior legislator
Start Party ¹¹	PSD, PNL, PDL, ¹² UNPR, PP DD, USR, PMP, ALDE, PC, UDMR
Clock	“1”, “2”, “3”, “4”

Table 1: Presentation of Variables

Before moving on, the conviction variables require special attention. With regards to *convicted own-party head*, it is not theoretically clear whether the loss of one’s party head due to conviction is a permanent change that haunts subordinate legislators until the next legislative election, or if it is a big splash that only lasts one year. It is easier to believe that the effects of ministerial convictions are more limited in time, but a significant problem is introduced by the fact that some ministers changed parties after holding executive office, so that the last party with which they were affiliated prior to conviction is not the party in which they served as minister. With regards to signalling there are thus four possibilities:

- a) all of that minister's colleagues, in both past and present parties, think "if this could happen to one of our people who was/is a minister, it could happen to me."
- b) only the people in the party of which the minister was a part of *while* s/he was in ministerial office will get the message; “if they could pin a (potentially former) colleague who back then was a minister, they might pin me.”
- c) only people in the current party might get the message: "after that minister left their former party and came to us they lost their former party’s protection, and our party is not strong enough to give this newcomer protection, so therefore our party is not strong enough to back me.”
- d) the people in the current party (in which the minister did *not* serve while they were minister) conclude that they are safe, since the conviction is simply revenge from the party that the minister left, and not a general signal that their current home is unsafe. Therefore, when a minister who changed parties is convicted, nobody gets any message, as both new and old party colleagues reason that “it serves them (the convicted minister) right.”

Appendix 2 shows robustness checks on two different specifications of convicted *own-party head* and four specifications of *convicted own-party minister*, reflecting the possibilities outlined above. The

10 1 = former Hapsburg possessions of Transylvanian, Bucovina, and Banat; 2 = Moldova up to the Prut river; 3 = Old Wallachia, including Bucharest and Dobrogea; 4 = nation-wide seats reserved for national minorities, e.g. Albanians, Lipovan Russians; 5 = reserved seats for the Romanian diaspora.

11 For the model of first party switching, I do not include ethnic minority representatives from either the Hungarian UDMR or from seats reserved for ethnic minority representatives (such as Germans, Bulgarians, Jews, etc.) because there is only one party switch in the entire history of these groups.

12 The Democratic-Liberal Party, or PDL, disappeared in 2015 after a decisive internal split: roughly half of the members joined the PNL, an equal portion joined the newly formed Popular Movement Party (PMP), while the rest went into the political wilds. The timing of the decision is important: the future PMP faction left in spring 2014 and caucused as independents until the next legislative elections when they entered parliament. On the other hand, those that joined the PNL only did so in spring 2015, fully a year after the split, during which time negotiations with the PNL took place. I therefore treat 2014 departures as legitimate party switches, while ignore 2015 departures as mere absorption into the PNL.

tactic is to add each variable separately to the base model and compare their magnitudes and p-values. Since there is no obvious difference between the variants I choose the most catholic version of each: the version of *convicted own-party leader* that treats party leader conviction as a definitive mark until the next legislative election, and variant (a) of *convicted own-party minister*, which signals to the widest audience.¹³

Appendix 3 conducts robustness tests with respect to another substantive issue. Of the four leaders removed due to anticorruption, three were *de facto*, not *de jure* leaders, and one of them abdicated in anticipation of court proceedings, i.e. he left without actually being convicted. I therefore conduct separate analyses in which, one at a time, I code as “zero” the *convicted own-party head* variable for each party that is in doubt. As a final robustness test I remove all parties with potential doubts, leaving only the PSD whose leader, Liviu Dragnea, was unambiguously removed from his formal party position the day he was sent to jail. The results reported below are robust to the exclusion of any and all ambiguous situations; I therefore keep them all.

Results¹⁴

For brevity I only report the coefficients associated with the following variables: clock, government, leadership change, convicted own-party leader, convicted own-party minister. All other variables are included in the model for completeness; full regression output from R can be found in Appendix 4. Table 2 presents the results from the event-history analysis. A note on interpretation: when using a discrete-time, logistic framework, we model conditional log hazards of events occurring, which is the log odds of something happening versus it not happening, given that it has not yet happened. The results in Table 2 are in log odds, so negative numbers indicate a reduction in the log odds, while positive numbers indicate an increase. In the following paragraph I only discuss coefficients that approach conventional significance levels. In this context I exponentiate the coefficient (in base *e*), transforming it into a regular hazard, or odd of something happening versus it not happening, given that it has not yet happened. For example, exponentiating the leadership change coefficient gives the number 3.42, which indicates an increase in the odds of first party switch by 242% for legislators whose party experiences a leadership change in a given year (and who have not yet switched parties), when compared to legislators whose party does not experience a leadership change in said year (and who have not yet switched parties). Categorical variables are interpreted as contrasts relative to the omitted reference value, marked in parentheses for “Clock” and “Government,” and implied by the zero value of binary variables.

	First Party Switch			Early Retirement	
	Coefficient	P-value		Coefficient	P-value
<i>Clock (ref= "1")</i>					

13 There are three other considerations with respect to convicted own-party ministers: a minister may be convicted more in more than one case, and a second current or former minister from the same party may be convicted in the same year. In both cases one could say that the signal is additive, so that second convictions either of similar or different persons strengthen the signal, however one views it. In practice there are very few such section convictions, so I reduce *convicted own-party minister* to a binary variable. Thirdly, after the PDL party dissolved in 2015 (see footnote 7 supra) certain former PDL ministers were convicted for corruption: it is uncertain who would get the message. I have chosen the conservative route and assume that this message falls on deaf ears, i.e. I ignore post-2015 convictions of former PDL ministers.

14 The R code implementing the statistical model, can be found at XXX.

2	0.60353	0.000233		0.10670	0.833419
3	-0.07930	0.708434		0.75131	0.145789
4	-0.08213	0.696453		-0.94684	0.437199
<i>Government (ref= "opposition")</i>					
Junior	-1.91389	6.32e-05		-0.10467	0.904048
Senior	-0.41430	0.005043		1.06055	0.019580
Leadership Change	1.22962	6.99e-15		0.31187	0.503919
Convicted Own-Party Leader	1.68273	1.93e-07		-1.06907	0.121223
Convicted Own-Party Minister	0.37818	0.065523		0.21273	0.483256
<i>N</i>	4554			5737	

Table 2: Results from Event-History Analysis of Correlates of Time to first party switch, and early retirement

As regards the clock, we see that (relative to the first year of a mandate) first party switches are more likely to occur in the second year of a mandate: the hazard increases by 83%. Being in the governing party (relative to being in the opposition) reduces the odds of a first party switch by 85% for junior coalition partners, and 34% for senior partners. Leadership changes (except for those caused by conviction of party leaders) are associated with an 242% increase in the odds of a first party switch, a highly significant result. Having one's party leader convicted raises the odds of leaving the party by 438%, again a highly significant result. Finally, seeing a current or former minister, who is or was a party colleague, convicted of corruption increases the odds of a first party switch by 46%, however the signal is weak, as the p-value is only 0.066. On the other hand, none of the above-mentioned factors are correlated with an increased hazard of early retirement, with the exception of participation in the senior governing party (versus being in the opposition), which increases the odds of early retirement by 189% .

Discussion and Model Limitations

The results in the previous section strongly support Expectation 1 (the conviction of one's own party head increases one's chances of switching parties for the first time), weakly support Expectation 2 (the conviction of a current or former minister associated with one's party increases one's chances of switching parties), and do not support Expectations 3 and 4 (related to growth in the chances of early retirement). The first result is intuitive, especially given that party leadership changes for reasons besides conviction lead to significant increases in the probability of switching parties for the first time: this is exactly what we would expect in patrimonialistic political systems where exiled bosses take their vassals with them. The second result is also sensible, though less expected: there could be many other things interfering with the negative signal that one's high-ranking colleagues have been convicted, not least of which is the fact that convictions tend to come many years after the ministerial stint. This delay might explain the weaker finding in this regard. Finally, the null findings for Expectations 3 and 4 set a baseline for future research: patrimonial and oligarchic networks may be tight, but they are not so

cohesive to lead to individual legislators voluntarily renouncing their mandates, which if nothing else come with a salary, chauffeur, secretary, and generous per diem.¹⁵

In other words, we can confidently say that judicial anticorruption is affecting Romanian political competition in complex and inter-connected ways, because the conviction of leading party characters can reconfigure the balance of powers in the national parliament. When combined with the finding that, on average, legislators who switch parties are less likely than their loyal colleagues to return to the legislature (Gherghina 2016), it seems that big-time convictions markedly perforate the political opportunity structure and thereby make space for new actors to enter legislative politics. And in Romania outside actors have not been found wanting: each legislative election since 2012 has featured new parliamentary parties with a decidedly anti-system bent: in 2012, the populist, anti-anti-corruption People's Party – Dan Diaconescu, whose leader was himself convicted in 2014; in 2016, the populist, anti-corruption Save Romania Union; in 2020, the populist, nationalist Alliance for Romanian Unity.¹⁶ In fact the political opportunities created by judicial anticorruption seem to invariably be seized by populists, all whom pay at least lip service to the importance of anticorruption.

Anticorruption prosecutors should therefore be heartened that their efforts have consequences far beyond convicting one influential politician. At the same time, greater party switching leads to more unstable government majorities and therefore less stable lawmaking, both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, recent Romanian legislation threatening judicial independence was passed by a highly disciplined parliamentary majority unified around a party leader who was threatened by (and subsequently jailed on grounds of) corruption: one might welcome legislative indiscipline in this case. But the longer-term instability induced by successful judicial anticorruption can just as well be corrosive to the constitutional balance of powers. Romania already suffers from the excessive use of executive orders (Antonovici 2018), often justified on the grounds that it is too difficult to pass laws in parliament, and it is telling that the opposition government installed shortly after the jailing of the former coalition leader anticipated so many roadblocks in parliament that it ruled largely by decree until the upcoming elections.

In closing this section I would like to mention two limitations of the foregoing analysis. First, the time-grain of the observations is the calendar year, a rough measure. This means that a first party switch may be associated with the conviction of a party leader even if that conviction happened several months after the legislator in question switched parties, inviting questions of accuracy. At the same time this temporal fuzziness may catch the fact that legislators prepare the ground for their departure in anticipation of a trial date. Strategic anticipation is a complex issue unto itself, which may however be parsimoniously engulfed by the use of a rough time-grain.

The second issue regards the specification of the event-history model. A common concern when fitting such models is that the proportional hazards assumption may be violated, which can easily be checked by seeing if the interaction between the clock variable and the main independent variables pass a likelihood ratio test. Analyses not presented here show that these interactions do pass the likelihood ratio test, which strongly implies that interaction terms with time should be included in the model. Doing so, however, creates a data sparsity issue since practically all cross-term categories include very few observations, and the resulting interaction terms (as well as the main effects) lose significance. It is unlikely that this misspecification nullifies the real, underlying correlations, because fitting the same

15 The null finding also argues for one particular assumption of discrete-time event-history models, namely that censoring is uninformative with respect to nearly all of the variables under consideration.

16 The point is even stronger when we consider that the “new” parliamentary parties, formed from factions of older parties, were themselves either anti-anticorruption (former prime minister Tăriceanu's ALDE) or populist (former president Băsescu's PMP). Not to mention that the 2016-2020 legislature saw a hard shift towards anti-anticorruption and nationalist, populist rhetoric by the ruling Social Democrats.

data using on OLS, linear probability model¹⁷ yields substantively similar results (results not shown). That said, this proportional-hazards issue is one more argument for using a finer time grain, since using months instead of years would allow for more flexibility in specifying a statistically sound model.

Anticorruption and the Judicial System: Fracturing Romanian Magistrates

The most acrimonious debates surrounding Romanian anticorruption have centred on the role and power of magistrates, especially of prosecutors affiliated with the National Anticorruption Directorate, or the DNA. Various presented as usurpers of electoral power, stooges of the security services, or lone wolves seeking personal enrichment, anticorruption prosecutors have also been a source of contention among academics, with Romania's most famous anticorruption scholar claiming that the DNA is a political tool (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018), while other scholars have accused the DNA and its chiefs for aggrandizing themselves at the expense of the procedural rights of the accused (Mendelski 2020).¹⁸ Unfortunately, insufficient attention has been paid to the effects of judicial anticorruption on the magistracy itself: this is the goal of the current section, and I begin with the incentives and professional structures of judges and prosecutors.

When discussing professional dynamics the main point is that individual-level competition among magistrates largely occurs through climbing the career ladder to higher-prestige and higher-pay positions within the judicial hierarchy.¹⁹ With this in mind, we should note that the anticorruption drive has created new resources within the magistracy, and therefore new constituencies for and fights over said resources. For one, until 2016 the DNA experienced a consistent period of growth, hiring ever more prosecutors and becoming essentially a parallel procuracy, with its own system of territorial offices and employing as many prosecutors as the more populous appellate circuits (Mendelski 2020). The same situation holds for the Directorate for Combatting Crimes of Terrorism and Organised Crime (DIICOT), whose jurisdiction not infrequently overlaps with the DNA's. Moreover, both the DNA and the DIICOT pay magistrates as if they were attached to the High Court, with the result that the base salary of DNA/DIICOT staff prosecutors is equal to the base pay of a chief prosecutor attached to a regional court of appeals.²⁰ Finally, while nominally subordinated to the country's prosecutor general, in practice DNA and DIICOT chiefs operate autonomously. All of these elements conspire to turn these prosecutorial agencies, and the DNA in particular with its highly publicised investigations, into desirable destinations for ambitious magistrates.

Unfortunately, this has led to a double division within the Romanian magistracy, among prosecutors themselves and between prosecutors and judges. These divisions can be seen in two ways: the structures of professional mobility among prosecutors and judges, and intra-professional rivalry in the Supreme Council of the Magistracy (CSM)—the joint professional body of judges and prosecutors—occasioned by the establishment of the Special Section for the Investigation of Crimes in the Justice System (SIJ). I begin with two graphs showing the inter-appellate transfer network of prosecutors and

17 A linear probability model is theoretically acceptable in the present case because all of the independent variables are categorical, so the resulting estimates and predicted probabilities fall in the [0,1] interval.

18 Compare this to the universal praise of the DNA in European Commission reports (Lacatus and Sedelmeier 2020), and its support by anticorruption protesters (Pojoranu 2017) and political parties unaffiliated with the Social Democrats (Dragoman 2020).

19 See Pârvolescu (2020) for a general treatment of competition and mobility in hierarchical organisations such as civil service bureaucracies.

20 See Section I, article 3 (sub-article 11) of Decision number 11 of the 4th of May, 2020 of the Romanian High Court of Cassation and Justice (Întalta Curte de Casație și Justiție a României 2020) which reaffirms the practice, by reference to magistrate pay schedules in Appendix A of Emergency Ordinance 27 of the 29th of March 2006 (Government of Romania 2006).

judges in 2013, a year that is representative of the magistrate transfer networks after the progressive introduction of the DNA and DIICOT starting in 2002. The data used to create these graphs come from the Romanian Judicial Professions Database (Pârvulescu 2021). The nodes in these graphs represent courts/parquets in one appellate region (e.g. Craiova – CR, which includes Dolj, Gorj, Mehedinți and Olt counties), while connecting lines signify personnel flows: for instance, how many judges moved between the Craiova and Bucharest appellate regions in 2013, because of promotions, demotions, or lateral transfers.²¹ The size of the nodes shows how many magistrates each jurisdiction employs. The High Court and its Parquet are coded independently, as are the DNA and DIICOT. The key to node names is provided in Appendix 5.

These graphs show that there are different jurisdictional “cliques,” indicated by different colours: in both the judge and prosecutor professional exchange networks organisations in the same clique preferentially recruit magistrates from clique members. This is not concerning in and of itself, since we expect national-level bureaucracies to silo careers regionally, if only because people are often loathe to relocate. What is notable, however, is the differing structure of the two mobility networks. In the case of the judges we see two geographic clusters anchored by regional centrers (Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca) along with a cluster of “leftovers,” a common residual in social network analysis. The core of the judge network is nearly empty (occupied mostly by the national High Court, which recruits judges from all appellate areas), indicating that judicial careers tend to evolve in one of two regional cliques. The prosecutor network, on the other hand, is strikingly different: for one, the network is highly centralised around Bucharest (the largest appellate circuit), the DIICOT and the DNA. The Bucharest region anchors one cluster, while the DIICOT anchors another; in many years the DNA and its closest nodes switch between the Bucharest and DIICOT clusters, showing that the DNA’s clique is semi-detached (results not shown). Again we find a residual cluster of hard-to-categorise institutions. Overall, the tight core of the prosecutorial mobility network indicates a more centralised system.

There are two lessons from these graphs. First, careers evolve differently for judges and prosecutors: the former can expect territorial career development, while the latter are much more in the orbit of the national, semi-parallel institutions of the DNA and DIICOT, as well as the capital city. Since standardised career ladders are a definitional element of professional identity (Abbott 1988, 129ff.; Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996), different professional mobility structures imply qualitative differences in the professional identity of judges and prosecutors. The second point is that prosecutors themselves are internally divided between three turfs: the capital, DIICOT, and to a lesser extent the DNA. These moreover also have a partly territorial, clique-ish logic: the DIICOT cluster, for instance, is largely composed of the historically Hapsburg dominions of Transylvania and the Banat. Consequently, Romanian prosecutorial career can develop not only along the geographical axis but also along an organisational dimension, due to the importance of the DIICOT and the DNA. This second dimension of potential difference may water down the *esprit de corps* of prosecutors as whole.

These graph reveal the structural potential for inter- and intra-professional division. Such potential was only actualised, however, during acute conflict over a new professional resource. In July 2018 parliament passed a law introducing the Special Section for Investigating Crimes in the Justice System, or SIIJ. On paper, this elite, fifteen-person prosecutor’s office could take over any investigation from any existing prosecutor, including the DNA, so long as the magistrates (i.e. judges and prosecutors) were suspected of involvement in criminal activity.²² From the beginning observers

21 In the jargon of network analysis, these are weighted, directed edges (the arrows have been suppressed for visual simplicity). I measure centrality via shortest-path betweenness (Freeman 1977) and identify communities via the Louvain method (Blondel et al. 2008). The graphs were drawn with Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy 2009).

22 <https://www.mpublic.ro/ro/content/sec%C8%9Bia-pentru-investigarea-infrac%C8%9Biunilor-din-justi%C8%9Bie;>
<https://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/articolele-dau-puteri-sporite-sectiei-speciale-declarate-neconstitutionale-argumente->

noted that such wide-ranging powers combined with the fact that the its first head would be appointed during a period in which the CSM was seen as being close to the government would create a politicised counter-weight to the DNA, and serve to cow magistrates by opening spurious investigations against them.²³

Now central authorities creating another institution to watch the watchmen is not exceptional: the history of the Tsarist and Soviet procuracies follows precisely this pattern (Christian 1982). More telling were the struggles occasioned by the creation of the SIIJ. The creation of this new entity opened a breach among prosecutors, because the SIIJ was to be composed of prosecutors investigating both prosecutors and judges. The possibility of acrimonious intra-professional score-settling soon became reality when the SIIJ Chief Prosecutor placed the former General Prosecutor and former DNA Chief Prosecutor under criminal investigation. That said the greater battle was between prosecutors and judges, for several reasons.

Before anything else, the SIIJ issue divided prosecutors and judges, as the creation of this new unit tapped into the simmering gripe that prosecutors could open investigations against judges but not vice versa: the head of the SIIJ, however, would be named by the CSM, whose majority is judges. And as noted above, the prosecutor appointed by the majority-judge CSM did not tarry in opening an investigation against a former chief prosecutor. Another sign of inter-professional conflict was the uncharacteristic publicity of calls by several CSM members, especially prosecutors, for the resignation of then-CSM president (and judge) Lia Savonea.²⁴ Additionally, then-Chief Prosecutor of the SIIJ Gheorghe Stan broke protocol to personally bring to court a request to re-open a corruption investigation against then-CSM judge Bogdan Mateescu.²⁵ Finally, in an unusual and highly publicised series of events the CSM failed nine times to appoint a new chief prosecutor of the SIIJ: votes that would typically have been a formality ended in ties or were forestalled entirely when CSM members refused to attend, thereby withholding quorum. In all cases the recalcitrant party was primarily composed of prosecutors,²⁶ who engaged in block voting. Overall ideological and party affinities were almost certainly involved, and while block-voting by profession was not the rule, the uncharacteristic publicity and mere existence of abstention and professional block voting revealed deep fault lines in the Romanian magistracy

To sum, we see that the creation of a new, judicial oversight institution putatively tasked with rooting out corruption within the magistracy (which had heretofore been the province of the DNA) created new slots for ambitious prosecutors accused of being in cahoots with the governing majority, and give them a potent institutional weapon. The founding and operation of this new unit accentuated existing fault-lines among magistrates and generated previously unheard-of level of conflict within the higher reaches of the profession(s). I therefore conclude that judicial anticorruption doubly fractured the Romanian magistracy, first by inducing different career patterns within and between judges and

[magistratii-ccr-siiij-1_5f0484c95163ec4271bd2211/index.html](https://www.rfi.ro/politica-130490-sectia-pentru-investigarea-infractiunilor-din-justitie-la-judecata-csm)

- 23 Despite never operating at full capacity the SIIJ managed to take over and close several highly sensitive investigations, begin investigations into former DNA chief and then-candidate for EPPO chief prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi and former vice-president of the EU Commission and Frans Timmermans, and see its first head be very quickly promoted to the rank of Constitutional Court judge. <https://www.rfi.ro/politica-130490-sectia-pentru-investigarea-infractiunilor-din-justitie-la-judecata-csm>; <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-23200908-fostul-sef-sectiei-anchetare-magistratilor-gheorghe-stan-numit-psd-judecator-ccr-vrea-fie-rezervat-post-procuror-sectia-speciala.htm>; <https://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/sebastian-ghita-achitat-definitiv-intr-un-dosar-dupa-ce-siiij-a-retras-apelul.html>
- 24 <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-23428443-document-continua-scandalul-csm-7-membri-cer-revocarea-liei-savonea-indepartat-institutia-rolul-sau-constitutional-consecinte-extrem-grave-planul-functionarii-credibilitatii.htm>
- 25 <https://www.g4media.ro/gheorghe-stan-seful-sectiei-speciale-de-investigare-a-magistratilor-a-vrut-sa-sustina-personal-la-curtea-suprema-redeschiderea-unei-anchete-pe-numele-unui-membru-csm-judecatorul-iccj-nu-i-a-permi.html>
- 26 <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/justitie/csm-nu-a-validat-o-din-nou-pe-adina-florea-la-sefia-siiij-blocaj-dupa-centralizarea-voturilor-1201669>

Figure 2: Inter-appellate region transfer network of judges, 2013. Colours indicate cliques/communities.

Figure 3: Inter-appellate region transfer network of prosecutors, 2013. Colours indicate cliques/communities.

prosecutors, and second by introducing new positions over which to compete, thereby weaponising the aforementioned differences. In all cases the action has centred around prosecutorial agencies putatively tasked with weeding out corruption: the DNA and the SIIJ.

Net Effects of Judicial Anticorruption: Decoupled Rationalisation

I would now like to connect and make explicit what has so far remained beneath the surface. First, Romanian judicial anticorruption has fractured the two fields in which it is most deeply imbricated, politics and the judiciary, thereby making the concrete job of eliminating graft more uncertain and difficult. Second, the fact that it has undercut itself is not a sign of its failure, because the main purpose of judicialised anticorruption is not to root out public graft but to reaffirm collective commitment to an abstract ideal of public integrity. I will take each in turn.

The section on the effects of anticorruption convictions on the legislature stopped shy of the conclusion: writing and passing laws and monitoring the executive—in short, doing what liberal political theorists claim a legislature should do—is more difficult under successful judicial anticorruption, because constant convictions destabilise the set of veto players and increase the policy distance between them, therefore making it harder to find a core (or winset) of policies about which different veto players can agree (Tsebelis 2002, Ch.1). It is not hard to see why. On the one hand, more legislative party switching means a more unruly legislature. This can be useful: it has often been remarked that presidents in US style constitutions can cobble together policy coalitions that more disciplined parties would whip out of existence. But such systems are also notorious for legislative horse-trading, which encourages high-level corruption; see Balán (2014). On the other hand, the consistent entrance of anti-system parties riding a wave populist sentiment means that each legislature begins with an obstinate party loathe to admit to supporters that it must compromise with existing parliamentary elites. The content of the party's ideology is secondary: what matters is that they are all populists who have gained seats by denigrating their soon-to-be legislative colleagues.

The same can be said about judicial anticorruption on its home turf. The new resources offered by the anticorruption drive fracture professional career lines and heterogenise the magisterial profession(s). Simultaneously, fights over new resources serve as an occasion for structurally-supported distinctions to be weaponised to gain competitive advantage. Together these dynamics sharpen ideological cleavages within the judiciary, with the net effect that judicial anticorruption activity is dampened: a new agency becomes one more judicial veto player, magistrates become less keen to engage in anticorruption for fear that they themselves will be investigated (justly or otherwise), and gridlock in decision-making bodies starves institutions of human, symbolic, and procedural resources. Not only are chief prosecutors needed for their expertise and to rally the troops, but also because interim heads have diminished powers to move cases along. Again, while gridlock may sometimes be useful successful in anticorruption does not wait for convenient moment: it always tends to gridlock.

On top of all these is the highly potent dynamic of attack and counter-attack, especially from those who feel personally threatened. The most inveterate opponents of Romanian anticorruption have been politicians with prior convictions: media mogul and party chief Dan Voiculescu, former head of the Social Democratic Party Liviu Dragnea, and former head of the People's Party, the eponymous Dan Diaconescu. Each one accelerated their attacks against judicial anticorruption *after* receiving their first convictions, and while a subsequent prison sentence subdued one, it did not deter another: the third has yet to be released from prison.

All this suggests that judicial anticorruption may not be the most effective tool against public graft, a consistent Anglo-Saxon opinion most recently expressed with regards to the newly-founded European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) (Wade 2019). While perhaps true, this criticism misses

the point: criminal investigations, like criminal law in general, do not have to reduce crime to be successful, they simply have to create opportunities to publicly reaffirm commitments to absolute moral ideals, in this case of purity and selflessness in public life.²⁷ And on this front Romanian anticorruption has been a stunning success. It hastened entry in the European Union, as national elites managed to convince their European counterparts of Romania's commitment to anticorruption just long enough to squeak into the Union, before firing reformist ministers and returning to the bad old ways (Ivanov 2010; but cf. Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010).²⁸ It has turned Romania into a celebrated case of judicial activism, culminating in the recent appointment of former DNA chief prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi to be the first head of EPPO.²⁹ Most profoundly, judicial anticorruption has firmly implanted public protest into the political toolkit of Romanian citizens. While mass demonstrations were slowly picking up steam twenty years after bloody crackdowns on student protesters in the early 1990s (Abăseacă and Pleyers 2019), the wave of anticorruption protests starting in 2017 featured the highest public turnout since the 1989 revolution (Pojoranu 2017), and elevated "the street" to a formidable new player in Romanian politics, albeit one that is even more unpredictable than the fractious legislature.

The sociological term for people and organisations not following institutional models of behaviour is "decoupling," and it refers to the gap between policy and practice. The principal claim of neo-institutionalist sociologists is that decoupling can be permanent, and even the sign of a healthy system: after all, following rules to the letter is a classic tool of union obstruction (Meyer, Krücken, and Drori 2009 Ch.2). This decoupling holds especially vis-a-vis rationalisation attempts via law, such as disciplining public officials through anticorruption campaigns, because laws are meant to be aspired to at least as much as they are to be abided by. Modern justice very rarely catches or punishes lawbreaking, and when it attempts to judge what it does catch it gives pride of place to ill intent (*mens rea*), using it to parse out manslaughter from murder, and oversight from fraud. That this is viewed as a humane aspect of criminal justice drives home the point that often genuine belief is unnecessary but sufficient for effective social action. So too with judicial anticorruption, which by inducing chaos in objective structures perfects our commitment to and belief in the virtues of public selflessness, thereby striking at the heart of corruption and graft.

27 The thesis that criminal law primarily functions as a mechanism to increase social cohesion by strengthening a common morality is foundational to contemporary sociology. See Durkheim's

28 The subsequent carrot and stick of Schengen entry and the CVM have irritated some local elites and catalysed others, but it has not amounted to anything close to EU Conditionality (Lacatus and Sedelmeier 2020).

29 It is interesting to note that one of the major Romanian investigative journalists with respect to anticorruption has explicitly brought up the advantages of colonising the EPPO with Romanian prosecutors: <https://www.g4media.ro/de-ce-au-intrat-in-coliziune-presedintele-iohannis-si-guvernul-orban-cu-parchetul-european-condus-de-kovesi.html>

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Appendix 1: Party Names and Acronyms

PNL: “Partidul Național Liberal” ; National Liberal Party

PSD: “Partidul Social Democrat” ; Social Democratic Party

ALDE: “Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților” ; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats

PMP: “Partidul Mișcarea Populară” ; Popular Movement Party

USR: “Uniunea Salvați România” ; Save Romania Union

PP DD: “Partidul Popular – Dan Diaconescu” ; Popular Party – Dan Diaconescu

PMP: “Partidul Mișcarea Populară” ; Popular Movement Party

PDL: “Partidul Democrat – Liberal” ; Liberal Democratic Party

PC: “Partidul Conservator” ; Conservative Party

UNPR: “Uniunea Națională Pentru Progresul României” ; National Union for the Progress of Romania

UDMR: “Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România”, “Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség” ; Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania

Appendix 2: Robustness Checks With Respect to Coding of Main Independent Variables

	log odds	p-value
Minister Conviction - Full	0.0189	0.9169
Minister Conviction – Old Members Only	0.213	0.29
Minister Conviction – New Members Only	-0.1157	0.5595
Minister Conviction – Ignore Ministers defunct parties	0.0832	0.708
Leader Conviction – Only Conviction Year	1.9605	0
Leader Conviction – All Years After Conviction	1.5095	0
<u>Full Model: Leader Conviction (All Years) + Minister Conviction (Full)</u>		
Leader Conviction – All Years After Conviction	1.7154	0
Minister Conviction - Full	0.3817	0.0635

Appendix 3: Robustness Checks With Respect to Coding Specific Party Leader Convictions

	log odds	p-value
All Parties	1.7154	0
no PP DD	1.8042	0
no PC	1.7146	0
no UNPR	1.6213	0
only PSD	1.6981	0
no PSD	1.2903	0.0175

Appendix 4: Complete Output Tables from Event History Regressions

First Party Switch

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-3.65006	0.25607	-14.254	< 2e-16 ***
h_region2	-0.03016	0.17694	-0.170	0.864641
h_region3	0.21391	0.13668	1.565	0.117577
h_region5	0.10541	0.56605	0.186	0.852271
legis2012-2016	0.21377	0.18235	1.172	0.241079
legis2016-2020	-0.44002	0.27547	-1.597	0.110182
legis_clock2	0.60353	0.16397	3.681	0.000233 ***
legis_clock3	-0.07930	0.21204	-0.374	0.708434
legis_clock4	-0.08213	0.21052	-0.390	0.696453
senate	-0.21392	0.13149	-1.627	0.103745
senior_catjourneyman	0.14402	0.14714	0.979	0.327680
senior_catmaster	-0.06510	0.17142	-0.380	0.704113
start_partyALDE	4.03094	0.50874	7.923	2.31e-15 ***
start_partyPC	0.36350	0.57089	0.637	0.524307
start_partyPDL	1.17314	0.20579	5.701	1.19e-08 ***
start_partyPMP	1.75222	0.43998	3.983	6.82e-05 ***
start_partyPNL	0.06477	0.18165	0.357	0.721406
start_partyPP_DD	3.37049	0.28874	11.673	< 2e-16 ***
start_partyUNPR	1.41257	0.62659	2.254	0.024172 *
start_partyUSR	-0.01121	0.53234	-0.021	0.983195
p_govtjunior	-1.91389	0.47842	-4.000	6.32e-05 ***
p_govtsenior	-0.41430	0.14774	-2.804	0.005043 **
lead_change	1.22962	0.15795	7.785	6.99e-15 ***
lead_conv_multi_year	1.68273	0.32325	5.206	1.93e-07 ***
min_conv_full	0.37818	0.20535	1.842	0.065523 .

Signif. codes:	0 '***'	0.001 '**'	0.01 '*'	0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Early Retirement

For Retirement

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	-6.67931	0.82617	-8.085	6.23e-16 ***
h_region1	0.10872	0.49155	0.221	0.824955
h_region3	0.25727	0.43923	0.586	0.558055
h_region5	0.92354	1.11395	0.829	0.407066
legis2012-2016	0.65659	0.47592	1.380	0.167701
legis2016-2020	0.01585	0.60624	0.026	0.979144
legis_clock2	0.10670	0.50735	0.210	0.833419
legis_clock3	0.75131	0.51652	1.455	0.145789
legis_clock4	-0.94684	1.21869	-0.777	0.437199
senate	-0.44017	0.36653	-1.201	0.229782
senior_catjourneyman	-0.19330	0.42860	-0.451	0.651987
senior_catmaster	0.43324	0.37493	1.156	0.247869
start_partyALDE	-13.35892	951.89932	-0.014	0.988803
start_partyPC	3.28766	0.97142	3.384	0.000713 ***
start_partyPDL	-0.58800	0.71807	-0.819	0.412867
start_partyPMP	-13.57646	1019.58109	-0.013	0.989376
start_partyPNL	0.26974	0.41907	0.644	0.519795
start_partyPP_DD	1.72512	0.86057	2.005	0.045004 *
start_partyUDMR	0.64876	0.93334	0.695	0.486992
start_partyUNPR	-13.88542	1381.73212	-0.010	0.991982

```

start_partyUSR      0.89234    1.19889    0.744 0.456694
p_govtjunior        -0.10467    0.86828   -0.121 0.904048
p_govtseior         1.06055    0.45433    2.334 0.019580 *
elect_year          1.67606    1.13285    1.480 0.139005
p_switch1           -0.50455    0.75463   -0.669 0.503743
lead_change          0.31187    0.46664    0.668 0.503919
lead_conv_multi_year -1.06907    0.68987   -1.550 0.121223
min_conv_full        0.21273    0.30343    0.701 0.483256
---
Signif. Codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

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Appendix 5: Key to Node Names of Inter-appellate Region Transfer Graphs

<i>Node Key</i>	<i>Full Name</i>
AB	Alba
B	Bucureşti
BC	Bacău
BV	Braşov
CJ	Cluj
CRAI	Craiova
CT	Constanţa
DIICOT	Direcţia de Investigare a Infracţiunilor de Criminalitate Organizată şi Terorism
DNA	Direcţia Naţională Anticorupţie
IA	Iaşi
ICCCJ	Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie (High Court)
GL	Galaţi
ORAD	Oradea
PIT	Piteşti
PLOI	Ploieşti
TGMS	Târgu Mureş
SV	Suceava