Identifying the Uncanny Phenomena in Educational Practice

Roberto Ollivier-Garza

Department of Language, Literacy, and Sociocultural Studies
College of Education the University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM, USA

Abstract:

One could argue that Jentsch's (1906) essay, on "The Psychology of the Uncanny," was a precursory step toward structuralism. His ideas on alienation, revolution, and repetition inspired and were incorporated into the respective works and disciplines pursued by Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida. Despite the uncanny's impact on and applicability to these respective areas, this theory has not yet been evaluated or vetted for its relevance to the modern conditions of globalization that impact student learning, in particular, those students whose immigrant, minority, or socioeconomic status posit them on the periphery of their respective dominant educational systems. Therefore, this paper's purpose is to identify and examine the history and theory of the uncanny, to define the alienation experience of its patrons, to explore the impact and effect on their cognitive development, and to suggest the need to recognize the uncanny experience as a legitimate threat to multiculturally responsive teaching - an issue that requires addressment as well as educational and praxis reform.

Keywords: educational system, educational reform, multicultural responsive teaching, uncanny, uncanny valley theory

Identifying the Uncanny Phenomena in Educational Practice

In 1906, the German psychiatrist Dr. Ernst Anton Jentsch published an essay titled “*Zur Psychologie des Umheimlichen*” or “The Psychology of the Uncanny.” In it, Jentsch introduces and explores the formation and significance of the word *unheimlich*, which represents a novel product of the German language’s ability to marry together two previously unassociated words, thereby generating a new word and by simultaneous default, a new concept otherwise previously unimagined.

Introduction

According to Jentsch (1906), this new German word “*unheimlich*” represents the antithesis of a previously well-established German word “*Heimlich*” [“homely”], or “*heimisch*” [“native”], effectively emphasizing the opposite of all that was considered familiar; thereby driving the reader, participant, or protagonist to the conclusion that those items, experiences, or people that are thus perceived as *unheimlich* or unhomely /uncanny and therefore must be simultaneously frightening precisely because they are unknown or unfamiliar. Jentsch (1906) extends this reasoning by qualifying that:

this word appears to express that someone to whom something uncanny happens is not quite at home or at ease in the situation concerned, that the thing is or at least seems to be foreign to him. In brief, the word suggests that a lack of orientation is bound up with the impression of the uncanniness of a thing or incident (p. 2).

In most cases, Jentsch (1906) claims the “usual and the hereditary is dear and familiar to most people, and they incorporate the new and the unusual with mistrust, unease and even hostility (misoneism),” leading to a sense that those items that are new and unfamiliar are also frightening and dangerous (p. 3).

This “uncanny phenomenon,” a term and experience that Jentsch identifies and that most people experience, can be readily explained when one considers the difficulty that most people have in establishing quickly and completely a conceptual connection with that new object, experience, or person in relation to their own particular ideational spheres. In other words, it alludes to the facility with which people can and do establish intellectual mastery over the new item or experience. Of course, one also must recognize simultaneously that the relationship is not capable of inversion, and therefore, they also must acknowledge that the same impression or experience does not necessarily exert an uncanny effect on everybody because individual background experiences are broadly diverse, allowing one person’s previous experiences to make more readily familiar those same items that are unfamiliar or uncanny to another person.

Furthermore, one also must understand that the same perception on the part of the same individual does not necessarily develop into the uncanny every time or at least not in the same way, which can lead to a quandary of understanding of what the uncanny truly encapsulates and how the term is and should be appropriately and accurately applied.

In other words, the crux of the uncanny, as Jentsch argues, is that the brain is often reluctant to overcome the resistance required for the assimilation of the uncanny phenomenon and the subsequent allocation, incorporation, or investment into one’s intellectual or emotional

memory vaults-unlike those other items, concepts, or people that have long been familiar and are typically welcomed straightforwardly and unreservedly. It is these new and unfamiliar or “unhomely” items or experiences, as well as those individuals who are deliberately removed from their traditional placement or perspectives, because the power of understanding is accustomed to and related to the power of the habitual, that incorporate and form the essence of these feelings of uncertainty or uncanniness. Curiously, Jentsch (1906) tells us that the feelings of uncertainty more frequently make their presence felt “in those who are more intellectually discriminating when they perceive daily phenomena and that this may play an important role in the origin of the drive to knowledge and research” (p. 4). It is the uncanny’s impact on the “drive to knowledge” and its potential affect on global multiculturally responsive teaching and pedagogical reform as it relates to immigrant, minority, and subordinate-culture children that motivates the interest and concern for this issue.

As children typically have little holistic life experience, and those from minority or subordinate cultures typically have even less, what is often considered to be a simple thing or a minor change from the perspective of an adult, particularly one who hails from the dominant socioeconomic or cultural group, often is viewed and experienced as inexplicable or terrifying to children. Therefore, even slightly complicated or new situations can represent potentially sinister threats, triggering feelings of anxiety and physical and intellectual uncertainty. Jentsch asserts that this lack of broad life experience is why children can and often do present so fearful and apprehensive in new situations, and he contends that bright children are often the most fearful because they are typically clearer, or more astute, “about the boundaries of their own orientational abilities than more limited children are” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 5).

Of the multitude of physical and psychological uncertainties that can trigger feelings of uncanniness the item that Jentsch names as most powerful, and that which may most commonly trigger or create feelings of uncanniness in the children of immigrant, minority, or “othered” subordinate groups in dominant culturally geared academic environments is what Jentsch describes as an underlying fear or “doubt as to whether an apparently living being really is animate, and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 8). It is this aspect of the uncanny phenomena theory that provides the foundation and crux of the argument that motivates the question about how best to reassure, humanize, or personalize faculty and learning environments that may appear uncanny to children or students from nondominant sociocultural, linguistic or economic backgrounds, subsequently improving learning and academic success rates in these immigrant, minority, and socioeconomically subordinate student groups.

When one considers that “students of color make up more than 40 percent of the school-age population, whereas in contrast teachers of color were only 17 percent of the teaching force” (Boser, 2014, p. 2), one cannot help but wonder if these feelings of uncanniness are not part of what frames the profound problems inherent in the Anglocentric North American educational system. If the data from the Center for American Progress, which identifies 40 percent of North American students as non-Anglo or “other” is accurate, then logic dictates that student psychological and emotional disassociation from the dominant, uncanny Anglo socioeconomic culture, particularly because it is one that does not represent the same safe animate “homely”

recognizable physical incorporations, manifestations, mannerisms, movements, speech patterns, etc. with which they have been and are familiar, only makes sense.

Because of these racial, sociocultural and economic discrepancies, the “real” status of the faculty, in terms of the platonic real, and as observed by the students, is continually in question. This perpetually triggers the uncanny effect or phenomena in the minds and bodies of minority or disadvantaged children-students. Jentsch (1906), argues that this mood or effect will remain interminably until these doubts are resolved and thus make way for another kind of feeling to occur. However, as Jentsch accentuates, as long as students possess doubt or question the nature of the perceived object’s movement and the obscurity of its cause, these feelings of terror or uncertainty will persist in the students concerned. What’s more, if that object or, in this case, faculty member, does indeed demonstrate that he is in possession of an organic state, then “a feeling of concern for one’s own freedom from personal harm arises, which then assumes a dominance of the situation as far as all other items or intensities are concerned” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 8).

Jentsch informs us that this fear is of particular concern for many sensitive souls, of which children should undoubtedly be included because the figure that caused the concern is able to perpetuate or maintain its unpleasant impact upon the vulnerable individual long after he has made the decision as to whether this individual is indeed animate and as such truly represents a physical or psychological threat. These concerns and doubts are then automatically and regularly renewed when one gains the courage to more closely examine the object and thus upon perceiving finer details, subsequently discovers new distinctions that reinforce an awareness of the differences that exist between the self and the other. Were this not concerning enough, the uncanny effect makes its appearance even more clearly felt when these “imitations of the human form” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 10), e.g. Anglo faculty members, not only impact one’s perception but are perceived by non-Anglo students to “appear to be united with certain bodily or mental functions” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 11) like those presented by predominately Anglo teachers in a predominately Anglocentric instructive environment.

Interestingly, not only does the possibility that an animate object is of a questionable nature give rise to the uncanny, because it creates a physical and subsequent psychological fear and uncertainty, but so too did Jentsch argue that the uncanny may be created by one’s own fantasy or imagination. This may happen when one undertakes to reinterpret some kind of lifeless object, item, or article as being part of an otherwise organic creature. In other words, it is not just the previously cited animate instructor’s actions that can give rise to the feelings of the uncanny, but so too can the physical environment evoke feelings of uncanniness, particularly when one considers the likelihood that the physical learning environment may present as “*unheimlich*” or “unhomely” as most likely would be the case for those students emerging from lower socioeconomic, minority, or subordinate cultural backgrounds whose home environments may present as substantially different from the technocentric environments that they experience at their respective dominant culture-designed learning institutions. Additionally, Jentsch believes that the people most likely to be affected by the previously cited phenomena were “women, children, and dreamers” (p. 12), particularly because he believes they possess a weaker critical sense of that which is real and present and thus possess a more prevailing “psychical background that can be actively tinged” (p. 12). This frailty, thereby, allows them the means of “conjuring up

the most detailed terrifying visions out of the most harmless and indifferent phenomena” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 12), effectively making them all the more susceptible to that which is uncanny.

Despite being more than 100 years old, Jentsch’s paternalistic belief in women and children’s susceptibility to the uncanny still enjoys popular success, thanks in great part to the perpetuation of this myth passed down through dominant androcentric cultural literature. A relatively recent and extremely pertinent visual representation of the uncanny phenomenon that Jentsch describes is portrayed in the 1989 published work, “The Teacher from the Black Lagoon,” produced by the renowned children’s literature author and animator Mike Thaler. In this short work, the young, male protagonist believes that his new teacher, Mrs. Green, is, in fact, a monstrous (read: uncanny) entity and that he almost certainly will meet an untimely and gruesome end as a result of having been assigned to her classroom. Although the denouement of the story is meant to be positive and reassuring in nature and means to assuage any student residual fears that the teacher’s eerie or uncanny characteristics are not to be feared, one could argue that it fails to consider or adequately address the fears that immigrant, minority, or subordinate groups might possess, while simultaneously perpetuating internal feelings of “otherness.” The eventual creature-to-teacher transition leads to the conclusionary emergence of a tall, shapely blond woman who, under the circumstances and based on the demographic composition of the audience, might very well still be perceived as uncanny as the original monstrous entity in the eyes of children and those other students who do not mirror or share the teacher’s physical, cultural, or linguistic manifestations. Because there exist a plethora of similarly themed Black Lagoon School-related books, one might surmise that children and their parents are already, albeit unknowingly, addressing the uncanniness present in dominant-culture designed academic learning environments, one clearly rife with terrifying experiences.

Freud and the Uncanny

If one graciously overlooks Jentsch’s previous seemingly misogynistic and paternalistic statement, one might argue that his true motivation was meant to specify that it was and remains the task of the formidable members of society to accommodate the more vulnerable members in their struggles to overcome or work through the limitations or restrictions that the uncanny phenomena generates. Jentsch makes this point effectively in the closing passage of his essay when he clarifies that “whether this working through is factual or not is of no great importance, so long as its final result is accepted by the individual” (Jentsch, 1906, p. 15). In intellectual, emotional, and psychosocial terms, he means for the person to master in one’s own fashion their imaginative field so that these moods and doubts can be resolved, allowing for another kind of feeling, experience, or dare one suggest it, learning to take place.

Although Jentsch is responsible for having identified and established inceptive parameters around the concept of the uncanny phenomenon, it was his contemporary, Dr. Sigmund Freud’s own explorative essay, “The Uncanny” published in 1919, that helped propel Jentsch’s medico-psychological piece, which Freud describes as “while rich in content, is not exhaustive” (Freud, 1919, p. 123) into its role as a legitimately studied psychosocial phenomenon. To lay the groundwork for his own study, Freud condensed Jentsch’s theory on the uncanny to its essential condition, which he identifies synoptically as “intellectual uncertainty” (Freud, 1919, p. 125). Freud argues that according to Jentsch, the uncanny is always an area “in which a person is unsure of his way around: the better oriented he was in the world around him,

the less likely he would be to find the objects and occurrences in it uncanny” (Freud, 1919, p. 125). However, based upon lexical and etymological analyses of the root of the word “*unheimlich*” and the equivalent terms identified in the Latin, Greek, English, French, and Spanish languages, Freud argues that there exists a pattern that suggests that the concept of the term “unhomely” or uncanny more accurately reflects or “applies to everything that was intended to remain secret, hidden away, and has come into the open” (Freud, 1919, p. 132), going so far as to include the Arabic and Hebrew terms in which the concept of uncanny “merges with the demonic and the gruesome” (Freud, 1919, p. 125). Thus, Freud argues that the intellectual uncertainty that fuels Jentsch’s idea of the uncanny must also include an added dimension of horror and concealment not previously considered by Jentsch.

Freud further argues that provided psychoanalytical theory was correct in asserting that “every affect arising from an emotional impulse - of whatever kind - is converted into fear by being repressed, it follows that among those things that are felt to be frightening there must be one group in which it can be shown that the frightening element is something that has been repressed and now returns” (Freud, 1919, p. 147). It was this species of the frightening that would then constitute the uncanny and that it would be unimportant or immaterial whether the item, object, or person were itself originally frightening or if it arose from another effect. In other words, Freud argues that unlike Jentsch’s original theory of the uncanny, based solely upon intellectual uncertainty, his more accurate assessment of the uncanny suggests that it is not just limited to something new or strange but rather also includes an element of something that has long been familiar to the psyche but is estranged from it only through being repressed. This Freudian uncanny effect “arises when the boundary between fantasy and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that we have until now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full function and significance of what it symbolizes” (Freud, 1919, p. 150). As a result, and perhaps most importantly when that which was once familiar or (homely) assumes the negative prefix *un*, such as in “*unheimlich*,” it thereby simultaneously becomes the indicator and semantic structuralist symbol of oppression.

In possession of this newly refined definition of the uncanny, Freud posits that those uncanny elements that we know from previous experiences arise either when “repressed childhood complexes are revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs that have been surmounted appear to be once again confirmed” (Freud, 1919, p. 155). This sense of the uncanny arises when there is a conflict of judgment as to whether those items have been successfully surmounted and merit no further credence and thus may not after all be possible in real life, which in regard to threats such as solitude, silence, darkness, and the questionable animate versus inanimate reality suggest that the genesis of the uncanny exists in infantile or evolutionary anxieties, which Freud believes is “something that most of us never wholly overcome” (Freud, 1919, p. 159). Because fully overcoming these intrinsic and seemingly infantile evolutionary impulses is highly improbable, we might be better served if we consider the possibility that these same tools that once ensured our primitive ancestors’ survival might not now inhibit or limit our current abilities to incorporate or assimilate new experiences, information, or people that appear threatening or antithetical to our antiquated biological survival programming systems.

The Uncanny Valley Theory

One theory, which bridges this auto-involuntary conflict with the earlier works of Jentsch and Freud, is the uncanny valley theory, introduced in 1970 by the robotics professor Masahiro Mori in an article titled “Bukimi no Tani Genshō,” which translates to “The Uncanny Valley.” In this article (1970), Mori argues that as a robot’s appearance becomes more human, it will appear more familiar or (homely) until a point is reached at which the subtle imperfections in appearance or action make them appear eerie or uncanny. Mori claims that when this tipping point is reached, the observer’s response quickly becomes one of strong revulsion. However, as the appearance continues to become more humanlike, minus the earlier imperfections, and less distinguishable from real human beings, the psycho-emotional response of the observers will again become increasingly positive and will approach a normal human-to-human empathy level. This uncanny-valley phenomena motivated Mori to contend that when robotic features look and move almost, but not exactly like natural beings, it not only triggers an evolutionary revulsion or rejection response but that this response can be mapped on a graph with a representative dip that demonstrates a divergence in the observer’s comfort level. This dip or valley suggests that there exists at that point in the encounter a cognitive disassociation or dissonance from both the uncanny entity as well as from the encounter itself.

Mori’s discovery and data seem to align with professor Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, which identifies “the existence of nonfitting relations among cognitions” (p. 5). Specifically, Festinger claims that in human beings, there exists a powerful motive to maintain a cognitive consistency and that a divergence can give rise to irrational and sometimes maladaptive behavior. Festinger further argues that any situation, which might involve conflicting attitudes, beliefs or behaviors would lead to an altering of these items to reduce said cognitive discomfort and thus restore balance. Mori’s subsequent work with humanoid robotic figures proved supportive of Festinger’s earlier theory when the data demonstrated that as a more natural likeness or humanistic representation became available, the observer’s comfort level returned to a more normal state. This, in turn, reinforced Festinger’s theory that human beings possess an involuntary and likely evolutionary intrinsic need for aesthetic acceptability when presented with new animate or pseudo-animate objects.

The question then becomes what galvanizes this underlying need for aesthetic acceptability? Although a number of theories have been proposed to explain the cognitive mechanism underlying Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory and Mori’s uncanny-valley phenomenon, for the purposes of this essay, one must consider and limit oneself to an examination of only those theories that best address and potentially impact the learning environment and by extension the pedagogical practices that one hopes to improve upon. Of primary importance to the uncanny-valley theory is the idea that these uncanny encounters may identify a subconscious violation of human norms. It is argued that the uncanny valley might, in fact, be “symptomatic of entities that elicit a model of a human other but do not measure up to it” (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006, p. 1).

If, as Mori suggests, an animate/inanimate entity (read: teacher) appears to be sufficiently nonhuman, then its functional human characteristics will be observed and associated while it simultaneously generates a sense of pathos from the observer. If, however, that entity appears almost human, it will trigger the normative expectations of the human “other,” and at that point,

its nonhuman characteristics will be discerned, giving rise to the sense of strangeness or uncanniness. In other words, an entity, object, or person can or might become stuck inside the uncanny valley and is then judged as either an object trying to pass as a human being and doing a poor job of it, or instead is observed and judged as a human being possessing some sort of unnatural or uncanny characteristic, which causes a nonfitting cognitive relationship to occur. This triggers a perceptual and existential uncertainty as well as predictive coding errors, i.e., a mismatch between a prior expectation and reality in the observer. These, in turn, generate and perpetuate instances of cognitive dissonance to occur.

Another possible trigger for the uncanny-valley effect to occur is one that professor Roberts (2012) identifies and attributes to applied evolutionary psychology. He postulated in 2012 that uncanny situations or encounters may activate a cognitive and/or evolutionary mechanism that evolved to protect humans from potential pathogens by generating an uncanny or disgust/repugnance response. Roberts (2012) writes, "The more human an organism looks, the stronger the aversion to its defects, because (1) defects indicate disease, (2) more human-looking organisms are more closely related to human beings genetically, and (3) the probability of contracting disease-causing bacteria, viruses, and other parasites increases with genetic similarity" (p. 155). These responses, he argues, were precipitated by conflicting perceptual cues, which occur when an individual perceives antipathetical cues to category membership such as irregular or unusual movement or possession of some other unusual visible features. He also posits that this cognitive conflict or dissonance would manifest as psychological discomfort or uncanniness and thus concurred with the cognitive dip that Mori had previously identified as the uncanny valley.

Roberts and Mori are not alone in their consideration and evaluation of the importance of understanding the impact of the uncanny valley and its accompanying cognitive dissonance. Subsequent studies support their earlier observations and findings, and one study in 2015 by Mathur and Reichling, "Navigating a Social World with Robot Partners," even found that the time that subjects took to gauge a robot face's human-or mechanical resemblance peaked for faces deepest in the uncanny valley, suggesting that perceptually classifying these faces as "human" or "robot" posed a greater cognitive challenge. While the findings suggest that perceptual confusion coincided with the uncanny valley, they did not fully offset the effects of the uncanny valley, suggesting that perceptual confusion alone is not the sole mechanism at work behind the uncanny-valley effect and that the uncanny experience that leads to it is not merely one of strangeness or alienation.

Instead, as professor Royle, (2003) at the University of Sussex argues, it includes an internal "crisis of the proper; it entails a critical disturbance of what is proper (from the Latin *proprius*, 'own'), a disturbance of the very idea of personal or private property, including the properness of proper names, one's so-called 'own' name, but also the proper names of others, of places, institutions and events" (p. 1). Royle further extrapolated these concepts in his book "The Uncanny" published in 2003, informing readers that "the uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing and borders, an experience of liminality [from the Latin word "*līmen*," meaning "a threshold"]. It may be that the uncanny is a feeling that occurs only to oneself, within oneself, but is never one's own. It may thus be construed as a foreign body within oneself, even the

experience of oneself as a foreign body, the very estrangement of inner silence and solitude” (Royle, 2003, p. 2).

Based on the previously cited data, one could then argue that this estrangement from self, as well as that from the perceived unnatural animated “other” and its subsequent uncanny-valley cognitive dissonance effect, must also by sociolinguistic necessity and default be intertwined with language. If, as Chomsky claims, there can be no self and no identity without language, and if identity, which is a recognized and significant part of educational success, is undermined by the effects of the uncanny and the uncanny valley, then by necessity because of the impact on society at large, this phenomena must become a focus area in the arenas of pedagogy, pedagogical reform, and culturally responsive teaching, just as it has been relevant as a focus area since the mid-19th century in the fields of critical, literary, philosophical, and political reflection.

Discussion

Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida recognize that everything that has to do with notions of alienation, revolution, and repetition trace back to the original Jentsch essay “*das Unheimlich*.” Despite these men’s consideration and incorporation of the uncanny into their respective fields, there does not appear to exist any literature that addresses the uncanny or the uncanny-valley effect (UVE), including its role, application, and implication on 19th- century educational and pedagogical policy, nor and perhaps more importantly, its potential impact, and relevance on 21st- century global education.

To bring the uncanny and the UVE phenomena into pedagogical relevance successfully, one might first consider conflating Jentsch’s and Freud’s theories of the uncanny with that concept of the “other”, i.e., cultural misrepresentation and its impact, initially posited by Said (1978) in his text *Orientalism*. When these ideas are juxtaposed, one recognizes that they seem to function as mirror images: one construct identifying and deconstructing uncanniness in terms of one’s internal gaze and personal disassociation from the dominant culture paradigm, while the other construct identifies and deconstructs uncanniness and “othering” in terms of external gaze and disassociation from the dominant culture paradigm. Both constructs address issues that significantly impact or inhibit successful learning by students, who by dint of these phenomena exist on the periphery of their respective dominant sociocultural, economic, or linguistic groups. Although Jentsch, Freud, and Said imagined and introduced these concepts, none of these men seem to have presupposed that these theories might someday prove pivotal when applied to future globalized pedagogical theory, or as is increasingly *de rigueur*, improving culturally responsive teaching methods.

One person who has considered the possible implications and impact of the uncanny on an increasingly mobile and globalized world, albeit thus far limited solely to the world of architecture and environmental space, is Anthony Vidler, Dean of the Irwin S. Chanin School of Architecture at The Cooper Union, New York, and author of “Essays in the Modern Unhomely.” Vidler (1992) recognizes in his writing that the uncanny and its effects have become “inextricably bound up with thoughts of home and dispossession, the homely and unhomely, property and alienation, through these, the uncanny becomes a metaphor for a fundamentally unlivable modern condition.” Vidler further emphasized that “Estrangement and unhomeliness

have emerged as the intellectual watchwords of the [twentieth] century, given periodic material and political force by the resurgence of homelessness generated sometimes by war, sometimes by unequal distribution of wealth” (Vidler, 1992, p. 9).

Although Vidler’s awareness and writing about of the uncanny and its effect on livable and unlivable space is both fascinating and substantive, it does not adequately address the impact that changing geopolitical, socioeconomic, and cultural conflict, within which the uncanny is encapsulated, has on the learning and assimilation process of students who are suffering from this uncanniness or who are “othered” as a direct result of those variables that Vidler identifies.

Because there is arguably little chance that the intracultural and intercultural disparities that fuel these aforementioned estrangement and unhomeliness-causing global conflicts will decrease in occurrence, one can reasonably anticipate based upon current global patterns that North American and European demographics will continue to become increasingly diverse. In the same vein, it is likely that this increase in immigration and diversity will fuel increased domestic conflicts as these new arrivals, made up predominately of previously colonized peoples who suffered generations of restrictive economic and cultural policies meant to perpetuate and superimpose Western might and thought upon the Saidian “other,” arrive in the so-called modern world only to discover that the uncanny, the UVE, and their “otherness” stymies or inhibits their acceptance by the dominant group, while simultaneously inhibiting their children’s future assimilation into the dominant culture and adoption of its value systems.

Although current generations of North Americans and Europeans may not be directly aware of nor are they responsible for the genesis of these problems, they and their progeny will be better served if and when they recognize that the inherent Western practice of forced imposition of the foreign dominant body on the self, as well as the expected adoption of subjugation and subordination of the anima proper, only further exacerbates and disenfranchises minorities, newly arrived immigrants, and those socioeconomically differentiated others. Taking this into consideration, one recognizes that one cannot mandate, require, or risk putting new pedagogical protocols into effect blindly, lest one discover that free will has been eliminated, supplanting one system of control for another, producing little more than a modern day clockwork orange or person who “has the appearance of an organism lovely with colour and juice but is in fact only a clockwork toy to be wound up by God or the Devil or (since this is increasingly replacing both) the Almighty State” (Burgess, 1962, p. ix). Instead, one must recognize that education is a means to encourage and develop the opportunity for each learner in his or her own way to live a moral, creative, and productive life, one not deprived of free will.

Therefore, one could argue that there is an increased necessity for the Academy to begin addressing the gap that exists between recognizing and understanding uncanny theory and the praxis necessary to minimize or mitigate the subsequent UVE. The objective, of course, would be the successful discovery of new pedagogical practices that would provide resolution or extenuation. To achieve this end, what is needed in an increasingly globalized and transient world are education and policy professionals who will advocate tirelessly for culturally responsive teaching reform and who hail from the selfsame uncanny minority or subordinate sociocultural groups as the students they hope to serve. It is these rising minority to majority professionals who will best address and mitigate the effects of the uncanny and UVE phenomena

in other students, regardless of age, whose own learning was or is impacted, restricted, or denied by current prejudicial, hegemonic, monolithic, and educational policies or dictums.

Conclusion

Ultimately, it is not enough for the Academy to merely nod in acquiescence at the need for improved multiculturally responsive education. Instead, its members must actively consider and seek out alternative causes and solutions to the very real possibility and likelihood that predominately Anglo-occupied and directed classrooms and learning environments, conducted in increasingly technocentric institutions, are fostering and fueling the metastization of the uncanny and the UVE at a faster rate than at any other time in history. Provided that this is the case, then the onus of how best to instruct or educate those parties that hope to assimilate successfully into the new respective culture of their choice, despite being inhibited by an uncanny-valley cognitive dissonance deficit, will fall to educators and politicians who will increasingly have to consider, and ultimately decide, what best practice looks and sounds like.

To mitigate the uncanny valley's negative effects, current educators will first have to recognize the prevalence and existence of the uncanny and the UVE within their respective classrooms and learning institutions. Once educators understand that their own physical appearances, classroom environments, and the very language they use are all factors that impact the manifestation of the uncanny, they can begin to minimize the presence of the UVE and its accompanying cognitive dissonance. If there is any hope of resolving, amending, or mitigating the uncanny and the UVE, the teachers and the environments in which they work must be more representative and reflective of the students they are instructing, and teachers must be educated about how the physical, cultural, and linguistic divergences that exist, be they the result of recent immigration, minority status, or socioeconomic other, impact the relationship between themselves and their respective students.

About the Author:

Roberto Tomás Ollivier-Garza, M.Ed., M.A., CAGS, M.L.A., GCERT, ABD is currently as third-year doctoral student at the University of New Mexico. Roberto was raised and educated internationally as the dependent of a U.S. diplomat and it is his experiences in Mozambique, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Spain, Korea, Japan, Bolivia, India and China that motivate his work in the fields of globalization, education, culture/ identity and pragmatics.

References

- Allan, D. (2015). *An assessment of the application of the robotics theory of the Uncanny Valley (Bukimi No Tani) by Masahiro Mori to the study of realistic human facial animation in computer-generated 3D characters*.
- Boser, U. (2014, May 14) *Teacher Diversity Revisited*. Retrieved from <https://www.americanprogress.org/>
- Burgess, A. (1986). *A clockwork orange*. New York: Norton.
- Festinger, L. (1962). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

- Freud, S., McLintock, D., & Haughton, H. (2003). *The uncanny*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fullwood, Sam. (2015, November 15) *When a Race Problem Becomes a Social Challenge*. Retrieved from <https://www.americanprogress.org/>
- Jentsch, E., & Surprenant, C. (1995). *On the psychology of The uncanny (1906)*. *Angelaki* 2 (1):7 – 16.
- MacDorman, K. F., & Ishiguro, H. (January 1, 2006). The uncanny advantage of using androids in cognitive and social science research*. *Interaction Studies*, 7, (3), 297-337.
- Mathur, M. B., & Reichling, D. B. (January 1, 2016). Navigating a social world with robot partners: A quantitative cartography of the Uncanny Valley. *Cognition*, 146, 22-32.
- Roberts, S. C. (2012). *Applied evolutionary psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Royle, N. (2003). *The uncanny*. New York: Routledge.
- Said, E. W. (1979). *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Thaler, M., & Lee, J. D. (1989). *The teacher from the black lagoon*. New York: Scholastic.
- Uncanny Valley Inventor Masahiro Mori. (January 01, 2011). *Wired San Francisco*-, 19,12, 66.
- Vidler, A. (1992). *The architectural uncanny: Essays in the modern unhomely*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.