

1 Increased carbon footprint of materials production driven by rise in
2 investments

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15 **The production of materials is an important source of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to**
16 **reduce emissions, policies aim to enhance material efficiency and the circular economy but**
17 **our understanding of the dynamics of material-related greenhouse gas emissions is limited.**
18 **Here, I quantify the greenhouse gas emissions from material production and the carbon**
19 **footprint of materials in industries that are the first users of materials, and in final**
20 **consumption, using in a multiregional input-output model of the global economy and the**
21 **hypothetical extraction method. From 1995 to 2015, greenhouse gas emissions from just**
22 **material production increased by 120%, with 11 billion tons CO₂-equivalent emitted in 2015.**
23 **As a proportion of global emissions, material production rose from 15 to 23%. China**
24 **accounted for 75% of the growth. In terms of the first use of materials, two fifths of the**
25 **carbon footprint of materials is attributed to construction, and two fifths to the**
26 **manufacturing of machinery, vehicles, and other durable products. Overall, the replacement**
27 **of existing or formation of new capital stocks now accounts for 60% of material-related**
28 **emissions. Policies that address the rapidly growing capital stocks in emerging economies**
29 **therefore offer the best prospect for emission reductions from material efficiency.**

30 It is now widely acknowledged that material production causes over half of greenhouse gas
31 (GHG) emissions from industry¹⁻⁴ and that material efficiency⁵⁻⁷ and the circular economy⁸⁻¹⁰
32 are important strategies to reduce those emissions. The International Energy Agency^{2,11} traces
33 energy use and direct emissions from production processes of high-volume materials—iron and
34 steel, cement, chemicals and petrochemicals, aluminium, and pulp and paper. Not all materials
35 are covered, emissions associated with non-energy inputs are ignored, and there is little
36 information on the use of materials in the economy.¹² Individual technology case studies, for

37 example, of buildings, infrastructure, and vehicles, show an important contribution of materials
38 to the life-cycle impact of those systems and indicate potential synergies and trade-offs
39 between energy and material efficiencies.^{4,13} The lack of a comprehensive understanding may
40 impair the development of material efficiency or circular-economy strategies for climate-
41 change mitigation¹².

42 Here, I present a first analysis of the contribution of material production to the carbon footprint
43 of products and final consumption between 1995 and 2015, analyze the use of materials by
44 downstream fabrication and manufacturing processes, and quantify the global GHG emissions
45 in the production of materials by type of material. On the basis of the system of national
46 economic and environmental accounts, data on economic activity, energy and material
47 conversion and use, and resulting emissions, researchers recently produced time series of
48 multiregional input-output (MRIO) tables.^{14–16} I used the method of hypothetical extraction
49 (HEM)^{17,18} to identify the contribution of materials in the upstream and downstream emission
50 accounts of a global MRIO. The applicability of HEM to global MRIO tables has not been
51 universally recognized.¹⁹ In the section Methods and Data, I show that HEM is indeed applicable
52 to global models and I provide a mathematical derivation of the determination of materials'
53 contribution to the footprint of other products and final consumption. The assessment
54 highlights the important contribution of materials that constitute the capital stock—machinery,
55 factories, and warehouses—to the carbon footprint of produced products and delivered
56 services, on the basis of a recently developed dataset for the endogenization of the
57 consumption of fixed capital.²⁰ Finally, the investigation of different final-demand categories

58 shows that capital formation is a more important final-demand driver than household or
59 government consumption.

60 In conventional footprint analysis, double counting is a serious issue that impacts the
61 usefulness of previous analyses, in particular for assessing the potential contribution of material
62 efficiency to lowering the carbon footprint of products.^{21,22} A recent proposal for correcting
63 such double counting was developed in the process of quantifying the carbon footprint of
64 Japan's material use^{23,24} and was extended to analyze the environmental and employment
65 impacts of global supply chains.²⁵ The present paper provides an independent derivation of the
66 suggested method^{23,25} to correct for double counting and extends it to downstream impacts.
67 Following the material efficiency literature,¹⁻⁶ this manuscript addresses structural and
68 functional materials used to compose products and excludes foodstuff, fuels, and chemicals.

69 **GHG emissions from global material production**

70 GHG emissions from material production increased by 120% from 5 billion metric tons CO₂
71 equivalent (GtCO₂e) in 1995 to 11Gt in 2015, raising their share of the global total from 15 to
72 23% (Fig. 1A). CO₂ equivalents are a metric for greenhouse gas emissions where the emissions
73 of methane, nitrous oxide and other minor greenhouse gases are converted to an equivalent
74 amount of CO₂ which would produce a comparable amount of climate forcing integrated over a
75 100-year time horizon. Iron and steel production caused 3.6 Gt CO₂e in 2011, the year with the
76 most reliable data. When corrected for the use of materials in the production of other
77 materials, this amounted to 31% (3.3 Gt) of all emissions caused by material production (Fig.1B,
78 Table 1). The next most important contributions were from cement, lime, and plaster

79 production with 24% and rubber and plastics including basic plastics with 13%. Non-ferrous
80 metals contributed 10%, and non-metallic mineral products contributed 14%, with glass alone
81 contributing 4% (Fig. ED1). Ignoring land-use-related emissions, including deforestation, pulp,
82 paper, and wood products, caused a total of 1 Gt (9%). Of these materials, the largest growth in
83 emissions was associated with glass; sand and clay; iron and steel; cement, lime and plaster;
84 lead, zinc, and tin; and other non-ferrous metal products, which all increased by 160–170% in
85 the period 1995–2015. The smallest growth was associated with paper, pulp, and wood
86 products, stone, copper, and precious metals, but of all materials, only paper increased by less
87 than the total global GHG emissions, 49%.²⁶

88 In 2011, GHG emissions from the production of materials were 10.8 GtCO₂e. Of these
89 emissions, 86% were CO₂, and the remainder was mostly methane associated with energy
90 supply. Direct emissions from material-producing sectors constituted 53% of the cradle-to-gate
91 emissions of the materials (Fig. 1A), a share that varied from 84% for cement to 11% for
92 aluminium (Table 1a). Energy supply to material production and other upstream activities
93 contributed 35% of the total, mining 2%, and other inputs 10%. Emissions associated with the
94 production of fuel and electricity used in mining and of other inputs were counted as energy-
95 sector emissions. If upstream energy were allocated to mining and other inputs, these would
96 contribute 3 and 36% of emissions, respectively, emphasizing the importance of a life-cycle
97 perspective when determining the emissions of material production.

98 **GHG emissions associated with various uses of materials**

99 The largest carbon footprints of materials in downstream production were those of cement,
100 lime, and plaster in construction (2.5 GtCO₂e in 2011) and of iron and steel used in
101 manufacturing (2.4 Gt). Building and construction was the top designation for other non-
102 metallic minerals including glass, as well as for wood, lead, zinc, and tin (Table 1b).
103 Manufacturing was the top destination for rubber and plastics, aluminium, copper, precious
104 metals, and other non-ferrous metals.

105 A more detailed breakdown reveals that iron and steel were used primarily in construction (a
106 carbon footprint of 0.75 Gt CO₂e), in the production of machinery (1.1 Gt), for fabricated metal
107 products (0.6 Gt), for motor vehicles (0.4 Gt), and for other transport equipment (0.2 Gt). Basic
108 plastics corresponding to 0.5 GtCO₂e were used in the production of rubber and plastics.
109 Rubber and plastics were used in machinery, motor vehicle and other transport equipment, and
110 final demand (ca. 0.2 Gt each).

111 When looking at the share of materials in the total carbon footprint of products delivered by
112 different sectors of the economy, materials contributed 70% to the carbon footprint of
113 construction (Table 2). High fractions were also obtained for electrical machinery and
114 equipment (64%), machinery (60%), and other transport equipment (58%). Materials
115 contributed 56% of the carbon footprint of vehicle production. Surprisingly, materials were
116 important for the carbon footprint of some services, contributing 43% to real estate services,
117 37% to computer services, 34% to post and telecommunications, and 23% to recreational,
118 cultural, and sporting organizations. For services, the use of buildings, equipment, and other
119 capital goods were important channels for materials to contribute to carbon footprints. For
120 example, materials in capital good contributed only 9% to the carbon footprint of construction

121 but 27% to the footprint of post and telecommunications (Table 2). Table 2 contains a
122 weighted global average multiplier of aggregated products, the share of direct emissions, and
123 material and non-material inputs, identified as intermediate or capital inputs.

124 **Final demand drivers of material production**

125 The immediate demand of materials is often to produce semi-finished products and capital
126 goods, which are then used further to produce consumer goods or services. The material-
127 related footprint of the final demand for services, of the final demand for manufactured
128 products, and of the net investment in additional buildings and infrastructure are 3GtCO₂e each
129 (Fig. 2A). For services, material-intensive capital goods such as buildings and vehicles are more
130 important than the intermediate input of materials to service production, as Table 2 shows. The
131 final demand for food (0.6 Gt), energy (0.2 Gt), and transport services (0.2 Gt) was less
132 important. Construction and machinery dominate investments, followed by vehicles and
133 electronics. In consumption, services have grown to be important, especially public
134 administration, health, and education.

135 The contribution of materials to the carbon footprint of consumption (and changes in stock and
136 valuables) grew from 4.1 to 7.3 GtCO₂e in the period 1995–2015, whereas their contribution to
137 net investment grew fourfold from 1.0 to 4.2 Gt (Figure 2). The carbon footprint of gross capital
138 formation, which includes all investment, grew from 3.6 to 9.4 Gt (Fig. ED3), surpassing that of
139 consumption. Gross capital formation is the sum of net capital formation and reinvestment to
140 replace capital which is being consumed (depreciated) in the process of production. Much of

141 the increase in the total emissions from materials production is hence connected to a growth of
142 net investment and the increasing importance of capital to industrial and service production.

143 **Rapid growth in emerging economies**

144 In 2015, slightly more than half of the emissions related to material production occurred in
145 China (Fig. ED2a). China quadrupled those emissions from 1995, while India and Brazil almost
146 tripled theirs. At the same time, the emissions in Canada, the European Union, Russia, and the
147 United States declined by up to one quarter. Part of the explanation lies in trade. When looking
148 at materials' contribution to the carbon footprint of countries consumption, only Russia saw a
149 significant decrease, the EU saw a slight decrease (-4%), Canada saw an increase by 30%, and
150 the US saw an increase by 9% (Fig. ED2b). As these post-industrial economies started importing
151 more manufactured products, they also outsourced material production, primarily to China (Fig.
152 ED2c). Net imports constituted one third of the material-related carbon footprint of the EU; net
153 exports amounted to 13% of China's material-related emissions and 18% of the emissions from
154 the BRITS (Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa).

155 Three quarters of the dramatic increase in emissions happened in China. China's net exports
156 rose moderately from 0.3 to 0.6 Gt and hence explains only a small portion of the growth.

157 Instead, it is China's investment-driven development that serves as explanation for this rapid
158 rise (Fig 2B): residential floor space increased from 10 to 30 m² per person,²⁷ and China built a
159 first-rate high-speed rail network and constructed many roads, bridges, ports, and factories.

160 Extending building lifetimes from 23 years to a more normal 60 years,²⁸ stopping building
161 unoccupied flats,²⁹ and shifting from construction and heavy industry to services³⁰ can

162 dramatically reduce material demand and its associated emissions. Light-weight designs³¹ and
163 low-carbon materials³² offer GHG mitigation options for countries entering phases of rapid
164 development, and improvements in reuse and recycling of materials have the largest
165 applicability in developed economies, which have the largest stocks of manufactured
166 capital.^{33,34}

167 China had been moving towards a service economy and had increased its efficiency.³⁰ Emissions
168 from cement production had stabilized. Current news, however, indicate that in light of the
169 COVID19-induced slump in the world economy, China has stimulated investment again,
170 resulting in a rising demand for iron ore on the world market. The overarching importance of
171 the role of investment confirms Müller et al.'s³³ notion of infrastructure and durable goods as
172 the main driver of material consumption and related GHG emissions, although the current
173 analysis also shows that the stock is not necessarily static and that consumption still plays an
174 important role. Similar build-ups of structures, transport systems, and factories are foreseeable
175 in regions such as India and sub-Saharan Africa, where population growth is still rapid, and
176 urbanization is at an earlier stage. Finding ways to urbanize and develop in a manner that relies
177 on less materials and building lighter structures and collective transportation systems are
178 potential approaches to reduce the material stock required for a modern society.^{34,35}

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269 **Author contributions**

270 EGH designed the research, conducted the calculations, interpreted the findings, and wrote the
271 manuscript.

272 **Competing interests**

273 The author declares no competing interests.

274 **Figure captions**

275 **Figure 1:** Greenhouse gas emissions from material production.

276 Three perspectives on the greenhouse emission of material production are shown: **(A)** by
277 emitting process, **(B)** by class of material, and **(C)** carbon footprint of materials by using
278 industry. Total emissions are measured in gigatons (petagrams) of CO₂ equivalent per year,
279 represented by the black line, which refers to the right y-axis. The 100-year global warming
280 potential was used to convert the climate forcing of greenhouse gases such as methane, nitrous
281 oxide, and carbon hexafluoride into an equivalent forcing by CO₂.

282 **Figure 2:** The material-related carbon footprint of final demand.

283 The portion of the carbon footprint of final demand that has been caused by materials,
284 organized by **(A)** product demanded and **(B)** country/region. Final demand consists of
285 consumption (by households, non-profits, and the government) and net investment (gross fixed

- 286 capital formation minus consumption of fixed capital). The regions represent the entire world;
- 287 BRITS is Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa. EU is the European Union.

288 Methods and Data

289 **Method choice.** The present work utilizes input-output methods which have long been used to
290 describe economic relations among sectors of the economy and have recently been shown to
291 be useful for environmental analysis, especially when national tables are combined with trade
292 data to construct a global table and when complemented by emission and resource-
293 consumption data. Such multiregional input-output tables are now the preferred tools for
294 material,^{36,37} carbon,³⁸ and other footprinting.³⁹ Alternatively, life-cycle inventory data could be
295 combined with material-consumption statistics to provide information on the impacts of
296 various materials, as it has been done for the global use of metals.^{40,41} Such an analysis could
297 correct for double counting, and with material-flow analysis, it could be extended to the use of
298 materials. It would be difficult to address the materials' contribution to the carbon footprints of
299 final or materials' share of emissions in the carbon footprint of other products.

300 **Data and scope.** The modeling is based on version 3.6 of the EXIOBASE multiregional input-
301 output (MRIO) database,^{14,42} in which different materials were detailed on the basis of data
302 from mineral statistics^{43,44} and IEA energy statistics.⁴⁵ EXIOBASE 3.6 represents the world
303 economy in 43 individual territories and 6 aggregated regions. CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel
304 combustion and industrial processes such as iron and clinker production, methane emissions
305 from agriculture and the energy system, and nitrous-oxide emissions from agriculture are the
306 most important sources of GHG emissions. Emissions from land-use change were not included,
307 because they cannot be clearly allocated to a specific production activity, and CO₂ absorption in
308 the growth of wood or through the carbonation of cement was ignored.⁴⁶ These omissions

309 result in potential errors connected to wood, pulp, and paper and an overestimate of the
310 climate impact of cement and plaster.

311 The production and the consumption of up to 200 products are modeled in each region,
312 including the following materials: Iron and steel; Aluminium; Copper; Precious metals; Lead,
313 zinc and tin; Other non-ferrous metals; Cement, lime, plaster; Stone; Sand and clay; Other non-
314 metallic minerals; Glass; Wood; Pulp; Paper; Rubber and plastic, Basic plastics. Note that this is
315 a product-by-product table; therefore, inputs are to production processes, not economic
316 sectors. The material-efficiency work by the IEA,¹¹ by comparison, addresses iron and steel,
317 aluminium, cement, pulp and paper, and chemicals. It specifies energy use but does not
318 quantify related or other upstream emissions. Other MRIO tables do not offer the level of detail
319 on different materials presented here, and plastics are commonly grouped with other
320 chemicals. Further, data on the consumption of capital are not available, making it impossible
321 to carry out the modelling presented here without more data development.

322 **Endogenization of capital.** The use of capital goods such as machinery, buildings, and vehicles
323 in the production of goods and services was included in the carbon-footprint assessment by
324 using the approach and data in Södersten et al.²⁰ In this methodology, the consumption of fixed
325 capital is treated as an input to production, with the required material demands, whereas the
326 gross fixed capital formation, which normally is treated as a category of final demand, is
327 replaced by the net fixed capital formation, reflecting only the investment above the
328 consumption of fixed capital, which can be seen as expanding production capacity. In this
329 manner, the carbon footprint of a product includes the emissions associated with producing the
330 machinery used in the product's production. The annual table is still balanced and reflects the

331 annual emissions, including those of material production. However, the disadvantage of this
332 approach is that the technology assumed to be used for producing the capital goods is the
333 current technology, their “carbon replacement value,”³³ and not the likely higher historical
334 costs. Alternative approaches in which emissions associated with current capital formation are
335 allocated to future years of capital utilization could remedy this problem⁴⁷ but do not yet offer
336 the same capital product detail utilized here. To investigate the importance of gross fixed
337 capital formation, the carbon footprint of gross fixed capital is also calculated (Fig. ED3), with
338 the total material-related carbon footprint of final consumption plus investment covering
339 emissions from material production in that year plus a representation of emissions of the
340 previous years associated with the capital consumed in the production of materials in the given
341 year.

342 **Input-output methods.** In an input-output table, the matrix A of input coefficients describes the
343 technology of the economy, with each column representing the intermediate inputs required to
344 produce a unit output of a product. The matrix Y represents the final demand for products, and
345 the vector x represents the production volume. The market balance in a closed or global
346 economy shows that the total output needs to satisfy both the required intermediate inputs
347 and the final consumption, $Ax + Yi = x$, where i is a vector of ones that sums over the
348 preceding matrix. This system of linear equations written in matrix notation can be solved for
349 the total production volume, yielding the Leontief demand-pull model, $x = (I - A)^{-1}y = Ly$,
350 where y is an arbitrary unit of final demand. L is the Leontief inverse, which specifies the
351 production volumes per unit final demand from each sector.

352 The matrix or row vector π represents the input of production factors (or value added), such as
353 capital, labour, and land, to produce a unit output in each sector. Together, A and π represent
354 the technology of the economy. The firm or production balance indicates that the price of each
355 product is the sum of the costs of intermediate inputs and the costs of factor inputs, or the
356 value added, per unit output. Writing this for each production process gives $pA + \pi = p$.
357 Solving for the price of goods, we obtain the Leontief price model, $p = \pi(I - A)^{-1} = \pi L$.

358 The emissions per unit output are contained in the matrix S (one line per pollutant) and are
359 weighted with the characterization vector c of 100-year global-warming potentials to obtain
360 CO₂ equivalent. The Leontief demand-pull model can be used to calculate the carbon-footprint
361 multiplier, that is, the cradle-to-gate GHG emissions to produce one unit of each product, $m =$
362 cSL . Note the similarity between the multiplier for emissions and the price. The total carbon
363 footprint of a final consumption basket y is given by $E = cSLy$. If y only describes final
364 consumption, there is no double counting, because all emissions are allocated to final
365 consumption.

366 This Leontief demand approach to the quantification of the cradle-to-gate environmental
367 impacts and carbon footprints is widely accepted and can be applied to any final product.^{15,16} It
368 could, in principle, also be applied to the materials in question. However, materials are required
369 to produce materials. In fact, there is very little final demand for materials; the final demand is
370 for products, including machinery and structures, made from materials and services created
371 with the help of these products. Accounting only for materials purchased by final consumers
372 would grossly underestimate the importance of materials for GHG emissions. An application of
373 the total Leontief multiplier to gross output (i.e., total material production) does not yield the

374 proper total environmental impacts²² because of double counting.^{21,22} The hypothetical
375 extraction method (HEM)^{17,48,49} offers a way in which the economy-wide impact of material
376 production (or any other intermediate inputs) can be estimated exactly while avoiding double
377 counting. It does so by quantifying the production volumes and emissions not related to
378 material production and by identifying the production activities and emissions related to
379 materials as the remainder.

380 HEM is used in regional and structural economics to study forward and backward linkages
381 among sectors, as well as the potential economic consequences of disasters and acts of
382 terror.^{17,18,48,50} Recently, Dietzenbacher, von Burken, and Kondo¹⁹ argued that HEM cannot be
383 used in global models, because the extracted product is often seen as being imported (e.g., see
384 Duarte et al.^{18,50} as well as Fig. ED4), and there is no place from which to import in a global model.
385 The following section shows that HEM can be applied broadly to any system for which the basic
386 input-output accounting identities and Leontief production functions hold. The extraction of a
387 sector is only hypothetical and provides an identification of relationships within the input-
388 output table. By implication, it also applies to global and multiregional models, where any
389 number of production processes, individual inputs, or a fraction thereof can be extracted.

390 **Hypothetical extraction method.** We would like to quantify the use of various production
391 processes x^o in the economy required to satisfy both the intermediate and final consumption of
392 a specific product, or group of products, signified by o . Further, we would like to quantify the
393 use of factors in the production of those goods, and the share of the cost/factors of producing o
394 in the price/factor requirements of other goods. Imagine now that we engage in an experiment
395 where we trace the expenditure on o through the value chain by splitting the input-output

396 description of the economy into two additive parts: one describing the complete production of
 397 intermediate and final demand for products o , including the production of products $* \notin o$
 398 serving as intermediate input to the production of o , and the other describing the final demand
 399 for the remaining products $*$ (Fig. ED4),

$$400 \quad A = A^* + A^o; y = y^* + y^o \quad (1)$$

401 where the production volume *not* involved with the production of o is given by

$$402 \quad A^* x^* + y^* = x^* \quad \rightarrow \quad x^* = (I - A^*)^{-1} y^* = L^* y^* \quad (2)$$

403 The Hypothetical Extraction theorem says that the output required to satisfy the intermediate
 404 and final demands for the extracted product, o , can be calculated as the difference in the
 405 production volume of the unperturbed system and the system where certain intermediate and
 406 final demand has been extracted.

$$407 \quad x^o = Ly - L^* y^* \quad (3)$$

408 Alternatively, the value can be identified as

$$409 \quad x^o = Ly^o + LA^o L^* y^* \quad (4)$$

410 and the two solutions can be shown to be equivalent because $LA^o L^* = L - L^*$. The
 411 identification of the production volume of extracted materials through eq. 4 corresponds to the
 412 identification of sectors by Cabernard et al.²⁵ based on the work of Dente et al.²³ It can be seen
 413 from eq. 3 that HEM avoids double counting.

414 The production balance eq.5a can be used to identify the contribution of the extracted
 415 products to the price of the non-extracted products (Fig. ED4). It can be solved using the
 416 solution to the production balance of the extracted products $p^o = \pi^o L$.

$$417 \quad p^* = p^* A^{* \cdot} + p^o A^o + \pi^* \quad (5a)$$

$$418 \quad p^* = \pi^* L^* + \pi^o LA^o L^* \quad (5b)$$

419 Here, the second term of the right-hand side of Leontief price model in eq. 5b represents the
 420 value added associated with producing the extracted inputs, i.e. the materials. For (1) and (2) to
 421 hold, $p^o = p^* = p$ and $\pi^o = \pi^* = \pi$. Given that emissions and other factor inputs can be
 422 treated in the same manner as the value added, the carbon footprint of material production in
 423 other products (y^*) is given by the multiplier

$$424 \quad m^o = sLA^o L^* = s(L - L^*) \quad (6)$$

425 Here $s = cS$, the GHG emissions in CO₂ equivalents per unit output.

426 To determine the total emissions associated with the production of extracted inputs, there are
 427 now two ways of calculating those. One is simply to multiply the production volume required to
 428 produce the extracted product by the respective factor coefficients.

$$429 \quad E^o = sx^o \quad (7a)$$

430 The second is to sum the respective multipliers over the final demand for extracted and non-
 431 extracted products.

$$432 \quad E^o = sLy^o + sLA^o L^* y^* \quad (7b)$$

433 The respective vector and matrix multiplications entail summations over contributions of
 434 different producing processes, trades, and final demands. It is of interest to distinguish these
 435 through a decomposition of the matrix multiplication. Γ symbolizes the decomposition of the
 436 total factor costs of producing the extracted product, here, the carbon footprint of materials.

437 $\Gamma^x = s\widehat{x}^o$ (8) by emitting process (Fig. 1A, Table 1a)

438 $\Gamma^{FU} = sL\widehat{y}^o + sLA^o\widehat{x}^*$ (9) by first use (Fig. 1C, Table 1b)

439 $\Gamma^y = sL\widehat{y}^o + sLA^oL^*\widehat{y}^*$ (10) by product in final consumption (Fig.2,
 440 Table 1c)

441 $\Gamma^M = \widehat{m}y^o + \widehat{m}A^oL^*y^*$ (11) by material (Fig. 1B)

442 Here, the entire production of material(s) j was extracted by setting all intermediate and final
 443 demand for both domestically produced and imported inputs to other sectors and the final
 444 demand to zero ($A_{j..}^* = 0; Y_{j..}^* = 0$). As Dietzenbacher and Lahr¹⁷ have shown, it is not necessary
 445 to set cells to zero, through partial extraction; one can also set them to a different value. One
 446 can also extract only a single input, such as the use of steel in the automotive industry, as long
 447 as eq. 1 holds.

448 *The identification of individual materials.* If a single material is extracted, other materials will
 449 have been used in its production, for example, steel and copper in the machinery and cement in
 450 the infrastructure. Some materials are intermediate stages to other materials, such as pulp for
 451 paper production. If all materials are extracted individually, the total emissions obtained by
 452 summing over the E^o for all materials will thus contain double counting. The next paragraph

453 describes a strategy to identify such interdependencies. To avoid double counting and correctly
454 estimate the emissions associated with each material going to the production of downstream
455 products and apart from the inputs of other assessed materials, eq. 11 was used for the case
456 where all materials have been extracted at the same time. The calculation method implies that
457 emissions during the production of zinc used as a steel alloy are counted as being part of the
458 carbon footprint of steel, not that of zinc, and the carbon footprint of zinc is only for zinc used
459 outside material production.

460 *Interdependencies of different materials* (Table S1). To determine the use of materials as direct
461 or indirect inputs in the production of other materials, a single line was added to the extension
462 matrix S for each material j , being unity for each production process of the respective material
463 and zero otherwise. With this S , equation (8) then yields the amount λ_{ij} of materials i required
464 to produce each individually extracted material j and λ_{ii} is the production volume of material i .
465 Table S1 contains the results for all materials. It displays interdependencies, such as the use of
466 most pulp for paper production or the use of nearly half of basic plastics in rubber and plastic
467 production. For most materials, on the order of 10–20% of the production volume is used in the
468 production of materials.

469 The analysis was conducted at the country/regional level, with each material being extracted in
470 all regions at once, and the results were aggregated to the global level.

471 **Uncertainty.** The present assessment of the carbon footprint of materials, the use of materials,
472 and the material-related component of the carbon footprint relies on a multiregional input-
473 output table constructed for this type of analysis. Different MRIO tables have been constructed

474 by using different principles and data sources, yielding different results in footprint studies.⁵¹
475 Significant sources of uncertainty are related to the assumed homogeneity of products or
476 sectors and related to that, the aggregation of products,⁵² and the uncertainty in the emissions
477 data. By using a Monte Carlo analysis of country-level consumption-based carbon-emission
478 accounts across different MRIO databases, Rodrigues et al.⁵³ find a coefficient of variation (CV,
479 normalized standard deviation) of 2–16% across countries. They find much higher product-level
480 uncertainty ranging from 10 to 200%, depending on the product. Similar uncertainties apply to
481 the results reported in this manuscript, with higher relative uncertainties for smaller production
482 volumes. We cannot necessarily assume that the uncertainties of individual-country products
483 are independent from each other; there may be issues associated with the collection of energy-
484 use data or the disaggregation procedure which afflict all estimates for a specific material in the
485 same manner.⁵³ Uncertainties for the most recent years are higher than those up to 2011;
486 indeed, the input-output tables were detailed on the basis of a set of assumptions and
487 preliminary data, because final national-account data were not yet available.

488 Nuss and Eckelman⁴⁰ projected the carbon footprint of global metal consumption in 2008 by
489 using life cycle assessment (LCA) data and global production volumes of metals. They estimated
490 3.1 GtCO_{2e}, compared to 3.7 estimated in this work. The contribution of iron and steel,
491 aluminium, and other metals was 2.4, 0.4, and 0.3 Gt, respectively, compared to 2.8, 0.5, and
492 0.4 in the present paper. Although the widely acknowledged issue of cut-off errors in LCA would
493 offer a convenient explanation, there can be many other causes for this discrepancy. Yet the
494 comparison provides some comfort that the first significant figure is correct.

495 **Data availability**

496 A public version of EXIOBASE 3 is available on Zenodo,
497 <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3583071>. The public version differs slightly from the version
498 that was used in the present research, which makes use of proprietary third-party energy data
499 from the International Energy Agency (IEA). The private version of the data is available from the
500 author upon request by anybody who has obtained a license to the IEA Energy Statistics and
501 Energy Balances.

502

503 **Code availability**

504 MatLab code is available on Zenodo, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4280697>

505

506 **Methods and Data References**

507

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Tables

Table 1: Cradle-to-gate emissions of greenhouse gases associated with the production of materials in 2011. The share is always the share of total emissions shown in the top line. Emissions are split by (a) location where emissions occur (similar to scope 1, 2, and 3 in the Greenhouse Gas Protocol), (b) the sector buying the materials (first user), and (c) the final product that consumers purchase or companies invest in.

	Iron & steel	Aluminium	Other metals	Cement	Glass	Other minerals	Wood products	Plastic & rubber
GHG emissions (Gt CO ₂ e)	3.3	0.58	0.49	2.6	0.42	1.0	0.97	1.4
(a) Location of Emissions								
Material production	48%	11%	28%	84%	25%	42%	33%	10%
Energy	38%	62%	33%	12%	48%	38%	39%	57%
Mining	2%	2%	13%	1%	2%	10%	1%	1%
Products and services	12%	25%	26%	3%	25%	10%	27%	33%
(b) Use of Materials by Industry								
Construction	23%	5%	25%	94%	37%	70%	20%	10%
Machinery, incl. electrical	32%	47%	32%	0%	10%	4%	3%	14%
Fabricated metal products	19%	19%	16%	0%	3%	1%	1%	2%
Transport equipment	14%	10%	3%	0%	8%	2%	2%	12%
Electronics	2%	5%	5%	0%	6%	1%	3%	8%
Other products	3%	10%	9%	1%	18%	7%	32%	25%
Services	2%	1%	3%	2%	11%	5%	19%	11%
Final Consumption	4%	3%	7%	2%	7%	10%	21%	17%
(c) Carbon footprint of Materials in Final Consumption and Net Capital Formation								
Food	5%	5%	5%	4%	9%	4%	11%	8%
Clothing	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	4%
Shelter	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	3%	6%	4%
Construction	23%	16%	27%	49%	32%	43%	10%	10%
Transport equipment	11%	10%	6%	2%	6%	4%	3%	9%
Machinery, incl. electrical	15%	20%	14%	2%	6%	6%	3%	7%
Electronics	4%	5%	5%	2%	5%	3%	3%	5%
Other manufactured products	7%	9%	8%	3%	6%	4%	23%	21%

Public adm., health, education	15%	16%	15%	15%	17%	16%	22%	18%
Real estate services	6%	6%	6%	8%	6%	6%	5%	5%
Transport services	3%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%
Other services	8%	8%	7%	9%	7%	7%	9%	8%

Table 2: Sale-weighted average multipliers of aggregate global sector output at the 17-sector aggregation level, specifying the source of emissions as a share of the multiplier: direct emissions of the sector in question, intermediate inputs and consumption of fixed capital, each separated into material and non-material components.

GHG emissions multiplier	Absolute	Direct	Inputs		Capital	
			Material	Non-material	Material	Non-material
kg CO ₂ e/EUR						
Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing	2,6	66 %	1 %	27 %	3 %	3 %
Mining & quarrying	2,3	68 %	7 %	18 %	5 %	2 %
Food production, beverages & tobacco	1,4	11 %	6 %	74 %	5 %	4 %
Textiles, leather & wearing apparel	1,5	13 %	10 %	64 %	8 %	4 %
Petroleum, chemicals & non-metallic mineral products	2,2	32 %	26 %	34 %	6 %	2 %
Electrical & machinery	1,1	5 %	45 %	34 %	12 %	5 %
Transport equipment	0,9	5 %	45 %	33 %	11 %	5 %
Manufacturing & recycling	1,3	18 %	27 %	42 %	9 %	4 %
Electricity, gas & water	8,4	74 %	1 %	22 %	2 %	1 %
Construction	1,1	4 %	62 %	22 %	9 %	3 %
Sale, maintenance & repair of vehicles; fuel; trade; hotels & restaurants	0,3	13 %	6 %	47 %	20 %	13 %
Transport	1,0	46 %	4 %	36 %	8 %	6 %

Post & telecommunications	0,3	9 %	7 %	31 %	27 %	25 %
Financial intermediation & business activity	0,4	12 %	9 %	36 %	26 %	17 %
Public administration; education; health; recreation; other services	0,5	13 %	11 %	53 %	14 %	9 %