This paper investigates how the intriguing intuitive-cooperative effect can be moderated by the risk of cooperation. Recent studies suggested that people cooperate more when they use less time to make decisions in social dilemmas. Those studies, however, mainly used social dilemmas where the cooperation and defection choices are equally risky as defined under the game riskiness model. Based on the premise that people who use less time to make decisions are more risk-seeking in such decisions, we hypothesize that the intuitive-cooperative effect would be stronger in cooperation-more-risky social dilemmas than in defection-more-risky counterparts. We showed across an exploratory study (N = 183) and a confirmatory study (N = 210) that risk of cooperation moderated the effect of decision time on cooperation. This paper shed light on the heated debate of the intuitive-cooperative effect that researchers should not just focus on whether such effect exists, but also when the effect exists.