Main content



Loading wiki pages...

Wiki Version:
Recent findings indicate that individuals use prosocial options as default in social dilemmas and specifically first order public goods. In two studies, we test whether this spontaneous cooperation effect generalizes to second order public goods in the form of punishment behavior in one-shot and iterated public goods, and investigate the underlying motivations. In line with spontaneous cooperation, quick punishment is larger than slow punishment. Negative affect moderates this spontaneous punishment effect in one-shot public goods, in that punishment decisions are more quickly taken by persons that are more upset about the contribution behavior of their group members. Unlike spontaneous cooperation, spontaneous punishment is not driven by dispositional prosociality, but by situational high contributions. A significant three-way interaction in an overall-analysis indicates that the spontaneous punishment effect is mainly driven by above-average, highly upset contributors.
OSF does not support the use of Internet Explorer. For optimal performance, please switch to another browser.
This website relies on cookies to help provide a better user experience. By clicking Accept or continuing to use the site, you agree. For more information, see our Privacy Policy and information on cookie use.

Start managing your projects on the OSF today.

Free and easy to use, the Open Science Framework supports the entire research lifecycle: planning, execution, reporting, archiving, and discovery.