Populist Democrats? Unpacking the Relationship between Populist and Democratic Attitudes at the Citizen Level

Accepted for publication in *Political Studies*

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Abstract

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens' support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democratic support at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens' populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support has been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals' populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1); populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2); and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while citizens with stronger populist attitudes are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that citizens with higher populist attitudes not less supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are highly supportive of forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed.

Introduction

The rise of populist parties and movements has spurred debates among political scientists and pundits about citizens' commitment to democracy (Foa and Mounk 2016; Voeten 2016). Citizens' support for democratic rule is important as the endurance of democracy hinges upon it (Easton and Framework 1965; Claassen 2020). Despite reassuring recent findings that citizens are no less supportive of democracy today than in the past (Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020b; Zilinsky 2019), the fear remains that the onset of populism in modern democracies poses a threat to citizens' allegiance to democracy.

Political theorists have warned that populist politics are at odds with the central underpinnings of democracy (Müller 2017; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2017, 2019c). Populism rejects political mediation through political parties by advocating a direct relationship between the people and its political leadership. This radical majoritarian vision of representation also clashes with norms of political pluralism in debate and institutions. Empirical research on the relationship between the presence of populist parties and the quality of democracy by and large confirms the detrimental effect of populism on democracy (Ruth 2018; Houle and Kenny 2018; Huber and Schimpf 2017; Juon and Bochsler 2020).

However, while empirical research on the populism-democracy nexus has flourished on the supply-side of politics, the nature of the association between populism and attitudes toward different conceptions of democracy on the citizen level has been understudied. To understand the implications of populism on

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views among the citizenry for democracy, it is crucial to know whether citizens with stronger populist attitudes are supportive of democracy and, if so, what *kind* of democracy they support. Previous research suggests that citizens with higher levels of populist attitudes are ‘dissatisfied democrats’: supportive of the idea of democracy in principle, but unhappy with how democracy works in practice (Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). Yet, support for democracy *in the abstract* obscures what kind of conceptions of democracy individuals with stronger populist attitudes actually support (Mónica Ferrín and Kriesi 2016; König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022; Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020a).

Specifically, whether citizens with stronger populist attitudes reject or support a liberal democratic view of democracy has remained understudied. This is surprising, since the citizens’ support for democracy matters for its ultimate survival (Claassen 2020). We believe the same is true for liberal democracy: the endurance of liberal democratic institutions hinges, in part, on public support. Cueing theory posits that parties can affect citizen preferences (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014), and recent research shows that partisanship affects citizens’ perceptions of democracy (Krishnarajan 2022). Studying the relationship between populist beliefs and support for (liberal) democracy at the individual level is therefore particularly relevant in a context of high populist mobilization.

We unpack the relationship between populism and democracy at the citizen-level with three different cross-sectional studies conducted in the Netherlands. Study 1 revisits the relationship between populist attitudes, satisfaction with democracy, and support for democracy. In Study 2, we examine whether individuals who hold stronger populist attitudes support key components of liberal democracy. In Study 3, we investigate whether individuals with stronger populist attitudes support a different, populist conception of democracy. With these three empirical studies, we explicitly aim to bridge the gap between political theory on populism and democracy (Laclau 2005; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Müller 2017; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2017, 2019a) and empirical political science.

This article is one of the first studies to examine the relationship between populist attitudes and different conceptions of democracy (but see van der Brug et al. 2021; Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen 2022). Data availability has proven to be an obstacle for testing the relationship between democracy preferences and populist attitudes. Data resources that combine items on populist attitudes and as well as a series of indicators measuring different aspects of democratic support are scarce. The study by Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen (2022) discusses descriptive evidence on the connection between populist attitudes and democracy, but with a limited number of items to capture different aspects of democratic support. Van der Brug et al. (2021) study the role of populist voting, rather than populist attitudes, on support for liberal democracy, with a limited set of indicators for liberal democracy. Combining individual-level measures of populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014) with new measures of democratic support, we examine the association between citizens’ populism and different forms of democratic support. We do so using newly collected data from multiple waves of the LISS panel (2015/2016 and 2018/2019) from CentERdata (2019), a high quality true probability sample from the Netherlands. The Dutch case is suitable for studying the association between populism and democratic preferences in Western Europe, as populist ideas are present at both the citizen and party level across the political spectrum (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Werner and Jacobs 2021).

Our results show that the relationship between populism and democracy at the citizen level is not as straightforward as often assumed. We find that individuals with stronger populist attitudes are generally supportive of democracy, but are dissatisfied with how democracy works in practice. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that citizens with stronger populist attitudes do not necessarily oppose key institutions of liberal democracy, but wary of mediated representation through political parties. Citizens with stronger populist attitudes also overwhelmingly support majority rule without judicial constraints and decision-making through referendums. These results suggest that individuals with stronger populist attitudes are particularly critical of constraints on ‘the rule of the people’.

Our findings have important implications for research on democratic attitudes and populism. The negative relationship between populism and liberal democracy found at the party level does not squarely

correspond with the liberal democratic preferences of populist citizens. Our results also suggest that citizens' pluralist preferences and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy are not mutually exclusive. Citizens with stronger populist attitudes both support a highly majoritarian vision of democracy, while also supporting key pluralistic institutions of liberal democracy. This highlights the importance of studying citizens' democratic preferences in a disaggregated manner by distinguishing different constitutive aspects of democratic governance.

Defining Populism

We define populism as a set of political ideas which sees political contestation as a struggle between the virtuous people and the corrupt elite (Mudde 2004, 2017; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2018). This 'ideational approach' stresses the ultimate sovereignty of the people, as the people are the only true and legitimate source of political power (Mudde 2004). The people are seen as a pure, homogenous group which share a single 'general will' that should be reflected in political power. The people, often conceived as society's 'ordinary people', stand in contrast to the 'bad' or even 'evil' elite, who are corrupted by holding political power (Taggart 2018). By not holding political power, the people are, politically speaking, uncorrupted (Urbiniati 2019a, 57). The juxtaposition between the people and elite is moral in nature: it is seen as a conflict between good and bad (i.e., a 'Manichean' worldview). The populist conception of the people as a homogenous entity amounts to a partial view of society. Only a specific part of society, be it an ethnic, cultural, or class identity, belongs to the people (Urbiniati 2019a, 15). This inherent exclusionary trait of populism highlights its supposed tension with pluralism.

This ideational definition of populism contrasts with conceptions of populism as a political strategy (Weyland 2017), as a political style (Moffitt and Tormey 2014), and as an understanding of representation and democracy (Urbiniati 2019a). Strategic and stylistic definitions do not consider populism to be a set of coherent political ideas. Rather, the strategic perspective of populism sees populism as a form of political organization in which highly personalized leadership is used to mobilize voters to obtain political power (Weyland 2001, 2017). The stylistic approach regards populism as a performance or repertoire in which populists' style or language and their appeal to emotions are key (Moffitt and Tormey 2014). While both approaches have their merits for studying populism at the party level, the focus exclusive on the supply-side limits their applicability to individual-level populism research. Political theorists have conceptualized populism as an understanding of democracy and representative government (Urbiniati 2019a; Rummens 2017). Yet, the theoretical definition of populism as a model of democracy inhibits understanding populism and democracy as analytically distinct concepts, which is crucial for an empirical endeavour that wants to investigate the relationship between populist attitudes and democratic support at the citizen level.

The ideational approach to populism, by contrast, is particularly conducive to empirical analysis; its concise definition permits researchers to measure degrees of populism in individuals (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014) and among political parties (Meijers and Zaslove 2021) in different political contexts. The ideational approach has been applied to parties and citizens on the left and the right side of the political spectrum in various regions and countries. Measuring populism as a continuous, latent construct, the ideational approach allows us to differentiate between individuals who have a higher and lower degree of populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Schulz et al. 2018). To be sure, individuals who are more populist are more likely to support populist parties. Yet, not all individuals with stronger populist attitudes support a populist party, and not all individuals who support populist parties possess stronger populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Akkerman, Zaslove, and Spruyt 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018).

Populism and Definitions of Democracy

The nature of the relationship between populism and democracy is contentious. While some regard populism to be an essentially democratic ideology (Laclau 2005), others highlight fundamental contradictions between populism and democracy (Müller 2014; Urbinati 2019a). Crucially, scholars' evaluations of the relationship between populism and democracy depend on the definition of democracy that is applied.

Scholars of democracy have distinguished 'minimalist' and 'maximalist' definitions of democracy (Dahl 2008a; Morlino 2012; Przeworski 2019). Famously, Schumpeter proposed a 'minimalist' view of democracy as *electoral democracy*, in which democracy primarily denotes popular sovereignty by representation achieved through free and fair elections (Przeworski 2019; Schumpeter 1942). By contrast, a 'maximalist' view of democracy emphasizes the importance of two pillars: the representative and the constitutional pillar (Mény and Surel 2002; Diamond 2003). Whereas the former ensures that representation is possible via free and competitive authorization mechanisms (i.e., elections), the latter ensures necessary constitutional features such as the separation of powers and the rule of law.

Scholars who argue that populism, in theory, is congruent with democracy accept a more 'minimalist', Schumpeterian perspective of *electoral* democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). By contrast, scholars who hold that populism is inherently at odds with democracy adopt a 'maximalist' view of democracy, according to which democracy is impossible without liberalism, pluralism, separation of powers, and the rule of law (Müller 2017; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2017, 2019a). In fact, Urbinati (2019a) argues that liberal democracy is a pleonasm, because democracy cannot exist without pluralistic political debate and the institutions ensuring pluralism that are enshrined in liberalism. In view of this debate, we expect that the relationship between populism and democracy to differ across different approaches to defining, and measuring, citizens' democratic preferences.

To be sure, most theorizing about the implications of populism for democracy focuses analytically on the country- or party-level (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2019a). Nevertheless, macro-level theory about populism's relationship with democracy can inform individual-level research (Jacobs, Akkerman, and Zaslove 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). Political theory work about populism's implications for democracy therefore guides the hypotheses that we formulate, and subsequently test, in our three empirical studies.

Empirical Approach

The empirical analyses of our three studies rely on original nationally representative surveys of the Netherlands. All surveys used in Studies 1-3 are fielded by CentERdata on the LISS (*Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences*) panel, a high quality panel that is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) (see also Werner and Jacobs 2021). Table 1 lists the surveys that are used in all three studies. We complement our three unique surveys with data from recurring modules fielded by LISS (See Table 1). Measured at single time periods, our data is of cross-sectional nature. This means we do not aim to make *causal* claims about the relationship populism and democratic attitudes. All analyses are conducted in R.¹

The Case: The Netherlands

The Netherlands is a good case to test the relationship between populism and democracy among citizens (cf. Werner and Jacobs 2021). Populist attitudes have been present in the Netherlands on both the left and the right side of the political spectrum for some time (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014), and the Netherlands also boasts both left-wing and right-wing populist parties in opposition (Otjes and Louwerse 2015). According to the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index, the quality of democracy in the Netherlands is comparable with other Western European democracies (Coppedge

Table 1: Overview of survey data used

Surveys Used			
Study	Survey	Date of data collection	Data Source
1	Survey 1	December 2015 - January 2016	LISS Politics and Values Module Wave 8
1	Survey 2	April 2016	*Ukraine Referendum Third Measurement
1	Survey 3	April 2016	LISS Module Background Variables
1, 2, 3	Survey 4	December 2018 - March 2019	LISS Politics and Values Module Wave 11
2	Survey 5	April 2019	*Political Discontent
1, 2, 3	Survey 6	June & July 2019	*Wiv Referendum 2018: Fourth Measurement
* Newly collected data			
Data collected by LISS Panel Data			

et al. 2021). Our data was collected prior to the Covid19 pandemic. As such, The Netherlands did not experience severe economic or political crises at the time of study. We are confident therefore that our findings have bearing on the relationship between democratic preferences and populist attitudes for other parliamentary democracies in which the populist right and/or populist left were not in government. It is possible, however, that the relationship between populism and democratic attitudes at the individual level is different when a populist party is in office. As Krishnarajan (2022) found, democratic ideals are likely evaluated through a perceptual screen of current politics and partisan preferences. Jungkunz, Fahey, and Hino (2021) show that voters' populist attitudes hinge on whether a populist party is in power, or not. Hence, while our study provides an important first step into the relationship between populism and democratic attitudes at the individual level, future research should examine the relationship between populism and liberal democracy in contexts in which populist parties are in power.

Measuring Populist Attitudes

Our key independent variable in all three studies is respondents' populist attitudes. Populist attitudes are measured with the scale developed by Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2014). Six survey items measured on a Likert scale (1, disagree completely, to 5, agree completely) are used to address the three core dimensions of populism, tapping into the anti-elite, people-centrist, and antagonistic nature of populism (see Table 2). Given that populism is considered to be a latent construct, we conduct a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). We do so both for the 2016 and for the 2019 data from Original Survey 2 and 6. The CFA produces a one-factor structure for both samples. In line with previous research (Geurkink et al. 2020), we covary the error terms for POP1-POP2 and POP2-POP3 (See Tables A18 and A19). Not only does this produce a better model fit, co-varying these three items is also theoretically relevant as all three items tap into the people-centrist notion of populism. We use the regression scores from the CFA to construct our populist attitudes variable.

Table 2: Items used for Populist Attitudes

Populist Items	
POP1	The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people.
POP2	The people, and not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions.
POP3	I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician.
POP4	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
POP5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
POP6	What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.

Measuring Democratic Attitudes

Support for democracy has been measured in many different ways. We argue that one’s approach to measuring citizens’ democratic attitudes depends on the theoretical objective at hand. For this reason, we rely on different measures of democratic support in our three studies. Study 1 revisits the relationship between populist attitudes and both satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy. Doing so, we follow a long tradition of measuring *regime performance*, as satisfaction with democracy, and *regime preferences*, as overall democratic support (see [Mattes 2018](#) for an overview). In Study 2, we study the association between populist attitudes and support for liberal democracy. As liberal democracy comprises an array of different norms and institutions, we argue liberal democratic preferences cannot be captured with a single indicator (see [König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022](#) for a discussion). As such, we are inspired by Mónica Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) who operationalize support for liberal democracy in a multi-dimensional way (see also [Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020b](#); [König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022](#)). To do so, we measure support for the constitutive institutions of liberal democracy with nine separate items. Previous research has found that the aggregation of dimensions of liberal democracy into a single latent construct is fraught with problems (see [König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022, 2034](#)). In Study 3 we turn to a populist conception of democracy - measuring support for two forms of majoritarian rule. The exact operationalization of the democracy measures are discussed in each study.

Study 1: Populist Citizens as Dissatisfied Democrats

The centrality of popular sovereignty and majority rule in populism leads some scholars to conclude that populism is inherently a democratic ideology ([Canovan 1999](#); [Laclau 2005](#); [Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012](#)). After all, its stated aim is to give voice to the people by *some form of* representation. This sets populism apart from anti-democratic extremist ideologies such as fascism. Employing a minimalist definition of electoral democracy, scholars argue that populist movements can increase the quality of democracy by giving a voice to under-represented political concerns and by increasing political participation ([Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012](#)). Indeed, populism can serve as a ‘corrective’ to democracy ([Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017](#)). Empirical research shows some support for this positive rendering of populism’s impact on democracy. Huber and Ruth (2017) show that the presence of populist parties can indeed improve the equality of democracy by reducing the unequal participation of poorer and less educated citizens. Leininger and Meijers (2020) show that the parliamentary representation of populist parties has positively affected voter turnout in Central and Eastern Europe.

Populism can also be seen as a response to the functioning of democratic decision-making. Populist

parties rally against the political establishment, because the establishment fails to sufficiently serve the people’s interests. From this perspective, populists are democrats who are dissatisfied with the state of democracy in their country (Canovan 1999; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). This suggests that it is important to distinguish citizens’ *evaluations of democracy* from their normative *views on democracy* (Mónica Ferrín and Kriesi 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020; Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020a). Indeed, Stoker and Hay (2017) argue that populism is not a cry against democracy, but dissatisfaction with the current practice of politics. The ‘stealth democracy’ thesis by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argues that citizens are dissatisfied by politics, because they see too much of the decision-making processes of a representative system that ultimately does not deliver on its promises (cf. Stoker and Hay 2017; Webb 2013).

In Study 1, we examine the relationship between populist attitudes and individuals’ satisfaction with democracy and their support for the principle of democracy. Previous studies have found that individuals who hold stronger populist attitudes are more supportive of democracy than less populist respondents (Zaslave et al. 2020; Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). Citizens who support populist parties are not indifferent about politics, but are rather inclined to be *more* politically interested (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). Hence, discontent from individuals with stronger populist attitudes is likely rooted in genuine concern and dissatisfaction about the way democracy works (Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020). Study 1’s hypotheses are therefore:

Hypothesis 1.1: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the lower the respondent’s satisfaction with democracy.

Hypothesis 1.2: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the higher the respondent’s support for democracy.

Study 1: Empirical Analysis

Respondents’ satisfaction with democracy is measured in Survey 1 and Survey 6 with items that ask individuals how satisfied they are with democracy (see Table 1). We estimate the effect of populist attitudes on individuals’ satisfaction with democracy using OLS regression models. To adjust for possible heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors.²

Support for democracy, in Survey 2, is measured by taking the mean of the sum of two Likert items about how people value democracy: “Democracy is the best political system” and “It is important that a country is governed on the basis of democratic principles”. The correlation between the items is 0.73. In Survey 6, support for democracy is measured with the so-called ‘Churchill-democracy’ item: “Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any other form of government”. To avoid that skewed variable distributions affect our results, we also estimate logistic regression models as a robustness check (see the Online Appendix). The statistical significance and substantive findings are the same across these different model specifications.

The regression models control for respondents’ gender, level of educational, age, and income (log). To make sure we estimate the effect of populism *pur sang*, we control for respondents’ left-right position and their degree of political trust. The models examining support for democracy also include satisfaction with democracy as a control.³ The exact operationalization of the control variables is described in Section A.1 in the Online Appendix.

Figure 1 shows a coefficient plot for the OLS regression of the effect of populist attitudes on satisfaction and support for democracy in 2016 and 2019.⁴ As hypothesized in Hypothesis 1.1, we find a statistically negative effect of populist attitudes on respondents’ satisfaction with democracy in both models, corroborating evidence proffered by Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert (2020).

Turning to the effect of populist attitudes on support for democracy, the evidence is mixed. In line with previous research (Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020), the 2016 data display a positive effect of

Figure 1: Populism, Satisfaction and Support for Democracy (OLS regression)

populism on support for democracy – indicating that respondents with stronger populist attitudes are more likely to support democracy than respondents with weaker populist attitudes. By contrast, the 2019 analysis finds no statistically significant effect of populist attitudes on support for democracy. It is possible that the different operationalization of the ‘support for democracy’ variable in the two surveys underlies these different findings. Given this mixed evidence, we do not find support for Hypothesis 1.2, which states that populist respondents are more supportive of the principle of democracy.

All in all, our findings indicate that while individuals with stronger populist attitudes are clearly dissatisfied with how democracy currently works, these same individuals are by no means *less* supportive of the principle of democracy. Yet, commitment to the abstract principle of democracy begs the question how citizens with stronger populist attitudes evaluate the constitutive dimensions of liberal democracy. We will address this question in Study 2.

Study 2: Populist Citizens as Reluctant Liberal Democrats?

Scholars who posit that populism is at odds with democracy, argue that populists defy political norms related to political pluralism, checks and balances, and the rule of law. In other words, populism is deemed incompatible with *liberal* democracy. From a maximalist understanding of democracy, political theorists argue that populism is antithetical to the core features and institutions of liberal democracy (Müller 2017; Rummens 2017; Urbinati 2017, 2019a). Populists’ narrow conception of the people is deemed incompatible with political pluralism, and with competing notions of the common good (Herman 2017; Müller 2014). The idea that the ‘true people’ are a homogenous group negates the presence of political diversity in society and in public debate. Urbinati therefore argues that populism constitutes a “radical and programmatic partiality” (2019a, 15). The idea that only a part of society is sovereign as ‘the people’, can amount to a rejection of minority rights and legal egalitarianism. What is more, theorists fear that populism is antithetical to political opposition, as there is no space for legitimate opposition from its anti-pluralist perspective of politics (Moffitt 2020, 97).

It has been argued that a corollary of populists’ rejection of political pluralism is its rejection of political mediation by political parties. In this sense, populism can be seen as a continuation of a long history of anti-party sentiment (Herman 2017; Muirhead 2006; Rosenblum 2010). Populists reject the idea that political parties play an important intermediate role between citizens’ preferences and government policy, as mediation distorts the ‘pure’ will of the people. Moreover, the diversity of political parties necessitates compromise which distorts the general will of the sovereign people. Yet, party politics is precisely about contested notions of the common good (Urbinati 2017; Van Biezen 2012; Viviani 2019).

Populists’ radical majoritarian view of political sovereignty also relates to its supposed incompatibility with institutional checks and balances, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law. Pluralism is institutionalized in liberal democracies through the separation of powers and the rule of law through which the rule of the majority is purposely constrained (Plattner 2010; Diamond 2003; Bellamy 1996;

Urbinati 2019c). In theory, this is incompatible with the populist idea that the will of the people should be unbridled (Urbinati 2019c, 2017).

These considerations motivate Urbinati (2019a, 15) to conclude that populism disfigures the fundamental institutions of representative democracy, especially when in power. Empirical research on the country- and party-level by and large supports these concerns. Studies show that populist parties and leaders have eroded checks and constraints on the executive (Ruth 2018; Houle and Kenny 2018; Huber and Schimpf 2017; Juon and Bochsler 2020), have hampered media freedom (Juon and Bochsler 2020; Kenny 2020), and have attacked minority rights (Huber and Schimpf 2017). It remains unclear, however, whether populism’s incompatibility with political pluralism also applies to the citizen level.

Below we present our hypotheses on the relationship between individuals with stronger populist attitudes and support for constitutive components of liberal democracy. To test the extent to which expectations about the relationship between populism and liberal democracy in political theory research hold true for the individual level, we base our hypotheses explicitly on this literature.

Operationalizing Preferences for Liberal Democracy

To measure support for liberal democracy among citizens, we follow Mónica Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) and measure support for liberal democracy in a multi-dimensional, disaggregated fashion (see also König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022; Wuttke, Gavras, and Schoen 2020b). Despite widespread agreement on the *theoretical consistency* of liberal democracy as a multi-faceted concept (i.e., Dahl 2008b), previous research has shown that a valid aggregation of items measuring constitutive aspects of liberal democracy into a latent construct is fraught with problems (König, Siewert, and Ackermann 2022, 2034). More importantly, the aim of our endeavor is to uncover the relationship between populist attitudes and support for the various *underlying aspects* of liberal democracy. Therefore, we have explicitly chosen to measure support for liberal democracy with separate items that cover the constitutive aspects of liberal democracy, as theorized by Urbinati (2019a).

Our operationalization of citizen preferences for liberal democracy follows the theoretical distinction between two dimensions of liberal democracy: *political pluralism and mediation* and *separation of powers and the rule of law* Urbinati (2019a). Both dimensions are key to dominant definitions of liberal democracy or polyarchy (Dahl 2008a; Diamond 2003).⁵ Given that we are interested in the association between populist attitudes and the specific underlying components of both dimensions, we do not aggregate support in these dimensions. Rather, we use the dimensions of *political pluralism and mediation* and *separation of powers and the rule of law* as a theoretical lens for our empirical analysis. Table 3 lists the different components of liberal democracy as well as their operationalization.

Political Pluralism and Mediation

Political theorists like Urbinati (2019a) and Müller (2017) have argued that populism is at odds with political pluralism. We test the theoretical expectation that citizens with stronger populist attitudes reject political pluralism for the five components of political pluralism listed in Table 3.

First, populists adhere to a monistic conception of the public good, which does not permit open contestation (Herman 2017, 740). This suggests that populists consider dissenting views to be a threat. As such, populists’ rejection of political pluralism at the citizen level can be apparent from a rejection of *opinion diversity*. We therefore hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2.1: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that it is important to listen to the opinion of other groups.

Populists’ anti-pluralism also leads them to reject party politics and partisan mediation. Given that the ‘true people’ are a homogenous group with a single general will, there is no need for political parties. Party politics requires deliberation and debate, finding common ground between contrasting views, and

Table 3: Constitutive Features of Liberal Democracy and Item Wording

	Liberal Democratic Dimensions	Item Wording
Political Pluralism	Opinion Diversity	It is important to listen to the opinions of other groups.
	Partisan Mediation	Political parties are essential for the functioning of our democracy.
	Critical Opposition	Opposition parties are free to criticise the government.
	Free Speech	Everyone should express their opinion, no matter how extreme.
	Media Freedom	The media is free to criticise the government.
Separation of Powers	Judicial Constraints	In our democracy, it is important that the courts are able to stop the government when it acts beyond its powers.
	Rules and Procedures	In our democracy, it is important that governments always follow the set rules and procedures, regardless of the situation.
	Minority Rights	In our democracy, it is important to protect minority groups.
	Equality before the Law	In our democracy, it is important that the courts treat everyone equally.

striking compromises (Gutmann and Thompson 2010). Instead, populist leaders insist on more direct forms of representation, i.e., through the populist leader her- or himself. From this perspective, it is expected that populist citizens reject *partisan mediation*:

Hypothesis 2.2: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that political parties are essential for the functioning of democracy.

A consequence of this rejection of partisan mediation is that *opposition parties* should have no business in criticizing those in power. The idea that multiple parties in opposition should criticize the government is not in line with a monistic view of politics that is ascribed to populists. As such, one could expect populist attitudes to be associated with a rejection of critical opposition parties:

Hypothesis 2.3: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that opposition parties are free to criticize the government.

Populists’ homogenous view of the people should also lead to rejection of free public debate – as only a ‘part’ of the society can speak for the people’s singular views. This leads to the theoretical expectation that populists reject *free speech*.

Hypothesis 2.4: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the *less* likely the respondent is to believe that everyone should be able to voice their opinion.

Populists’ monistic view of legitimate political opinions can also extend to the public sphere (Herman 2017, 748). *Media freedom* is arguably a cornerstone of free political contestation in liberal democracies. The media disseminates a diversity of political opinions and, crucially, serves as an important check on government’s power. Supply-side research has shown that populist parties in power regularly attack media freedom (Juon and Bochsler 2020; Kenny 2020). From a monist perspective of politics, populist citizens are likely to believe that the media should not be able to criticize the government. From this perspective, we can postulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2.5: The higher a respondent's level of populist attitudes, the *less* likely the respondent is to believe that the media are free to criticize the government.

Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law

Populists' rejection of political pluralism also relates to its frustration with the separation of powers and the rule of law. Arguably, the separation of powers and the rule of law institutionalize pluralist norms by constraining majority rule (Plattner 2010; Diamond 2003). This should frustrate citizens with strong populist attitudes given populism's belief in unconstrained majoritarianism.

Separation of powers denotes the idea that the elected executive, representing a political majority, cannot interfere with or obstruct the legislative branch and the judicial branch. The clearest example of separation of powers is when the courts rule that government policy is at odds with the law. Therefore, populists likely believe that *courts should not be able to constrain the government*. In addition, a radical majoritarian view on democracy is likely to be impatient with procedures that ensure governments act in line with the rule of law. We therefore test whether citizens believe that the government should always act according to set *rules and procedures*. In theory, populists should reject such proceduralism as it can stand in the way of popular sovereignty. In light of these considerations, we posit the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2.6: The higher a respondent's level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that is important that the courts can constrain the government's actions.

Hypothesis 2.7: The higher a respondent's level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that is important that governments, regardless of the situation, adhere to set rules and procedures.

Populists' singular view of the people can also translate to a partial view of the law. As such, populism can be at odds with the idea of *minority rights* and *equality before the law*. Indeed, empirical research on the party level has shown that populists have a deteriorating impact on minority rights (Huber and Schimpf 2017). We therefore test the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2.8: The higher a respondent's level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that is important that minority groups are protected.

Hypothesis 2.9: The higher a respondent's level of populist attitudes, the less likely the respondent is to believe that is important that the courts treat everyone equally.

An Alternative View: Dissatisfied Liberal Democrats and Laclauian Populism

The hypotheses above are rooted in the pessimistic view of political theorists like Müller (2017), Rummens (2017), and Urbinati (2019a) on the relationship between populism and liberal democracy. Yet, not all scholars paint such a dark picture of the association between populist ideation and liberal democracy.

First, Stoker and Hay (2017) argue that populists' dissatisfaction does not stem from a rejection of liberal representative democracy. Rather, discontent stems from the belief that political elites do not deliver on the promises of representative democracy. From this perspective, citizens with high levels of populist attitudes do not necessarily reject principles like the rule of law, but believe these principles are wielded selectively. This would lead to different expectations between populist thought and support for liberal democratic institutions at the individual level. For instance, populist citizens might be more, or equally, likely to believe that governments should follow strict rules and procedures (cf. Hypothesis 2.7), precisely because (mainstream) governments are perceived *not* to do so. In a similar vein, highly populist citizens are likely to be more, or equally, supportive of principle of equality before the law (see Hypothesis 2.9), because they believe elites are currently unencumbered by laws and regulations.

Second, with respect to the relationship between populism and pluralist principles, political theorists like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe put forward a positive, even emancipatory view of populism. Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2005) see populism, in its left-wing form, as a vehicle to achieve ‘radical democracy’: a form of democracy that revolves around political difference rather than compromise and consensus. In this view, representative democracy has become an increasingly closed political system with power in the hands of the few (Moffitt 2020, 100). What is necessary, therefore is an emancipatory (left-wing) form of populism that brings power back to ‘the people’. While ‘the people’ in the ideational approach to populism is considered to be a homogeneous entity, the Laclauian discursive approach emphasizes the openness and indeterminacy of ‘the people’ (Moffitt 2020, 101).

Although this discursive conception of populism is not entirely congruent with the ideational approach to populism, its relationship with liberal democracy is worth noting nonetheless. Whereas populism in the ideational definition is distinctly anti-pluralist, this is not so clear-cut in the Laclauian discursive approach to populism. For Laclau and Mouffe, populism revolves around bringing adversarialism and conflict back into mainstream politics, emancipating a diverse group of citizens as ‘the people’ to shake up the establishment (cf. Stavrakakis et al. 2018). When we theorize about the relationship between pluralist components and populism from this perspective, different expectations come to fore. Rather than opposing political opposition (see Hypothesis 2.3), highly populist citizens could embrace opposition to the government as a way to change the political status-quo and hope for political renewal. Similarly, the antagonistic character of Laclauian populism could lead to a view that free speech cannot be curbed (cf. Hypothesis 2.4). Those who argue that populism can have *corrective* effect also argue that populist movements can address previously ignored issues (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). An antagonistic, anti-establishment view of populism could, moreover, lead to the expectation that highly populist citizens welcome the media’s critique on the government (cf. Hypothesis 2.5). Indeed, although highly populist citizens are less keen on so-called traditional media outlets, recent research shows they are more likely to engage with alternative media (Müller and Schulz 2021). From this perspective, highly populist citizens might be particularly likely to support a media that is perceived as free and critical.

Ultimately, however, also Laclau’s theory of populism can also be regarded to be at odds with pluralism as power is concentrated in a leading figure, who will unite ‘the people’ (Moffitt 2020, 109–10). Therefore, it remains unclear how the pluralist aspects of Laclauian populism relate to its anti-pluralist tendencies, and how these translate to the individual level.

Study 2: Empirical Analysis

We test all nine hypotheses from Study 2 with newly collected data from two surveys in 2019 from the LISS panel (Survey 5 and Survey 6). We leverage the panel structure of the LISS panel and the close temporal proximity of the surveys to combine these in a single dataset, complemented with data from Survey 4 (see Table 1). We operationalize populist attitudes in the same way as in Study 1. We estimate OLS regression models for the 9 dependent variables. All models rely on the same control variables as the models estimating support for democracy (See Section A.2 in the Online Appendix). The OLS models include robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity. As a robustness check, we also estimate logistic regression models for all nine models. The statistical significance and substantive findings are the same across model specifications (See the Online Appendix for a more extensive discussion regarding the specification of these models.)

Figure 2 displays the coefficients of our independent variable of interest, populist attitudes, on the various dependent variables representing different components of liberal democracy (full models can be found in Tables 7-12 in the Online Appendix).

Starting with the relationship between populist attitudes and opinion diversity, the coefficient plot shows a negative, but statistically insignificant effect of a respondent’s degree of populism on opinion diversity. Thus, we find no support for Hypothesis 2.1, which posited that populists’ monistic view of

Figure 2: Populism and Liberal Representative Democracy (OLS regression)

the public good should reduce preferences for opinion diversity. We see no evidence that individuals with strong populist attitudes are more likely to oppose opinion diversity than citizens with weaker populist attitudes.

Hypothesis 2.2 posited that individuals with stronger populist attitudes reject mediated political representation by parties. The coefficient plot shows that respondents' populist attitudes have a sizable negative and statistically significant effect on their propensity to reject parties as necessary for democracy. Turning to the relationship between populist attitudes and the idea that opposition parties should be free to criticize the government (Hypothesis 2.3), Figure 2 demonstrates that there is no significant effect of populist attitudes on support for a critical opposition. This might suggest that populists' anti-pluralist and anti-establishment preferences might cancel each other out.

With respect to free speech, Hypothesis 2.4 posited that populists' anti-pluralism leads to a rejection of free speech. Figure 2 shows that there is a clear positive and statistically significant effect of populist attitudes on support for free speech, in contrast to Hypothesis 2.4. Hypothesis 2.5 posited that highly populist individuals are less likely to support the idea that the media is free to criticize the government. Again, Figure 2 shows that there is no statistically significant effect of respondents' populist attitudes on media freedom, which – again – might suggest that anti-pluralist and anti-establishment sentiments offset one another.

Turning to the question of separation of power and the rule of law, Hypothesis 2.6 posited that populists likely find it less important that courts can constrain the government's actions when its policy is at odds with the law. Contrary to what was hypothesized, the coefficient in Figures 2 shows a statistically insignificant effect of populist attitudes on this variable. Regarding populists' views on procedural governance, Hypothesis 2.7 stipulated that individuals with stronger populist attitudes are less likely to think that governments should always adhere to existing rules and procedures. Yet, contrary to what we hypothesized individuals with stronger populist attitudes, in fact, are more likely to think that governments should adhere to set rules and procedures.

Hypotheses 2.8 and 2.9 expressed the expectation that citizens with stronger populist attitudes are less likely to support the idea of minority group protection as well as the idea that everyone should be equal before the law. Interestingly, however, we find a statistically insignificant effect of stronger populist attitudes on minority rights, leading us to reject Hypothesis 2.8. Moreover, we reject Hypothesis 2.9 as we find a significant, positive effect of stronger populist attitudes on support for equality before the law.

In sum, Study 2 finds that while individuals with stronger populist attitudes reject partisan mediation, they are not less supportive of liberal democracy's core pluralist institutions. This suggest that supply-level conclusions about the relationship between populism and (liberal) democracy (Urbinati 2019c) do

not hold at the individual level. Interestingly, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are more supportive of free speech, that governments follow the rules, and that all citizens are treated equally before the law than citizens with lower populist attitudes. We return to these findings in the conclusion.

Study 3: Populist Democracy as Majoritarian Popular Rule

Our findings so far have shown that Dutch citizens with stronger populist attitudes are no less supportive of democracy and no less supportive of most dimensions of liberal democracy. Yet, their frustration regarding the functioning of democracy, and with the role of political parties in particular, stands out. This is in line with the argument that individuals with stronger populist attitudes reject mediated representation (Urbiniati 2019c). Instead, populist support a vision of majoritarianism in which the wishes of the majority of the people are decisive. Study 3 tests whether citizens with stronger populist attitudes are more prone to support a form of majoritarian popular sovereignty.

In theory, populism can be seen as a claim about political representation as it advocates a radical majoritarian vision of representation. Central to a populist vision of political representation is the idea that the people, and only the people, are sovereign. As a consequence, the demands and wishes of the people should never be curtailed (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Urbiniati 2019c). Populist conceptions of democracy stipulate that majority rule cannot be constrained by elites and non-elected bodies, such as the judiciary.

Unbridled majoritarian rule should also hold when the demands of the people are incompatible with legal provisions enshrined in the country’s constitution. Citizens with stronger populist attitudes are therefore likely to reject any adjudication of the majority’s will by the judiciary, as this would amount to an encroachment of popular sovereignty. We therefore hypothesize that citizens with stronger populist views believe that the will of the majority should never be constrained by the courts:

Hypothesis 3.1: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the more likely the respondent is to believe that in our democracy the will of the majority should never be constrained by the judiciary.

Plebiscites are another form of unbridled majoritarian rule. Referendums are a commonly proposed form of democratic reform to improve the participatory character of political decision-making (Scarrows 2003). Referendums put complex policy questions directly to the people, after which the majority (or plurality) prevails. In case of legally binding referendums, referendums provide the people a direct, unmediated form of influence on government policy.

Populism’s emphasis on unmediated representation also explains its affinity with direct forms of representation. Referendums can be seen as a way to return political power to the people (Mudde 2007, 151). Referendums, especially those originating from grass-roots citizen initiatives, escape the power of elites (Mudde 2007, 151; Jacobs, Akkerman, and Zaslove 2018). What is more, referendums speak to populism’s homogenous conception of the people as they enable representation of the people in its entirety with little differentiation (Canovan 2005). As such, referendums are a form of unconstrained majoritarianism *par excellence*. Indeed, previous research has found that populists tend to support referendums (Jacobs, Akkerman, and Zaslove 2018), and that populist citizens are more likely to accept the outcome of a referendum when ‘their’ side loses (Werner and Jacobs 2021). We therefore test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3.2: The higher a respondent’s level of populist attitudes, the more likely the respondent is to support a referendum on important issues.

Study 3: Empirical Analysis

We test both hypotheses using data from original survey data (Survey 6, see Table 1). We adopt the same approach as in Study 1 and Study 2, and estimate the effect of populist attitudes on the dependent variables of interest, while controlling for possible confounders. We use the same populist attitudes variable and control variables as in Study 2 (Section A.3 in the Online Appendix). We estimate the two models examining populist democracy by way of OLS regression models, with robust standard errors.⁶

We measure support for *majority rule without judicial constraints* with the Likert-item “In our democracy the majority should be decisive, and judges should, for example, not be able to constrain it”. Support for a *referendum vote on important decisions* is measured using the item “On some decisions that are important for our country, voters should vote via a referendum” (see also [Jacobs, Akkerman, and Zaslove 2018](#)). Figure 3 shows a coefficient plot with the effect of respondents’ populist attitudes on two dependent variables: support for *majority rule without judicial constraints* and support for a *referendum vote on important decisions* (See Table A13 for full models).

Figure 3: Populist Democracy

Coefficients for populist attitudes with 95% confidence intervals.
Robust standard errors.

Figure 3 shows a strong, statistically significant and positive effect of populist attitudes on support for unconstrained majority rule. This allows us to accept Hypothesis 3.1. We also see a significant and positive effect of populist attitudes on referendum support – leading us to accepting Hypothesis 3.2. The magnitude of the effects for both variables is quite striking and indicates strong support for the idea that populists support a majoritarian form of political representation.

Conclusion

The relationship between citizens’ populist attitudes and their attitudes toward democracy has been understudied. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we provide new and important insights into the relationship between populism and democracy at the individual level by examining the relationship between populist attitudes and satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy (Study 1), between populist attitudes and dimensions of liberal democracy (Study 2), and between populist attitudes and forms of unconstrained majority rule (Study 3). Corroborating previous findings ([Rovira Kaltwasser and Van Hauwaert 2020](#)), we find in Study 1 that populist citizens are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy, but not less supportive of the principle of democracy. In Study 2, we find that while populist citizens reject the idea that political parties are important mediators, they do support key tenets of liberal democracy. Lastly, Study 3 shows that highly populist citizens are more likely to support majoritarian popular rule and unequivocally support referendums.

The findings that citizens with stronger populist attitudes do not, in fact, exhibit less support for key institutions of liberal democracy as citizens with lower populist attitudes ran contrary to the expectations formulated on the basis of political theory work by Müller (2017), Rummens (2017) and

Urbinati (2019c). These findings highlight that the association between populism and pluralist political preferences is more complicated than often assumed. At least in our sample of Dutch citizens, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are not more likely to oppose minority rights or the separation of powers. These findings are commensurate with recent research by Ellenbroek, Meijers, and Krouwel (2021), who find that populist voters are equally supportive of political pluralism in parliament and government. In addition, our findings are in line with the recent descriptive study by Wuttke, Schimpf, and Schoen (2022), who show that populist citizens in France Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are not more likely to reject the rule of law than non-populists. In a similar vein, studies have shown that citizens who vote for populist parties are not more likely to oppose liberal democratic principles (van der Brug et al. 2021), and that populist attitudes are not a good predictor of voting for a far right candidate with authoritarian credentials (Silva, Fuks, and Tamaki 2022).

This gives credence to the argument put forward by Stoker and Hay (2017) that individuals with stronger populist attitudes do not necessarily reject liberal representative democracy *per se*. Rather, we can speculate that these individuals believe the system does not live up to its promises, as the high levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy also indicate (Study 1). Neblo et al. (2010) (p. 580) sum this up nicely: “There is no contradiction between passionate support for democratic ideals and despair about the way status quo practices subvert them.” Hartevelde et al. (2021) find that populist radical right voters and nativist voters become much more satisfied with democracy when radical right parties are included in government. While the study focuses on nativist voters of the radical right, this also suggests that political discontent is strongly linked to a lack of inclusion – as opposed to fundamental opposition to representative democracy.⁷

What is more, our findings also lend support to a Laclauian take on the relationship between populism and democracy (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005). For Mouffe and Laclau, populism can be a healthy corrective to democracy by bringing back conflict and political difference into political debate and by challenging a ‘closed political system’ (cf. Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). This echoes our findings that individuals with stronger populist attitudes tend to support check and balances on the executive. One could even posit that our findings suggest that, in certain respects, citizens with higher populist attitudes are *better* democrats than those with lower populist attitudes, given the positive effect of populist attitudes on support for free speech, procedural governance, and equality before the law.⁸

Individuals with stronger populist attitude’s support for democracy *in principle* and their acceptance of most pluralistic institutions enshrined in liberal democracy notwithstanding, we find that these individuals strongly favour majoritarian and unmediated forms of political representation. Citizens with stronger populist attitudes are strongly in favour of referendums and believe majority rule should not be curtailed by actors such as judges. Moreover, they reject the idea that parties are important for the functioning of democracy. This mirrors the supposition that party politics conflicts with the populist notion of a single common good (Mair 2002; Herman 2017; Müller 2014), and dovetails with the populist view that political parties stand in the way of the common sense of the people (Caramani 2017). From the theoretical angle of thinkers like Rummens (2017) and Urbinati (2019c), a rejection of political parties can be considered as the repudiation of a crucial component of liberal democracy.

Yet, while our theoretical argument is inspired by a view that sees political parties as a central component of liberal representative democracy (Muirhead 2006; Urbinati 2019b), others have argued that liberal democracy is possible without, or at least with less, party involvement. Studies of deliberative democracy show the promise of deliberative citizen assemblies and mini-publics for representative democracy (Neblo et al. 2010; Dryzek et al. 2019). Moreover, one’s rejection of political parties could also stem from the belief that parties not live up to their democratic task (Stoker and Hay 2017), and hence from a desire for more genuine deliberation – among citizens and also among politicians who are not burdened with partisan polarization. What is more, one could argue that a rejection of parties is not necessarily a rejection of all political mediation as such. It is possible some citizens are wary of political parties as oligopolistic forces and prefer mediated representation by independent MPs or experts instead.

This study into the relationship between citizens' populist attitudes and democratic preferences was conducted in the Netherlands. The presence of populism among both citizens and opposition parties makes the Netherlands a good starting point for this new research agenda on democratic preferences and populism (see also Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014; Werner and Jacobs 2021). As such, it is likely that our findings travel to similar West European contexts.

Yet, to further our understanding of the relationship between populism and democracy among citizens, it is important to assess this association in different political contexts. Previous democracy research has indeed found that support for dimensions of democracy depends on the political context (Easton 1975; Spierings 2014). It is therefore possible that the incumbency in government of a populist party affects the relationship between populism and democratic attitudes at the individual level. Jungkunz, Fahey, and Hino (2021) find that the level of populist attitudes among voters for populist parties is lower when the populist party in question is in power. Moreover, recent research has found that what citizens evaluate as 'democratic' strongly depend on motivated reasoning and the ideology of the politician proposing a certain policy (Krishnarajan 2022). This suggests that democratic ideals are gauged through a perceptual screen of current politics and partisan preferences. This suggests that populists' appraisals of democracy likely depend on their national experience with democracy.

Thus, while our study provides an important first step into the relationship between populism and democracy at the individual level, future research should study whether the relationship between populism and liberal democracy holds in cross-national comparative fashion. Examining the contingency of this relationship by also studying the perceived importance of key institutions of liberal democracy in contexts in which populist leaders are in power is a promising avenue for future investigation.

Our finding that citizens with strong populist attitudes are more supportive of free speech, procedural governance, and legal egalitarianism could therefore well stem from feelings of political exclusion (Taggart 2002), rather than democratic commitment alone. To test this empirically, more research is needed on why highly populist citizens are more likely to support free speech, rule-based governance, and equality before the law. Is this rooted in the principled belief that free speech, legal egalitarianism, and rule-based governance are necessary for a healthy democracy? Or, alternatively, is it rooted in a partisan belief that these principles are currently applied selectively (i.e., free speech, legal equality, and rule of law do not apply to everyone)? Lastly, it is worth exploring measures of democratic support without reference to the executive. Despite the inclusion of control variables like satisfaction with democracy and political trust in our models, it is possible that these measures of institutionalized pluralism pick up on anti-establishment sentiments. Using factorial experiments, future research could attempt to separate preferences for pluralism and the separation of powers from anti-elite evaluations.

All in all, we believe that this study is a significant step forward in understanding the implications of populist thought for citizens' democratic commitment. While populist actors in power often distort liberal democracy (Ruth 2018; Houle and Kenny 2018; Juon and Bochsler 2020), we find that the same is not true for citizens. This suggests that we should be cautious of applying meta- and meso-level theories about populism and democracy to individual-level dynamics.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and constructive comments on the paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the ECPR General Conference August 20-28, 2020 at the panel entitled: *Mapping the Complex Relationship Between Voters and Parties to Explain Differences in Radical Party Performance Based on New Theorizing, New Data, and New Methods*. We would like to thank the discussant Robert Huber for his very good comments and suggestions. The paper was also presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions workshop *New Frontiers in Democracy Research: Tackling a Conceptual and Methodological Impasse*, May 26 - 28, 2021. We would like to thank the discussant Lea Kaftan for her very helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the workshop chairs Reinhard Heinisch and Annika Werner as well as all other workshop participants. In addition, we would like to thank Fabian Habersack, Alex Lehr, Alberto Stefanelli, and Yaël van Drunen for their advice and comments on earlier versions of the paper.

Notes

¹Statistics were carried out with RStudio 2023.03.0+386 and R version 4.2.3 (2023-03-15). The following packages were used for data manipulation, for statistical analysis and presentation: bookdown 0.33; broom 1.0.4; dplyr 1.1.1; forcats 1.0.0; ggplot2 3.4.1; glue 1.6.2; haven 2.5.2; here 1.0.1; huxtable 5.5.2; jtools 2.2.1; lavaan 0.6-15; marginaleffects 0.11.0; modelsummary 1.3.0.9013; kableExtra 1.3.4; knitr 1.42; patchwork 1.1.2; purrr 1.0.1; rmarkdown 2.20; sandwich 3.0-2; scales 1.2.1; sjmisc 2.8.9; tibble 3.2.1; tidyverse 2.0.0; tidyr 1.3.0; tinytex 0.44; vtable 1.4.2. See References for full reference information. The paper was written in RMarkdown.

²We use HC3 robust standard errors from the R sandwich package. The robust standard errors for the coefficient plots are calculated within the modelplot function from the modelsummary package. The robust standard errors for regression tables in the Online Appendix are calculated from within the modelsummary function, also from the modelsummary package.

³Individuals with stronger populist attitudes are often dissatisfied with democracy. At the same time, dissatisfaction with democracy is not the same thing as being populist. Given that we are interested in the affect of populism *pur sang*, we include satisfaction with democracy as a control. The model Support for Democracy (2016) uses the same data as Zaslove et al (2020) with the exception of two independent variables (left-right self-placement and satisfaction with democracy), which were measured at a different moment in time. The left-right self-placement and satisfaction used in this paper were also used as robust checks in Zaslove et al. (2020).

⁴The coefficient plots are produced with modelsummary package. The 2016 question for satisfaction with democracy was measured in December 2015 and January 2016. The full models for the OLS regression models can be found in Tables A4 in the Online Appendix.

⁵Mónica Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) distinguish between an electoral and a liberal component of liberal democracy (see also Hernández 2016). This distinction largely overlaps with our distinction between ‘pluralism and mediation’ and ‘separation of powers and the rule of law’, and is constituted by the same components. However, for the purpose of examining the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, we define liberal democracy’s main components in line with Urbinati (2019a).

⁶The variables majority rule and support for referendums are normally distributed. As such, we only estimate OLS regression models

⁷In contrast, Kokkonen and Linde (2023) find that nativist votes show less support for constitutional constraints and minority rights.

⁸We thank Alexander Wuttke for pointing this out.

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A Online Appendix

A.1 Study 1

Study 1 consists of four Models. The dependent variables for models 1 and 2 are satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy. Satisfaction with democracy is measured with the following question: “How satisfied are you with the way in which the following institutions operate in the Netherlands?” In this case “Democracy”. The variable was originally measured on a 0-10 scale, with 0 being very dissatisfied and 10 being very satisfied. We rescale the variable to a 1-5 point scale. We use the rescaled version of satisfaction with democracy as the dependent variable for model 1. Support for democracy is measured with two items: “Democracy is the best political system” and “It is important that a country is governed on the basis of democratic principles”. Both items are measured with a 1-5 scale, with 1 being disagree completely and 5 being agree completely. The Pearson correlation between the two items is 0.73. We create a new variable for the 2016 Data for support for democracy by taking the mean of the sum.

The dependent variables for model 3 and 4 are also satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy. Satisfaction with democracy is measured with the item: “I am in general satisfied with the manner in which democracy functions in the Netherlands”. Support for democracy is measured with the following question: “Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any other form of government”. Both items are measured on a 1-5 point scale, with 1 being disagree completely and 5 being agree completely.

Populist attitudes is our main independent variable. We use the scale developed by (Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove 2014) to measure populist attitudes. Six items are used to measure the core dimensions of populism. See Table 2 in the main text. These items are measured on a five point Likert scale, 1 indicating completely disagree and 5 completely agree. We perform a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and use the regression scores to create our populist attitudes variable. The CFA produced a single-factor structure. To improve the fit we co-vary POP1-POP2 and POP2-POP3. See Table A17 in the Online Appendix for the fit statistics.

Our socio-economic control variables are gender, education, age, and income. Gender is measured with a female-male distinction, with male as the reference category. Education is measured with six categories: Primary School; VMBO (intermediate secondary education); HAVO-VWO (higher secondary education); MBO (intermediate vocational training); HBO (higher vocational training); WO (university). We create three categories from these six education levels. Primary School and VMBO are combined to create the category Low Education. HAVO-VWO are combined with MBO to create the category Medium Educated. And the High Educated category consists of individuals with a HBO or WO level education.

Age is measured by the declared age of the respondent. Income is measured with declared monthly net income. The income variable produces a high number of missing values. We, therefore, use the imputed variable as provided by LISS.⁹ We use the natural log of this variable. The -Inf scores, that are produced for the zero income from running the natural log in R are converted to zeros. A dummy is included in the model, where 1 represents the 0's that have been used to replace the -Inf and where 0 represents the full income values (values from the log transformation). The dummy variable is included in the model to control for the measurement error that may occur from the fact that the values of zero that are used to replace the -Inf scores are not log transformations. We label this variable “Income equals Null”.

In addition, we control for political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and left-right self-placement. Political trust is measured with two items assessing the degree of trust that individuals have in the Dutch government and in the Dutch parliament. We take the mean of the sum to create a new variable, political trust. The Pearson's correlation for the 2016 survey is 0.93 and for the 2019 it is 0.88. The left-right self-placement is measured with the following item: “In politics, a distinction is often made

between ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. Where would you place yourself on the scale below, where 0 means left and 10 means right?”. Models 2 and 4 also use the item measuring satisfaction with democracy as an independent variable. We include satisfaction with democracy in all models, except where satisfaction with democracy is the dependent variable.

Satisfaction with democracy is included to ensure that we are testing the relationship between populist attitudes and our dependent variable *pur sang*. We anticipate that satisfaction with democracy can act as a confounder, having an effect on the effect of populist attitudes on our dependent variables, in question. We do not include support for democracy in the models, where support for democracy is not our dependent variable, given that we do not expect support for democracy to act as a confounder. We do not anticipate that support for democracy will effect the relationship between populism and our dependent variables under investigation. See Table A1 for the descriptives.¹⁰

We estimate all four models as OLS regression models. Do to possible heteroskedasticity, we estimate the OLS models with robust standard errors.¹¹

A.2 Logistic Regression Models

Items measuring attitudes towards democracy are often not normally distributed. Due in part to what Ferrin (2018) refers to as “satisficing”, respondents tend to have positive evaluations of democracy. As such, respondents tend to clump around the higher end of the measurement scale. We follow Ferrin and Kriesi (2016) and we estimate the two models on support for democracy as logistic regression models.

In order to estimate the logistic regression models, we create a dichotomous variable from the two items measuring support for democracy. As noted above, the 2016 support for democracy item is constructed from two items. The newly created support for democracy variable has scores from 1-5 with intervals of 0.5. We create a dichotomized variable, where vales higher than 4 are given a 1 and values of 4 and less are given a score of 0.

Support for democracy in 2019 is measured on a 1-5 point scale, ranging from 1 disagree completely to, 5 agree completely. We dichotomize the variable, where values of 5 are given a score of 1 and the remaining values are given a score of 0. See Table A3 for the descriptives of the dichotomized variables.

The satisfaction with democracy variables are less skewed than the items measuring support for democracy. Moreover, diagnostic checks of the residuals and fitted values of the OLS models with the satisfaction with democracy as dependent variable show that these models do not violate the functional form. Plots of the residuals also show a normal distribution. As such, we estimate the models for satisfaction with democracy only as an OLS regression.

Table A1: Descriptives Data 2016

Variable	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Socio-economic Controls					
Gender	2525				
... Male	1190	47.1%			
... Female	1335	52.9%			
Age, yrs.	2525	54.079	17.018	18	98
Education	2522				
... low	768	30.5%			
... medium	906	35.9%			
... high	848	33.6%			
Income (net)	2389	1666.055	4439.56	0	183934
Income Log	2389	6.571	2.256	0	12.122
Income equals 0 (Dummy)	2389				
... 0	2154	90.2%			
... 1	235	9.8%			
Populist Attitudes					
Populist Attitudes (CFA)	1999	0	0.444	-1.365	0.881
Pop1 (mj16a093)	2315	3.676	0.871	1	5
Pop2 (mj16a094)	2305	2.959	1.073	1	5
Pop3 (mj16a095)	2261	2.824	1.041	1	5
Pop4 (mj16a096)	2125	3.488	0.959	1	5
Pop5 (mj16a097)	2294	3.744	0.954	1	5
Pop6 (mj16a098)	2203	3.317	1.097	1	5
Democracy					
Satisfaction with Democracy	2361	6.068	1.997	0	10
Satisfaction with Democracy (rescaled)	2361	3.427	0.799	1	5
Support for Democracy	2251	4.106	0.611	1	5
Democracy best political system	2271	4.055	0.701	1	5
Country governed by democratic principles	2265	4.148	0.615	1	5
Political Attitudes					
Political Trust	2338	5.337	2.107	0	10
Trust in Government	2343	5.293	2.149	0	10
Trust in Parliament	2339	5.38	2.134	0	10
Left-Right Self-Placement	2150	5.232	2.133	0	10

Note:

Data: Ukraine Referendum Third Measurement; LISS Politics and Values Module Wave 8; Background Variables

A.3 Study 2

Study 2 uses the same independent variables as outlined for models 2 and 4 in Study 1. Study 2 has nine dependent variables. We group the dependent variables into two categories: *Political Pluralism and mediation* and *Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law*.

The 5 dependent variables for Political Pluralism and Mediation are as follows: The dependent variable for model 1 is opinion diversity. It is measured with the following question: “It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups”. The dependent variable for model 2 is partisan mediation. It is measured with the following question: “Political parties are essential for the functioning of our democracy”. The dependent variable for model 3 is critical opposition. It is measured with the following question: It is important for democracy in general “that opposition parties are free to criticize the government”. The dependent variable for model 4 is free speech. It is measured with the following question: “Everyone should freely express their opinion, no matter how extreme this is”. The dependent variable for model 5 is free media. It is measured with the following question: How important it “that the media are free to criticize the government”. The questions that measure critical opposition and free media are originally measured on a 0 to 10 points scale, 0 indicating not at all important for a democracy in general and 10 is extremely important for a democracy in general. We rescale these two items to make a 1-5 point scale. The rest of the items are measured on a 1-5 point Likert scale, 1 indicating completely disagree and 5 indicating completely agree. Individuals were asked to assess how important these items are for how democracy functions in your country.

The 4 dependent variables for *Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law* are as follows: The dependent variable for model 6 is judicial constraints. It is measured with the following question: “In our democracy it is important that the courts are able to constrain the government when it acts beyond its authority”. The dependent variable for model 7 is rules and procedures. It is measured with the following question: “In our democracy it is important that the government, no matter the situation, always follows the stated rules and regulations”. The dependent variable for model 8 is minority rights. It is measured with the following question: “In our democracy it is important that minority groups are protected”. The dependent variable for model 9 is equality before the law. It is measured with the following question: “In our democracy it is important that the courts treat everyone in an equal manner”. The items are measured on a 1-5 point Likert scale, 1 indicating completely disagree and 5 indicating completely agree. See Table A2 for the descriptives.

Do to possible heteroskedasticity, we run all OLS models with robust standard errors.

A.4 Logistic Regression

Given the skewed nature of the items measuring liberal democracy, we employ the same strategy as above regarding the items measuring support for democracy and estimate the liberal democracy models as logistic regressions. We dichotomize the liberal democracy items, employing the same approach as with the support for democracy items. All of the liberal democracy variables are measured on a 1-5 point scale, with the exception of the items measuring critical opposition and free media, which are measured on a 0-10 point scale. A dichotomized variable is created, where scores of 5 are given a 1 and the rest are given a 0. The two items measured on a 0-10 point scale (critical opposition and free media), are dichotomized in a similar manner. Scores of 10 are given a 1 and the rest are given a 0. See Table A3 for descriptives of the dichotomized variables for the logistic models for liberal democracy.

A.5 Study 3

Study 3 uses the same control variables and the same independent variables as indicated in Study 2. The dependent variable for majority rule is measured with the following question: “In our democracy the majority should be decisive, and judges should, for example, not be able to constrain it”. Support for referendums is measured with the following item: “On some decisions that are important for our

country, voters should vote via a referendum”. Both items are measured on 1-5 point Likert scale. 1 indicates completely disagree and 5 indicates completely agree. See Table A2 for descriptives.

Both items display a fairly normal distribution, while diagnostic checks of the residuals and fitted values of the two OLS regression models, with majority rule and support for referendums as dependent variable, show that the functional form is not violated. Plots of the residuals also show a normal distribution. As such, we estimate these models as a OLS regressions and do not estimate the models as logistic regressions. Do to possible heteroskedasticity we run all OLS models with robust standard errors.

Table A2: Descriptives Data 2019

Variable	N	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Socio-economic Controls					
Gender	1793				
... Male	846	47.2%			
... Female	947	52.8%			
Age, yrs.	1793	56.427	16.793	19	101
Education	1792				
... low	497	27.7%			
... medium	624	34.8%			
... high	671	37.4%			
Income (net)	1696	1748.629	1232.026	0	27240
Income Log	1696	6.798	2.102	0	10.212
Income equals 0 (Dummy)	1696				
... 0	1558	91.9%			
... 1	138	8.1%			
Populist Attitudes					
Populist Attitudes (CFA)	1525	0	0.504	-1.518	1.099
Pop1 (v7c)	1737	3.679	0.908	1	5
Pop2 (v5b)	1712	2.803	1.08	1	5
Pop3 (v5a)	1696	2.799	1.009	1	5
Pop4 (v7a)	1623	3.606	0.977	1	5
Pop5 (v7b)	1716	3.67	1.006	1	5
Pop6 (v5c)	1682	3.015	1.119	1	5
Political Attitudes					
Political Trust	1708	5.694	1.924	0	9.5
Trust in Government	1722	5.698	2.022	0	10
Trust in Parliament	1711	5.691	1.941	0	10
Left-Right Self-Placement	1546	5.233	2.199	0	10
Democracy					
Satisfaction with Democracy	1724	3.643	0.808	1	5
Support for Democracy	1664	4.094	0.733	1	5
Liberal Democracy					
Opinion Diversity	1463	4.112	0.547	2	5
Partisan Mediation	1676	3.769	0.796	1	5
Critical Opposition	1464	4.232	0.71	1	5
Free Speech	1738	3.283	0.99	1	5
Free Media	1464	4.249	0.734	1	5
Judicial Constraints	1687	4.116	0.722	1	5
Rules and Procedures	1706	3.888	0.774	1	5
Minority Rights	1712	3.734	0.827	1	5
Equality before the Law	1729	4.298	0.676	1	5
Populist Democracy					
Majority Rule	1656	3.103	1.039	1	5
Referendum	1698	3.246	1.173	1	5

Note:

Data: Wiv Referendum 2018: Fourth Measurement, Political Discontent, LISS Politics and Values Module Wave 11

A.6 Histograms for Dependent Variables

Figure A1: Histogram Plots for Dependent Variables

Figure A2: Histogram Plots for Dependent Variables continued...

Table A3: Descriptives Dichotomized Variables

Variable	N	Percent
Support for Democracy (2016)	2251	
... 0	1620	72%
... 1	631	28%
Support for Democracy (2019)	1664	
... 0	1179	71%
... 1	485	29%
Opinion Diversity	1463	
... 0	1159	79%
... 1	304	21%
Partisan Mediation	1676	
... 0	1447	86%
... 1	229	14%
Critical Opposition	1464	
... 0	1021	70%
... 1	443	30%
Free Speech	1738	
... 0	1589	91%
... 1	149	9%
Free Media	1464	
... 0	995	68%
... 1	469	32%
Judicial Constraints	1687	
... 0	1200	71%
... 1	487	29%
Rules and Procedures	1706	
... 0	1385	81%
... 1	321	19%
Minority Rights	1712	
... 0	1470	86%
... 1	242	14%
Equality before Law	1729	
... 0	1036	60%
... 1	693	40%

Note:

Data: Ukraine Referendum Third Measurement; Political Discontent; Wiv Referendum 2018: Fourth Measurement

A.7 Regression Models

Table A4: Populism, Satisfaction and Support for Democracy (OLS)

	Satisfaction Democracy (2016)	Support Democracy (2016)	Satisfaction Democracy (2019)	Support Democracy (2019)
Female (ref: Male)	0.047	−0.011	−0.072+	0.011
	0.034 (0.161)	0.032 (0.719)	0.040 (0.071)	0.040 (0.792)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.012	0.017	0.005	0.127*
	0.043 (0.788)	0.038 (0.649)	0.051 (0.923)	0.050 (0.012)
High Education (ref: low)	0.005	0.149***	0.021	0.233***
	0.046 (0.909)	0.040 (<0.001)	0.052 (0.692)	0.052 (<0.001)
Age (years)	−0.001	0.006***	0.000	0.006***
	0.001 (0.496)	0.001 (<0.001)	0.001 (0.746)	0.001 (<0.001)
Income (log)	0.069*	0.022	−0.028	0.058
	0.032 (0.032)	0.029 (0.434)	0.037 (0.448)	0.038 (0.131)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.492*	0.121	−0.122	0.402
	0.238 (0.039)	0.213 (0.571)	0.278 (0.662)	0.291 (0.166)
Populism	−0.221***	0.108**	−0.167**	0.018
	0.046 (<0.001)	0.042 (0.010)	0.055 (0.002)	0.051 (0.726)
Political Trust	0.193***	0.023*	0.231***	0.031+
	0.011 (<0.001)	0.010 (0.015)	0.016 (<0.001)	0.016 (0.057)
Satisfaction with Democracy		0.069***		0.300***
		0.010 (<0.001)		0.033 (<0.001)
Left-Right	0.003	−0.011+	−0.009	−0.006
	0.007 (0.678)	0.007 (0.092)	0.009 (0.309)	0.009 (0.500)
Intercept	1.934***	3.111***	2.590***	1.956***
	0.247 (<0.001)	0.237 (<0.001)	0.298 (<0.001)	0.314 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1667	1647	1294	1277
R2	0.365	0.108	0.353	0.202
R2 Adj.	0.361	0.103	0.348	0.196
Std.Errors	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A5: Populism and Support for Democracy (logistic regression with log-odds)

	Support Democracy (2016)	Support Democracy (2019)
Female (ref: Male)	−0.375** 0.123 (0.002)	−0.056 0.142 (0.692)
Medium Education (ref: low)	−0.060 0.157 (0.701)	0.155 0.183 (0.399)
High Education (ref: low)	0.444** 0.160 (0.005)	0.504** 0.190 (0.008)
Age (years)	0.011** 0.004 (0.005)	0.015*** 0.004 (<0.001)
Income (log)	−0.105 0.105 (0.317)	0.098 0.135 (0.465)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	−0.907 0.783 (0.247)	0.901 1.011 (0.373)
Populism	0.331* 0.163 (0.042)	−0.007 0.172 (0.968)
Political Trust	0.086* 0.040 (0.032)	0.042 0.054 (0.438)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.207*** 0.039 (<0.001)	1.040*** 0.123 (<0.001)
Left-Right	−0.056* 0.026 (0.034)	−0.042 0.030 (0.166)
Intercept	−2.216** 0.814 (0.007)	−6.635*** 1.140 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1647	1277

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are log-odds. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A6: Populism and Support for Democracy (logistic regression with odds ratios)

	Support Democracy (2016)	Support Democracy (2019)
Female (ref: Male)	0.687**	0.945
	0.085 (0.002)	0.134 (0.692)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.942	1.167
	0.148 (0.701)	0.214 (0.399)
High Education (ref: low)	1.559**	1.656**
	0.249 (0.005)	0.314 (0.008)
Age (years)	1.011**	1.015***
	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (<0.001)
Income (log)	0.901	1.103
	0.094 (0.317)	0.149 (0.465)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.404	2.462
	0.316 (0.247)	2.489 (0.373)
Populism	1.392*	0.993
	0.226 (0.042)	0.171 (0.968)
Political Trust	1.090*	1.043
	0.044 (0.032)	0.056 (0.438)
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.230***	2.830***
	0.049 (<0.001)	0.349 (<0.001)
Left-Right	0.945*	0.959
	0.025 (0.034)	0.029 (0.166)
Intercept	0.109**	0.001***
	0.089 (0.007)	0.001 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1647	1277

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are odds ratios. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A7: Populism and Liberal Democracy: Political Pluralism and Mediation (OLS)

	Opinion Diversity	Partisan Mediation	Critical Opposition	Free Speech	Free Media
Female (ref: Male)	−0.082*	0.017	−0.254***	−0.270***	−0.185***
	0.034 (0.017)	0.043 (0.697)	0.042 (<0.001)	0.061 (<0.001)	0.043 (<0.001)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.047	0.024	0.077	−0.027	0.175**
	0.041 (0.251)	0.052 (0.646)	0.055 (0.167)	0.068 (0.689)	0.059 (0.003)
High Education (ref: low)	0.206***	0.053	0.187**	−0.111	0.255***
	0.046 (<0.001)	0.056 (0.343)	0.059 (0.002)	0.076 (0.144)	0.064 (<0.001)
Age (years)	0.002*	0.003**	0.002	0.003+	0.003*
	0.001 (0.017)	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.128)	0.002 (0.083)	0.001 (0.047)
Income (log)	−0.056+	−0.026	0.074+	0.025	0.051
	0.034 (0.099)	0.036 (0.467)	0.040 (0.061)	0.051 (0.619)	0.039 (0.186)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	−0.351	−0.152	0.370	0.346	0.349
	0.253 (0.166)	0.270 (0.574)	0.307 (0.229)	0.377 (0.359)	0.291 (0.231)
Populism	−0.015	−0.305***	0.061	0.413***	0.083
	0.044 (0.729)	0.057 (<0.001)	0.051 (0.231)	0.076 (<0.001)	0.052 (0.116)
Political Trust	0.034**	0.059***	−0.003	−0.005	−0.001
	0.013 (0.008)	0.018 (<0.001)	0.016 (0.874)	0.022 (0.821)	0.015 (0.974)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.042	0.223***	0.002	0.077	0.053+
	0.027 (0.120)	0.038 (<0.001)	0.030 (0.941)	0.049 (0.118)	0.032 (0.096)
Left-Right	−0.036***	−0.012	−0.054***	0.006	−0.048***
	0.007 (<0.001)	0.009 (0.198)	0.009 (<0.001)	0.014 (0.670)	0.009 (<0.001)
Intercept	4.197***	2.667***	4.000***	2.816***	3.801***
	0.265 (<0.001)	0.305 (<0.001)	0.314 (<0.001)	0.425 (<0.001)	0.313 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1069	1273	1069	1289	1069
R2	0.099	0.227	0.111	0.073	0.081
R2 Adj.	0.090	0.221	0.102	0.066	0.072
Std.Errors	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A8: Populism and Liberal Democracy: Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law (OLS)

	Judicial Constraints	Rules and Procedures	Minority Rights	Equality before Law
Female (ref: Male)	−0.048	−0.184***	−0.073	−0.108**
	0.042 (0.252)	0.045 (<0.001)	0.046 (0.115)	0.037 (0.004)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.045	0.012	0.150*	0.116*
	0.053 (0.398)	0.056 (0.837)	0.061 (0.014)	0.048 (0.016)
High Education (ref: low)	0.183**	0.066	0.365***	0.279***
	0.056 (0.001)	0.060 (0.275)	0.063 (<0.001)	0.051 (<0.001)
Age (years)	−0.001	0.003*	0.005***	0.001
	0.001 (0.310)	0.001 (0.032)	0.001 (<0.001)	0.001 (0.562)
Income (log)	−0.018	0.002	−0.076+	0.018
	0.038 (0.625)	0.043 (0.971)	0.042 (0.069)	0.033 (0.584)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	−0.086	−0.004	−0.467	0.106
	0.277 (0.757)	0.321 (0.989)	0.309 (0.130)	0.250 (0.672)
Populism	0.026	0.318***	0.038	0.146**
	0.052 (0.621)	0.056 (<0.001)	0.059 (0.517)	0.047 (0.002)
Political Trust	−0.026+	0.013	0.047**	0.016
	0.015 (0.084)	0.017 (0.447)	0.018 (0.008)	0.015 (0.284)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.121***	0.165***	0.148***	0.128***
	0.031 (<0.001)	0.036 (<0.001)	0.039 (<0.001)	0.029 (<0.001)
Left-Right	−0.059***	−0.008	−0.104***	−0.023**
	0.009 (<0.001)	0.010 (0.409)	0.010 (<0.001)	0.008 (0.005)
Intercept	4.298***	3.168***	3.603***	3.647***
	0.296 (<0.001)	0.341 (<0.001)	0.334 (<0.001)	0.269 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1278	1283	1281	1287
R2	0.062	0.067	0.174	0.078
R2 Adj.	0.055	0.060	0.168	0.071
Std.Errors	HC3	HC3	HC3	HC3

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A9: Populism and Liberal Representative Democracy: Political Pluralism and Mediation (logistic regression with log-odds)

	Opinion Diversity	Partisan Mediation	Critical Opposition	Free Speech	Free Media
Female (ref: Male)	−0.474**	−0.141	−0.684***	−1.216***	−0.546***
	0.170 (0.005)	0.185 (0.444)	0.150 (<0.001)	0.274 (<0.001)	0.147 (<0.001)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.116	0.200	0.086	0.350	0.148
	0.234 (0.620)	0.260 (0.443)	0.187 (0.647)	0.292 (0.232)	0.184 (0.422)
High Education (ref: low)	0.991***	0.578*	0.373+	0.726*	0.407*
	0.233 (<0.001)	0.258 (0.025)	0.197 (0.058)	0.311 (0.020)	0.193 (0.035)
Age (years)	0.006	0.017**	−0.001	−0.013+	0.002
	0.005 (0.246)	0.006 (0.003)	0.005 (0.903)	0.007 (0.080)	0.004 (0.689)
Income (log)	−0.444**	−0.057	0.210	0.372	0.109
	0.156 (0.004)	0.174 (0.745)	0.147 (0.153)	0.245 (0.128)	0.141 (0.439)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	−2.736*	−0.092	1.597	3.247+	0.519
	1.163 (0.019)	1.314 (0.944)	1.103 (0.148)	1.852 (0.080)	1.061 (0.625)
Populism	−0.049	−0.620**	0.178	1.701***	−0.048
	0.202 (0.808)	0.223 (0.005)	0.176 (0.311)	0.288 (<0.001)	0.173 (0.783)
Political Trust	0.179**	0.063	−0.039	−0.104	−0.042
	0.067 (0.008)	0.078 (0.419)	0.052 (0.451)	0.071 (0.145)	0.052 (0.416)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.139	1.072***	−0.035	0.280*	−0.006
	0.132 (0.291)	0.167 (<0.001)	0.107 (0.743)	0.143 (0.050)	0.105 (0.953)
Left-Right	−0.147***	−0.075+	−0.193***	0.021	−0.175***
	0.036 (<0.001)	0.039 (0.050)	0.032 (<0.001)	0.049 (0.672)	0.031 (<0.001)
Intercept	0.512	−6.889***	−0.751	−5.243**	−0.301
	1.234 (0.678)	1.509 (<0.001)	1.135 (0.508)	1.891 (0.006)	1.093 (0.783)
Num.Obs.	1069	1273	1069	1289	1069

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are log-odds. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A10: Populism and Liberal Representative Democracy: Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law (logistic regression with log-odds)

	Judicial Constraints	Rules and Procedures	Minority Rights	Equality before Law
Female (ref: Male)	−0.522*** 0.139 (<0.001)	−0.378* 0.161 (0.019)	−0.715*** 0.181 (<0.001)	−0.498*** 0.129 (<0.001)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.216 0.178 (0.225)	0.028 0.197 (0.886)	0.455+ 0.251 (0.070)	0.364* 0.162 (0.025)
High Education (ref: low)	0.623*** 0.185 (<0.001)	0.426* 0.205 (0.038)	1.200*** 0.250 (<0.001)	0.877*** 0.172 (<0.001)
Age (years)	0.000 0.004 (0.971)	0.007 0.005 (0.136)	0.010+ 0.005 (0.061)	−0.003 0.004 (0.495)
Income (log)	−0.085 0.128 (0.509)	−0.005 0.150 (0.973)	−0.436** 0.159 (0.006)	0.049 0.120 (0.685)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	−0.354 0.962 (0.713)	−0.353 1.134 (0.756)	−2.842* 1.197 (0.018)	0.402 0.899 (0.655)
Populism	0.108 0.166 (0.515)	0.850*** 0.193 (<0.001)	0.331 0.212 (0.118)	0.370* 0.157 (0.019)
Political Trust	−0.099* 0.049 (0.046)	−0.070 0.054 (0.196)	0.026 0.066 (0.696)	0.004 0.046 (0.930)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.467*** 0.102 (<0.001)	0.499*** 0.114 (<0.001)	0.367** 0.133 (0.006)	0.404*** 0.093 (<0.001)
Left-Right	−0.151*** 0.029 (<0.001)	−0.072* 0.033 (0.029)	−0.281*** 0.038 (<0.001)	−0.095*** 0.028 (<0.001)
Intercept	−0.703 1.020 (0.491)	−2.860* 1.206 (0.018)	0.363 1.280 (0.777)	−1.751+ 0.954 (0.066)
Num.Obs.	1278	1283	1281	1287

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are log-odds. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A11: Populism and Liberal Representative Democracy: Political Pluralism and Mediation (logistic regression with odds ratios)

	Opinion Diversity	Partisan Mediation	Critical Opposition	Free Speech	Free Media
Female (ref: Male)	0.623**	0.868	0.505***	0.296***	0.579***
	0.106 (0.005)	0.161 (0.444)	0.076 (<0.001)	0.081 (<0.001)	0.085 (<0.001)
Medium Education (ref: low)	1.123	1.221	1.090	1.419	1.159
	0.263 (0.620)	0.317 (0.443)	0.204 (0.647)	0.415 (0.232)	0.213 (0.422)
High Education (ref: low)	2.693***	1.782*	1.452+	2.066*	1.503*
	0.627 (<0.001)	0.459 (0.025)	0.285 (0.058)	0.642 (0.020)	0.290 (0.035)
Age (years)	1.006	1.017**	0.999	0.987+	1.002
	0.005 (0.246)	0.006 (0.003)	0.005 (0.903)	0.007 (0.080)	0.004 (0.689)
Income (log)	0.641**	0.945	1.233	1.451	1.115
	0.100 (0.004)	0.164 (0.745)	0.181 (0.153)	0.355 (0.128)	0.157 (0.439)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.065*	0.912	4.939	25.710+	1.680
	0.075 (0.019)	1.198 (0.944)	5.449 (0.148)	47.614 (0.080)	1.782 (0.625)
Populism	0.952	0.538**	1.195	5.477***	0.953
	0.192 (0.808)	0.120 (0.005)	0.210 (0.311)	1.576 (<0.001)	0.165 (0.783)
Political Trust	1.197**	1.065	0.961	0.901	0.959
	0.081 (0.008)	0.084 (0.419)	0.050 (0.451)	0.064 (0.145)	0.050 (0.416)
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.150	2.920***	0.966	1.324*	0.994
	0.152 (0.291)	0.488 (<0.001)	0.103 (0.743)	0.189 (0.050)	0.105 (0.953)
Left-Right	0.863***	0.927+	0.825***	1.021	0.839***
	0.031 (<0.001)	0.036 (0.050)	0.026 (<0.001)	0.050 (0.672)	0.026 (<0.001)
Intercept	1.668	0.001***	0.472	0.005**	0.740
	2.059 (0.678)	0.002 (<0.001)	0.535 (0.508)	0.010 (0.006)	0.809 (0.783)
Num.Obs.	1069	1273	1069	1289	1069

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are odds ratios. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A12: Populism and Liberal Representative Democracy: Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law (logistic regression with odds ratios)

	Judicial Constraints	Rules and Procedures	Minority Rights	Equality before Law
Female (ref: Male)	0.593***	0.685*	0.489***	0.608***
	0.083 (<0.001)	0.110 (0.019)	0.088 (<0.001)	0.078 (<0.001)
Medium Education (ref: low)	1.241	1.029	1.577+	1.439*
	0.221 (0.225)	0.202 (0.886)	0.396 (0.070)	0.234 (0.025)
High Education (ref: low)	1.865***	1.530*	3.321***	2.404***
	0.346 (<0.001)	0.313 (0.038)	0.831 (<0.001)	0.414 (<0.001)
Age (years)	1.000	1.007	1.010+	0.997
	0.004 (0.971)	0.005 (0.136)	0.006 (0.061)	0.004 (0.495)
Income (log)	0.919	0.995	0.647**	1.050
	0.118 (0.509)	0.149 (0.973)	0.103 (0.006)	0.126 (0.685)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.702	0.703	0.058*	1.495
	0.675 (0.713)	0.797 (0.756)	0.070 (0.018)	1.344 (0.655)
Populism	1.114	2.341***	1.392	1.447*
	0.185 (0.515)	0.451 (<0.001)	0.295 (0.118)	0.227 (0.019)
Political Trust	0.906*	0.932	1.026	1.004
	0.045 (0.046)	0.050 (0.196)	0.068 (0.696)	0.046 (0.930)
Satisfaction with Democracy	1.596***	1.647***	1.444**	1.498***
	0.163 (<0.001)	0.187 (<0.001)	0.192 (0.006)	0.140 (<0.001)
Left-Right	0.860***	0.930*	0.755***	0.910***
	0.025 (<0.001)	0.031 (0.029)	0.029 (<0.001)	0.025 (<0.001)
Intercept	0.495	0.057*	1.438	0.174+
	0.505 (0.491)	0.069 (0.018)	1.841 (0.777)	0.166 (0.066)
Num.Obs.	1278	1283	1281	1287

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Coefficients are odds ratios. Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses.

Table A13: Populist Democracy (OLS)

	Majority Rule	Referendum
Female (ref: Male)	−0.088	−0.113*
	0.057 (0.126)	0.056 (0.044)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.033	0.103
	0.067 (0.626)	0.065 (0.116)
High Education (ref: low)	−0.116	0.062
	0.073 (0.111)	0.071 (0.381)
Age (years)	0.007***	−0.007***
	0.002 (<0.001)	0.002 (<0.001)
Income (log)	0.041	−0.095+
	0.048 (0.388)	0.053 (0.072)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.384	−0.917*
	0.360 (0.286)	0.397 (0.021)
Populism	0.950***	1.525***
	0.073 (<0.001)	0.067 (<0.001)
Political Trust	0.045*	0.023
	0.021 (0.033)	0.020 (0.245)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.016	−0.102*
	0.044 (0.715)	0.041 (0.012)
Left-Right	0.063***	−0.027*
	0.013 (<0.001)	0.013 (0.039)
Intercept	1.833***	4.773***
	0.391 (<0.001)	0.433 (<0.001)
Num.Obs.	1263	1284
R2	0.245	0.412
R2 Adj.	0.239	0.407
Std.Errors	HC3	HC3

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Estimate, standard error with p-value in parentheses

A.8 Regression Models (Standardized)

In this section we present the OLS regression models with standardized coefficients. We only present those models where populism demonstrates a statistically significant effect. The continuous independent variables are mean-centered and they are scaled by 1 standard deviation. The dependent variable is not rescaled. Standard errors are robust (HC3).¹²

Table A14: Standardized Predictors for Democracy (OLS) Models with Significant Effects

	Satisfaction (2016)	Support (2016)	Satisfaction (2019)
Female (ref: Male)	0.047 (0.034)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.072 (0.040)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.012 (0.043)	0.017 (0.038)	0.005 (0.051)
High Education (ref: low)	0.005 (0.046)	0.149 *** (0.040)	0.021 (0.052)
Age (years)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.090 *** (0.016)	0.006 (0.019)
Income (log)	0.143 * (0.067)	0.046 (0.059)	-0.056 (0.073)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.492 * (0.238)	0.121 (0.213)	-0.122 (0.278)
Populism	-0.097 *** (0.020)	0.047 ** (0.018)	-0.083 ** (0.027)
Political Trust	0.394 *** (0.023)	0.047 * (0.019)	0.423 *** (0.029)
Satisfaction with Democracy		0.133 *** (0.019)	
Left-Right	0.006 (0.016)	-0.024 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.020)
Intercept	3.432 *** (0.042)	4.070 *** (0.041)	3.718 *** (0.047)
N	1667	1647	1294
R2	0.365	0.108	0.353

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Robust (HC3) standard errors in parentheses.

Table A15: Standardized Predictors for Liberal Democracy (OLS) Models with Significant Effects

	Partisan Mediation	Free Speech	Rules and Procedures	Equality before Law
Female (ref: Male)	0.017 (0.043)	-0.270 *** (0.061)	-0.184 *** (0.045)	-0.108 ** (0.037)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.024 (0.052)	-0.027 (0.068)	0.012 (0.056)	0.116 * (0.048)
High Education (ref: low)	0.053 (0.056)	-0.111 (0.076)	0.066 (0.060)	0.279 *** (0.051)
Age (years)	0.055 ** (0.021)	0.052 (0.030)	0.049 * (0.023)	0.011 (0.019)
Income (log)	-0.052 (0.072)	0.051 (0.102)	0.003 (0.085)	0.036 (0.066)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	-0.152 (0.270)	0.346 (0.377)	-0.004 (0.321)	0.106 (0.250)
Populism	-0.152 *** (0.029)	0.206 *** (0.038)	0.158 *** (0.028)	0.073 ** (0.023)
Political Trust	0.108 *** (0.032)	-0.009 (0.040)	0.023 (0.030)	0.029 (0.027)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.179 *** (0.030)	0.062 (0.040)	0.132 *** (0.029)	0.103 *** (0.024)
Left-Right	-0.027 (0.021)	0.013 (0.030)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.050 ** (0.018)
Intercept	3.790 *** (0.048)	3.453 *** (0.063)	3.986 *** (0.051)	4.251 *** (0.045)
N	1273	1289	1283	1287
R2	0.227	0.073	0.067	0.078

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$. Robust (HC3) standard errors in parentheses.

Table A16: Standardized Predictors for Populist Democracy (OLS) Models with Significant Effects

	Majority Rule	Referendum
Female (ref: Male)	-0.088 (0.057)	-0.113 * (0.056)
Medium Education (ref: low)	0.033 (0.067)	0.103 (0.065)
High Education (ref: low)	-0.116 (0.073)	0.062 (0.071)
Age (years)	0.108 *** (0.028)	-0.117 *** (0.027)
Income (log)	0.082 (0.095)	-0.191 (0.106)
Income equals Null (Dummy)	0.384 (0.360)	-0.917 * (0.397)
Populism	0.476 *** (0.037)	0.759 *** (0.033)
Political Trust	0.084 * (0.039)	0.041 (0.036)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.013 (0.035)	-0.082 * (0.033)
Left-Right	0.139 *** (0.028)	-0.059 * (0.028)
Intercept	3.147 *** (0.062)	3.286 *** (0.062)
N	1263	1284
R2	0.245	0.412

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Robust (HC3) standard errors in parentheses.

A.9 Conditional Predictions for the Regression Models with Significant Results

In this section we plot the OLS models. We only present those models where populist attitudes are statistically significant. Figure A3 present the models from the regression models presented in tables A4, A7, A8 and A13.¹³ In figure A4 we present the same models, however, the populism variable is the mean of the sum of the populist items. To obtain the mean of the sum, we sum the 6 populism items used in the CFA and divide the sum of the items by 6. In the paper, we argue that populism is a latent construct. As such, using the regression scores from the CFA is the more appropriate approach. However, we also plot the populism variable as a mean of the sum given that some readers may find this scale more intuitive for interpreting the effect sizes.

Figure A3: Conditional Predictions for Models with Significant Effects

Figure A4: Conditional Predictions for Models with Significant Effects (with mean of the sum)

A.10 Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Table A17: Fit Statistics

Fit Statistics for CFA and Populist Attitudes					
Model	χ^2_M	df _M	RMSEA (90% CI)	CFI	SRMR
2016 Data	+42.994	7	0.051 (0.037 - 0.066) p 0.437	0.993	0.019
2019 Data	+56.471	7	0.068 (0.052 - 0.085) ++p 0.031	0.985	0.024
Cutoff Values: RMSEA <0.08; CFI ≥ 0.90; SRMR <0.08					
+ Chi-square is statistically significant. But due to large sample size we rely on the other fit statistics.					
++ Even though the RMSEA is below 0.05 we choose the current model for theoretical and consistency considerations.					
Both models have two covariances.					

Table A18: Factor Loadings

Estimates for Factor Loadings for Populist Items 2016			
	Unstandardized Estimate	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate
Indicators			
Pop1	1.000		0.557
Pop2	1.509	0.058	0.677
Pop3	1.487	0.068	0.683
Pop4	1.294	0.061	0.647
Pop5	1.597	0.067	0.804
Pop6	1.754	0.075	0.775
Error covariances			
Pop1 ↔ Pop2	0.172	0.014	0.302
Pop2 ↔ Pop3	0.229	0.017	0.377
Unstandardized estimates, $p < .001$; $N = 1999$			

Table A19: Factor Loadings

Estimates for Factor Loadings for Populist Items 2019			
	Unstandardized Estimate	Standard Error	Standardized Estimate
Indicators			
Pop1	1.000		0.608
Pop2	1.286	0.060	0.662
Pop3	1.227	0.062	0.676
Pop4	1.050	0.058	0.595
Pop5	1.326	0.064	0.732
Pop6	1.460	0.071	0.723
Error covariances			
Pop1 ↔ Pop2	0.103	0.017	0.174
Pop2 ↔ Pop3	0.230	0.021	0.379
Unstandardized estimates, $p < .001$; $N = 1525$			

A.11 Survey Questions

Table A20: Study 1

Variable	Question	Survey
Pop1	The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people	2
Pop2	The people, and not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions	2
Pop3	I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician	2
Pop4	The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people	2
Pop5	Elected officials talk too much and take too little action	2
Pop6	What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles	2
Satisfaction with Democracy	How satisfied are you with the way in which the following institutions operate in the Netherlands? (Democracy)	1
Support for Democracy	Democracy is the best political system	2
Support for Democracy	It is important that a country is governed on the basis of democratic principles	2
Political Trust	Can you indicate how much trust you personally have in each of the following institutions or countries?	2
	Dutch Government	2
	Dutch Parliament	2
Left-Right Self-Placement	Where would you place yourself on the left\ right scale?	1
Socio-Economic controls	Gender, Age, Income and Education	3

*For exact wording of the questions see the codebook

Table A21: Study 1

Variable	Question	Survey
Pop1-Pop6	Wording and question order the same. See Study 1 (2016) above	6
Satisfaction with Democracy	I am in general satisfied with how democracy works in the Netherlands	6
Support for Democracy	Democracy may have its problems but it is better than any form of government	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch government?	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch parliament?	6
Left-Right Self-Placement	Where would you place yourself on the left-right scale?	4
Socio-Economic controls	Gender, Age, Income and Education	6

*For exact wording of the questions see the codebook

Table A22: Study 2

Variable	Question	Survey
Pop1-Pop6	Wording and question order the same. See Study 1 (2016) above	6
Satisfaction with Democracy	I am in general satisfied with how democracy works in the Netherlands	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch government?	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch parliament?	6
Left-Right Self-Placement	Where would you place yourself on the left-right scale?	4
Opinion Diversity	It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups	5
Free Speech	Everyone should be able to freely expression their opinion no matter how extreme	6
Media Freedom	The media are free to criticize the government	5
Partisan Mediation	Political parties are essential for the functioning of our democracy	6
Critical Opposition	Opposition parties are free to criticize the government	5
Judicial Constraints	In our democracy it is important that the courts control the government if it acts beyond its powers	6
Rules and Procedures	In our democracy it is important that the government obeys the rules and procedures, no matter the situation	6
Minority Rights	In our democracy it is important that minority groups are protected	6
Equality before the Law	In our democracy it is important that the courts treat everyone in the same manner	6
Socio-Economic controls	Gender, Age, Income and Education	6

*For exact wording of the questions see the codebook

Table A23: Study 3

Variable	Question	Survey
Pop1-Pop6	Wording and question order the same throughout. See Study 1 (2016) above	6
Satisfaction with Democracy	I am in general satisfied with how democracy works in the Netherlands	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch government?	6
Political Trust	How much trust do you have in the Dutch parliament?	6
Left\ Right self-placement	Where would you place yourself on the left\ right scale?	4
Majority Rule	In our democracy the majority should be decisive, and judges should, for example, not be able to constrain it	6
Support for referenda	On some decisions that are important for our country, voters should vote via a referendum	6
Socio-Economic controls	Gender, Age, Income and Education	6

*For exact wording of the questions see the codebook

Notes

⁹If net income is not given, net income is estimated from brutto income. (See CentERdata (2019) and de Voss (2011)).

¹⁰All descriptive tables in the Online Appendix are produced with the vtable package.

¹¹Regression tables for the all of the OLS and logistic regression models are produced with the modelsummary package.

¹²We use the jtools package. Jtools uses the sandwich package to generate the robust standard errors.

¹³The marginaffects package was used to produce the conditional prediction plots.