The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

Hanne M. Watkins*

Simon M. Laham

University of Melbourne

Author Note

*Current affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania. Hanne M. Watkins was supported by an Australian Postgraduate Award while undertaking this research. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Hanne M. Watkins, Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Email: hwatkins@sas.upenn.edu

Abstract

The *principle of discrimination* states that soldiers are legitimate targets of violence in war, whereas civilians are not. Is this prescriptive rule reflected in the descriptive judgments of laypeople? In 2 studies ($Ns = 300, 229$), U.S. Mechanical Turk workers were asked to evaluate a soldier or a civilian in terms of their character traits. Participants also made moral judgments about scenarios in which the target individual (soldier vs. civilian) killed or was killed by the enemy in war. We found that soldiers were consistently viewed as more dangerous and more courageous than civilians (Study 1). Participants also viewed killing by (and of) soldiers as more permissible than killing by (and of) civilians, in line with the principle of discrimination (Study 1). Altering the war context to involve a clearly just and unjust side (in Study 2) did not appear to moderate the principle of discrimination in moral judgment, although soldiers and civilians on the just side were evaluated more positively overall. However, the soldiers on the unjust side of the war were not attributed greater courage than were civilians on the unjust side. Theoretical and practical implications of these descriptive findings are discussed.

Key words: moral judgment, stereotyping, principle of discrimination, judgments of soldiers, person perception

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

The principle of discrimination: Investigating perceptions of soldiers

Who can and cannot be killed in war? The *principle of discrimination* states that combatants are legitimate targets of attack in war, whereas civilians (non-combatants) are not (Orend, 2005). As well as being codified in international laws of war (Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, Articles 48, 51), this principle ranks first among philosophical prescriptions for how wars should be fought (Orend, 2005; Moseley, 2015). In common parlance, it may be better known as “civilian immunity,” and throughout world history – from contemporary laws of armed conflict, to ancient China and early Islam – humanitarian limits on war have included some version of this principle (French, 2016; Traven, 2013, 2015). Despite widespread in-principle agreement with the principle of discrimination (see Gade, 2010, for a review), applying it to any particular act of killing in war is difficult – both for soldiers using the principle to guide their actions (e.g., Graves, 1929/2000; Klay, 2014), and for third-party judges, evaluating the conduct of war after the fact (e.g., Apuzzo, 2014; BBC, 2013, 2017; McMahan, 2010; McVeigh, 2017). This is partly because of the challenge of defining “combatant” or “soldier” appropriately – a challenge attested to by the fact that 97 of the 161 rules of customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are attempts at spelling out more precisely who and what counts as a legitimate target of attack in war (Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005).

The principle of discrimination is a *prescriptive* principle: It states how people *should* think about killing in war. In the present paper, we address three descriptive questions relevant to understanding the principle of discrimination, focusing on how third-party judges do, in fact, evaluate killing in war. First, we ask which features distinguish between the “soldier” and “civilian” categories, drawing on research on person perception to uncover the distinctive characteristics of the soldier stereotype. Second, we investigate whether people make moral judgments about the killing of (and by) soldiers and civilians in a way that corresponds to the principle of discrimination. Third, we ask: Does it matter what the soldier is fighting *for*? The principle of discrimination, as a prescriptive principle, should (according to many philosophers, e.g., Walzer, 2006) be applied equally when judging soldiers and civilians on just and

unjust sides of a war – but are lay people likewise insensitive to justness concerns when judging acts of killing in war? Answering these questions represents a first step towards bridging the gap between social and moral psychology, and the laws and philosophy of war.

The Stereotype of Soldiers

Debate in philosophy and law about appropriate definition and categorization of “soldiers” and “civilians” hinges partly on which features are emphasised.¹ For example, if the emphasis is on threatening the lives of others, a civilian who engage in hostilities can acquire the status of “combatant”, even in the absence of a uniform or other identifying insignia (e.g., Deakin, 2014; Dörmann, 2003; Kutz, 2005; Walzer, 2006). Here, we complement the prescriptive categorization question by asking how people view soldiers (versus civilians) descriptively, drawing on a wide range of person perception theories and models. Although person perception and stereotyping research has studied an impressive range of targets, there is little work on soldiers. First, therefore, given that the threat soldiers pose to others is emphasised by philosophers and international law, we draw on a model of mind attribution to assess a soldier’s perceived agency, experience, and harmfulness (Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). Piazza and colleagues (2014) conceive of harmfulness as “perceived as having a disposition that leads to behaviors that harm others” (p.6). On the one hand, a soldier’s profession involves high levels of danger and (highly selective) harmful intentions; on the other hand, despite soldiers acting in ways that are harmful (to their enemies), it is unclear whether people will infer harmful *dispositions* in soldiers as a group. Nonetheless, we predict that soldiers will be perceived as more harmful and agentic than civilians.

Further, in a recent study using a revised stereotype content model (Goodwin, Piazza, Rozin, 2014) participants rated soldiers along with a large range of targets (Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016). Soldiers were in this study characterised as relatively moral (e.g., trustworthy and principled) and

¹ In the philosophical literature, subtle distinctions are made between soldiers (vs. civilians), combatants (vs. non-combatants), and the liable (vs. the innocent). Here we use “soldier” and “combatant” interchangeably, while acknowledging that combatant refers to the broader category. Throughout the studies reported here, participants read about “a soldier” and “soldiers”.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

competent (e.g., talented and skilful), but were also seen as relatively unsociable (e.g., unfriendly, not outgoing). While these researchers did not directly compare soldiers to civilians, we also expect that soldiers will be rated low on sociability, but high on morality and competence. This would also be consistent with the values the U.S. military promotes: On their webpage they highlight that *Being a Soldier* involves acting with the utmost integrity and professionalism (Living the Army Values, n.d). Taking a more “fine-grained” look at moral character perceptions, research on moral exemplarity suggests that the heroes of society can be classified as brave, just, or caring (Walker & Henning, 2004). The stereotype of soldiers intuitively fits within the “brave” category (see also the Army Values, n.d.), and we therefore expect that a soldier’s moral character will primarily have a courageous (rather than just or caring) flavour.

Finally, some (unpublished) research suggests that soldiers are dehumanized (Bain & Hirst, 2011; Ogilvie, 2013); that is, they are denied human traits such as emotional responsiveness or rationality. We therefore also expect that soldiers will be dehumanized.

Thus, the present study expands the scope of a range of models of person perception, to include an important but often overlooked social group. Research in person perception – even when soldiers have been included as a target category – has not to our knowledge included a direct comparison between soldiers and civilians. Further, while Li, Leidner, and Castano (2014) discuss the theoretical relationships between the constructs assessed by the models of person perception outlined above, we are not aware of any previous research including measures of all these constructs in the same study. Exploring the empirical relationships among these constructs – albeit in the context of soldiers and war – represents an additional contribution of the present studies.

Judging the Killing of Soldiers

The principle of discrimination is a prescriptive principle for judging *acts* in war: All else being equal, killing a soldier is more permissible than killing a civilian (Orend, 2005). And indeed, third-party judges prefer particular acts of war that target combatants over non-combatants (Dill & Schubiger, unpublished manuscript), and judge as more permissible attacks that target soldiers over civilians

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

(Benbaji, Falk, & Feldman, 2015). However, these studies only manipulated the status of the victim: They show that soldiers (vs. civilians) are more liable *to be killed*. The principle of discrimination, as manifest in international laws of war and discussed in the philosophy of war (Deakin, 2014; Kutz, 2005; Pfanner, 2004), also implies discrimination with regard to the *agent* of the act: Only soldiers (not civilians) are permitted *to kill*. In other words, while soldiers are legitimate targets of attack (relative to civilians; which we might call the principle of *victim* discrimination), it is not the case that *anyone* is permitted to kill in war, the categorical distinction also makes a difference for the agent. Therefore, we build on the studies cited above by also eliciting judgments about soldiers and civilians as agents of killing. Further, by assessing character evaluations and moral judgments of soldiers and civilians in the same study, we are able to explore the relationship between the soldier stereotype (as captured by constructs from the person perception literature), and moral judgments about acts of killing by soldiers and civilians.

Just Cause for War

Soldiers are always fighting for a particular country (or group), which may have had a just or an unjust reason for going to war. Importantly, however, it is commonly stipulated that judgments about a *country's decision* to go to war, should be made separately from judgments about actions taken by soldiers *in* the war (Walzer, 2006): *All* soldiers are expected to uphold the principle of discrimination; *all* soldiers should be condemned if they do not. Again, as with the principle of discrimination, this stipulation is prescriptive. To investigate whether lay moral judgments also align with the principle of discrimination when one party to the conflict is fighting a just war, Benbaji and colleagues (2015, cited above) also manipulated which side of the conflict was just (or unjust). In this study, participants on the just side of the war appeared to discriminate *less* between soldiers and civilians, than did those on the unjust side: “Among participants who responded to the defensive [just] war (...), the willingness to attack was not significantly reduced when it was aimed at civilians rather than soldiers” (Benbaji et al., 2015, p. 28). Participants in this study were positioned as actively involved in the war (as commanders, making decisions to attack or not), and Benbaji and colleagues therefore provisionally explain their findings by

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

reference to moral licensing (e.g. Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010): Participants on the just side felt that their soldiers were *licensed* by the justness of their cause to target both civilians and soldiers on the unjust side.

However, IHL and the philosophy of war concerns third-party judgments; they specifically pertain to *impartial* evaluations of all parties to the conflict. To be able to directly speak to the principle of discrimination as articulated in law and philosophy, descriptive research must also elicit third-party judgments. Therefore, in the present study we investigate whether third-party judges will also judge soldiers on the just side more leniently than those on the unjust side. In particular, will the justice of the war interact with the (soldier vs. civilian) status of the victim (or the agent), such that for the just side, failure to discriminate is permissible?

Overview of Studies

In both studies, participants evaluated a soldier or a civilian, using the full range of constructs from the revised stereotype content model (morality, sociability, and competence, Goodwin et al., 2014), Henning and Walker's moral exemplarity framework (brave, just, caring, 2004), dehumanization theory (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), and a model of mind attribution (agency, experience, and harmfulness, Piazza et al., 2014). They also made moral judgments about the target individual when they killed and were killed in war. In the second study, we introduced a reason for the war (one country unjustly invaded another, and the invaded country defended itself), and participants judged a target from either the just or the unjust side. In Study 1 we expected that overall, soldiers would be seen as more competent, more agentic, and more harmful than civilians, as well as more moral (especially courageous). We also expected that they would be dehumanized, and viewed as less sociable than civilians. We had no specific hypothesis about how the justness of the soldier's country's decision to go to war would influence these evaluations (in Study 2). We further expected that it would be more permissible to kill a soldier (than a civilian), and more permissible for a soldier (than a civilian) to be the agent of killing (Study 1), in line

with the principle of discrimination. We expected that this difference would be attenuated when the agent was on the just side of the war (following Benbaji et al., 2015; Study 2).

Study 1

Method

Participants. Three hundred participants (110 female, 189 male, 1 other) with a mean age of 30.92 years ($SD = 10.00$) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).² No *a priori* power analysis was conducted, however, a sensitivity analysis for the critical comparison between soldiers and civilians in a repeated measures ANOVA (including between-subject factors) indicates that with $N = 209$ we would be able to detect (at $\alpha = .05$) with 80% power a minimum effect size of $f = .13$ to $.06$ (depending on the degree of correlation between repeated measures, from 0.2 to 0.8, respectively; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).³ Data collection was stopped before the data were analysed.

Materials and procedure. Full scenarios and scales are provided in Supplemental Materials, and at osf.io/xxx [Note to reviewers: This information will be included in the final version of the manuscript. Please contact the action editor for an anonymous link to the OSF project page]. Participants first provided basic demographic information, before being randomly allocated to one of two target conditions: *civilian* or *soldier*. This target was always described as being a man from “Country X”, and was referred to as Person X or Soldier X. The target was always described as a man because most soldiers are male (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 2013). Participants were always told that they themselves were from a third-party country, Country Z.

² The data for both studies in the present paper are from the PhD thesis of the first author; however, the present paper involves a substantial reanalysis of the data. In the first study presented here (Study 3 of the thesis), only a subset of the full sample were asked about their political orientation; this subset is the sample for the present Study 1. See Supplemental Materials for further discussion of the sample, and information about demographic variables.

³ This analysis was conducted using $N = 209$ (rather than the full sample size of 300) due to exclusion criteria in some cases reducing the sample by as much as 91 participants. It is therefore a conservative estimate of power in the present study.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Participants evaluated their target (Person X or Soldier X) on 56 characteristics drawn from person perception research. Eighteen items assessed sociability (e.g., sociable, easy-going), competence (e.g., capable, skilful), and moral character (e.g., principled, trustworthy; Goodwin et al., 2014). We also selected three additional sets of adjectives that have been rated as prototypical of just (e.g., has integrity, listens to all sides; 4 items), brave (e.g., is courageous, takes risks; 4 items), and caring (e.g., is good-hearted, is supportive; 4 items) exemplars (Walker & Hennig, 2004). Twelve mind attribution items assessing agency (e.g., is able to plan actions, can communicate) and experience (e.g., can experience pride, can experience pain) were drawn from Gray, Gray, & Wegner, (2007), and 6 harmfulness items (e.g., is hostile, is violent) were drawn from Piazza et al., (2014). Finally, 8 items assessing humanness were drawn from Bastian, Jetten, Chen, Radke, Harding, and Fasoli (2013). These items were half positively worded (e.g., emotionally responsive), and half negatively worded (e.g., unsophisticated). All items were rated on a 7-point response scale, with higher numbers indicating more of the given characteristic.

After rating their target, participants were given more information about a war context involving “Country X” and “Country Y”. In the soldier condition, they were told that “Soldier X is deployed to the front lines”, whereas in the civilian condition, they were told that the target “does not join the army, but remains a civilian of Country X”. They were then asked to think about “a number of things that might happen to [target]”, and were asked “to what extent do you believe these actions are morally permissible?” The following four scenarios were presented to participants in a random order.⁴

⁴ The full design of the present study was thus 2 (target condition: civilian vs. soldier) x (2) (status of enemy: civilian vs. soldier) x (2) (syntactic role of target: subject vs. object), with the last two factors being within-subjects. However, the final factor, “syntactic role”, is of no theoretical interest to the present study, and substantially complicates the statistical analyses. We have therefore moved analyses including this variable to the Supplemental Materials, and report the result for the two scenarios in which the target was the subject (scenarios 1 & 2) in the Results section, and the results for the two scenarios in which he was the object (scenarios 3 & 4) in Supplemental Materials. The results for these two latter scenarios parallel the results reported in the main manuscript.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

1. [Target] kills a soldier from Country Y
2. [Target] kills a civilian from Country Y
3. A soldier from Country Y kills [target]
4. A civilian from Country Y kills [target]

Participants made moral judgments about all four scenarios on a 7-point response scale, from 1 = *morally permissible* to 7 = *morally impermissible*. Due to the minimalistic nature of these scenarios, participants were also given the option of responding “not enough information to judge”. By varying both the target status and the status of the enemy, we were able to analyse the principle of discrimination for both the agent and the victim of the act. Finally, participants responded to an attention check question (they were asked to indicate whether they were from Country Z, X, Y, or other), were debriefed and thanked.

Results and Discussion

Participants who failed the attention check question were filtered out prior to analysis, leaving a total N of 277. All the analyses below were also performed with the full sample; the results of these analyses are reported in addition below, when relevant.

Assessing the stereotype of soldiers. In this study, participants rated a soldier (or civilian) on traits drawn from a wide range of theories or models of person perception. We report comparisons between civilians and soldiers on the *a priori* traits (e.g., competence, sociability, morality; as specified by the revised stereotype content model, Goodwin et al., 2014) in the Supplemental Materials. However, many of the traits identified by these models are theorized to be related to each other (Li et al., 2015), and we were interested in whether we could empirically derive the constructs which underlie these theoretical scales (albeit in the context of war and soldiers). We therefore first performed an exploratory factor analysis to uncover the underlying dimensions of person perceptions in the present study. We used maximum likelihood extraction with oblique rotation (direct oblimin, delta = 0), as we did not assume that the factors would be uncorrelated. Nine factors had an eigenvalue > 1 , and a parallel analysis and the Velicer MAP test suggested 5 and 6 factors, respectively. However, examining the pattern matrix suggests that all 9 factors were interpretable, and we therefore use all 9 factors in the present study

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

(summarized in Table 1). Together, these accounted for 63.11% of the variance. Factor scores were created using Bartlett Scores, in order to weight each item appropriately to its factor (DeStefano, Zhu, & Mindrila, 2009). This factor structure, and the results reported below, were largely unchanged when the full sample (without exclusions) was used instead. The pattern matrix and more detail about the EFA and resultant factors (including correlations) is available in the Supplemental Materials.

The main purpose of assessing the perceived character of the target was to investigate which traits *best discriminate* between soldiers and civilians. In order to answer this question we conducted a logistic regression: Regressing target condition (civilian vs. soldier) on all the traits in a stepwise fashion, the greatest gain was had from adding courageous to the model (i.e., perceptions of courageousness discriminates most strongly between soldier and civilian targets). Overall, the traits courageous, dangerous, and sociable provided 83.0% accuracy in classification (see Table 2).⁵ Although “positive humanization” also significantly discriminated between the two conditions, this trait did not substantially improve classification accuracy. Nor did the traits of negative humanization, (in)competence, rationality, (un)caring, or mind attribution contribute to discriminating between the two conditions. These are novel findings which extend the scope of the person perception literature. We compare our results to those of previous research in the general discussion.

⁵ The logic of logistic regression in this context is the same as discriminant analysis (Press & Wilson, 1978). We conducted a logistic regression rather than a discriminant analysis, because the output is more easily interpretable. See Supplemental Analysis for descriptive statistics across soldier and civilian conditions, including correlations among traits, and results of hierarchical linear regressions analysing the effect of target condition (civilian vs. soldier) on each trait as well.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table 1

Factor Labels, Items and Descriptions, Study 1.

Factor Label	Items	Description
Rational (5)	Rational, reasonable, rational and logical, moral, listens to all sides	This factor captured some items from the ‘morality’ scale, some from the ‘justness’ scale, and one of the positively worded human uniqueness items
Mind (11)	Experience pleasure, experience pain, experience fear, capable of longing, experience pride, capacity for thought, experience anger, understand right from wrong, plan actions, control actions, communicate thoughts	Almost all the items from the ‘mind attribution’ scale loaded on a single factor. This is consistent with recent work which has failed to replicate the 2-dimensional structure of mind attribution (Piazza, et al., 2014).
Dangerous (6)	Violent, hostile, dangerous, mean, aggressive, takes risks	All the items from the ‘dangerousness’ scale loaded on this factor.
Sociable (6)	Friendly, easy-going, sociable, playful, extroverted, honest	This factor captured mostly ‘sociability’ items, plus the single item ‘honest’.
Incompetent (7)	Skilful, capable, talented, effective, competent, responsible, intelligent	This factor captured all the ‘competence’ items. However, they loaded negatively on this factor, thus higher numbers mean <i>less</i> competence; to improve interpretability we’ve therefore labelled it <i>incompetent</i> .
Positive humanization (4)	Refined and cultured, emotionally responsive, can understand how others are feeling, open-minded, can think clearly	Most of the positively worded human traits (both human uniqueness and human nature) loaded on this factor.
Uncaring (4)	Nurturing, comforting, warm, good-hearted	The items from the ‘caring’ loaded negatively on this factor; again to improve interpretability we’ve labelled it <i>uncaring</i> .
Courageous (8)	Courageous, heroic, stands up for his beliefs, is supportive, is principled, is trustworthy, has integrity, is fair	This factor captured many of the ‘morality’ items, as well as most of the ‘bravery’ and ‘justness’ items.
Negative humanization (8)	Superficial, with no depth, unsophisticated, lacking self-restraint, like an animal, mechanical and cold like a robot	The negatively worded human traits loaded on this factor. However, the factor loadings were <i>negative</i> , thus higher numbers indicate greater <i>humanization</i> .

Note. Numbers in brackets (left hand column) indicate number of items loading on that factor.

Table 2

Results of Stepwise Logistic Regression, Predicting Target Condition (Civilian = 0, Soldier = 1) from the Value of Each Factor.

Step	Factor	Classification accuracy after adding each factor	Model parameters at step 4				
			B(Std.Err.)	<i>p</i>	Exp(B)	95% CI for Exp(B)	
1	Courageous	69.7%	1.83 (0.26)	<.001	6.24	3.78	10.30
2	Sociable	78.0%	-1.37 (0.22)	<.001	0.25	0.16	0.39
3	Dangerous	83.0%	0.69 (0.17)	<.001	2.00	1.43	2.78
4	Positive humanization	80.9%	-0.45 (0.16)	.004	0.64	0.47	0.86

Note. Classification accuracy at step 0 was 50.5%. When the full sample was used, the factor “uncaring” also had some predictive power, but did not overall increase classification accuracy.

Moral judgments. The second aim of the present study was to investigate discrimination in moral judgment – both when a soldier (vs. a civilian) is the victim of killing in war, and when he is the agent. Anyone responding “not enough information to judge” was filtered out of the relevant analyses ($N_s = 18-40$), which explains the varying degrees of freedom in the following analyses. An analysis of this missing data is provided in the Supplemental Materials.

Comparing judgments of “target kills an enemy soldier” to “target kills an enemy civilian”, in a mixed measures ANOVA, showed that it was overall less permissible to kill an enemy civilian, i.e., there was a main effect of enemy status, $F(1, 207) = 124.497, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .38$. It was also overall less permissible for the target civilian (compared to the target soldier) to kill, consistent with the principle of (agent) discrimination, $F(1, 207) = 16.971, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$. However, these effects were qualified by an interaction between enemy status and target status, $F(1, 207) = 13.172, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$. The target soldier, compared to the target civilian, was relatively more permitted to kill an enemy soldier, $F(1, 229) = 25.071, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$. On the other hand, neither target soldier nor target civilian was permitted to kill an enemy civilian, $F(1, 227) = 1.411, p = .236, \eta_p^2 < .01$. These results are illustrated in Figure 1. (Comparing judgments of “target is killed by an enemy soldier” to “target is killed by enemy

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

civilian” yielded a similar pattern, see Supplemental Materials.) These results were the same when participants who failed the manipulation check were included in the analyses.

We have thus found evidence that participants’ moral judgments align with the principle of discrimination. This principle does not manifest as a simple downgrading of soldiers’ moral status. Rather, soldiers were more permitted both to be killed and *to kill*; the principle of discrimination applies to agents as well as victims of killing in war.

Figure 1: Figure illustrating the effect of target condition (soldier vs. civilian) and status of enemy (soldier vs. civilian) on moral impermissibility judgments in the two scenarios in which the target is the subject. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

A subsidiary question at this point concerns how differences in moral judgments of soldiers and civilians relate to differences in their perceived character. Can the principle of discrimination in moral judgment be accounted for by the differences in the perception of the soldier’s (versus the civilian’s) character traits? To test this possibility, we conducted parallel mediation analyses for the scenario “target kills an enemy soldier”; entering the traits courageous, sociable, and dangerous as potential mediators of

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

the effect of target condition (soldier vs. civilian) on moral judgments.⁶ This analysis is depicted in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 3. As can be seen in Table 3, there were significant indirect effects via sociability and dangerousness, suggesting that these traits account for part of the variability in moral judgments of the target soldier versus the target civilian. However, the direct effect of target status remained significant after the traits were added, which suggests that these factors alone cannot account for the principle of discrimination in moral judgment. Further, these analyses were exploratory, and should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 2: Schematic illustration of mediation model, in which the effect of condition (i.e., target status) on moral impermissibility judgment is mediated by character evaluations. Path labels correspond to columns in Table 3 below.

Table 3

Summary of Mediation Model in Study 1 ($n = 231$). Columns Correspond to Paths Labelled in Figure 2.

	Path <i>a</i>	Path <i>b</i>	Indirect effects			Direct effect
			Effect estimate	95% CI (Lower)	95% CI (Upper)	Path <i>c'</i> (95% CI)
Target kills soldier						-0.668 (-1.308, -0.028)
Sociability	-0.659***	0.366**	-0.241	-0.487	-0.065	
Dangerousness	0.714***	-0.318*	-0.227	-0.455	-0.061	
Courageousness	0.931***	-0.206	-0.191	-0.515	0.070	

Note: Significant indirect effects are bolded. All analyses performed with PROCESS Macros for SPSS, using Hayes (2012) “model 4” with 10,000 bootstrapped resamplings. Bias correlated and accelerated bootstrapped 95% CI’s reported.

*** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

⁶ For the scenario “target kills an enemy civilian”, there was no main effect of target status on moral judgment (see Figure 1), and any mediation would thus be hard to interpret. Nonetheless, the corresponding analysis for this scenario, and for other two scenarios (“target is killed by soldier or civilian”) are provided in the Supplemental Materials.

In the present study we did not provide participants with any information about *why* the war was being fought. If one side is fighting a just war, and the other is fighting an unjust war, will this influence the principle of discrimination? In the next study, we investigate this possibility.

Study 2

In Study 2 we sought to conceptually replicate the results of Study 1 while also addressing an additional potential influence on the principle of discrimination: The justness (or otherwise) of the war itself. Whether a particular cause for war is just or unjust is a fraught question; nonetheless, a war of aggression is usually considered unjust, whereas a war of defence can be just (International Review of the Red Cross, 2014; Orend, 2005, 2013; Moseley, 2017). We therefore used this paradigmatic case as our just versus unjust war manipulation. Based on the results of the previous study, we expect that soldiers will overall be seen as more courageous and dangerous, and less sociable, than civilians. However, soldiers on the unjust side may be attributed less positive traits (e.g., courage) and more negative traits (e.g., dangerousness) than those on the just side, suggesting an interaction between side of the conflict (just vs. unjust) and target status. Further, based on research by Benbaji et al., we expect that the principle of discrimination – the difference in moral judgments for soldier versus civilian agents and victims – will be smaller when the target is on the just side of the war.

Method

Participants. Two-hundred and twenty-nine participants (100 female, 129 male, 0 other) with a mean age of 33.13 years ($SD = 11.33$) were recruited through AMT, and compensated for their participation (Berinsky, et al., 2012). Sensitivity analyses suggest that in this study (rounding down to $N = 160$), we had 80% power to detect an effect of $f = .14$ to $.07$ at $\alpha = .05$ (again for a range of correlations between repeated measures from $.20$ to $.80$). Data collection stopped before the data was analysed.

Materials and procedure. The overall procedure was the same as in Study 1. Participants were randomly allocated to one of four target conditions, in a 2 x 2 between-participants factorial design: *Civilian* or *soldier* target, and *just* or *unjust* side of the conflict. The initial background information again specified that Country X and Country Y were at war, with one country unjustly invading the other in order to take control over its natural resources, and the other country defending itself. We manipulated whether participants judged a just or an unjust target by varying whether Country X or Country Y was described as the unjust (invading) country; the target was always described as being from Country X. As a manipulation check, participants were asked at the end of the study which country they thought was on the just side, on a 9-point scale anchored at “Country X was 100% on the just side”, and “Country Y was 100% on the just side”. (The middle of the scale was labelled “neither country was on the just side”). Full scenarios and scales are provided in the Supplemental Materials and on the OSF: [osf.io/xxx]

Next, participants were asked to rate their target on the same characteristics as in Study 1, and to make moral judgments about the same scenarios as in Study 1. The full design of the present study was thus 2 (side: just vs. unjust) by 2 (target condition: civilian vs. soldier) by (2) (status of enemy: civilian vs. soldier) by (2) (syntactic role of target: subject vs. object), with the last two being within-subject factors.

Results

As in Study 1, participants who failed the attention check question were filtered out, leaving a total N of 201. Overall, there were 45 valid responses in the just civilian condition, 62 in the unjust civilian condition, 52 in the just soldier condition, and 42 in the unjust soldier condition. We also conducted all the analyses below without filtering out these participants, and where relevant we indicate below how this influenced the results.

Analysing the manipulation check variable in a 2 (side: just vs. unjust) x 2 (target condition: civilian vs. soldier) between-subjects ANOVA indicated that the manipulation was successful, as it was affected by the manipulated justice of each side, $F(1,197) = 642.75, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .77$ (just side: $M = 7.96, SD = 1.56$; unjust side: $M = 2.03, SD = 1.70$), but not significantly by target condition,

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

$F(1,197) = 0.776, p = .380, \eta_p^2 < .01$. The interaction between side and condition was not significant, $F(1,197) = 0.223, p = .637, \eta_p^2 < .01$. These results were almost identical when the analyses were conducted without excluding any participants.

Character evaluations. As in Study 1, we first performed an exploratory factor analysis (using maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation) on the character traits. This time 7 factors had an Eigenvalue of > 1 , while a parallel analysis suggested 4 factors, and the Velicer MAP test suggested 8 factors. As the first 7 factors were interpretable, we retained this number (see Table 4 for a summary). The main difference relative to Study 1, was that the items from the positive humanization, sociability, and caring factors all loaded on a single factor in this study (labelled CaringPlus).

In addition to investigating the principle of discrimination, in this study we also investigated how the *side of the war* influenced perceptions of the target's character, and whether side interacted with their status as soldier or civilian (i.e., influenced the principle of discrimination). Each factor was therefore regressed on status, side, and their interaction. As can be seen in Table 5, across most factors there was an effect of side: A target on the just side was perceived more positively than a target on the unjust side. Consistent with Study 1, soldiers were overall seen as more courageous and more dangerous; however, in this study they were also seen as less rational, and less human, consistent with Bain and Hirst (2011). Further, and importantly, side and status interacted to influence a number of factors (dehumanization, courageousness, and mindlessness).

Table 4
Overview of Factors, with Their Factor Label, Study 2.

Factor Label	Items	Description
CaringPlus (15)	Warm, easy-going, playful, friendly, nurturing, comforting, refined and cultured, listens to all sides, sociable, open-minded, can think clearly, good-hearted, vulnerable, fair, trustworthy, honest	This factor was broader than in Study 1. It captured many of the ‘sociability’ items, as well as most of the ‘caring’ and ‘morality’ items; and the positively worded ‘human’ items.
Dangerous (5)	Violent, hostile, dangerous, mean, aggressive	Similar to in Study 1, the ‘dangerous’ items loaded on a common factor.
Mindless (12)	Experience pleasure, experience pain, experience fear, capable of longing, experience pride, capacity for thought, experience anger, understand right from wrong, plan actions, control actions, communicate thoughts, can understand how others are feeling	This factor captured almost all the items from the ‘mind attribution’ scale. The items loaded negatively on this factor; therefore we’ve labelled it “mindless”.
Incompetent (7)	Skilful, capable, talented, effective, competent, responsible, intelligent, extroverted	This factor was also highly similar to in Study 1, and as the items again loaded negatively, we labelled it “incompetent”.
Courageous (8)	Courageous, heroic, stands up for his beliefs, is supportive, is principled, has integrity, takes risks, is moral	This factor was similar to in Study 1, however in this study more moral items loaded on this factor as well. As the loadings were negative, we multiplied it by -1 in order to retain the positive label.
Rational (4)	is reasonable, is rational, rational and logical	Similarly to in Study 1, a “rational” factor emerged; however there were fewer items captured by this factor in this study.
Dehumanization (8)	Superficial, with no depth, unsophisticated, lacking self-restraint, like an animal, mechanical and cold like a robot	As in Study 1, the negatively worded items all loaded together on a single factor. This time the loadings were positive, so we’ve kept the negative label for the factor.

Note. Numbers in brackets (left hand column) indicate the number of items loading on that factor. These same 7 factors emerged when the analyses were conducted without excluding any participants.

Therefore, in Table 6 we report the results of a logistic regression for the just and unjust sides of the war separately. On the unjust side, perceptions of dangerousness discriminated strongly between soldiers and civilians, and no further traits significantly improved the accuracy of classification. On the

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table 5
Results of ANOVA for Each Factor in Study 2.

	Rational (-)			Mindless			Dangerous (+)		
	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Target	7.534	.007	.04	0.264	.608	<.01	41.395	<.001	.17
Side	3.087	.080	.02	3.263	.072	.02	18.909	<.001	.09
Target x Side	0.025	.867	<.01	10.541	.001	.05	0.834	.362	.01
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.03*			.05**			.21***		
	CaringPlus			Incompetent			Dehumanized (+)		
	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Target	3.728	.055	.02	3.264	.072	.02	5.896	.016	.03
Side	16.860	<.001	.08	5.235	.023	.03	16.529	<.001	.08
Target x Side	0.449	.504	<.01	0.019	.892	<.01	7.021	.009	.03
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.07**			.04*			.10***		
	Courageous (+)								
	<i>F</i> (1,197)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2						
Target	14.133	<.001	.07						
Side	33.395	<.001	.15						
Target x Side	11.337	<.001	.05						
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.23***								

Note. Significant effects of target condition (civilian = 0, soldier = 1) and side (unjust = 0, just = 1) are bolded. The symbol in brackets next to the factor name indicates direction of the effect for target status: (+) = greater scores for soldier target; (-) = lower scores for soldier target. Analyses with gender and political orientation included as covariates are presented in Supplemental Materials, Table S15.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

just side, on the other hand, the greatest classification gain was had from adding ‘courageous’ to the model (i.e., perceptions of courageousness discriminates most strongly between soldiers and civilians on the just side), followed by dangerousness and (ir)rationality. Broadly speaking, the results for the just target correspond to those in Study 1; however on the unjust side there appears to be less discrimination between soldiers and civilians overall.

Table 6

Results of Stepwise Logistic Regression, Predicting Target Condition (Civilian = 0, Soldier = 1) from the Value of Each Factor; for the Unjust Side (Top) and Just Side (Bottom) Separately.

Unjust side (n = 104)							
Step	Factor	Classification accuracy after adding each factor	Model parameters at Step 1				
			B (Std. Err.)	p	Exp(B)	95% CI for Exp(B)	
1	Dangerous	71.2%	0.86 (0.22)	<.001	2.35	1.52	3.64
Just side (n = 97)							
Step	Factor	Classification accuracy after adding each factor	Model parameters at Step 3				
			B (Std. Err.)	p	Exp(B)	95% CI for Exp(B)	
1	Courageous	72.2%	1.16 (0.32)	<.001	3.20	1.70	6.03
2	Dangerous	74.2%	1.07 (0.38)	.005	2.93	1.38	6.20
3	Rational	78.4%	-0.67 (0.33)	.043	0.51	0.27	0.98

Note. The classification accuracy at step 0 was 59.6% for unjust side, 53.6% for just side. These results remained the same if the full sample was analysed.

Moral judgments. The results for moral judgments are illustrated in Figure 3. Participants responding “not enough information to judge” ($Ns = 8-16$) were filtered out of the following analyses. An analysis of this missing data is provided in the Supplemental Materials. We first analysed responses to the two scenarios “target kills enemy civilian” and “target kills enemy soldier” in a 2 (target condition: civilian vs. soldier) by 2 (side: just vs. unjust) by 2 (enemy status: civilian vs. soldier) mixed-design ANOVA, with repeated measures on the latter factor. Responses to the remaining two scenarios are analysed in the Supplemental Materials.

The target was again less permitted to kill an enemy civilian than an enemy soldier, in line with the principle of (victim) discrimination: $F(1,167) = 68.314, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .29$. The target civilian was also less permitted to kill than was the soldier target (i.e., a main effect of target condition, $F(1,167) = 5.940, p = .016, \eta_p^2 = .03$), in line with Study 1 and the principle of (agent) discrimination. In addition, the target on the just side was overall more permitted to kill than was the target on the unjust side; the main effect of side was significant, $F(1,167) = 14.578, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$. This finding is consistent with Benbaji et al. (2015). However, these main effects are qualified by a three-way

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

interaction, $F(1,167) = 7.647, p = .006, \eta_p^2 = .04$. In order to investigate this interaction, we next analysed the unjust side and the just side separately. These analyses allow us to answer the question of whether the principle of discrimination is attenuated on the just side of the conflict.

Figure 3: Figure illustrating the effect of target condition (soldier vs. civilian), status of enemy (soldier vs. civilian) and side (unjust vs. just) on moral impermissibility judgments in the scenarios in which the target is the subject, i.e. “[target] kills the enemy”. See Supplemental Materials for scenarios in which the target is the object, i.e. “enemy kills [target]”. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

On the unjust side, the main effect of enemy status was significant, $F(1, 90) = 37.036, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .29$, indicating that the unjust target was judged more harshly for killing a civilian than for killing a soldier (in line with the principle of discrimination). There was also a small effect of target condition, $F(1, 90) = 4.140, p = .045, \eta_p^2 = .04$, such that it was marginally less permissible for the unjust civilian than the unjust soldier to be the agent of the killing.⁷ In other words, participants upheld the principle of (both agent and victim) discrimination when judging soldiers on the unjust side of the conflict.

⁷ Including all participants, this effect was still significant, $F(1, 97) = 5.666, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .06$.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

On the just side, the main effect of enemy status was also significant: $F(1, 77) = 32.210, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .30$, indicating that the just target was also judged more harshly for killing a civilian than for killing a soldier, in line with the principle of discrimination and contrary to Benbaji et al. (2015). On this side of the conflict the effect of target condition was not significant, $F(1, 77) = 2.036, p = .158, \eta_p^2 = .03$.⁸ However, target and enemy status interacted, $F(1, 77) = 12.702, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .14$, such that when the just soldier was the target, he was judged significantly more harshly for killing a civilian than a soldier, $F(1, 44) = 54.342, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .55$. However, when the just *civilian* was the target, he was *not* judged more harshly for killing a civilian than a soldier, $F(1, 33) = 1.752, p = .195, \eta_p^2 = .05$. In other words, the principle of discrimination appeared to be slightly attenuated when a civilian on the just side of a war killed an enemy soldier or civilian. Thus, although we found a main effect of side, such that killing was seen as generally more permissible on the just side of the war (and targets on the just side of the war were perceived to have a more virtuous character), contrary to Benbaji et al. (2015) we did not generally find that the principle of discrimination was weakened on the just side of the war (the main effect of enemy status had η_p^2 of .29 and .30 on the unjust and just side, respectively). We discuss the implications of these results – and differences to Benbaji et al. (2015) – below.⁹

General Discussion

The principle of discrimination is of central concern to International Humanitarian Law (IHL; Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 2005) and just war theory (Orend, 2005). The present studies, however, present the first full exploration of a *descriptive* principle of discrimination. They demonstrate that soldiers are seen as more harmful and more courageous than civilians; that killing them is judged as more permissible than killing civilians, and that they are also more permitted to kill than are civilians.

⁸ Including all participants, this effect was significant, $F(1, 93) = 5.188, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = .05$.

⁹ For this study we have not conducted a mediation analysis, as the sample size for each statement (for each side of the conflict) would be fairly small. However, in the Supplemental Materials we include a series of hierarchical regressions, predicting moral judgments from status, side of conflict, and the relevant characteristics. Except where noted, when we ran all the moral judgment analyses without excluding any participants, the pattern of results was the same.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Introducing a just versus unjust *cause* for the war, we found that although the just soldiers (and civilians) were evaluated more positively and their acts judged more leniently overall, the expected discrimination between soldiers and civilians remained. This is important because it provides a counterpoint to Benbaji et al. (2015), who found that participants on the just side of a war did not discriminate as much between soldiers and civilians when ordering an attack, as did those on the unjust side. The researchers suggest that this might be because of “moral licensing” (Merritt et al., 2010). Moral licensing is usually considered as a “first-party” phenomenon (Merritt et al., 2010), and participants in the Benbaji et al. study were positioned as commanders involved in the war. While the participants in their study were thus possibly licensing themselves to kill civilians (if they were on the just side of the war), in the present study we did not find evidence that participants positioned as third-party judges – paralleling the impartial ideal of IHL and the philosophy of war – “licensed” the agents on the just side.

However, the character of soldiers (vs. civilians) was perceived somewhat differently on the just versus unjust side of the war: Soldiers on both sides were seen as dangerous (relative to civilians), whereas soldiers on the just side were seen as courageous as well. This may have been because of the positive and moral items which loaded on the *courageous* factor: Instead of being “purely” about facing danger (which is arguably true for soldiers on either side of a war), courage appeared in this study to be a concept which carried aspects of “having positive intentions”, and participants may therefore have been reluctant to endorse these items to describe a soldier fighting on the unjust side of a war (and thus presumably having negative intentions; cf. the controversy about Bill Maher refusing to call the 9/11 terrorists cowards; Chatterbox, 2001; Gerstein, 2001).¹⁰ The finding that dangerousness discriminated between soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict, however, corroborates the argument of

¹⁰ Similarly, when Lt. Gen. Peter Leahy (Chief of the Australian Army, 2002-2008) was interviewed for the documentary *Afghanistan: Inside Australia's War* (Series 1, Episode 1: Acts of War; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8:30pm Tuesday 23 February 2016), and talked about the 9/11 terrorists and the commitment they displayed in flying the planes into the World Trade Centre, he hedged carefully: “I want you to imagine that you’re the pilot of that plane... and you see that building coming towards you, getting bigger and bigger, and you don’t flinch. That’s your enemy. ... Silly thing to say, but I respect them for their courage for their mission, they’re a real enemy”.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

philosophers who maintain that the critical feature distinguishing between civilians and soldiers (or non-combatants and combatants) is the ability to pose a threat to the lives of others.

Despite its largely descriptive nature, the present studies of the principle of discrimination have both theoretical and practical implications. Moral psychology research provides a great deal of insight into the moral psychology of everyday life (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014), and has mapped out broad domains of moral value and basic principles of moral judgment grounded in religious texts (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and legal documents (Mikhail, 2007) from around the world. However, some researchers have also highlighted the context sensitivity of moral judgment (Simpson, Laham, & Fiske, 2016; Carnes, Lickel, & Janoff-Bulman, 2015), and in particular, the potential contrast between the morality of war and morality of peace (e.g. Fiske & Rai, 2014; Giner-Sorolla, Leidner, & Castano, 2012, Watkins & Laham, 2018). For example, Rai and Fiske suggest that the moral matrix of war is governed by a different set of relationships than is our everyday moral matrix. Yet moral psychology is surprisingly silent regarding moral judgments in war; we have (for example) no research on “moral foundations” mapping onto the International Humanitarian Law or the Laws of Armed Conflict. Here, we take these laws – in particular, the principle of discrimination – as a starting point for mapping out a moral matrix of war. Along with a handful of studies that are beginning to focus squarely on morality in war (albeit investigating other principles of the conduct of war; Watkins & Goodwin, 2018; Watkins & Laham, 2018; Adelman, Orazani, & Leidner, 2017), the present studies thus prepare the ground for studying the war context in its own right.

Our findings also have implications for person perception and stereotyping research. This field of research has covered an impressive range of target individuals and groups (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray & Wegner, 2009; Ward, Olsen, & Wegner, 2013). In contrast to this wide angle view, the present study focuses on a particular target. In contrast to previous research, we did not consistently observe dehumanization of soldiers (Ogilvie, 2013), nor did we observe differences in competence (Landy et al., 2016). This difference may be due to differences in design – for example, Ogilvie (2013) had participants playing a video game using a soldier avatar, and in the Landy et al. (2016)

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

studies the soldier was evaluated among a large set of professionals. These differences in the context of evaluation, and the comparisons they imply, may have highlighted different aspects of the soldier stereotype than did the present study. The relationships between the other *a priori* frameworks and the results of our exploratory factor analyses are also worth noting. For example, consistent with the revised stereotype content model (Goodwin et al., 2014), the three factors – sociability, competence, and morality – did emerge from among the larger set. However, it was a specific type of moral value – courageousness – which was most critical for distinguishing soldiers from civilians (especially on the just side of the conflict). Further, we did not find evidence for the traditional two dimensions of mind attribution (Gray et al., 2007) – the items from the theorized agency and experience subscales consistently loaded together – nor did this measure of mind attribution differ between soldiers and civilians. *Harmfulness*, however, which is a recent addition to the mind attribution model (Piazza et al., 2015), played a role in distinguishing soldiers and civilians on both the just and the unjust side of a conflict. Based on previous research, and extant frameworks, the fact that harmfulness and courage set soldiers apart from civilians was not entirely unexpected; however, these two characteristics are not well captured by dominant theories in person perception (i.e. the stereotype content model; mind attribution). This is not to fault the models as such – their aims are broad, rather than deep – but it does highlight the value of occasionally homing in on a particular group. By doing so, we have also expanded the scope of the existing frameworks, to include an important but often overlooked social group.

Limitations and Future Directions

In the present studies we have not directly attempted to *explain* the principle of discrimination. Although we in Study 1 (and the Supplemental Materials) explored the correlational relationships between moral judgments and character evaluations, we cannot yet say whether the principle of discrimination in moral judgments is emerging because soldiers are seen as less sociable and more dangerous, or whether there is an underlying process affecting both these judgments. Nonetheless, our findings do highlight the utility of assessing perceptions of soldiers' character – in particular, their

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

dangerousness, courage, and (lack of) sociability or rationality – alongside perceptions and judgments of their actions, and future research could explore these connections in more detail.

Given that our samples consisted of American residents, another caveat is in order: Residents of other countries, with different histories of war and military-civilian relations (e.g. Becker, Butz, et al., 2016) may have alternative, unique, stereotypes of soldiers (relative to civilians), and make different judgments about them. We do, however, expect that the principle of discrimination itself will be widespread (e.g. Traven, 2013), and that people will judge the killing of civilians more harshly than killing of and by soldiers, even if different aspects of the role are prominent in the soldier stereotype. We also expect that the distinction between soldiers and civilians is culturally constructed, in that it may have emerged with the growth of larger scale societies and institutions for war – in smaller scale societies it may instead be the case that every able male is a potential soldier, and every outgroup member is a potential target (Luke Glowacki, personal communication, April 25, 2017). Even in contemporary nation states, the distinction between soldiers and civilians is contested (Kasher & Yadlin, 2005; McMahan, 2010) and possibly in flux, given the greater number of private contractors currently employed by (for example) the U.S. military (Maddow, 2013). Future research may uncover more nuanced aspects of the principle of discrimination by including different categories of combatants.

Conclusion

Although the principle of discrimination might be increasingly honoured in word (Coady, 2008), it appears to be less honoured in deed: *The Guardian*'s recent article "Rules of war 'need urgent review'" (2017), was prompted by the high proportion of civilian casualties in modern war.¹¹ At the same time, in contemporary wars, military personnel appear to be more likely to be tried and sentenced for the murder of civilians than previously (e.g., Apuzzo, 2014; BBC, 2013, 2017). It is timely, then, for psychology to begin exploring descriptive questions about how people perceive and judge soldiers and civilians; taking

¹¹ Estimates for the actual proportion vary. One oft-cited number is 90%, but this appears unsubstantiated. Nonetheless, it is no doubt high; for example, the Iraqi Body Count has as the lower estimate 65% (May, 2017).

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

an approach which complements the prescriptive principle of discrimination. I hope the present paper can spur further research on this important topic.

Pre-Print

References

- Adelman, L., Leidner, B., & Orazani, S. N. (2017). Psychological Contributions to Philosophy: The Cases of Just War Theory and Nonviolence. In *The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict* (pp. 267-291). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57123-2_14
- Apuzzo, M. (2014). Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings. News article published in *The New York Times*, October 22, 2014. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html?_r=0
- Article 48: Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977. Retrieved March 1, 2016, from <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750054?OpenDocument>
- Article 51: Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June, 1977. Retrieved March 1, 2016, from <http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750054?OpenDocument>
- Bain, P., & Hirst, J. (2011). Dehumanizing our defenders: Perceptions of the military's humanness and its consequences. Poster presented at the European Association of Social Psychology General Meeting, Stockholm, 2011.
- Bastian, B., Jetten, J., Chen, H., Radke, H. R., Harding, J. F., & Fasoli, F. (2013). Losing our humanity the self-dehumanizing consequences of social ostracism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(2), 156-169. doi:10.1177/0146167212471205
- Bastian, B., Laham, S. M., Wilson, S., Haslam, N., & Koval, P. (2011). Blaming, praising, and protecting our humanity: The implications of everyday dehumanization for judgments of moral status. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 50(3), 469-483. doi:10.1348/014466610X521383
- Becker, J. C., Butz, D. A., Sibley, C. G., Barlow, F. K., Bitacola, L. M., Christ, O., ... & Sulz, A. (2017). What do national flags stand for? An exploration of associations across 11 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 48(3), 335-352. doi:10.1177/0022022116687851
- Benbaji, Y., Falk, A., & Feldman, Y. (2015). Commonsense Morality and the Ethics of Killing in War: An Experimental Survey of the Israeli Population. *The Law & Ethics of Human Rights*, 9(2), 195-227. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2094022
- Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis*, 20(3), 351-368. doi:10.1093/pan/mpr057

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

- British Broadcasting Corporation. (2013). Marine guilty of Afghanistan murder. News article published at *BBC*, November 8, 2013. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24870699>
- British Broadcasting Corporation. (2017). Israeli soldier gets 18 months for killing wounded Palestinian attacker. News article published at *BBC*, February 21, 2017. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39037605>
- Brock, R. N., & Lettini, G. (2012). *Soul repair: Recovering from moral injury after war*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Carnes, N. C., Lickel, B., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2015). Shared perceptions: Morality is embedded in social contexts. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 41(3), 351-362. doi:10.1177/0146167214566187
- Chatterbox. (2001). In What Sense Are Terrorists Cowards? Opinion piece published September 11, 2001, in *Slate*. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2001/09/in_what_sense_are_terrorists_cowards.html
- Coady, C. A. J. (2008). The Status of Combatants. In D. Rodin & H. Shue (Eds.), *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers* (pp. 153-175). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Deakin, S. (2014). Naked Soldiers and the Principle of Discrimination. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 13(4), 320-330. doi:10.1080/15027570.2014.991507
- Dill, J. & Schubiger, L. (2018). Attitudes toward killing in war. *Working paper, London School of Economics*.
- DiStefano, C., Zhu, M., & Mindrila, D. (2009). Understanding and using factor scores: Considerations for the applied researcher. *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation*, 14(20), 1-11. doi:10.1.1.460.8553
- Dörmann, K. (2003). The legal situation of “unlawful/unprivileged combatants”. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 85(849), 45-73. doi:10.1017/S0035336100103521
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G* Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior research methods*, 39(2), 175-191. doi:10.3758/BF03193146
- Fiske, A. P., & Rai, T. S. (2014). *Virtuous Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

- Frame, T. (Ed.). (2015). *Moral injury: Unseen wounds in an age of barbarism*. Sydney, Australia: NewSouth Publishing.
- French, S. E. (2016). *The code of the warrior: Exploring warrior values past and present*. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gade, E. K. (2010). Defining the Non-Combatant: How do we Determine Who is Worthy of Protection in Violent Conflict? *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(3), 219-242. doi:10.1080/15027570.2010.510863
- Gerstein, J. (2001). Terror Attacks Spark Cowardly Debate. News article published in *abc news*, September 26, 2001. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=121312&page=1>
- Giner-Sorolla, R., Leidner, B., & Castano, E. (2012). Dehumanization, demonization, and morality shifting: Paths to moral certainty in extremist violence. In *Extremism and the psychology of uncertainty*, (pp. 165-182). New York: The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology.
- Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P. (2014). Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 106(1), 148-168. doi:10.1037/a0034726
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5), 1029-1046. doi:10.1037/a0015141.
- Graves, W. (2000). *Goodbye to All That*. London, UK: Penguin Modern Classics. (First published in 1929.)
- Gray, H. M., Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2007). Dimensions of mind perception. *Science*, 315(5812), 619-619. doi:10.1126/science.1134475
- Gray, K., & Wegner, D. M. (2009). Moral typecasting: divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(3), 505-520. doi:10.1037/a0013748
- Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 65, 399-423. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115045
- Henckaerts, J.- M., & Doswald-Beck, L. (2005). *Customary international humanitarian law: Rules*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

- Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Behavioral and brain sciences*, 33(2-3), 61-83. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999152X
- Hofmann, W., Wisneski, D. C., Brandt, M. J., & Skitka, L. J. (2014). Morality in everyday life. *Science*, 345(6202), 1340-1343. doi:10.1126/science.1251560
- International Committee of the Red Cross. (2014). *International Humanitarian Law: answers to your questions* (ICRC Report No. 0703). Geneva: ICRC. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0703.htm>
- Kasher, A., & Yadlin, A. (2005). Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 4(1), 3-32. doi:10.1080/15027570510014642
- Klay, P. (2014). *Redeployment*. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Kutz, C. (2005). The difference uniforms make: collective violence in criminal law and war. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 33(2), 148-180. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00028.x
- Landy, J. F., Piazza, J., & Goodwin, G. P. (2016). When it's bad to be friendly and smart: The desirability of sociability and competence depends on morality. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 42(9), 1272-1290. doi:10.1177/0146167216655984
- Li, M., Leidner, B., & Castano, E. (2014). Toward a comprehensive taxonomy of dehumanization: integrating two senses of humanness, mind perception theory, and stereotype content model. *Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology*, 21(3), 285-300. doi:10.4473/TPM21.3.4
- Maddow, R. (2013). *Drift: The unmooring of American military power*. New York, NY: Random House Digital, Inc.
- McMahan, J. (2010). The just distribution of harm between combatants and noncombatants. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 38(4), 342-379. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2010.01196.x
- McVeigh, K. (2017). Rules of war 'need urgent review' as civilian deaths hit record high. News article published in *The Guardian*, November 24, 2017. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/nov/24/rules-of-war-urgent-review-civilian-deaths-record-high>
- Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 4(5), 344-357. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.x

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

- Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 11(4), 143-152. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.12.007
- Moseley, A. (n.d.). Just War Theory. *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ISSN 2161-0002, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>, Retrieved November 29, 2015.
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy). (2013). *2013 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community*. Retrieved January, 2016, from Military OneSource: http://www.militaryonesource.mil/footer?content_id=267470
- Ogilvie, C. (2013). *The social neuroscience of justified violence* (Unpublished honour's thesis). The University of Queensland, Brisbane.
- Orend, B. (2005). War. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/war/>>. Retrieved July 1, 2015.
- Pfanner, T. (2004). Military uniforms and the law of war. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 86(853), 93-123. doi:10.1017/S1560775500180113
- Piazza, J., Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2014). Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing. *Cognition*, 131(1), 108-124. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.013
- Press, S. J., & Wilson, S. (1978). Choosing between logistic regression and discriminant analysis. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 73(364), 699-705. doi:10.1080/01621459.1978.10480080
- Sherman, N. (2015). *Afterwar: Healing the moral wounds of our soldiers*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Simpson, A., Laham, S. M., & Fiske, A. P. (2016). Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 156(6), 594-609. doi:10.1080/00224545.2016.1140118
- Traven, D. J. (2013). *The Universal Grammar of the Laws of War: A Theory of Moral Discourse and International Norms* (Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University).
- Traven, D. (2015). Moral Cognition and the Law and Ethics of Armed Conflict. *International Studies Review*, 17(4), 556-587. doi:10.1111/misr.12230

- Walker, L. J., & Hennig, K. H. (2004). Differing conceptions of moral exemplarity: just, brave, and caring. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86(4), 629-647. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.4.629
- Walzer, M. (2006). *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (4th ed.). New York, UK: Basic Books.
- Ward, A. F., Olsen, A. S., & Wegner, D. M. (2013). The harm-made mind observing victimization augments attribution of minds to vegetative patients, robots, and the dead. *Psychological Science*, 24(8), 1437-1445. doi:10.1177/0956797612472343
- Watkins, H. M. & Goodwin, G. (2018). A fundamental asymmetry in the judgments of soldiers at war. Manuscript in preparation.
- Watkins, H. M., & Laham, S. M. (2018). The influence of war on moral judgments about harm. Manuscript accepted for publication in the *European Journal of Social Psychology*.

Supplemental Materials

This document contains:

- [Information about the samples](#)

STUDY 1

- [Full scenarios](#)
- [Items from all scales, Studies 1 and 2](#)
- [Comparing soldiers and civilians on *a priori* characteristics \(*t*-tests\)](#)
- [Correlation among *a priori* characteristics](#)
- [Overview of EFA, including pattern matrix, correlations, and descriptive stats \(and *t*-tests\)](#)
- [Discussion of demographic variables, including gender and politics, Study 1](#)
- [Analysis of missing data in moral judgments](#)
- [Omnibus ANOVA, and additional results](#)

STUDY 2

- [Full scenarios](#)
- [Descriptive statistics for *a priori* characteristics](#)
- [Correlation among *a priori* characteristics](#)
- [Overview of EFA, including pattern matrix](#)
- [Hierarchical linear regression for each trait, including gender and politics](#)
- [Analysis of missing data in moral judgments](#)
- [Additional results for moral judgments](#)

Information about the samples

The data for the present studies are from Study 3 and Study 4 of the PhD thesis of the first author, and the conclusions drawn are largely the same as in the thesis; however, the present paper involves a substantial and improved reanalysis of the thesis data. In Study 3 of the thesis only a subset of participants were asked about their political orientation; this subset is the sample for the present study 1. For Study 2 presented here (Study 4 of the thesis) the sample is the same as in the thesis. In the thesis, the influence of demographic variables on the outcome measures was not analysed in these two studies (see [section on demographic variables](#)).

Scenarios for Study 1

Target Conditions

In the civilian condition, participants were given the following information:

Imagine that there are three countries, Country X, Country Y, and Country Z. You are citizen of *Country Z*, but otherwise the exact same person you are now (i.e. you have the same family, same job, living situation, attitudes, etc).

Country X is a country much like many Western countries in the world today. We would like you to think about what the male civilians of this country might be like, based on what you know about *the average Western man* in the world today.

Once you have a clear idea of what kind of person you are thinking about, click next.

In the soldier condition, the second paragraph was exchanged for the following:

Country X has a standing army, much like many Western countries in the world today. We would like you to think about what the soldiers in this army might be like, based on what you know about the *average Western soldier* in the world today.

War Scenario

After rating the target on all the different characteristics, participants were given more information, which introduced a war context (soldier condition in parentheses):

Now imagine that Country X and Country Y go to war. Remember, you are a citizen of *Country Z*, which is neutral to the conflict.

Person X, *the prototypical man* who you were thinking about earlier, does not join the army, but remains a *civilian of Country X*. (or: Soldier X, the *prototypical soldier from Country X* who you were thinking about earlier, is deployed to the front lines.)

In this context, we'd like you to think about a number of possible things that might happen to Person X (or: Soldier X).

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Target characteristics for Study 1 and 2

Person Perception

Participants rated the target on each characteristic on a 7-point Likert scale

1 = *not at all*; 7 = *extremely*

Sociability

[Target] is sociable

[Target] is warm

[Target] is friendly

[Target] is easy-going

[Target] is extroverted

[Target] is playful

Competence

[Target] is competent

[Target] is capable

[Target] is intelligent

[Target] is effective

[Target] is skilful

[Target] is talented

Morality

[Target] is moral

[Target] is principled

[Target] is honest

[Target] is trustworthy

[Target] is fair

[Target] is responsible

Moral exemplarity

Participants rated the target on each characteristic on a 7-point Likert scale

1 = *not at all*; 7 = *extremely*

Justness

[Target] listens to all sides

[Target] has integrity

[Target] is reasonable

[Target] is rational

Bravery

[Target] is heroic

[Target] is courageous

[Target] stands up for his beliefs

[Target] takes risks

Caring

[Target] is good-hearted

[Target] is supportive

[Target] is nurturing

[Target] is comforting

Mind attribution

Participants rated the target on each characteristic on a 7-point Likert scale

1 = *none*; 7 = *a lot*

Agency

[Target] is able to plan his actions

[Target] can understand right from wrong

[Target] is able to control his actions

[Target] can understand how others are feelings

[Target] can communicate his thoughts or feelings to others

[Target] has a capacity for thought

Experience

[Target] can experience physical or emotional pain.

[Target] can experience physical or emotional pleasure

[Target] can experience fear

[Target] can experience anger

[Target] is capable of longing or hoping for things

[Target] can experience pride

Harmfulness

[Target] is hostile

[Target] is violent

[Target] is dangerous

[Target] is aggressive

[Target] is mean

[Target] is vulnerable

Humanness

Participants rated the target on each characteristic on a 7-point Likert scale

1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much so*

Human Nature

Open-minded, can think clearly

Emotionally responsive

Superficial, with no depth

Mechanical and cold, like a robot

Human Uniqueness

Refined and cultured

Rational and logical

Lacking self-restraint, like an animal

Unsophisticated

Comparing civilians and soldiers on *a priori* characteristics

Table S1

Results of t-tests Comparing Ratings of Civilians and Soldiers on the 11 a priori Characteristics, Study 1 (n = 277) .

	Means (SD)		t-value	95% confidence interval of the difference	
	Civilian	Soldier		Lower	Upper
Person Perception					
Sociability	4.72 (0.9)	4.16 (1.0)	-5.113***	-0.782	-0.347
Competence	4.90 (0.9)	5.11 (1.0)	1.851	-0.014	0.447
Morality	4.58 (0.9)	4.72 (1.0)	1.207	-0.089	0.371
Moral exemplarity					
Justness	4.53 (0.9)	4.51 (1.1)	-0.134	-0.263	0.230
Bravery	4.61 (0.9)	5.30 (1.0)	6.155***	0.467	0.907
Caring	4.33 (0.9)	4.18 (1.1)	-1.228	-0.395	0.091
Mind Attribution					
Agency	5.27 (1.0)	5.25 (1.0)	-0.220	-0.259	0.207
Experience	5.72 (1.0)	5.89 (0.9)	1.476	-0.056	0.392
Harmfulness	3.66 (1.0)	4.36 (0.9)	6.126***	0.480	0.935
Dehumanization					
Human Nature	4.45 (0.9)	4.27 (1.1)	-1.412	-0.416	0.069
Human Uniqueness	4.59 (0.9)	4.29 (1.1)	-2.468*	-0.527	-0.059

Note. Ratings were made on a 1-7 response scale. Bold text indicates significant differences between soldier and civilian. This pattern of results was the same if the full sample (no exclusions; $n = 300$) was analysed.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table S2
Study 1 Correlations Among a priori Characteristics.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Person Perception											
1 Sociability		.674***	.727***	.604***	.537***	.721***	.440***	.396***	-.382***	.515***	.467***
2 Competence	.486***		.762***	.676***	.551***	.613***	.510***	.458***	-.313***	.466***	.629***
3 Morality	.601***	.743***		.778***	.560***	.767***	.482***	.362***	-.459***	.581***	.649***
Moral Exemplarity											
4 Justness	.588***	.652***	.834***		.549***	.739***	.518***	.333***	-.409***	.633***	.666***
5 Bravery	.345***	.634***	.653***	.641***		.577***	.287***	.278**	-0.042	.352***	.363***
6 Caring	.650***	.528***	.733***	.838***	.516***		.439***	.287**	-.407***	.658***	.497***
Mind Attribution											
7 Agency	.335***	.523***	.499***	.503***	.503***	.369***		.810***	-.403***	.638***	.630***
8 Experience	.203*	.319***	.261**	.196*	.391***	0.087	.656***		-.252**	.487***	.459***
9 Harmfulness	-.230**	-0.147	-.308***	-.319***	-0.011	-.259**	-0.096	0.112		-.485***	-.452***
Dehumanization											
10 HN	.450***	.383***	.549***	.575***	.315***	.503***	.495***	.235***	-.494***		.659***
11 HU	.452***	.592***	.696***	.704***	.448***	.612***	.511***	.199*	-.513***	.731***	

Note. Soldier condition ($n = 140$) below diagonal; civilian condition ($n = 137$) above.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Exploratory Factor Analysis, Study 1

In exploratory factor analysis, unique and common variance are statistically separated, and common variance is assumed to be driven by a common underlying factor (also referred to as “latent” factor). It is therefore a good approach for the items in the present study, since they are derived from theories that have a lot of conceptual overlap (Li et al., 2015). We followed the guidelines by Sakaluk (2017) and used maximum likelihood extraction, with oblique rotation (direct oblimin; as we did not assume that the factors would be uncorrelated).

The resulting pattern matrices for Study 1 can be seen in Table S4 below; in Table 1 in the main manuscript we provide summaries of the latent factors and their new labels. Because some items loaded on their factors better than others, we created composite factor scores using Bartlett Scores, in order to weight each item appropriately to its factor (DiStefano et al., 2009). These composite factor scores are then used for the remaining analyses. We also provide a table of correlations among the resultant factors for Study 1 in Table S3 below. In addition, *t*-tests comparing soldiers and civilians on the empirical factors are provided in Table S5.

Table S3

Correlations Among Factors (Bartlett Scores), Study 1.

<i>Factor</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 Rational	.123*	-.253***	.260***	-.374***	.182**	-.206**	.328***	.322**
2 Mind		-.024	.142*	-.211***	.122*	-.053	.205**	.243***
3 Dangerous			-.210***	.046	-.116	.104	.074	-.329***
4 Sociable				-.269***	.146*	-.329***	.190**	.168**
5 Incompetent					-.019	.079	-.304***	-.207**
6 Positive humanization						-.268**	.107	.140*
7 Uncaring							-.238***	-.174**
8 Courageous								.223***
9 Negative humanization								-

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

NB: this table breaks over two pages. The header rows are repeated on the next page.

Table S4

This table shows the rotated factor loadings for each item in study 1. Loadings smaller than .300 are not shown. Highest loading for each item in bold.

Item	1	2	3	4	Factor 5	6	7	8	9
rational	.773								
reasonable	.627								
rational and logical	.538								
moral	.381			.339				.345	
listens to all sides	.355						-.329		
can experience physical or emotional pleasure		.804							
can experience physical or emotional pain		.800							
can experience fear		.753							
capable of longing or hoping for things		.742							
can experience pride		.738							
has a capacity for though		.729							
can experience anger		.727							
can understand right from wrong	.310	.646							
able to plan his actions		.541			-.341				
able to control his actions		.483							
can communicate his thoughts		.467				.305			
violent			.758						
hostile			.758						
dangerous			.697						
mean			.683						
aggressive			.679						
takes risks			.319						
friendly				.713					
easy-going				.712					
sociable				.694					
playful				.583					
extroverted				.505					
honest				.347				.315	.310
skilful					-.693				
capable					-.689				
talented					-.647				
effective					-.537				
competent					-.460			.321	
responsible					-.397			.324	
intelligent					-.393				
refined and cultured						.516			
emotionally responsive						.504			
can understand how others are feeling		.340				.404			
open-minded, can think clearly						.400			

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

NB: this table starts on the previous page. The header rows are repeated.

Item	Factor								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
comforting							-.524		
warm				.339			-.496		
good-hearted							-.482		
courageous								.727	
heroic								.671	
stands up for his beliefs								.459	
supportive								.456	
principled	.301							.443	
trustworthy								.417	
has integrity	.329							.344	
fair								.314	
superficial, with no depth									-.733
unsophisticated									-.646
lacking self-restraint, like an animal									-.590
mechanical and cold, like a robot									-.535

Note: Maximum likelihood extraction, direct oblimin rotation (Delta = 0)

Table S5

Results of t-tests Comparing Ratings of Civilians and Soldiers on the Empirical Characteristics, Study 1 (n = 277).

	Means (SD)		t-value	95% confidence interval of the difference	
	Civilian	Soldier		Lower	Upper
Rational	0.08 (0.9)	-0.08 (1.2)	-1.220	-0.413	0.097
Mind	-0.08 (1.1)	0.08 (1.1)	1.229	-0.091	0.396
Dangerous	-0.36 (1.0)	0.36 (1.0)	6.012***	0.485	0.957
Sociable	0.34 (0.9)	-0.33 (0.9)	-5.516***	-0.909	-0.431
Incompetent	0.12 (1.0)	-0.11 (1.1)	-1.795	-0.480	0.022
Positive humanization	0.18 (1.0)	-0.18 (1.2)	-2.735**	-0.629	-0.102
Uncaring	-0.06 (1.0)	0.06 (1.2)	0.961	-0.132	0.385
Courageous	-0.44 (0.9)	0.43 (1.0)	7.322***	0.632	1.097
Negative humanization	-0.001 (0.9)	0.001 (1.2)	0.016	-0.257	0.262

Note. Mean values calculated using Bartlett factor scores. Bold text indicates significant differences between soldier and civilian. This pattern of results was the same if the full sample (no exclusions; n = 300) was analysed.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Discussion and analysis of gender and politics, Study 1

An additional question of interest in the present project was whether demographic differences – gender or political orientation – would affect the principle of discrimination. In the end we decided not to include these hypotheses and analyses in the present paper, as almost none of the effects were significant. However, since this is potentially an important null result, we include further information about this aspect of the project here.

Gender and political orientation are among the most robust predictors of support for war (Eichenberg, 2003; McCleary & Williams, 2009). Therefore, one might expect that these judgments would carry over to judgments of the conduct of war – someone who supports war more, will be more lenient when judging killing in war. However, there is an important distinction to be made here, between “support for war” and killing *in* war. “Support for war” usually concerns decisions to go to war; and (in social psychology) it is assessed as the extent to which an individual holds militaristic or nationalistic values (e.g. Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; McCleary & Williams, 2009). The principle of discrimination concerns permitted behaviour *in* war. This distinction is important to the philosophy of war (Walzer, 2006), in IHL, and in common parlance: “hate the war, love the warrior”, as the saying goes.¹²

In the thesis from which the data here are drawn, the topic of demographic variables was explored elsewhere, not with the present data. In Study 1 of the thesis, results showed that gender, political orientation, social dominance orientation and authoritarianism had relatively little influence on judgments of conduct in war. However, that study did not include the principle of discrimination (soldiers were only killing other soldiers), nor were the character traits of the soldiers investigated.

What might be expected here? Liberals in the U.S. are sometimes “accused” of seeing soldiers as victims (Bateman, 2014). This might imply that they see soldiers as more similar to civilians; the principle of discrimination would accordingly be smaller when a liberal is making the judgment. Or, it might mean that liberals (relative to conservatives) emphasise different aspects of the soldier stereotype. Regarding gender differences, women are more sensitive to harm (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011), and tend to have stronger deontological inclinations (Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015), than do men. Harm sensitivity might lead to *weaker* discrimination – it is simply bad for anyone to kill or be killed – but deontological inclinations might lead to *stronger* discrimination, since it is a deontological rule. We therefore did not make any strong predictions about the impact of demographic

¹² This quote is attributed to Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, speaking in the context of (a film about) the Vietnam War. However it is now found on bumper stickers in the U.S. as well.

variables on neither character evaluations nor moral judgments. The results of the relevant analyses can be viewed elsewhere in these Supplemental Materials.

Results, Study 1

As discussed above, we were also interested in the relationship between gender and political orientation, and the principle of discrimination. Political orientation was assessed on a 7-point scale; 1 = *very liberal*, 7 = *very conservative* ($M = 3.14$, $SD = 1.49$).

First, we correlated each factor with gender and political orientation; results can be seen in Table S6. The only factor that correlated with either of the demographic variables was “positive humanization”: conservatives tended to make higher ratings of this characteristic overall.

Next, for each factor we regressed the factor on target condition (soldier vs. civilian), gender, and politics. This allowed us to observe overall differences in perceptions of soldiers and civilians (and these results parallel those reported in the main manuscript), as well as any main effects of gender and politics. Finally, we added the condition by gender, and condition by politics, interactions, to investigate whether these demographic variables moderated the principle of discrimination. As adding the interaction terms in no cases changed the main effects, we report the coefficients at the second step for each factor in Table S4.

Table S6

Correlations among factors (Bartlett scores), and politics and gender, study 1.

<i>Factor</i>	Politics	Gender
1 Rational	.003	-.016
2 Mind	-.087	-.055
3 Dangerous	.001	.012
4 Sociable	.038	.011
5 Incompetent	-.055	.065
6 Pos. Human	.225***	.065
7 Uncaring	-.104	-.036
8 Courageous	-.080	-.059
9 Neg. Human	.037	-.069

Note: political orientation is z-scored.

Gender coded 0 = women, 1 = men.

Anyone responding “other” to the gender question was filtered out. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Overall, in these analyses we observed no effect of gender nor politics on the principle of discrimination. In addition, when gender and political orientation was included in the analyses of the principle of discrimination in moral judgment, the results remained unchanged. In other words, we have no evidence that liberals and conservatives, or men and women, view the principle of discrimination differently. This lack of an effect is somewhat surprising, given these variables’ often strong effects on judgments about war in general (e.g. Eichenberg, 2003). However, if not a false negative (due to potential low power in the present study), this is an important null finding, given the conflicting dynamic between “soldiers as heroes” and “soldiers as victims” and the way these competing representations are

thought to align with political orientation (Bateman, 2014).

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table S7

Hierarchical linear regressions for each factor; step 2 coefficients. Significant effects of target condition (civilian = 0, soldier = 1) are bolded. Study 1. The only factor for which demographic variables had an effect was “positive humanization”: conservatives made slightly higher ratings overall. (Items such as “refined and cultured,” “open-minded,” and “can think clearly” loaded on this factor.)

	Rational			Mind			Dangerous		
	β	t	p	β	t	p	β	t	p
Constant		0.064	.949		-0.431	.667		-2.641	.009
Target condition	.009	0.087	.931	.110	1.118	.264	.318	3.443	.001
Gender	.048	0.545	.586	-.015	-0.171	.865	-.019	-0.229	.819
Politics	-.004	-0.054	.957	-.059	-0.717	.474	.103	1.329	.185
Target x Gender	-.119	-1.030	.304	-.058	-0.500	.617	.053	0.485	.628
Target x Politics	.007	0.082	.935	-.007	-0.088	.930	-.078	-1.011	.313
Adjusted R^2	<.01			<.01			.11***		
	Sociable			Incompetent			Positive Humanization		
	β	t	p	β	t	p	β	t	p
Constant		2.707	.007		0.519	.604		1.369	.172
Target condition	-.367	-3.924	<.001	-.165	-1.695	.091	-.220	-2.311	.022
Gender	-.031	-0.370	.711	.031	0.364	.717	-.025	-0.302	.763
Politics	.012	0.147	.883	-.076	-0.931	.352	.180	2.255	.025
Target x Gender	.074	0.673	.501	.079	0.688	.492	.115	1.026	.306
Target x Politics	-.026	-0.329	.743	.003	0.031	.975	.023	0.289	.773
Adjusted R^2	.09***			<.01			.06**		
	Uncaring			Courageous			Negative Humanization		
	β	t	p	β	t	p	β	t	p
Constant		-0.766	.444		-3.110	.002		0.194	.846
Target condition	.117	1.194	.233	.440	4.916	<.001	.078	0.793	.428
Gender	.030	0.347	.729	-.014	-0.178	.859	-.013	-0.151	.880
Politics	-.024	-0.288	.774	.068	0.905	.366	-.008	-0.097	.923
Target x Gender	-.097	-0.842	.400	-.065	-0.616	.539	-.116	-1.004	.316
Target x Politics	-.094	-1.149	.252	-.142	-1.898	.059	.072	0.882	.378
Adjusted R^2	<.01			.16***			<.01		

Note. ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Missing Data: “Not enough information to judge” responses in Study 1

Participants had the option of responding “not enough information to judge” to the 4 mini-scenarios.

These participants were filtered out of any moral judgment involving the relevant scenario, in the main manuscript. Here we report an analysis of whether these “missing” responses differed across condition, in Study 1 (Table S8).

Table S8

Frequency distribution of those answering “not enough information to judge”, across all 4 scenarios, as well as results of a binary logistic regression for each scenario, testing whether the proportion was significantly different in the civilian vs. the soldier condition.

<i>Condition (n)</i>	Scenario				Total ^a
	Target kills soldier	Target kills civilian	Soldier kills target	Civilian kills target	
Civilian (137)	28	21	19	22	35
Soldier (140)	18	27	19	28	40
<i>Difference</i> χ^2	2.891	0.759	0.005	0.729	0.685
<i>p</i> -value	.089	.384	.943	.393	.408

Note: ^aThe total column is coded as “missing” for a participant if they responded not enough information to judge to any of the scenarios in that row.

Moral judgments from Study 1, further analysis

As mentioned in Footnote 3 of the main manuscript, the final factor of the experimental design, syntactic role, substantially complicated the analyses of the present data. In the omnibus ANOVA, there was an incidental main effect of syntactic role $F(1, 198) = 9.220, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .04$, and syntactic role interacted with condition, $F(1, 198) = 18.791, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$, and with status of the enemy, $F(1, 198) = 42.631, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .18$. (Including all participants, these results were largely the same, except that the interaction between syntactic role and condition was not significant.) We therefore analysed the two mini-scenarios in which the target was the subject of the sentence, and the two for which he was the object of the sentence, separately. In the main manuscript we report the results for the scenarios in which the target was the subject of the sentence. Here we illustrate the full results in a single figure, rearranged for ease of interpretability. Table S9 and Figure S1 below should be read together. We then report just the results of the scenarios in which the target was the object of the sentence.

Table S9

This table illustrates who is killing whom, across the eight cells of the design, rearranged to be ‘neutral’ as to which syntactic role the target plays. The shading corresponds to the shading in the figure below.

Target	Target as subject		Target as object	
	...kills civilian	...kills soldier	...killed by civilian	...killed by soldier
Civilian	Civilian kills civilian	Civilian kills soldier	Civilian kills civilian	Soldier kills civilian
Soldier	Soldier kills civilian	Soldier kills soldier	Civilian kills soldier	Soldier kills soldier

Figure S1: Illustration of moral judgments across all four mini-scenarios, re-arranged for ease of interpretation. The plain bars represent the scenario when the target was the subject of the sentence; the dotted bars represent the same scenario when the target was the object of the sentence. Overall, it looks like “syntactic role” of the target might have some influence on moral judgments; however this effect is not of interest in the present project.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Comparing judgments of “target is killed by an enemy soldier” to “target is killed by an enemy civilian”, results were similar to those reported in the main manuscript. Participants judged that it was overall less permissible for the target civilian to be killed (than for the target soldier to be killed; $F(1, 218) = 57.324, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .21$), and overall less permissible for an enemy civilian to be the agent of the killing (than for an enemy soldier to be; $F(1, 218) = 41.774, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .16$). The interaction was also significant, $F(1, 218) = 6.739, p = .010, \eta_p^2 = .03$: if the target civilian was killed, whether a soldier or a civilian killed him had a small effect, $F(1, 112) = 11.793, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$. However, if the target soldier was killed, this was seen as more permissible if the agent of the killing was a soldier than if he was a civilian, $F(1, 106) = 29.204, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .22$. These results are illustrated in Figure S2, and they remain unchanged if the full sample is used.

Figure S2: Figure illustrating the effect of target condition (soldier vs. civilian) and status of enemy (soldier vs. civilian) on moral impermissibility judgments in the scenarios in which the target was the object. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Scenario for Study 2

War scenario: justice of side of war manipulation

In all conditions, participants were given the following information:

Imagine that there are three countries, Country X, Country Y, and Country Z. You are citizen of *Country Z*, but otherwise the exact same person you are now (i.e. you have the same family, same job, living situation, attitudes, etc).

Country X and Country Y are currently at **war**. Remember, you are not a citizen of either of these two countries.

The manipulation of justice was then introduced, with either Country X or Country Y being described as the unjust country (manipulations highlighted below).

The reason why the countries are at war, is that **Country [X /Y]** *illegitimately invaded and occupied parts of Country [Y/X]'s territory*, in order to take control over newly discovered gas deposits.

All potential political and diplomatic solutions have been exhausted to no avail. Thus, **Country [Y/X]**, the country being invaded, has resorted to military action as a means of self-defence against this unprovoked aggression. This self-defensive military action has the full support of major international bodies and other countries in the region.

Given this background, we could consider the invading nation, **Country [X/Y]**, to be on the *unjust* side of the conflict, and the nation that is defending itself, **Country [Y/X]**, could be said to be on the *just* side of the conflict.

Target Conditions

Then, participants were either asked to think about a *soldier* or a *civilian* from Country X. The information about the soldier and the civilian differed slightly from in study 1, as it was necessary to specify that the civilian remained a civilian even after the war began.

Soldier condition

We would like you to think about what the **soldiers in the army of Country X** might be like. On the next few pages you will be asked to evaluate a hypothetical soldier from Country X, called Soldier X. Please spend some time imagining what **Soldier X** might be like.

Civilian condition

We would like you to think about what the **male citizens of Country X** might be like. On the next few pages you will be asked to evaluate a hypothetical male civilian from Country X, called Person X. *When his country went to war, Person X did not join the army*, but remained a civilian; just an average man in Country X. Please spend some time imagining what **Person X** might be like.

Descriptive statistics for *a priori* characteristics, Study 2

Table S10

Mean ratings (Standard Deviations in brackets) for all a priori scales, across each of the four target conditions, Study 2.

	Justice of Side			
	Unjust side		Just side	
	Target Condition		Target Condition	
	Civilian	Soldier	Civilian	Soldier
Person perception				
Sociability	3.97 (1.1)	3.43 (1.2)	4.42 (1.0)	4.29 (0.9)
Competence	4.40 (1.1)	4.50 (1.2)	4.79 (1.0)	5.12 (0.8)
Morality	4.17 (1.4)	3.69 (1.2)	4.81 (1.1)	5.05 (0.9)
Moral exemplarity				
Justness	4.27 (1.5)	3.55 (1.4)	4.88 (1.0)	4.99 (1.0)
Bravery	4.24 (1.1)	4.28 (1.2)	4.29 (1.3)	5.53 (0.9)
Caring	3.82 (1.3)	3.27 (1.4)	4.62 (1.0)	4.64 (1.1)
Mind Attribution				
Agency	5.42 (1.1)	4.77 (1.4)	5.33 (1.0)	5.73 (0.9)
Experience	5.72 (1.0)	5.41 (1.3)	5.52 (1.1)	6.12 (0.9)
Harmfulness	3.60 (1.3)	4.80 (1.0)	3.18 (0.9)	4.03 (0.9)
Humanness				
HN	4.60 (1.3)	3.57 (1.1)	4.98 (1.0)	4.93 (1.2)
HU	4.58 (1.2)	3.80 (1.1)	5.02 (1.0)	4.84 (1.1)

Ratings were made on a 7-point response scale.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table S11
Study 2 Correlations Among a priori Scales.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Person Perception											
1 Sociability		.723***	.837***	.791***	.268**	.841***	.435***	.235*	-.450***	.654***	.655***
2 Competence	.571***		.803**	.738**	.517***	.708***	.561***	.380***	-.316**	.559***	.589***
3 Morality	.845***	.692***		.907**	.413***	.879***	.591***	.357***	-.489***	.729***	.729***
Moral Exemplarity											
4 Justness	.823***	.571***	.881***		.419***	.897***	.537***	.248**	-.500***	.704***	.736***
5 Bravery	.609***	.706***	.733***	.665***		.427***	.250**	.246*	.232*	.064	.137
6 Caring	.888***	.498***	.845***	.920***	.653***		.486***	.285**	-.451***	.668***	.678***
Mind Attribution											
7 Agency	.484***	.498***	.570***	.634***	.425***	.519***		.752***	-.301**	.649***	.587***
8 Experience	.320**	.431***	.440***	.411***	.370***	.301**	.830***		-.065	.416***	.326**
9 Harmfulness	-.433***	-.120	-.443***	-.429***	-.109	-.439***	-.118	.128		-.622***	-.650***
Dehumanization											
10 HN	.673***	.368***	.714***	.742***	.467***	.767***	.526***	.330**	-.541***		.873***
11 HU	.689***	.476***	.776***	.812***	.461***	.758***	.534***	.276***	-.548***	.791***	

Note. Soldier condition ($n = 94$) below diagonal, civilian condition ($n = 107$) above.

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Exploratory Factor Analysis, Study 2

The pattern matrices for Study 2 can be seen below in Table S14; in Table 4 in the main manuscript we provide summaries of the latent factors and their new labels. The procedure in Study 2 was the same as in Study 1.

In Table S12 below we provide descriptive statistics for the empirically derived factors, across the four conditions, and in Table S13 we provide correlations.

Table S12

Mean Ratings (Standard Deviations in brackets) for all Empirical Scales, Across each of the four Target Conditions, Study 2.

	Justice of Side			
	Unjust side		Just side	
	Target Condition		Target Condition	
	Civilian	Soldier	Civilian	Soldier
Rational	0.08 (1.2)	-0.37 (1.2)	0.33 (0.8)	-0.08 (1.0)
Mindless	-0.04 (0.9)	0.34 (1.3)	0.16 (1.0)	-0.37 (0.8)
Dangerous	-0.17 (1.2)	0.80 (0.8)	-0.63 (0.8)	0.10 (0.7)
Caring+	-0.11 (1.0)	-0.38 (1.3)	0.37 (0.9)	0.20 (0.8)
Incompetent	0.27 (1.0)	0.03 (1.3)	-0.04 (1.0)	-0.32 (0.8)
Dehumanized	-0.05 (1.1)	0.67 (0.9)	-0.25 (0.9)	-0.28 (1.0)
Courageous	-0.41 (0.9)	-0.35 (0.9)	-0.09 (1.0)	0.85 (0.8)

Note. Factor scores represent Bartlett scores.

Table S13

Correlations Among Empirical Scales, Study 2.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 Rational		-.052	-.330**	.261**	-.275**	-.223*	.160
2 Mindless	-.221*		.151	-.181	.288**	.422***	-.226*
3 Dangerous	-.107	-.069		-.305**	.262**	.536***	.010
4 Caring+	.142	-.278**	-.336**		-.506***	-.312**	.280**
5 Incompetent	-.208*	.280**	.054	-.169		.351**	-.428***
6 Dehumanized	-.360***	.262*	.461***	-.391***	.176		-.115
7 Courageous	.090	-.316**	-.225*	.458***	-.408***	-.420***	

Note. Soldier condition ($n = 94$) below diagonal, civilian condition ($n = 107$) above.

** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

NB: this table breaks over two pages. The header rows are repeated on the next page.

Table S14

This table shows the rotated factor loadings for each item in study 2. Loadings smaller than .300 are not shown. Highest loading for each item in bold.

Item	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
warm	.684						
easy-going	.673						
playful	.666						
friendly	.643						
nurturing	.629						
comforting	.626						
Refined and cultured	.563						
listens to all sides	.557						
sociable	.531						
Open-minded, can think clearly	.453						
good-hearted	.448				-.348		
vulnerable	.446						
fair	.439						
trustworthy	.417						
honest	.371						
emotionally responsive							
dangerous		.777					
violent		.775					
aggressive		.750					
mean		.725					
hostile		.689					
can experience physical or emotional pleasure			-.887				
capable of longing or hoping for things			-.864				
has a capacity for thought			-.825				
can experience fear			-.797				
can experience pride			-.754				
can experience physical or emotional pain			-.735				
can communicate his thoughts			-.729				
can experience anger			-.707				
can understand right from wrong			-.622				
able to control his actions			-.615			.321	
can understand how others are feeling			-.612				
able to plan his actions			-.585				
skilful				-.840			
effective				-.753			
capable				-.748			
intelligent				-.692			
competent				-.689			
talented				-.593			
extroverted				-.513			
responsible				-.461	-.365		
heroic					-.709		
courageous					-.662		
has integrity					-.564		

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

NB: this table starts on the previous page. The header rows are repeated.

Item	Factor						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
stands up for his beliefs				-.308	-.562		
takes risks		.391			-.461		
supportive	.382				-.424		
principled					-.394		
moral	.320				-.343		
reasonable					-.319	.306	
rational						.477	
rational and logical						.475	
lacking self-restraint, like an animal							.875
unsophisticated							.773
superficial, with no depth							.731
mechanical and cold, like a robot							.651

Note: Maximum likelihood extraction, direct oblimin rotation (Delta = 0)

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table S15

Results of ANCOVA for each factor in Study 2, with gender and politics included as covariates. There were few significant main effects of these covariates (see the effect of gender on dehumanization below), and they did not interact with target condition (civilian = 0, soldier = 1) or side (unjust = 0, just = 1). Significant effects of target status are bolded.

	Rational			Mindless			Dangerous		
	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Target	7.489	.007	.04	0.277	.599	<.01	40.982	<.001	.17
Side	2.945	.088	.02	4.008	.047	.02	18.954	<.001	.09
Target x Side	0.028	.867	<.01	11.097	.001	.05	0.889	.347	.01
Gender	0.178	.673	<.01	2.777	.097	.01	0.149	.700	<.01
Politics	0.390	.533	<.01	0.007	.932	<.01	0.118	.732	<.01
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²				.06**			.20***		

	Caring+			Incompetent			Dehumanized		
	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Target	3.718	.055	.02	3.313	.070	.02	5.912	.016	.03
Side	15.976	<.001	.08	6.156	.014	.03	18.445	<.001	.09
Target x Side	0.440	.508	<.01	0.048	.827	<.01	7.492	.007	.04
Gender	0.439	.509	<.01	2.447	.119	.01	4.460	.036	.02
Politics	0.301	.584	<.01	0.034	.853	<.01	0.219	.640	<.01
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.07**			.04*			.12***		

	Courageous		
	<i>F</i> (1,195)	<i>p</i>	η_p^2
Target	14.270	<.001	.07
Side	35.565	<.001	.15
Target x Side	12.119	<.001	.06
Gender	1.676	.197	.01
Politics	1.180	.279	.01
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	.23***		

Note: ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001

Missing Data: “Not enough information to judge” responses in Study 2

Participants had the option of responding “not enough information to judge” to the 4 mini-scenarios. These participants were filtered out of any moral judgment involving the relevant scenario, in the main manuscript. Here we report an analysis of whether these “missing” responses differed across condition, in Study 2 (Table S16).

Table S16

Frequency distribution of those answering “not enough information to judge”, across all 4 scenarios, as well as results of a binary logistic regression for each scenario, testing whether the proportion was significantly different across the four experimental conditions.

Condition (n)		Scenario				Total ^a
		Target kills soldier	Target kills civilian	Soldier kills target	Civilian kills target	
Unjust	Civilian (65)	6	5	6	6	8
	Soldier (49)	2	6	2	4	8
Just	Civilian (51)	8	7	2	5	13
	Soldier (64)	4	8	5	13	16
Overall	χ^2	2.017	0.809	0.113	3.769	4.699
Diff.	<i>p</i> -value	.365	.667	.945	.152	.095

Note: ^aThe total column is coded as “missing” for a participant if they responded not enough information to judge to any of the scenarios. The almost significant overall effect for the “total” column is because the effect of side was significant; Exp(B) = .491 (.249, .970), $p = .040$. Participants on the just side were more likely to respond “not enough information to judge.”

Moral judgments, Study 2, scenario in which the target is the object

As in study 1, there were two mini-scenarios in which the target was the object of the sentence: “enemy soldier kills [target]”, and “enemy civilian kills [target]”. Analysing responses to these two scenarios in a repeated-measures ANOVA with target condition as a between-subjects factor yielded a main effect of target condition: $F(1,168) = 21.942, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .12$; it was more permissible for a target soldier than a target civilian to be killed (i.e. in line with the principle of discrimination). There was also a main effect of side: $F(1,168) = 5.939, p = .016, \eta_p^2 = .03$, such that it was more permissible for the unjust target to be killed than the just target. The effect of status of enemy was also significant: $F(1,168) = 10.183, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .06$; it was less permissible for the civilian than the soldier to kill. These results are all consistent with the principle of discrimination, and with the results reported and discussed in the main manuscript.

The interaction between target condition and status of enemy was significant, $F(1,168) = 5.159, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = .03$, and the three-way interaction was marginal: $F(1,168) = 3.874, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .02$. (The target condition by side interaction was not significant, $F(1,168) = 2.347, p = .127, \eta_p^2 = .01$; nor was the status of enemy by side interaction, $F(1,168) = 0.415, p = .520, \eta_p^2 < .01$. The fact that side did not interact with the other factors suggests that it does not overall “interfere” with the principle of discrimination.) These results are illustrated in Figure S3 below. We break down the significant interactions, by looking at each target condition separately.

When the civilian was the target, neither the effect of status of enemy, nor the effect of side, were significant (Status of enemy: $F(1,91) = 0.483, p = .489, \eta_p^2 < .01$; Side: $F(1,91) = 0.446, p = .506, \eta_p^2 < .01$). This indicates that it does not matter who kills the civilian target; it remains impermissible. (See the grey bars in the figure below.)

When the soldier was the target, on the other hand, there was a main effect of status of enemy, $F(1,77) = 13.050, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$; and a main effect of side: $F(1,77) = 7.257, p = .009, \eta_p^2 = .09$; but no interaction: $F(1,77) = 0.767, p = .384, \eta_p^2 = .01$. (See the black bars in the figure below.) This indicates that soldiers are more permitted to be killed than are civilians, and that those on the just side *overall* are more permitted to kill; however, the principle of discrimination itself is not influenced by the side of the conflict.

Figure S3: Figure illustrating the effect of target condition (soldier vs. civilian), status of enemy (soldier vs. civilian) and side (unjust vs. just) on moral impermissibility judgments in the scenarios in which the target is the object, i.e., “enemy kills [target]”. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.

As in Study 1, we could ask in Study 2 whether the principle of discrimination in moral judgment is accounted for different perceptions of soldiers and civilians on the dimensional factors. Below we therefore report the results of a hierarchical linear regression in which we in step 1 regressed each scenario on target condition (civilian vs. soldier), and in step 2 added the factors dangerous, courageous, and rational (since these were the factors which discriminated between soldiers and civilians in Study 2). As can be seen in Table S10 below, for each mini-scenario for which there was an effect of condition, this effect remained significant at step 2. The dimensional factors occasionally contributed to explaining variance in moral judgment (e.g. there was a consistent main effect of sociability), but the categorical distinction between target soldier and target civilian continued to add explanatory power beyond these dimensional factors.

THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCRIMINATION

Table S17

Results of Hierarchical Linear Regressions for each Scenario, Study 2.

		95% Confidence Intervals (B)				β	t	p	ΔR^2
<i>Target kills enemy soldier</i>		B	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound				
Step 1	Target status	-1.369	0.322	-2.003	-0.734	-.303	-4.255	<.001	.09***
Step 2	Target status	-1.428	0.354	-2.128	-0.729	-.316	-4.031	<.001	.04
	Courageous	-0.238	0.153	-0.540	0.064	-.115	-1.557	.121	
	Dangerous	0.351	0.167	0.021	0.681	.162	2.099	.037	
	Rational	0.154	0.148	-0.137	0.445	.077	1.044	.298	
		95% Confidence Intervals (B)				β	t	p	ΔR^2
<i>Target kills enemy civilian</i>		B	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound				
Step 1	Target status	-0.067	0.258	-0.577	0.442	-.020	-0.261	.795	<.01
Step 2	Target status	-0.026	0.289	-0.596	0.543	-.008	-0.092	.927	.01
	Courageous	-0.154	0.128	-0.406	0.097	-.096	-1.211	.228	
	Dangerous	0.071	0.136	-0.198	0.34	.043	0.523	.602	
	Rational	0.017	0.118	-0.216	0.251	.011	0.145	.885	
		95% Confidence Intervals (B)				β	t	p	ΔR^2
<i>Enemy soldier kills target</i>		B	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound				
Step 1	Target status	-1.594	0.294	-2.175	-1.013	-.369	-5.416	<.001	.14***
Step 2	Target status	-1.465	0.331	-2.118	-0.813	-.339	-4.43	<.001	.02
	Courageous	0.111	0.144	-0.173	0.395	.055	0.770	.442	
	Dangerous	-0.233	0.155	-0.540	0.073	-.113	-1.502	.135	
	Rational	0.031	0.139	-0.243	0.304	.016	0.221	.825	
		95% Confidence Intervals (B)				β	t	p	ΔR^2
<i>Enemy civilian kills target</i>		B	Std. Error	Lower Bound	Upper Bound				
Step 1	Target status	-0.994	0.312	-1.610	-0.377	-.234	-3.180	.002	.06**
Step 2	Target status	-0.746	0.345	-1.428	-0.064	-.176	-2.159	.032	.05*
	Courageous	0.138	0.153	-0.164	0.440	.068	0.900	.369	
	Dangerous	-0.295	0.160	-0.611	0.021	-.148	-1.846	.067	
	Rational	0.224	0.143	-0.060	0.507	.119	1.558	.121	

Note. Civilian = 0, Soldier = 1