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“Measure of Shame”: Media Career of the Global Slavery Index

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ABSTRACT

Rankings are widely regarded as particularly well-suited for capturing the public eye, which is considered a reason why they have become so ubiquitous. However, we know surprisingly little about how rankings direct media attention, as well as how media in turn shape and help sustain careers of specific rankings in the public over longer periods of time. To advance our understanding of the discursive dynamics at the intersection of rankings and the press, this study examines the media career of Global Slavery Index by analyzing 361 newspaper and magazine articles, published between the release of index's inaugural edition in 2013 and until the end of 2019. To interpret the media coverage, the study draws attention to the distinctive properties of the Global Slavery Index, in particular its universality, highly rationalized character, and a pledge to spotlight violation of the global moral order. The longitudinal examination of the media coverage points to the following properties of the index as having shaped and helped sustain its career in the public: (1) *repeated publication*; (2) *broad conceptualization* of modern slavery; and the construction thereof as (3) *a measurable global burden*. These properties further allowed for (a) the construction of countries, organizations, and individuals as morally responsible for the said global burden, as well as for (b) the discursive linking of local and situational concerns with global narratives.

KEYWORDS: Rankings, Media, Virtue, Transnational Governance, Global Slavery Index

1. Introduction

It is a truth universally acknowledged that rankings command media attention. Not only do media¹ draw attention to rankings, but they can also play an important role in the public discourse which emerges around a specific ranking (Barats, 2020; Davis, Kingsbury, & Merry, 2015; Espeland & Sauder, 2016; Lee & Matanock, 2020; Martens & Niemann, 2013). However, save for few studies which point to the importance of media discourse in this respect (e.g. Barats, 2020; Martens & Niemann, 2013), we know little about *how* rankings direct media attention to various issues. Arguably, our understanding of how rankings shape public discourse requires a closer examination of the role media play in it.

The present study aims to advance the understanding of the discursive dynamics at the intersection of rankings and the press. It specifically examines the variety of ways in which media outlets across the world cover and otherwise refer to a specific ranking. It draws inspiration from the recent work by Hallett, Stapleton, and Sauder (2019) which looks into how social science ideas are put to use in the public, where they develop *careers* as public ideas. While rankings are not ideas in themselves, invoking a specific ranking in a variety of discursive contexts may call for similar patterns of flexibility in use which Hallett and colleagues (2019) identify in the case of social science ideas.

Empirically, the study takes the Global Slavery Index (GSI) produced by the Walk Free Foundation. GSI ranks countries according to the estimated absolute and relative number of people in what it refers to as "involuntary servitude" or "modern slavery."² It is a promising case for examining rankings in the international media discourse for at least three reasons. First, GSI's inaugural edition, published in 2013, has been reported as having received a broad coverage in widely-read international media (Chuang, 2015; Kelley & Simmons, 2014). Second, GSI is rooted in the construction of modern slavery as a *global* problem, which allows for examining its media career across national contexts. Third, while its country rankings have been included in all four editions to date, GSI's scope, methodology, and thematic focus, have varied across the editions. This variability allows for investigating whether, as well as how, the change has been reflected also in the media.

The chapter is organized as follows. I start with sketching out the empirical evidence on how media engage with rankings. In doing so, I also problematize the task of investigating media coverage of rankings. This is followed by the presentation of the case, the Global Slavery Index, and a short examination of its characteristics as a ranking, with the attention to its embeddedness in the global moral order and the implications thereof. Taking media to be important "spaces" in which rankings are mediated, I specifically look into how GSI was reported on, or otherwise invoked in newspaper and magazine outlets around the world, covering all four releases of the index to date. Drawing from the longitudinal examination of the GSI's media coverage, the study points to the following properties of the index as having played a role in sustaining and shaping its career as an object of media attention

¹ Throughout the article, I use the word "media," "mass media," and "press" interchangeably to refer primarily to the print and online media, such as newspapers and magazines, as a "mediating space" in which journalists, commentators, and other mediators report on or otherwise refer to the index.

² The phrase "modern slavery" is used indiscriminately, regardless of the quotation marks. It is, however, noteworthy that the GSI's definition of "modern slavery" has been a subject of debate in the academic circles (e.g. see Gallagher, 2017).

and reference: (1) *repeated publication*; (2) a *broad conceptualization of modern slavery*; and (3) the construction of modern slavery as a *measurable global burden*. I also find that the press were remarkably consistent—over the period and across world regions—in guiding the public attention to the "worst offenders" of the global moral order and not least in further dramatizing and even scandalizing complicity in the illicit practice. The chapter closes with a short discussion and conclusion.

2. Rankings and the media: an overview

Rankings are widely regarded as well-suited for capturing the public eye, which is considered one of the reasons why they have become so ubiquitous. Media outlets, more specifically, are known for being particularly attracted to rankings (Espeland & Sauder, 2016; Grek, 2009; Wormer, 2007). As Cooley aptly puts it, media "consume" rankings and indicators as "authoritative background that validates a story about a particular country" (Cooley, 2015, pp. 12–13). This points to the rankings' potential, or tendency even, to be used as a "credibility signal" (Hallett et al., 2019, p. 552) for a specific news story. The appeal of rankings, and not least their authority as sources of information, is typically attributed to the cultural authority of science and numbers (Merry, 2016; Porter, 1996). However, historical accounts on rankings, such as the evidence from the nineteenth-century competitive sports, point us to the importance of other developments when accounting for the affinity between rankings and mass media, most notably the newspaper industry and related technological infrastructure (Ringel & Werron, 2020; see also Minnetian & Werron in this volume).

Scholars generally agree that mass media play an important role in producing, perpetuating, and disrupting narratives produced or inspired by rankings. While the complexity of this role is not always explicitly acknowledged, few scholars would claim that rankings are nothing more than vehicles for the diffusion of information. The importance of media in the context of rankings has been especially studied by international relations and public policy scholars, who have mostly focused on the effects of nation-state rankings on national governance, policy, and politics, and more broadly on the role of rankings in transnational or global governance (e.g. Andreas & Greenhill, 2010; Cooley, 2015; Kelley, 2017; Kelley & Simmons, 2015). While this scholarship would by and large agree that media matter to rankings' effect on national and international affairs, how exactly they matter is not as straightforward. In one of the few studies which have explicitly contributed to this line of inquiry, Martens and Niemann (2013) evidence how national media coverage of the reception of the OECD PISA ranking in Germany and the United States shaped respective national receptions and discourses. As the authors conclude, countries with similar performances in international rankings can have very different responses to the same ranking—responses which are critically mediated by national newspapers.

An important condition for rankings' enduring effect on public discourse is that they are published repeatedly and ideally at regular intervals (Brankovic, Ringel, & Werron, 2018; Landahl, 2020). Due to this essentially historical character of the most influential rankings known and studied, the attention a specific ranking is given in the media can vary over time. In a study on the annual Shanghai university ranking, Barats (2020) shows how its coverage in the French press evolved between the first edition of the ranking in 2003 and 2014. Similarly to Martens and Niemann (2013), Barats also finds national actors and issues to be critical for both the extent of attention press gives to a ranking and for its framing. Like universities (Espeland & Sauder, 2007), governments too are no strangers to the efforts

to "climb" rankings they see as important in the national context, which is usually reported and followed by national journalists (Doshi, Kelley, & Simmons, 2020).

Clearly, it is unlikely that everything about a ranking is considered newsworthy in the eyes of a specific media outlet and worthy of their and their readers' attention. In a recent study on the Corruption Perception Index, Lee and Matanock (2020) found that, the news media "almost always focus on the countries that TI [Transparency International] identifies as the most and least corrupt in the world" (p. 351). At the same time, as documented by Ringel in another chapter of this volume, ranking organizations can vary in their approach to the press. Arguably, this depends both on the sector in which they operate and on the kind of organization they are (see also Ringel, Brankovic, & Werron, 2020). Rankers such as the OECD, Transparency International, and *Business Week*—assuming they have different motives, interests, and capacities for producing a ranking—are therefore expected to vary in their respective media strategies.

Newsrooms, meanwhile, have their own specific dynamics which can and do affect decisions such as what gets published, when, and how (e.g. Bennett, 2016; Christin, 2018; Hamilton, 2006; Schudson, 1989). The release of a new ranking is often newsworthy, especially if the ranking is widely considered relevant or in some way controversial (Cooley, 2015; Martens & Niemann, 2013). Over time, the press and journalists specializing in certain issues may develop a relationship with a particular ranking, which then becomes a "journalistic resource" in its own right (Barats, 2020, p. 3). Furthermore, technological advances, the proliferation of new types of media in recent decades, and not least new ways the public content is produced and consumed, have certainly affected journalism, both the more traditional print formats and the ever-changing online ones (Christin, 2020).

The affinity between rankings and newsrooms can also be witnessed in the fact that some of the best-known rankings today are produced by media organizations, such as the U.S. News and some of the other major higher education rankings (Stack, 2016). Rankings themselves are a medium and as such they play a part in the broader processes of mediatization across policy domains (Grek, 2009; Hjarvard, 2013; Stack, 2016). Mediatization, paired with the aforementioned developments in digital technologies and trends in their application, therefore, have clear implications for how rankings themselves evolve (see also Bandola-Gill et al. in this volume).

Finally, obvious as it may seem, how a ranking is portrayed, contextualized, and framed in the media discourse will be shaped, possibly to a large extent, also by the characteristics of the ranking in question. In this sense, an examination of a ranking's career in the public, especially considering the variety of meanings and interpretations it could possibly be given across contexts, calls for a closer observation of the ranking's normative framework and its discursive implications. Following this line of reasoning, in the following section I put forward a potentially productive distinction between different kinds of rankings in terms of their normative framework, and I position the Global Slavery Index within it.

3. What kind of a ranking is the Global Slavery Index?

As it has been widely documented, rankings are a textbook example of the production of symbolic orders (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Hamann & Schmidt-Wellenburg, 2020; Marginson, 2007). Most

rankings we know today are explicitly geared towards symbolically rewarding good performance. Good performers—be they individuals, organizations, or nation-states—are typically rewarded with the acknowledgement of good reputation, prestige, attention, and other valued symbolic resources. By way of illustration, the available evidence from sports and university sectors draws our attention to the symbolic value of reputation for excellence—a highly desired and scarce resource for which actors compete in rankings (Brankovic et al., 2018; see also Minnetian & Werron in this volume). In the context of transnational governance, where rankings are usually produced in order to monitor or regulate, top performers are explicitly rewarded for adhering to the moral principles promoted by these rankings (Boli, 2006; Doshi et al., 2020; Mehrpouya & Samiolo, 2016).

Boli’s (2006) distinction between *virtue* and *virtuosity* is particularly helpful in theorizing the normative foundations of this distinction, rooted in the global moral order. Virtue, Boli explains, is “the embodiment of goodness;” virtuosity is “the embodiment of excellence” (Boli, 2006, p. 96). Virtuosity is, by extension, about the superiority of performance and capacity, whereas virtue is about morality and adhering to ethical standards. Rationalized virtue and virtuosity are, therefore, vehicles of world-cultural principles of justice and progress, respectively (Boli, 2006). Rankings, as well as ratings and similar devices, are their highly-rationalized instrumental technologies.

Global Slavery Index (henceforth GSI) is a report on the world-wide status of modern slavery which also includes rankings. To date, GSI has been released in four editions—2013, 2014, 2016, and 2018.³ The report is produced by the Walk Free Foundation (henceforth Walk Free), founded by “global philanthropists”—as they are referred to in the inaugural report—Andrew and Nicola Forrest. Established the year before the first GSI was published, Walk Free is explicitly committed to “ending all forms of modern slavery in this generation,” which includes “slavery, slavery-like practices (such as debt bondage, forced marriage and sale or exploitation of children), human trafficking and forced labour, and other practices described in key international treaties, voluntarily ratified by nearly every country in the world” (GSI, 2013, p. iv). In the sense of Boli’s argument, Walk Free would be an exemplar of an actor posing as a “paragon of virtue” (Boli, 2006, p. 97).

GSI’s claims to moral authority are rooted in the core issue GSI is concerned with, which, broadly put, falls in the category of human rights violation. This normative framing places GSI rankings alongside other rankings and indices which have been created for the purpose of drawing global attention to the practices which are widely considered illicit, or even illegal, and for which there is a broad international consensus that they should be curbed or eradicated. Notable examples are the much-studied Corruption Perception Index (Andersson & Heywood, 2009; Bukovansky, 2015; Lee & Matanock, 2020), Financial Secrecy Index (Cobham, Janský, & Meinzer, 2015), numerous ratings, such as the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report (Kelley & Simmons, 2015) and Freedom in the World report (Roberts & Tellez, 2020), as well as “blacklisting” of countries and jurisdictions for illegal practices such as money laundering and financing terrorism (Johnson, 2001; Morse, 2020).

GSI extensively draws on scientific expertise, which is another important source of authority for the growing number of actors in the transnational governance space (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Zapp,

³ The links to reports and access details are provided in Appendix A.

2018). It is of no minor importance that some of its authors and principal researchers are academics working in universities. The index itself has also attracted attention, and not least criticism, of other scholars, mostly those working on a range of topics related to contemporary slavery and human trafficking (e.g. Gallagher, 2017; Guth, Anderson, Kinnard, & Tran, 2014; Weitzer, 2015). The criticism has been mostly directed at the transparency of the method and not least at the Walk Free's "sweeping definition of slavery" (Weitzer, 2015, p. 229), which, as one of the most vocal critics of the index noted, "seeks to encompass under its expansive umbrella a raft of exploitative practices and a myriad of victims" (Gallagher, 2017, p. 91). Searching "global slavery index" in the Google Ngram Viewer⁴ shows a steady increase in references over the years, which overall suggests that the index is becoming a part of the scholarly conversation. What characterizes this conversation is, however, beyond this study, although examining how these or other rankings are referred to or used in academic literature, and not least what implications of this is for the more general discourse, is an important empirical question.

At this point it is important to take a closer look at what it means to rank, discursively speaking, and how a *ranking* differs from other devices of comparison. The first critical characteristic is that rankings are *zero-sum* comparisons of performances, which sets them apart from ratings (Fourcade, 2016; Werron & Ringel, 2017). The zero-sum logic of rankings dictates that, ideally, two countries can never be equal, which in the case of virtue-measuring rankings refers to moral "goodness." As a rule, therefore, rankings have top performers, second-best, third-best, and so on. Such exactness is made possible and plausible by the *quantification* of zero-sum comparisons, which is typically more pronounced in rankings than what we would find in categories, lists, standards, or benchmarks (see also Ringel, Espeland, Sauder & Werron in this volume). In this regard, rankings are an exemplar of a highly rationalized instrumental technology, especially when they are based on elaborate composite measurements rooted in social-scientific reasoning, such as is the case with GSI.

Particular to the rankings of countries, especially if they include all, or almost all countries, is that they are rooted in the principle of universalism and nation-states equivalence in this respect (Berkovitch & Bradley, 1999). As such rankings allow for seeing both top and bottom performers, and everyone in between, being "invisible," in principle at least, is not an option. When this aspect is considered in the case of rankings seeking to expose complicity in illicit practices, such as corruption and human rights violation, the bottom may be as important as the top in the eyes of the public. This is consistent with what Lee and Matanock (2020) find to be the case with the media coverage of Corruption Perception Index.

Considering all four GSI reports produced to date, the comparisons of countries⁵ are presented in two different rankings and one rating. (1) One of its rankings ranks countries according to the estimated *absolute number* of people in modern slavery, or, as this would be referred to in the reports, according to "the size of the problem" in different countries. (2) The other, so-called "prevalence" ranking, compares countries according to the estimated number of people in modern slavery *relative to the country's population*. Throughout the four reports published to date, the focus was on the countries

⁴ Google Ngram Viewer, <https://books.google.com/ngrams/>, accessed on December 3, 2020.

⁵ In the inaugural edition GSI ranked 162 countries, which was later expanded to 167, which have "their combined populations equalling 99 percent of the total world population" (Appendix A, GSI 2014, p. 24).

scoring the highest on these two rankings, whereby the ranking table would most of the time be an inverse one, that is, with the "worst" country at the top, followed by the "second-worst," and so on. (3) Finally, the rating, called "government response," is based on the evaluation of countries' measures and policies targeting modern slavery. Here, countries would be grouped into one of ten rating categories, ranging from "AAA" to "D," the latter being reserved for the governments with "wholly inadequate response." An interesting aspect of this rating table is that it is considerably "bottom-heavy": only two countries—the Netherlands and Sweden—ever scored 70 points or above (on the <0-100 scale) and made into one of the top three "A" categories, while majority of countries would normally score less than 40 points. In some of the reports, government response comparisons are also presented as a zero-sum ranking based on country scores. Although not a ranking in the strict sense, the government response rating is important to highlight as it, perhaps more than the two rankings, speaks directly to the idea of morality as rooted in one's "capacity to choose" (Boli, 2006, p. 99).

In taking this discussion forward, in the next step, I zoom in on the coverage of GSI in media outlets, between its release in 2013 and the end of 2019. As the aim here is to understand GSI's career in the media "space," I analyze both the index and its message primarily, but not exclusively, from the "angle" of its representation in the media.

4. Data and methodology

The analysis is based on the articles published in English-language web-based newspapers and magazines, native in print or digital (henceforth referred to as media outlets). To create a sample of articles, I queried the News on the Web (NOW) corpus⁶ which contains over eighteen million articles from web-based newspapers and magazines published between 2010 and the present day (Davies, 2013). I accessed the corpus in March 2020 and searched for the exact phrase "global slavery index." I placed the end-point of query at the end of 2019, that is, the end of the previous quarter. This query retrieved exactly 564 articles. When retrieved, the table contained the following meta-data for each article: date of publication, URL, name of the media outlet, country code of the outlet, and about thirty words of text in which the queried phrase was mentioned at least once. After removing inactive web pages and duplicates and adding 41 English-language media articles not included in the NOW corpus, which I identified by searching "Global Slavery Index" on Google, I arrived at exactly 361 articles from 191 media outlets (see Appendix B for the list of outlet countries and the count of articles per country). I retrieved complete articles and entered them in a qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA for further analysis.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the articles by article type and the regions or geographical clusters of countries in which their outlets are based. The fact that almost half of all the articles included were published in media outlets in Asia points to the first of several limitations which come with using the NOW corpus: the corpus does not include articles written in other languages, and is only limited to twenty countries. The aforementioned Google search for additional articles was conducted in order to extend the geographical span of the corpus, however, this did not lead to a significant change in the already established pattern. The second limitation has to do with the fact that the NOW corpus is

⁶ The NOW corpus (News on the Web), <https://www.english-corpora.org/now/>, accessed on March 10, 2020.

created with the help of automated scripts. As it became obvious when searching the Internet for additional articles to include, there was more than a handful of newspaper articles which met the search criteria but were not retrieved when the NOW corpus was queried. Lastly, for many of the outlets it was not possible to reliably determine the category (e.g. tabloid, broadsheet) or political orientation, although this turned out not to be of crucial importance for the analysis. Having these limitations in mind, this article does not assume that the sample is in any way representative of the global media discourse on GSI, nor in any way sufficient for drawing definite conclusions on specific countries. However, I consider it sufficiently large and diverse to offer valuable and possibly unique insight.

Table 1. Geographical distribution of the media articles' outlets, by article type (N=361)

Region or geo. cluster	News	Feature	Editorial	Op-Ed	Letter	Total
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka	76	24	1	1	1	103
Southeast Asia	49	16	2		1	68
Africa	43	17	1	1		62
USA & Canada	33	19				52
UK & Ireland	31	11				42
Australia & New Zealand	22	10				32
Central America & Caribbean	1					1
Continental Europe		1				1
Total	255	98	4	2	2	361

In addition to the pre-assigned metadata, I categorized the articles according to the article type (as shown in Table 1⁷), country or region in focus (if one could be identified), and focal theme. The very few articles which were exactly the same in content but were published in different outlets were kept, as they were assumed to address different audiences. Each article in the sample was read line by line and coded thematically in order to allow for basic qualitative content analysis, although the main analytical approach was discourse analysis (Hardy, Phillips, & Harley, 2004; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). To be able to contextualize and interpret the material, I also examined the four editions of GSI released to date (see Appendix A).

5. The study: "According to the Global Slavery Index..."

Depending on how central GSI was to an article, the media articles were grouped into two principal categories, as longitudinally presented in Figure 1.⁸ The first category refers to the articles which are primarily and mostly about GSI (herewith referred to as GSI Central; $n=96$), in which GSI is "being the news" (Hallett et al., 2019, p. 554). These articles are largely concentrated around four points in time when each of the four editions of the index was released: the fourth quarters of 2013 and 2014, the second quarter of 2016, and the third quarter of 2018. As rankings which are repeatedly published are

⁷ Distribution by country of outlet and year is provided in Appendix B.

⁸ It should be noted that running the same query ("global slavery index") on major collections available on the open-source platform Media Cloud returns a strikingly similar frequency pattern for the same time period. When ran on its default media collection, *U.S. Top Online News 2017*, the query did, however, return 232 stories for the same time period (and the same frequency pattern). <https://explorer.mediacloud.org/>

expected to create such peaks each time a new edition is released, we could think of these periods as GSI's main "points of (re-)entry" into the media discourse. In addition to the news items, which constituted 85% ($n=82$) of the articles in this group, the remaining ones are mostly opinion pieces discussing various aspects of the index, occasionally also penned by scholars, or one of the authors of the index (Table 2).

Figure 1. Articles over time, according to how central GSI is in the content

News items ($n=82$) are of particular interest here. These articles are in many respects similar, not least because they tended to be taken over from major news agencies, such as the Associated Press or Reuters,⁹ or based on press releases produced by Walk Free. However, they are important to observe as they point us to the information contained in the rankings that the media find newsworthy. These articles could also be considered the closest of the entire article dataset to how producers of the index would wish their message to be communicated. A closer look reveals that a large majority gives primacy to a particular country. Except for a handful of cases, the articles reporting on the release of the new index would either mostly focus on their own country or region, or would at least briefly mention its rank and/or other information they would consider potentially of interest to their readers.

Table 2. Categorical distribution of media articles according to GSI centrality, by article type ($N=361$)

Centrality of GSI to the article	News	Feature	Editorial	Op-Ed	Letter	Total
GSI Central	82	12	1		1	96
GSI Peripheral	173	86	3	2	1	265
Total	255	98	4	2	2	361

In the second and much larger category ($n=265$), GSI is largely peripheral. Here the articles engage with GSI in a more indirect way, by making some sort of reference to it while being primarily about a

⁹ This is also in agreement with Paterson's (2005) argument that news agencies dominate the international news on the Internet, although they mostly remain in the background.

different topic. The category can be further broken into two subsets: (1) the articles which are primarily about modern slavery in general, or a topic which can be considered thematically "close" to it, such as human trafficking, debt bondage, child labor, exploitation, slavery in the supply chains, and related ($n=220$); and (2) the articles which are about less related or more general topics, such as human rights, workers' rights, migration, business, politics, and other ($n=45$). As shown in Figure 1, the number of articles in the "peripheral" category increases over time, both in absolute and relative terms, in particular in the aftermath of the most widely covered release of the third GSI edition in 2016. These articles are worth observing as they allow us to see which elements of the index are pulled into the discourse, and how, when other issues are reported or discussed. Crucially, they point us to GSI's career as a piece of public information.

There are several general observations worth making about the "peripheral" category of articles in the dataset. First, while news items still dominate in count, the share of other article types increases. These are mostly feature articles, such as opinion pieces by journalists, scholars, and activists. Second, once we move away from the articles focusing on GSI, the share of media outlets from the Western countries decreases, from about one half of all the articles to about one fifth. This could potentially indicate that the index was more "successful" in becoming embedded in broader discussions in the media outside the Western world. Third, given that these articles do not focus on GSI as such, the index now typically becomes in some way subjected to its relationship with other topics, as designated by the article author.

In the remainder of the section, I will focus on the three dominant ways the index was covered or referred to, which emerged from the data, and which, taken together, allow us to capture the career of GSI's rankings in the media discourse over the years studied. Although the analysis is mainly based on the media articles, I will occasionally refer to the GSI reports in order to offer an interpretation of the media material.

5.1 News! "Modern Slavery Estimated to Trap 45 Million People Worldwide"¹⁰

News headlines are especially worth observing as they normally contain what media outlets consider the most newsworthy piece of information and most likely to attract readers' attention. In this sense it is little surprising that about half of the headlines from the articles reporting on the new release of the index included some kind of figure, either a country rank or the number of people in modern slavery a country is estimated to have. In most cases, however, it would be a variation of the following headline from *The Independent's* coverage of the inaugural edition: "30 million people worldwide living in 'modern slavery', warns Global Slavery Index" (October 17, 2013),¹¹ or the *TIME's* piece from the following year: "36 Million People Live in Modern Slavery, Report Says" (November 17, 2014).

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, May 31, 2016, headline.

¹¹ Primary sources quoted in the chapter are cited according to the document coding system used in the analysis: *Outlet name*, YY-MM-DD, followed by the two-letter ISO code of the country of the outlet.

This particular figure—highlighted in all four GSI reports as the global “key finding”¹²—can be found in each of the articles reporting on the release of the new index. It is also the single most reported piece of information in the entire article dataset—across countries, article types, throughout the period, and including the articles which engage GSI peripherally. It should be noted also that the way this figure was reported often came with a dramatic, sensationalist, and even a scandalous undertone to it, especially when placed prominently in the text, such as in the headline. In some cases, this was accompanied by the use of markedly negative words, as it can be seen in this example from one of the articles: “Forty percent of the world's estimated 45.8 million slaves are in India, although *the scourge* [emphasis added] exists in all 167 nations surveyed by the Australian-based group Walk Free Foundation” (*Daily Times*, May 31, 2016).

Crucially, the figure points to two assumptions built into GSI’s narrative framing of modern slavery which, as we shall see later on, extends to their rankings. First, seen through the “eyes” of GSI, modern slavery is, before anything else, a “global burden.” Second, this global burden can be measured as such, and therefore expressed in a single (global) figure, which can be interpreted as the “global sum” of the “unwanted” illicit practice which is to be exposed, condemned, and eradicated. An ideal world, in the sense of the index, would be the one completely free of slavery and slavery-like practices.

Although framing the global problem as an aggregated “sum of” national estimates does not in itself tell anything about how countries are evaluated and ranked, it does allow for a possibility to construct countries, but also organizations and ultimately individuals, as carriers of this measurable global burden. Discursively, if we look at its reports, an ideal country in GSI’s perspective would be the one which is entirely free of involuntary servitude, with a government doing all it can to prevent such practices from taking place. An ideal business is the one which ensures its supply chains are slavery-free. Finally, ideal individuals are those who do not consume goods and services which are “tainted” by some form of modern slavery. For slavery is not just a “bad” practice, it is, in the words of Walk Free’s founder, “abhorrent, more rampant than at any time in history, and entirely avoidable.”¹³ Therefore, the more a country, an organization, or an individual is “slavery-complicit,” the further away from this ideal it is considered to be.

5.2 Directing attention to the “worst offenders”

Upon the release of each new GSI report, considerable media attention was directed to their rankings.¹⁴ The ranking of countries according to “the size of the problem” (estimated absolute number of people in modern slavery) and the “prevalence” ranking (estimated number of people, *relative* to the country’s population) have both been extensively covered in the media material analyzed. In

¹² This number would vary, going up to 45.8 million in 2016 and then down to 40.3 million in 2018. The 40.3 number, however, first emerged in 2017, in a report titled *Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage*, produced jointly by Walk Free and International Labour Organization, in partnership with International Organization for Migration.

¹³ GSI 2016. FOREWORD by Andrew Forrest – A Personal Message to Leaders (Appendix A).

¹⁴ As the dataset contained several articles which directly and explicitly copied the Walk Free’s press release, in part or entirely, it was clear that the attention to rankings, in some media outlets at least, was also drawn by Walk Free.

addition to these two, the media would routinely report also on the "government response" rating, although it would give it comparatively less attention overall.

Regardless of the geographical location or focus of the outlet, the rankings' "worst offenders" would almost always make news, especially in the subset of articles reporting on the new release of GSI. It is noteworthy that nationally oriented news outlets would sometimes mention the rank of their country in the headline, even if it was not among the top "offenders" as the following examples illustrate: "Philippines 19th largest enslaved population" (*Philippine Star*, November 18, 2014); "Slavery league: Ghana ranks 34th" (*GhanaWeb*, May 31, 2016); "Nigeria ranks 23rd on global slavery index" (*The Nation*, August 23, 2016). Being ranked as a country is clearly news in itself, although the dramatic potential of the idea that "slavery exists in our country" is not to be undermined in this sense.

One country which clearly stood out as the most frequently named "worst offender" in the entire article dataset was India, which was indeed named by GSI as the one with the highest estimated number of enslaved people. This did not change even when the media outlets from this country were excluded from the sample, when only Western media were considered, or when only headlines were examined. When the 2014 index was released, *Times of India* referred to its country as "the world's slave capital" (November 17, 2014). In covering the following edition, Pakistani *Hindustan Times* ran the headline: "Bonded labourers, sex workers, forced beggars: India leads world in slavery" (May 30, 2016). The fact that India would end up in the top five on the prevalence ranking, in all editions but the last one, seems to have only confirmed its status in the media as "the world's slave capital." Much to the dissatisfaction of India's authorities, it was the only country in which Walk Free conducted state-specific surveys in preparation of the 2016 index, thus further exposing the country's alleged ills to the scrutiny of outsiders and generating controversy:

The problem of slavery in India – including child marriage and bonded labor – has long been a challenge and cause for shame. Just last week, the chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee lambasted India's record on human rights, asking how India could have so many slaves. (*Business Insider*, 16-06-02 US)

India was not the only one to occupy the center of the global modern slavery "stage." Other highly ranked countries on either of the two rankings, such as Mauritania, Haiti, China, and Uzbekistan, would typically be listed alongside. Most of the time this would be only in name and rank, and in some cases their particular situations would be examined more closely, especially by local press. For example, India's neighbor Pakistan, another highly ranked country on both rankings, would undergo a great deal of scrutiny by its own media, such as *The Express Tribune*, which regularly covered the index, referring to it as a "measure of shame" (October 18, 2013). Like in India, here too the authorities appeared to have been dissatisfied with the report. Reportedly, Pakistani labor minister, Manekha Gandhi, told *Hindustan Times*, "I totally disagree with their findings /.../ I can say they don't know how to analyze slavery. ... It's totally wrong" (*Business Insider*, June 2, 2016).

The 2018 edition of GSI, however, brought change for these countries. This time the GSI report included only the ranking by prevalence, in which, due to a number of changes in the methodology,

both India and Pakistan dropped in rank—with India all the way to the position 53.¹⁵ This overall led to the two countries largely disappearing from the news articles reporting on the release of that year's index, thus sharing the fate of Mauritania and Haiti—the "stars" of the first two editions, only to be "forgotten" in the media when subsequent ones came along. Although this could potentially indicate that GSI became less newsworthy to the Indian and Pakistani media once these countries were not in its focus anymore, the countries' respective performances in GSI would still regularly be brought up when other slavery-related issues of national concern were discussed, in particular debt bondage, human trafficking, and child labour. Yet a closer look at those instances reveals that, in most cases, there is very little, if any, engagement with the index itself or the information it is solicited for:

Activists say Saturday's rescue is one in a series illustrating the extent of debt bondage across India, the most prevalent form of forced labour in a country where an estimated 18 million people live in some form of modern slavery, according to the latest Global Slavery Index by the Walk Free Foundation. (*Reuters India*, November 14, 2016)

India – which has an estimated 40 percent of almost 46 million people enslaved worldwide according to the 2016 Global Slavery Index – is a destination and transit point for young girls and women being trafficked into brothels or domestic servitude. (*The News International*, June 23, 2017)

Once we examine about a dozen of randomly selected articles which peripherally mention GSI while centrally covering various slavery-related issues in different countries, the pattern which emerges suggests a kind of *routinization* in invoking the index. The sentence(s) referring to it could easily be placed anywhere in the text, while the mentioning of the index looks almost incidental. The following example from a news article covering the floods in India's eastern region neatly illustrates this:

South Asia is the fastest-growing and second-largest region for human trafficking in the world, after East Asia, according to the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime.

India is home 40% of the world's estimated 45.8 million slaves, according to a 2016 global slavery index published by the Australia-based Walk Free Foundation.

Thousands of children, mostly from poor rural areas, are taken to cities every year by gangs who sell them into bonded labour or hire them out to unscrupulous employers. (*Hindustan Times*, August 26, 2016)

With India leaving the center stage of international news coverage of the index, the country moving to it was North Korea. Not only did it top the prevalence ranking in 2016 and again in 2018, North Korea also occupied the very bottom position in GSI's government response for three consecutive years. The country was especially singled out in this respect, by GSI and consequently in the media, although it was not until India was largely "out of sight" that North Korea was given more visibility. Similarly to India two years earlier, in the 2018 report North Korea was the one to be examined more closely by

¹⁵ The estimates were, however, provided in the prevalence ranking table, leading to the statements such as the one in this headline: "Ten million slaves go missing from survey in India" (*Dhaka Tribune*, July 23, 2018).

the producers of the index, as part of the broader focus of the edition on repressive regimes, together with the respectively second and third ranked countries, Eritrea and Burundi.

5.3 Global burden and shared complicity

The universalistic character of GSI, particularly seen in the fact that GSI observes and ranks almost all countries, has clear implications also for those countries which are not as complicit in the modern slavery problem as India, Pakistan, or Mauritania. However, by and large, these countries were given far less attention than the "worst offenders," although those governments assessed as "making efforts" would be praised accordingly. When mentioned, however, they would be dedicated a relatively small portion of text and in most cases this would mean not more than being listed. Notable exceptions include outlets which have a clear national focus and those whose countries have been ranked particularly low or rated high on government response:

The report gave Ireland a ranking of 160th, joint second lowest with the UK in term of prevalence, and eclipsed only by Iceland. (*Irish Times*, November 19, 2014)

The Irish Government's response to the threat of slavery is also rated highly, receiving a BBB grade. Sweden scored an A, while the Netherlands came out on top with AA. (*The Journal*, November 19, 2014)

In the U.S., about 59,644 people are estimated to be enslaved, ranking the world's largest economy at 134 on the index based on proportional terms, above nations like Germany, South Korea, Australia, France, Canada, and the UK. (*International Business Tribune*, October 17, 2013)

The normative framing of modern slavery as a global problem implicating *all* countries, however, made such neutral-to-positive statements rare. In particular when concerning the Western countries, the evidence of modern slavery as such, regardless of the rank, was in itself considered not only an important piece of information, but also something which contrasts the country's superiority in rank. Notably, the country's rank as such would often not even be mentioned. The following excerpts illustrate this:

Although [emphasis added] the United States, Canada and Western Europe rank very low on the Global Index, they're still home to thousands of slaves. (CBS, October 17, 2013)

Europe, *while at the bottom of the list* [emphasis added] — with Iceland and Ireland the best ranked — has 566,000 people involved in forms of modern slavery, with people trafficked into Ireland to grow cannabis, or forced into begging in France. (*The Express Tribune*, November 17, 2014)

More than 70% of the 4.8 million sex exploitation victims are in the Asia and Pacific region. Forced marriage is most prevalent in Africa. *But* [emphasis added] there isn't a single country that isn't tainted by slavery: 1.5 million victims are living in developed countries, with an estimated 13,000 enslaved here in the UK. (*The Guardian*, February 25, 2019)

Along similar lines, the following passage from a 2019 edition of the *TIME* magazine is illustrative of how GSI is used to contrast the widely covered story of 39 Vietnamese migrants with the fact that the UK had earlier been praised by GSI for introducing legislation to target modern slavery:

The world’s eyes were on the U.K. after the October deaths of 39 Vietnamese migrants, *though* [emphasis added] the country has been taking significant steps to tackle human trafficking and modern slavery. The 2019 [sic] Global Slavery Index, a country-by-country analysis of the state of modern slavery worldwide conducted by the Walk Free Foundation, placed the U.K. as the country taking the most action to respond to modern slavery. It joins France, the Netherlands and Australia as a handful of nations in the world that have introduced legislation targeting slavery in the last 10 years. (*TIME*, December 2, 2019)

The lack of interest in the rank as such could also be observed in the articles which directly or indirectly covered the discussions related to the Modern Slavery Acts in the UK and Australia respectively, typically invoking GSI as evidence of the scale of the problem, which the new legislation was expected to mitigate:

The 2016 Global Slavery Index estimated that 45.8 million people in 167 countries are victims of slavery. Two-thirds, or 30.4 million of these people, are in the Asia-Pacific region, with more than 4000 in Australia.

Business lobbies and companies acknowledge that more needs to be done to address the problem, but remain concerned that Australia may end up with laws that place stricter requirements on companies than is the case in other nations such as Britain, which has a Modern Slavery Act. (*The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 1, 2017)

This type of exposure notwithstanding, Western countries would overall receive far less publicity for their “contribution” to the global slavery burden than India, Pakistan, or North Korea (see Appendix C). The 2018 edition of the index did, however, set out to change this by directing attention to those countries which were considered most likely to benefit from global slavery, economically in the first instance, yet which had not been previously as explicitly viewed as part of the problem:

“Modern slavery is a First World problem,” said Andrew Forrest, an Australian businessman and a co-founder of the Walk Free Foundation. “If you are a chief executive or an investor and you are not prepared to take human rights into account now, you don’t deserve to be a chief executive or an investor.” (*The New York Times*, July 19, 2018)

As a result of this, countries identified as the “largest importers of at-risk products,” such as the United States, Japan, and Germany—and the rest of G20¹⁶—were now being constructed and ranked by the index as direct “offenders” and were as such scrutinized in the media for ignoring and therefore allowing modern slavery to thrive globally. Moreover, the shared global problem—and responsibility thereof—was this time not only presented as headcount, risk factors, or ratings, but also in purely monetary terms:

The report [GSI 2018] noted that other countries were often complicit through the import of goods at risk of being produced through forced labour – with the United States importing the most at-risk goods of any nations, at US\$144 billion (S\$198 billion) a year. (*The Straits Times*, July 19, 2018)

¹⁶ According the report, South Africa and the European Union were the only members excluded, due to methodological reasons.

Alongside policy makers, businesses and consumers too were being explicitly identified as part of the problem. Although international trade, supply chains, and certain industries were always a point of interest in GSI reports, it was not until the 2018 edition that they were explicitly mentioned in the highlights section of the report. However, this aspect of the index was not particularly visible in the news coverage of its releases. Instead, it was more likely to be found in articles which were addressing other issues, and which would then use a piece of information from the index in order to link a specific (local) issue to a global context or simply as evidence of the "size of" the problem produced by a global industry. The following excerpt from an article published in a Canadian daily newspaper illustrates the latter:

On the surface, the most controversial aspect of chocolate is its effect on the waistline or the teeth, but people are beginning to learn that one of the darker aspects of the industry is its connection with modern slavery in major cocoa-producing countries like Ghana.

According to the Global Slavery Index, between 2013 and 2017, Ghana had an estimated 3,700 adults and 14,000 children working in conditions of forced labour. In Côte d'Ivoire, the number of people working in conditions of slavery was also high. (*Winnipeg Free Press*, March 9, 2019)

Some of these articles would not focus on industries or businesses, but would instead construct consumers as actors in the context of global modern slavery problem. "Are hipsters really responsible for modern day slavery?" (*Women24*, May 4, 2015), asked a South African fashion magazine in a headline. Referring also to the global fashion and textile industry, a Singaporean business magazine suggested its readers to be mindful when buying clothes: "Is your T-shirt clean of slavery? Science may soon be able to tell" (*Eco-Business*, November 29, 2014). Fishing industry—a much scrutinized sector by GSI—also inspired headline-writing: "Floating sweatshops: is the fish you eat caught by 'slaves'?" (*Business Day*, May 29, 2019). The Australian newspaper *New Daily* went as far as pointing an accusing finger at readers: "Enjoy your tuna? The 'slaves' who produced it didn't" (January 10, 2019). These examples clearly illustrate how media instrumentalized the index for a dramatic effect.

Going beyond the contemporary slavery, GSI found itself mentioned in articles which dealt with a broad range of issues, with human rights, national politics, and international relations being the dominant ones, and further extending to child/women/workers' rights, migration, business and trade, poverty, crime, and terrorism. These articles were, however, rarely interested in ranks of countries, while frequently stressing the "surprise" or "shock" dimensions of the assertion that there are *still (so many) people who live as slaves (in our country)*. Opinion pieces and editorials, directly or indirectly engaging with GSI, would sometimes even make this contrast explicit, as illustrated in this excerpt from an editorial in a Nigerian national newspaper:

Meanwhile, against the background that Nigeria, according to a recent report by the Global Slavery Index, hosts the largest number of enslaved people in sub-Saharan Africa, I fail to understand the hypocrisy over the plights of our compatriots in Libya, as tragic and sad as it may be. A survey conducted by an anti-slavery organisation, "Walk Free Foundation," reveals how almost a million Nigerians are practically living in bondage in their own country. (*This Day*, December 6, 2017)

Modern slavery would also be contrasted with the national slavery-related history, further emphasizing the revelatory dimension of the index. The following excerpts illustrate how this contrast was produced:

Mauritania was the last country in the world to abolish slavery in 1981, and has the highest prevalence of slavery – four percent of the population – with some 150,000 people living as slaves, according to the Global Slavery Index. (*Times LIVE*, August 18, 2015)

According to the GSI, over 58 percent of slaves today live in just five countries. India's embrace of slavery is astounding, with over 18 million Indians enslaved today – over 4.5 times more than the U.S. had during its peak decade of the 1860s. (*finews.asia*, August 21, 2016)

Observing the peripheral references to GSI, it can be noted that, over time, GSI became part of a broader family of rationalizing instruments, including other rankings, ratings, and reports of different kinds, but also awareness days, which all seemed to have acted as "triggers" for mentioning or discussing GSI. The most frequently mentioned report, for example, was the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons Report,¹⁷ which was itself the central theme of more than a handful of articles referring to different countries, while the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery was in several cases an occasion to discuss contemporary slavery and also mention GSI.

Even though the presence of GSI in these and many other articles which treated it peripherally seems almost incidental, it is nevertheless indicative of GSI's potential beyond merely "being the news" (Hallett et al., 2019, p. 547). The overall diverse thematic scope of the subset of articles in which GSI itself is not news points to the index's flexibility in use (Hallett et al., 2019) and, by extension, a potential to span issues. Its career as a specific piece of news is, therefore, not the one of an interpretant, in the sense Hallett, Stapleton, and Sauder (2019) would have it, which would imply it being used to make sense of other pieces of news or phenomena. Rather, GSI's flexibility in use seems more about its potential to contextualize other pieces of news or phenomena by offering a plausible link between local and situational concerns and global narratives.

6. Discussion and conclusion

Most rankings known and studied are meant to reward good performance. They direct the public gaze to the exemplary, thus rewarding achievement with attention and other scarce symbolic resources, such as admiration and much sought good reputation. Success in outperforming others is not just recognized, but also dramatized: winners are more closely observed, their achievements celebrated, chronicled, analyzed, and challenged, their methods emulated (Dobbins & Martens, 2012). This is especially the case with rankings celebrating virtuosity, although it also applies to many rankings which spotlight virtue.

Within the category of virtue-measuring rankings, however, a distinction could be made between, on the one hand, (1) rankings which direct the world's gaze towards those who uphold values such as human rights, civil liberties, and environmental protection, and, on the other, (2) rankings which direct

¹⁷ This is not surprising given the coverage this particular report normally receives (see e.g. Kelley, 2017).

the same gaze towards those who violate them. The latter, posing as a moral authority and backed by the authority of numbers and science, primarily point the proverbial finger of name, shame, and blame. It is this normative framework, embedded in the global moral order (Boli, 2006), which allows for GSI to be seen both as an articulation of virtue and as a *measure of moral violation*.

To hold countries accountable for the said moral violation, the Global Slavery Index observes, compares, and ranks them on the basis of their share in the complicity in the aggregated global "size of the problem"—or a global burden of sorts.¹⁸ A similar kind of discursive world-aggregation is observed in a recent study by Zapp, which analyzes the historical rise and spread of global reporting and the role thereof in the construction of what the author refers to as "global consciousness" (Zapp, 2021, p. 227). This universalistic character of this global consciousness, in the sense of the index, imposes a moral obligation for countries—but also organizations and individuals—to assume responsibility as empowered modern actors (Meyer & Jepperson, 2000) and act upon the new "knowledge" produced by the ranking. The measure of moral violation offered by GSI, in this regard, is a measure of exactly how much the responsibility of each country weighs, relative to other countries.

The analysis of the media career of GSI points to the following properties of the index which shaped and helped sustain its career as a phenomenon of media attention and interest: (1) *repeated publication*, which made it a newsworthy object for the media on the occasions of new releases; (2) *broad conceptualization of modern slavery*, albeit contested, which made its spanning thematic contexts a plausible move, thus further expanding the range of issues it could be credibly related to; and (3) the construction of modern slavery as a *measurable global burden*, which also allowed for (a) the construction of countries, organizations, and individuals as carriers of the said burden and thus morally responsible for it, as well as for (b) the discursive linking between local and situational concerns and global narratives.

By either continuously reminding the world of what its problems are, or by providing space for such reminders to be voiced by others, the press can act as a powerful ally to the ranking. As we have seen in the case of GSI, media can be remarkably consistent in guiding readers' attention to the most dramatic elements, both over the period studied and across world regions. Their fixation on the global "key figure" perfectly exemplifies what seems to be a truism of sorts: "there seems to be nothing the media love more than figures and surveys which convey (apparently) simple messages" (Wormer, 2007, p. 391). The repetition of GSI's assertions about modern slavery, even when these assertions were marginal and without an explicit interpretative function, is nevertheless noteworthy. Indeed, it is tempting to think that their peripheral, synecdochically reduced, and echo-like character may mean that the index is largely inconsequential when it comes to the public discourse on issues such as modern slavery, human rights, or government responsibility, once it stops "being the news." Whether this is indeed the case—for this or any other ranking out there—is, however, an open empirical question.

¹⁸ The earlier-mentioned Financial Secrecy Index has a similar kind of measure as one of index's components, called "global scale weight." The measure is "attributed to each jurisdiction, and this is based on the assessment of the size of each jurisdiction's share of the global market for financial services provided to nonresident clients" (Cobham, Janský, & Meinzer, 2015, p. 292).

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Links to GSI reports

Global Slavery Index (2013)

Not available on the official website

https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/7905/pdf/1688_globalslaveryindex_2013_download_web1_original.pdf

Global Slavery Index (2014)

Not available on the official website

https://reporterbrasil.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/GlobalSlavery_2014_LR-FINAL.pdf

Global Slavery Index (2016)

<https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/resources/downloads/>

Global Slavery Index (2018)

<https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/resources/downloads/>

Appendix B. Count of media articles per country of outlet, per year, alphabetically

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Australia	2	1	4	3	2	7	2	5	26
Bangladesh		1				1	1	4	7
Cambodia					3				3
Canada		3		1	3	1	1	4	13
Germany			1						1
Ghana			2		4	2			8
Great Britain		7	7	2	6	1	3	7	33
Hong Kong		1			1		1	1	4
India		1	3	2	25	8	6	10	55
Ireland		1	2	1	3	1	1	3	12
Jamaica						1			1
Kenya					1			2	3
Malaysia					4	2	2	1	9
New Zealand					2	1	2	1	6
Nigeria					5	4	6	4	19
Pakistan		4	3	2	13	12	8	2	44
Philippines		1	5	3	2	4	3	2	20
Singapore				1	10	3	6	5	25
South Africa		2	3	2	6	4	6	8	31
Sri Lanka					1	1	1	1	4
Tanzania			1						1
Thailand			1						1
USA		9	5	1	8	2	4	6	35
Grand Total	2	32	37	18	99	55	53	66	361

Appendix C. Count of articles mentioning specific countries, per year, descending

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
India	2	21	24	6	64	23	17	11	168
Australia*	2	15	17	7	45	18	14	13	131
Pakistan		18	18	3	45	13	12	6	115
UK		11	9	2	27	19	21	26	115
USA	1	10	13	4	31	16	15	21	111
China		15	11	1	44	7	13	9	100
North Korea		1	3		37	3	9	6	59
Uzbekistan	2	3	10	1	36	3	3	1	59
Bangladesh		8	3		32	6	3	6	58
Nigeria		10	6		15	8	8	11	58
Mauritania	1	14	15	2	7	4	7	5	55
Cambodia		2	2		27	4	5	3	43
Russia		10	8	1	7	2	4	6	38
Qatar		3	8	2	15	2	1	4	35
Nepal	1	9	2	2	12	3	1	2	32
Iran		3	2		12		8	5	30
Haiti		13	7	1	5	3			29
France		3	1	4	3	4	5	4	24
Afghanistan		1	1		5	2	13	1	23
Netherlands		1	4		15		1	2	23
Eritrea		1			8		9	3	21
Central Afr. Rep.			3		8		9	1	21
Canada		4			6	1	4	6	21
Sweden		2	4		13		1		20
Norway		1	2		13		2		18
Ireland		5	5		5		1	1	17
New Zealand		1	1		8		2	1	13
Ethiopia		7			2		1	1	11
Iceland		5	4		2				11
Burundi			1		0		8	1	10
Japan			2		2		2	4	10
Germany		2	0		4	1	3		10
Denmark		1	0		8				9
Switzerland		1	2		5				8
Luxembourg		1	1		5				7
N = Documents	2	31	37	18	99	55	53	66	361

* Australia is frequently mentioned as the country of Walk Free Foundation.

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