Do Voters Respond to Cross-Ethnic Campaigning in Divided Societies?

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Abstract

In order to comply with electoral rules incentivizing cross-ethnic mobilization, candidates in divided societies often campaign in opponents' strongholds among non-coethnics. In this paper, we show that such cross-ethnic campaign rallies may actually depress outgroup candidates' support among non-coethnics. We argue that candidates' holding of campaign rallies in non-coethnic constituencies can inadvertently trigger perceptions of intergroup competition, increase the salience of ethnicity, and depress support for non-coethnic candidates. We leverage a natural experiment that exploits the timing of an unscheduled campaign rally held by a presidential candidate in a non-coethnic county in his opponent's stronghold during Kenya's 2017 election. In comparing survey respondents before and after the rally, we find that the candidate's post-rally favorability significantly decreased among non-coethnic voters, while the proportion of voters identifying in ethnic terms simultaneously increased. These findings have important implications for the efficacy of institutional design to promote cross-ethnic political mobilization in polarized societies.

Keywords: Campaign effects, rallies, ethnic politics, social identity theory, Kenya

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1 Introduction

Electoral rules are frequently used to promote political accommodation in divided societies. Indeed, scholars have promoted specific institutional structures to encourage candidates to seek votes beyond their own identity groups (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985; Sartori, 1994). For example, 65 percent of countries with presidential systems require winning candidates to garner over 50 percent of votes cast (Bormann and Golder, 2013). These rules are particularly common in multi-ethnic societies. To incentivize cross-ethnic electoral coalitions, Afghanistan requires presidential candidates to win an absolute majority (Mobasher, 2017). Other countries have geographic distributional requirements to achieve similar ends. In Indonesia, winning presidential candidates must garner at least 20 percent of votes cast in half of all provinces to avoid a runoff (Reilly, 2006). Nigeria’s winning presidential candidates must demonstrate cross-regional support by winning a majority of the national vote and at least 25 percent of votes cast in at least two-thirds of the country’s 36 states (Bogaards, 2010).

The spread of rule-based incentives for cross-ethnic campaigning calls for a systematic understanding of how voters respond to such campaigns. Existing works show politicians respond to absolute majority institutional incentives by cultivating electoral support among non-coethnics (Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015). There is also evidence that, despite politicized ethnic cleavages, information dissemination during campaigns can persuade voters to update their political preferences. Lindberg and Weghorst (2013) demonstrate that swing voters in Ghana base their vote choice on public goods provision rather than ethnicity. McCauley (2014) shows that political mobilization on the basis of identity can change voters’ policy preferences, while Conroy-Krutz (2013) finds that information on candidate quality conditions support for coethnic candidates. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how cross-ethnic campaign outreach ultimately affect voters in deeply polarized countries where ethnicity is the primary basis of political mobilization.

This paper examines the effects of cross-ethnic campaigns in polarized societies. To explain our findings, we draw on insights from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987) and the ethnicity-as-heuristic literature (Ferree, 2010; Adida et al., 2017). We argue that cross-ethnic campaigns by out-group candidates in polarized societies can — contrary to their intent — reify voters’ ethnicized

perceptions of candidates. Geographical concentration of ethnic groups is common in countries with explicit rule-based incentives for cross-ethnic mobilization. Under such conditions, outgroup candidates who cross identity/constituency boundaries can inadvertently trigger perceptions of intergroup differentiation among voters socialized into seeing elections as identity-driven distributive conflicts. We demonstrate that campaigning in non-coethnic constituencies can decrease candidates' electoral support because such campaigns increase the salience of ethnicity among voters.

To identify the effects of cross-ethnic campaigning, we leverage a natural experiment around the timing of a mass rally during Kenya's 2017 election. Rallies are an important part of campaign outreach in countries where voters have limited alternative sources of information on candidates.¹ We analyze the impact of an unscheduled rally held for Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo and leading opposition presidential candidate, on voters' attitudes in Uasin Gishu County that is majority ethnic Kalenjin. Uasin Gishu was part of President Uhuru Kenyatta's base, and the home county of his running mate William Ruto. The rally was Odinga's attempt to reach out to non-coethnic voters — an effort necessitated, in part, by Kenya's electoral rules. In addition to an absolute majority requirement, Kenya's winning presidential candidates must also secure 25 percent of votes in at least 24 of the country's 47 counties.

The timing of Odinga's rally was independent of a locally representative survey already being conducted in Uasin Gishu County, making it a source of exogenous variation in voters' exposure to an outgroup candidate. We estimate the effect of the rally on voters' evaluations of the two main presidential candidates by comparing survey respondents interviewed prior to the rally (the control group) to those interviewed after the rally (the treatment group). We show that the rally failed to persuade voters to support the outgroup candidate. Instead, the rally significantly reduced Odinga's approval ratings (between 8–10 points), while increasing Uhuru's ratings (5–8 points). Further analysis suggest that the mechanism behind these results is a heightened salience of ethnicity following the rally. Voters expressed significantly higher levels of ethnic identification in the post-rally sample.

These findings are noteworthy for two reasons. First, we document an abrupt increase in the salience of ethnicity that can be traced to an outgroup candidate's discrete attempt to cross an ethnic

¹For example, nearly 40 percent of respondents across 32 African countries reported having attended a rally in their respective previous election. See Afrobarometer, Round 7

political divide. Notably, the rally happened two weeks before the election, meaning that our findings are not simply an artefact of the heightening of the salience of ethnicity around elections documented by (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010). Second, we find that respondents were primed to evaluate Odinga on ethnic terms despite his eschewing any mention of ethnicity during a rally that focused on valence issues such as the economy, corruption, and electoral fairness. In other words, the objective of the rally was to persuade voters in Uasin Gishu, the majority of whom are non-coethnics of Odinga.²

We contribute to different strands of literature on institutions and identity politics, including political ethnicity (Lynch, 2011; Koter, 2013), institutional design and impacts on identity politics (Lijphart, 1977; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005; Madrid, 2012; Bormann and Golder, 2013), and cross-ethnic campaign strategies (Ferree, 2006; Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015; Klaus and Paller, 2017). Our findings highlight the limits of institutional design in mitigating the normatively undesirable effects of identity-based political polarization. In particular, we foreground the role of voters in a literature that primarily focuses on politicians' and parties' responses to electoral rules or the need to signal broad-based support. We demonstrate that the attitudinal and behavioral effects of cross-ethnic campaigning are conditioned by cognitive processes that influence how voters perceive candidates' identities and the groups they represent. Our findings do not preclude elite-level cross-ethnic alliance building. Instead, what we show is that in contexts where identity, such as ethnicity, is the dominant means of political mobilization, politicians may be limited in their ability to reach non-coethnic voters whose elites are part of a rival alliance.

2 Cross-Ethnic Campaigning through Rallies

Campaign rallies are a staple of politics. Throughout Africa (Paget, 2019), Asia (Chua, 2007), and Latin America (Szwarcberg, 2014), candidates use these large-scale public gatherings to connect with voters because “nothing has replaced the attraction of the mass rally or the razzmatazz of the candidates’ visits to villages or populous neighborhoods” (Espíndola, 2002, p.74). As sites of political communication, rallies enable candidates to visibly signal their leadership potential to voters. Especially in

²The full transcript of the rally is available in the online appendix.

countries where clientelistic politics predominate, candidates often use rallies to signal their status as patrons by distributing handouts – including money, food, or other gifts to rally attendees (Kramon, 2016). Rallies thus reaffirm candidates' personal connection with voters and credibility in representing their interests in government. For these reasons, candidates compelled by electoral rules to mobilize voters across identity lines typically rely on campaign rallies to make in-person appeals to voters.

However, rallies also pose a special challenge for candidates in ethnically divided societies precisely because they underscore candidates' identities. Insights from social identity theory and the scholarship on ethnic heuristics suggest that ingroup voters, once polarized along ethnic lines, will be resistant to outreach from an outgroup candidate. Under these conditions, the political signal that an outgroup candidate intends to convey through a rally can be interpreted by ingroup voters as much as a threat as an appeal. Just as the rally is understood by all to be a manifestation of the outgroup candidate's viability as a leader, the very act of assembling large numbers of people also serves to remind ingroup voters that such mobilization may put their ethnically-defined interests at risk.

In a context of heightened polarization along ethnic lines, an outgroup candidate's physical presence at a rally is likely to reify perceived ethnic differences in the minds of ingroup voters rather than persuade them of any shared interests. Voters who value membership in an identity group are likely to be motivated to act in conformity with the group's norms and behaviors (Tajfel, 1982). Individuals that attach their personal self-esteem to a group identity face incentives to think and behave in ways aimed at maintaining the group's positive image or status vis-à-vis others. In the same vein, the salience of inter-group differentiation increases as individuals advance their relative status by drawing invidious distinctions between groups (Fiske and Pavelchak, 1985; Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Perceived inter-group distinctions can result in competitive behaviors as individuals mobilize to advantage their own groups, possibly at the cost of others.

By accentuating identity-based dynamics, an outgroup candidate's rally in a non-coethnic constituency may be sufficient to activate perceptions of inter-group differentiation – despite the candidate's intent.³ A rally's effects may not depend on what a candidate says or does. Instead, the candi-

³In this respect, the candidate's identity sets in motion the cognitive processes of identification and discrimination among voters (Petrow, 2010; McConnaughy et al., 2010).

date's identity induces voters to consider how support for the candidate would impact inter-ethnic distributive and hierarchical relations. A rally's electoral effects thus end up being conditioned by the demographics of the constituency in which it is held.

Polarized voters are especially likely to weigh a candidate's outgroup status if they have been primed to think of electoral outcomes in ethnicized terms. In countries with histories of fractious ethnic politics or conflict, politicians invest considerable effort in defining their opponents — over several election cycles, if not decades — along identity lines, questioning their ability to represent voters outside recognized ethnic boundaries. This negative framing strategy helps to neutralize cross-ethnic campaigns by making politicians' promises to attend to the interests of non-coethnics seem implausible (Ferree, 2010). Widespread belief in ethnic favoritism by politicians and associated motivated reasoning may attenuate the impacts of candidates' campaign promises or demonstrable past performance (Carlson, 2015; Adida et al., 2017).

In light of the above discussion, political geography plays an important role in structuring the impacts of campaign rallies because ethnic groups tend to be geographically concentrated. The resulting physical proximity to voters with a common identity not only facilitates the emergence of a shared political outlook, but also accentuates the notion that each individual's fate is intertwined with that of their group. These perceptions of linked fate (Miller et al., 1981), underpinned by geographic proximity, help to coordinate voters' expectations that the future flow of political benefits is tied to having an ingroup member in office. Furthermore, voters' experience of ethnic discrimination in the allocation of spatially-targeted public goods reinforce these perceptions (Edjemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2017). Consequently, voters learn to view identity-based voting as the best way to advance both individual and communal interests.

Given their potential for increasing the salience of ethnic categorization, rallies in ethnically polarized societies are likely to nudge voters to consider electoral contexts in terms of inter-ethnic competition. The candidate's identity can cue ingroup members to actively consider the impacts of election results on both their relative group status as well as potential material benefits. From this perspective, an outgroup candidate's rally — a mass event held by an “outsider” within their homeland —

can be interpreted as an incursion by a rival group that threatens the ingroup's political unity, power, and ability to collectively access future material benefits. Simply stated, an outgroup politicians' rally may symbolize an incursion that puts both status-based and material benefits on the line.⁴

The logic outlined in this section leads to two straightforward expectations regarding how campaign rallies condition the relationship between outgroup candidates and ingroup voters in ethnically polarized societies. First, in ethnically polarized societies, rallies for outgroup candidates in constituencies populated by non-coethnic voters are likely to weaken their local electoral support. This is because the outgroup candidate's presence induces ingroup voters to engage in the cognitive processes described above – and evaluate such candidates on the basis of identity. Second, and as evidence of the mechanism driving outcomes observed, an outgroup candidate's rally will lead to an increase in the salience of ethnicity among ingroup voters.

It is important to note that our framework does not preclude cross-ethnic alliance building, including in ethnically polarized societies. For example, in a hypothetical country with four ethnic groups (A,B,C, and D), it is possible to have cross-ethnic alliances (e.g. AB vs CD), and polarization across ethnic groups A and/or B vs C and/or D. It is also possible for these alliances to shift from election to election. However, once ethnic alliances are constructed for a given election, inter-alliance polarization militates against successful cross-ethnic campaigning during that election cycle. Once voters from group A see their politicians in an alliance with politicians from group B, they are likely to perceive candidates from groups C and D as outgroup representatives. The Kenyan case discussed in this paper involves Odinga (Luo), whose running mate was Kalonzo Musyokka (Kamba), campaigning in the home county of William Ruto (Kalenjin), who was the running mate of Kenyatta (Kikuyu). In the same vein, Luo and Kikuyu elites were in the same alliance in 2002 largely against Kalenjin elites; while in 2007 Kalenjin and Luo elites were in the same alliance against a Kikuyu incumbent.

⁴This is in line with research from the United States showing that majority racial ingroups tend to support candidates or policies that are hostile to minority outgroups in proportion to the latter's perceived threat (Dixon, 2006; Enos, 2014). For instance, the population share of African Americans is positively correlated with White support for overtly racist candidates (Wright, 1977; Giles and Buckner, 1993), as well as White opposition against Black candidates (Hutchings, 2009; Piston, 2010; Highton, 2011).

3 Empirical Context

Kenya presents an ideal context for assessing voters' responses to cross-ethnic campaigning. The political salience of ethnicity and the geographic concentration of ethnic groups make it possible to explore how candidate identity and constituency demographics interact to condition rally effects. Politicized ethnicity has deep historical roots in Kenya (Ajulu, 2002; Lynch, 2011). A colonial-era ban on cross-ethnic parties helped entrench ethnicity as a principle of organizing post-independence politics. The geographic concentration of ethnic groups and presidential abuse of discretionary authority further facilitated ethnic favoritism in the distribution of public resources (Kramon and Posner, 2016).

The centrality of ethnicity to electoral mobilization is most evident in the designation of “zones” under the former ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Fearing the electoral threat posed by politicians from other ethnic groups after the reintroduction of multipartyism, President Daniel arap Moi designated constituencies inhabited by his coethnics and allied ethnic groups as KANU zones in the 1992 and 1997 elections. Candidates from outgroups were called “enemy” or “foreigner” in such zones (Osamba, 2001), and often forcibly prevented from campaigning (Hassan, 2016). The high stakes associated with such ethnicized electoral competition periodically resulted in violent conflict (Kasara, 2017; Klaus, 2017).

Yet, Kenya's demographics compel politicians to form cross-ethnic alliances in order to win national elections (Lynch, 2014). The largest ethnic group, Kikuyus, comprise less than 20 percent of the population. These alliances, nevertheless, tend to be short-lived. For example, Kikuyu and Luo politicians were part of the same alliance in the 2002 presidential election, pooling voter support from their respective ethnic constituencies. But in 2007 Luo politicians allied with Kalenjin politicians against a Kikuyu incumbent president. And in both 2013 and 2017 a Kalenjin-Kikuyu alliance beat a Luo-Kamba alliance. While these alliances may change, once created they result in high levels of ethnic polarization and sometimes violence.

It is in this context that the particularly violent 2007 election jolted Kenyan elites into implementing comprehensive constitutional reforms aimed, in part, at compelling presidential candidates to build national multiethnic coalitions. The 2010 constitution requires winning candidates to win

a majority of votes cast and at least one quarter of votes in 24 of 47 counties. Otherwise, the top two candidates enter a second-round runoff.⁵ To make cross-ethnic coalitions credible, the post of Deputy President became an elected position (Ghai, 2103). Presidential candidates now have to choose their running mates before elections — visibly committing to their electoral alliances — and cannot dismiss them at will, as was previously the case.

The subsequent 2013 and 2017 elections featured competitive races between the same set of cross-ethnic presidential tickets: Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as presidential candidate and Ruto (Kalenjin) as his deputy president versus Odinga (Luo) and Musyoka (Kamba) as his running mate. Kenyatta and Ruto headed the Jubilee ticket in both elections, while Odinga and Kalonzo headed the the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) in 2013 and then the National Super Alliance (NASA) in 2017.⁶ Therefore, in 2017, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba zones comprised core areas for the respective electoral alliances. “Swing” ethnic zones exist where local elites are divided across the two main alliances and are often hotly contested (Horowitz, 2017). Due to demographic arithmetic, each coalition was forced to campaign across the country in order to meet the constitution’s majority (50 percent plus one) and distributional thresholds (25 percent in at least 24 counties).

Being majority Kalenjin and the home county of Ruto, Uasin Gishu was naturally considered part of Kenyatta’s core base. Yet Odinga had an incentive to campaign in the county because its local demographic mix meant he might reach the constitutional minimum 25% vote threshold requirement in that county. According to our survey, Kikuyus and Kalenjins comprise about 75% of the county’s population. In the 2013 election, Odinga garnered 21.3% of the vote in Uasin Gishu to Kenyatta’s 75%. In short, Odinga’s rally in the run-up to the 2017 election was an instance of cross-ethnic outreach intended to increase his vote share up to the 25% threshold.⁷ According to *Daily Nation*, one of the country’s main daily newspapers, Odinga’s rally was understood to be a move into “Deputy President William Ruto’s Uasin Gishu backyard.”⁸

⁵Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, Article 138.

⁶The Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) split ahead of the 2017 election, resulting in the creation of the National Super Alliance (NASA) coalition.

⁷Stephen Rutto, “Raila Woos Ruto’s North Rift Backyard, Says Maize Shortage Shows Jubilee Failure,” *The Star*, 26 July 2017.

⁸Wycliffe Kipsang and Philemon Suter, “Raila Odinga Camps in William Ruto’s Uasin Gishu Backyard,” *Daily Nation*,

Odinga's rally on 26 July 2017 was bound to attract considerable local attention because it was held in the main stadium of Uasin Gishu's capital and largest city, Eldoret.⁹ The rally was structured to emphasize Odinga's local as well as national support with a series of twelve speakers addressing the rally over two and a half hours. Ethnic Kalenjin politicians spoke first, vouching for the candidate's ability to protect their local interests while reminding the crowd that the incumbent government had neglected their economic interests. Uasin Gishu is a major agricultural county, so voters would immediately understand references speakers made to the maize and dairy sectors. National politicians such as Odinga's running mate, Kalonzo Musyoka, were also in attendance to address the rally and symbolize the broad coalition mobilized behind Odinga nationwide.

The headline speech delivered by Odinga focused on valence issues such as development and governance. As with some of the preceding speakers, Odinga criticized the incumbent administration for its alleged failings, pointing to persistently high levels of corruption. Odinga also sought to convince rally attendees that he would improve their economic conditions, bring down the cost of living, and expand opportunities for youth. For example, he told the assembled crowd: "We will start major projects in every capital city in Kenya. We will bring construction tools and machines to assist in the development of proper homes for our citizens. Youths will be taught skills and also be given capital to start their own businesses. This will help in creating more job opportunities for the youth." Odinga, however, never made reference to the Kalenjin specifically or to ethnicity more broadly. Odinga's outreach gambit ultimately failed. In the election that followed just two weeks later, he received 21.2% to Kenyatta's 78.2%.¹⁰ Odinga's vote share was virtually unchanged from the previous election.

We are able to identify the impact of Odinga's rally on voters within Uasin Gishu due to a fortuitous natural experiment. Between 18 July 2017 and 1 August 2017, we conducted a locally representative field survey for an unrelated study. Odinga's unscheduled rally occurred approximately halfway through this field survey, allowing us to compare the favorability ratings of both presidential candidates among registered voters before and after the rally. The rally's exogenous timing, relative to the

26 July 2017.

⁹See here: <https://vimeo.com/231680307>

¹⁰Republic of Kenya, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

survey’s administration, serves as a natural source of variation in voter exposure to the rally. The rally had already been cancelled twice due to the sudden deaths of prominent Kalenjin politicians Nicholas Biwott and Bethwell Kiplagat.¹¹ Odinga’s rescheduled rally on 26 July 2017 was unanticipated by Uasin Gishu’s voters, since it was organized only at the last minute.

Importantly for our analysis, we are confident that trends subsequent to Odinga’s rally are not due to counter-mobilization efforts by the Kenyatta-Ruto campaign. Our survey protocol required enumerators to report on all political and campaign activities occurring within their designated enumeration areas. Indeed, this is how we were alerted to the occurrence of the Odinga campaign rally in the first place. Yet, in the following weeks, no enumerator reported any unusual or stepped-up campaign activity by the incumbent party. Furthermore, Odinga’s rally did not coincide with any local or national political events that would have affected his evaluations among only a subset of voters. In the following section, we describe additional steps taken to corroborate this claim.

Table 1: Rallies held during campaigns for 2017 Kenyan Presidential Election, June–August

	Classification of Rally Location			
	Incumbent Stronghold	Opposition Stronghold	Competitive Area	Total
<i>Party Holding the Rally</i>				
Jubilee (Incumbent) Party	5 (56%)	3 (33%)	1 (11%)	9 (100%)
NASA (Opposition) Coalition	5 (24%)	4 (19%)	16 (76%)	21 (100%)
Total	10	7	17	30

Notes: Author collected data on mass rallies held by the incumbent and opposition party attended by the presidential and vice presidential candidate between June 3rd–August 5th, 2017. Classification of rally locations is based on whether either the presidential and deputy presidential candidates for each party were from the majority ethnic group of the county in which the rally was held.

The implications of our findings in Uasin Gishu travel beyond this particular case or locality. Kenyan presidential candidates face strong incentives to reach out across ethnic group boundaries, including within their opponents’ core bases ([Gadjanova, forthcoming](#)). For instance, in 2017, Kenyatta also sought to expand support beyond his party’s ethnic bases by campaigning in Kisumu and

¹¹“NASA cancels Rift Valley rallies to mourn Biwott, Bethuel Kiplagat,” *The Star*, 21 July 2017.

Homabay, both Luo-majority counties and part of Odinga's core base.¹² Similarly, Odinga campaigned in Kiambu, Kenyatta's home county (majority Kikuyu).¹³ More recently, Odinga's party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), unveiled a new plan to make "inroads into Deputy President William Ruto's [Kalenjin] turf in the Rift Valley" ahead of the 2022 presidential election.¹⁴ Ruto, too, plotted to make inroads in Odinga's (Luo) Nyanza base.¹⁵ More systematic data on the location of party rallies during the three month run-up to the August 2017 presidential elections further validates the fact that forays into the opponent's "home turf" are not uncommon. As reported in Table 1, while the incumbent Jubilee party spent more than a majority of their time campaigning in their own backyard, a full 33% of their rallies were held in the opposition's strongholds. Although the opposition NASA coalition seemed to have focused their mobilization efforts predominantly in competitive or "swing" areas, close to a quarter of their rallies were conducted in counties that are classified as Jubilee party strongholds. These figures bolster confidences that the inferences drawn in this paper are not a unique feature of this single rally event but a dynamic we are likely to observe across a broader class of rallies held in the opponent's core.¹⁶

While the salience of ethnicity is known to increase during campaign periods (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010), elections in Kenya and other African countries are not simple ethnic censuses. Politicians and parties must regularly engage in cross-ethnic campaigns (Cheeseman and Larmer, 2015; Gadjanova, forthcoming), balancing base mobilization strategies with persuasion of non-coethnic voters through policy and material inducements. Even in polarized contexts like Kenya, a sizable share of voting is driven by economic considerations (Bratton and Kimenyi, 2008). Under such circumstances, attempts at cross-ethnic mobilization make sense, especially in response to electoral rules mandating absolute majority and distributional requirements. Yet, our argument implies that, once cross-ethnic alliances are created in the context of identity-based polarization, attempts to cam-

¹²"Kenyatta Visits Kisumu, Homa Bay as He Continues With Campaigns", *Daily Nation*, July 12, 2017.

¹³"Raila Odinga takes Nasa campaigns to Kiambu County," *Daily Nation*, July 4, 2017

¹⁴"ODM targets North Rift voters, says it has not endorsed Gideon Moi", *Daily Nation*, August 2, 2020

¹⁵"Ruto raids Raila turf as Sudi hosts Nyanza delegation", *The Star*, August 2, 2020

¹⁶We classified rally locations based on whether either the presidential and vice presidential candidates for each party were from the majority ethnic group of the county in which the rally was held. Competitive, or "swing" areas are counties whose majority ethnic group is not represented in the presidential ticket for either of the two parties.

campaign across ethnic divisions can backfire.¹⁷ Amidst identity-based polarization, exposure to political action by outgroup candidates can trigger perceptions of external threat, thereby increasing identity-driven evaluation of politicians and negating the very objective of cross-ethnic campaigning.

Our contribution here is noteworthy in that we identify the causal effect of a campaign rally on identity-driven political behavior under conditions of already elevated ethnic salience. The day of Odinga’s rally, 26 July 2017, was *several months* into the campaign period and a mere fortnight before the election. What we document is an *abrupt* change in the salience of ethnicity and concomitant shifts in the evaluations of candidates following a campaign rally. This mechanism is independent of whether or not voters in a constituency attended the rally in person. Instead, what drives voters’ reactions is knowing about the occurrence of the rally – the very fact that an outgroup candidate sought to mobilize support within their constituency. This observation does not preclude the fact that media markets and social networks that propagate our mechanism are often spatially-concentrated. We should expect stronger reactions to Odinga’s rally among respondents who had direct information about the rally.

4 Research Design

4.1 Empirical Strategy

Capturing the effect of campaigns on voters remains one of the most “perplexing problems” in political science (Druckman, 2004). Innovations in experimental methods have allowed for an increasing number of studies to use novel techniques to assess how exposure to campaigns shape voters’ reactions (Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon, 1999; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006), but it remains unclear if these effects hold beyond the laboratory environment (Gerber, Green and Kaplan, 2014). Cognizant of such methodological challenges, we attempt to identify the effect of a real-world campaign on voters’ evaluations of presidential candidates by leveraging a natural experiment. As noted in the

¹⁷The external validity of our results is limited to contexts with high levels of partisan or identity-based polarization. Cross-ethnic campaigning can be successful in countries lacking high levels of identity-based polarization (Dunning and Harrison, 2010; Adida et al., 2016).

previous section, we exploit the fieldwork schedule for a locally representative survey that straddled an unscheduled campaign rally in Kenya’s Uasin Gishu County during the 2017 general election.¹⁸ The timeline of events around the survey is presented in Figure 1. Since the field schedule of the survey was determined independent of the rally, the rally’s timing relative to the administration of the survey produces a natural source of exogenous variation in voter exposure to a campaign event.

Figure 1: Timeline of Events

In this design, survey respondents interviewed within a certain time interval *prior* to the rally are considered the experimental control group, while those interviewed *after* the event are designated as the treatment group. The assumptions and conditions under which valid causal inferences can be drawn from this so-called Unexpected Event during Survey Design (UESD) has recently been systematized by [Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández \(2020\)](#). We address potential threats to inference concretely in Section 6 below. Empirical studies that adopt a similar research design include [Van der Brug \(2001\)](#), [Legewie \(2013\)](#), and [Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa \(2018\)](#).¹⁹

We estimate the effect of the rally on respondents’ evaluations of the main presidential candidates in Kenya’s 2017 election – Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. While it would have been preferable to use reported vote intention as the main outcome variable, our survey did not include such a question

¹⁸Our claim that the rally was unexpectedly cancelled and rescheduled is corroborated by data on web searches. Figure 6 below plots the count of Google and Youtube searches within Kenya for the term “NASA Eldoret.” The figure reveals large spikes in both searches on the date of the rescheduled rally (26 July) and the day after (27 July) with a smaller number of searches on the originally scheduled date (21 July). Importantly, there is no discernible increase in search trends in the days leading up to the rescheduled rally. Finally, the outcomes of interest in this paper were measured prior to the administration of the experimental treatments in our original study.

¹⁹A detailed description of the survey’s fieldwork methodology is in SI Appendix Section B. The survey was administered in manner that mitigates concerns over observed and unobserved differences in the composition of the pre- and post-rally samples, which could compromise the validity of this research design. Section 6 of the paper provides a discussion of how we address the potential inferential threats to this design.

prior to the rally's occurrence. Instead, we use a feeling thermometer question that was consistently asked before and after the rally. The feeling thermometer has been frequently used as a composite measure for candidate evaluations (e.g., [Ladd and Lenz \(2008\)](#)). The average treatment effect of the rally can be estimated with regression models and a dichotomous variable for the treatment status:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{PostRally}_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is the feeling thermometer rating for each candidate, PostRally_i is an indicator that takes on the value of 0 if the respondent was interviewed before the rally and 1 if she was interviewed after, X_i is a vector of pretreatment covariates for individual respondents that includes age, prior turnout, level of education, religious identification, and an index of asset ownership.²⁰ The parameter of interest, β_1 , provides the effect of the rally on presidential candidate evaluations.²¹

In the following analyses, we make pre- and post-rally comparisons using different bandwidths around the day of Odinga's rally in accordance with a widely accepted analytic approach to natural experiments ([Bueno and Dunning, 2017](#); [Legewie, 2013](#); [Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018](#)). Since we have information on the exact time and location of the rally, combined with the precise time stamps for each survey, we choose to keep surveys collected during the day of the rally, since all were completed before the rally was held. It is important to highlight that the identification strategy we employ does not afford us with an exogenous source of variation on rally attendance. What we are able to estimate using our empirical strategy is the causal effect of a candidate's rally on average local public opinion, which includes individuals who attended the rally themselves, those who had knowledge that the rally occurred in their locality, as well as those who did not.

²⁰The asset ownership index is the mean of five dichotomous variables denoting ownership of a motor vehicle, a mobile phone, a radio, a television, and a bicycle.

²¹To rule out the possibility that other events around the time of the rally are driving our results, we conducted a thorough examination of news outlets within the time period in question, but did not find noteworthy events that could potentially impact voter assessments of the candidates. We reviewed the *Daily Nation*, *The Star*, *The Standard*, and *AllAfrica.com* as well as the Youtube pages of KTN News, NTV, and Citizen TV.

4.2 Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the county survey sample on key covariates that enter our regression equations and inform the subsequent empirical analyses. By design, the survey is almost exactly balanced on gender. The mean age of the sample is at 32.6 years. As expected of a county in Kenya's upper Rift Valley, Kalenjins, the coethnics of Kenyatta's running-mate, Ruto, are the largest ethnic group represented in the survey with 65% of respondents. Kikuyus, Kenyatta's coethnics, constitute 10%. Together, these two incumbent-aligned ethnic groups comprise 75% of the population. Luos, Odinga's own coethnics, constitute 5% of the sample, while Luhyas represent 15% of the sample.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of county survey sample

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Demographics					
Gender	1,361	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	1,358	32.62	10.71	18	81
Voted in 2013	1,359	0.66	0.47	0	1
Voted Uhuru 2013	1361	0.54	0.50	0	1
Voted Raila 2013	1361	0.09	0.28	0	1
Secondary Education	1,360	0.79	0.41	0	1
Asset Index	1,360	0.62	0.24	0.00	2.40
Ethnicity and Religion					
Kalenjin	1,361	0.65	0.48	0	1
Kikuyu	1,361	0.10	0.30	0	1
Luo	1,361	0.04	0.19	0	1
Luhya	1,361	0.15	0.36	0	1
Protestant	1,359	0.67	0.47	0	1
Treatment and Outcomes					
Surveyed After Rally	1,361	0.31	0.46	0	1
Aware of Rally	425	0.82	0.38	0	1
Attended Rally	425	0.15	0.36	0	1
Acquaintance Attended Rally	425	0.31	0.46	0	1
Odinga Feeling Thermometer	1,356	42.11	29.85	0	100
Kenyatta Feeling Thermometer	1,357	77.80	24.36	0	100

Out of 1,361 respondents interviewed in the full survey, 31% or 425 were surveyed *after* the political rally. Among these 425 respondents, a strikingly high proportion (82%) report that they had knowledge that Odinga's rally was held in Uasin Gishu on 26 July 2017, attesting to the high salience of the event.²²

²²The breakdown of rally awareness and attendance by ethnic group and a regression-based analyses of the correlates of these variables are reported in Tables C1 and C2 in the SI Appendix.

²³ In the post-rally sample, 15% of respondents report having attended the rally in person, while 31% report having a family, friend, or acquaintance who attended the rally. These figures are in line with Afrobarometer data reported from other African countries, reflecting the fact that rallies remain one of the most important modes of communication between candidates and voters in Kenya.²⁴ Finally, the mean feeling thermometer responses for the two presidential candidates are in line with the fact that Uasin Gishu is considered a stronghold of the Kenyatta-Ruto presidential ticket: Kenyatta’s mean in the entire sample is 77.80, while Odinga’s mean is 42.11.

4.3 Design Validation

We leverage the exogeneity of the timing of Odinga’s rally vis-à-vis our locally representative survey to identify the causal impact of the campaign event on voters’ evaluations of the two leading candidates. While it is implausible that the Odinga campaign coordinated their rally based on the timing of our survey, administered as a part of a different field experiment, we nevertheless examine whether there is any statistically significant imbalance between the control (pre-rally) and the treatment (post-rally) groups on key pre-treatment covariates. Importantly, the outcomes we use in this paper were measured prior to the experimental treatments administered as part of our original study. Table 3 shows the results of the balance tests.

The results of the balance tests between the pre- and post-rally samples increase our confidence that the empirical strategy can yield valid causal estimates for the rally’s effects. In Table 3, we show the mean value of a battery of pretreatment covariates in the pre-rally and post-rally samples, the difference in the mean values between those two samples, and the p-value of the difference-in-means for the full sample, 5 day bandwidth, and 3 day bandwidth. There is little evidence of meaningful differences between the respondents surveyed before and after the rally. Pre- and post-rally samples are remarkably similar in terms of past electoral participation, age, secondary education, coethnicity with

²³Using this information, we can estimate the impact of the rally on the subset of the survey sample with knowledge of the rally, or the complier average causal effect (CACE). Results are presented in Table F1 in the SI Appendix.

²⁴We were able to add rally awareness and attendance measures to the survey after enumerators reported at the conclusion of Day 9’s data collection that a rally was about to occur. The additional items were included in the survey in time for commencement of data collection on Day 10.

Table 3: Balance Statistics

A. Full Sample (N=1361)					B. 5 Day Bandwidth Sample (N=886)				
	Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)		Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)
Demographics					Demographics				
Gender	0.465	0.517	0.052	0.077	Gender	0.454	0.516	0.062	0.072
Age	32.279	33.377	1.098	0.091	Age	32.175	33.219	1.044	0.161
Prev. Turnout	0.665	0.647	-0.018	0.521	Prev. Turnout	0.670	0.652	-0.018	0.581
Voted Uhuru	0.533	0.557	0.024	0.418	Voted Uhuru	0.556	0.558	0.002	0.934
Voted Raila	0.093	0.069	-0.024	0.117	Voted Raila	0.077	0.071	-0.006	0.739
Sec. Edu	0.792	0.818	0.026	0.274	Sec. Edu	0.793	0.826	0.033	0.214
Protestant	0.690	0.623	-0.067	0.018	Protestant	0.718	0.630	-0.088	0.007
Asset Index	0.616	0.622	0.006	0.689	Asset Index	0.613	0.621	0.008	0.644
Ethnicity					Ethnicity				
Kalenjin	0.628	0.682	0.054	0.051	Kalenjin	0.676	0.695	0.019	0.550
Kikuyu	0.104	0.133	0.029	0.136	Kikuyu	0.098	0.111	0.013	0.534
Luo	0.043	0.026	-0.017	0.101	Luo	0.023	0.026	0.003	0.775
Luhya	0.165	0.116	-0.049	0.014	Luhya	0.149	0.122	-0.027	0.261
Kamba	0.010	0.009	-0.001	0.978	Kamba	0.006	0.009	0.003	0.624
Other	0.050	0.033	-0.017	0.129	Other	0.049	0.037	-0.012	0.387

C. 3 Day Bandwidth Sample (N=493)

	Pre-Rally	Post-Rally	Diff. Means	P-Value (T-Test)
Demographics				
Gender	0.469	0.523	0.054	0.235
Age	31.835	32.899	1.064	0.258
Prev. Turnout	0.685	0.693	0.008	0.855
Voted Uhuru	0.560	0.601	0.041	0.367
Voted Raila	0.099	0.064	-0.035	0.159
Sec. Edu	0.798	0.817	0.019	0.616
Protestant	0.722	0.642	-0.080	0.062
Asset Index	0.620	0.625	0.005	0.815
Ethnicity				
Kalenjin	0.630	0.679	0.049	0.258
Kikuyu	0.121	0.124	0.003	0.921
Luo	0.026	0.023	-0.003	0.847
Luhya	0.165	0.142	-0.023	0.489
Kamba	0.011	0.009	-0.002	0.841
Other	0.048	0.023	-0.025	0.134

either Kenyatta (Kikuyu) or Ruto (Kalenjin), and asset ownership. The only apparent imbalance is in the proportion of respondents identifying as Protestants. The proportion of Protestants is 8 percent-

age points lower in the post-rally sample (64%) in comparison to the pre-rally sample (72%). However, in Kenyan politics, Christian denominational affiliation is not a politically-relevant category.

We also conduct F-tests of joint significance. The p-values for the F-tests consistently fail to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. While we generated these balance statistics using the three-day bandwidth sample, covariate balance remains substantively unchanged for other samples. Despite the lack of imbalance, we include these covariates in some of the regression specifications.

5 Does Cross-Ethnic Campaigning Work?

5.1 The Rally's Effects on Candidate Support

How did the outgroup candidate's rally affect voter evaluations of the two presidential candidates? We first take a descriptive approach to the analysis by graphically presenting daily trends in the evaluations of the outgroup candidate (Odinga) versus ingroup candidate (Kenyatta) before and after the rally in Figure 2.²⁵ This descriptive approach will provide a preliminary but *intuitive* assessment of the idea that there should be discernible changes to the evaluation of ingroup and outgroup candidates induced by the rally. Points in blue and red represent in Figure 2 individual observations in the pre- and post-rally samples, while the blue and red lines are LOESS fits based on these raw data. The area shaded in gray on either side of the blue and red LOESS lines constitute the 95% confidence intervals.

The ten-point drop in Odinga's feeling thermometer after the rally is noticeable in subfigure (a). Conversely, the eight-point increase in Kenya's feeling thermometer ratings is clearly observed in the post-rally sample vis-à-vis the pre-rally sample. Furthermore, these effects do not appear to fade. Odinga's ratings never recover from the immediate post-rally drop, maintaining a mean of 35 throughout the remainder of the data collection period. Kenya's ratings also do not revert back to pre-rally levels, maintaining a mean of 83 until the last day of data collection and just seven days prior to the presidential election.

²⁵These plots, while resembling graphical analyses of regression discontinuity designs (RDD), should not be interpreted to indicate that our analyses satisfy assumptions required for a RDD-based analysis.

Figure 2: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations, by day

Notes: Feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Points represent FT rating for each respondent with jittering to mitigate overlap. LOESS curves for the pre-rally and post-rally samples are presented in blue and red respectively, with 95 percent confidence intervals for each shaded in gray. The opposition rally was held on day 9 of the survey.

Given that the descriptive trends corroborate our intuition, we proceed by applying the empirical approach outlined in our research design section. Figure 3 is a coefficient plot that summarizes the main results of linear regressions with the raw feeling thermometer scores for Odinga, the outgroup candidate, and Kenyatta, the ingroup candidate, as outcome variables. The figure reports the average treatment effects estimated using the full sample of the survey as well as the five and three-day bandwidth sub-samples. We present results with and without a battery of respondent-level controls.

Consistent with the expectations of social identity theory and the ethnic heuristics literature, the results indicate that the rally did not produce its intended effects for the outgroup candidate. A comparison of the pre- and post-rally samples shows that the rally had a *negative* effect on respondent evaluations of Odinga. Across the range of samples and specifications with and without respondent-level controls—represented by the circle and square—there is nearly around a 10 point drop in Odinga’s mean feeling thermometer ratings. These negative changes across model specifica-

Figure 3: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls, and with respondent level controls and ethnicity fixed effects are denoted by the circle, square, and triangle respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

tions are consistently statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. By contrast, the rally benefited the ingroup candidate. Kenyatta's mean feeling thermometer ratings increased between 6 to 8 points according to the same model specifications.²⁶

One concern regarding the findings' validity, given the nature of politics in Kenya, may arise from any imbalance in the proportion of ethnic groups represented in the pre- and post-rally respondent pools. Depending on the bandwidth sample, the ethnic groups that align with Kenyatta (Kalenjin and Kikuyu) were around 3–5 percentage points more likely to be included in the post-rally sample than in the pre-rally sample.²⁷ To rule out the possibility that differences in sample composition are

²⁶These results can be considered intention-to-treat (ITT) effects: they include both people who had knowledge of the rally (for whom we expect the rally to have an effect) as well as those who did not (for whom the rally should not have an effect). Among respondents who learned of the rally, the effects increase in magnitude by around 20%. See Table F1 in the SI Appendix for a discussion of these complier average causal effects (CACE) analysis. The effect of the rally also had spillover effects on down-ballot races. Jackson Mandago, Uasin Gishu's incumbent governor who ran on Kenyatta's Jubilee party ticket, also benefited unexpectedly from the rally. Analysis of the rally's effects on Mandago's support is presented in SI Appendix Table G1

²⁷The imbalance reaches statistical significance at the $P < 0.1$ level in the full sample, but do not reach statistical signif-

driving results, we also run analyses that include respondent ethnicity fixed effects (spanning 15 ethnic categories). The point estimate of the effects from these analyses is denoted as the red triangle in both subplots in Figure 3.

Even with the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects, the rally's negative impact on the outgroup candidate's feeling thermometer persists; the rally leads to a decrease in Odinga's ratings by around eight points. The rally's positive effect for Kenyatta's feeling thermometer (around five points) also retains statistical significance at $p < 0.01$. These results are further corroborated with analysis employing non-parametric matching methods (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013), where we match on all individual-level covariates and match *exactly* on ethnic group membership and religion. These results are reported in Table H1 of the SI Appendix.

Taken together, the regression analyses and graphical presentation indicate that Odinga's rally effectively "backfired" as a form of cross-ethnic campaign outreach, resulting in a decidedly negative shift in voter evaluations for the outgroup candidate. Instead, the rally moved voter opinion in favor of the ingroup candidate. To facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of these findings, we present in Figure 4 the difference in the proportion of individuals who had a *positive* evaluation of Odinga and Kenyatta, a score of 50 or above in their respective feeling thermometers, across the pre-and post-rally samples.²⁸

As subfigure (a) shows, around 35% of voters had a positive evaluation of Odinga in the pre-rally sample. This relatively low proportion of positive evaluations is expected, since Uasin Gishu is a stronghold of the ingroup presidential ticket. In the post-rally sample, however, the proportion of respondents with a positive evaluation drops even further to 22%. This represents a 33% decrease, statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. Subfigure (b) shows the change in the proportion of respondents with a positive evaluation of Kenyatta. In the pre-rally sample, the proportion of respondents with favorable views of Kenyatta was 80%. Despite this high baseline rate, the proportion still rose to 88% in the post-rally sample, a statistically significant increase. This is remarkable, given that the rally

ificance at the 5 day and 3 day bandwidth samples.

²⁸We present the same analysis on alternative operationalization of our outcomes in SI Appendix Table E1. Our main findings hold when we employ these alternative operationalizations.

Figure 4: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations (binary indicator)

Notes: To generate the outcomes for subplots (a) and (b), we recode the feeling thermometer ratings for each candidate into a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when a survey respondents gives a rating of 50 or more; it is 0 otherwise. These differences were calculated based on the full sample of survey respondents. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

took place after months of national campaigning and a time when the standard generalized increase in the salience of ethnicity (a la Eifert, Miguel and Posner (2010)) should have already been baked in.

5.2 Why Does an Outgroup Candidate's Rally Backfire?

We have argued that campaign rallies held by outgroup candidates in non-coethnic constituencies are likely to trigger voter perceptions of inter-group differentiation, thus inducing individual voters to evaluate candidates through an ethnic lens informed by perceptions of inter-ethnic competition. Here, we subject this expectation to a series of empirical tests that examine whether a mechanism associated with increased ethnic identification is borne out by our data. If the expectations of social identification and ethnic heuristics are correct, we should find that voters in the post-rally sample are, first, more likely to support the candidate perceived to represent their ingroup, and, second, more likely to identify themselves in ethnic terms. Again, our hypothesized expectations are above

and beyond any pre-existing heightened salience of ethnicity that is typical of electoral periods in Africa (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010). Since Odinga's rally occurred *several months into the campaign period*, and only about a fortnight from the election, there are few other possibilities to account for an abrupt change in patterns of self-identification among local voters.

Figure 5: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations by ethnic group

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, disaggregated by ethnic group. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls are denoted by the circle, and square respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

In Figure 5, we present results from subgroup analyses that seek to test our first observable implication. We disaggregate the effect of Odinga's rally based on respondents' self-identified ethnicity. If our expectation regarding ethnicity's salience is correct, we should observe that the rally induced respondents to evaluate more favorably the candidate considered to represent their ethnic group, while assessing more unfavorably the candidate thought to represent an outgroup. We expect the rally to have decreased Odinga's support among Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters, and increased his support among his coethnic Luos and the other major ethnic group (Luhya) aligned with his electoral coalition. Similarly, we expect increased support for Kenyatta among Kikuyus and Kalenjins, and

decreased support among Luos and Luhyas.

The analyses in Figure 5 largely corroborate these expectations. We find a large post-rally decrease in Odinga's feeling thermometer ratings among Kalenjin and Kikuyu respondents, the political ingroups in Uasin Gishu. For Kalenjin respondents, the change represents around a 9–10 point reduction. The decrease among Kikuyus is larger at around 14–15 points. These effects are statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. By contrast, the rally consolidated Odinga's support among his coethnic Luos. Odinga's feeling thermometer increased by around 20 points in the post-rally sample, statistically significant at $p < 0.01$, despite the limited number of Luo respondents in the sample. The coefficient for Luhyas, who are part of Odinga's electoral coalition, is positive, but the effect fails to obtain statistical significance.

The evaluations for Kenyatta move in opposite directions. Odinga's rally seems to have conversely led to a 6–8 point increase in Kenyatta's feeling thermometer ratings among Kalenjin and Kikuyu respondents. This increase is statistically significant at conventional levels. The effect of the rally on evaluations of Kenyatta among Luos and Luhyas, by contrast, are negative. For Odinga's coethnic Luos, the rally led to a 14 point decrease in their feeling thermometer ratings for Kenyatta. While this change is substantively large, the drop is only marginally significant at $p < 0.1$, and loses significance when respondent-level covariates are included. For Luhyas, the effects are negative, albeit not statistically distinguishable from zero.²⁹

Table 4 provides further evidence that the rally increased the salience of ethnicity among respondents. Here we use a dichotomous indicator based on the five-point ordinal variable for ethnic versus national identification. The indicator takes the value of 1 when a respondent reports that they identify only with Kenyan nationality; 0 otherwise. We prefer this dichotomous measure because social desirability bias in Kenya should be expected to push respondents to under-report the extent to which they identify with their own ethnic groups. In the full sample, more than 47% of respondents report only identifying as Kenyan and not at all with their ethnic group.³⁰ With such a large proportion of individ-

²⁹We conducted the same analysis (disaggregated by ethnic group) on the alternative operationalization of our outcome. The findings are presented in SI Appendix Table I1. The results remain substantively unchanged.

³⁰The ethnic patterns of identification in Table 4 are largely in line with our findings from six rounds of Afrobarometer surveys (see SI Appendix Section J).

Table 4: Increase in ethnic identification by ethnic group

	National versus ethnic identification				
	Full Sample	“Identify only as a Kenyan”			
	(1)	Kalenjins (2)	Kikuyus (3)	Luos (4)	Luhyas (5)
Post Rally	−0.08 (0.03)	−0.09 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.09)	0.02 (0.18)	−0.05 (0.08)
Constant	0.50 (0.08)	0.48 (0.09)	0.72 (0.23)	0.43 (0.33)	0.50 (0.15)
Observations	1,356	875	153	51	203

^a Notes: Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on respondent national/ethnic identification. The national/ethnic identification item was modeled after the Afrobarometer surveys, wherein respondents are asked, whether they identify i) exclusively on ethnic terms, ii) more on ethnic terms than national terms, iii) equally on ethnic and national terms, iv) more on national than ethnic terms, and v) exclusively on national terms. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

uals claiming that they only view themselves in national terms, the best way to capture any changes away from national identification is by examining the *decrease* in the proportion of individuals who identify exclusively as Kenyans.

Employing this dichotomous measure of national identification as our outcome, we conduct the same pre-and-post rally sample comparisons. The results show that individuals surveyed after Odinga’s rally are around eight percentage points less likely to identify exclusively as Kenyans and, conversely, eight percentage points more likely to identify at least partially in ethnic terms. While disaggregating the sample into separate ethnic groups reduces statistical power, we still observe large and substantively important movement towards greater ethnic identification among Kalenjin respondents with a seven-point reduction, significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Overall, these additional tests add confidence to our conclusion that Odinga’s rally backfired, and depressed his support among non-coethnics voters after the rally.

6 Threats to Inference and Alternative Explanations

We presented in Section 4 an argument and some empirical tests to verify that our approach meets the identifying assumptions required to estimate the causal effect of the cross-ethnic campaign rally (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). In this section, we address additional concerns regarding potential threats to inference and alternative explanations.

6.1 Simultaneous and Collateral Events

One concern for inference is that other unrelated events, rather than the rally, affected the evaluation of the candidates. Although we are not able to provide conclusive evidence against this possibility, two observations assuage this concern. First, as part of the survey’s implementation, the on-site project manager and survey enumerators were instructed to report back on all unusual political or campaign activities as they undertook the random walk survey protocol modeled after the Afrobarometer. Referencing communication logs with the enumerator team and the project manager, we find no evidence of increased campaign activity that coincided with Odinga’s rally and would have thus affected our main outcomes. Second, in order to account for the possibility that national events affected candidate evaluations in Uasin Gishu county, we conducted a comprehensive news search of three major national news papers (The Nation, The Standard, and The Star), as well as the online social media accounts (Twitter and Facebook) of the Jubilee and NASA coalitions and their constituent parties. We were unable to detect any unusual activity that would induce such a large shift in support levels for Odinga and Kenyatta in Uasin Gishu.³¹

Additionally, there might be concern that the voter shifts we identify are not due to the rally itself, but rather to a series of counter-reactions triggered by the rally. This would entail the mobilization of a counter-campaign by Jubilee party activists responding to Odinga’s foray into Uasin Gishu. We provide two observations against this interpretation of our findings. First, as noted above, our team of enumerators sent hourly reports on any unexpected political activity in their designated survey areas. None reported any counter-campaign activity by Kenyatta’s Jubilee Party in their respective

³¹Articles were accessed through AllAfrica.com, as well as the respective newspaper outlet websites.

enumeration areas in the days following the rally. Second, we report in the SI Appendix K, Figure L1 an analysis of a rally held by the Jubilee Party in the neighboring county of Trans Nzoia, a “swing” county that is dominated by Luhyas, a group that was not ethnically connected to any of the leading candidates in the Jubilee (Kikuyu/Kalenjin) or NASA (Luo/Kamba) tickets. In this case, we find that Kenyatta’s rally resulted in a small positive effect in his support, which is what the rally was intended to produce. If one candidate’s rally would typically trigger a counter-mobilization by the other’s party, we find no such evidence in Trans Nzoia. And there is no reason to expect that a counter-mobilization effort would have such dramatic effects in Uasin Gishu and not in Trans Nzoia.

To further corroborate the fact that the effects we observe are uniquely attributable to the rally itself, we conduct a series of robustness checks in which we employ placebo treatments; i.e. recode the date of the rally to each day of the survey enumeration period. The results are reported in the SI Appendix Figure K1. The placebo treatments are not able to pick up the effect of the rally, and suggests that neither the cancellation of the initially scheduled rally or events occurring prior to the actual rally are causes in the shift in candidate evaluation.³²

6.2 Endogenous Timing of Rally

As noted above, Odinga’s rally took place while our survey was already in the field for an unrelated project. The timing of the rally was thus exogenous to our survey schedule. Here, we provide additional evidence suggesting that voter engagement and interest across Kenya was triggered by the rally. Figure 6 plots the count of Google web and Youtube searches for the term “NASA Eldoret” during the entire fieldwork period of our locally-representative survey. The red lines and points represent searches in Youtube (www.youtube.com), and the blue lines and points web searches in Google (www.google.com).³³

The search trends also provide partial corroboration for our claim that the original rally scheduling/cancellation (21 July) as well as the subsequent occurrence of the rally (to 26 July) were unexpected events. Across the entire survey period, the biggest spike in web (Google) searches happens on 26 July,

³²A more detailed discussion of these results accompanies Figure K1 in the SI Appendix.

³³We do not have sufficient data to disaggregate down to Uasin Gishu.

Figure 6: Rally-related searches using Google Trends data from Kenya

the day of the rally. A small number of searches preceded the rally – likely attributable to the rally being cancelled on 21 July and the ensuing press coverage of the cancellation. Youtube search trends follow a similar pattern, albeit with a slight (one day) delay in the spike. This delay is reasonable given that much of the national news coverage, especially television coverage, occurred on the day following the rally (27 July).

6.3 Robustness to Unobserved Confounding

Despite the resilience of the rally effects to potential *observed* confounders (including ethnicity), one might still be concerned that our results are driven by selection on *unobservables*. To alleviate this concern, we employ a coefficient stability-based sensitivity analysis proposed by [Oster \(2017\)](#) to estimate the level of unobserved confounding that would lead us to mistakenly detect a statistically significant effect when the true average treatment effect is zero. This analysis takes as an input the R^2 of a hypothetical linear regression on our outcome that includes our treatment variable (post-rally), observables (age, gender, vote in previous election, secondary education, asset ownership, religion, and ethnicity), and unobservables. For each value of R^2 , we calculate the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that could be driving our estimate, given that the true effect for

Figure 7: Coefficient stability to unobserved confounding

the rally is zero.

The results of these analyses are presented in Figure 7. The blue line shows that – for R^2 values between 0.3 and 0.7 needed to mistakenly detect an 8.16 point decrease on Odinga’s feeling thermometer as a result of the rally when the true effect is zero – individuals would need to be selecting into the post-rally sample (treatment) on the basis of unobserved attributes that are 1.6 times to 13 times more influential than the combined effect of observables. Similarly, the red line shows that for the same R^2 range the unobserved attributes that drove selection into treatment should be 1.5 times to 19 times stronger than the observables driving selection if we were to spuriously detect a 5.47 point increase on Kenyatta’s feeling thermometer when the true effect is zero. Given the set of observables we include in the analysis, we conclude that the omission of an unobservable of such importance is unrealistic. It is only when we assume extreme R^2 values of 0.97 and 0.92 for Odinga and Kenyatta, respectively, that unobservables that are equally important vis-à-vis observables in driving selection into treatment could lead us to mistakenly detect statistically significant effects when the true effects

are zero. We find such extreme values of R^2 highly unlikely given the existence of measurement error and idiosyncratic variation in survey outcomes.

7 Conclusion

Following the advice of scholars and policymakers, many countries have adopted electoral rules to mitigate the negative effects of identity politics. For example, since the 1950s, the share of presidential systems with absolute majority rules have increased from 6% to 65%. Other countries have specific spatial distributional rules, requiring candidates to demonstrate support across different geographic regions. These rules incentivize politicians to craft inclusive national electoral majorities by campaigning outside of their core identity-based constituencies, including among their opponents' core supporters. We find that, in a context of high ethnic polarization, campaigning in an opponent's core ethnic region can backfire and suppress support. The data show that a likely mechanism is that such campaigns prime voters to evaluate candidates on the basis of ethnicity, the very outcome that electoral rules designed to incentivize cross-ethnic mobilization aim to prevent.

Our findings highlight the limits of institutional design in addressing the undesirable effects of identity-based politics in polarized societies. We show that once political polarization along specific identity cleavages emerge, attempts at cross-cleavage outreach – including when incentivized by institutional design – may reinforce perceptions of zero-sum inter-group competition. These findings call for more research on how voters respond to institutions and rules meant to foster cross-identity political mobilization in polarized societies. How do elite incentives for cross-identity alliance building interact with voters' micro-level electoral behavior predicated on zero-sum inter-group competition and reinforced by historical experience? How does institutional design impact party development among voters in deeply divided societies? And under what conditions can elite cues result in voters' support for non-coethnics?

Beyond Kenya, our findings have implications for other multi-ethnic electoral democracies in Africa where cross-ethnic campaigning is common. For example, in 2016 Ghana's John Mahama cam-

paigned in Ashanti Region, the ‘the electoral bank of the opposition New Patriotic Party.’³⁴ In Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari campaigned in Nigeria’s South-East region, a stronghold of his opponent, Goodluck Jonathan, during the 2019 election.³⁵ Similarly in Liberia, George Weah campaigned in Lofa County, his opponent’s stronghold, in 2017.³⁶ These examples call for more research on how electoral rules designed to encourage cross-ethnic political mobilization in diverse societies impact perceptions of candidates and individual voting behavior.

³⁴“NDC will win 13 Parliamentary seats in Ashanti region, Pres. Mahama,” *MyJoyOnline.Com*, November 6, 2016

³⁵“Elections: Buhari gets key endorsements in South-east” *Premium Times*, January 30, 2019

³⁶“Liberia: Lofa Endorses Weah,” *The New Dawn*, September 19, 2017

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Supporting Information (SI)

Do Voters Respond to Cross-Ethnic Campaigning in Divided Societies?

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A The Political Context in Kenya

Kenya's current electoral rules were adopted with the express purpose of engineering cross-ethnic political mobilization.¹ The constitution has both a majority rule and distributional requirement. The winning presidential candidate must garner at least 50 percent plus one of the valid votes cast, and get at least 25 percent of the votes in at least half of the 47 counties.

Therefore, the electoral rules create strong incentives for presidential candidates to reach out to ethnic outgroups. While ethnicity remains to be an important principle of organizing politics in the country, no single ethnic group has the capacity to win elections outright. The five largest ethnic groups are Kikuyu (17.7 percent), Luhya (14.2 percent), Kalenjin (13.3 percent), Luo (10.8 percent), and Kamba (10.4 percent). Since independence Kenya has had three Kikuyu presidents and one Kalenjin president. All four administrations have been characterized by ethnic discrimination in the provision of public goods and services, access to public sector jobs, and general oppression of perceived oppositionist ethnic groups. This experience is colloquially described in Kenya as part of "historical injustices" committed by successive administrations.² Following the reintroduction of multiparty electoral politics in 1992, all elections have been marked by electoral violence and high levels of ethnic voting – especially among the biggest ethnic groups.

The current electoral rules requiring cross-ethnic political mobilization and outreach were adopted in the aftermath of widespread violence in parts of the country following a disputed election in 2007. The goal of the majority rule was to encourage to form nationally competitive parties by campaigning among ethnic outgroups. And it appears to have worked. In both 2013 and 2017 Kenyan presidential elections were dominated by two leading coalitions – one headed by Raila Odinga (CORD then NASA) and the other by Kenyatta (Jubilee). CORD and later NASA were dominated by Luo, Luhya, and Kamba elites and their constituents. The formateurs of the Jubilee coalition were Kalenjin and Kikuyu elites.

For both coalitions, the dominant groups could not on their own satisfy both the majority rule (50 percent plus one) and the distributional requirement (at least 25 percent in at least 24 counties) stipulated in the constitution. Therefore, the respective presidential candidates had to campaign among ethnic outgroups.

It is in this context that Raila Odinga headlined NASA's campaign rally on July 26, 2017 in Eldoret's 64 Stadium in Uasin Gishu county, a majority Kalenjin county and a jubilee stronghold. The rally was an explicit attempt by NASA to woo Kalenjin voters to support its presidential candidate. While Odinga may not have been able to win the county, campaigning among ethnic outgroups in Uasin Gishu could add to his total tally of votes, as well as give him more cushion with regard to the constitution's distributional requirement (he eventually missed the 25 percent threshold by just over 3 percentage points). In this quest, the party highlighted traditional economic messages – especially focusing on agriculture and Jubilee's alleged neglect of the sector, since Uasin Gishu is the main maize producing region of Kenya.³

¹See Ndegwa, Stephen N. 1998. "The Incomplete Transition: The Constitutional and Electoral Context in Kenya," *Africa Today*, Vol. 45, No. 2 pp. 193-211; and Kenya Human Rights Commission (2018): Ethnicity and Politicization in Kenya: <https://short1.link/HYrBGs>

²Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (2018), Towards National Cohesion and Unity in Kenya: Ethnic Diversity and Audit of the Civil Service. Accessed on February 10, 2019: <https://bit.ly/2WVQ1P8>. See also Ajulu, Rok. 2002. "Politicised ethnicity, competitive politics and conflict in Kenya: A historical perspective." *African Studies* 61(2):251–268

³Rutto, Stephen. 2017. "Raila Woos Ruto's North Rift Backyard, Says Maize Shortage Shows Jubilee Failure," *The Star*,

Overall, NASA's rally is an important example of how institutions and electoral rules can condition the behavior of politicians and parties in ethnically polarized societies. However, it is also a cautionary tale on the limits of institutional design as a mechanism of ameliorating the negative effects of political ethnicity. Ultimately, the attempt to reach out to an outgroup electorate backfired by activating identity-based categorization and evaluation of politicians among voters.

B Research Ethics

This paper examines a much-studied feature of Kenyan politics. However, we acknowledge that political ethnicity and ethnic polarization have often resulted in violence and destruction, especially around elections. Our study took care to assure each individual participant that they were at liberty to stop responding to questions at any point in the survey.

Our enumerators obtained participants' informed consent by reading out loud a consent request, either in English or Swahili (Kenya's two national languages). Enumerators presented a consented document to potential respondents to ascertain eligibility (18-years or older) and consent (verbal agreement). Participating respondents were given copies of consent forms with contact information for the research teams. The consent request included a summary of the purpose of our study, procedure, time commitment, benefits, potential risks or discomforts with survey questions, confidentiality, compensation (50s shillings of airtime), participants rights, the researchers involved, and our contact information. Prior to deployment, we recruited and trained our enumerators on how to elicit consent from respondents. One co-author was in the field during the implementation of the survey, and worked with a supervisor to ensure that our enumerators stuck to the protocols established. We held daily briefing sessions in the mornings before enumerators were dispatched.

There was no deception involved in this study. We primed voters with publicly available information on the performance of their county government. The survey instrument had two main parts. Part I presented respondents with questions on basic demographics, public issues, political party preferences, and candidate preferences. The "Treatment Script" was considered experimental because respondents were randomly selected to hear different versions of the following dimensions: (a) whether the allocated funds are based on a formula or political negotiation; (b) whether allocated funds for development projects met legal thresholds (good news) or allocated funds for development were not fully spent (bad news) or no news about how those funds were spent; and (c) the name of the county governor, his political party and which presidential candidate he/she supports. After completing Part I of the survey, respondents were asked to watch a three-minute video on the electronic tablets about the state of their county's use of public funds. Respondents were given the option not to watch the video. In the video, a narrator's voice read a "Treatment Script." The script described the role of county governments in managing funds for public services under the new Kenyan constitution as well as how the county's current government has allocated funds.

All information presented in the video was factual and publicly available. The information on county funds was from official government audit reports. The names and party affiliations of county governors were publicly available. Respondents saw images in the video that corresponded to the text in the "Treatment Script," including figures for the funds used in their county and a photo of their county governor. At the end of each survey, participants were given 50 shillings worth of phone

airtime (approx. \$0.50) as an appreciation of their time. The participant pool was diverse, was largely representative of the ethnic composition of Uasin Gishu county.

The outcomes of interest in this paper were measured prior to the implementation of the experimental intervention in our original study.

Our study did not have any bearing on actual political outcomes. We focused on the gubernatorial race Uasin Gishu, in which the incumbent had garnered 74.8% of the vote share in the 2013 election and was running for reelection. We provided respondents with publicly available information as a prime, and our sample size of 1,400 was not large enough to sway the electoral outcome. We asked questions that were not designed to instigate cross-ethnic antagonism in Uasin Gishu county. Questions about ethnicity, partisan affiliation, and intended vote choice are common in survey work in Kenya, and have not been known to cause harm to respondents. Similar surveys have been conducted throughout Kenya, in both ethnically homogeneous and diverse contexts. Our original study in Uasin Gishu was designed to study attribution and accountability under devolved government in Kenya, and included fact-based questions about the performance of county governors. The study targeted adults of voting age (over 18) and did not include any vulnerable populations or ask questions that would introduce or expose participants' vulnerability. Our chosen sampling protocol did not disadvantage any groups in Uasin Gishu. Finally, in addition to our own attention to research ethics, our study was formally approved by a university Institutional Review Board and the Government of Kenya's National Commission For Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).

C Survey Fieldwork Methodology

NASA's rally in Uasin Gishu coincided with our pre-planned and unrelated field survey of voters in the county. The original rally was scheduled to take place before our survey went live in the field, but had to be suspended twice following the death of senior politicians in the region.¹ The rally is therefore a plausible natural experiment that allows us to identify the causal effect of a campaign rally by an outgroup politician in an opponent's (geographic) stronghold.

A distinct advantage of our study over other works that use a similar identification strategy is that we have complete information regarding how the survey was conducted in Uasin Gishu county. Our survey is locally representative in the county. Many nationally-representative surveys follow a sampling and data collection strategy is geographically clustered; where enumerators and enumeration teams concentrate on collecting data from one geographical unit (say a constituency) at a time and only proceeds to the next geographical unit once the quota for the first unit has been met. This can pose a significant threat to inference if, for example, geographic units sampled before and after an event (in our case, the rally) systematically differ on a variety of characteristics, both observed and unobserved.

We argue that the fact that our survey is a locally representative county level survey, rather than a national survey, certainly decreases the potential that there is significant heterogeneity in the sample composition on multiple covariates based on fieldwork schedule. But in order to mitigate these concerns even further, we deliberately adopted a survey sampling/data collection approach made sure that our enumeration team, comprised of 12 enumerators, *simultaneously* engaged in data collection across different sampling areas dispersed across multiple geographic units (in our case the

¹Ndanyai, Matthew. 2017. "NASA cancels Rift Valley rallies to mourn Biwott, Bethuel Kiplagat," *The Star*, July 22, 2017. Accessed on February 10, 2019: <https://bit.ly/2GBZ55F>

Figure B1: Map of Uasin Gishu county and sampled geographic units

constituency). At any given time throughout the data collection period, enumerators were spread across at least three (and often more than 3) different constituencies. Within their assigned sampling areas, an enumerators were instructed to identify a specific sampling point and then administer a random-walk household sampling protocol modeled off the Afrobarometer surveys. The design of the survey methodology mitigates concern that by comparing the pre-and post-rally samples, we are not comparing geographic units that are systematically different on observable and unobservable characteristics (as the balance tests conducted on the pre and post samples, reported in Table 3 demonstrate). Overall, we have no reason to believe that there are any systematic patterns in the field implementation of the survey that could challenge our research design.

D Rally-related statistics

Rally awareness and attendance by ethnic group

Table C1 presents the proportion of survey respondents who reported they had i) knowledge of the rally being held, ii) personally attended the rally, or iii) an acquaintance attend the rally, broken down by the respondent's ethnic group. Although the differences in the proportion of individuals who had knowledge of the rally being held are relatively slight, the proportion of individuals who report having attended the rally differ significantly across ethnic groups; whereas 45% of ethnic Luos (coethnics of Raila Odinga) report having attended the rally, a mere 13% and 8% of respondents who identified as Kalenjin and Kikuyu (ethnic coalition behind Uhuru Kenyatta) said they attended.

Table C1: Rally-related statistics by ethnic group

	Kalenjin	Kikuyu	Luo	Luhya
Knowledge of rally	81.4%	91.4%	100.0%	77.5%
Personally attended rally	13.1%	8.9%	45.5%	22.4%
Acquaintance attended rally	26.8%	30.4%	81.8%	40.8%

These figures add confidence to an important assumption in our empirical set up: that a sizable majority of residents of Uasin Gishu were broadly aware of the campaign rally and the presence of an outgroup presidential candidate in their county – in the person of Raila Odinga. It is also clear from the Table C1 that attendance of the rally was strongly correlated with co-ethnicity with elites in the opposition NASA coalition. Only 13.9 percent and 2.2 percent of Kalanjins and Kikuyus, respectively, attended the rally; compared to 45.5 and 22.4 percent of Luos and Luhyas surveyed.

Correlates of rally awareness and attendance

Table C2 reports findings from regression analyses that probe the correlates of rally awareness and attendance. Controlling for a host of respondent-level covariates, respondents from the Luo group are 26.3% points more likely to have personally attended the rally, and 41.3% points more likely to have a personal acquaintance attend. Such differences in ethnic group membership are, again, not observed for awareness of the rally. In other words, the rally was broadly known to have taken place independent of ethnic identity – here proxied by being Luo or Luhya, the major co-ethnics of leading elites in NASA. Access to media in the form of a TV and having had some secondary education are positively correlated with rally awareness, suggesting that most respondents learned of the rally through the mass media – especially television and newspapers. Ownership of a radio (which is widespread among most Kenyan households) is not statistically correlated with awareness of the NASA rally.

The broad awareness of the rally is also an indicator of the importance of political rallies in African electoral campaigns; and adds credence to our claim of the importance of interrogating the causal impacts of these forms of outreach to voters. In Kenya and across much of Africa, mass rallies are an important way to reach voters – often providing politicians with opportunities to showcase their ability to provide clientelistic benefits, such as through the distribution of material benefits (e.g. t-shirts, *chitenge*, foodstuffs).¹

¹See, for example, Worden, Sarah. 2014. “Chitenje: The Production and Use of Printed Cotton Cloth in Malawi,” *Textile Society of America Symposium Proceedings*. Available here: <https://bit.ly/2th0qXV>; and Guardado, Jenny and Leonard Wantchekon. 2017. “Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior?” *Afrobarometer Working Paper, No. 171*. Available here: <https://bit.ly/2GGWibL>

Table C2: Correlates of rally awareness and attendance

	Awareness of rally	Personally attended	Acquaint. attended
Ethnic Luo	0.058 (0.109)	0.263 (0.106)	0.413 (0.135)
Ethnic Luhya	−0.064 (0.054)	0.100 (0.053)	0.107 (0.067)
Age	−0.006 (0.002)	0.0001 (0.002)	−0.006 (0.003)
Prior turnout	0.064 (0.044)	−0.019 (0.043)	0.019 (0.054)
Secondary education	0.167 (0.058)	0.097 (0.057)	0.036 (0.072)
Protestant	−0.005 (0.037)	0.004 (0.036)	0.061 (0.046)
Owns radio	0.101 (0.065)	0.055 (0.063)	0.089 (0.080)
Owns TV	0.097 (0.045)	0.071 (0.044)	0.137 (0.055)
Owns motor vehicle	−0.001 (0.044)	−0.003 (0.043)	−0.055 (0.054)
Owns mobile phone	0.100 (0.065)	−0.056 (0.064)	−0.046 (0.081)
Owns bicycle	0.032 (0.038)	0.113 (0.037)	0.186 (0.047)
Constant	0.609 (0.113)	−0.035 (0.110)	0.215 (0.139)
Observations	421	421	421
R ²	0.181	0.084	0.141

^a Notes: Robust standard errors (SEs) from linear regression analysis in parentheses.

E The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer ratings

In this section we show results from estimates of voters' evaluations of presidential candidates after exposure to the rally in different bandwidths. We show the results in Table D1. The results in Table D1 were used to generate Figure 3. Regardless of the choice of bandwidth (full sample, vs 5 days, vs 3 days), NASA's campaign rally in Uasin Gishu appears to have had a statistically significant and consistently negative impact on Odinga's candidate feeling thermometer ratings. Conversely, the rally seems to have had a statistically significant positive impact on Kenyatta's candidate feeling thermometer ratings regardless of bandwidth selection. These findings further reinforce our confidence in the stability of the causal effect of NASA's rally.

Table D1: Effect of rally on evaluations of presidential candidates

Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga (outgroup candidate)									
Panel A.	Full Sample			5 Day Bandwidth			3 Day Bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	-10.48 (1.73)	-10.31 (1.74)	-7.87 (1.54)	-9.41 (2.05)	-9.15 (2.09)	-8.65 (1.83)	-9.47 (2.74)	-8.93 (2.77)	-7.50 (2.39)
Constant	45.39 (0.97)	45.74 (3.96)	31.41 (4.11)	44.36 (1.30)	48.80 (5.15)	35.52 (5.35)	44.91 (1.83)	52.53 (7.00)	34.74 (7.07)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,356	1,352	1,352	884	880	880	492	490	490
R ²	0.03	0.04	0.26	0.02	0.04	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.31
Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta (ingroup candidate)									
Panel B.	Full Sample			5 Day Bandwidth			3 Day Bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	7.86 (1.41)	7.37 (1.43)	5.37 (1.24)	6.12 (1.64)	5.43 (1.66)	4.90 (1.44)	5.92 (2.18)	5.25 (2.17)	4.29 (1.86)
Constant	75.35 (0.79)	72.87 (3.24)	82.18 (3.31)	77.14 (1.03)	73.59 (4.10)	83.31 (4.21)	76.41 (1.46)	66.78 (5.49)	83.31 (5.51)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,357	1,353	1,353	884	880	880	492	490	490
R ²	0.02	0.04	0.28	0.02	0.04	0.29	0.01	0.07	0.34

^a Notes: Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership from a list of 15 groups. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

F The effect of the opposition rally on alternative outcomes

In this section we employ different operationalizations of the effect of the campaign rally on the evaluations of the two leading presidential candidates – incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga. We also show point estimates of the effects of the campaign rally using different bandwidths (full sample, vs 5 days, vs 3 days).

Outcome: Evaluation gap between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga

Next, we operationalize the outcome variable as the gap in respondents' evaluation of incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition candidate Raila Odinga. We then estimate the effect of NASA's campaign rally using different bandwidths (i.e. the full sample, 5 days, and 3 days). We show the results in Table E1. Regardless of the bandwidth selection, the campaign rally appears to have had a consistent positive effect in the gap between the evaluations of Kenyatta and Odinga in the candidate feeling thermometer ratings. The gap in the ratings of Kenyatta and Odinga are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls and ethnicity fixed effects.

Table E1: Effect of rally on evaluations of presidential candidates

	Evaluation Gap between Kenyatta and Odinga (FT Kenyatta – FT Odinga)								
	Full Sample			5 day bandwidth			3 day bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	18.29 (2.72)	17.62 (2.75)	13.22 (2.29)	15.55 (3.22)	14.58 (3.28)	13.55 (2.72)	15.39 (4.36)	14.18 (4.37)	11.79 (3.56)
Constant	30.03 (1.52)	27.20 (6.24)	50.91 (6.10)	32.81 (2.04)	24.91 (8.09)	47.91 (7.93)	31.50 (2.91)	14.25 (11.05)	48.57 (10.54)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,354	1,350	1,350	883	879	879	492	490	490
R ²	0.03	0.04	0.35	0.03	0.04	0.36	0.02	0.06	0.40

^a Notes: Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

G Complier average causal effect (CACE)

Table F1: Complier average causal effect of the rally

Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga			
	Full Sample	5 day bandwidth	3 day bandwidth
Post Rally	−12.73 (2.13)	−11.61 (2.57)	−11.34 (3.32)
Constant	45.39 (0.98)	44.36 (1.32)	44.91 (1.85)
Covariates	No	No	No
Observations	1,356	884	492
Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta			
	Full Sample	5 day bandwidth	3 day bandwidth
Post Rally	9.55 (1.73)	7.55 (2.03)	7.08 (2.62)
Constant	75.35 (0.79)	77.14 (1.04)	76.41 (1.46)
Covariates	No	No	No
Observations	1,357	884	492

Estimated complier average causal effects (CACEs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers. Complier effects are calculated by using the post-rally indicator variable as an instrument for awareness of the rally. Results reported are from two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Standard errors (SEs) in parentheses.

Another concern that may emerge from the preceding analyses is that the intention-to-treat (ITT) approach we adopt also includes survey respondents who reported having no knowledge of the opposition rally in the analyses. Although the ITT approach still provides us with valid estimates of the average treatment effect, since we are interested in how presidential candidate evaluations in Uasin Gishu changed in response to Odinga’s rally, the inclusion of these non-compliers may prevent us from estimating the quantity of interest to us. We therefore conduct additional analyses to estimate the effect of the opposition rally on the subsample of “compliers,” or respondents who reported having knowledge that the rally was held.

We specifically estimate the complier average causal effects (CACEs) using the standard instrumental variables approach in which we use the *assignment to treatment* status – the post-rally indicator – as an instrument for *actual treatment receipt* – a dummy variable that denotes whether a respondent was aware of the rally. Results from the 2SLS regression are reported in SI Appendix Table F1. The

results are consistent with our main findings: Odinga's rally had a negative effect on his own feeling thermometer ratings and a positive effect on Kenyatta's ratings. The CACEs reported are larger in magnitude than the ITT effects reported in Figure 3 by around 10–20%, meaning that the inclusion of noncompliers in the ITT analyses did, in fact, dilute the impact of the rally.

H Effect of opposition rally on down-ballot candidates

Kenya's 2017 General Election included gubernatorial elections. In Uasin Gishu county, incumbent governor Jackson Mandago – allied to Kenyatta's Jubilee coalition – was up for reelection against challenger Zedekiah Kiprop Bundotich, an independent candidate. We estimate the rally's effect on the candidate feeling thermometer ratings of Jackson Mandago (incumbent) using different bandwidths (full sample, 5 days, and 3 days).

Pooled effects

Table G1: Effect of rally on down-ballot candidates (gubernatorial)

	Feeling thermometer for incumbent governor Jackson Mandago)								
	Full Sample			5 day bandwidth			3 day bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post Rally	6.99 (1.86)	6.95 (1.88)	5.94 (1.72)	6.18 (2.19)	6.04 (2.23)	5.44 (2.07)	2.00 (2.90)	2.04 (2.90)	0.61 (2.68)
Constant	61.34 (1.04)	55.35 (4.28)	29.82 (4.58)	63.45 (1.39)	52.60 (5.49)	30.65 (6.04)	64.85 (1.93)	49.70 (7.32)	39.69 (7.95)
Covariates	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	1,357	1,353	1,353	883	879	879	493	491	491
R ²	0.01	0.02	0.20	0.01	0.03	0.18	0.001	0.04	0.21

^a *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for the incumbent governor Jackson Mandago, who was the gubernatorial candidate for the incumbent Jubilee party. Respondent-level covariates included in some specifications are respondent age, vote in the previous election, secondary education, religion, and the asset ownership index. For ethnicity fixed effects, we take responses from the self-reported measure of ethnic group membership. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

Table G1 shows results for the pooled sample using different bandwidths. We find that NASA's rally had a positive and statistically significant effect on the ratings of Governor Mandago in the full sample and the sample that includes a bandwidth of 5 days. However, using a 3 day bandwidth, we find that the effect of the rally on Mandago's rating is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The findings in columns 1-6 are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls and ethnicity fixed effects. The failure to detect any effects within the 3 day window might suggest that NASA's rally was initially primarily viewed in terms of the presidential election (NASA had no viable candidate in the gubernatorial race).

I Robustness check: Matching analysis

In addition to the regression-based analysis presented, we conduct robustness checks of the findings using Genetic Matching, developed by [Diamond and Sekhon \(2013\)](#).¹ In line with the approach employed in the regression analyses, we match on individual covariates (respondent age, prior turnout, secondary education, and the asset ownership index). We also match *exactly* on the self-reported religion and ethnicity of the respondent. Although pre and post matching balance statistics are not reported, the matching procedure successfully corrects the minor covariate imbalances in pre and post-rally samples.

Table H1: Effect of rally, Genetic Matching

	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Raila Odinga		
	Full Sample	5 Day Bandwidth	3 Day Bandwidth
Estimate (ATT)	−10.584	−8.495	−7.382
AI SE	(1.970)	(2.438)	(2.912)
P-Value	p<0.001	p<0.001	p=0.011
Observations	920	637	333
	Outcome: Feeling thermometer for Uhuru Kenyatta		
	Full Sample	5 Day Bandwidth	3 Day Bandwidth
Estimate (ATT)	5.9358	4.0186	5.473
AI SE	(1.408)	(1.776)	(2.088)
P-Value	p<0.001	p=0.023	p=0.009
Observations	920	637	333

^a Notes: Estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from matching analysis of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. Matching was conducted using the R package Matching developed by [Diamond and Sekhon \(2013\)](#). Abadie-Imbens standard errors (SEs) which account for the asymptotic variance induced by the matching procedure reported in parentheses.

The findings from the matching analysis strongly corroborate the regression analyses. In the full sample, the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the rally is around -10 points for Raila Odinga's feeling thermometer rating, which is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$. As we narrow the bandwidth to 5 and 3 days before and after the rally, the ATTs decrease marginally, but retain their statistical significance at conventional levels. Similar patterns are observed for the ATTs for evaluations of Uhuru Kenyatta, which oscillates between 4 and 6 points depending on the sample analyzed.

¹The matching procedure was implemented using the R package Matching.

J Alternative tests of the mechanism

In this section we dig deeper into the analysis of the rally's impact on respondents' evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, again disaggregated by ethnic group.

Outcome 1: Evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, by ethnic group

Table I1: Effect of rally on evaluation gap between Kenyatta and Odinga, disaggregated by ethnic group

	Evaluation Gap between Kenyatta and Odinga (FT Kenyatta – FT Odinga)							
	Kalenjins		Kikuyus		Luos		Luhya	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post Rally	18.05 (2.53)	17.35 (2.54)	18.30 (5.61)	19.28 (5.64)	−34.90 (10.52)	−28.21 (10.79)	−7.96 (8.44)	−6.14 (8.71)
Constant	42.57 (1.46)	36.19 (6.60)	49.38 (3.40)	49.31 (15.35)	−26.92 (4.94)	−2.79 (19.65)	−7.55 (4.14)	10.51 (15.51)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	873	870	153	153	50	50	204	203
R ²	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.19	0.34	0.004	0.04

^a *Notes:* Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on candidate feeling thermometers for Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta, disaggregated by ethnic group of respondent. Respondent ethnic group is coded based on a self-reported ethnic affiliation question included in the survey. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression in parentheses.

The results in Table I1 largely conform to the findings above. After the rally, Kalenjins and Kikuyus had, on average, higher levels of ratings for Kenyatta and lower levels of ratings for Odinga. In short, the gap widened. Similarly, for Luos and Luhyas, after the rally respondents who self-identified as members of these ethnic groups had consistently higher levels of ratings for Odinga and lower levels for Kenyatta. Like in the examples above, these findings are robust to the inclusion of covariates as controls.

Outcome 2: Party feeling thermometers, by ethnic group

As we noted above, the Kenyan political terrain is marked by a close overlap between ethnicity and party affiliation. In the 2017 election, ethnic Kalenjins and Kikuyus were largely associated with the Jubilee Party; while ethnic Luos and Luhyas were allied with NASA. We have also shown above that an important mechanism through which the rally reduced support for Odinga while boosting the same for Kenyatta was through an increase in the salience of ethnicity. Given the close association of ethnicity with political affiliation in Kenya, we also posit that the increase in the salience of ethnicity was marked by an increase in perceived affiliation with parties and coalitions associated with co-ethnic presidential candidates and elites. Knowing the Kenyan context, we are confident that party affiliation did not condition ethnicity. The Jubilee Coalition bringing together Kalenjin and Kikuyu

elites was formed in 2013, while the Jubilee Party was formally launched on September 8, 2016.¹ The National Super Alliance (which grew out of the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy [CORD]) only congealed in December 2016 and was formally launched in January of 2017.

Table I2: Mechanism: Increase in party feeling thermometer by ethnic group

	Party Feeling Thermometer				
	Full Sample	Kalenjins	Kikuyus	Luos	Luhyas
Post Rally	5.49 (1.09)	6.33 (1.21)	0.77 (3.49)	20.58 (6.17)	-1.19 (4.45)
Constant	80.26 (2.99)	78.02 (3.06)	68.85 (8.51)	78.27 (11.65)	85.25 (8.22)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity FE	Yes	-	-	-	-
Observations	975	681	92	37	118

^a Notes: Estimated average intention-to-treat effects (ITTs) of the rally on evaluation of the respondent's own political party. Standard errors (SEs) from linear regression analysis.

The results in Table I2 show that NASA's rally in Uasin Gishu has the effect of increasing partisan attachment among respondents – measured as the rating of the party in the feeling thermometer. There is a clear difference in the partisanship effects before and after the rally in the full sample. When we disaggregate the sample by ethnicity, we find strong effects among Kalenjins and Luos. The effects among Kikuyus and Luhyas are not statistically distinguishable from zero. These differences in effect sizes may partially be driven by sample sizes and the differential effects of co-ethnicity with candidates at the top of the ticket (Luos and Odinga) or the sense of being the ingroup facing a political event led by an ethnic outgroup (Kalenjins in Uasin Gishu).

¹“11 parties fold and merge into Jubilee today ” *The Star* September 9, 2016. Accessed on February 10, 2019: <https://bit.ly/2SKFE00>

K Salience of Ethnic Identity

Figure J1: The Salience of Ethnicity Across Time in National Surveys

Notes: Figure shows summaries of respondents who identify as “Kenyan only” across rounds 2 through 7 of the Afrobarometer survey. Solid lines represent national election years (2002, 2007, and 2013). Dotted lines indicate referendums (2005 and 2010). Notice the overall secular increase in the share of respondents identifying as “Only Kenyan” over time.

Our findings are even more remarkable given that the salience of ethnicity was already high during the election cycle. As noted by [Eifert, Miguel and Posner \(2010\)](#), across African states, the salience of ethnicity increases around elections. Yet we document an increase in the salience of ethnicity, *despite the already heightened salience of ethnicity during the campaign period*. There is no reason to believe that the rally, which happened merely a fortnight before the election on August 8th, marked the onset of the increase in the salience of ethnicity during the 2017 electoral cycle either in Uasin Gishu county or in Kenya more generally.

Figure J2 shows changing reported perceptions of unfair treatment by the government across multiple ethnic groups, according to data from Rounds 2 through 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. Notably, perceptions of unfair treatment varies with an ethnic groups representation in the national government.

Figure J2: Ethnicity and Perceptions of Government Discrimination

Notes: Figures show self-reported perceptions of unfair treatment of one's ethnic group by the government and reported primary identity. Perceptions of discrimination and reported primary identity varies with ethnic group elites' roles in the national government.

L Robustness: Placebo Treatment Analysis

Figure K1: Treatment Effects with Placebo Treatments

Notes: Figures show treatment effects of the opposition rally, using each day of the survey enumeration period as “placebo” treatments (i.e. the day the rally was held) and imposing 3 day rolling bandwidths to estimate differences in evaluations of the outgroup candidate (Raila Odinga) and ingroup candidate (Uhuru Kenyatta) respectively. The point estimates for the effect of the rally with the full set of controls are denoted by the circle. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.

Some might be concerned that other events during the survey enumeration period is driving the findings reported in the main text. For example, it might be the case that the cancellation of the originally scheduled rally, rather than the rally itself, is driving the negative evaluation of the outgroup candidate and the positive evaluation of the ingroup candidate. While this cannot be tested directly, we attempt to probe this possibility by conducting analysis using placebo treatments. This approach basically recodes the “postrally” treatment indicator to each day of the survey enumeration period and conduct pre/post treatment comparisons within a 3 day bandwidth; the intuition is

that we should see that the treatment effects to be most substantively meaningful the day in which the rally was actually held, with little to no observed effects on differences in candidate evaluations pre/post a date in which a rally did not take place. Figure K1 presents the results of these analyses. The upper subfigure are estimate treatment effects by each day of the survey enumeration period with 3 day rolling bandwidths for Raila Odinga (outgroup candidate), and the bottom subfigure for Uhuru Kenyatta (ingroup candidate).

The results in Figure K1 strongly supports the idea that it was the rally itself, rather than other events during the survey enumeration period, that had a substantively meaningful impact on candidate evaluations. First, we observe no treatment effects if the treatment indicator (postrally variable) is set to any days during the days preceding the date in which our rally occurred in real life (day 9), with the exceptions of days 7 and 8, for which the rolling 3 day bandwidth includes respondents that were surveyed after the actual rally occurred (the estimates for day 7 include respondents from day 10, and the estimates for day 8 includes respondents from day 10 and 11, which are observations that fall after the date of the actual rally (day 9)). Note especially that the cancellation of the rally of the initially scheduled on day 4 of the survey enumeration period had no observable effect on candidate evaluations within a 3 day bandwidth window; the coefficient is close to zero and statistically indistinguishable at at the 90/95% level.

Second, the point estimate of the effect of the rally is largest when we make pre/post comparisons centered on the date the actual rally was held (day 9). Once we move the placebo treatments to days following the actual rally (days 10, 11, 12, 13), the effect of the rally decrease in magnitude, as the rolling bandwidth includes what are in reality post rally observations in the *pretreatment* period for the placebo treatments.

M Rally Effects in Trans Nzoia

Figure L1: Rally effects on presidential candidate evaluations: Trans Nzoia

Notes: The effect of the rally on feeling thermometer (FT) ratings for presidential candidates Raila Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta. The point estimates for the effect of the rally without controls, with respondent level controls, and with respondent level controls and ethnicity fixed effects are denoted by the circle, square, and triangle respectively. The lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.