From Low-Cost Flights to the Ballot Box:

How Eastern European Migration Shaped Far-Right Voting in London

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We examine patterns of migration and far-right voting in London following the Eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007. To address immigrant sorting, we draw on transport and geography scholarship about migration to develop an instrumental variable approach. Our dataset combines ward-level election and census information with geo-referenced data on pre-existing bus stops providing access to low-cost flight connections with the new EU states. We estimate a large positive effect of Eastern European migration on changes in support for anti-immigrant parties between the 2004 and 2012 London Assembly elections. Our analysis suggests concerns about affordable housing were a channel through which this migration affected support for the populist right, but not the main fascist party. Our study highlights the utility of distinguishing different migrants and far-right parties; contributes evidence from Britain on how migration affects local elections; and offers a methodological alternative to the shift-share instrument.

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The Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007 brought unprecedented access to the UK for citizens of ten Central and Eastern European countries. The likely population flows resulting from this development were difficult to predict. One major study commissioned by the UK government considered the country “not a very popular migration destination” and estimated an annual net inflow of between 5,000 and 13,000 from these EU accession countries in the years up to 2010 (Dustmann et al. 2003: 57). Instead, official statistics show actual numbers averaged more than 100,000.¹ Unlike most of its counterparts elsewhere in the EU, the British government did little to restrict these flows. This period thus saw a radical change in migration into the UK more generally and its capital city in particular.

In this paper, we examine how this migration affected support for far-right parties, and draw out implications for the study of the electoral effects of migration. By focusing specifically on migrants from the accession countries, this setting also helps understanding how EU policies deliberately designed to promote cross-national mobility affected relations between its peoples. London provides a unique laboratory, due to the scale and diversity of migration into the city, and the availability of highly granular electoral and census data. Expanding the existing empirical toolkit, we address the problem of migrant sorting with a novel instrumental variable strategy that recognizes the dominance of a particular transport mode, low-cost flights, with a distinct infrastructure for this specific migrant group. This allows us to estimate a large positive effect of Eastern European migration on changes in support for far-right parties in London elections between 2004 and 2012. In addition, we investigate the channels that might drive this result and find that housing costs condition the electoral response to migration for the populist right.

Our work contributes a nuanced analysis that distinguishes different categories of migrants. In doing so, we complement and extend work by Dancygier (2010) on earlier

¹Central and Eastern European residents from the 2004 accession countries increased from an estimated 167,000 in 2004 to 1,323,000 in 2018, while those from Bulgaria and Romania increased from 42,000 in 2007 to 495,000 in 2018 (Vargas-Silva and Fernandez-Reino 2018: 4).

waves of migration from former colonies to Britain and its capital city, contrasting different political consequences associated with West Indian and South Asian immigration. We focus on Britain’s second major wave of post-war migration. In studying its electoral consequences, we draw on the work of transport and geography scholars who have noted the “hypermobile” nature of this migration, characterized by a far higher degree of connectivity between the country of birth and the host country of migrants than in preceding population movements (Burrell 2011; Pooley 2017). Previous migrants typically faced various (logistic, legal, political, affordability, etc.) constraints to frequent travel back to their countries of birth. In recent decades, however, the liberalization of transportation markets in some parts of the world has transformed the availability and affordability of cross-national travel (Akgüç, Beblavý and Simonelli 2018; Dobruszkes 2009). This insight underpins our empirical strategy, but our focus is also important in substantive terms. Prior research highlights that different categories of migration can affect political attitudes and voting outcomes in distinct ways (e.g., Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dancygier 2010; Ford 2011). The category we examine is especially important where policymakers actively promote economic integration and cross-national mobility.

Our analysis also differentiates different far-right parties. While we estimate effects of similar magnitude for the two parties we examine, a nuanced analysis of the supply side turns out to be important for the channels that drive the electoral response. Using a split sample strategy that exploits variation in initial conditions across wards, we study both economic and cultural threat channels. Amongst the major grievances emphasized in the political campaigns of far-right parties is the lack of affordable housing. We find that wards with lower initial housing costs show higher support for one of two far-right parties in response to migration. Housing costs condition the electoral response to migration for the populist right, but not for the main fascist party. This lends further support to claims by scholars who have emphasized the importance of distinguishing different categories of far-right parties (see Golder 2003: 443). The far-right vote is not homogeneous and different parties use different mechanisms to attract support. In the UK, economic stress induced by the abolition of housing-related benefits has been identified as a significant factor explaining subsequent support for exit from the EU (Fetzer 2019). Our analysis chimes with this in suggesting concerns about housing costs as a key driver of support

for the populist right in this period.

We contribute to a growing literature on the electoral impact of migration that attempts to address threats to valid inference (e.g., Barone et al. 2016; Calderon, Fouka and Tabellini 2019; Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm 2019). Subnational units are more comparable than countries, which helps to mitigate concerns about omitted variable bias (Golder 2016). Our analysis adds evidence from Britain to the literature on the effects of local-level migration on support for far-right parties in local or national elections (Cools, Finseraas and Rogeberg 2021), but with a novel methodological approach. With rare exceptions (e.g., Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm 2019) the location decisions of migrants are not (as-if) random. In attempts to address the problem of immigrant sorting, many scholars rely on instrumental variables including the shift-share instrument (e.g., Edo et al. 2019; Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017; Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2018). The latter exploits an initial distribution of migrants to project the flow of new migrants across geographic units, based on the idea that location decisions are influenced by pre-existing networks. Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler (2018) note the heavy reliance on this approach and caution that when the shift-share instrument is correlated with ongoing responses to previous immigration shocks, estimates may not identify the short-run causal effect (see also Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift 2020).

We offer an alternative empirical strategy. Where migrants maintain regular links with their home countries, their location decisions partly reflect ease of access to relevant travel infrastructure (Burrell 2011; Dobruszkes 2009). Our study shows that the distribution of migrants from the new EU member states across London is linked to the location of pre-existing infrastructure that provides access to the principal means of travel to and from their home countries, especially low-cost airlines. We combine 2001 and 2011 census data on the inflow of migrants into London with information on the location of pre-existing bus stops serving the two dominant airports for cheap flights to and from Central and Eastern Europe. Passenger survey data confirm the importance of this mode of travel to the relevant airports. We also confirm empirically that these bus stops are associated with changes in the population of migrants from this region, but not other migrants. Using proximity to these bus stops as an instrument for ward-level increases in the pop-

ulation from these countries, we uncover a large positive effect on changes in support for far-right anti-immigrant parties between the 2004 and 2012 London elections. Our approach provides an alternative strategy when data limitations hamper the deployment of the shift-share instrument, and as a robustness check.

We proceed as follows: The following section provides background on EU enlargement and the subsequent increase in migration with a focus on London, the empirical setting for our study. We then motivate our empirical approach, explain the construction of our instrumental variable, and set out the data and specification. The results section presents our core estimates of the impact of migration from the new EU members states on support for far-right parties. We also summarize a range of robustness checks and probe underlying channels. The conclusion draws together the main findings and implications.

EU enlargement and migration in London

Our study exploits significant spatial heterogeneity in the changing composition of London’s population as a result of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. In the first decade of the millennium, ten Central and Eastern European member states joined the EU. The “EU8” comprising the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania, or the “EU2”, in 2007.² This offers a unique context to examine the electoral effects of migration caused by the UK government’s decision not to impose transitional work restrictions on workers from EU8 countries. Most other EU governments feared a large influx of migrants would put pressure on labor markets and implemented a phasing-in period of up to seven years for the free movement of workers from the accession countries. In 2004, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden were the only countries which did not impose any restrictions and allowed unfettered access to their labor market from day one (Becker and Fetzer 2016). With significantly fewer restrictions here compared to countries such as Germany or Austria,

²Official UK statistics label these groups of new member states as the “EU8” and “EU2” respectively and we collectively refer to them as the “new EU” or “EU8+2” countries.

many Eastern European migrants chose to come to the UK (Kone 2018).³

London reflects Britain’s post-war history of migration in the composition of its population unlike any other part of the country (Judah 2016). EU enlargement contributed to a substantial inflow of migrants into the capital, with census data showing over a quarter of a million residents from the EU8+2 countries added between 2001 and 2011. London thus offers an ideal laboratory for studying the electoral implications of post-enlargement migration. Due to its large number of foreign-born residents, we can obtain highly disaggregated population data by country of birth without running into statistical disclosure problems, which arise when individuals are identifiable from census data. This is crucial for our study design, as it allows us to probe electoral responses to specific migrants with empirical strategies that require the most granular data on country of birth, as we set out in the following section. Figure 1 shows that the share of migrants from the accession countries increased almost everywhere in London between the 2001 and 2011 census rounds, but with significant variation across electoral wards. We discuss the data in more detail below.

This development offered fertile ground for far-right parties to tap into real or perceived grievances associated with immigration (Campbell 1965; Dancygier 2010; Golder 2003; Ivarsflaten 2008). In addition to fears related to increased competition for jobs, these parties amplified welfare concerns by claiming that migrants put pressure on housing and local services, and extract welfare benefits (Becker and Fetzer 2016; Clarke et al.

³Although Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU three years after the EU8, this matters little for our study. We analyze the impact of migration as captured in the 2001 and 2011 census rounds, which span both accession dates. Although EU2 nationals, unlike their EU8 counterparts, were subject to interim work restrictions until the end of 2013, census data show a sharp increase in London residents born in Bulgaria (+24,200 or 802%) and Romania (+41,800 or 1371%) between 2001 and 2011. These growth rates are the sixth and second highest of all immigrant groups, which is also reflected in EU2 air passenger traffic during this period (see Figure B.4 in Appendix B).

Figure 1: Change in EU8+2 migrants, 2001-2011

2017).⁴ In the run-up to the 2016 referendum on leaving the EU, one infamous campaign poster claimed the UK was at “breaking point.” It showed a long queue of dark-skinned migrants and demanded: “We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders.” A popular portrait of the capital city during this period portrays it as teeming with migrants, many unable to speak English, sleeping rough or in overcrowded housing, and working for cut-throat wages (Judah 2016). Far-right parties campaigned on policies to prioritise natives over migrants. In their 2012 London electoral campaign, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) promised “more jobs for Londoners by saying ‘No’ to open-door immigration” and prioritising Londoners “over migrants and asylum seekers” for jobs and housing. The fascist British National Party (BNP) demanded that “British people must be housed first” and “British jobs for British workers.”⁵ Our analysis probes to what extent these messages are related to voting patterns.

The unique electoral system used in London Assembly elections is a second factor that motivates our focus on the capital. We analyze local elections as opposed to national

⁴Contrary to such perceptions, European migrants in fact make a positive net fiscal contribution to the UK exchequer, unlike natives (Dustmann and Frattini 2014).

⁵Appendix A displays the 2012 campaign leaflets of these parties.

ones because they allow us to carry out a highly spatially disaggregated analysis of voting patterns at the ward level. In Britain, national election results are announced at the borough or constituency level, which are far larger geographic areas.⁶ The granularity of our ward-level study also stands out in comparison to prior work, which uses data at the level of municipalities (Barone et al. 2016; Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm 2019; Steinmayr 2021), counties (Calderon, Fouka and Tabellini 2019; Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2018), regions (Edo et al. 2019), or congressional constituencies (Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2016). Our setup thus allows us to analyze the impact of migration and the underlying channels that drive the results at the neighbourhood level.

Greater London Authority elections are held every four years and voters simultaneously choose the Mayor of London, 14 constituency Assembly members, and 11 London-wide Assembly members. Elections to the London Assembly are unusual among local governments in the UK in that they use an “additional member system” combining “first-past-the-post” as well as closed list proportional representation.⁷ We focus on the London-wide Assembly elections for several reasons.⁸ This is the only context in which we can capture the purest form of support for far-right parties. Votes cast for the London-wide party

⁶Our analysis focuses on 620 wards across 32 local authorities, while for general elections London had 74 parliamentary constituencies from 1997 until 2010 (when the number was reduced to 73). The total population of wards ranged between 4,692 and 17,257 in 2001 and between 5,110 and 23,084 in 2011. In contrast, parliamentary constituencies in 2010 had total populations between 81,831 and 136,111 (London Parliamentary Constituency Profiles 2010, London Datastore).

⁷The D’Hondt method is used to allocate London-wide seats from party lists. A party receives seats when this method yields a number that is greater than its constituency seats, using its party list to allocate any extra seats.

⁸We also analysed the results from the Constituency London Assembly elections and found similar patterns of support. A variety of administrative and empirical issues (e.g., the BNP did not put forward any candidates in 2004 and only ran in 6 out of the 14 constituencies in 2012; UKIP ran under a different name in 2012) make these findings

list are least likely to be distorted by strategic considerations that play a role in other settings, notably the first-past-the-post electoral system used for parliamentary and some other local elections in Britain. Moreover, this is the only ballot choice where voters are asked to vote for a party, not a candidate, meaning that party affiliation will be the primary heuristic used by most voters. Finally, the ballot is unique to the whole of London, hence there is no need to account for candidate effects, ballot order effects, or whether a party has fielded a candidate or not. Next, we explain in more detail how these elements feed into the empirical strategy.

Empirical strategy

In exploiting the geographic distribution of migrants, we face the problem of endogeneity of settlement choices. To overcome this issue, many papers use a shift-share instrument, which interacts national inflows by country of origin with an initial geographic distribution of immigrants. This is an attractive solution where previous migration shocks are unlikely to be correlated with ongoing responses (Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler 2018). However, constructing a shift-share instrument is not always possible. In our case, we can use data from either the 1991 or the 2001 census to recreate the original (pre-enlargement) stock of migrants from new EU member states. The 1991 census data captures the distribution of migrants prior to the granting of freedom of movement and residence rights to nationals of EU countries in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.⁹ However, most countries that joined the EU in 2004 did not exist as independent states when the 1991 census was designed.¹⁰ While the 2001 census contains reliable disaggregated country of birth data, we worry that the distribution it captures is not exogenous as migration patterns may

less useful and we do not present them here.

⁹The Treaty of Maastricht created the EU and took effect in November 1993. It established, among others, the freedom of movement of persons. This refers to freedom of settlement, freedom to access employment and to work, and freedom to provide services in another EU member state.

¹⁰In 1991, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania became independent from the USSR, and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. In 1993, Czechoslovakia dissolved into two

have started to shift in anticipation of the EU’s Eastern enlargement.

To address identification challenges, we seek inspiration from the transportation and geography literature. The role of transportation infrastructure is a recognized but neglected element in the literature on migration and mobility (Pooley 2017). Studies of different urban contexts find that location decisions are linked to access to public transport, on which especially new migrants tend to rely more than established residents (Chatman and Klein 2009; Perez, Dragicevic and Gaudreau 2019; Tsang and Rohr 2011), and that some migrants value access to airports (Maslova and King 2020). Below, we examine the link between transportation and migration with high cross-national mobility. We then set out how we use insights from this literature in order to address empirical challenges in our study of the electoral consequences of migration.

The period around the start of the millennium was characterized in many industrialized countries by increased competition in aviation markets. The entry of low-cost operators, containing operating costs and offering more basic “no-frills” services than traditional airlines, made air travel affordable on a wide scale not seen before. In 1993, the US Department of Transportation described this as the “Southwest Effect” with reference to the airline’s expansion. In Europe, too, low-cost or “budget” airlines grew rapidly during this period. Liberalization from 1992 allowed EU airlines with an operating license to serve the entire EU market without commercial restrictions. Low-cost carriers took advantage of this development and increased their seat share from less than 2% in the early 1990s to more than 40% by 2010, exceeding that of “legacy carriers” – those with established routes prior to liberalization – thereafter. In 2016, Ryanair, the EU’s first low-cost carrier, became Europe’s largest airline by passengers carried (Akgüç, Beblavý and Simonelli 2018). During this period, low-cost carriers were a powerful force behind an expansion and diversification of flight networks on west-east routes with the new member states. Especially the Irish carrier Ryanair and Hungarian airline WizzAir aggressively increased their provision of flights on west-east routes and commenced a range of new services (Dobruszkes 2009; Jankiewicz and Huderek-Glapska 2016).

independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Policy assessments of the consequences of low-cost travel in Europe have focused on economic aspects and benefits in terms of mobility. The European Parliament has noted impacts on established airlines and airports, competition, and regional development (Macário et al. 2007). Low-cost air travel can increase tourism and business-related travel, and it boosts the mobility of labour and students by lowering the cost of migration. Following the initial migration of an individual, affordable travel facilitates visits to and from friends and relatives, or “VFR” travel in industry jargon. A leading EU think tank concludes that low-cost carriers “play a vital role in bringing Europe closer together by fostering mobility and making air travel affordable to a wider public” (Akgüç, Beblavý and Simonelli 2018: 44).

This unprecedented level of connectivity is a crucial new element that characterizes this period of European integration. In sharp contrast, earlier migration from Central and Eastern Europe to the West was typically final and much more constrained (Ignatowicz 2011: 35). Traditional airlines were too expensive and alternative modes of transport – coach, ferry, or rail – too cumbersome to enable large volumes of migration with high levels of mobility (Akgüç, Beblavý and Simonelli 2018). When the EU’s Eastern enlargement removed restrictive work and travel rules, low-cost carriers fuelled and shaped this new wave of migration. Citizens from the “new” EU member states could travel to and work in the “old” ones with far greater ease than at any point in the past. Moreover, access to regular and affordable journeys back home allowed them to maintain family and social ties, and lowered the perceived risk of migration. According to Ignatowicz (2011: 43), this also had significant emotional value, since mobility is “not only about the actual physical movement but also about a feeling of being in a privileged position to go home at any time.” Burrell (2011: 1023) sums up: “Ryanair flights define this new migration.”

This literature provides the underpinnings of our empirical approach. The insight we develop is that the distribution of highly-mobile migrants is likely to be systematically linked to their access to low-cost travel infrastructure that connects them – both physically and emotionally – with their home countries. This allows us to link the location decisions of this category of migrants to specific pre-existing access points to low-cost air

travel to and from Central and Eastern Europe in our empirical context. If empirically confirmed, this link offers a strategy to overcome bias due to immigrant sorting and to assess the causal effect of migration on electoral support for far-right parties in such settings.

Accordingly, we instrument the distribution of new EU migrants across the London wards between 2001 and 2011 using distance from the nearest relevant travel hub:

$$z_w = \min(|Centroid_w - BusStop_i|) \quad (1)$$

where the instrument z_w captures the distance, in kilometres, from each ward w to the nearest pre-existing stop i for bus 757 (connecting central London to Luton, the base of WizzAir) or A6 (for Stansted, the base of Ryanair). As we explain in detail in Appendix C, these two operators dominated bus transport to the respective airports and their buses travelled along the same main route north through London. We only consider stops established prior to May 2004. We use each ward’s geometric center $Centroid_w$ to calculate the distance to all of these pre-existing 757 and A6 bus stops. For each ward, we then keep the shortest distance. This is illustrated and summarized in Figure 2, where the bus stop locations are indicated on the map as white dots. The darker the shading of a ward, the closer its centroid is to the nearest of these bus stops. The inset map shows the location of Luton and Stansted airports, both to the north of London. Flights to and from the capital are also available at several other airports that are omitted here, including Heathrow in the West and Gatwick in the South, the two main airports in the country during this period, as well as London City and Southend in the East. However, as we show in Appendix B, only Luton and Stansted saw a sharp and sustained rise in passenger traffic with the EU8+2 countries over this period, as WizzAir and Ryanair came to dominate these specific routes and acted as main conduits for migration from the region (see also Burrell 2011; Dobruszkes 2009).

We focus on these specific bus stops, as opposed to access points to other modes of transport, for several reasons. Luton and Stansted airports are not connected to London’s underground network, unlike the capital’s largest airport Heathrow, thus ruling out this mode of transport. Moreover, access to the underground network is likely to affect the

location decisions of recent migrants more widely, which implies a violation of the exclusion restriction. We know that public transport is disproportionately important for recent migrants in particular, as they are less likely to have a car (e.g., Tsang and Rohr 2011; Ignatowicz 2011: 36).¹¹ For those without a car, taking a train or taxi could be alternatives, but both of these are significantly more expensive than a bus.¹² This makes the bus a likely choice for budget-conscious travellers. Statistics from this period confirm that sizable proportions of travellers used the bus to get to both Luton and Stansted airports.¹³ Overall, these are strong reasons to focus on this mode of transport to the two airports specifically for EU8+2 migrants who came to the capital during these years.

The validity of our instrument rests on the key assumption that the evolution of far-right political success was not affected by the existence of these travel nodes, except for their

¹¹Census 2011 Table DC4203EW from the Office for National Statistics shows tenure by car or van availability by ethnic group. In London, merely 28% of those classified as English, Welsh, Scottish, Northern Irish, or British lived in households without a car or van, while the equivalent figure for “other white” (such as European migrants from the EU8+2 countries) was 43%.

¹²The price of train journeys between London and Luton or Stansted listed in travel guides from 2004 that we consulted (see Appendix C) was up to twice the cost of a bus. The listed price of a one-way transfer on a London taxi, or “black cab,” was up to 11 times the price for a bus. Private hire vehicles or minicabs can be somewhat cheaper than a black cab.

¹³The UK Civil Aviation Authority carries out an Annual Passenger Survey. Between 2004 and 2006, the reported shares of departing passengers who travelled to the airport by bus/coach increased from 24.1% to 29.8% for Luton, and from 11.4% to 16.3% for Stansted. From 2007, the reported categories are different. (www.caa.co.uk/Data-and-analysis/UK-aviation-market/Consumer-research/Departing-passenger-survey/Survey-reports/, Table 9a “Modes of transport used at the [...] survey airports,” downloaded on January 27, 2021).

Figure 2: Proximity to bus stops instrument

effect through the proportion of immigrants who decide to settle in their proximity for easy access to means of travel to their home countries. In our case, the establishment of this specific transport infrastructure precedes the Eastern enlargement of the EU. To verify the location of individual bus stops at the time of enlargement, we obtained official confirmation from the responsible government body, Transport for London (TfL), of the pre-existing stops on the main routes of the two dominant operators.¹⁴ In the case of the 757 to Luton, this line was established before the end of the Cold War, in the wake of the 1980 Transport Act deregulating coach services. Bus services to the redeveloped Stansted airport were in place following the opening of a new terminal building in 1991. At this time, much of the context for this paper — the EU, the Greater London Assembly, several of the later accession countries, and liberalized air travel — did not even exist.

While the decisions of some airlines to expand their routes between London and Central

¹⁴Coach companies need permission to operate any bus routes within London. TfL is the governing body which authorizes these requests. As we document in Appendix C, we confirm the dominant pre-existing bus routes and operators against sources including travel guides and official documents from the period. Smaller operators such as EasyBus or Terravision varied over time and often travelled along the same or similar routes.

and Eastern Europe responded to demand, our identification strategy requires that their choice of airport base in London was exogenous to the processes we study. Indeed, low-cost carriers chose their airport bases before any large-scale migration movements from the region to London. Ryanair moved its base from Gatwick to Stansted in 1991 already, at a time when the outcomes of the transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe were highly uncertain and more than a decade prior to the accession to the EU of new member states emerging from this process. WizzAir commenced flights to and from Luton in May 2004, coinciding with their accession. The airline had also considered Stansted as a base. Importantly, these were not the only feasible airports for low-cost carriers, as London had a total of six international airports. Had these airlines chosen different airports as their bases, we contend, subsequent migrant settlement patterns across London would likely look different, too. Given the timing of the different decisions involved, it seems highly implausible that these companies chose their London base with reference to some anticipated spatial distribution of Central and Eastern European migrants across the capital, or how far-right parties might perform across different wards.

The exclusion restriction would be violated if these travel nodes affected the location decisions of other migrant categories. This is unlikely. On average, migrants from Western Europe constitute the wealthiest population segment in the UK (Dustmann and Frattini 2014), which makes them less reliant on low-cost transportation. Those among this group who prefer low-cost flights have options that are more geographically dispersed. For instance, another major low-cost airline, EasyJet, services a dense network of Western European destinations from its largest base, Gatwick, which is South of the capital. In addition, convenient access to several Western European countries exists via several other modes of transport, including a high-speed rail service, the Eurostar, or by car using the Channel Tunnel opened in 1994.¹⁵ Non-EU migrants have longer travel distances to their countries of birth, which makes travel to these destinations less convenient and more expensive. As a result, they are less likely to travel home as frequently as those

¹⁵Eurostar alone transported 100 million passengers between 1994 and 2009. See www.eurostar.com/uk-en/about-eurostar/our-company/our-history (last accessed January 24, 2021).

from the EU. This, in turn, makes it unlikely that the location decisions of non-European migrants are influenced by the proximity or accessibility of any particular international travel nodes. While these are strong reasons to believe that the relevance of our instrument is specific to EU8+2 migrants, we also confirm this empirically in the results section.

Casual inspection of the two maps above also suggests that our instrument is relevant. Overall, the Northern half of the capital was both better connected to Luton and Stansted airports, via the bus stops on the main coach routes to these airports, and it contains many more wards with substantial post-enlargement migrant inflows than the South. It is striking that the South East of London is furthest from access to the key travel nodes we identify, and at the same time the part of the capital that received the fewest migrants from the region between 2001 and 2011. In the results section, we formally assess the relevance of our instrument.

Data and specification

This section provides an overview of our data, with full details in Appendix D. The dependent variables are the percentage point changes in support for UKIP and the BNP between 2004 and 2012. While the BNP is a fascist party and UKIP held more populist right-wing positions, both strongly opposed immigration. We focus on 2004 and 2012 because these elections are temporally closest to relevant census years, 2001 and 2011. We also include supplementary results looking at changes between the 2004 and 2008 elections. There were minimal boundary changes in this period, so that our results are directly comparable without any adjustments or imputation. Although London Mayoral and Assembly elections were held in 2000, when these institutions were established, this was followed by major boundary changes. Moreover, ward-level results were not collected until 2004.

Importantly, the 2004 elections took place only one month after the EU's enlargement. As a result, the number of migrants from the new EU member states who would have had time to settle in London is likely to be negligible. Therefore, we use the 2004 election results as the baseline for pre-enlargement political support. If the inflow of migrants in the first few weeks following the 2004 Eastern enlargement was already sizable enough

to leave an impression on the local population, and to affect their voting behavior, our results may understate the electoral response.

The main independent variable is the percentage point change in residents born in any of the EU8+2 member states who settled in each of the 620 London wards in our dataset, shown in Figure 1. To calculate this, we commissioned the UK Office for National Statistics to produce ward-level census data for 2001 on the country of birth of all residents, consistent with information from the 2011 census.¹⁶ A positive number indicates an increase in migrant residents from EU8+2 countries. The values range from -0.06 percentage points (in Hacton, Havering, which is the only ward with a negative trend as the EU8+2 share dropped from 0.86% in 2001 to 0.8% in 2011) to +15.28 percentage points (in Grove Green, Waltham Forest, where it jumped from 0.51% in 2001 to 15.79% in 2011).

We account for several potentially confounding socio-economic and demographic factors that might be correlated with both changes in voting patterns and the composition of the population. The first category encompasses changes in the median household income and unemployment over the period, as well as median house prices in 2001. The latter variable is important for modeling patterns of migration, as affordability of housing is a key driver of residential choice. The second category includes the percentage changes in the retired and student populations. We also account for the percentage point change in all other foreign-born residents (excluding those born in EU8+2 countries), with the native population as the omitted reference category.

Our two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification is as follows:

$$\Delta NewEU_{w,2001-2011} = \alpha_{1b} + \beta Z_w + \gamma_1 C_w + \Delta \epsilon_{1w} \quad (2)$$

¹⁶Such high-quality and granular census data may not be available for parts of the country with fewer migrants, due to statistical disclosure controls. Disclosive risks may result in some disaggregated data not being available, or require techniques such as the swapping of records to safeguard personal information. This approach is targeted at households with unusual characteristics in small areas, such as wards.

$$\Delta Votes_{p,w,2004-2012} = \alpha_{2b} + \rho_{2SLS} \Delta New EU_{w,2001-2011} + \gamma_2 C_w + \Delta \epsilon_{2w} \quad (3)$$

where β in equation 2 captures the first-stage effect of our instrumental variable Z_w on the percentage point change in immigrants from EU8+2 countries in ward w between 2001 and 2011, while accounting for ward-level covariates C and borough fixed effects α_b . The fitted values $\Delta New EU_{w,2001-2011}$ enter the second stage as specified in equation 3, where the outcome is the percentage point change in votes cast for party p , either UKIP or the BNP, between the 2004 and 2012 elections. Numerical subscripts indicate the first or second-stage estimates where the same variables are entered.

Results

Our main findings for both outcomes are presented in Table 1. The first two columns report baseline OLS results, with t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.¹⁷ The coefficients on our variable of interest suggest no relationship in the case of UKIP, and at best a substantively small and statistically weak relationship for the BNP. A one percentage point increase in the share of migrants from the new EU member states is associated with a .01 percentage point increase in the share of votes cast for UKIP, and an equivalent of .05 for the BNP. These results give us a baseline against which to evaluate our empirical approach.¹⁸

¹⁷The number of London Assembly constituencies (14) or London boroughs (32) is smaller than recommended for clustered standard errors (Angrist and Pischke 2008; Cameron and Miller 2015). Our coefficients of interest in columns five and six of Table 1 are also significant at the 5% level or higher with ordinary standard errors or when clustering either at the constituency or at the borough level.

¹⁸In our setting we cannot assess parallel trends or run a placebo regression using electoral outcomes for the pre-period, since no ward-level results were retained from the first elections to the London Assembly in 2000.

Table 1: Migration from new EU member states and far-right support in London-wide party list Assembly elections

	OLS		First Stage		Placebo 1st Stage		2SLS		Reduced Form	
	UKIP	BNP	Δ New EU	Δ All other foreign-born	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.01 (0.28)	0.05 (1.50)		-0.12 (-1.81)	0.69*** (3.54)	0.63*** (3.68)				
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-0.14*** (-5.09)	-0.12*** (-4.03)	-0.07 (-1.67)		-0.09* (-2.09)	-0.07 (-1.79)	-0.13*** (-4.91)	-0.11*** (-4.03)		
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	-1.20*** (-3.51)	-1.18*** (-3.80)	0.92* (2.23)	2.80*** (5.11)	-1.45*** (-3.52)	-1.40*** (-3.83)	-0.82* (-2.43)	-0.82** (-2.67)		
Δ Retired residents (pc)	3.38*** (5.58)	2.12*** (3.78)	-1.64 (-1.87)	-1.57 (-1.15)	4.59*** (5.41)	3.15*** (3.93)	3.46*** (5.85)	2.11*** (3.86)		
Δ Student residents (pc)	-0.58* (-2.01)	-0.89*** (-3.70)	-0.08 (-0.35)	3.29*** (7.92)	-0.57 (-1.77)	-0.87*** (-3.29)	-0.62* (-2.13)	-0.92*** (-3.78)		
Δ Median household income (£000s)	0.07 (1.74)	-0.02 (-0.57)	-0.10 (-1.33)	-0.05 (-0.65)	0.16* (2.27)	0.06 (0.90)	0.09* (2.52)	-0.01 (-0.15)		
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	0.01*** (3.35)	0.01*** (3.82)	-0.01*** (-4.52)	-0.00 (-0.74)	0.01*** (4.08)	0.01*** (4.56)	0.00* (2.18)	0.00* (2.36)		
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)			-0.20*** (-5.50)	0.05 (1.06)			-0.14*** (-4.50)	-0.13*** (-4.48)		
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-test on excluded instrument			30.2	1.12						
R ²	0.74	0.70	0.61	0.64	0.52	0.50	0.75	0.71		

Notes: The dependent variable for columns 1, 5 and 7 is the percentage point change (Δ pp) in votes cast for the UK Independence Party between 2004 and 2012. Columns 2, 6 and 8 have as outcome the percentage point change in votes cast for the British National Party between 2004 and 2012. The outcome variable in column 3 is the percentage point change in residents from new EU member states between 2001 and 2011, while the outcome variable for column 4 is the percentage point change in all other foreign-born residents during the same time period. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the OLS results. Column 3 estimates Equation 2, while column 4 is a placebo first stage, where we estimate the role this travel infrastructure plays on the settlement patterns of other, non EU 8+2, migrants. Columns 5 and 6 estimate Equation 3. The final 2 columns show the reduced form for the bus stop instrument. All models include borough fixed effects and robust standard errors. All Δ in the control variables refer to the change between 2001 and 2011, apart from Δ Median household income which refers to the period 2001/2002 - 2012/2013 (closest available estimates). t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The first-stage results in column three of Table 1 allow us to assess the strength of our instrument. The instrument is a significant predictor of the change in new EU residents. The first-stage F-test on the omitted instrument comfortably exceeds the conventional cut-off value of 10, indicating that our instrument provides sufficient exogenous variation. In other words, our bus stop instrument and the spatial distribution of the accession-induced migration shock are sufficiently correlated for the instrument to be relevant.

We also carry out a placebo first-stage regression, where we use the change in other foreign-born residents as the dependent variable and control for the change of EU8+2 residents. These results are presented in column four of Table 1. As we argue above, other migrant groups are not obviously dependent on the specific transportation infrastructure that underpins our identification strategy. Indeed, the results confirm that our instrument is unrelated to the change in non-EU8+2 migrants across wards. This provides additional support for our claim that the bus stops in Figure 2 are likely to affect the location decisions of EU8+2 migrants in particular, but not those of other foreign-born residents where the country of birth is further away or conveniently accessible via a wider range of travel options.

Columns five and six in Table 1 implement our instrumental variable (IV) approach. The second-stage point estimates of .69 (for UKIP's vote share) and .63 (for the BNP's) are positive and statistically significant at all conventional thresholds. In relative terms, the IV estimates are much larger than their OLS baselines, increasing twelve-fold for the BNP and almost seventy-fold for UKIP. These increases in coefficient size relative to the OLS results underscore the importance of modeling the location choices of migrants. The OLS estimates suffer from substantial bias due to immigrant sorting that masks the true effect of migration on support for far-right parties. Our instrument addresses this bias by identifying a channel which functions independently of the electoral dynamics we examine. Translated into the absolute number of votes, a one percentage point increase in EU8+2 migrants in a ward generated about 28 additional votes for UKIP and 19 for the BNP (Table G.1). These are sizable impacts given that in 2012 these parties averaged 124 and 59 votes, respectively (Table D.3).

To round off our results, the final two columns in Table 1 present reduced-form regressions for both outcome variables. A statistically insignificant coefficient on our instrument in these regressions would result in no significant effect in our IV regressions, which is not the case. Conversely, a significant coefficient would be a particular concern if it coincided with no result in the first stage, indicating a violation of the exclusion restriction that our instrument works only through its effect on the location decisions of EU8+2 migrants. In our case, the coefficient on the instrument is statistically significant in both the first-stage and reduced-form regressions.

Robustness and supplementary analysis

To supplement our core results, we also assessed changes in far-right support between the 2004 and 2008 elections. Lacking more granular data, we obtained 2008 population estimates for each of the 32 boroughs from the Office for National Statistics and then used 2001 census data to approximate a distribution of EU8+2, other foreign, and native-born across wards in each borough. In other words, we assume 2008 borough-level totals are distributed across wards as they were in 2001. The results in Table G.2 show a much larger effect for UKIP, while the estimate for the BNP is smaller and has a negative sign. The combined effect for the two parties ($1.56 - .49 = 1.07$) is 20% smaller than in Table 1 ($.69 + .63 = 1.32$). While the data used here are less precise than in our core analysis, we conclude that EU8+2 migration consistently boosts overall far-right support in this period, with some substitution between the parties across elections.

We assessed our empirical strategy against alternative approaches in related literature. Appendix E provides a detailed discussion of these results. We use, in turn, initial distributions of EU8+2 migrants in 1991 or 2001 and versions of the shift-share instrument exploiting this information (Table E.3). As the 1991 census does not contain precise data on EU8+2 migration, we develop an imputation strategy. The resulting instruments are somewhat weaker, perhaps due to these data limitations. In contrast, instruments using the 2001 initial shares are strong. In addition, we also use an alternative transportation-related instrument. Analogous to our bus stop instrument, we calculated each ward's distance to the nearest of three train stations with direct connections to Luton (King's Cross/St Pancras) or Stansted (Tottenham Hale and Liverpool Street). Finally, we com-

bine our preferred bus stop variable and either 1991 or 2001 initial shares as instruments (Table E.4). As it turns out, for each party we analyze, the IV estimates obtained with any of seven alternative instruments or their combinations with our bus stop instrument are very similar to our core results.

Further, we explore the sensitivity of our results to variations in control variables in Table G.3. First, we drop all controls. In this specification, our instrument is too weak. A more complete model of residential choice includes the affordability of housing. When we add median house prices in 2001, our instrument becomes highly relevant. We then introduce, in turn, borough fixed effects, demographic controls, and economic controls. This reduces the size of the coefficients of interest, but does not affect the pattern of results. In a final specification, we also add the 2001 initial share of EU8+2 residents to our main model. All of these alternatives yield positive and statistically significant estimates on our variables of interest. Our results are robust and our main specification produces conservative estimates.¹⁹

Channels

One potential complication is the possibility that EU8+2 migrants themselves directly influenced the outcome of these elections, as citizens from one EU country enjoy voting rights at the local level in other EU countries. We checked the extent to which EU8+2 nationals were registered to vote by matching ward-level data on electors by nationality that we requested from the electoral services managers of all 32 London boroughs, to census data we commissioned from the Office for National Statistics on the country of

¹⁹We also considered controlling for changes in cultural diversity and relative deprivation. While our results hold when we include relevant measures, we are worried about post-treatment bias and do not report the findings. Furthermore, while we use the percentage change in unemployed, retired, and inactive students, the results are robust to using percentage point changes instead.

birth of the population of voting age (18 years or above).²⁰ We used this to approximate EU8+2 registration rates across 216 wards from the 11 boroughs that supplied data, yielding an average of 62.1% (for further details, see Appendix F). A sizable share of EU8+2 migrants did register to vote.

How plausible is it that these migrants themselves voted for the BNP or UKIP? Although we cannot directly verify their participation in elections, we find no significant effect of EU8+2 migration on overall turnout (Table G.4). To explore the composition of far-right party support, we turn to survey data. In 2016, wave eight of the internet panel of the British Election Study 2014-2023 (Fieldhouse et al. 2020) included the question: “Which party or independent candidate will you vote for to be your Assembly-wide member?” Out of 2,798 respondents, 282 indicated UKIP. Of these 282, merely five had another EU country’s citizenship, four were Commonwealth citizens, and two declared another non-British citizenship. The EU category includes EU8+2 nationals but also respondents from the 15 member states of the EU prior to 2004. While results for the BNP are not available from this study, it is even less plausible that immigrants would vote for this ultra-nationalist party (John et al. 2006). We conclude that the electoral response we document is driven by the voting behavior of the UK-born population.

This provides a basis to explore the channels through which this migration wave triggered far-right support among natives. The London election campaigns of UKIP and the BNP emphasised two perceived economic threats: competition for jobs and for housing. In our analysis, the unit of analysis is too small for a closed labor market, as most Londoners work in a different ward to the one they live in. It may therefore be difficult to detect this channel in our data. In terms of pressure on housing, this is likely to be keenly felt in the immediate neighbourhood. Furthermore, this channel is recognised in the literature as a factor in the rise of anti-immigrant parties (e.g., Cavaille and Ferwerda 2018; Hooijer 2021). Work by Dancygier (2010) on West Indian and South Asian migration in Britain,

²⁰Census 2011 Commissioned Table CT0796. There is a mismatch in the underlying definitions. However, few of these migrants were likely to have acquired British citizenship at this point. The latter would bias our estimates of registration ratios downwards.

including case studies of two London boroughs, highlights the role of competition for public housing as a trigger for conflict and providing fertile ground for far-right fascist parties in the second half of the previous century. Since then, while the importance of public housing controlled by local authorities has declined substantially, pressures on the affordability of housing have been linked to support for newer brands of far-right populist parties and their causes, especially UKIP and its campaign for Brexit (Fetzer 2019). Moreover, Adler and Ansell (2020) find that house prices are negatively associated with support for Brexit in the 2016 referendum, which they link to white working class communities losing out from housing market gains and anxieties about decline.

In addition, perceived cultural threat is an alternative channel that these and other far-right parties routinely exploit. The latter could be particularly relevant in this case, as significant language barriers impede sustained and meaningful contact with natives.²¹ Allport (1954) proposed the inter-group contact theory as the mediating factor between out-group presence and attitude formation towards the other group. More recently, Steinmayr (2021) finds consistent evidence that far-right party support in Austria decreases with sustained interaction with refugees but increases with brief exposure.

To examine underlying mechanisms in more detail, following Edo et al. (2019) and Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller (2017), we adopt a split sample strategy that exploits variation in initial conditions across wards. If we wanted to run models with interaction terms instead, this would require finding a separate instrument that is both relevant and plausibly only affects the outcome via its effect on the relevant interaction. Using data for 2001, we distinguish wards at or below the median, and those above it, in terms of house prices (as a proxy for overall housing costs) and unemployment rates.²² Our expectation is that those living in areas where housing is relatively cheap would be more vulnerable

²¹Data from the 2011 Census shows that 21.1% of the new EU migrants living in the UK say they “cannot speak English well” or “cannot speak English”. In comparison, only 3.9% of old EU migrants report this. The only groups with worse language acquisition are Bangladeshi (30.2%), Pakistani (22.9%), and Chinese nationals (22.5%).

²²Housing costs are also linked to the quality of local services, especially schools.

to rising costs and fears of decline, and perceived job competition is likely greater where unemployment is high. In addition, we probe a potential link to contact theory. Using our detailed census data on country of birth, we calculate the initial number of EU8+2 residents in each ward. Our assumption is that a subsequent influx of migrants from these countries will stand out more in areas where residents are less likely to have had prior contact with migrants from these countries, thus triggering a stronger electoral response.

Table 2: Exploring channels with split sample regressions using initial unemployment, house prices, and contact with EU8+2

	Main results	Unemployment Below median	Above median	House prices Below median	Above median	Contact Below median	Above median
I. UKIP							
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.69*** (3.54)	0.55* (2.56)	1.24 (1.76)	0.58*** (3.77)	0.18 (0.87)	0.68* (2.56)	1.14 (1.04)
II. BNP							
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.63*** (3.68)	0.60** (3.04)	0.84 (1.39)	0.43** (3.07)	0.40* (2.34)	0.70** (2.90)	0.74 (1.04)
Observations	620	310	310	308	312	311	309
F-test on excluded instrument	30.2	26.06	3.8	41.06	11.3	25.34	1.07
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: 2SLS estimates with t-statistics based on robust standard errors. Further details are in the notes of Table 1, and Appendix D provides sources for the variables used to create the split samples. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Results are reported in Table 2. Our instrumental variable is weak in some subsamples, which means we cannot make meaningful comparisons relating to initial levels of unemployment or diversity. We do, however, get a clear result related to housing. Here, the effect on UKIP support is three times larger in wards where initial house prices are low, but there is no difference in support for the BNP.²³ Consistent with the patterns reported by Adler and Ansell (2020) for the “leave” vote in the 2016 Brexit referendum, housing seems to have played a similar role in the electoral success of UKIP. This is also consistent with findings by Fetzner (2019), who demonstrates that austerity measures that

²³Using the same data source, we calculate that actual increases in housing costs over the following decade are very close to the overall sample mean of 85% in both subgroups. However, an increase might be more keenly felt by those dependent on affordable housing.

cut housing-related benefits boosted electoral support for UKIP and led to the success of the “leave” campaign. While Fetzner shows large post-2004 UKIP gains in coastal regions, Wales, and some industrial areas of the Midlands, our more granular analysis below the local authority level reveals that the same warning signs existed in metropolitan areas as well. The fact that this mechanism is not linked to support for the BNP suggests that in this period, support for the party seems to be driven more strongly by other channels, possibly concerns about national or cultural identity.

Conclusion and implications

To examine the electoral consequences of migration, we draw on two separate strands of research: a growing political economy literature on the electoral impact of migration at the local level, and the transport and human geography literature related to migration. Our empirical work exploits substantial heterogeneity of changes in the composition of residents across 620 wards in London following the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007. The enlargement brought a policy shift by disabling legal barriers to migration from the region and coincided with a boom in the low-cost aviation industry that ensured regular and affordable flight connections. We show that travel infrastructure is linked to the location decisions of these specific migrants, which allows us to study how this migration flow affected support for far-right parties. We estimate that a one percentage point increase in the share of migrants from the EU’s Eastern accession countries increased the vote shares of the two major anti-immigrant far-right parties, UKIP and the BNP, in London Assembly elections by about two-thirds of this amount. This is very close to the average effect calculated in a recent meta-analysis of studies investigating other Western European countries, which did however highlight substantial heterogeneity in estimates (Cools, Finseraas and Rogeberg 2021).

Our work has several implications for the study of the electoral effects of migration. First, prior studies of the political effects of migration look at migrants in general (e.g., Barone et al. 2016), specific subcategories such as refugees (e.g., Dinas et al. 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Piil Damm 2019; Gessler, Tóth and Wachs 2021), or migrants distinguished by education or skill level (e.g., Edo et al. 2019; Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller 2017; Mayda, Peri and Steingress 2018). Yet migrants are very heterogeneous, including in

terms of post-migration travel to their country of birth. Complementing and extending prior work on different migrant communities in Britain (Dancygier 2010), we are the first to study the electoral effects of “hypermobile” migration, which is particularly relevant in settings where policy-makers promote economic integration. While we exploit this for our empirical strategy, the distinction between highly-mobile and less-mobile migrants deserves further exploration. For instance, given that mobility may affect pressures to assimilate (Ignatowicz 2011: 43), future work should assess the integration trajectories of more and less mobile migrants, and observe how these patterns influence opportunities for sustained contact with the native population.

We also reveal important nuances in how migration affects support for different types of far-right parties. While both populist as well as fascist far-right parties benefit from migration, they do so for different reasons. In our case, UKIP strongly benefits in areas that rely on affordable housing, which is not an important channel for the BNP at least in this period. This is consistent with work by other scholars on the determinants of support for far-right populism in Britain around this period (Adler and Ansell 2020; Fetzer 2019). Our analysis suggests that warning signs about the political consequences of cuts to housing-related benefits analyzed by Fetzer (2019) were already present in 2012, the year prior to the implementation of these measures. This also implies that effective strategies to counter far-right support need to recognize distinct channels through which subsets of voters might be attracted to different types of far-right parties.

In addition, our approach expands the methodological toolkit for the study of the consequences of migration, which thus far has relied heavily on versions of the shift-share instrument in attempts to tackle endogeneity of settlement choices among new migrants. Over-reliance on this strategy is a growing concern among migration scholars (Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler 2018). Alternatives are also needed where data constraints preclude or limit the usefulness of this approach. Our paper provides such an alternative. Drawing on a hitherto separate literature on transport and human geography, we develop an instrumental variable based on the proximity to travel hubs that are of specific importance to the migrant group we study. This offers a potential solution to researchers who face similar data constraints, and it can serve as a robustness check for studies that primarily

rely on the traditional shift-share approach.

We see significant potential to deploy our approach across a wider range of settings to analyze the electoral consequences of migration. One of the distinguishing features of the wave of migration into the UK we study is that it resulted in settlement patterns that are more geographically spread out than previous waves (Kone 2018). This may well be linked to the evolution of flight networks across the UK during this period, and similar relationships may hold in other countries where low-cost travel boosted international mobility. Moreover, the flip side of the phenomenon we examine is emigration, which affects the demographic composition of communities that are left behind. Recent scholarship exploits geographic heterogeneity in emigration to analyze its electoral consequences (Anelli and Peri 2017). In this area, too, future work could deploy empirical strategies based on pre-existing transportation links.

Our analysis also suggests policy implications. In the EU, policy debates relating to the liberalization of travel markets and increased mobility have highlighted economic benefits, with claims of low-cost airlines “bringing Europe closer together” (Akgüç, Beblavý and Simonelli 2018). Our work highlights a political dark side of mobility that pulls into the polar opposite direction. In drawing lessons from Brexit for the prospects of European integration, and economic integration elsewhere, discussions of cross-national mobility should look beyond economic benefits. Policy-makers who promote mobility must also pay attention to its potential political consequences and consider how they might be mitigated, for instance through targeted programs ensuring affordable housing for natives in areas with a high influx of migrants, or by proactively managing settlement patterns.

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Online Appendix

A UKIP and the BNP campaigns

Lawrence Webb

A Fresh Choice for London

Only UKIP offers a truly Fresh Choice for London.

Millions of Londoners fear for their livelihoods because of punishing EU regulations which threaten up to half a million jobs that rely on a thriving financial services industry.

This is not just banking, it is the support services, like secretaries, IT workers, cleaners, bar and restaurant staff - even cabbies.

Only UKIP will fight to protect those jobs by saying NO to EU regulation of the City.

Vote UKIP on May 3rd.

Lawrence Webb

Fresh Ideas for London

- ✓ **Create more jobs** for Londoners by saying 'No' to open-door immigration.
- ✓ **Cut rates for local businesses** employing local people.
- ✓ **Fight EU red tape** strangling London businesses.
- ✓ **Priority for Londoners** whatever their ethnic origin for jobs and housing, over migrants and asylum seekers.
- ✓ **Zero tolerance** on gangs, knife crime and anti-social behaviour. Offend on Saturday, face court on Monday.
- ✓ **20 minutes free parking** across London.
- ✓ **Allow taxis** to use Olympic VIP lanes.
- ✓ **Cut Council house waiting lists** in half by filling empty properties from a central register and prioritising the needs of long-term Londoners.
- ✓ **Stop spending public money** on public sculpture when pensioners can't pay their bills.
- ✓ **Give landlords the power** to decide if they want smoking rooms in pubs and clubs.
- ✓ **5% VAT** on beer and cider.

UK Independence Party

Published & promoted by Peter Staveley on behalf of UKIP 156 Pentonville Rd, London N1 9JL

0800 587 6 587 ukipmayor.com

UKIP 2012 campaign – relevant points:

- Create more jobs for Londoners by saying 'No' to open-door immigration
- Fight EU red tape strangling London businesses
- Priority for Londoners whatever their ethnic origin for jobs and housing, over migrants and asylum seekers

visit www.BNP.org.uk

**Think commonsense
Vote BNP**

Call 0844 809 4581

BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY

People like you voting BNP:

- ✓ British people must be housed first
- ✓ No amnesty for illegal immigrants
- ✓ Build a better NHS
- ✓ Zero tolerance on crime and anti-social behaviour
- ✓ British jobs for British workers
- ✓ Abolish the Congestion Charge, CPZ and LEZ
- ✓ Reduce council tax
- ✓ Free weekend Tube and train travel

Dear Londoner,

I've lived in London since 1989 and I have worked for the BBC and then at the Commonwealth Office. I am of Italian descent which, I guess, makes me the most 'cosmopolitan' candidate standing for **London Mayor in 2012**.

I was outraged to find some immigrant communities refusing to respect the British people and their way of life so I joined the British National Party because I want to preserve the traditions, freedoms and identity of the country that has been so good to me and my family.

London is a diverse city and although there are some benefits, Multiculturalism has clearly led to division and confrontation instead of integration. The shocking looting and rioting last August is a prime example of this failed policy.

London needs a strong Mayor who is fair and decisive with the vision to make this great city of ours dynamic, safe and prosperous. I am that man!

Vote for me on 3rd May and together we will make London a city to be proud of again.

Carlos Cortiglia
Carlos Cortiglia
British National Party
Mayoral Candidate

Want to see Carlos take on the other mayoral candidates live on TV?
Call BBC London on 020 8743 8000 and demand that they invite the British National Party to all televised debates

CORTIGLIA Carlos
British National Party

First choice

☒

Prepared by election agent Clive Jefferson of PO Box 1244, Enfield EN1 9UF

British National Party – London

“ I support the British National Party all the way because I want to make a difference and have a no-nonsense British government that puts British people first. ”
Mike Jones, London Cabbie

“ I'm backing the British National Party because they support our traditional Christian faith. We need strong leadership to protect our national identity from the threat of Islam. ”
Reverend Robert West

“ We always vote for the British National Party because we want streets that are safe to walk on. We want to see local bobbies on the beat and we want to feel part of a caring British community again. ”
Penny McCulley, Pensioner

BNP 2012 campaign – relevant points:

- British people must be housed first
- No amnesty for illegal immigrants
- British jobs for British workers

B Airlines and destinations

WizzAir was one of the first airlines to capitalize on the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The company was established in 2003 and had its first flight on May 19, 2004 (only two weeks after enlargement) from Katowice, Poland to London Luton. The company soon expanded to operate regular flights between London and various Central and Eastern European countries, flying to a mix of primary, secondary and regional airports. The variety in destination airports makes the company attractive for migrants who also want to reduce commuting time in their home countries. WizzAir's main competitor in Central and Eastern Europe is Ryanair. Founded in November 1984, Ryanair moved its main London base to Stansted in 1991.

The flight networks of WizzAir and Ryanair contrast with that of EasyJet, another low-cost airline, which adopted a different strategy. This is visible in Figure B.1 when comparing panels (a) and (b) with panel (c). Unlike its two competitors, EasyJet expanded less aggressively into Central and Eastern European countries, where it tends to fly only to the capital cities. Moreover, and importantly in the context of our paper, EasyJet's largest base of operation is London's Gatwick airport.

While these maps show flight routes in 2020, they reflect historical patterns. Dobruszkes (2009) highlights the role of WizzAir and Ryanair in expanding west-east routes in direct response to the Eastern enlargement of the EU, in contrast to EasyJet's continued focus on Western Europe. His study reports route networks for these and other airlines as of 2008. To assess trends across London's airports more specifically, we obtained historical flight and passenger data from the UK's Civil Aviation Authority for the period 2000 to 2015. Our analysis is presented in Figures B.4, B.2, and B.3. The data show how quickly after accession EU8+2 passenger traffic through London's airports expanded, and how Gatwick was overtaken by Stansted and Luton in terms of the number of EU8+2 flight destinations and passenger volumes. Low-cost flights to and from the region quickly became concentrated in the two airports located to the north of London.

Figure B.1: (a) WizzAir flights from Luton Airport (b) Ryanair flights from Stanstead Airport (c) EasyJet flights from Gatwick Airport. Source: openflights.org; data downloaded on October 8, 2020.

Figure B.2: Number of EU8+2 destinations by London airport, 2001-2014. Source: Own calculations based on annual data from the Civil Aviation Authority (2020), Table 12.1, downloaded on December 28, 2020.

Figure B.3: Passenger traffic to/from EU8+2 countries by London airport, 2001-2014. Source: Own calculations based on annual data from the Civil Aviation Authority (2020), Table 12.1, downloaded on December 28, 2020.

Figure B.4: Total number of passengers to/from London and EU8/EU2 countries, 2001-2014. Source: Own calculations based on annual data from the Civil Aviation Authority (2020), Table 12.1, downloaded on December 28, 2020.

C Bus stops and their distance from ward centroids

To identify the pre-existing bus route infrastructure to Luton and Stansted airports, we first consulted travel guides from around the period of EU enlargement or earlier. These consistently identified two main bus routes: Green Lines bus number 757 from Victoria to Luton Airport, and the National Express Airbus A6 to from Victoria Coach Station to Stansted Airport. Both routes have a history that predates the period we examine. Just prior to the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the 757 departed from central London towards the airport about 30 times on weekdays, and the A6 about 40 times (Lonely Planet 2004). Both providers dominated their respective routes. For example, according to data in Luton Borough Council’s 2006 Provisional Bus Strategy the 757 accounted for about two thirds of busses connecting the airport to central London. Both the 757 and the A6 followed a similar route into and out of London, with some shared stops and others in close proximity. The smaller rival operators to these dominant services, too, tended to follow these routes.

Next, we confirmed the stops on these routes, where travellers to or from the airport were able to board, at the time of EU enlargement in 2004. Although there is substantial continuity in stops used over the years, there were also some changes, and we wanted to be certain to capture the pre-existing ones only. In July and September 2020, we submitted requests under the UK’s Freedom of Information Act to Transport for London (TfL), which is responsible for the approval of coach stops. In response, TfL confirmed when it first approved the existing stops to operate under a London Service Permit, a regulatory regime for any bus, coach, or tours service outside of the TfL network. Prior to this, such services operated under London Local Service licences, a separate regulatory regime. Stops with the earliest approval date were likely also approved at an earlier date, but TfL does not hold any earlier information. TfL sent us a full listing of existing bus stops in both directions and the dates of their approval under the current regulatory regime. We coded only those in one direction, since the corresponding stops in the other direction are typically in very close proximity, often on the opposite side of the road.

According to TfL, the following existing 757 stops for travel from Luton and towards Victoria were approved to operate under a London Service Permit from 1 August 2002

(bus stop codes in brackets): Brent Cross (BP4663), Childs Hill (9358), Lord’s Cricket Ground (4804), Baker Street Station (4789), Baker Street (1588), Oxford Street (179), Marble Arch (29908), Hyde Park Corner (36857), and Victoria (BP4469). For the A6, the following existing stops for travel from Luton and towards Victoria Coach Station were approved under a London Service Permit from 24 May 2004: Golders Green Bus Station (RO802), Finchley Road (BP4403), St Johns Wood Wellington Road (4804), and Baker Street Station (4879). The Finchley Road bus stop is for travel in the opposite direction, but we use it as a proxy as the corresponding one in the direction of central London has a more recent approval date, suggesting some minor adjustment in its location over the years. We also added Victoria Coach Station as the terminus for the A6, as indicated in various travel guides we consulted.

Next, we used this information to determine the distance of wards to each of these transport nodes. We first obtained the locations of TfL’s more than 19,000 bus stops from the London Datastore (<https://data.london.gov.uk>) and identified the above A6 and 757 stops. In a few instances TfL’s listing did not include the bus stop, which was the case when it did not serve any TfL buses. In these cases, we searched the TfL website (<https://tfl.gov.uk>) for the location of these stops and used the closest TfL stop or tube station for which we had information on its precise location. Our listing of TfL tube station locations is also from the London Datastore. We then calculated the distance between each ward centroid and each A6 and 757 bus stop. These operations were carried out with QGIS version 3.4. This provided the data for our instrument, which for each ward gives the distance (in kilometres) between its centroid and the closest A6 or 757 bus stop approved in 2004 or earlier.

D Data and variables

We started with data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Open Geography Data Portal (Office for National Statistics 2019) to match lower layer super output areas (LSOA) used in the census and electoral wards/divisions used for election outcomes. Two documents provided by the ONS assisted with the task: “WD10_LAD10_EW_LU”, containing the new 9 character ward codes and the old 6 character ward codes; and “WD11_CMWD11_LAD11_EW_LU”, containing the lookup between the census merged wards (E36) to electoral wards (E05). We then added information on electoral outcomes, on population counts by country of birth, and other ward-specific data.

Next, we checked for electoral border changes. Table D.1 shows that most electoral changes took place before the 2004 election or after the 2012 one. The only electoral changes in the period investigated in this paper are targeted at the City of London. We exclude the City of London from the analysis. This does not impact the results significantly, as “the City” is a business centre and has a negligible number of residents. The 2001 Census counted between 1061 and 3003 residents in the remaining wards and the 2011 Census between 1434 and 2782 residents.

Table D.2 presents the timeline of key events and helps to clarify several aspects of our data. First, we do not use the 2000 elections because ward and borough data were not collected. The unit of analysis for which the 2000 election results are available (London Assembly constituency) is too large to conduct any meaningful analysis. Instead, we use the 2004 results. Second, as the timeline suggests, the 2004 elections took place one month after the EU’s enlargement in that year. We assume this is a short enough period to make it unlikely for new EU migrants to arrive in London and leave an impression on the local population, in a way that substantially affects their electoral behavior. The Civil Aviation Authority reports approximately 100,000 more travellers on all routes (back and forth) between London airports and EU8 destinations in May 2004 (263,322 travellers) compared to the same month in the previous year (160,859 travellers). See also Figure D.1 for a monthly breakdown of relevant air travel in 2004. Finally, we use the 2012 election results because they are temporally closest to the 2011 Census. Therefore, this election is the one for which we have the most accurate data related to the number of

new EU residents.

Table D.1: Electoral changes orders since 2001

File ref	SI Number	SI Title	District Code	District/UA Name	Year
W327	N/A	City of London (Ward Elections) Act 2002	00AA	City of London	2007
W327B	N/A	City of London Act	00AA	City of London	2013
W52	780/2000	The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Order 2000	00AB	Barking and Dagenham	2002
W42	333/2000	The London Borough of Barnet Order 2000	00AC	Barnet	2002
W48	312/2000	The London Borough of Bexley Order 2000	00AD	Bexley	2002
W483	481/2017	The London Borough of Bexley Order 2017	00AD	Bexley	2018
W72	1846/2000	The London Borough of Brent Order 2000	00AE	Brent	2002
W71	1764/2000	The London Borough of Bromley Order 2000	00AF	Bromley	2002
W70	1765/2000	The London Borough of Camden Order 2000	00AG	Camden	2002
W55	781/2000	The London Borough of Croydon Order 2000	00AH	Croydon	2002
W506	1125/2017	The London Borough of Croydon Order 2017	00AH	Croydon	2018
W26	334/2000	The London Borough of Ealing Order 1999	00AJ	Ealing	2002
W73	1845/2000	The London Borough of Enfield Order 2000	00AK	Enfield	2002
W77	1977/2000	The London Borough of Greenwich Order	00AL	Greenwich	2002
W56	782/2000	The London Borough of Hackney Order 2000	00AM	Hackney	2002
W391	2795/2013	The Hackney Order 2013	00AM	Hackney	2014
W74	1844/2000	The London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham Order 2000	00AN	Hammersmith and Fulham	2002
W57	783/2000	The London Borough of Haringey Order 2000	00AP	Haringey	2002
W27	316/2000	The London Borough of Harrow Order 1999	00AQ	Harrow	2002
W49	313/2000	The London Borough of Havering Order 2000	00AR	Havering	2002
W69	1766/2000	The London Borough of Hillingdon Order 2000	00AS	Hillingdon	2002
W28	317/2000	The London Borough of Hounslow Order 1999	00AT	Hounslow	2002
W58	784/2000	The London Borough of Islington Order 2000	00AU	Islington	2002
W59	785/2000	The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Order 2000	00AW	Kensington and Chelsea	2002
W401	25/2014	The Kensington and Chelsea Order 2014	00AW	Kensington and Chelsea	2014
W68	1767/2000	The Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames Order 2000	00AX	Kingston upon Thames	2002
W29	319/2000	The London Borough of Lambeth Order 1999	00AY	Lambeth	2002
W61	1236/2000	The London Borough of Lewisham Order 2000	00AZ	Lewisham	2002
W30	318/2000	The London Borough of Merton Order 1999	00BA	Merton	2002
W67	1768/2000	The London Borough of Newham Order 2000	00BB	Newham	2002
W31	335/2000	The London Borough of Redbridge Order 1999	00BC	Redbridge	2002
W484	609/2017	The London Borough of Redbridge Order 2017	00BC	Redbridge	2018
W50	314/2000	The London Borough of Richmond upon Thames Order 2000	00BD	Richmond upon Thames	2002
W60	786/2000	The London Borough of Southwark Order 2000	00BE	Southwark	2002
W474	1202/2016	The London Borough of Southwark Order 2016	00BE	Southwark	2018
W75	1847/2000	The London Borough of Sutton Order 2000	00BF	Sutton	2002
W54	787/2000	The London Borough of Tower Hamlets Order 2000	00BG	Tower Hamlets	2002
W390	1786/2013	The Tower Hamlets Order 2013	00BG	Tower Hamlets	2014
W32	336/2000	The London Borough of Waltham Forest Order 1999	00BH	Waltham Forest	2002
W51	315/2000	The London Borough of Wandsworth Order 2000	00BJ	Wandsworth	2002
W53	788/2000	The City of Westminster Order 2000	00BK	Westminster	2002
P325	5008/2013	The City of Westminster Order 2013	00BK	City of Westminster	2014

Source: Data in the current format was provided by the ONS in private correspondence. It is also available online on The Local Government Boundary Commission for England website: <https://www.lgbce.org.uk/resources/database-of-local-government-orders/greater-london>.

May 4, 2000	• London elections
April 29, 2001	• Census
May 1, 2004	• EU enlargement (EU8 join)
June 10, 2004	• London elections and EU Parliament election
January 1, 2007	• EU enlargement (EU2 join)
May 1, 2008	• London elections
March 27, 2011	• Census
May 3, 2012	• London elections

Table D.2: Timeline of key events

Figure D.1: Monthly total number of passengers to/from London and EU8/EU2 countries, 2004. The EU8 countries joined the EU in month 5 (May). Source: Own calculations based on monthly data from the Civil Aviation Authority (2020), Table 12.1, downloaded on February 6, 2021.

Data used to calculate the share of votes cast for UKIP and the BNP were obtained from the London Datastore (Greater London Authority 2004; 2012). We focus on the London Member election and calculate the percentage point change in votes for party $p \in \{BNP, UKIP\}$ in each ward $w \in \{1 : 620\}$ according to the formula:

$$\Delta Votes_{p,w} = \frac{Member_{p,w,2012}}{Member_{TotalValidVotes,w,2012}} \times 100 - \frac{Member_{p,w,2004}}{Member_{TotalValidVotes,w,2004}} \times 100 \quad (D.1)$$

The 2004 elections for London coincided with the European Parliament elections. This affects the patterns we observe in our data on electoral outcomes. Far-right parties are known to fare better in second-order elections such as these. Holding EU elections on the same day would have prompted individuals to vote in higher numbers for these parties in the London elections, too, thus increasing their levels of support in 2004. The data depicted in the maps below confirm that support largely declined in 2012, relative to 2004. However, since the coincidence of EU and London elections in 2004 affects all of London, it does not distort our ward-level analysis of the link between EU8+2 migration and support for these parties.

Figure D.2: Percentage point change in votes for **UKIP**, 2004-12 by ward

Figure D.3: Percentage point change in votes for the **BNP**, 2004-12 by ward

To construct the percentage point change in new EU residents and in all other foreign-born residents, we use commissioned data from the Office for National Statistics: Census 2001 Commissioned Table C1397 and Census 2011 Commissioned Table CT0226 (<https://data.london.gov.uk/census/tools/country-of-birth-ward-tool/>, last accessed November 19, 2020).

$$\Delta Residents_{c,w} = \frac{Residents_{c,w,2011}}{Residents_{Total,w,2011}} \times 100 - \frac{Residents_{c,w,2001}}{Residents_{Total,w,2001}} \times 100 \quad (D.2)$$

For the main independent variable, the percentage point change in new EU residents, subscript c in equation D.2 refers to residents born in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia or Slovenia who resided in ward w at the date of the census. Our calculation of the percentage point change in all other foreign-born residents involves subtracting the number of residents born in an EU8+2 country from the total number of non-UK born residents.

The remaining control variables are obtained from two sources available on the London Datastore website. We obtain information on the unemployed, retired, and economically inactive students for each ward released by the Census Information Scheme (2011) and data on household income and median house prices released by the Greater London Authority (2013). The former data are already released in percentage changes, so no transformations are needed for the variables $\Delta Unemployed residents (pc)$, $\Delta Retired residents (pc)$ and $\Delta Student residents (pc)$. The median house price data (in pound sterling) come from the Land Registry, which publishes full postcode price paid data on their website. The

median household income (also in pounds) was calculated by the Greater London Authority and released for 2001/02, 2007/08, and 2012/13. We then construct the variable $\Delta Median\ household\ income\ (\pounds\ 000s)$ by subtracting the median income in 2001/02 from that in 2012/13 and re-scaling to thousands of pounds. Table D.3 below shows the summary statistics for all variables.

Table D.3: Descriptive statistics

	Min	Mean	Max	Std.Dev.	Obs
BNP votes 2004	13	130.09	480	94.33	620
BNP votes 2004 (pct.)	0.69	5.17	24.97	4.01	620
BNP votes 2012	7	58.89	251	41.37	620
BNP votes 2012 (pct.)	0.21	2.36	14.95	2.02	620
Absolute change BNP votes	-272	-71.20	14	57.75	620
Δ BNP votes (pp)	-13.70	-2.81	0.55	2.26	620
UKIP votes 2004	27	221.15	790	136.06	620
UKIP votes 2004 (pct.)	2.44	8.50	23.14	4.62	620
UKIP votes 2012	22	123.50	491	75.31	620
UKIP votes 2012 (pct.)	0.88	4.72	15.69	2.79	620
Absolute change UKIP votes	-367	-97.64	7	72.75	620
Δ UKIP votes (pp)	-14.09	-3.78	0.35	2.52	620
Votes 2004	978	2651.05	5042	650.69	620
Turnout 2004	33.38	36.93	41.49	2.51	620
Votes 2012	1263	2740.03	4693	618.77	620
Turnout 2012	19.30	34.15	51.72	5.34	620
Δ Turnout	-18.83	-2.78	18.34	5.58	620
UK-born residents in 2001	3504	8374.77	15178	1941.89	620
UK-born residents in 2011	3383	8288.62	14942	2031.53	620
Absolute change native population	-3284	-86.15	3231	700.65	620
EU2 residents in 2001	0	9.73	65	8.74	620
EU8 residents in 2001	0	59.11	431	51.89	620
New EU residents 2001 (pct.)	0.00	0.59	3.38	0.44	620
EU2 residents in 2011	3	115.91	857	136.59	620
EU8 residents in 2011	13	402.99	2265	341.71	620
New EU residents 2011 (pct.)	0.31	3.80	15.79	2.85	620
Δ New EU residents (pp)	-0.06	3.20	15.28	2.71	620
All other foreign-born residents 2001 (pct.)	3.99	26.34	57.60	12.23	620
All other foreign-born residents 2011 (pct.)	4.69	32.21	63.74	12.45	620
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-1.88	5.87	18.69	3.69	620
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	-0.42	0.43	1.62	0.32	620
Δ Retired residents (pc)	-0.41	-0.01	0.68	0.12	620
Δ Student residents (pc)	-0.49	0.43	2.84	0.38	620
Median household income 2001/02 (£000s)	17.01	27.31	46.11	5.03	620
Median household income 2012/13 (£000s)	25.09	39.27	88.33	7.40	620
Δ Median household income (£000s)	5.61	11.95	42.22	2.89	620
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	73.50	173.03	730.00	70.07	620
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)	0.28	10.65	29.72	6.29	620
Distance from closest train station (km)	0.37	10.96	25.61	6.16	620
2001 initial shares	0.00	0.16	1.05	0.13	620
Shift-share, 2001 initial shares	0.00	450.39	2763.76	355.64	620
1991 initial shares	0.01	0.16	1.65	0.18	620
Shift-share, 1991 initial shares	15.17	450.78	4174.61	501.21	620

E Alternative instrumental variables

Before creating various alternative instruments, we first had to adjust the 1991 census data. In generating estimates of the initial distribution of the population from the EU8+2 countries across wards in London in 1991, we faced two obstacles. First, six of these ten countries did not exist until 1991 or later and hence the populations born in them and residing in London were not directly captured in the 1991 UK census. The affected countries are Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (which were part of the USSR until their independence in 1991); Slovenia (which was part of Yugoslavia until its independence in 1991); and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (which became independent states in 1993 following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia). Second, the ward structure at the time of the 1991 census is different from the 2004 ward structure that underpins our empirical analysis. To use the 1991 census data thus required a process for imputing the 1991 distribution of the population from the later EU8+2 countries using 2004 ward boundaries.

We started by compiling 1991 total population estimates for the EU8+2 countries, which we obtained from the World Bank. The World Bank data draw on United Nations population estimates, national census data, as well as data from various regional and other statistical agencies. We cross-checked these estimates against those of the United Nations Population Division’s “World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision” data and found differences to be small. We also obtained total population estimates for the USSR (from the 1989 census) and Yugoslavia (from the 1991 census) as reported on Wikipedia. For the USSR, the 1989 census is the last undertaken before the union’s dissolution and provides the closest available estimate.

Next, we used this information to construct weights for the population from later EU8+2 countries who in the 1991 UK census report their country of birth as USSR, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia. This entailed dividing the World Bank 1991 population estimates for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia by the relevant total population of the entity of which they were part before the end of the Cold War. For example, we divided the World Bank’s estimate of the 1991 population of Slovenia (1999429) by the total population in the 1991 Yugoslav census (23229846) to estimate the share of the Slovenian population in the total population of Yugoslavia at the time,

about 0.0861. We repeated this for the three Baltic countries using the 1989 Soviet census, while for Czechoslovakia we derived the denominator by summing the World Bank’s 1991 population estimates for the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

At the end of this process, we thus had a set of weights that we could use to back out estimates of the population from the later EU8+2 countries in London at the time of the 1991 UK census. We obtained the number of people recorded in the 1991 census as born in the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, as well as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. For the latter four, we made no adjustments. For the former three, we backed out estimates for the relevant EU8+2 country using the weights described above. For instance, to obtain an estimate of the Slovenian population in a given ward in London in 1991, we multiplied the census count for those giving Yugoslavia as their country of birth in that ward by 0.0861, and equivalent for the five other countries. This left us with 1991 population estimates across all wards in London of those born in all entities later included in the new EU accession countries. The steps involved in this calculation are summarized in Table E.1.

It is important to acknowledge our underpinning assumptions. Lacking any other information, we assumed that emigration from the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was uniformly distributed. Hence, we assumed that Slovenians were as likely to leave Yugoslavia for the UK as were Serbs or Croats, for example; or that someone from the territory of Estonia was as likely to emigrate to the UK as someone in, say, Irkutsk. This may or may not hold in individual circumstances, but it is a reasonable approach given that we lack systematic data on the composition of those emigrating to the UK from the different regions of these countries.

Our final step in making the 1991 data usable for our study was their conversion into 2004 ward boundaries. We could not commission the 1991 data in 2004 ward boundaries from the Office for National Statistics. Thus, we carried out a spatial join using the 1991 and 2004 ward shapefiles, to refit the 1991 data to the 2004 boundaries. We did so with the “proportional sum” operation that assumes individuals are uniformly distributed in any given ward, so that the proportion of the 1991 ward that falls into a 2004 ward can

be used to attribute individuals to the new ward. Without other information about the distribution of these immigrants within wards, this was the most neutral assumption. This operation was carried out with QGIS version 3.4.

Table E.1: Estimating EU8+2 ward populations from the 1991 UK census

Country	1991 population	Our weight is constructed by dividing the 1991 population by the population of:	Our 1991 estimate is the product of the weight and the ward count for the relevant COB category
Bulgaria	8632367	Bulgaria	1 x COB Bulgaria
Czech Republic	10308578	Czechoslovakia	0.660304 x COB Czechoslovakia
Estonia	1561314	USSR	0.005445 x COB USSR
Hungary	10373400	Hungary	1 x COB Hungary
Lithuania	3704134	USSR	0.012919 x COB USSR
Latvia	2650581	USSR	0.009244 x COB USSR
Poland	38246193	Poland	1 x COB Poland
Romania	23001155	Romania	1 x COB Romania
Slovak Republic	5303294	Czechoslovakia	0.339696 x COB Czechoslovakia
Slovenia	1999429	Yugoslavia	0.086072 x COB Yugoslavia
USSR (1989)	286730819		
Yugoslavia (1991)	23229846		
Czechoslovakia (1991)	15611872		

Sources: The country of birth (COB) categories for the 1991 UK census were defined by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (Annex A of “1991 Census: Definitions Great Britain”). EU8+2 population estimates for 1991 are from the World Bank DataBank (series SP.POP.TOTL downloaded on April 1, 2020); the USSR census total is from [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Census_\(1989\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Census_(1989)) and the total for Yugoslavia from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia.

We then used these data to construct two alternative instruments that are commonly used in the migration literature. First, we calculate initial shares:

$$z_{2w,t} = \frac{\sum_{c \in EU8+2} Migrants_{c,w,t}}{\sum_{c \in EU8+2} TotalMigrants_{c,t}} \quad (E.1)$$

Here, $z_{2w,t}$ represents the initial share of all new EU migrant residents in ward w at time t , which can be either 1991 or 2001. It is calculated as the sum of the number of migrants from each of the ten Eastern enlargement countries c that joined the EU in 2004 or 2007 and who resided in a given ward w , divided by the total number of migrants from these countries across all wards at that time.

Next, we construct an alternative variable that is a version of the widely used shift-share instrument:

$$z_{3w,t} = \sum_{c \in EU8+2} Share_{c,w,t} \times Shift_{c,2011-2001} \quad (E.2)$$

The variable $z_{3w,t}$ distributes the London-wide inflow of migrants from an EU8+2 country (the “shift”) using weights depending on an initial spatial distribution of immigrants from that country (the “share”). For either 1991 or 2001, $Share_{c,w,t}$ is the initial share in ward w of immigrants across all wards in our dataset who were born in country $c \in \{EU8 + 2\}$. $Shift_{c,2011-2001}$ is the total flow of migrants from country c into all wards between 2001 and 2011.²⁴

One concern related to shift-share instruments in the context of our study is that using pre-accession census data of Central and Eastern European residents may only be partly related to subsequent migration flows. This is because these data may more accurately capture specific sub-categories of these migrants, such as highly skilled workers, students, or older immigrants (Becker and Fetzer 2016). Furthermore, the methodological debate about shift-share instruments highlights the importance of the exogeneity of the initial shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift 2020; Jaeger, Ruist and Stuhler 2018). In our case, this is more plausible in 1991. However, the data for that year suffer from other inaccuracies due to the transformations required to make them usable for our study.

We further considered instruments based on proximity to alternative transport links, especially train stations. This is calculated in the same fashion as our bus stop instrument, focusing on three train stations with direct connections to the two airports: King’s Cross/St Pancras for Luton; and Tottenham Hale and Liverpool Street for Stansted.

²⁴As we examine the impact of changes in the share of EU8+2 migrants, we also compiled an alternative version where we scale the instrument by 2001 ward population. The results are very similar, although the scaled versions of our shift-share instruments are slightly weaker in the first-stage regressions. We report results with the non-scaled versions in this appendix and include models with the alternative scaled versions in the replication package.

However, this instrument is less convincing, because these stations provide valuable travel links to other destinations and hence a wider group of migrants. For instance, St Pancras provides direct train links to Paris and Brussels and adjacent King’s Cross offers a direct underground link to Heathrow Airport. Also, as we discuss in the paper, trains are more expensive than busses, which make them less appealing to those seeking the most affordable journey to the airport. Overall, this makes the exclusion restriction less plausible.

The first-stage results presented in Table E.2 show a strong and positive relationship between the train station, initial share, or shift-share instruments, and the increase in the share of migrants from new EU countries. The instruments using 1991 data are weaker than the alternatives, but close to the conventional cut-off as indicated by the F-statistics. The second-stage estimates presented in Table E.3 are much larger than their OLS baselines. The coefficients with the transport instrument are similar to those with the other instruments for both UKIP and the BNP.

In Table E.4, we present second-stage estimates for a selection of multiple instruments. We combine the bus stop instrument with the initial share instrument described in Equation E.1. For comparison, the first two columns show the 2SLS results presented in the main analysis, columns three and four combine the transport instrument with the 1991 shares of migrant residents from new EU countries and columns five and six use the 2001 distribution of migrants as the “initial” share of EU8+2 residents. The results are almost identical.

Table E.2: First-stage regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)	-0.20*** (-5.50)					
Distance from closest train station (km)		-0.16*** (-4.93)				
Shift-share, 1991 initial shares (000s)			0.86** (3.19)			
1991 initial shares				1.99** (2.79)		
Shift-share, 2001 initial shares (000s)					1.81*** (4.54)	
2001 initial shares						4.44*** (4.19)
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-0.07 (-1.67)	-0.08 (-1.81)	-0.07 (-1.72)	-0.07 (-1.63)	-0.06 (-1.51)	-0.06 (-1.44)
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	0.92* (2.23)	0.83* (1.99)	0.52 (1.31)	0.50 (1.25)	0.81* (2.09)	0.72 (1.85)
Δ Retired residents (pc)	-1.64 (-1.87)	-1.59 (-1.84)	-1.68* (-2.01)	-1.68* (-1.99)	-1.52 (-1.85)	-1.59 (-1.92)
Δ Student residents (pc)	-0.08 (-0.35)	-0.12 (-0.53)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (-0.04)	0.02 (0.07)	0.00 (0.01)
Δ Median household income (£000s)	-0.10 (-1.33)	-0.09 (-1.21)	-0.15* (-2.24)	-0.13 (-1.88)	-0.09 (-1.27)	-0.11 (-1.45)
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	-0.01*** (-4.52)	-0.01*** (-4.41)	-0.01*** (-4.12)	-0.01*** (-3.94)	-0.01*** (-4.15)	-0.01*** (-4.11)
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-test on excluded instrument	30.2	24.29	10.2	7.77	20.65	17.53
R ²	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.61	0.60

Notes: Linear models with borough fixed effects and robust standard errors. The outcome is the percentage point change (Δ) in residents from new EU member states between 2001 and 2011. In this table, for presentational purposes, we report the coefficient for our shift-share instruments in units of thousands. The instrument using distance to the closest train station only accounts for trainstations with direct connections to the two airports (King's Cross / St Pancrass for Luton; and Tottenham Hale and Liverpool Street for Stansted). Further details are in the notes of Table 1. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.3: Comparison between different instruments

	OLS	Transport instrument		1991 instrument		2001 instrument	
		Bus	Train	Shift-share	Initial shares	Shift-share	Initial shares
Outcome: Δ UKIP votes (pp)							
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.01 (0.28)	0.69*** (3.54)	0.67** (3.13)	0.53* (2.15)	0.71* (2.13)	0.70*** (3.30)	0.74** (3.05)
Outcome: Δ BNP votes (pp)							
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.05 (1.50)	0.63*** (3.68)	0.57** (2.97)	0.58** (2.61)	0.62* (2.27)	0.62*** (3.33)	0.59** (3.07)
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
First-stage controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: OLS or 2SLS estimates with t-statistics based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable for the first panel is the percentage point change (Δ pp) in votes cast for the UK Independence Party between 2004 and 2012. The outcome variable for the second panel is the percentage point change in votes cast for the British National Party between 2004 and 2012. The first column shows OLS estimates and the remaining six columns report 2SLS estimates. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table E.4: Second-stage estimates with single vs. multiple instruments

	Transport		Transport & '91 shares		Transport & '01 shares	
	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.69*** (3.54)	0.63*** (3.68)	0.69*** (3.78)	0.63*** (3.93)	0.72*** (4.06)	0.61*** (4.05)
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-0.09* (-2.09)	-0.07 (-1.79)	-0.08* (-2.08)	-0.07 (-1.81)	-0.08* (-2.04)	-0.07 (-1.87)
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	-1.45*** (-3.52)	-1.40*** (-3.83)	-1.46*** (-3.51)	-1.40*** (-3.84)	-1.46*** (-3.46)	-1.40*** (-3.84)
Δ Retired residents (pc)	4.59*** (5.41)	3.15*** (3.93)	4.60*** (5.46)	3.14*** (3.99)	4.64*** (5.35)	3.11*** (3.96)
Δ Student residents (pc)	-0.57 (-1.77)	-0.87*** (-3.29)	-0.57 (-1.76)	-0.87*** (-3.29)	-0.57 (-1.75)	-0.87*** (-3.31)
Δ Median household income (£000s)	0.16* (2.27)	0.06 (0.90)	0.16* (2.21)	0.06 (0.88)	0.17* (2.25)	0.06 (0.87)
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	0.01*** (4.08)	0.01*** (4.56)	0.01*** (4.10)	0.01*** (4.59)	0.01*** (4.19)	0.01*** (4.69)
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cragg-Donald F-statistic	31.33	31.33	18.08	18.08	24.46	24.46

Notes: All models reflect the 2SLS results, showing impact on the percentage point change (Δ pp) in votes cast for the UK Independence Party and the British National Party between 2004 and 2012. Columns 1 and 2 estimate Equation 3. The remaining columns instrument the percentage point change in new EU migrants between 2001 and 2011 across London wards using both the proximity to a A6 or 757 bus stop and the initial shares of new EU migrants in 1991 (Columns 3 and 4) and 2001 (Columns 5 and 6). Further details are in the notes of Table 1. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

F Estimates of EU8+2 voter registration rates

Figure F.1: Estimated EU8+2 voter registration rates across wards in selected boroughs (2011)

Between November 2018 and May 2019, we contacted the electoral services managers of London’s 32 boroughs and requested information on the number of electors by nationality in each ward. Eleven boroughs included in Figure F.1 were able to supply this information for 2011. The figure summarizes the ward-level distributions of EU8+2 nationals on the electoral registers of these boroughs, relative to the number of residents aged 18 or older and born in an EU8+2 country (from Census 2011 Commissioned Table CT0796 compiled by the Office for National Statistics). We omit the Harold Wood ward in Havering, where our estimate is 133% (201 electors against 151 residents). Several factors introduce inaccuracies. First, the census and registry data refer to different dates. Second, the census data used here refer to country of birth instead of nationality. Third, the electoral registers may not capture recent arrivals or departures. Finally, there is a margin of error in census counts.

G Supplementary results

Table G.1: Number of votes cast for UKIP and BNP

	OLS		2SLS		Reduced Form	
	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP
Δ New EU residents (pp)	2.73** (2.95)	3.07*** (3.66)	27.66*** (4.23)	19.32*** (4.42)		
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-1.46 (-1.90)	-1.39* (-1.99)	0.59 (0.43)	-0.05 (-0.05)	-1.34 (-1.81)	-1.40* (-2.07)
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	-45.24*** (-4.64)	-38.41*** (-4.84)	-54.74*** (-4.06)	-44.60*** (-4.52)	-29.31** (-3.07)	-26.84*** (-3.47)
Δ Retired residents (pc)	101.50*** (6.21)	60.42*** (4.59)	145.93*** (5.17)	89.37*** (4.27)	100.44*** (6.26)	57.60*** (4.40)
Δ Student residents (pc)	-3.63 (-0.52)	-16.51** (-2.93)	-2.96 (-0.33)	-16.07* (-2.42)	-5.15 (-0.75)	-17.61** (-3.06)
Δ Median household income (£000s)	0.40 (0.40)	-1.40 (-1.71)	3.83 (1.69)	0.84 (0.54)	1.04 (1.11)	-1.11 (-1.29)
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	0.11* (2.28)	0.13** (3.24)	0.29*** (3.46)	0.24*** (4.07)	0.01 (0.24)	0.05 (1.20)
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)					-5.56*** (-5.78)	-3.88*** (-5.56)
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: The change in absolute number of votes cast for the UK Independence Party (columns 1, 3 and 5) and the British National Party (columns 2, 4 and 6) between 2004 and 2012. Further details are in the notes of Table 1. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table G.2: Main regressions with 2008 elections

	OLS			First Stage		Placebo 1st Stage		2SLS		Reduced Form	
	UKIP	BNP	Δ New EU	Δ New EU	Δ All other foreign-born	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP
Δ New EU residents (pp)	0.45*** (7.46)	-0.19*** (-3.37)			-0.92*** (-7.09)	1.56*** (6.97)	-0.49*** (-3.51)				
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	0.15*** (4.53)	-0.13*** (-4.25)	-0.23*** (-6.61)			0.42*** (5.57)	-0.20*** (-4.94)	0.06* (2.11)	-0.09*** (-3.95)		
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	-3.42*** (-5.77)	0.02 (0.03)	0.66 (1.51)		2.33* (2.53)	-3.31*** (-4.24)	-0.02 (-0.03)	-2.27*** (-3.81)	-0.34 (-0.71)		
Δ Retired residents (pc)	6.36*** (5.29)	-1.29 (-1.81)	-0.19 (-0.20)		0.42 (0.22)	6.76*** (3.89)	-1.40 (-1.78)	6.46*** (6.14)	-1.30 (-1.91)		
Δ Student residents (pc)	-2.43*** (-4.55)	0.16 (0.62)	0.43 (1.83)		2.72*** (4.57)	-2.97*** (-4.85)	0.31 (1.04)	-2.30*** (-4.34)	0.10 (0.38)		
Δ Median household income (£000s)	0.08 (0.74)	-0.12 (-1.58)	-0.20 (-1.85)		-0.51** (-2.60)	0.40* (2.23)	-0.21* (-2.25)	0.08 (0.86)	-0.10 (-1.71)		
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	0.01** (2.86)	-0.00 (-0.74)	-0.00** (-2.82)		0.00 (0.72)	0.01** (2.98)	-0.00 (-0.99)	0.00 (0.60)	0.00 (0.47)		
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)			-0.20*** (-7.40)		-0.07 (-1.19)			-0.32*** (-8.64)	0.10*** (3.36)		
Observations	621	621	621	621	621	621	621	621	621	621	621
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-test on excluded instrument			54.82		1.42						
R ²	0.78	0.73	0.77		0.78	0.63	0.70	0.79	0.72		

Notes: The estimated percentage point change in residents from new EU member states between 2001 and 2008 and the percentage point change (Δ pp) in votes cast for the UK Independence Party and the British National Party between 2004 and 2008. Δ Median household income refers to the percentage point change between 2001/2002 - 2007/2008, while the other Δ pc variables refer to the estimated (based on the assumption of linearity) percentage change in unemployment, inactive student population and retired population between 2001 and 2008. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table G.3: Building the main model

	No controls		Baseline control		Fixed effects		Demographic controls		Economic controls		EU8+2 initial share	
	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP	UKIP	BNP
Δ New EU residents (pp)	7.54* (2.23)	6.28* (2.21)	1.18*** (7.18)	1.08*** (7.08)	0.88*** (3.68)	0.85*** (3.99)	0.78*** (3.68)	0.75*** (3.97)	0.69*** (3.54)	0.63*** (3.68)	0.63* (2.57)	0.61** (2.82)
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)			0.04*** (11.98)	0.03*** (10.37)	0.02*** (6.12)	0.02*** (5.58)	0.02*** (5.86)	0.02*** (5.17)	0.01*** (4.08)	0.01*** (4.56)	0.01*** (3.18)	0.01*** (3.69)
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)							-0.11** (-2.67)	-0.09* (-2.26)	-0.09* (-2.09)	-0.07 (-1.79)	-0.09* (-2.17)	-0.07 (-1.80)
Δ Retired residents (pc)							3.86*** (4.24)	2.74** (3.21)	4.59*** (5.41)	3.15*** (3.93)	4.49*** (5.25)	3.12*** (3.79)
Δ Student residents (pc)							-1.02** (-3.10)	-1.20*** (-4.35)	-0.57 (-1.77)	-0.87*** (-3.29)	-0.56 (-1.80)	-0.87*** (-3.31)
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)									-1.45*** (-3.52)	-1.40*** (-3.83)	-1.37*** (-3.24)	-1.38*** (-3.60)
Δ Median household income (£000s)									0.16* (2.27)	0.06 (0.90)	0.16* (2.28)	0.06 (0.88)
New EU residents 2001 (pct.)											0.27 (0.61)	0.08 (0.21)
Observations	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620	620
Borough fixed effects	χ	χ	χ	χ	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
F-test on excluded instrument	5.35	5.35	84.69	84.69	27.65	27.65	27.8	27.8	30.2	30.2	17.56	17.56

Notes: All coefficients estimate the 2SLS results from Equation 3. Further details are in the notes of Table 1. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table G.4: Turnout

	OLS	First Stage	2SLS	Reduced Form
Δ New EU residents (pp)	-0.76*** (-8.90)		0.39 (0.94)	
Δ All other foreign-born residents (pp)	-0.53*** (-7.91)	-0.07 (-1.72)	-0.43*** (-5.14)	-0.46*** (-6.13)
Δ Unemployed residents (pc)	0.68 (0.94)	0.95* (2.31)	0.20 (0.24)	0.58 (0.72)
Δ Retired residents (pc)	3.70* (2.58)	-1.63 (-1.85)	5.73** (2.73)	5.09** (2.98)
Δ Student residents (pc)	-2.13*** (-4.21)	-0.07 (-0.30)	-2.10*** (-3.88)	-2.13*** (-4.06)
Δ Median household income (£000s)	0.39* (2.41)	-0.10 (-1.34)	0.55** (2.68)	0.51** (2.67)
Median house price in 2001 (£000s)	0.00 (0.92)	-0.01*** (-4.48)	0.01* (2.04)	0.01 (1.59)
Distance from closest A6/757 bus stop (km)		-0.20*** (-5.47)		-0.08 (-0.99)
Observations	624	624	624	624
Borough Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
F-test on excluded instrument		29.97		

Notes: We measure the impact migration from new EU member states had on the percentage point change (Δ pp) in turnout between 2004 and 2012. Further details are in the notes of Table 1. t statistics between parentheses; * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$