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LEAVE OR REMAIN?

**How outraged reactions to intragroup threat affect
group membership preference.**

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*“Moral outrage is the most powerful motivating force in politics”
(M. Blackwell)*

*“Moral outrage is born not of anger but of love. It comes from the highest in us, not from
a lower-level sense of anger or cynicism”.
(M. Williams)*

*“It is only because the majority opinion will always be opposed by some that our
knowledge and understanding progress..
.it is always from a minority acting in ways different from what the majority would
prescribe that the majority in the end learns to do better.”
(F.A. Von Hayek)*

ABSTRACT

Whether we think about large-scale social groups (e.g. associations, clubs, and nations) or small-scale interpersonal group (e.g. close relationships, colleagues, and group of friends), the life cycle of any social group develops along a continuum that goes from its formation to its dissolution. The different phases of group life are characterized by opposing forces that somehow determine the continuity of the group, such as conformism and cohesion, or its discontinuity, such as deviance, intragroup conflict and schism.

Social psychology has concentrated almost exclusively on the processes that allow groups achieving oneness and uniformity, such as social identity and categorization process, and has given little attention to the phenomenon of group dissolution, the schism. Although the complexity of this process may have limited the research, schism is not a so rare phenomenon and the recent international events of Grexit, Brexit, and the separatism of Cataluña, have shown that it critically affects the society as a whole.

In general, schism refers to a split or separation of a group into subgroups, and the final secession of at least one subgroup from the original group. Differently from the individual exit, the schism involves that individuals act as a (sub-) group, and as such it implies that an intragroup situation (the original group) become an intergroup situation (subgroups) where conflicts over essential aspects of the group identity stimulate a division between “us” and “them”.

Although the social psychological model of schism in groups proposed by Sani (2005) has highlighted some necessary conditions of a schism, among which there are the perception of identity subversion, the lack of group entitativity and the existence of conflicting majority and minority factions, the link between the cause and the decision to leave a group is unclear as one cause may facilitate leaving for one member and not for another.

In this endeavour, the current research was aimed to address this gap, by investigating the role of affective and cognitive reactions to a perceived identity threat, and pointed to moral outrage (a specific emotion) and to psychological disengagement (a cognitive process) as two decisive reactions that may motivate minority group members to secede from a superordinate group.

Identity threats are of critical importance for individuals and groups, because when people identify with a social group, they start thinking and behaving in terms of “we” instead of “I”; that is, in terms of a social identity. Since this identity strongly affect the

self-esteem (Stets & Burke, 2000), individuals are motivated to self-categorise and to evaluate themselves and their group more favourably than other groups. When a perceived threat to the group integrity occurs (as happens when individual's positions within a group changes from majority to minority), members of both minority and majority group engage in defensive strategies such as social comparison and self-verification, that produces pressures for intergroup differentiation with the objective of enhancing self-esteem. Individuals who find their opinions supported by others (thus belongs to the majority) tend to assimilate with and positively value the in-group category (e.g. Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Schmitt, Branscombe, Silvia, Garcia, & Spears; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). On the other hand, individuals that find their position supported by a minority group of people, tend to stress the existing discrepancy between the self (the minority) and the group (the majority), and to engage in defensive mechanism aimed at reshaping the self-concept in a way that reduce the salience of the group identity (the majority) for the self. That is, they decrease their psychological identification (Prislin & Christensen, 2005) and increase the psychological disengagement with the majority position, and this may be crucial in generating the intention to leave the group, as a means of intergroup differentiation.

However, psychological disengagement does not always lead to the break up with a group, as some people may accept the situation, whereas others may resent it (Dube' & Guimond, 1983; 1986). Moreover, leaving a group is costly and it may be experienced as a form of betrayal, and may be sanctioned as a deviant behaviour (Millward & Brewerton, 2000). According to Harris (2015), the emotional experience associated with a membership may be critical in generating exit intention, via psychological disengagement. Those individuals experiencing identity threat and thus identity subversion, come to feel a mix of dejection and agitation-related emotions (Higgins, Shah & Friedman, 1997) as a group and these motivate them to make changes to group-relevant standards and/or behaviour. The extent to which these group-based emotions are intense may be decisive to activate and prepare the ground for taking a decision on whether to collectively exit from majority.

Scholars have mapped several influential emotions on behavioural tendencies in intergroup conflict and have found moral outrage being a particular emotion that provide the motivational force to act with respect of social norms and social order (Kroll & Egan, 2004). More specifically, moral outrage is a form of emotional distress, provoked by the perception that a moral standard has been violated, which determines an intense experience of morally based anger (e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989). This emotion involves the

judgment and the condemnation of others and has been found to play a key role in collective actions (Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008), as a means of changing the status quo and defending one's social identity under threat (Rotschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe & Sullivan, 2013; Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). Outrage has been also linked to avoidance tendencies (Smith, Seger & Mackie, 2007) and to an unwillingness to engage in contact with the out-group (e.g. Esses & Dovidio, 2002) and thus it may be linked to the perception of "identity subversion" that trigger schismatic intentions (Sani & Reicher, 1998).

Starting from these premises, it was hypothesized that minority group members' experience of outrage, caused by the perception that the majority is threatening their minority moral standing, may play a pivotal role in increasing their psychological disengagement, and consequently their willingness to collectively exit the majority group.

Three studies examined the effect of (a) moral outrage and of (b) psychological disengagement on schismatic intention and identified the conditions under which these reactions lead minority group members to give up with their membership in a majority group. In the first two studies, a moderated mediational model of moral outrage was tested in the relationship between moral threat and intention to leave. In the third study, a mediational model of disengagement in the relationship between moral outrage and leaving intention was tested.

Study 1 analysed the real-life event of Brexit (it was run few days before the referendum), and found moral outrage about maintain the membership in the EU, mediating the relationship between a moral threat (caused by PM, Cameron, defending EU position) and the intention to leave the EU. Study 2 (run nine months after the referendum) accounted for the change in leadership prototypicality after the Brexit results (Cameron resigned, and May become the new Prime Minister of UK) and confirmed the mediating role of outrage about staying in EU, and the decision to leave the EU. These two studies provided an initial evidence for the motivating role of moral outrage in pushing forward the defence of the minority identity (UK), at the expense of the membership in a superordinate identity (EU).

Study 3, lend further support to the causal role of moral outrage on exit processes, by pointing to psychological disengagement as a mediator of such relationship. By manipulating two discrete components of moral outrage (anger and contempt were considered, because of their different social functions; see e.g. Roseman & Fisher, 2007), disengagement was found to differently predict the collective actions of voice and exit. In particular, results showed that the contempt component of outrage, rather than the anger

component, triggered individual's intention to give up with their membership in the majority group, and this relationship was fully mediated by psychologically disengagement.

Directions for future research and implementations of the findings of the current research are discusses according to schism theory and intergroup conflict processes.

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INTRODUCTION

Research on group-exit has been systematically addressed by few existing theory and empirical work in social psychology (see Levin, Moreland & Ryan, 1997; Moreland & McMinn, 1999, for exceptions), and it has concentrated almost exclusively on why people leave groups as individuals rather than as groups. However, several areas of social psychology offered relevant insights and each of these is informative about particular aspects of the exit process.

Although, schismatic phenomena has been traditionally associated with religion (Sani & Reicher, 2000), they occur in many other types of groups, such as political parties (Sani & Reicher, 1998), nations (Bookman, 1994), professional organizations (Dyck & Starke, 1999) and social movements (Mamiya, 1982). Despite the diversity of contexts, these events were triggered by similar events, and followed the same course: at same point of the group history, some group members started to have conflicting ideas about the status quo and attempted to change it. The frustration of members' inability to implement such changes generated dissonance and dissatisfaction and resulted in a cognitive opening. This cognitive opening allowed doubts to arise about maintaining the group membership (Björge & Horgan, 2009). While general doubts were resolved privately, and commitment was sustained, exit occurred when alternative discourses or other identity's resources became available, through which doubts could be resolved (Dyck & Starke 1999). Said otherwise, the cognitive opening began the psychological process for possible group disengagement via confronting the alternatives (Coates, 2013).

This is what happened, for example, during the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. According to Bookman (1994), Slovaks started blaming their union with Czechs because their history, religion, culture were too much different from those of the Czechs and their economic status was critically lower in comparing to Czechs. As such, they started to believe that they will benefit from a divorce. Similarly, the Czechs came to believe that they too will benefit from a schism, because they will not have to deal anymore with some of the policies of the Slovak government that they opposed. Thus, Czechs and Slovak were increasingly feeling to be different from each other and these disagreements where decisive to determine the end of their union.

Research on schism in political parties (Sani & Reicher, 1998), religious association (Mamiya, 1982; Sani & Reicher, 2000) as well as management teams (Jackson, Brett, Sessa, Cooper, Julin & Peryronnin, 1991) further provided evidence of the impact of diversity on

group scission. Based on interviews with members of the Italian Communist party, Sani and Reicher (1998) suggested that the schism occurred in the party in 1991 could be attributed to severe differences in opinions between different factions regarding what the party's position should be after the fall of the Soviet Regime. The secessionist faction decided to create a breakaway party because they believed that the changes decided by the congress undermined the communist identity. In the same line, the authors (2000) found that the processes that lead many members of the Church of England to leave their own institution following the ordination of women to the priesthood, was because they believed that the ordination of women priests fundamentally denied essential aspects of the group's beliefs and values, thereby changed the group identity. Similarly, the very recent phenomena of Grexit, Brexit and the separation of Cataluña from Spain, showed that disagreement over important aspects of one's identity are decisive for group exit.

Although group-exit is sustained by decisions at individual level, the processes associated with the collective self are a little bit different to those that characterize the individual self. Group-exit entails group-based aspects related to one's social identity, and implies that group members appraise events in group terms rather than individual and behave accordingly (Smith, 1993).

In this endeavour, the following chapters build on literature on individual mobility and on group mobility to disentangle the different features and processes that describe overt leaving decisions at individual and group level.

Social psychological research on individual mobility has focused mostly on social exclusion (e.g. Fritzsche & Schubert, 2009) and individual overt leaving as a reaction to norm-deviating members (i.e. Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016). This literature pointed to derogation and de-categorization along with group devaluation as decisive mechanisms that motivate individual mobility (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Hogg, 2001; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001).

Conversely, research on group mobility has examined schismatic phenomena (the division of a single group into multiple distinct groups; i.e. Sani, 1999, 2000) as an extreme reaction to conflicts over the group-identity (value, status, morality). These conflicts split the group into different factions that start to negotiate. If the negotiation fails, the extent to which these factions perceive that the situation is subverting central aspect of their identity, will be decisive in motivating them to break up with the whole group.

CHAPTER 1: LEAVING A GROUP

1.1 INDIVIDUAL MOBILITY

When group membership dominates self-perception (i.e., social identity is salient; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), in-group members' behaviour is evaluated with regard to its fit to the group norm (e.g., Hogg & Hains, 1996).

Individuals who do not follow this norm are generally perceived as reflecting negatively on the group as a whole (Hornsey, Jetten, McAuliffe, & Hogg, 2006; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Such deviant in-group members threaten the integrity of the group by undermining normative consensus within the group (Scheepers, Branscombe, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) and by reducing group cohesiveness (Wellen & Neale, 2006). Consequently, the group and the deviate reach a state of divergence that requires reactions to the deviate's behavior (i.e. group socialization model, Levine & Moreland, 1994).

The range of reactions to norm-deviating in-group members can include the attempts to re-socialize the deviate through communication (e.g. Frings, Abrams, Randsley de Moura & Marques, 2010), but also more extreme reactions like harshly derogating and socially excluding the deviate from the in-group, as research on the black sheep effect demonstrated (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Such derogation serves to exclude the deviant from the psychological in-group (Eidelman, Silvia & Biernat, 2006). Because deviance critically affect the contents and the structure of knowledge available (Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007) and it is perceived to compromise the whole group's functioning, by derogating the deviant members one takes distance from the deviate and prevents the deviate reflecting a negative image of both the group as a whole and its single members. Derogation allows group members to maintain their membership within a group and to avoid other most costly responses to deviation such as di-sidentification from the group. In fact, di-sidentification implies that individuals give up with a relevant part of the self.

Although social exclusion is the most frequent response to deviation, in particular conditions it can also happen that normative members of the group decide to leave the group before the social exclusion comes forth. For example, when other in-group members are perceived to accept the deviant behaviour, and individuals experience lower levels of control over the situation (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016), interest to join another group can arises and individual mobility may be more likely to occur. In such situation, non-deviant group members can engage in a series of defensive mechanism to avoid the negative group identity (Prislin & Christensen, 2005). For example, they can decrease ratings of self-group

similarity, de-categorize from the group (psychological exclusion of the self from the group) along with group devaluation. Indeed, similarity with others that are judged as unfavourable threatens one's sense of self, creating the fear of being "associatively miscast" (Cooper & Jones, 1969). Along with similarity devaluation, group members that see their group has having a negative value tend to emphasize the heterogeneity within the group, which may help convey that unfavourable group features do not necessarily apply to the individual self (see Doosje, Spears R, Ellemers N, Koomen, 1999b). When one's social identity is no longer attractive, individuals shift their attention to other identities (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman & Sloan, 1976), and in some circumstances, they try to leave the group while gaining access to another, more attractive group. This allows them to maintain high levels of self-esteem (see Tajfel and Turner 1979).

However, leaving a group is not always possible. There are situations where the mobility is physically reduced and where group boundaries are less permeable (e.g. Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). When derogation is not any more effective as a group-level strategy because the other group members accept the deviance, and physical barriers to exit are imposed, individuals engage in alternative strategies to increase interpersonal differentiation such as group disidentification (Eidelman & Biernat, 2003). This strategy allows individuals to create distance from an unfavourable target responsible for the threat (Spears, Doojse, & Ellemers, 1997; Cialdini et al., 1976), while at the same time serving an individualistic (as opposed to group) protection motive. By limiting the importance that the group holds for one's identity, an individual dissociates from an unfavourable other by preventing the perception of association (Eildeman & Biernat, 2003). Said otherwise, those who share group memberships with unfavourable others may also appear "guilty" simply by the way of their resemblance. Harshly devaluing an unfavourable group limits the likelihood of being cast in the same negative light. The invalidating experience of being part of a deviant group, cause disillusionment and invoke dissonance and dissatisfaction (e.g. McFarland & Buehler, 1995). The inability to integrate these inconsistencies (e.g. Festinger, 1957) with the existing schema negatively affects both the processes that endorse the group's ideology and the individuals' level of commitment as a member. As such, the group loses its influence on the individual and the likelihood of disengagement increases (Björge & Horgan, 2009; Ebaugh, 1988; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010; Skonovd, 1979; Wright, 1987). By psychological disengaging from a negative group identity, individuals redefine their self-concept to reduce the salience of the group identity and to maintain a positive self-esteem (Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe & Crocker, 1998;

Schmader, Major & Gramzow, 2001). Disengaged individuals decline opportunities to improve the standing of their group (Wright et al. 1990) or to help other group members (Ellemers, 2001) they become “*physically uninvolved in tasks, cognitively un-vigilant, and emotionally disconnected from others in ways that hide what they think and feel, their creativity, their beliefs and values, and their personal connections with others*” (Kahn, 1990, p. 702).

Thus, when individuals perceive that their social identity is inconsistent with their self-concept, this results in a number of perceptual, affective, and behavioural consequences (such as psychological disengagement, negative mood), aimed at decreasing levels of commitment with the group and at seeking out alternative social identities that are more self-consistent.

Group dis-identification and group devaluation have been mainly viewed as a uniquely individualistic distancing strategy, where improvement for the group as a whole is overridden by the desire for upward mobility at the individual level. Unfortunately, the concern with the personal self and issues of personal identity as an explanatory frame for understanding social behaviour is not counter-balanced by a likewise interest in group processes, that is when two or more people decide as a group to break up with the rest of the in-group. These group processes tend to remain relatively understudied, which is likely to diminish concerns with group-level outcomes.

This neglect is unfortunate since group phenomena, and particularly group-mobility, may have more striking and dramatic consequences (i.e. on societal scale than on individual scale) than individual mobility, as the recent international events have shown (i.e. Grexit, Brexit and the very recent separatism of Cataluña).

1.2 GROUP MOBILITY

Although, social identification and categorization represent the driving forces that motivate group members to achieve oneness and uniformity (Sani, 2005), social groups can be internally divided into subgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) on the basis of a particular set of attributes (demographic, psychological, values) and in some circumstances these differences may become so fundamental to lead members of these subgroups to break up with each other's (Liebman, Sutton, & Wuthone, 1988; Worchel, 1984). These attributes are different components of one's social identity, which although related, may operate relatively independently of each other's (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2001, Smith Murphy & Coats 1999). Group members can define themselves either on the level of the entire group, in which case a superordinate identity is salient, or on the level of the subgroup, in which case a subgroup identity is salient.

Accordingly, Lau and Murnighan (1998) have proposed the fault line hypothesis to explain how these attributes create imaginary dividing lines within a group that determine the location where it is more likely to break after a force is imposed on it, increasing the risk of members discontent and group conflict (Hart & Van Vugt, 2006). If these faulty lines are stressed, processes of intergroup competition are activated and compromise the cooperation and the cohesion of the super-ordinate group, thus undermining the collective interest (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Said otherwise, differences in some attitudes, values, and beliefs have the potential to create severe conflicts among members of the same group and thus influence group outcomes and behaviours (Daft & Weick, 1984).

Although groups tend to evolve to have unique compositions (homogeneity) of members who are relatively similar to each other, when a match is judged unsatisfactory, pressure forms and encourages dissimilar members to leave the organization (George & Bettenhausen, 1990). When this mismatch makes the subgroup identity salient and prevailing over the super-ordinate identity, group entitativity collapses and group schism is more likely to occur (Sani & Todman, 2002).

Research on dual identity (a simultaneous identification with a distinct subgroup and a common superordinate group; i.e. Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Nguyen & Benet, Martínez, 2013; Sam & Berry, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), have shown that the overlap between different social identities can either improve or disrupt the perceptions and the behavioural tendencies between the subgroups of a superordinate identity. For example, the

presence of a biracial identity in the interracial context in the United States led Whites to exhibit lower levels of symbolic racism towards Blacks, and to express higher levels of empathy towards Black violence victims (Levy et al., under review). In addition, studies performed in the Israeli Palestinian context (i.e. Arab citizen of Israeli) found that when these identities overlapped, Israelis showed greater motivation for contact with Palestinians, more egalitarian intergroup resource allocation, and diminished support for aggressive policies (Levy, Saguy, Van Zomeren & Halperin, 2017).

Although, the link between the dual identities has so far been stressed as a positive attribute, it can easily become detrimental, especially in the context of severe intragroup conflict. Sani and Todman (2002) coined the term *identity subversion* to label members' perception that a situation undermines or changes the essence of the whole group. The extent to which this subversion is perceived as noteworthy, leads group's members to change their position within the whole group, and makes salient the subgroup perspective. Because, in-group's members tend to judge each other's more harshly than out-group members for the same actions (i.e., the black sheep effect; Marques et al., 1988), identity subversion may be decisive for group schism. Thus, the link between the subgroup identity and superordinate identity "... *might backfire and lead to having the multiple identity perceived as a fifth column or raise issues of threat and betrayal*" (Levy et al., 2017, p. 5).

At the heart of identity subversion and schism, lies the paradox that even if the superordinate group identification can bind subgroups together into a powerful psychological whole, it can also destroy distinctive and valuable identities that constitute the subgroups. Several research accounts identity threat as a critical factor that led subgroup to conflict within a super ordinate group context (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2002). This perceived identity threat accentuates subgroup solidarity, sharpen intergroup boundaries (faulty lines) and inhibit super-ordinate group identification (Horney & Hogg, 2000).

In such context, perceptual, affective, and behavioral responses are instrumentally employed to achieve intragroup differentiation and affirmation, as a means of defending one's identity under threat. For example, individuals can stress the homogeneity of the subgroup (Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995), can differentiate between groups (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999), and can display relatively high levels of self-stereotyping (Spears et al., 1997) and of differentiation on stereotypic dimensions (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 2001d). They can also increase subgroup affiliation, subgroup loyalty, and subgroup cohesiveness (e.g. Branscombe et al. 1999). These group biases indicate a state of mind that is conducive to collective subgroup behavior aimed at

challenging the source of threat and changing the present status configuration as it is unfavourable for the subgroup (Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1999).

In these circumstances, subgroup distinctiveness may become so important to generate a desire for subgroup superiority, so that highly committed group members may settle for a negative identity rather than being regarded positively (Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). These members may also engage in over discrimination (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1999), and they may even display hatred and disgust towards the whole group as a result of the motivation to sharpen group boundaries (Keltner & Haidt, 1999).

Although the need for positive intergroup distinctiveness is a basic element of intergroup relationships, there are several strategies less aggressive than a schism that allow for distinctiveness purpose, such as in-group solidarity and intergroup competition. Therefore, what does motivate people to seek differentiation in such a destructive way whereas others are able to achieve the same goal in a non-destructive way?

First of all, at the group level social status -in terms of status or morality- and positive group distinctiveness (having a higher status and being morally superior) are the main contextual factors that produce identity threat (i.e. Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto & Leach, 2008). A substantial body of research indicated that morality is a crucial dimension for social identity, and groups compete more for moral status rather than for material status (Leach, Van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk & Spears, 2008). Because failure to meet moral standard is a particular aversive experience (Monin, 2007), individuals engage in more defensive reaction to defuse the threat when being confronted with morally superior comparison target (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013).

Second, the way people perceive, and experience intergroup relations fundamentally relates to being member of a majority (higher status group) or minority group (lower status group). Thus, when a conflict over group moral values (morality) occurs, individuals may change their position within a group. While individuals that endorse the situation assimilate in the super-ordinate identity, those that appraise the situation as subverting the group's identity may endorse more alternative minority positions (subgroup) and may be more concerned with intergroup differentiation.

Third, the extent to which social status hierarchy is seen as illegitimate, higher status group (majority) and lower status groups (minority) react differently, with most minority members trying to change the status quo, as a means to express their (suppressed and devalued) identity (Barreto, Ellemers, & Banal, 2006).

Since minority members are more concerned with changing the status quo to achieve group distinctiveness than majority members, and that usually they are less powerful than their counterpart (Lucken & Simon, 2005), they may rely more on aggressive strategies- such as group-exit- as an attempt to regain control and achieve extreme intergroup differentiation.

1.2.1 SCHISM IN GROUPS CHARACTERIZED BY A MAJORITY AND A MINORITY

Studies on majority and minority (Prislin, Limbert & Bauer, 2000; Prislin & Christensen, 2005) clearly indicated that being part of the majority is attractive per se (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1992; Simon & Hamilton, 1994), but also increases social status and positive social identity (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In contrast, minority tends to be deprecated, stigmatized, and dismissed (Moscovici, 1994) thus the minority social identity is less attractive, unless active coping strategies are developed (De Dreu, Harinck & Van Vianen, 1999; Majory et al., 1998; Porter & Washington, 1993).

One way through which members of minority group can enhance their social identity is to dissociate themselves from unsuccessful or low-status group and try to gain membership in others, more attractive groups (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Accordingly, experimental research shows that, in general, people tend to distance themselves from their group when the comparison is unfavorable with other groups, whereas they identify more strongly with their group when confronted with a favorable intergroup comparison (e.g. Ellemers et al., 1999; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988).

However, research also showed that when the relative position of one's group may change in the future (as is the case of ongoing intergroup competition), or a severe deviation is perceived and experienced, people do not readily dissociate themselves from an unsuccessful group (e.g., Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1990). In their original formulation of social identity theory, Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed that a negative social identity (i.e., an unfavorable outcome of an intergroup comparison) "*promotes subordinate-group competitiveness toward the dominant group to the degree that subjective identification with the subordinate group is maintained*" (p. 45). Thus, members of low-status groups, when are strongly identified, are more prone to make efforts to improve their position after an unfavorable intergroup comparison (i.e., failure) and engage in the so-called social competition to maintain a positive social identity. As a matter of fact, minority

group members tend to exhibit more in-group biases than majority group members. For example, they are more self-focused (Guinote, Brown & Fiske, 2006; Mullen, 1991), they favor their ingroup more (Mullen, 1991; Mullen, Brown, Smith, 1992; Sachdev & Bouhris, 1984), and display higher level of intergroup differentiation (McGuire, McGuire & Winton, 1979). Minority group members react more negatively than majority group members to recategorisation of the groups as one-group, which requires them to abandon their subgroup identity. When mergers involve high- and low-status groups, members of low- status groups perceive less common group identity with the merged entity than do members of majority groups (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Omay, & Frey, 2007), they have less favorable expectations of the merger and they are generally more suspicious that their group will not be adequately represented in the merged organization (Mottola, 1997). Conversely, majority group members tend to see the qualities of the superordinate group as representing their dominant values and characteristics (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004), thus they do not experience identity threat and they are more apt to endorse recategorisation as a single superordinate group. That is, for majority group members the superordinate identity essentially promotes their group's values. Boen, Vanbeselaere, Brebels, Huybens, and Millet (2007) found that when people believed that the merged organization would reflect their group's values, stronger pre-merger group identification predicted more positive reactions to the merger; conversely, when people believed that their group's values and characteristics would not be well represented in a merged organization, stronger pre-merger group identification predicted more negative responses to the merger.

Moreover, when members of minority groups perceive the disparities between the groups as illegitimate and the group boundaries as impermeable (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001) they particularly value the distinctive qualities of their group, beyond those that define the status relationship, more than do majority group members (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Mullen et al., 1992). This lead minority and majority group to have different preferences for the ultimate outcomes of inter-group relations. Whereas majority group members favor the assimilation of minority groups into one single culture (a traditional "melting pot" orientation) -the dominant culture (Horenczyk, 1996)- minority group members often tend to want to retain their cultural identity. Accordingly, Worrell and Gardner-Kitt (2006), found that Blacks with higher levels of racial identification were more resistant to cultural assimilation that fails to recognize their group's distinctive characteristics and contributions.

At the behavioral level, when minority status is threatened by comparison with a higher status group (the majority), competitiveness can lead minority members to redress the situation by engaging in collective actions (Kelly & Breinlinger 1996; Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fisher, 2007; Van Zomeren, Spears Fisher & Leach, 2004), as has been observed for a variety of social groups, ranging from workers (e.g., Veenstra & Haslam 2000) to gay people (Simon, Loewy, Stürmer, Weber, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier & Spahlinger, 1998). The (il) legitimacy of outcome distributions generates higher levels of discontent and results in elevated entitlement among the disadvantaged group (Folger, 1987; Gurin, 1985).

Although these results illustrate the different strategies that minority groups members use to defend their threatened identity, researches have been mainly focused on investigating the role of minority members commitment to their minority identity, as predictors of most behavioural outcomes. Little is known about minority members levels of commitment to their superordinate identity and its effects on group's behaviour. While collective actions such as protest, implies a certain degree of engagement with the superordinate identity and thus requires minority group members to remain categorized and identified with their superordinate identity, collective exit requires individuals to end their involvement and their engagement with the superordinate identity, while remaining strongly committed with their minority identity. Indeed, especially in a context of dual identity (i.e., majority and minority), leaving the group entails giving up on important aspect of self-definition, and only by psychologically disengaging and detaching from the superordinate identity, group-exit can occur.

1.2.2 WHEN MINORITY PSYCHOLOGICALLY DISENGAGE FROM THE MAJORITY

Since people identify with a social category to enhance their self-esteem (Stets & Bruke, 2000), when a perceived threat to the group integrity occur (such as when minority and majority position arise), members of the minority group may experience a decrease in their self-esteem. However, if they are strongly committed with their minority position, they may start questioning their commitment in their superordinate identity, and to protect their self-esteem they may reduce the salience of such superordinate identity. This process, called psychological disengagement, is *“a defensive detachment of self-esteem from outcomes in a particular domain, such that feelings of self-worth are not dependent on successes or*

failure in that domain” (Major et al., 1998, p.35). It allows individuals to maintain positive self-esteem especially in degrading circumstances, such as experience of discrimination, prejudice and relative deprivation (Major, et al., 1998; Schmader et al., 2001).

Psychological disengagement consists of two strategies, respectively devaluation and discounting (Major et al., 1998; Major & Schmader, 1998, 2001; Schmader et al., 2001). Devaluation occurs when individuals believe that they have been valued because of their group reputation (i.e. being black; being a woman) rather than realistically, and consists of reducing the importance of the domain where one has been evaluated for the self-definition. For example, pervasive negative views of the role and contribution of women in the police force, lead police- women to reduce the importance of their job for their self-appraisal (Tougas, Rinfret, Beaton & De la Sablonnière, 2005).

On the other hand, discounting occurs when individuals perceive that the putative standing of the group plays a central role in one’s evaluation (Major & Schmader, 1998; Schmader et al., 2001), and implies reducing the validity of a feedback received. By attributing no validity to feedback received or performance appraisals individuals, protect their self-esteem from discriminatory evaluations. Furthermore, by discounting the opinions of others, whether colleagues or superiors, evaluations become less relevant to feelings of self-worth. In this way, individuals protect their self-esteem without reducing the value of socially important domains (Croizet & Martinot, 2003). Individuals devalue a domain to the extent that their ingroup is unsuccessful in that domain relative to an outgroup (Schmader & Major, 1999). However, a further set of studies showed that this tendency to devalue group failure is moderated both by the relative status of one’s in-group and the perceived legitimacy of that status (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). When the status hierarchy is perceived as legitimate, members of higher status groups devalue domains in which lower status groups excel, whereas members of lower status groups actually value domains in which higher status groups excel. On the other hand, when the status hierarchy defining the groups is delegitimized, lower status group members devalue domains in which higher status groups outperform their own group.

In a similar vein, research on organizational behaviour has found that when subordinates feel that they are being abused by an authority (i.e., when moral values are threatened), they distance themselves from the abuse, as a to attempt to regain a sense of emotional control (Frijda, 1986). By doing so, employees are not only likely to increase external search behaviors (Turnley & Feldman, 1999), but they also decrease in-role and discretionary efforts, such as improvement-oriented voice (Townsend, Phillips, & Elkins,

2000). Such behavioural alterations represent an attempt to restore a sense of equity between what employees believe they are getting from and giving to the organization (Ashforth, 1997). The extent to which alternatives employment are available makes the attachment to the organization a primary psychological consideration affecting employees' turnover, suggesting that employees often psychologically detach, or mentally begin the process of quitting, long before they physically exit (Burris & Detert, 2008).

The disengagement explanation for collective actions (exit vs voice) seems to have a good fit with situations where majority and minority positions are conflicting. The legitimacy of the status (social threats) and the presence of alternative identities (minority identity) may favour minority group members' disengagement from the majority group and this may be decisive to group-exit (vs group voice).

Yet, psychological disengagement is not automatically activated each time minority feels threatened by majority. The group life is characterized by a continuous exchange of opinions between subgroups, and these may generate more or less extreme threats to the respective identities, that members of a subgroup try to voice by instrumentally detaching. This may be the case when majority attempts to impose its decision to the other counterpart or vice-versa. However, this continuous exchange (of threats) does not automatically lead to a schism. For example, in the recent event of Brexit, UK called for the referendum after a relevant number of confrontations with EU. Thus, although being in a condition of threat, and having alternative identities that resolve the doubts can explain collective actions such as protest, they are not sufficient to explain group-exit, as it seems that a sort of critical point should be reached before the exit decision is taken.

According to Harris (2015), the emotional experience associated with a membership may be critical in generating exit intention via psychological disengagement. Individuals experiencing identity threat and thus identity subversion come to feel a mix of dejection and agitation-related emotions (Higgins et al., 1997) as a group and these motivate them to make changes to group-relevant standards and/or behaviour. The extent to which these group-based emotions are intense may be decisive to activate and prepare the ground for taking a decision on whether to collectively voice the majority (e.g., Folger, 1987) or to collectively exit from majority, via psychological disengagement.

CHAPTER 2: GROUP-BASED EMOTIONS

Group-based emotional experiences are not a mere spontaneous reaction to group-related event, but they imply group-based appraisals of an event (Frijda, 1986; Smith, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). These appraisals give birth to specific collective emotions - targeted to different group, which can be the in-group, the out-group or specific said group (Goldenberg, Halperin, Van Zmeren & Gross, 2016; Iyer & Leach, 2008; Mackie, Devos & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993), and are associated with collective action tendencies.

For example, when groups experience that their collective value has been threatened, they tend to appraise the source of threat as unjust and illegitimate (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and these group-based judgments are central to whether respond to collective disadvantage (Walker & Smith, 2002) through collective actions (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers, Wilke, & Van Knippenberg, 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Wright et al., 1990) because they promote action oriented emotions like anger (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993).

Group-based emotions provide a more differentiated evaluation of a salient inter-group relation than the single dimension of positive and negative affect (Smith, 1993) because they include motivating components (Brehm, 1999) associated with specific inter-group behaviors.

Scholars have mapped several influential emotions on behavioural tendencies in intergroup conflict related processes such as collective action (Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh & Siddiqui, 2011; Van Zomerer et al., 2004), support for social and political concessions (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010), and support for intergroup aggression (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013; Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011). For example, feelings of hatred towards the outgroup, has been found to plays a destructive role in intergroup conflict and resolution (Halperin, 2011), reflecting the desire to harm or even annihilate its targets (Bar-Tal, 2007; White, 1996). Similarly, group-based pride was found to promote intergroup prejudice (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003), justify oppression and violence (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), and legitimize the in-group's wrong doings (Bilali, 2013). Additionally, intergroup anger has been found to foster the support for violent actions and military attacks (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), to appraise such actions as less risky and more likely to succeed (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and generally lead to the escalation of intergroup aggression and conflict (Halperin & Gross, 2011b; Mackie et al., 2000; Mullen & Skitka, 2006).

The dimension that makes group-based emotions decisive to group behaviour is that they embody a distinct human feature of "morality". The puzzle of the moral emotions is that humans, far more than any other animal, devote a considerable portion of their emotional life to reacting to social events that do not directly affect the self, or at least affect the self as a part of a social category. Haidt (2003) defined the moral emotions as those emotions "*that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent*" (p. 276). Moral emotions are those emotions that provide the motivational force—the power and energy—to do good and to avoid doing bad, with respects to social norms and social order (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Moreover, they often have long-term effects on social relationships between violators and third parties (i.e. Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, Haidt, 1999). As such, they can be decisive for actions taken at group level (either voice or exit). Among several moral emotions (i.e. shame, embarrassment, guilt, pride) moral outrage seems to be particularly relevant for the violations of the social order. This emotion involves the judgment and the condemnation of the others and has been found to play a key role in collective action (Van Zomeren, et al., 2008), and to provide a better explanation for collective action than positive emotions (Becker, Tausch & Wagner, 2011).

Although there is no single, commonly accepted definition of moral outrage (overall researcher defined outrage as a morally based anger) two main elements have found to constitute the basis for most definitions of outrage: first the appraisal that injustice has occurred, second the consequences of this appraisal is to engage in moral cleansing behaviours, such as political action, protest participation and preventative and punitive behaviours (Pagano & Huo, 2007), to restore the injustice.

2.1 GROUP-BASED MORAL OUTRAGE

The appraisal producing moral outrage is that a moral standard or principle (i.e. equality; equity; 'Do not harm') has been violated. It differs from the appraisal evoking personal anger, where the single interest raises the emotion as well as from emphatic anger, where is the interests of a person for whom one cares that have been thwarted (Batson, Kennedy, Nord, Stocks, Fleming, Marzette, Lishner, Hayes, Kolchinsky & Zerger, 2007).

Montada and Schneider (1989) elaborated moral outrage as arising from an appraisal of social inequity and disadvantage. When confronted with this circumstance, unequal aspect of the distribution of outcomes causes feelings of deprivation and emotional distress (outrage). These feelings arise because desires become legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society. More specifically, such feeling of discontent and outrage arise from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group, and this strengthens a group's collective identity. Tetlock (2002), Darley and Pittman (2003) further suggested outrage as a reaction to violation and transgression of sacred-values (cultural or social norms) that community holds (such as Community, Autonomy and Divinity; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 2000). Various social entities including individuals (e.g., celebrities), groups of people (e.g., social groups, population groups), organizations (e.g., businesses, political parties), governments, or even whole nations can violate moral standards and generate outraged experiences. These violations evoke outraged reactions, as a means of defending one's group moral standing (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). Because morality is so important to individuals and groups, failure to meet moral standards is a particular aversive experience that one would rather not to have (Monin, 2007; Tetlock, 2000). Thus, people and groups are motivated to see themselves as acting in line with moral belief. Consequently, a single immoral act has more impact on how individual or group are evaluated, and since being judged immoral involves the risk to be rejected from a moral community, individuals and groups use moral outrage more as a means to defend their moral standing rather than following an altruistic portrayal of punishing the violator (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013).

2.2 MORAL OUTRAGE AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Overall, the distinctive interpretations of interpersonal behaviour which trigger the reaction that 'justice needs to be done', have found moral outrage to be strongly associated with protest against national policies that are considered illegitimate (Jetten, Iyer, Branscombe, & Zhang, 2007). Threats to collective image elicit outrage and this lead citizen to question whether their country's actions jeopardize the group's image and therefore motivate people to protest (Lodewijkx, Kersten, & Van Zomeren, 2008). Moral outrage facilitates political engagement by lowering risk appraisals and by increasing perceptions of control and in-group strength (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Lerner et al., 2003),

accelerating decision making and reducing information processing (i.e. Valentino, Hutchings, Banks & Davis, 2008), and most of all, maintaining a core world view under threat (Ivery, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Skitka & Bauman, 2008).

Montada and Schneider (1989) found moral anger over societal inequity encouraging the advantaged in a society to advocate on the part of the disadvantaged by supporting for education and employment policies. Moreover, interactions between groups in developed and developing countries increase feelings of efficacy and moral outrage and spur respondents in developed countries into activism in the name of the disadvantaged abroad (Thomas, McGarty, Mavor, 2009). Moral outrage was also found to motivate groups to take part in violence, as well as to support collective conciliation (Tagar et al., 2010) and to inspire social movements and collective behavior (Morrison, 1971).

Overall these studies suggested moral outrage as a core emotional experience that arises when committed individuals experience a certain degree of threat and that motivates people to collectively engage in collective actions.

However, what the described work does not address, is how moral outrage affect collective actions when individuals hold multiple identities. Differently from situations where there is clear cut “in-group” and “out-group” categories (such as advantaged vs disadvantaged), individuals that hold dual identity have more potential for exit, at both individual and group level (subgroup). Moral outrage may motivate minority group’s members to collectively leave the majority group when moral threat is perceived to completely subvert the whole group identity (moral threat). The invalidating experience generated from the threat, can critically affect the subgroup status and distinctiveness, and the resulting outrage may be decisive in motivating minority group members to look for alternative forms of collective action, such as group-exit, as a means to defend their minority identity (and thus to restore justice). Said otherwise, multiple identities may act as a possible gateway to a moral outrage explanation of group exit.

These considerations call into question the important aspect of groups’ members’ engagement (or disengagement) to the group. As already said, while collective actions such as protest implies a certain degree of engagement with the superordinate identity, collective exit requires individuals to end their involvement and their engagement with the superordinate identity, while remaining strongly committed with their minority identity. Because moral outrage is a defensive reaction of higher identified group members (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013) to a perceived threat to their identity, it may result in group exit by decreasing feeling of engagement with the superordinate identity.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

From the main arguments that the minority group members perception that their identity has been subverted is the first cause of schism, that moral outrage is a defensive reaction to identity threat, and individuals often disengage before leaving a group, three specific hypotheses were derived. These hypotheses were aimed at disentangling the conditions where and the process through which moral outrage motivate group-exit, rather than group-voice.

The first hypothesis was specifically aimed at verifying whether the experience of moral outrage is effectively predicted by an experience of threat. It was hypothesized that the extent to which minority group members appraised the situation as threatening their group's image, this will increase their experience of group-based outrage about maintaining the membership in majority group (threats hypothesis). From the definition of outrage as an experience of "*an aversive arousal state that has cognitive, affective and behavioral components*" (Tetlock, 2003, p.321), the research zoomed in on the emotional components of outrage as activated by threat to group status. Thus, it has been used the umbrella concept of outrage, where outrage is seen as motivating a defensive response (Tetlock, 2003). Although threat to morality has been showed to be a strong elicitor of emotions, (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013), the current research seeks to further improve the understanding of what trigger moral outrage by investigating two class of intra-group moral threat: one as coming out from being a minority, the other coming out from leadership failure. As leaders are expected to be exemplary and on the path of salvation, their behavior has to be consistent with the group's ideals and goals (Haslam & Platow, 2001a). When a leader behaves in ways that favor the in-group, he or she is acting in a highly ingroup prototypical manner. Instead, leaders' failure to adhere to expectations cause members to doubt about their involvement and the sacrifices made for the group (Bjørge, 2011), and may further represent a threat to their groups' status. Thus, it was expected that the extent to which individuals perceived their leader as not representing their group's values, this will result in stronger experience of threat, especially for those that appraised their minority position as threatening.

The second hypothesis is more central to the research theorizing, and was aimed at investigating the mediational effect of outrage on the association between identity threats and group-exit. It was predicted that the extent to which minority group members appraised their leaders as not representing their group's values, this would result in outraged reactions, which in turn will increase subgroups members' willingness to leave that group, especially

for those that appraised their minority position as threatening (outrage hypothesis). Hypothesis 1 and 2 are summarized in the moderated mediation model depicted in Fig 1.

Figure 1. 1st Theoretical Model

Third, from the reasoning that individuals tend to distance from a source of threat and this allow them to protect their self-esteem and to cope with the situation, and that individuals mentally begin the process of quitting long before exit, by psychologically detaching from the group (Burris et al., 2008), it was predicted that morally outraged individuals will be more likely to leave their group because moral outrage increases the likelihood of their psychological disengagement (psychological disengagement). More specifically, it was hypothesized that in a majority-minority context psychological disengagement will mediate the relationship between the social function of moral outrage (anger vs contempt) and the collective actions. It was expected that the extent to which moral outrage was contemptuous based rather than anger based, will increase minority group members' psychological disengagement with the majority group, and thus result in group-exit rather than group-voice (Fig.2).

Figure 2. 2nd Theoretical model

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH STUDIES

4.1 STUDY 1

Introduction

On 23 June 2016, British citizens were asked by their Prime Minister Cameron to take a huge decision: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”. This was the question of the famous Brexit Referendum. Voters could choose between two responses: 1) remain a member of the European Union, or 2) leave the European Union. Although Cameron publicly favored the “remain” vote, leave won by 51.9% to 48.1%.

Membership in the EU has long been a topic of debate in the United Kingdom. For example, on 1975, Britain voted on a similar issue, when the EU was known as the European common market. Thus, Britain’s definitive self-ejection from Europe on June 2016 represented the culmination not just of four months of heady campaigning but four decades of latent Euro scepticism, which, through good and bad times, never really went away. Many argued that the EU’s scope and purpose has shifted dramatically during ages, in a way that could not have been predicted by those who voted yes, the first time around. Consistent with these statements, a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs (PE 571.402), suggested that the main bulks of argumentation employed by “Leave” campaign expressed a general *“sense of immorality in the current situation EU-membership”* (PE 571.402, p.98) and evoked a sense of unfairness and injustice in the voters supporting the “Leave” campaign. Absence of control, national security, and strain on public goods were some of the elements stressed during the campaign. EU institution have been defined *“nefarious, undemocratic and fraudulence”* (PE 571.402, p.100) because of their incompetence and inflexibility. The national sovereignty has been invoked as a public good that UK lost through membership in the EU. Thus, for most “leave” voters, EU did not represent anymore a proper institution to rely on, conversely maintaining membership with EU was believed to dramatically changes UK prosperity for coming years, leading people to claim a change for the situation. On the other hand, the “Remain” campaign was predominately occupied by arguments related to the loss of specific but disparate benefits of EU membership, in terms of employment, trade, foreign investment and macroeconomics. Differently from the “Leave” campaign, the “Remain” side was *“defending the status quo”* (Mendez & Mendez, 2017, p. 101).

In sum, the Brexit scenario was characterized by two opposing factions (leave vs stay) of the same group (UK) contending their membership in the same community, the EU. While for “leave” voters this membership was experienced as denying central aspect of the group identity and thus was appraised as threatening the UK identity, for the “stay” voters the implications of such membership for the group (UK) status was not appraised as problematic. Yet, they perceived that leaving such membership would represent a critical loss of status, with nefarious consequences. While for them, the situation was consistent with their identity needs, for “leave” voters the situation represented the end of the group as it used to be.

The framework outlined and the results of the Referendum, allows comparing Brexit to a schism. Indeed, according to the Social Psychological Model of Schismatic Processes (Sani, 2005) a schismatic process is triggered when members of a faction perceive a given situation, which is supported by the other group members representing the group as a whole, as subverting the central, historically grounded principles forming the group identity. Said otherwise, a schism is based on a disagreement over the nature of the relationship between a proposed situation -which constitutes a change in the group’s ideological and doctrinal corpus—and the group identity. This is exactly what happened during Brexit.

Starting from these considerations, the referendum constituted a privileged setting where to investigate how intergroup conflict over identities can degenerate into a schism. Moreover, given the fact that *“Brexit was a passionate campaigning for the vote on both sides and has seen tempers boil over with rivals accusing each other of peddling lies, hatred and distrust in pursuit of political gain; Thus the hatred has divided British society”* (<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/24/europe/uk-referendum-emotions/index.html>), it could allow to further investigate schism by taking into account the role of group-based emotions, such as outrage, in determining collective exit. As matter of fact, the perception of a radical transformation of the group essence includes not only self-evaluative aspects but also the group’s moral image and these concerns are more emotive and motivate groups’ members to defend their group value and thus their group distinctiveness (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013).

For leave voters, the actual situation and consequently maintaining the membership in the EU may have been generated stronger negative emotions (such as outrage) in comparison to their counterparts (the stay voters). This argument is in line with the sacred value protection model (Tetlock, 2003), according to which individuals are very sensitive

to moral threat and these evoke affective arousal that can translate into defensive moral outrage, as a means to defend of one's social identity (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). Furthermore, given the consistent demonstration that inter-group behavior is driven by group-based emotions either for hedonic or instrumental purpose (Levy et al., 2017; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009; Smith & Mackie 2008), leave voters may have strategically taken into account hatred emotions to sustain intergroup conflict and impair reconciliation with EU. Although this defensive outrage has been more often studied in intergroup conflict related processes such as support for political action (Montada & Schneider, 1989), protest participation (Thomas et al., 2009) and preventative and punitive actions (Pagano & Huo, 2007), these studies have investigated outrage in situations where the boundaries between "in-group" and "out-group" were clear. That is, although moral outrage has also been found to be associated with avoidance tendencies (Smith et al., 2007) and an unwillingness to engage in contact with the other group (Esses & Dovidio, 2002), research on moral outrage may have neglected the study of group-exit because no exit can occur when groups are already two separate identities. Thus, by considering different social contexts, such those where the boundaries between groups are less evident (i.e. multiple identities), one may be allowed to put forwards the knowledge about the relationship between outrage and intergroup behavior and considering others form of collective actions, such as group-exit. Although the tendency to categorize people into distinct social groups is one of the most basic aspects of human social behavior, the notion of monolithic and distinct social categories may not always accurately reflect social reality (Levy et al., 2017). Indeed, individuals often belong to more than one group at a time and therefore may hold multiple identities. For example, Dovidio and colleagues (2009) coined the term "dual identity" to indicate a simultaneous identification with a distinct subgroup and a common superordinate group. In such a situation, when the superordinate identity is perceived to undermine one's subgroup identity, the positions of members within the group can change and can generate majority and minority position. Since minority group members are more concerned with intergroup differentiation than majority group members, they may experience stronger negative emotional reactions, such as outrage, than their counterpart. Such group-based outrage may motivate minority group members to collectively leave the majority group, as a means of defending their minority identity and improving their social status.

Applied to the Brexit situation, since leave voters experienced their membership in EU as no more satisfactory because immoral, they may have experienced a critical dissonance that resulted is a pervasive feeling of moral anger, and they may have been

valued group-exit as “the” option for reaffirming their minority identity. It may be not a coincidence that one notable difference in how the two campaigns employed economic arguments was that “leave” most often opted for describing benefits for the societal level (i.e. “for us”) while “remain” most often employed a high level of abstraction, e.g. describing benefits in terms of GDP growth (gross domestic product growth), and tried to make the risks associated with withdrawal from the EU, relevant to the personal economic situation of its citizens.

Thus, there are some indications that the defensive reaction of outrage can also fit with schismatic intentions. In this vein, the current study aimed to bring together the hypothesized effects of moral threat to group status by suggesting that these threats are more likely to evoke extreme form of defensive reactions that are explained by group-based emotions and lead to group-exit. Although moral threat can be generalized to the extent to which individuals appraise a situation as compromising one’s group social standing, in social dilemma situations such as Brexit, there might be more specific source of threat to take into account.

In this vein, the study commissioned by the EU, further mentioned that even if “*the direct and active involvement of David Cameron seems to have increased the probability of “Remain” votes*” (Mendez & Mendez, 2017, p. 92), “leave” voters “*had concerns about Cameron because he did not address the grievances that it was supposed to and was defending the status quo rather than improve it*” (Mendez & Mendez, 2017, p.101)”. In other words, David Cameron (leader of minority) may has been liable for how he conveyed the negotiation with EU. That is, its leadership may have been decisive for Britons’ decision to “leave” or to “stay”.

The notion that leadership has an important influence on followers’ behaviors, either in an intergroup context or in an intragroup context, is not new. Indeed, “*it is very difficult to think groups without thinking about who leads or manages them, and about well they are led and managed*” (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003, p.1). Without some form of leadership, many groups and organisations are not able to deal adequately with social dilemmas, because in the absence of leaders and authorities free riding in groups would be too widespread (Olson, 1965; Yamagishi, 1986). Therefore, in context where inter-group competition is high (such as when minority and majority position become salient), and minority group members seek to maximize inter-group differentiation (Hamilton, Sherman & Lickel, 1998; Scheepers, Spears, Doojse, & Manstead, 2002, 2006), minority leaders

may threaten the group image as well. If moral threats to group status (membership in EU) may have elicited outraged reactions in leave voters, and if this outrage was aimed at defending the threatened social image, then it follows that it should be those who identified more strongly with the group and endorsed their leaders more who also may have shown these responses most strongly. More specifically, it may be that those outraged reactions come from both a minority leader defending reasons and values of his/her faction or from a minority leader not defending reasons and values of his/her faction. These outraged reactions would be justified as leaders are representative of the prototypical member, and thus any inconsistencies between the leaders' behavior and the group's ideals or the message he/she convey can lead to the interpretation of the ideology and methods to achieve group goals as insincere. The inability of leaders to practice what they preach can result in disillusionment (Demant, Sloodman, Buijs, & Tillie, 2008a; Wright, 1987), resentment and doubts about leaders sacrifices to achieve group goals (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). Group members can also become disillusioned by the inability of their leaders to provide sufficient direction and focus, or adapt to the changing circumstances and, thus, inspire members (Björge & Horgan, 2009; Demant et al., 2008a; Fink & Hearne, 2008). In sum, a lack of leadership and political influence can cause members to doubt the group's capability to achieve societal change (Reinares, 2011). Consequently, leadership may become an important source of moral threat to one's group standing.

In the case of Brexit, by defending the reason to "stay" in Europe, Cameron policy may have been perceived and appraised as a leadership failure, especially among leave supporters. This may have generated harshly outrage reactions about maintaining the membership in EU. Consistent with these propositions, it may be advanced that Cameron political leadership may have indirectly increased the chances for a "leave" vote, by generating outraged reactions.

Overview and hypothesis

From the main argument that moral threat coming from leadership failure can motivate the defense of one's social identity through group exit because it arises defensive reactions of group-based outrage, three specific hypotheses were derived.

First, for leader relative ingroup prototypicality, it was hypothesized (H1a) stronger preferences to change group membership (leaving the European majority group) being expressed more from those valuing their leader (Cameron) as being low prototypical of their minority group (Great Britain). Second, it was predicted that the extent to which

individuals experienced moral outrage about maintaining a membership in the EU, will favor changes in group membership (H1b). Relative ingroup prototypicality, was also expected to trigger stronger experience of moral outrage, with those valuing their leader as low group prototypical, experiencing higher levels of outrage (H2). Furthermore, it was hypothesized that relative ingroup prototypicality would indirectly affect intention to leave the majority group through defensive outraged reactions (H3a), especially among those that appraised the Europe as a source of threat (H3b). In sum, a moderated mediation model was hypothesized with moral outrage mediating the relationship between ingroup prototypicality and the intention to leave the majority group, and with Europe threat moderating the relationship between ingroup prototypicality and moral outrage.

Method

Participants and procedure

The current study was conducted on the eve of Brexit, three days before the 2016 Referendum. For pre-selection purposes, only those participants with UK nationality and who had the right to vote in the upcoming referendum were eligible to participate. All participants were recruited via Prolific system and paid .80 penny for their participation. The questionnaire package relevant to the current study took approximately 15 minutes to be completed. Participants were told that the study was about the public opinion on the upcoming referendum (Brexit).

The sample comprised 230 participants (127 women, 103 men). Among them, 210 declared having UK nationality, 8 declared being Scottish, 1 declared coming from Northern Ireland and 11 preferred to not express their natinality. Age ranges from 18 to 77 years ($M_{age}=35.03$, $SD_{age}= 12.95$). Participants identified their political party affiliation as follows: Conservative 22.2%; Labour 39.6%; 10% LibDems¹; 3% SNP²; 6.1% UKIP³; 0.9% Plaid Cymru⁴; 10.9% Green Party; 7.4% other.

¹ Liberal democrats

² Scottish National Party

³ UK independence party

⁴ Party of Wales.

Measures

Social identification (APPENDIX A) was measured by asking participants how much they identified (3 items derived from Doosje et al., 1995; Leach et al., 2008) with Britain (e.g. “Being British is an important part of how I see myself”, $\alpha=.89$) and with Europe (e.g. “Being European is an important part of my self-image $\alpha=.91$). All items were rated on 5-points likert scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5=*strongly agree*). On average participants strongly identified with Britain ($M_{UK}=3.29$, $SD_{UK}=1.09$) and mildly identified with Europe ($M_{EU}=2.59$, $SD_{EU}=1.17$). To verify whether the strength of social identification may differ for those that wanted to remain in EU and those that wanted to leave the EU, a paired samples t-test was conducted. Results showed that “stay” voters were significantly less identified with UK ($M_{UK} = 3.08$, $SD_{UK} = 1.05$), than “leave” voters ($M_{UK} = 3.73$, $SD_{UK} = 1.04$), $t(228) = -4.35$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = 0.011$. Conversely, those that expressed their preference towards a “leave” vote were less identified with EU ($M_{EU} = 1.83$, $SD_{UK} = .96$) than those that preferred a “stay” vote ($M_{EU} = 2.95$, $SD_{EU} = 1.08$) and this difference was statistically significant $t(228) = 7.58$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = 1.074$.

Leadership. Participants were asked to evaluate their Prime Minister Cameron on group prototypicality (i.e. Platow & Van Knippenberg 2001, Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). Leader prototypicality (APPENDIX B) was assessed with 3 items such as “*My Prime Minister Cameron is acting as a good representative of the population*” on a 5-point likert scale (1= *not at all* and 5= *extremely*). Reliability of prototypicality measure was low $\alpha=.48$ and therefore one single item⁵ was used as measure of prototypicality. This result is consistent with previous research showing that the confusion about the specific meaning of prototypicality⁶ it often has resulted in measurement

⁵ In general, short measures struggle to achieve acceptable reliability because the constructs they assess are broad and heterogeneous. In the case of social identity related measure (such as identification) the construct has shown to be sufficiently homogeneous to be adequately operationalized with a single item (Postmes, Haslam & Jans, 2013).

⁶ Importantly, the present concept of leaders' identity prototypicality differs from leader prototypicality (or stereotypicality) developed within leader categorization theory (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984) that refers to the extent to which a leader is seen to be representative of leaders in general (i.e., of the category of a leader rather than the particular group that a leader is leading).

inconsistencies (Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, Platow, Fransen, Yang, Ryan, Jetten, Peters & Boen, 2014). Recent reviews (Bartel & Wiesenfeld, 2013; Hogg, Van Knippenberg, & Rast 2012; Van Knippenberg, 2011) pointed out that leader prototypicality can't be conceptualized with being maximally similar to other group members or with being an average group member. Prototypicality relates more to the ideal-type of what it means to be 'one of us' (Van Knippenberg, 2011, p. 1079; see also Steffens et al., 2014). This implies that prototypical position in the group is context-dependent (e.g. also Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992). Although leaders are valued more effective to the extent that they are seen to be 'one of us', they also need to 'do it for us' by promoting the shared interests of the group that they are leading to confirm their shared identity (i.e. Haslam, Platow, Turner, Reynolds, McGarty, Oakes, Johnson, Ryan, & Veenstra, 2001). Starting from these considerations, among the three different items used in the study questionnaire, the item "My Prime Minister Cameron is acting as a good representative of the population" has been selected because it most embeds the concepts of "doing it for us" and "being one of us". Overall participants valued Cameron as mildly prototypical ($M_{proto}=2.26$, $SD_{proto}=1.09$). A paired samples t-test showed a statistically significant decrease in Prototypicality scores from those that voted to stay ($M_{proto}=2.41$, $SD_{proto}=1.14$) to those that voted to leave ($M_{proto}=1.93$, $SD_{proto}=.93$), $t(228)=3.15$, $p<.001$, $d_{cohen}=.74$.

Moral Outrage was measured by asking participants to rate- on a 4-point likert scale (1=None and 4=High), the extent to which they were morally outraged in relation to: Cameron, Europe, Britain, about staying in Europe, about leaving the Europe (APPENDIX B). Despite the analysis of the direction of the outrage was behind the scope of the study, including them could provide a better overview of the group (UK)-based emotions during Brexit. Results from literature show that outrage is typically directed at the third part that is responsible of the moral violation and in this circumstance individuals engage more in defensive mechanism that block improvement efforts (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). However, in order to specifically address emotions related to a membership within a group and considering that is the EU membership that has been called into question for most "leave" campaign, the current study will specifically focus on outrage coming from being a member of EU. Moral outrage was conceptualized as a morally based anger and was measured with four items: hostility, anger, disgust and moral outrage (items were derived from e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas et al., 2009). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were feeling these emotions towards: their Prime Minister

Cameron ($\alpha=.93$), the Europe ($\alpha=.94$); the UK ($\alpha=.90$); about staying in Europe ($\alpha=.94$) and about leaving the Europe ($\alpha=.94$).

On average, participants felt more outrage towards Cameron ($M_{MO-C} = 2.5$, $SD_{MO-C} = .98$) and Britain ($M_{MO-UK}=2.02$; $SD_{MO-UK}=.80$) than towards Europe ($M_{MO-EU}=1.91$, $SD_{MO-EU}=.84$). Moreover, they expressed more moral outraged about leaving Europe ($M_{MO-EXIT}=2.41$; $SD_{MO-EXIT}=1.06$) than about staying in Europe ($M_{MO-STAY}=1.90$, $SD_{MO-STAY}=.96$). A paired samples t-test showed a statistically significant increase in outrage scores about maintaining the membership within EU, from those that voted to stay ($M_{MO-STAY} = 1.43$, $SD_{MO-STAY} = 0.52$) to those who voted to leave ($M_{MO-STAY} = 2.90$, $SD_{MO-STAY} = .11$), $t(228) = -15.68$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = 2.21$.

Social Identity threat was measured by asking participants the extent to which they believe Brexit was a response to years of European *e.g* “*oppression, unefficiency, incompetence, disengagement*” (7 items) on a 5 point likert scale (1=*strongly disagree* and 5=*strongly agree*). The identity threat index was created on the basis of the seminal work of Branscombe and colleagues (1999) and Stephan and Stephan (2000), and it specifically referred to the category “threats to the value of social identity” (APPENDIX C). This category reflects the notion that people attempt to defend the value of an important group membership when it is perceived to be directly attached and undermined by another group’s behavior (Branscombe et al., 1999). The index was found to have satisfactory psychometric property ($\alpha=.92$). Participants valued EU actions as an important source of threat ($M_{THREAT}=3.13$, $SD_{THREAT}=.97$). A paired samples t-test showed a statistically significant increase in threat scores, from those that voted to stay ($M_{THREAT} = 2.77$, $SD_{THREAT} = 0.52$) to those who voted to leave ($M_{THREAT} = 3.90$, $SD_{THREAT} = .71$), $t(228) = -10.03$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = .60$.

Intention to vote. Participants were asked what they will vote for in the referendum, to remain in Europe, or to leave Europe. The majority of participants were more likely to remain (67. 8%) rather than to leave the EU (32.2%) (APPENDIX D).

Results

Bivariate correlations

In order to verify preliminary relationships among study variables, zero order bivariate correlations were computed (Table 1). Moderate to strong correlations were found between moral outrage about remaining in EU and intention to leave the EU, as well as with prototypicality and social identity threat revealing preliminary relationships in line with the hypotheses.

Table 1. Correlations among variables of Study1

Measure	M	SD	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. IDB	3,29	1,09	-.194**	.213**	-.228**	.276**	-.213**	.309**	-.212**	.383**	.277**
2. IDE	2,59	1,17	-	.175**	.012	-.345**	.108	-.374**	.450**	-.372**	-.449**
3. PROTO	2,26	1,09		-	-.575**	-.187**	-.295**	-.200**	.007	-.065	-.205**
4. MO-C	2,48	0,98			-	.327**	.602**	.236**	.267**	-.024	.047
5. MO-EU	1,91	0,84				-	.358**	.814**	-.278**	.521**	.564**
6. MO-UK	2,02	0,80					-	.204**	.395**	-.022	-.027
7. MO-STAY	1,90	0,96						-	-.409**	.573**	.720**
8. MO-EXIT	2,41	1,06							-	-.435**	-.603**
9. THREAT	3,13	0,97								-	.553**
10. LEAVE INTENTION	1,32	0,47									-

Note. IDB= British Social Identity; IDE= European Social Identity; PROTO= Leader Prototypicality; MO-C= Outrage towards Cameron; MO-EU= outrage towards Europe; MO-UK= Outrage towards UK; MO-STAY= Outrage about staying in Europe; MO-EXIT= Outrage about Leave the Europe; THREAT= Social identity threat; LEAVE: intention to vote to leave.

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$;

Preliminary analysis showed an interesting and unexpected low correlation between the British social identities (UK and EU). It was found that on the eve of Brexit participants that identified with UK, tended to identify less with EU ($r = -.194$, $p < .01$). However, both those that identified with UK and EU, valued Cameron as prototypical ($r_{IDB} = .213$, $p < .01$; $r_{IDE} = .175$, $p < .01$). Correlations among social identities and moral outrage revealed that more participants identified with UK, more they experienced outrage towards Europe ($r = .276$, $p < .01$) and about remaining in Europe ($r = .309$, $p < .01$). Yet, they expressed lower feelings of outrage towards Cameron ($r = -.228$, $p < .01$), towards Britain ($r = -.213$, $p < .01$)

and about leaving Europe ($r = -.212, p < .01$). Conversely, the more participants identified with EU, the less they experienced outrage towards Europe ($r = -.345, p < .01$) and about staying in Europe ($r = -.374, p < .01$). Conversely, they expressed higher feelings of outrage about leaving Europe ($r = .450, p < .01$).

Considering the leadership dimension, the more Cameron was perceived as group prototypical, the less participants reported feelings of outrage towards Britain ($r = -.295, p < .01$), Europe ($r = -.187, p < .01$) and about staying in Europe ($r = -.200, p < .01$). Interestingly, measures of prototypicality and outrage about leaving Europe were not significantly correlated ($r = -.007, p > .05$).

With regards to the experience of threat, those that identified with UK experienced more threat in relations to EU ($r = .383, p < .01$), while identification with EU negatively correlated with the experience of threat ($r = -.372, p < .01$). Furthermore, the extent to which participants experienced being under threat was positively associated with outraged reactions towards EU ($r = .521, p < .01$) about remaining in EU ($r = .573, p < .01$), and negatively associated with outraged about leaving EU ($r = -.435, p < .01$). Interestingly, measure of prototypicality did not significantly correlated with the experience of threat ($r = -.065, p > .05$).

Looking at “EXIT” preferences, participants identification with Britain strongly correlated with preferences of leaving the EU ($r = .227, p < .01$). Conversely, participants identification with EU negatively correlated with leaving intention ($r = -.449, p < .01$). Leader prototypicality negatively correlated with intention to leave ($r = -.205, p < .01$). However, the more participants experienced threat, the higher their willingness to leave the EU was ($r = .553, p < .01$). Experiences of moral outrage towards Europe and about staying in Europe were found to positively correlate with the intention to leave the EU (respectively $r = .564, p < .01$; and $r = .720, p < .01$). Conversely, moral outrage about leaving the EU negatively correlated with exit preferences ($r = -.603, p < .01$). Feelings of outrage significantly correlated among each other's. Outrage towards Cameron was significantly associated with outrage towards Britain ($r = .327, p < .01$), Europe ($r = .602, p < .01$), about staying ($r = .236, p < .01$), and about leaving ($r = .262, p < .01$). Feelings of outrage about remaining in Europe negatively correlated with outrage about leaving Europe ($r = -.409, p < .01$), revealing that even if participants were generally outraged, they differently directed their outrage towards a specific target.

Predicting group-exit: Moderated Mediation analysis

To investigate the main hypothesis, a moderated mediation model was estimated with the leader prototypicality predicting the group membership preferences (“intention to leave”), and moral outrage (for staying in Europe) mediating the indirect effect of leader prototypicality on group membership preferences. Perceived moral threat (“Europe as a source of threat”) was supposed to moderate the relationship between leader prototypicality and moral outrage. Analysis were performed with PROCESS macro in SPSS (model 7; Hayes, 2012).

Firstly, it was examined whether minority leader prototypicality affected group membership preferences by increasing willingness to leave that majority group (H1a). The analysis (Fig. 1) revealed minority leader’s prototypicality did not directly affect group member’s willingness to leave the majority group. However, it is noteworthy that the direction of this effect was negative ($b_{\text{leave}} = -.26$, $p_{\text{leave}} = .18$), suggesting that the more Cameron was valued as prototypical, the more individuals would prefer to stay in the EU, rather than to leave the EU. Thus, Cameron was more prototypical of the majority group, rather the minority group. Second (H1b), moral outrage was found to significantly predict participants’ group membership preferences increasing their intention to leave the majority group ($b_{\text{leave}} = 2.56$, $p_{\text{leave}} < .01$; Nagelkerke $R^2 = .64$). With regards to H2, results showed that leader prototypicality significantly reduced the experience of moral outrage about maintaining a membership in the EU ($b_{\text{STAY-MO}} = -.15$, $p < .01$). That is, the less Cameron was valued as group-prototypical the higher individuals experienced moral outrage about remaining in EU. Also, the impact of social identity threat on moral outrage was positive and significant ($b_{\text{STAY-MO}} = .54$, $p < .01$), suggesting that those individuals that appraised the majority (here the Europe) as the source of threat, experienced more outrage than those that did not see the Europe as threatening their social identity. However, the interaction between leader prototypicality and social identity threat did not significantly predict moral outrage ($b_{\text{prototypexthreat}} = -.06$, $p > .24$). So social identity threat did not moderate the effect of leader prototypicality on moral outrage. Turning to the last hypothesis (H3a) the indirect effect of leader prototypicality on intention to leave the majority group via outrage was negative and significant (i.e. = $-.374$, bootstrap 95% C.I.: $-.6568 - -.1364$).

Conditional indirect effect for higher level of identity threat= $-.51^*$
 Conditional indirect effect for lower level of identity threat= $-.24$

Discussion

Findings of Study 1 provide first insights into the psychological particularities of group schism and give support to the hypothesis concerning the role of group-based emotions, and specifically of group-based outrage, in shaping group-exit.

First of all, findings showed that group-based outrage is evoked by moral threats to one's social identity, and that in circumstances where minority and majority positions are advocated, the majority position as well as the minority leader can be appraised as an important source of threat from minority group members. Results showed that minority group members that appraised the EU and their Prime Minister Cameron as a source of threat, experienced higher level of outrage about remaining in such group (EU) than their counterpart. Conversely, those that did not appraise neither the EU nor Cameron as a source of threat, experienced less outrage about remaining in EU, but more outrage about leaving the EU. These results are in line with other findings in the literature on the effect of moral threats to groups' emotions (Tetlock, 2003), and specifically that moral threats evoke affective arousal than translate into defensive moral outrage (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). In addition, this results extend prior research by showing that when majority and minority positions within the same group become evident, having a minority leader that favor the majority position can be experienced as a further and more critical source of threat, contributing to stronger negative emotional reactions and exacerbating intergroup relationships.

Of course, it may also be that minority group members appraised Cameron as less prototypical to derogate him, because he was somehow deviating from a group-norm. Perceiving that a critical member of the group is not defending the group position is a clear aversive experience that one would rather not to have. This may lead individuals to psychologically exclude the deviant as a means to reduce the dissonance that his/her behavior generated (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Pinto et al., 2010), to engage in individuals mobility (Dithrich & Sassenberg, 2016) and if alternative and stronger identity (such as the subgroup identity) are available, this may lead individuals to rely more on this identity and engage in group mobility. Consistent with this idea, results showed that those that were more prone to leave the majority group were strongly identified with their minority identity (UK), less identified with the majority group (EU) and valued Cameron as low in prototypicality. Conversely, those that were more likely to remain in EU, were more identified with the EU, less identified with UK and valued Cameron as

more prototypical. These findings seem to support the general idea that moral outrage is a defensive strategy (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013) and further extend it by showing that in a context of majority-minority conflict, this outrage can also motivates minority groups to engage in group exit, as a means to reaffirm an identity under threat.

Interestingly, the direct path between prototypicality and intention to vote was not significant. It may have happened that the voters, and specifically leave voters, may have not been so convinced about their position in the EU- UK debate, although they were emotionally distressed. Thus, the sample may have been characterized by “uncertain” leave voters and this may have affected somehow the effect of leader prototypicality of intention to vote, and nullified the effect for stay voters. Consistent with this proposition, are the positive correlations between leader prototypicality and both social identities- being identified with UK and being identified with EU. Thus, although there was a significant difference between the two groups of voters in terms of identification, prototypicality (and other measures), leave voters seemed to consider Cameron a prototypical leader, even if to a lower extent compared to the stay voters. Said otherwise, Cameron may have played a more conflictual role for leave voters and thus he may have been less influential in orienting the electorate.

Although the main prediction of this study has been confirmed (the moral outrage hypothesis), results indicated that the effect of leader prototypicality on moral outrage did not changed across conditions of threat. This may indicate that prototypicality and social identity threat are two different sources of threat and they both led individuals to experience important levels of emotional distress. Such distress motivates individuals to engage alternative and more extreme form of collective actions, such as group exit as a means of restoring the psychological balance while reaffirming one’s minority identity.

Limits of the study

Despite these promising preliminary findings, some limits may affect the generalization of results addressed by study 1.

First of all, prototypicality measure consisted of one single item. Although identity-related measure (such as identification) have been previously found to be sufficiently homogeneous to be adequately operationalized with a single item (Postmes et al., 2013), this short measure may have struggle to achieve acceptable reliability because the construct it assesses may have been broader.

Second, as the study involved a real context and it was run before knowing the real results of the referendum, one cannot select in advance a balanced sample of participants in terms of intention to vote in favor of stay or of leave. Indeed, the majority of participants in this study (67.8%) expressed a preference to maintain the membership with EU rather than to abandon it. Despite t-test analysis revealed significant differences among leave and stay voters in terms of prototypicality, social identity threat and levels of outrage, this sample imbalance may have affected the results of the mediation model. Thus, the fact that prototypicality negatively predicted participants outraged experienced may derive from the specific composition of the sample. To provide stronger evidence to the fact that leadership prototypicality represent a threat that provoke outraged experiences, one should manipulate prototypicality to have a leader more prototypical of the minority group.

Moreover, the results further showed that social identity threat did not moderate the relationship between leader prototypicality and moral outrage. One possible explanation for this missing moderation effect may be the fact that one cannot know how much Cameron's leader prototypicality was perceived as low by participants in absolute terms. In particular, it may be advanced that for lower (or for higher) levels of prototypicality the moderation effect will emerge. Indeed, perceived prototypicality may heavily depend on levels of participants identification with their (minority) group (i.e., Great Britain) and may change accordingly. Thus, by manipulating the levels of prototypicality one could further verify whether the path become conditioned by the levels of the perceived identity threat.

4.2 STUDY 2

Introduction

On 23rd of June 2016, UK electorate was called to express their preference for “stay” or “leave” the European Community (EU). The 72.2% of the UK electorate expressed their preference. The 51.9% voted to “leave” EU.

On 24th of June 2016 the PM, David Cameron resigned, and during his resignation discourse he stated: “... *I held nothing back, I was absolutely clear about my belief that Britain is stronger, safer and better off inside the European Union and I made clear the referendum was about this and this alone - not the future of any single politician including myself. But the British people have made a very clear decision to take a different path and as such I think the country requires fresh leadership to take it in this direction. I will do everything I can as Prime Minister to steady the ship over the coming weeks and months but I do not think it would be right for me to try to be the captain that steers our country to its next destination.*” (Daily Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/david-cameron-announces-his-resignation--full-statement/>).

After Cameron resignation, Theresa May won the unchallenged leadership election in July 2016, becoming Prime Minister. After about 6 months (January 2017), during a conference at Lancaster House she stated: “*A little over six months ago, the British people voted for change. They voted to shape a brighter future for our country. They voted to leave the European Union and embrace the world.*” (Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexiteer-speech-full/>).

May policy and position within the EU-membership debate strongly differed from that of Cameron. She publicly favored the “Leave” position and she devoted her work to prepare Britain for its definitive exit from Europe. Thus, and in accord with the results of the referendum, the new PM Theresa May was endorsing more the independentist position of the UK minority faction within the EU debate, and as consequences she should result a more prototypical leader than Cameron.

This critical change in the UK politics, and in particular in the leadership composition, provided a unique opportunity to overcome the limit of the study 1 and to further investigate the relationship between moral threat, moral outrage and group exit. Change in leadership should now results in a change in both the entity and in the sign of

the relationship between leader prototypicality and moral outrage, as well as in the relationship between leader prototypicality and group-behavior.

In order to ensure that both social identities (being a member of UK, and being a member of EU) and identity threat were salient to the same extent they were in the study 1, study 2 was run a week before the UK invocation of the Article 50 of the EU's Lisbon Treaty (March, 2017 -nine months after the referendum). This article is particularly relevant because it gives any EU member (in this case the UK) the right to quit unilaterally, and outlines the procedure for doing so. It gives the leaving country two years to negotiate an exit deal and once it's set in motion it can't be stopped, except by unanimous consent of all member states. After this period, the Treaties that govern membership no longer apply to Britain. Therefore, triggering Article 50 started the clock running and represented an important historical moment for UK and the whole EU. As a matter of its importance, during those days, anti- Brexit protests broke out on London streets and strong affective reactions were experienced and expressed through media. Said otherwise, UK citizens perceived the call of Article 50 as critical moment for their future, as the 2016 referendum was.

Given the circumstances that characterized the days before the call for article 50, the main aim of Study 2 was to replicate the results of the mediation model of study 1, and to observe whether a change occurs in the path linking leader prototypicality to moral outrage. In this endeavor, the study recalled back the same sample of participants of study 1 and invited them participate to study 2 (the follow-up). To overcome the limits due to the sample composition (in Study 1 the majority was “stay” voters), an additional sample of “Leave” voters were recruited. This would gave the opportunity to weight the role of “stay” vs “leave” position within the model.

In this study a further measure was introduced: group-based regret (e.g., Brehaut, O'Connor, Wood , Hack, Siminoff, Gordon, Feldman-Stewart, 2003). The reason why regret was measured is to show that the decision to leave should not only be coherent with the outrage experienced before the decision was taken but should also be coherent with the emotion experienced after the decision is taken. Who endorsed the “leave” should be less regretful than who endorsed the “stay”, and (high) outrage levels in should be correlated to regret levels.

Overview and hypotheses

The theoretical model and the derived hypothesis did not changed with respect to study 1. First, for leader relative group prototypicality, it was expected (H1a) stronger preferences to change group membership (to definitively leave the majority group-EU) being expressed from those valuing their minority leader (Theresa May) as being more prototypical of their minority group (the UK). Second, it was expected that the extent to which individuals experienced moral outrage about re-acquiring EU membership, will favor minority group members to confirm their preferences towards group-exit (H1b). Relative ingroup prototypicality was also expected to trigger strong experience of moral outrage about coming back in EU (H2), with those valuing their leader as low group prototypical, experiencing higher levels of outrage. It was further hypothesized that relative ingroup prototypicality would indirectly affect intention to leave the majority group by inducing morally outraged reactions (H3a), especially among those that appraised the Europe as the source of threat (H3b).

Method

Participants and procedure

All participants were recruited via Prolific system and paid .80 penny for their participation. Two different samples of participants were collected. The first sample consisted of participants that took part in Study 1 (follow-up sample). Among the 230 participants from Study1, only 116 participants replayed at time 2. Due to the poor sample size and considering that the 63.8% of participants were “Remain” voters, it was recruited and additional sample of 111 “leave” voters.

In the following sections, the results will be presented independently for the follow up sample and the whole sample. In the “measure” section, the descriptive statistics will be showed all together thus allowing instant comparison. Conversely, the results (correlations and regression analysis) will be discussed separately.

The questionnaire package relevant to the current study took approximately 15 minutes to complete. Participants were told that the study investigated the public opinion about Brexit nine months after the referendum.

The follow-up sample comprised 116 participants⁷ (69 female, 47 male) with an average age of $M_{age}=38.65$ years ($SD_{age}=12.97$; ages ranges from 18 to 68 years). The whole sample declared UK nationality. Participants political party affiliation was as follows: Conservative 27.6%, Labour 29.3%, LibDems 14.7%, SNP 3.4% UKIP 6.9%, Green Party 12.1%, and 6% not declared.

The total sample comprised 227 participants (126 women, 101 men). Among them, 170 declared having UK nationality, 6 declared being Scottish and 51 did not provide any declaration. However, participants only those participants with UK nationality and who had vote for Brexit were eligible to participate. Age ranges from 18 to 68 years ($M_{age}=39.44$, $SD_{age}=12.70$). Participants political party affiliation was: Conservative 35.2%, Labour 26%, LibDems 8.4%, SNP 2.6%, UKIP 13.2%, Green Party 8.8%, 5.7% not declared.

Measures

Social identification was measured by asking participants how much they identified with Britain (e.g. “Being British is an important part of how I see myself”, $\alpha=.89$) and with Europe (e.g. “Being European is an important part of my self-image” $\alpha=.91$). Both these measures consisted of four items (derived from Doosje et al., 1995; Leach et al., 2008, see APPENDIX E). All items were rated on 5-points likert scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5= *strongly agree*).

On average participants of both follow-up sample and total sample strongly identified with Britain (follow-up sample $M_{UK}=3.32$, $SD_{UK}=1.11$; total sample $M_{UK}=3.40$, $SD_{UK}=1.14$). The follow up sample mildly identified with Europe ($M_{EU}=2.64$, $SD_{EU}=1.14$) as well as the total sample ($M_{EU}=2.41$, $SD_{EU}=1.18$). To verify whether the strength of social identification may differ for those that wanted to remain in EU and those that wanted to leave the EU, a paired samples t-test was conducted. Results showed that “stay” voters where significantly less identified with UK ($M_{UK}=3.07$, $SD_{UK}=1.14$), than “leave” voters ($M_{UK}=3.59$, $SD_{UK}=1.10$), $t(225)=-3.351$, $p<.001$, $d_{cohen}=.467$. Conversely, those that expressed their preference towards a “leave” vote was less identified with EU ($M_{EU}=2.16$, $SD_{UK}=1.18$) than those that preferred a “stay” vote ($M_{EU}=2.87$, $SD_{EU}=1.04$) and this difference was statistically significant $t(225)=4.53$, $p<.001$, $d_{cohen}=0.627$.

⁷ A series of t-test analysis, revealed that the participants of Study 1 that did not take part to Study 2 (n=114) did not statistically differ from the follow-up participants (n=116), in none of the study variables. Thus, although the high rate of drop-out (114), the follow-up sample seems to represent adequately the sample of Study 1.

Table 2: Summary of Means, and Standard Deviations for Scores on the following measured variables: IDB, IDE, PROTO, MO-M, MO-EU, MO-UK, MO-BACK, MO-OUT, THREAT, REGRET

Measures	M	SD	M	SD
IDB	3,32	1,11	3,40	1,14
IDE	2,64	1,14	2,41	1,18
PROTO (May)	2,62	1,26	3,00	1,28
MO-M	1,94	1,00	1,76	0,91
MO-EU	1,54	0,66	1,80	0,87
MO-UK	2,05	0,95	1,79	0,91
MO-BACK	1,94	1,06	2,37	1,11
MO-OUT	2,08	1,01	1,74	0,93
THREAT	3,08	1,01	3,39	0,97
REGRET	3,21	1,33	2,64	1,58

Note. Means and Standard Deviation for the follow up sample (n=116) are presented in the first two columns. Means and Standard Deviation for the total sample (n=227) are presented in the second and third column. For all scales, higher scores are indicative of more extreme responding in the direction of the construct assessed. IDB= British Social Identity; IDE= European Social Identity; PROTO= Leader Prototypicality; MO-M= Outrage towards May; MO-EU= outrage towards Europe; MO-UK= Outrage towards UK; MO-BACK= Outrage about coming back in Europe; MO-OUT= Outrage about remaining outside the Europe; THREAT= Social identity threat.

Leadership. Participants were asked to evaluate their new Prime Theresa May on group prototypicality (e.g Van Knippenberg 2000, 2005). Leader prototypicality (see APPENDIX F) was assessed by asking participants the extent to which they agree (1= *not at all* and 5= *extremely*) with three statements (these statements were the same used in Study 1, e.g. “My Prime Minister Theresa May is acting as a good representative of the population”). Reliability of prototypicality measure was low $\alpha=.63$ and therefore one single item was used as measure of prototypicality (the same item used in Study 1). Overall participants valued May as high prototypical of their group (followup sample: $M_{proto}=2.62$, $SD_{proto}= 1.26$; total sample: $M_{proto}=3.0$, $SD_{proto}= 1.29$). Further revealed that leave voters

rated May as more prototypical ($M_{proto}=3.4$, $SD_{proto}= 1.15$) than stay voters ($M_{proto}=2.28$, $SD_{proto}= 1.19$), and this difference was statistically significant $t(225)=-6.955$, $p<.001$, $d_{cohen}=0.962$.

Moral Outrage was measured by asking participants to rate- on a 4 point likert scale (0=None and 4=High), the extent to which they were morally outraged in relation to: Cameron, Europe, Britain, about coming back in Europe, about remaining outside the Europe (see APPENDIX G). Again, the analysis of the direction of the outrage was behind the scope of this second study, however including them could provide further information.

Moral outrage was measured with the same items used in Study 1 (hostility, anger, disgust and moral outrage; e.g. Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas et al., 2009). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were feeling these emotions towards: their Prime Minister May ($\alpha=.94$), the Europe ($\alpha=.93$), the UK ($\alpha=.94$), about coming back in Europe ($\alpha=.95$), about remaining outside the Europe ($\alpha=.95$).

On average, participants from both samples felt medium levels of outrage towards May (follow-up sample: $M_{MO-M}=1.94$, $SD_{MO-M}=1.00$; total sample: $M_{MO-M}=1.76$, $SD_{MO-M}=.91$) and towards Europe (follow-up sample: $M_{MO-EU}=1.54$, $SD_{MO-EU}=.66$; total sample: $M_{MO-EU}=1.80$, $SD_{MO-EU}=.87$). Levels of outrage towards Britain was similar to the levels of outrage towards Europe, with those from the follow-up sample experiencing more outrage towards Britain than those from the overall sample (follow-up sample: $M_{MO-UK}=2.05$, $SD_{MO-UK}=.95$; total sample: $M_{MO-UK}=1.79$; $SD_{MO-UK}=.91$). In a similar vein, participants from the follow-up reported medium levels of outrage about coming back in EU ($M_{MO-BACK}= 1.94$, $SD_{MO-BACK}= 1.06$), while those from the total sample the average outrage was medium to high ($M_{MO-BACK}= 2.37$, $SD_{MO-BACK}= 1.11$). Interestingly, participants in the follow-up sample reported more outrage about remaining outside ($M_{MO-OUT}= 2.08$, $SD_{MO-OUT}= 1.01$) than about coming back in EU, while the total sample reported the reversed effect ($M_{MO-OUT}= 1.74$, $SD_{MO-OUT}= .93$). Thus, participants were more likely to feel outrage about coming back in Europe than about remaining outside the Europe. These results may due to the fact that the 111 additional participants recruited to have a proper sample size voted “to leave” at the 2016 Referendum, and thus they did/still rely on outraged reactions to motivate/support their choice. A t-test analysis on the whole sample, revealed that those that voted to stay experienced lower levels of outrage about coming back in Europe ($M_{MO-BACK}= 1.39$, $SD_{MO-BACK}= .57$) than leave voters ($M_{MO-BACK}= 2.92$, $SD_{MO-BACK}= .95$), and this difference was statistically significant $t(225)= -13.256$, $d_{cohen}= 1.836$. Conversely, stay

voters experienced higher levels of outrage about remaining outside the EU ($M_{MO-OUT}= 2.52$, $SD_{MO-OUT}= .97$) than their counterparts ($M_{MO-OUT}= 1.30$, $SD_{MO-OUT}= .52$), $t(225)=12.354$, $p<.001$, $d_{\text{cohen}}= 1.705$.

Results in terms of regret towards Brexit further provide an indirect evidence of this pattern (see below).

Social Identity threat was measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which they believe Brexit being a proper response to years of European i.e. *oppression* (same items of study 1; see APPENDIX H). Participants rated on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with each item (1=*strongly disagree* and 5=*strongly agree*). The index was found to have satisfactory psychometric property ($\alpha=.92$). Overall participants strongly appraised Brexit as the consequence of years of European unfair political actions (follow-up sample: $M_{threat}= 3.08$, $SD_{threat}=1.01$; total sample: $M_{threat}= 3.39$, $SD_{threat}= .97$). However, a t –test analysis revealed that those that did not wanted to come back in EU appraised the EU as more threatening ($M_{threat}= 3.79$, $SD_{threat}= .80$) than those that wanted to come back ($M_{threat}= 2.67$, $SD_{threat}= .82$), $t(225) = -9.938$, $p<.001$, $d_{\text{cohen}}= 1.387$.

Group-based Regret was measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which they agree with a series of items (items derived from Brehaut et al., 2003) related to the decisions that Brits made about Brexit, that is to leave the Europe (i.e. “it was the right decision”, see APPENDIX I) on a 5-point liker scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5=*completely agree*). The scale was found to have satisfactory psychometric property ($\alpha=.91$). A paired t-test analysis revealed “stay” voters experienced more group-based regret with regards to Brexit results ($M_{regret}=3.71$, $SD_{regret}= .80$) than “leave” voters ($M_{regret}=2.47$, $SD_{regret}=1.63$), $t(225)=6.41$, $p<.001$, $d_{\text{cohen}}= 0.892$.

Intention to vote. Participants were asked: “*If the Referendum was held today, what would you vote for?*” (see APPENDIX I). The majority of participants from the follow-up replayed they would choose to stay (74= 63.8%) and (42= 36.2%) to leave. However, the total sample express their preference towards a leave vote (145= 63.9%), rather than a stay vote (82= 36.1%).

Results

Manipulation check

Leader prototypicality

First, a t-test showed a statistically significant increase in prototypicality scores from Study 1 ($M_{PROTO} = 2.26$, $SD_{PROTO} = 1.09$) to Study 2 ($M_{PROTO} = 3.00$, $SD_{PROTO} = 1.28$), $t(456) = 6.77$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = 0.623$. That is, on average May was valued as more prototypical than Cameron (see Fig. 2).

Figure 4: Average leaders (Cameron and May) prototypicality scores in Study 1 and Study 2

Second, participants in Study 2 were also asked to indicate which one of the two Prime Minister (Cameron or May) was a) more representative of the UK population and b) was more likely to be defined as “one of us”. A t-test revealed a statistically significant difference for leaders’ prototypicality scores. Those that perceived May as being more representative of the UK population (Fig. 3), valued she as being more prototypical ($M_{MAY} = 3.38$; $SD_{MAY} = 1.13$) than those that perceived Cameron as more representative of the UK population ($M_{MAY} = 2.23$; $SD_{MAY} = 1.21$), $t(225) = 2.26$, $p < .001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = .97$.

Figure 5. Average Manipulation check scores on May prototypicality, Study 2. Comparison between those that valued Cameron as more representative of UK and those that valued May as more representative of UK, Study 2.

The same pattern of results was found for scores related to “being one of us” question. Those that perceived May as being more “one of us” (Fig. 4) rated she as more prototypical ($M_{MAY}= 3.31$; $SD_{MAY}= 1.18$) than those that perceived Cameron as being more “one of us” ($M_{MAY}= 2.23$; $SD_{MAY}= 1.21$), $t(225)=1.02$, $p<.001$, $d_{\text{cohen}} = .90$.

Figure 6. Average Manipulation check scores on May prototypicality Study 2. Comparison between those that defined Cameron as “one of us” and those that valued May more as “one of us”, Study 2.

Bivariate correlations

In order to verify preliminary relationships amongst variables computed zero order bivariate correlations were computed (Table 3). Moderate to strong correlations were found between moral outrage about coming back in EU and intention to leave the EU, as well as

between prototypicality and social identity threat, revealing preliminary relationships among the study variables in line with the hypotheses.

Table 3. : Correlations among Study 2 variables for the followup sample and whole sample.

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. IDB	-	-.020	.337**	-.218**	.140*	-.301**	.259**	-.208**	.175**	.218**	-.070
2. IDE	-.090	-	-.253**	.175**	-.072	.272**	-.264**	.290**	-.213**	-.289**	.175**
3. PROTO	.485**	-.309**	-	-.655**	.081	-.547**	.292**	-.464**	.263**	.421**	-.182**
4. MO-M	-.239**	.281**	-.710**	-	-.002	.638**	-.240**	.625**	-.338**	-.353**	.215*
5. MO-EU	.179	-.148	.086	.018	-	.166*	.524**	-.050	.457**	.282**	-.154.**
6. MO-UK	-.387**	.373**	-.625**	.656**	.151	-	-.209**	.813**	-.271**	-.465**	.243**
7. MO-BACK	.254**	-.360**	.331**	-.223*	.441**	-.194*	-	-.421**	.600**	.662**	.331**
8. MO-OUT	-.326**	.415**	-.562**	.644**	.005	.827**	-.412**	-	-.445**	-.636**	-.338**
11. THREAT	.288**	-.337**	.350**	-.323**	.403**	-.264**	.600**	-.381**	-	.552**	-.293**
10. LEAVE	.277**	-.386**	.429**	-.297**	.204*	-.415**	.761**	-.584**	.586**	-	-.393**
INTENTION											
11.REGRET	-.213*	.255**	-.353**	.339**	-.274**	.353**	.571**	.482**	-.394**	-.517**	

Note. Correlations for follow-up sample (n=116) are presented below the diagonal, and correlations for the total sample (n = 227) are presented above the diagonal. For all scales, higher scores are indicative of more extreme responding in the direction of the construct assessed. IDB= British Social Identity; IDE= European Social Identity; PROTO= Leader Prototypicality; MO-M= Outrage towards May; MO-EU= outrage towards Europe; MO-UK= Outrage towards UK; MO-BACK= Outrage about coming back in Europe; MO-OUT= Outrage about remaining outside the Europe; THREAT= Social identity threat; LEAVE: intention to re-vote to leave.

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$;

Follow up correlations

Preliminary analysis of the follow-up results revealed that nine months after Brexit, and one week before the Article 50, some important changes occurred.

First, participants' social identities (being UK, being EU) were not correlated anymore ($r = -.090$, $p = .34$). While in Study 1 being a member of UK implied being not a member of EU, in Study 2 this pattern is not anymore evident. Correlations among social identities and measure of prototypicality revealed another change from Study 1. While in the previous study, Cameron prototypicality correlated with both social identities, May prototypicality now showed a positive association with UK social identity ($r = .485$; $p < .01$) and negative

association with EU social identity ($r=.485$; $p<.01$). Thus, compared to Cameron, May was valued more prototypical of UK identity than EU identity.

Correlations among social identities and feelings of moral outrage revealed a positive association between UK identity and feelings of outrage about coming back in Europe ($r=.254$; $p<.01$), and a negative association between UK identity and feelings of outrage towards May ($r=-.239$; $p<.01$) and about remaining outside Europe ($r=-.326$; $p<.01$). Conversely, the correlation between EU identity and feelings of outrage about coming back in EU was negative ($r=-.326$; $p<.01$). Positive associations between EU identity and outrage towards May ($r=.281$; $p<.01$), and outrage about remaining outside EU were also found ($r=.415$; $p<.01$).

Considering the leadership dimension, the more May was perceived as prototypical, the less participants reported feelings of outrage towards Britain ($r = -.625$, $p < .01$) and about remaining outside the Europe ($r = -.562$, $p < .01$). Conversely, measures of prototypicality and outrage about coming back in Europe were positively correlated ($r= .331$, $p<.01$). This pattern of results suggests that those that perceived May as high in prototypicality were less distressed by the idea of remaining outside the Europe but more distressed about the idea of coming back in Europe.

With regards to the experience of threat, those that identified with UK experienced more threat in relations to EU ($r=.288$, $p < .01$), while identification with EU negatively correlated with the experience of threat ($r= -.337$, $p < .01$). Furthermore, the extent to which participants experienced being under threat was positively associated with outraged reactions towards EU ($r=. 403$, $p < .01$), about coming back in EU ($r=. 600$, $p < .01$), and negatively associated with outrage towards UK ($r= -.264$, $p < .01$) and about remaining outside the EU ($r= -.381$, $p < .01$).

Differently from Study 1, measures of threat significantly correlated with prototypicality ($r= .350$, $p < .05$), revealing that those that valued May as prototypical of their group, valued the Europe (the majority) as more threatening.

Looking at participants “EXIT” preferences (they were asked what they would have vote if the referendum was held that day), participants identification with Britain positively correlated with preferences of a leave vote ($r= .227$, $p < .01$). Conversely, participants identification with EU negatively correlated with leaving intention ($r= -.386$, $p < .01$). Contrary to the results in Study 1, in Study 2 leader prototypicality was found to positively correlate with intention to vote for leave the EU ($r= .429$, $p < .01$). However, the more

participants experienced a sense of threat, the higher their willingness to leave was ($r=.586$, $p<.01$).

Experiences of moral outrage towards Europe and about coming back in Europe were found to positively correlate with the intention to vote for leave the EU (respectively $r=.204$, $p<.01$; and $r=.761$, $p<.01$). Conversely, moral outrage about leaving the EU negatively correlated with exit preferences ($r=-.415$, $p<.01$). Measures of outrage towards different objects significantly correlated with each other's. Outrage towards May was positively associated with outrage towards UK ($r=.656$, $p<.01$) and about remaining outside the EU ($r=.644$; $p<.01$). Outrage towards May was negatively associated with feelings of outrage about coming back in EU ($r=-.223$; $p<.05$). Interestingly, outrage towards May was not significantly associated with feelings of outrage towards Europe ($r=.018$, $p=.84$). Differently from Study 1, where feelings of outrage were similarly directed to different focus showing a positive association between the different measure of outrage, Study 2 reveal a pattern more in line with ingroup and outgroup dynamics.

Looking at the correlations between group-based regret and study variables, results showed that it was negatively associated with UK identity ($r=-.213$, $p<.01$), with May prototypicality ($r=-.353$, $p<.05$), with outrage towards the EU ($r=-.274$, $p<.05$), outrage about coming back in EU ($r=-.571$, $p<.05$), social identity threat ($r=-.394$, $p<.05$) and intention to leave the EU membership ($r=-.517$, $p<.05$). Conversely, it was positively associated with EU identity ($r=.255$, $p<.05$), with outrage towards May ($r=.339$, $p<.05$), outrage towards UK ($r=.353$, $p<.05$) and outrage about remaining outside the EU ($r=.482$, $p<.05$).

Correlations with a sample of additional participants

Results among study variables with an additional sample revealed that results did not changed consistently. Both the direction and the size of the correlations were confirmed (see Table 3). Only the relationship between UK social identity and experience of outrage towards Europe become now significant, showing that the higher individuals felt being member of UK, the more they were experiencing outrage towards Europe ($r=.140$; $p<.05$). Also, the association between group-based regret and UK identity changed becoming now not significant ($r=.07$, $p=.33$).

Predicting group exit: Moderated Mediation analysis

The same moderated mediational model tested in study1, was also tested in Study 2 using the PROCESS macro in SPSS (model 7, Hayes, 2012). Analysis revealed that both relative in-group minority leader prototypicality ($b = 1.00$, $p < .01$) as well moral outrage ($b_{\text{leave}} = 2.73$, $p_{\text{leave}} < .00$) significantly predicted changes in membership preferences (H1) (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .65$, $p < .01$; Fig. 5).

However, contrary to expectations it was found that the higher May was valued as prototypical of UK the higher were the experiences of moral outrage, and the higher was also their willingness to confirm to remain outside the European Union. Thus, differently from Study 1, leader prototypicality was found to amplify feelings of moral outrage (H2) about coming back in EU ($b_{\text{mo}} = .13$, $p = .06$). Social identity threat significantly predicted moral outrage ($b_{\text{mo}} = .56$, $p < .01$), meaning that those individuals that appraised the majority (the Europe) as a source of threat for their identity, experienced more outrage, than those that did not appraise the Europe as the source of threat.

However, the interaction between leader prototypicality and social identity threat did not significantly predict moral outrage ($b_{\text{prottoxthreat}} = .06$, $p > .27$). Finally, the indirect effect of leader prototypicality on intention to leave via moral outrage was significant (i.e., indirect effect $b = -.18$, bootstrap 95% C.I.: $-.5554 - -.0210$;) confirming so the result emerged in study1.

Figure 7. Results from the path analysis (Study 2, follow-up sample). All coefficients were mean centred

Results with a sample of additional participants

Analysis on the whole sample did not changed consistently. Overall, the direct effects of both prototypicality and outrage on leaving intention were confirmed (H1). The more May was valued as prototypical of the minority group, and the more individuals experienced moral outrage about re-acquiring the EU membership, the more they were likely to abandon the majority group (direct effect for prototypicality: $b_{\text{leave}} = .75$, $p_{\text{leave}} < .01$; direct effect of moral outrage: $b_{\text{leave}} = 2.09$, $p_{\text{leave}} < .00$; Nagelkerke $R^2 = .75$, $p < .01$; Fig. 6).

The impact of relative ingroup prototypicality on feelings of moral outrage become now completely significant, showing that the sample composition may have an influence of the outcomes. The higher Theresa May was valued as prototypical of the minority group (UK), the higher individuals experienced feelings of outrage about maintaining the membership in EU ($b_{\text{mo}} = .12$, $p < .05$).

The effect of perceived identity threat on moral outrage remained statistically significant, confirming that being under condition of threat generates emotional distress ($b_{\text{mo}} = .62$, $p < .01$).

However, also in this case, leader prototypicality and social identity threat did not significantly interact to predict moral outrage ($b_{\text{prototoxthreat}} = -.05$, $p = .43$). Overall, predictors explained about 39% of total variability observed in moral outrage ($R^2 = .39$, $p < .01$). Looking at the indirect effects, results showed that the indirect effect of leader prototypicality on intention to leave via moral outrage, was statistically significant (i.e. indirect effect $b = .25$, bootstrap 95% C.I.: .0560 - .4919).

Figure 8. Results from the path analysis (Study 2, whole sample). All coefficients were mean centered.

Discussion

Nine months later, the second study replicated the preliminary findings of Study 1 by showing that feelings of moral outrage are still strongly associated with group behaviours and particularly with group-exit. Results showed that when minority group members experienced higher levels of outrage about maintaining their membership within the EU, they were more likely to remain outside that group and less likely to coming back in the EU. Conversely, members that experienced lower levels of moral outrage about EU membership, were less likely to vote for a definitive leave and more likely to vote for “coming back”. These results are in line with the findings of Study 1 and suggest that in circumstances where a common super-ordinate identity exists, and it is perceived as undermining the subgroup identity and values, minority group members are more likely to react emotionally with outrage and through such outrage engage in group-exit.

Findings of Study 2 provided further evidence that threats to one’s group values evoke strong negative emotional experiences. Similarly, to Study1, Study 2 showed that those Brit citizens that appraised the Europe as the source of threat for their minority group (the UK), reacted more harshly when thinking about re-acquiring the EU membership. Conversely, those that did not appraise the EU as the source of threat, experienced lower level of outrage and were more distressed about a definitive abandon of such membership. This result extends prior research about the defensive role of moral outrage, by showing that also in those contexts where there is a common superordinate identity that unifies different groups, if members of a subgroup experience that their identity is undermined by the superordinate identity, they can react with the same or even more outrage as if the threats come from a real out-group. In line with these propositions, previous research has shown that people sometimes judge in-group members more harshly than out-group members for the same action (i.e. the black sheep effect; Marques et al., 1988).

Interestingly, in this second study, the relationship between leader prototypicality and outraged reactions become positive. Results showed that the higher May was valued as prototypical of the minority group (UK), the more individuals experienced outrage about re-acquiring the membership in EU. Conversely, in Study 1, it was found that the more Cameron was perceived as prototypical of the minority group, the less individuals experienced moral outrage about remaining in EU. This change may reflect the fact that those leaders that sustain the position of their group, are valued as being more prototypical and consequently they can amplify or dampen the emotional experiences of their groups

members to pursue identity related goals. As a matter of fact, Cameron elicited less outraged reactions about remain in EU in those citizens that were more prone to remain in the EU, because his point of view was clearly favoring them (the majority position).

Conversely, he evoked more outraged reactions in those citizens that valued him as less prototypical because they believed that he was not endorsing their minority needs. Interestingly, Study 2 found that Theresa May evoked more outrage about coming back in EU in those members that wanted to secede from EU than in those members that wanted to remain in the EU. That is, the less May was valued as being prototypical (of the majority group) the less individuals would experience outraged reactions about remaining in EU.

Thus, results of Study 1 and 2 showed that the two leaders represented two opposing factions of the same group and as a consequence they were perceived as posing a threat by one faction and not the other, and thus conveyed different group-based emotions. It may be further advanced that leadership may have differently affected the emotional experienced of the two conflicting factions in two ways. First, leaders that are not prototypical of the minority group because they sustain the majority position (or leaders that are not prototypical of the majority group because they sustain the minority position), may represent an important source of threat to subgroup's value and morality. In this circumstance, moral outrage may be interpreted more in terms of a defensive reactions to one's group identity. Second, leaders that are prototypical of the minority group (or prototypical of the majority group), and thus sustain the minority (majority) identity needs, may amplify and sustain outraged reactions that minority (majority) members need to definitively break up (or to assimilate) with their counterpart. Said otherwise, when an intragroup situation become an intergroup situation, leadership may be the gateway where groups-based emotions are dampened or amplified according to each group's goal, thus influencing group behaviours.

Evidence of such processes, further emerges when one compares the results of the two studies with respect to the relationship between prototypicality and group-exit. While the direct effect of Cameron was not significant in predicting intention to leave, and was fully mediated by outraged feelings, in the second study May prototypicality did directly influence group-exit (partial mediation). Thus, it may be that in circumstances where leaders threaten the identity of their group, moral outrage may independently predict group-exit as a means to defend the identity. Conversely, when leaders sustain the minority identity, moral outrage may be used more as a mean through which enhance the threaten identity.

However in both circumstances, moral outrage represented the key emotional component able to motivate individuals to collectively engage a schism.

Findings about group-based regret provide indirect support to these propositions. Results showed also that British citizens that regretted more the choice UK made during the referendum, were less likely to experience moral outrage about a renovated EU-membership and thus were more likely to assimilate the majority positions. On the other hand, those that experienced less group-based regret about the referendum results, experienced higher levels of outrage and were more likely to strive for remaining outside the Europe, rather than coming back.

Limits of the study

One of the main advantage of Study 1 and 2 is that they investigated and found similar evidence about the psychological underpinnings of schism in real-life situations. Although this represents a novel result, some important limitations need to be discussed and addressed by further studies.

First of all, all variables in study 1 and in study2 were “measured” and not manipulated. Although changing in leadership between study 1 and study 2 during Brexit allowed us to investigate how outrage values changes when prototypicality threat changes and consequently how these indirect effects of outrage have affected the decision to leave, we still do not know whether we would still observe these effects when outrage levels are directly and experimentally controlled and manipulated. Thus, one can’t properly explain the role of outrage in schismatic phenomena in terms of causality. Indeed, by hypothesizing that moral threats indirectly affect membership preferences through moral outrage, means that moral outrage is one of the possible “cause” of group-exit. Thus, only by manipulating outrage and (experimentally) controlling for moral threats, one can observe if outrage really motivates group members (especially minority group members) to abandon the majority group as a means to defend and improve their social identity. These considerations further call into question what one has effectively measured with moral outrage and group-exit and if they really have the same meanings for participants across contexts and group types. Indeed, literature on moral outrage traditionally associated morally based anger to different form of collective actions, such as political protest and public demonstration (Iyer et al., 2007; Lodewijkx et al., 2008). But study 1 and study 2 showed that moral outrage may play also a role in group-exit behavior. Thus, it is crucial that to clarify if group-exit and group-voice are two distinct forms of collective actions linked to the same outrage feelings or

maybe to a different form of outrage, and identify those conditions and circumstances that may be crucial for the relationship moral outrage and group behaviour.

Although, the results of the mediational models found moral threats increasing the likelihood to experience moral outrage and in turn to lead minority group members to leave the majority group, what they didn't identify are the conditions where outrage increase the tendency to leave, and the condition where outrage instead increase the tendency to remain in the group. Previous research has for example found that moral outrage motivates protest by lowering risk appraisal, by increasing perceptions of control and by accelerating decision making (Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitska et al., 2008). Thus, there might be other circumstances and processes through which moral outrage may operate to motivate group-behavior that need to be differentiated from those where outrage motivate group-exit. Similarly, scholars are increasingly showing the importance of considering each discrete emotion, because each of these may underlie different emotional states and thus have different social functions. Although moral outrage has been traditionally conceptualized as a single undifferentiated emotional response, others have argued for differences among its components. For example, Rozin and colleagues (1999) mapped the moral domain, by identifying three specific moral emotions (CAD hypothesis): anger, disgust, contempt. These discrete emotions were found to be associated to a violation of three specific moral codes (community, autonomy and divinity). Consistent with this proposition, research on the social function of the emotions, found that the observation of behaviour that negatively impacts the self or the in-group paired with high level of control over the situation lead to anger (Mackie et al., 2000) which in turn generate a willingness to engage in protest and collective actions (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Conversely, observing a behaviour that negatively affect the self, paired with lower levels of control have been found to evoke more contempt or fear (Mackie et al., 2000) a state associated with avoidance tendencies and withdrawal from a situation that is responsible for social rejection and social exclusion (Fisher & Roseman, 2007). Thus, it may be that considering the social function of moral outrage, may improve the understanding of its association with inter-group behaviour. In this endeavour, Study 3 will be devoted to the experimental manipulation of moral outrage components in order to predict which of the different types of collective actions (voice vs exit) are significantly predicted, and in this aim Study 3 will try to better clarify the role of social functions of moral outrage in group-schism.

4.3 STUDY 3

Introduction

Results of study 1 and study 2 converge in sustaining the hypothesis that feelings of outrage may explain group-exit in the UK-EU debate. These outraged feelings mostly prevailed in “leave” voters who appraised EU as threatening the value and the identity of their minority group (UK). Seen through the lens of minority- majority, moral outrage may have sustained the needs of the “leave” faction to differentiate from the “stay” faction as a means to reaffirm their minority identity under threat.

Despite these new and interesting results, there is a need to better clarify the casual relationship between moral outrage and group-exit, and to identify those specific circumstances where moral outrage exclusively leads to group-exit.

To date, research on moral outrage has been focused on predicting various forms of collective behaviors, such as political participation and protest, in context where in-group and out-group were clearly defined. No study to date have merged research on moral outrage with research on schisms.

One factor that may have limited this kind of research resides in the conceptualization of outrage. Traditionally, it has been conceptualized as a morally based anger, but anger convey more a “fight for” reaction (i.e., fight for stay in EU) than a “flight from” reaction (i.e., better to leave EU to regain national identity as Theresa May Speech suggested). Thus, by focusing exclusively on the angry component one may not properly differentiate between “fight for” reaction and “flight from” reaction. There is a need to use different theoretical lens to explain moral outrage.

In this vein, the socio- functional approach to emotions suggests that each discrete emotion has different relational antecedents and communicate quite different messages (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004), thus serve different purposes, and play different roles in the relationship between individuals, groups and cultures (Ekman, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner, Haidt & Shiota, 2006). In particular, for the triad of negative social emotions concerned with judging the actions and the dispositions of the other (CAD Hypothesis, Rozin et al., 1999; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011), two particular discrete emotions may be useful to differentiate “fight for” reaction form “fligh from” reaction, i.e. respectively anger and contempt (Fisher & Roseman, 2007). Although they are both negative emotions that signal norm and rights violations (e.g.,

Giner-Sorolla, Caswell, & Bosson, 2012; Rozin et al., 1999) they communicate different things. While anger is approach-oriented, and it is aimed at confronting the other group about the injustice and gears up individuals towards actively addressing the perceived wrong (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2004; Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012), contempt implies avoidance orientation, and motivates individuals to distance from the source of threat (e.g. Roseman, Copeland & Fisher, 2003). Differently from anger, contempt belongs to the exclusion family of emotions and has been found to lead individuals to devalue or even dissolve the intergroup relationship, and avoid further contact (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).

Thus, contempt has exactly the opposite function of anger: the rupture of social relationships. Interestingly, a study by Ditrich and Sassenberg (2016) found that feelings of contempt were linked to a desire to avoid and withdraw from a situation when members of a minority group experienced very low levels of control and over outcomes (Fennis and Aarts, 2012; Guinote et al., 2006; Wright et al., 1990). These lower levels of control allow individuals to have a more negative view about the other (Fisher & Roseman, 2007). As such, contempt is more likely to occur in less intimate settings such as social groups.

Furthermore, since contempt signals the desire to exclude the other and to end a relationship, it should also result in higher levels of psychological disengagement from such relationship. On the other hand, the relational function of anger should have more positive effects on relationship maintenance, thus decreasing the willingness to change one's membership within a group, and maintaining the engagement with a group. Accordingly, contempt and anger should also result in different forms of collective action, with contempt motivating more individual and group mobility ("Fligh from") and anger motivating more voice ("fight for": stay and increase the efforts for reaffirming own identities within majority).

Voice and exit (Hirschman, 1970) are two forms of collective action in response to one's dissatisfaction with the status quo. While voice implies individual's engagement to actively change the circumstances and improve the situation, exit implies a disengagement from the situation. Accordingly, in his study on migration intention, Opp (1989) found that individuals dissatisfied with their leaving condition within a country were more likely to move to another place, especially when they did not identify with their actual leaving place. Conversely, dissatisfied individuals that strongly identified with their leaving place were more likely to fight for the situation (voice) by e.g. establishing citizen initiatives. In this study, it may be that those individuals that were more likely to migrate, experienced more

feelings of contempt towards their leaving condition rather than anger, and this contempt may have helped them to psychologically disengage from their leaving place. As a matter of fact, the social function of contempt consists of moving undesirable object or person (and their undesirable characteristics or outcomes) away (exclude) from the self rather than trying to change it (i.e. Roseman & Fisher, 2007).

In this vein, it may be decisive to separate the effect of contempt from the effect of anger (discrete emotions do not necessarily exclude one another) as they may “motivate” different collective behaviors.

Applied to the Brexit scenario, it may be that contempt contributed to group-exit more than anger because it strongly relates to one’s disengagement and disidentification.

Although, previous research has found that the desire for intergroup differentiation can manifest in a variety of behaviors to maximize intergroup differences, including perceiving the in-group to be better than the outgroup (Tajfel et al., 1971), derogation of the out-group (Scheepers et al., 2002) and allocating more resources to the in-group than to the outgroup (Brewer, 1979), it may be that contemptuous moral outrage allows individuals to maximize intergroup differentiation by disengaging from a group identity. By disengaging, individuals can reshape their self-concept to reduce the salience of the threatening group identity (the majority). Said otherwise, individuals that belongs and strongly identify with their minority group, and they perceive being under threat, they may decrease their psychological identification and increase their psychological disengagement with the majority position, and this may be crucial in generating the intention to leave the group.

Core to the social-categorization theory is the fact that individuals self-categorize with the aim of enhancing their self-esteem. Thus, when one’s social self is perceived being at the stake, as happen when a superordinate identity is perceived to undermine one subgroup identity, one’s self-esteem may be compromised, and individuals may psychologically disengage from the superordinate group to reaffirm one’s subgroup identity and thus maintain high level of self-esteem. Previous research has in fact found that psychological disengagement allows individuals to cope with a threatening situation- such as discrimination, prejudice and social stigma- and maintain high level of self-esteem (Crocker & Major, 1989). In such circumstances, individuals de-categorize from groups that threaten their identity by devaluing and discounting those dimensions on which their group fares poorly and to value those dimensions where their group excels.

In a similar vein, research on organizational citizenship behavior suggests that increased exit intentions (i.e., increased withdrawal or turnover cognitions; Hom & Griffeth, 1991; Sager, Griffeth, & Horn, 1998) reflects an ongoing psychological detachment from an organization (Griffeth, Hom & Gaertner, 2000; Tett & Meyer, 1993) and this process implies that employees decrease their personal engagement with, or psychologically separate themselves from their involvement in the organization (Burris et al., 2008). Detachment from an organization lead employee becoming “*physically uninvolved in tasks, cognitively unvigilant, and emotionally disconnected from others in ways that hide what they think and feel, their creativity, their beliefs and values, and their personal connections with others*” (Kahn, 1990, p. 702). Conversely, when individuals are attached to their organization they more frequently voice because attachment leads employees to exert effort on behalf of the organization (LePine & Van Dyne, 1998). Thus, contrary to detachment, attachment generate employee engagement (Harrison, Newman, & Roth, 2006). Despite the experience of disengagement can vary according to individual contexts as each group has its own “complexities, uniqueness and nuances” (Bjørge & Horgan, 2009, p. 2), it should be positively related to leaving intention even at group-level.

However, disengaging from a group may be particularly costly, as it implies giving up with some important aspects of one’s identity. Disengaging from a group may represents a form of betrayal and consequently seen as deviant behavior (Millward & Brewerton, 2000). Consequently, one should be particularly motivated to disengage from a group. Since psychological disengagement also arises in circumstances of threat (Harris, 2015), and since these circumstances have been found to be particularly relevant for group-based moral outrage (Study 1 and Study 2), feelings of outrage and in particular contemptuous outrage may specifically increase psychological disengagement which in turn may increase the likelihood of “exit”. Said otherwise, psychological disengagement may mediate the relationship between moral outrage and group-exit.

In this endeavor, the present study seeks to further examine the relationship between moral outrage and group-exit, by experimentally manipulating the social function of outrage in a minority-majority context, and by considering how induced feelings of outrage (anger vs contempt) differently affect collective actions (voice vs exit) by activating or not psychological disengagement. In sum, the present study advances that group-based outrage and group-based disengagement may explain how a minority reacts with different collective action (exit vs voice) to a threat coming from the majority group. More

specifically, it was hypothesized that different induced outraged conditions may have an indirect effect on collective action (exit vs voice) through group-based disengagement.

Overview and Hypotheses

The main aim of study 3 was to reproduce in a controlled experimental setting the conditions that led Britons to exit, by inducing appropriate levels of outrage in people belonging to a minority faction that is threatened by majority. Figure 7 schematically depicts the temporal sequence of the main manipulations.

Figure 9. Details of experimental procedure.

First, a factious scenario was presented to participants aimed to create majority and minority positions within a superordinate identity (all participants played the role of minority: UK). Specifically, participants were provided with a brief presentation of the activities of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the relevance of such organization for international policies were stressed. Participants were induced to believe that they were already a member of such Panel. Immediately after, participants were invited

to read a recent report from IPCC aimed to induce them to believe that their group (the minority) was somehow under-performing (with respect to majority) in terms of environmental attitudes and behaviors. This situation introduces the moral threat of majority towards the minority. Then, two different components of moral outrage were manipulated (between conditions): in one condition, the scenario conveyed a threatening message in an angry way; in the other condition, the scenario conveyed the threatening message in a contemptuous way. At the same time a further factor was also manipulated: for each of the two types of outrage (angry vs contempt) participants were induced to believe that this message was directed either towards their minority group (thus blaming the minority group), or towards the majority group (thus blaming the majority group). The target of moral outrage was considered because it is associated with different defensive reactions (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013). Therefore, minority members feeling contempt toward majority may have a different (collective) reaction with respect to members of a minority feeling contempt toward the minority. The same reasoning applies for angry feelings. Considering that minority members are more sensitive to threats and they strive more for intergroup differentiation, being accused of immorality may be critical for them, and may lead to group-exit.

Moreover, considering that during the schism of Brexit, the leader (David Cameron) played a key role in defending the stay position and hence the EU (oppressing) politic, the condition where the direction of outrage was manipulated, consisted of messages expressed by a factious minority leader. Thus, the leader was conveying the angry vs contemptuous message aimed at blaming the minority (protecting the majority) vs the majority (protecting the minority). Said otherwise, in one condition, the minority leader was defending the majority arguments (like David Cameron before Brexit), in the other condition the minority leader was defending the minority arguments (like Theresa May after Brexit). Starting from these considerations, it was hypothesized that:

H1a. The experience of group-based contempt will impede group's members striving to remain in the majority group thus increasing their willingness to leave the majority group.

H1b. The experience of minority group-based anger will motivate group members to remain in the majority group thus increasing their willingness to voice.

H2. The extent to which psychological disengagement is experienced, will favor group-exit behavior rather than group-voice.

H3a. Group-based contempt will lead individuals to leave the majority group by increasing their level of psychological disengagement (mediation hypothesis).

H3b. Group-based anger will lead individuals to voice towards the majority group, by increasing their level of engagement.

Finally, it was further hypothesized that:

H4a. The direct effect of manipulated outrage on psychological disengagement will be moderated by the manipulated focus of outrage, with individuals exposed to the majority directed contempt being more likely to leave the majority group.

H4b. The direct effect of manipulated outrage on psychological disengagement will be moderated by the manipulated focus of outrage, with individuals exposed to the minority directed anger outrage being more likely to voice towards the majority group.

In sum, the current study hypothesizes a moderated mediational model where moral outrage's component are the focal predictors and have direct effects on collective action (group exit/voice). Moreover, the study hypothesize that manipulated level of outrage have indirect effects on collective action through the psychological disengagement process. Finally, we advance that the indirect effect will be moderated by the target of outrage (blaming the majority vs blaming the minority).

Method

Participants and Design

Three hundred eight participants ($M_{age}=34.08$ years, $SD_{age}=10.2$; 233 women) recruited through Prolific system were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: Moral Outrage components (Anger outrage vs Contemptuous outrage) x Moral Outrage focus (Target of the manipulated outrage: Minority group -Minority Leader blaming the Minority- vs Majority group -Minority leader blaming the Majority) between subject design.

Moral outrage was manipulated in two successive steps. Firstly, it was induced by threatening participants' social identity. More specifically, participants were presented a report published by a neutral, uncommitted source, where the (minority) group (UK) moral standing was put under stake. Secondly, moral outrage was manipulated by presenting to participants (the minority) the reaction of their (minority) leader, whose outraged message (a) either focused the majority (thus defending the minority group) or the minority (thus

defending the majority group), and conveyed either (b) anger based outrage or contempt based outrage.

Due to the specific purpose of the study, that is to study minority members reactions to majority posing threats, only participants with UK nationality (the minority within the scenario), born in UK and that were currently living in UK were eligible to participate. In this way, the minority group was not factious, but established from a real social category. Eligible participants were paid .80 penny per hour for their participation. The questionnaire package relevant to the current study took approximately from 15 to 25 minutes to complete. Participants were told that the study was about citizens attitudes towards the environment and their opinion about the actions of intergovernmental organizations in protecting the environment.

Procedure and Measures

Phase 0: Baseline Measures

Social identity measurement: identification with Britain, and identification with environmental values.

Before starting the experiment, participants completed two scales of social identification. They were asked to rate the extent to which they identified with a) Britain and with b) Environmental Values (EID Scale, Clayton 2003). The purpose of taking these measures was to make salient these specific identities, and to allow for later manipulations. Immediately after, participants were invited to read a brief text (APPENDIX N) describing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The text was aimed at creating a positive image of the IPCC as intergovernmental body that helps countries to develop environmental sustainability vision, policies and strategies. It was specified that UK was one of the 195 members of the Panel, and that the Panel was made up of representatives of each member state. In this way, participants were induced to believe that they were already member of this Panel, and that they had a leader (hereafter called the minority leader) that represented them. As such, two social identities were made salient: being part of UK (the minority) and being part of the IPCC (the majority). Moreover, they knew they had a leader representing their country. To verify that IPCC membership was effectively made salient, immediately after the text, measures of participants' identification with IPCC were taken.

Phase 1: Inducing Moral Threat: the majority group (IPCC) threatening the moral standing of the minority group (UK).

Participants were invited to read a report published by a neutral, uncommitted source - *the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)*- stating that participants' in-group achievements regarding the implementation of pro-environmental policies were under performing⁸ (APPENDIX P). The in-group's shortcomings was framed in moral terms as follows:

"IPCC reports that Britain is among least concerned in the world about climate change. IPCC defined this behavior (UK dis-interest in adopting a more pro-environmental politics) as unfair and immoral standing the UK position within the IPCC. Many UK funding programs are currently under-performing, leading to a series of negative outcomes which will require extra work from all the countries".

This procedure served to ensure that the predicted effects were due to threat to morality, rather than to participants feeling more or less provoked by statements issued by a superior group (intergroup sensitivity effects, Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Oppes & Svensson, 2002). The report focused on a psychologically relevant topic that can be considered an issue that is relevant for nations worldwide⁹.

To lend more credibility of this claim the official logo of the IPCC was used. The purposes of this procedure was to ensure that participants perceived themselves under condition of moral threat, and to allow for the manipulation of moral outrage later in the study.

Phase 1.1: Measurement of threat

In order to verify that participants effectively perceive that their identity was under threat, they were asked the extent to which the situation described in the text i.e. "undermined their sense of self-worth as UK citizen".

⁸ a modified version of Tauber and Van Zomeren (2013) scenario was used.

⁹ Environmental pollution, the toleration of human rights abuses, support for authoritarian regimes, actions that break with cultural or religious norms, and the exploitation of labor are all important categories of business practices that inspire outrage (Lindenmeier, Schleer & Priel, 2009).

Phase 2. Manipulation of Moral Outrage (Angry Outrage vs Contemptuous Outrage).

At this point, the manipulation of moral outrage was introduced by assigning half participants to the anger condition, and the other half to the contempt condition. The conditions were structured on the basis of the results of Study 1 and 2. These studies highlight the importance of leadership in intergroup conflict, where the need for intergroup differentiation is high. When individuals feel that they have been treated unfairly by an authority, they are likely to experience anger (Bies & Tripp, 2002), and prototypical leaders helps people to express this emotional distress with the aim of defending the social identity under threat. As a consequence, moral outrage was manipulated by presenting individuals with the reaction of their UK representative within the IPCC. Two different scenarios were created, one was aimed at generating group-base anger, the other group-base contempt. In this way, one would be allowed to verify whether the anger or contempt component of outrage differently affect inter-group behaviors. The specific content of each scenario was built around recent research showing that the main difference between anger and contempt is that contempt implies the appraisal that the other is inferior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). In contempt the other is despised as stupid, incompetent, or immoral (see also Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Conversely, anger focus more on stressing the extent to which the other is blocking our goal and therefore motivate approach behaviors to regain control.

Thus, participants in the anger-outrage condition received the following text (see APPENDIX U for both manipulation texts) *“it is my view that IPCC is right when they state that UK it is not sufficiently engaged in promoting, endorsing and funding pro-environmental politics. So, I believe that too many UK individuals wrongly take advantage of low government-controlled system.”*

Phase 2.1 Manipulation of outrage direction (minority leader blaming majority vs minority leader blaming minority).

To bring forward the discussion about moral outrage, a further manipulation that differentiated the focus of outrage was introduced. Previous research has in fact found that feelings moral outrage arises when one judges and condemns the behavior of others, because it is valued as unfair. Since previous research has found that leadership is always endorsed when is in-group favoring (Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2001), outrage was further manipulated by altering the direction of the communication. Because communication can either communicate favorable ingroup standing or unfavorable ingroup

standing and this may generate different reactions, among those in the condition angry-outrage, half of participants were administered with the scenario where the anger expressed by the minority leader was directed towards them (the minority-the UK), while the other half received the manipulation where the target of the minority leader's anger was the majority (the IPCC). The same procedure was employed for those in the outrage- contempt condition. For example, individuals in the condition anger-outrage towards majority, were presented with the following statements:

“the efforts we made have not been fully appreciated by IPC and this means that extra work is required, and this will spread frustration. IPCC also need to revise its politics and implement rules that are compatible with the local community”.

Those in the contempt-outrage towards majority condition were presented with the following statements:

“It is my view that IPCC does not have an appropriate understanding about what environmental care is about, neither what problems UK is facing today. The interests of the world cannot always come before our local community's (individual) interests, and the former should not take the control over the other. I expected IPCC to show quick thinking and generate creative ideas-and so far, we haven't seen them either. The work done by IPCC doesn't show the originality that we have grown accustomed to here.”

Phase 3. Measurement of dependent variables

At this point, the dependent variables (DVs) were introduced: psychological disengagement (Tougas et al., 2005), and collective action (2 items to measure exit, 4 items to measure Voice, items derived from Hirschman, 1970). Participants responded to all questions on a 5-point scale, with anchors counterbalanced across participants. Scale anchors for all DVs were *strongly agree* (1) and *strongly disagree* (5). Only emotions scale anchors were *not at all* (1) and *extremely* (5).

Measures

Social identity measures

Identification with Britain and identification with environmental values. Participants indicated how much they identified with Britain on four items (e.g. “Being British is an important reflection of who I am”, “In general belonging to the UK is an

important part of my self-image”, $\alpha=.79$; derived from Doosje et al., 1995; Leach et al., 2008) and with environmental values on six items (e.g. “Engaging in environmental behaviors is important to me” $\alpha=.79$, from Environmental Identity (EID Scale, Clayton 2003; APPENDIX L, M). All items were rated on 5-points likert scale ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). On average participants strongly identified with both identities. However, their level of identification with environmental values ($M_{EID}=3.47$, $SD_{EID}=0.9$) was higher than their level of identification with UK ($M_{IDB}=2.88$, $SD_{IDB}=.96$).

Identification with IPCC. Participants indicated how much they identified with IPCC on three items (e.g. “I believe that is important to be part of such international panel where environment-related issues are discussed”, $\alpha=.89$) on 5-points likert scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5= *strongly agree*; APPENDIX O). On average participants strongly identified with IPCC ($M_{IPCC}=3.47$, $SD_{IPCC}=.9$).

Social Identity Threat. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the content of the report e.g. “undermined their sense of self-worth as UK citizen” (APPENDIX P). Participants completed the SIT scale, by rating three items on a 5 point-likert scale (0= *untrue for me*; 5= *true for me*). Reliability of the measure was good $\alpha_{threat}=.77$; on average participants reported high levels of threat ($M_{threat}=3.23$; $SD_{threat}=.95$).

Group based Moral Outrage was measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which the situation made them feel angry and contemptuous as UK citizen on a 5 point likert scale (1=*not at all*; 5= *extremely*; APPENDIX R).

Leader prototypicality. It was measured by asking participants the extent to which they agree or disagree of a 5 point likert scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5= *completely agree*) with three items related to their leader (i.e., “I can define as one of us”). The items were derived from Study 1 and Study 2 (see scale APPENDIX S). Reliability of the measure was discrete $\alpha=.65$. Thus, one single item was used as a measure of prototypicality. The item was the same of Study 1 and 2: “He is acting as a good representative of UK ”.

Psychological Disengagement was measured by asking participants to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree with a series of statements (15) on a 5 point likert scale (1= *completely disagree* and 5= *completely agree*). The scale was a modified version of the Psychological Disengagement scale (Tougas et al., 2005). It consisted of two sub-scales, one measured devaluation and the other discounting (APPENDIX T).

Devaluation sub-scale consisted of 7 items such as “being successful in IPCC environmental standards is not part of the most important things for our country”. Reliability of the measure was good $\alpha_{DEV}=.76$. Overall participants reported high level of devaluation ($M_{DEV}=3.07$, $SD_{DEV}=.62$).

Discounting sub-scale consisted of 7 items such as “the judgment passed from IPCC on UK faithfully reflect who we are”. Internal consistency was good $\alpha=.70$. On average, participants reported high discounting scores ($M_{DIS}=3.14$, $SD_{DIS}=.60$). The two sub-scales strongly correlated with each other’s ($r=.522$, $p<.001$).

Collective actions. As potential concrete examples of the two theoretical categories of collective action (i.e., exit, voice), 6 behaviors were selected. These examples were selected to include the range of options suggested by both the withdrawal and EVLN theory (Hirschman, 1970). Exit was operationalized with two items: “I want us, the UK, to seriously consider ending the membership within IPCC”; “As a UK citizen, I am not likely to continue the relationship with IPCC”. Voice was operationalized with four items i.e. “I want to work out a solution that is good for both of us (UK and IPCC)” and “I am thinking about engaging in collective actions (to protest)” (APPENDIX U). Participants were asked the extent to which they would be more likely to engage in each of the behaviors listed on a 5-point likert scale (1=*extremely unlikely* and 5=*extremely likely*). Reliability of both exit and voice measures was good ($\alpha_{exit}=.82$; $\alpha_{voice}=.80$). Interestingly, correlation among exit and voice was not significant ($r=.05$, n.s).

Results

Moral outrage

Anova analysis revealed that the experience of group-based anger and group-based contempt did not change across conditions. There was no effect of manipulated outrage components on group-based anger ($F(1,304)=1.215, p=.271, \eta_p^2=.004$), nor on group based contempt ($F(1,304)=.011, p=.915, \eta_p^2=.000$) among participants. The effects of manipulated direction of outrage did not significantly differentiated the experience of group-based anger ($F(1, 304)=.139, p=.709, \eta_p^2=.001$) from group-based contempt ($F(1, 304)=.111, p=.739, \eta_p^2=.000$). Furthermore, the interaction effects of the manipulated outrage components x manipulated outrage direction on group-based anger ($F(1,304)=1.796, p=.181, \eta_p^2=.006$) and on group-based contempt ($F(1, 304)=.044, p=.835, \eta_p^2=.000$) were not significant. To better understand why the manipulation failed, the correlation between the two discrete emotions were analysed. In the whole sample, the correlation between these two emotions is $r=.350$, and it changes across the four conditions, as follows (Table n 4):

Table 4. Correlations between anger and contempt in the four experimental conditions

		MORAL OUTRAGE DIRECTION	
		TOWARDS MINORITY	TOWARDS MAJORITY
MORAL OUTRAGE COMPONENTS (Anger vs Contempt)	ANGER	$r=.369^{**}$	$r=.476^{**}$
	CONTEMPT	$r=.165$ (n.s.)	$r=.405^{**}$

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Prototypicality

Anova analysis revealed a significant interaction effect between manipulated moral outrage components and manipulated moral outrage direction on prototypicality ($F(1, 304)=4.50, p=.035, \eta_p^2=.007$). Specifically, participants in the contempt condition, valued their leader as more prototypical when the focus of outrage was the majority ($M_{proto}=3.48, SD_{proto}=.12$), rather than the minority group ($M_{proto}=3.13, SD_{proto}=.12$).

Psychological Disengagement

Anova analysis revealed a significant direct effect of moral outrage direction on devaluation $F(1, 304)=7.015, p=.009, \eta_p^2=.002$), and a significant interaction effect of moral outrage components per moral outrage direction on devaluation $F(1, 304)=10.76, p=.001, \eta_p^2=.034$. Specifically, when the outrage was directed towards the majority, participants engaged more in devaluation strategy ($M_{DEV}=3.15, SD_{DEV}=.05$) than when the outrage was directed towards their minority group ($M_{DEV}=2.97, SD_{DEV}=.05$). Moreover, when the outrage was directed toward the majority group and was contempt type, participants devalued more their membership within IPCC ($M_{DEV}=3.39, SD_{DEV}=.07$) than when it was angry type ($M_{DEV}=3.01, SD_{DEV}=.07$). A pairwise comparison of manipulated outrage direction with manipulated components of outrage on devaluation further revealed a barely significant interaction effect when the outrage was directed towards the minority. In such circumstance, participants devalued more when the outrage was anger type ($M_{DEV}=3.06, SD_{DEV}=.07$), rather than contempt type ($M_{DEV}=2.88, SD_{DEV}=.08$), $F(1, 304) = 3.197, p = .075, \eta_p^2 = .011$).

With regards to the discounting strategy, anova analysis found only a significant direct effect of the manipulated direction of moral outrage on discounting scores ($F(1, 304)=13.18, p = .000, \eta_p^2 = .004$). Thus, when moral outrage was directed to the majority, participants discount more their membership within IPCC ($M_{DIS}=3.26, SD_{DIS}=.048$) than when moral outrage was directed towards the minority ($M_{DIS}=3.02, SD_{DIS}=.047$). Although the interaction effect was not statistically significant, a pairwise comparison revealed something noteworthy. When the outrage was angry type, participants discounted more when this outrage was directed towards majority ($M_{DIS}=3.21, SD_{DIS}=.07$) than when the outrage was directed towards the minority ($M_{DIS}=3.01, SD_{DIS}=.06$), and this difference was statistically significant $F(1,304)= 4.559, p=.034, \eta_p^2 = .015$). Participants discounted more also when contempt was directed towards the majority ($M_{DIS}=3.32, SD_{DIS}=.07$) than towards minority ($M_{DIS}=3.03, SD_{DIS}=.07$) and this difference was statistically significant $F(1, 304) = 8.890, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .028$).

Predicting Group-Exit: A Moderated Mediation Model

To test the main hypotheses, a moderated mediation model was implemented with the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Hayes, 2012). It was advanced that the manipulation of outrage components (Anger vs Contempt), and psychological disengagement would have

both a direct and significant effect on group collective behavior (exit or voice). It was also hypothesized that the manipulated outrage (Anger vs Contempt) should have a direct effect on psychological disengagement. Finally, it was advanced that the indirect effect of moral outrage components of group behavior, via disengagement would be moderated by the manipulated direction of outrage. Results concerning the exit prediction will be presented in the present paragraph while results concerning voice outcome will be presented in the next paragraph.

Firstly, it was examined whether manipulated moral outrage (contempt) and psychological disengagement, would affect membership preferences (H1). The analysis revealed that while the manipulated moral outrage (contempt) did not significantly influenced participants' membership preferences ($b_{type}=.051$, $p=.60$), psychological disengagement increased participants willingness to leave the majority group ($b_{dis}=.54$, $p_{dis}<.00$).

With regards to H2, it was found that the impact of the manipulated outrage (contempt) on psychological disengagement was not significant ($b_{type}=.049$, $p=.47$), thus outraged contempt did not significantly influenced participants' psychological disengagement. Conversely, the impact of the manipulated direction of moral outrage (toward majority), on psychological disengagement was significant ($b_{dir}=.17$, $p<.01$), meaning that when the outrage (contempt) was directed towards the majority, minority group members disengaged more from the majority group. Interestingly, the effect of manipulated outrage (contempt) on psychological disengagement was moderated by the manipulated direction (toward majority) of moral outrage ($b_{type \times direct}=.45$, $p<.001$, $R^2=.06$). More specifically individuals of minority manipulated with contempt directed towards the majority group showed significant higher levels of disengagement from the majority group than participants assigned to the angry condition,

Furthermore, conditional indirect effects, thorough psychological disengagement, showed that individuals manipulated with contempt directed towards majority were more likely to leave the majority group ($b_{ind}=.15$ CI [.06, .27]) than those participants manipulated with contempt directed towards the minority ($b_{ind}=-.09$, bootstrap 95% CI: [-.21, .01]). In conclusion, only in presence of contemptuous outrage directed toward majority the psychological path is active and increase the probability to endorse an exit strategy.

Figure 10. Results from the path analysis (Study 3; VD Group-exit). All coefficients were mean centred.

Predicting group-voice: a Moderated Mediation Model

Then it was examined whether manipulated moral outrage (contempt) and psychological disengagement, would affect group voice (H1). The analysis revealed that the manipulated moral outrage (contempt) did not influenced participants' intention to voice towards the majority ($b_{type} = .012, p = .87$). Conversely, psychological disengagement did affect participants intention to voice, but differently from the results of the previous model where disengagement increased the group-exit, here it decreased the likelihood to voice towards the majority group ($b_{dis} = -.57, p_{dis} < .01$). Thus, psychological disengagement had an opposite effect on group behavior, it motivated group-exit while at the same time it dissuaded group-voice.

With regards to H2, again the impact of the manipulated outrage (contempt) on psychological disengagement was not significant ($b_{type} = .05, p = .47$), while the impact of the manipulated direction of contempt (toward majority), on psychological disengagement was significant ($b_{dir} = .17, p < .01$). The interaction between manipulated moral outrage (contempt) and manipulated direction (toward majority) significantly predicted psychological disengagement again ($b_{type \times direct} = .45, p < .001$), confirming that discrete emotions (and in particular contemptuous outrage) do not have significance per se, but they need to be

contextualized and it need to be directed toward a target to activate disengagement processes that lead to appropriate collective behavior (like group-exit).

Conditional indirect effects, through psychological disengagement, showed that individuals manipulated with contempt (with respect to angry) directed towards majority were significantly less likely to voice towards the majority group ($b_{ind} = -.16$, bootstrap 95% CI: $[-.29, -.06]$) with respect to individuals exposed to the contempt towards the minority ($b_{ind} = .10$, bootstrap 95% CI: $[-.01, .21]$). In conclusion, differently from the collective exit prediction, collective voice seems more probable not when contempt toward majority is activated but rather when feelings of angry outrage toward majority prevail.

Figure 11. Results from the path analysis (Study 3; VD Group-voice). All coefficients were mean centred.

Discussion

The aim of study 3 was to bring forward the results of Study 1 and Study 2 about the effect of moral outrage on group-exit, by directly manipulating moral outrage components (angry vs contempt) and direction (toward minority vs toward majority). The study, was also aimed at extending the results of those studies, by pointing psychological disengagement as a key mediator of the relationship between outrage components and collective actions. It was hypothesized that, in a context characterized by a majority group threatening a minority group, moral outrage, and in particular contemptuous outrage, would motivate members of the minority group to engage in group-exit by increasing their psychological disengagement with the majority group, only when this outrage is directed toward majority.

The results partially supported the hypothesis concerning the prototypical pattern of contempt and anger on group-exit via psychological disengagement. Although psychological disengagement significantly increased group's members willingness to leave the majority group, neither anger nor contempt were found to significantly predict group-exit nor psychological disengagement. Thus, while results extend previous research on psychological disengagement, by showing that it can be also a group level-strategy that minority group's members use to prepare their exit from a majority group, the argument that anger and contempt have different social-function corroborate previous findings. However, the results that anger and contempt motivated different collective actions when they were directed towards different target (the majority vs the minority) is novel to the literature and bring attention to the fact that what may make emotions group-based and thus relevant for group (rather than) individual behavior, is that they should be directed towards a group different from the own. The results that when the contempt was directed towards the majority group, minority group's members disengaged more from the majority group, and this in turn increased their willingness to leave the majority group, may indicate that group-behavior is activated when the target of the group-based emotions (in this circumstance contempt) is the threatening group. This explanation is in line and merges previous research on the defensive function of outrage (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013) with that on the social function of emotions (e.g. Roseman & Fisher, 2007).

The results that anger did not affect group-exit but it affected group-voice further sustain these evidences. It was found that anger towards majority but not contempt did increased group-voice through psychological disengagement (negative). This result allows

to further sustain the argument that these two emotions have different focus that give birth to different group behaviors, with anger leading to a more engaged reaction of “fight for” while maintaining the social relationship than contempt (e.g. Roseman & Fisher, 2007). Moreover, the fact that exit and voice did not correlate, allows to affirm that the circumstances identified in the study were able disentangle the antecedents of group exit from those of group voice, respectively anger and contempt (both towards the majority).

A further comment that need to be done rely to the fact that the manipulation of the outrage direction was realized by inducing participants to believe that they were reading some statements of their minority leader who was reacting to the threat posed by the majority group (the factious superordinate identity of IPCC). Results showed that when the leader supported his group position and thus protected the group image, he was more endorsed (in terms of prototypicality) than the leader who did not favour the group. These results give further support to the idea that moral outrage and group-exit are associated with the defense of one’s social identity, and that leader’s actions and behaviors are decisive aspects of one’s social identity (e.g. Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2012).

The results that neither anger nor contempt when directed to the minority predicted group-exit or group-voice are in line with the argument that group-based behaviors are more likely to occur in a context of intergroup comparison. It could be that when the outrage is directed towards the minority, individuals may react more at individual level (individual mobility and individual disengagement, e.g. Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988; Pinto et al., 2010; Prislin & Christensen, 2005) than on group level.

The lack of significant difference between the measured angry and contempt may lead to the conclusion that these two discrete emotions do not necessarily exclude one another in situations of conflict, and thus a better definition of outrage is needed to disentangle the difference between angry vs contemptuous based outrage. As recently suggested by Roseman and Fisher (2007) according to which when anger persists over a longer period of time, it might start to coexist or completely develop into contempt, differentiating the temporal dynamics of those emotions may represent a direction for further studies, and it seems to represent a good explanation also for Brexit.

CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION

The current research, inspired by the recent events at international level such as Brexit, aimed to offer an explanation for the observation that in some situations collective outrage may motivate members of a subgroup to undergo a schism (Liebman, et al., 1988; Worchel, 1984), that is they leave their parent group (the common superordinate group; Dovidio et al., 2009) to form a breakaway group or to join another group.

The Social Psychological Model of Schismatic Processes (Sani, 2005) suggested that a schism is triggered by the perception that a given situation is subverting the central, historically grounded principles forming the group identity. This perception causes subgroup members to question the group as a whole and changes the social structure of the group, generating majority and minority positions. If negotiation process between the two factions fails, the dissatisfaction of the minority group members may become so severe to end up in group-exit. However, this model remained silent about the emotional and cognitive aspects that may be involved. From different line of thoughts in the literature on the effects of group-based emotions on social action (e.g. Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2009), and in the literature on the effects of identity threat on intergroup relationship (Monin et al., 2007; Tetlock, 2002; 2003), the present research hypothesized that group-based moral outrage may be decisive in motivating schismatic instances of a minority group.

Several negative emotions, such as hatred, have been found to play a destructive role in intergroup conflict, affecting the preservation of conflict, and hindering conflict resolution (Halperin, 2011). Although interpersonal anger as well as moral outrage have been found to motivate groups to engage in collective actions (e.g. protest), Hirschman suggested (1970) that individuals and groups act in a continuum of exit-voice possibilities. When the costs of exit are lower than the costs of voice, the discontent is more likely to lead to group exit than to group voice, especially among those individuals that are highly identified with the subgroup. Likewise, groups are embedded in a social structure and minority groups members are more concerned with changing the status quo as an attempt to regain control and achieve group distinctiveness (Doosje et al. 1999a). Thus, minority group members may be more likely to engage in group exit as an attempt to regain control and achieve extreme intergroup differentiation. These considerations map onto the general idea that moral outrage is a defensive reaction associated with the motivation to defend one's social identity under threat (sacred-value protection model, Tetlock, 2002).

In this endeavour, the current research suggested that when an intragroup conflict concerns important aspect of one's identity (such as group status, morality and more

generally group value), minority and majority factions start to negotiate. While majority group members will try to assimilate the minority group (Horenczyk, 1996), the minority faction will try to differentiate from the majority and if the differentiation fails, minority group members will become so outraged (threat hypothesis) that they will see exit as the sole option to reaffirm their group distinctiveness (outrage hypothesis). Morally based anger may help them to make strong moral judgment, to deeply condemn the others and transforms an intragroup situation in an intergroup situation, by sharpening group boundaries and by devaluing that group membership (disengagement hypothesis). These three hypotheses have been investigated in the present research studies. More specifically, the threat hypothesis was supported in the first two studies, the outrage hypothesis was supported by all three studies, while the disengagement hypothesis was supported in the third study.

Study 1 and Study 2 investigated the recent phenomena of Brexit, and were run respectively few days before the referendum of 2016, and few days before the invocation of the article 50, in the 2017. Both studies showed that the UK faction that was more dissatisfied and distressed with the UK membership in EU (leave voters), was more likely to vote for leaving the EU in the Referendum, as well as nine months after the referendum. The reversed pattern held for those that were less outraged by the EU membership (stay voters). Study 3, extended the group-based outrage explanation for group-exit, by pointing to psychological disengagement as a key mediator of such relationship. Morally outraged individuals, especially those experiencing higher levels of contempt, strongly disengaged from the majority group, and this increased their likelihood for exit while decreased their likelihood for voice. Overall, these results extend previous research on moral outrage and collective actions, by showing that moral outrage and psychological disengagement are two defensives reaction that are particularly relevant for minority group members when they contemplate leaving intention, rather than collective protest.

The notion that moral threats are particularly relevant in terms of psychological consequences, because they are strongly related with the social identity (threat hypothesis), was supported in both Study 1 and 2. The studies considered two class of intra-group threat: one as coming out from being a minority (the UK position in EU), the other coming out from leadership failure (the PM, David Cameron, defending the EU politics in study 1 and the PM, Theresa May, defending the UK politics in study 2). It was argued that the extent to which the leader would be appraised as being a source of identity threat (measured in terms of prototypicality), should resulted in increased feelings of moral outrage and group-

exit, especially among those that appraised the EU as undermining the UK identity. The results of Study 1 and Study 2 partially confirmed the hypothesis, and at the same time provided new insight into the association between identity threat and moral outrage.

Consistent with expectations, in the first study, individuals that perceived their leader (Cameron) as threatening their UK identity, experienced more group-based outrage about maintaining the EU membership, and this motivated them to vote for the exit of the UK. They perceived the EU more as an out-group rather than an in-group, as the negative correlation between the identities (UK and EU) demonstrated. Conversely, those that perceived their leader as representing the UK identity, thus that agreed about the assimilation of the UK identity in the EU identity, reacted with less outrage and were less likely to exit.

In study 2, after a change in leadership of UK, findings were reversed, although they indirectly confirmed the expectations. In this second study, May was the leader and differently from Cameron, she was endorsing a “leave” position. Thus, she was somehow more prototypical of the minority faction than Cameron, as the manipulation checks demonstrated. In this context, and according to the hypothesis, it was expected that she would be appraised less as a threat, thus decreasing expression of outrage. Interestingly, the reversed pattern was found. Although, she was perceived as more prototypical than Cameron, she somehow amplified the minority outrage. Indeed, the more she was valued as being prototypical of the UK, the more the outraged expressions increased. One explanation for such results may be that leaders can create either emotional dissonance or emotional resonance in their followers. The emotional dissonance occurs when leader negatively drive emotions, that is when they convey emotions that are dissonant with the emotions of their followers. On the other hand, they can positively drive emotions when they are emotionally coordinated with their followers. While Cameron may have created emotional resonance with stay voters, and emotional dissonance with leave voters, Theresa May may have created emotional dissonance with the stay voters and emotional resonance with the leave voters. When leaders create emotional dissonance they may be perceived as less prototypical, and as a consequence they exacerbate the negative emotional state of their followers. Conversely, when leaders create emotional resonance, they may be perceived as more prototypical, and consequently they can amplify the existing feelings (either negative or positive) of their followers. As a matter of fact, in both studies, it was found that those that valued Cameron as less prototypical experienced less outrage about leaving the EU and more outrage about remaining in EU. On the other hand, those that valued May as more

prototypical expressed more outrage about maintaining their membership in EU and less outrage about giving up with that membership.

With regards to the moderation effect, the influence of prototypicality on group-exit via outrage did not changed across conditions of threat, neither in study 1 nor in study 2. There was no difference between those that appraised the EU as the source of threat, and those that did not valued EU as a problem for their minority identity. The threat represented by the leadership acted upon levels of such threat, and affected directly the experience of moral outrage. However, and consistent with previous research (Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2015), it was also found that the extent to which the EU was appraised as a source of threat directly predicted stronger reactions of outrage about continuing such membership. The reverse pattern was held for those that did not appraised the EU as the source of threat. These results suggest that there are multiple kinds of threats that can directly affect group-based emotions, and the extent to which these threat are perceived as coming from the in-group, increases the chance for group-exit via group-outrage. The findings that salience of an identity drives the appraisal of a situation (in terms of threat) and give birth to different emotional reactions that are clearly associated with defensive goals, it was further supported by the different levels of identification of stay and leave voters. In both studies, stay voters were more identified with the EU and Cameron (rather than May), while the leave voters where more identified with the UK and May (than Cameron).

These results are in line with other findings in the literature on group-based emotions, such as the defensive processes associated with group-based guilt for high but not for lower identifiers (e.g. Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013; Doojse, Brascombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998, 2006). High identifiers are particularly willing to search for means of avoiding feelings of guilt (Doojse et al., 2006) and feelings of outrage long thought to be grounded solely in concerns with maintaining justice, sometimes serve to defend and maintain a moral identity and avoid such feeling of guilt (Rotshild & Keefer, 2015). By contrast perceiving the group as having defected elicits more striving to improve through feelings of shame (Gausel & Leach, 2011).

Similarly, these results are meaningful with respect to a social identity analysis of leadership (e.g. Hogg, 2002; Platow & Van Knippenberg, 2005). Leadership endorsement is positively related to group's member social identification and leaders high in ingroup prototypicality receive strong endorsement regardless of the leaders' ingroup-favouring, outgroup favouring or fair intergroup behaviour, but more of their resonance or dissonance with their groups emotions. Furthermore, these results are meaningful with respect of the

analysis of a membership within majority or a minority group. Being in a minority position arise concern for condemnation and fear of assimilation and this elicit defensive reactions (e.G. hiding, withdrawing, or avoiding the source of threat) through feelings of anger, aimed at expressing one minority identity that is perceived to be threatened (Pennenkamp et al., 2009).

Consistent with these propositions, in study 3 it was further hypothesized that moral outrage should result in group-exit because it may have switched off the minority group members' engagement with the superordinate identity (disengagement hypothesis). As a matter of fact, one cannot exclude himself/herself from a group if he/she is still psychologically attached to the group (Hirschman, 1970). From different line of thoughts on the different social functions of emotions for social relationship (e.g. Fisher & Roseman, 2007) and in the literature on disengagement (e.g. Harris, 2015), it was hypothesized that different components of moral outrage (anger vs contempt) would have different effects on group behaviour, and these effects would be explained (mediated) by psychological disengagement processes. Because contempt is more than anger characterized by the development of permanent negative belief changes about another person (e.g. Roseman, 2001; Fisher & Roseman 2007) and is more associated with the conclusion of a social relationship, it was predicted that psychological disengagement should be particularly relevant for group-exit when there is contempt. Moreover, because strongly disengaged individuals decline opportunities to improve the standing of their group (Wright et al. 1990) or to help other group members (Ellemers 2001), it was also predicted that psychological disengagement should increase the chance for group-exit and decrease the chance for group-voice. The disengagement hypothesis captured the reasoning that the extent to which individuals are disengaged with an identity it is crucial for a collective exit rather than for a collective voice.

Moreover, it was advanced that these effects would be stronger when moral outrage is directed towards the majority group rather than the minority group. Consistent with the results of Study 1 and 2, the direction of outrage was manipulated by presenting participants with statements of their minority leader. This leader was either expressing the outrage towards the majority group (consonance) or towards the minority group (dissonance).

Consistent with expectations, psychological disengagement was found to fully mediate the relationship between moral outrage and collective actions. Psychological disengagement increased the chances for group exit and decreased the chances for group voice. Group devaluation reduced the importance of such group membership and facilitated

their exit. Conversely, it negatively predicted group-voice. Said otherwise, psychological disengagement represented a valuable cognitive strategy for group-exit and (not) for group voice. Interestingly, and contrary to expectations, the extent to which moral outrage was contemptuous based did not directly affected group membership preferences, neither psychological disengagement. On the other hand, the results showed that the indirect effect of moral outrage on group-exit and group-voice, via psychological disengagement was modulated by the direction of outrage. Participants exposed to the condition where contempt was directed towards the majority were more likely to disengage from the majority group (thus reducing the salience of this identity) and as a consequence they were more prone to leave that majority, and less prone to voice the majority group.

These findings support and extend the notion that anger and contempt are characterized by different prototypical features that correspond with their main social functions, by pointing to the direction of this outrage as a decisive element for group-behavior. Indeed, it may be possible that when the target of outrage is the minority group, group members may rely more on other strategies such as individual mobility or leader derogation. However, the finding that contempt motivates individuals to psychological disengage from a social identity, confirmed that overall contempt based outrage have more destructive implications for the relationship with other groups, whereas angry based outrage may leave open the possibility to repair the relationship (Fisher & Roseman). In a similar vein, this finding seems to confirm the relevance of dissonance and consonance between leader and follower. In fact, when the leader conveyed contempt towards majority was valued more prototypical of the minority group than when he conveyed contempt towards the minority.

In conclusion, the results of these studies demonstrated that when members of a social group share a sense of collective identity people accept to be part of something that, to some extent at least, transcends their individuality (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). They become elements of a social entity that, in order to survive as such, needs to maintain a minimal level of cohesion and unity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994). Without some degree of agreement and consensus on the group norms, a group hardly be a group at all. It is little more than a loose collection of individuals. Obviously, however, the group norms are not set in stone, and the group members are involved in an ongoing, incessant process of negotiation about the nature of such norms. Although changes are a natural, inevitable aspect of groups, group members make an important distinction: there are changes that improve, strengthen, and reinforce group

identity, which are welcome, and changes that deny, overthrow, and subvert group identity, which are feared and opposed.

In these circumstances, those groups members that perceive to be disadvantaged (minority group), they start perceive their situation as collective and to feel or do something about it (for a review, see Walker & Smith, 2002). Collective disadvantage is itself likely to draw attention to groups and their unequal or unfair outcomes, rendering intergroup comparisons (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and group identity (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) salient. Especially in cases where no previous disadvantage of the group has been experienced and no social movement exists (unlike the models of Simon et al., 1998, and Klandermans, 1997, which are concerned with engagement in social movements), social identity salience and group level perception is likely to follow from rather than precede collective disadvantage (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Once group identity is salient, group members appraise events that befall them in group rather than individual terms (E. R. Smith, 1993). They start experiencing group-based emotions and react emotionally with outrage. The extent to which outrage convey contempt directed at the majority group is decisive to motivate their group-exit because it sustains minority group members disengagement with the whole group, that they don't recognize any more as self- and group consistent. In this context, leadership is a fundamental aspects of a social identity able to dampen or amplify group emotions, and thus to affect group behaviours, according to the salience of an identity.

This defensive mechanism associated with outrage is in line and extend recent research about the regulation of group-based emotion. Although group-members are motivated to experience positive emotions, such as group-based pride and respect (Haslam, Powell & Turner, 2000), and to avoid unpleasant emotions such as guilt (Wohl, Brascombe, & Klar, 2006), they can be also motivated to experience group-based emotions that can be instrumental for them and their group, even if these emotions are not positive (Porat et al., 2016). Indeed, people are motivated to experience emotional states for various reasons, including hedonistic or instrumental ones. People can regulate their emotion to a desired emotional state and this can shape subsequent emotional experiences and behavior (e.g., Tamir, Bigman, Rhodes, Salerno, & Schreier, 2015). For instance, people who are motivated to experience anger are more likely to select activities that induced anger, and experienced more intense anger after engaging in these activities (e.g., Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir et al., 2015). More intense anger, in turn, led to anger-consistent behavior. People who want to feel more anger ultimately felt angrier and became more aggressive (e.g.,

Tamir et al., 2008) and less prosocial (e.g., Tamir et al., 2015). To date, research on emotional preferences focused on the motivation to experience certain emotions (e.g., the extent to which people want to feel angry, happy, or afraid; Tamir et al., 2008; Tamir & Ford, 2009) but people may also prefer emotions that can help them achieve their goals (see Tamir, 2015). As such, members of minority group may be motivated and may prefer specific emotional states such as outrage to increase their moral status and their distinctiveness. Although the regulation of group-based emotions is not the aim of the current research, it may provide an alternative explanation consistent with the proposed role of outrage. Goldenberg et al. (2006) extended Gross & Thompson (2007) model of emotion regulation to group context and several implications may be drawn from it. The regulation processes include emotional disengagement, social category reappraisal and interpersonal regulation. Emotional disengagement is one of the most basic regulation techniques, and in most circumstances, implies disengaging by the situation, by distancing (e.g. situation selection; attentional deployment) the self from the situation (Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). However, when these strategies are not anymore possible due to relevance of an event, categorization reappraisal may then reduce the negative experiences. This strategy involves thinking about the situation in a way that changes its meaning (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Van Zomeren, Leach & Spears, 2012). In a context of dual identity if subgroups are forced to address an emotion provoking event (such as when moral threat to one identity is experienced) that one would have otherwise emotionally disengaged (e.g. by avoiding the situation or by deploying attention to other aspect of the situation), the experience of group-based moral outrage may lead subgroups to group-exit by cognitively reappraise the categorization (psychological disengagement), thus transforming the superordinate identity in the out-group. Turning to the Brexit example, British citizens that didn't wish to feel negative emotions, but feel that the presence of EU did not enable them to emotionally disengage from such event appraised as unpleasant because the EU itself represent the source of threat, can sever the social ties with EU through group-based outrage and re-categorize the EU as the out-group and thus respond in a minimally engaged manner.

Finally, a few more words need to be said about the methodology. The self-report measures have been often criticized because they can be biased, and they cannot catch the great variety of the emotional experiences as they are strongly influenced by the nature of the event and by the context in which they develop (Parkinson, 2011). Moreover, some categorizations are often arbitrary and temporary, resulting in groups with no history and

no future (Doosje et al. 2001). This implies that group processes tend to remain relatively suppressed, which is likely to diminish concerns with group-level outcomes. The present research tried to overcome such limitations by investigating real-life situations (Study 1 and 2) and real-life identities (Study 3). Furthermore, in the third study, the minority identity consisted in a real identity, being a British citizen, and the majority identity consisted in a real organization, the IPCC. Yet, it should be acknowledged that it is possible that other contextual factors such as perceived social support should somehow vary the story in some more way that this research has not foreseen and analysed. Another important point of criticism may rely on the measure of outrage. Comparing results of study 1 and 2 with the results of study 3, it was found that both measures of outrage were reliable for group exit, however, considering the different social functions that anger, and contempt have, there is a need to identify a measure of outrage that is able to better disentangle and discriminate between angered outrage and contemptuous outrage. Thus, it may be important to identify a more consistent measure of outrage and the condition under which contempt and anger occur independently or simultaneously. In this vein, the third study seems to suggest that one way to overcome such limitation is to take into account the direction of such outrage. For both group-voice and group-exit, it was decisive that the outrage was directed towards a majority group and not towards the minority group.

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STUDY 1

APPENDIX A: Social identification scales

Social identification with Britain

Instruction. Listed below are a number of statements about you and your relationship with Britain. Please rate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statement:

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Being British is an important part of how I see myself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I often think about the fact that I am British	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Being British is an important part of my self-image.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Social Identification with Europe

Instruction. Listed below are a number of statements about you and your relationship with Europe. Please rate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statement:

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Being European is an important part of how I see myself.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I often think about the fact that I am European.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Being European is an important part of my self-image.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

APPENDIX B: Leader prototypicality and Moral outrage measure

Leader prototypicality

Instruction. Do you think that the Prime Minister Cameron is acting as a good representative of the population?.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree

Moral outrage

Check the box in front of the words that best describe the extent to which you feel this way right now towards your Prime Minister Cameron/Europe/UK/about staying in EU/ about leaving the EU.

Items	High	Moderate	Low	None
1. Hostile*	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Angry*	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Disgusted*	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Outraged*	☐	☐	☐	☐

**all items were reversed coded*

APPENDIX C: Social identity threat scale

Instruction: Do you think that Brexit is the response to years of European:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item.

Items	Completely Agree	Partially Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially disagree	Strongly disagree
1.Oppression*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Unefficiency*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Selfishness*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4.Uncooperation*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5.Disengagement*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Incompetence*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Inability to define a strategic plan*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

* *all items were reversed coded*

APPENDIX D: Intention to vote measure Study 1.

Instruction. If the Referendum was held today, what would you vote for.

Please choose only one of the following

☐ STAY

☐ LEAVE

STUDY 2

APPENDIX E: Social identification scales

Social Identification with Britain

Instruction. Listed below are a number of statements about you and your relationship with Britain. Please rate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statement:

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Being British is an important part of how I see myself.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. I often think about the fact that I am British	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. Being British is an important part of my self-image.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

Social Identification with Europe

Instruction. Listed below are a number of statements about you and your relationship with Europe. Please rate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statement:

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Being European is an important part of how I see myself.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. I often think about the fact that I am European.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. Being European is an important part of my self-image.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

APPENDIX F: Leader prototypicality measure and comparison between leaders prototypicality.

Leader prototypicality

Instruction. Do you think that the Prime Theresa May is acting as a good representative of the population?.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree

Comparing Theresa May and David Cameron

Instruction. Which one among the following British Prime Ministers do you consider as more representative of your country? Please choose only one of the following:

☐ David Cameron ☐ Theresa May

Instruction. Which one among Cameron and May would you be more likely to define as "one of us"?. Please choose only one of the following

☐ David Cameron ☐ Theresa May

APPENDIX G: Moral outrage measure

Check the box in front of the words that best describe the extent to which you feel this way right now towards your Prime Minister Cameron/Europe/UK/about coming back in EU/ about remaining outside the EU.

Items	High	Moderate	Low	None
1. Hostile*	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Angry*	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Disgusted*	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Outraged*	☐	☐	☐	☐

**all items were reversed coded*

APPENDIX H: Social identity threat scale

Instruction: Do you think that Brexit is the response to years of European:

Please choose the appropriate response for each item.

Items	Completely Agree	Partially Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially disagree	Strongly disagree
1.Oppression*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Unefficiency*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Selfishness*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4.Uncooperation*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5.Disengagement*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Incompetence*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Inability to define a strategic plan*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
* all items were reversed coded					

APPENDIX I: Group based regret and intention to vote measure

Group-based regret

Instruction. Please reflect on the decision that Brits made about Brexit, that is to leave the Europe. Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements by selecting a number from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Please think about the decision that Brits made and not about your personal decision.

Items

	1	2	3	4	5
1. It was the right decision	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I regret the choice we made*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. I would go for the same choice if I had do it over again	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. The choice did me a lot of harm*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. It was a wise decision*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

** all items were reversed coded*

Intention to vote

Instruction. If the Referendum was held today, what would you vote for.

Please choose only one of the following

☐ STAY

☐ LEAVE

STUDY 3

APPENDIX L: Social identification with Britain

Instruction. Please, indicate the extent to which each of the following items is reflective of you:

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Overall, being British has very little to do with how I feel about myself*	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. The nation I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am*	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. Being British is an important reflection of who I am.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
4. In general, belonging to this nation is an important part of my self-image.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

* *items reversed*

APPENDIX M: Environmental Identity Scale (EID Scale Clayton 2003)

Instruction. Listed below are a number of statements about you and your relationship with environment. Please rate the extent to which you agree/disagree with each item.

Items	Completely disagree	Partially disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. Behaving responsibly toward the Earth –living a sustainable life -style– is part of my moral code.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. Engaging in environmental behaviors is important to me.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. If I had enough time or money, I would certainly devote some of it to working for environmental causes.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
4. Learning about the natural world should be an important part of every child’s upbringing.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
5. My own interests usually seem to coincide with the position advocated by environmentalists.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

APPENDIX N: Scenario IPCC

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the international body for assessing the science related to climate change. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and World Environment Programme (WEP) to provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation. The IPCC act by publishing assessment reports reviewing the latest climate science, as well as a number of special reports on particular topics. These reports are prepared by teams of relevant researchers from all its members. The assessments are policy-relevant in that they present projections of future climate change based on different scenarios and the risks that climate change poses and discuss the implications of response options. Through these reports, the IPCC has aided in the formulation of guidelines and treaties on issues such as the international trade in potentially harmful chemicals, transboundary air pollution, contamination of international waterways, and environmental-related policies for local communities. The IPCC provide rigorous and balanced scientific information to decision-makers because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature. Participation in the IPCC is open to all member countries of the WMO. It currently has 195 members among UK. The Panel, made up of representatives of the member states, meets in Plenary Sessions to take major decisions. The IPCC Bureau, elected by member governments, provides guidance to the Panel on the scientific and technical aspects of the Panel's work and advises the Panel on related management and strategic issues. IPCC assessments are written by hundreds of leading scientists who give their time and expertise as Coordinating Lead Authors and Lead Authors of the reports. They enlist hundreds of other experts as Contributing Authors to provide complementary expertise in specific areas. IPCC reports undergo multiple rounds of drafting and review to ensure they are comprehensive and objective and produced in an open and transparent way. Thousands of other experts contribute to the reports by acting as reviewers, ensuring the reports reflect the full range of views in the scientific community. Teams of Review Editors provide a thorough monitoring mechanism for making sure that review comments are addressed.

APPENDIX O: Manipulation check Scenario IPCC

Instructions. Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statement

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. I believe that is important to be part of such an international panel where environment-related issues are discussed.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I believe the work of hundreds of scientists from all over the world makes IPCC an important panel where to being member.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. I am proud that UK belongs to such an international panel-IPCC.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

APPENDIX P: Scenario inducing moral threat, and manipulation check identity threat

Scenario (derived from Tauber & Van Zomeren, 2013).

IPCC reports that Britain is among least concerned in the world about climate change. IPCC defined this behavior (UK dis-interest in adopting a more pro-environmental politics) as unfair and immoral standing the UK position within the IPCC. Many UK funding programs are currently underperforming, leading to a series of negative which will require extra work from all the country. The widespread of illegal exchange in natural resources management, will increase the potential for abuse and damage inflicted, affecting both natural system and local communities. Following IPCC, UK has to endorse all actions needed for reaching the ICCP requests even if this means fiscal pressure in the brief period.

Manipulation check of social identity threat

Instruction. When thinking about the situation described in the report, how to you feel as Uk citizen?

Items	True for me	Somewhat true for me	Neutral	Somewhat untrue for me	Untrue for me
1. As UK citizen, it undermines my sense of selfworth.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2.It makes me feel that Uk is less competent.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3.As Uk, we would have to change who we are.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

APPENDIX Q: Wording of outrage manipulation used

Condition	Outrage towards Minority	Outrage towards majority
Anger	<p>It is my belief that IPCC raised some critical points on UK anti-environmental economy that we as UK people should really consider when revising our politics. For example, it is my view that IPCC is right when they state that UK it is not sufficiently engaged in promoting, endorsing and funding pro-environmental politics. So I believe that too many UK individuals wrongly take advantage of low government-controlled system. So it is my belief that we failed as nation system. Adopting IPCC advices and changing UK economy to meet higher pro-environmental standard means that UK citizens should sacrifice their well-being in brief period for reaching the more basilar objective of a pro-environmental nation.</p>	<p>It is my belief that IPCC raised some critical points on UK environmental policy that we as UK should really consider with high attention in our politics. However, the efforts we made have not been fully appreciated by IPcc and this means that extra work is required and this will spread frustration. IPCC also need to revise its politics and implement rules that are compatible with the local community. Adopting IPCC advices and changing UK economy to meet higher pro-environmental standard means that UK citizens should sacrifice their well-being in brief period for reaching the more basilar objective of a pro-environmental nation. But I believe that also IPCC should improve its efforts.</p>
Contempt	<p>Personally, I remain concerned about the action taken by UK. There is not a proper collective thinking, and there is a widespread of irrational, unscientific, and unethical attitudes by many UK organizations and citizens that say they are “green”. Personally, I think that standing the UK position within the ICPP there is very little we can realistically do to smooth the bad UK reputation within ICPP. All in all as a UK citizen myself, I am surprised by the low quality of our results.</p>	<p>It is my belief that IPCC raised some critical points on UK environmental policy that we as UK should really consider with high attention in our politics. It is my view that IPCC does not have an appropriate understanding about what environmental care is about, neither what problems UK is facing today. The interests of the world cannot always comes before our local community’s (individual) interests, and the former shouldn’t take the control over the other. I expected IPCC to show quick thinking and generate creative ideas-and so far we haven’t seen them either. The work done by IPCC doesn’t show the originality that we have grown accustomed to here. Adopting IPCC advices and changing UK economy to meet some IPCC standard means that UK citizens should sacrifice their well-being in brief period for reaching the more basilar objective of a pro-environmental nation according the IPCC standards. I believe that IPCC requirements may be quite unsatisfactory for UK</p>

APPENDIX R: Manipulation check outrage manipulation.

Instructions. When reading the reply of your representative in the IPCC panel, to what extent do you as British feel the following emotions?

Items	Not at all	slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
1. Angry	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. Happy	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. Contemptuous	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
4. Sad	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

APPENDIX S: Manipulation check prototypicality measure

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither Agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
1. I can't define him as "one of us"*	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2. I think he is competent	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
3. Is acting he is not acting as a good representative of UK*	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
4. He is "doing good for us"	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

* *item reversed*

APPENDIX T: Psychological Disengagement scale

Instruction. Please rate the extent to which the following items represent your feelings and actual thoughts as Uk citizen.

Items	Completely Disagree	Partially Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Partially agree	Strongly agree
Discounting					
1. The feedback that we received from the IPCC is not a good indicator of our environmental values.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. I feel that attitudes toward us have been biased and discriminatory.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. The way the IPCC behaved toward us is not correct .	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. The judgments passed from IPCC on us are clearly discriminatory and biased.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. IPCC attitudes us reflect a positive image of us.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. UK status is evaluated fairly and reasonably.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. The judgments passed on UK faithfully reflect who we are.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Devaluing					
8. Being part of IPCC is an important value for me.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. As UK citizen, being appreciated by IPCC is not part of my standards of personal success.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Being well evaluated by IPCC is an important acknowledgement for us.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. At the moment, I have a good feeling about being a member of IPCC.*	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. Being successful in IPCC environmental standards is not part of the most important things for our country .	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
13. Being good or not according to IPCC doesn't bother me.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
14. I feel strong ties to other members of IPCC.*	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
15. I believe IPCC does not promote high standards and values of what pro-environment means.	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙

**items reversed*

APPENDIX U: collective actions measure

Instruction. To what extent you would be more likely to respond in each of the following ways as Uk citizen?

Items	Entremely unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	Entremely likely
Exit					
1.I suggest that UK separate from IPCC	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
2.I think we as UK have to stop doing business with IPCC in the near future	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
Voice					
3.I want to work out a solution that is good for both of us (Uk and IPCC);	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
4. I am thinking about to protest	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
5. I want to suggest changes	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙
6. I want to share disappointment by public demonstration	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙	⊙